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The OIG Report Into Jeffrey Epstein's Death: Conclusions And Recommendations (Chapter 7) (Part 4) · The Vault: The Epstein Files

• 0:00
  Speaker 1: What's up everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
• 0:04
  We're going to pick up where we left off in
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  the last episode, and that's with Chapter seven, Section four.
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  Clearing the ten PM institutional count knowing that it was inaccurate.
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  The OIG's Investigation and Review determined that on August ninth,
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  twenty nineteen, MCC new York staff cleared the ten PM
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  institutional count knowing that the inmate count from two housing
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  units were inaccurate. BOP policy and New York Shoe post
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  orders require that coos conducting an institutional count relay the
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  count verbally to the control Center, which maintains the master
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  count of all inmates. If account reported verbally does not
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  match the master count, the control center must notify the
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  Operations Lieutenant and the staff members must recount the inmates.
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  Mcc new York Shoe post orders further provide that count
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  slips which appear to be altered will not be accepted.
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  As discussed previously, the OIG determined that an internal transfer
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  of an inmate, Inmate four from the Shoe to receiving
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  and discharge on August ninth, was not documented appropriately at
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  the time of the transfer. The failure of the document transfer,
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  along with the Shoe staff not conducting the required inmate counts,
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  resulted in the mcc New York Control Center receiving account
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  slip from the Shoe with an incorrect number of inmates
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  identified as being present within the shoe at the ten
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  pm institutional count. During his OIG interview, Senior Officer Specialist six,
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  who was assigned to the Control Center, admitted that he
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  amended the ten PM count slips he received from the
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  Shoe and receiving in discharge an attempt to reflect the
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  correct number of inmates in the shoe following the internal
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  inmate transfer that resulted in a Shoe inmate in May
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  four being moved to receiving in discharge earlier in the day.
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  Senior Officer Specialist six acknowledged that he should have requested
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  a recount from the Shoe, but instead he cleared the
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  ten PM count. Senior Officer Specialist six explained that the
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  actions he took was known as ghost counting, something he
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  said he would not have done without authorization from the
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  Operations Lieutenant or someone of a higher rank than himself.
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  The morning Watch Operations Lieutenant denied having authorized a ghost count,
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  and we found no evidence to corroborate Senior Officer Specialist
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  six claim that the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant knew of
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  and approved the false count. The OIG found that Senior
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  Specialist six modified the count slips received from the shoe
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  and receiving in discharge, failed to request a recount of
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  the shoe inmates, and cleared the ten PM institutional caut
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  knowing that it was inaccurate and violation of BOP policy
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  and mcc new York Shoe Post Orders Part five failure
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  to adequately supervised shoe staff and conduct lieutenant rounds. The
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  OIG also found that mcc new York supervisory personnel failed
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  to effectively perform their duties, which contributed to the fact
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  that Epstein was unobserved for many hours before his death.
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  As discussed above, federal regulations require that mcc new York
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  supervisory personnel put forth honest effort in performance of their duties,
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  which includes appropriate supervision of shoe personnel. Additionally, BOP policy
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  requires that a lieutenant visit the shoe during each shift
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  to ensure that all procedures are being followed. The OIG's
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  investigation revealed that the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant and the
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  morning Watch Operations Lieutenant had oversight of the shoe during
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  their respective shifts. The evening Watch Operations Lieutenant told the
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  OIG that on August ninth, twenty nineteen, he did not
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  supervise the four pm count or conduct any rounds in
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  the shoe. He acknowledged that he signed some of the
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  pages of the four pm count, but he did not
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  sign all of the pages as he should have. Beginning
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  at ten pm on August ninth, the morning Watch Operations
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  Lieutenant was the sole supervisor overseeing the shoe. The morning
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  Watch Operations Lieutenant told the OIG that she noticed an
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  error in the twelve am count on August tenth, which
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  was due to shoe staff, including in May four who
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  had been internally transferred to receiving in discharge, among the
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  inmates in the shoe. According to the morning Watch Operations lieutenant,
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  the shoe staff should have conducted another count and submitted
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  a new count slip, but she did not know if
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  they actually did so. During her shift, the morning Watch
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  Operations Lieutenant conducted one round in the shoe at approximately
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  four am on August tenth. The OIG's review of the
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  available shoe security camera video revealed that the morning Watch
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  Operations Lieutenant was present in the shoe for approximately seven minutes,
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  during which time she conferred with Noel and Thomas, who
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  were seated at and around the shoe officer's station in
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  the common area of the shoe. The morning Watch Operations
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  Lieutenant told the OIG that she was not required to
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  visit each tier or go to each individual cell during
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  a lieutenant round, but rather the purpose of the lieutenant
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  round was for her to speak with the officers on duty.
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  This description of a lieutenant round is inconsistent with the
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  statements of many of the supervisors and BOP lieutenant training,
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  all of which emphasized the need for lieutenants to walk
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  down all of the shoe tears during around. During their
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  interviews with the OIG, the Northeast Regional Director Bill Warden,
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  Associate Warden I, and the Captain clarified that they expected
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  a lieutenant conducting around in the shoe to check in
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  with the officers, walk down each of the tiers in
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  the shoe, speak with the inmates, and address inmate concerns.
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  They explained that the lieutenants did not act responsibly if
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  they did not walk down each of the tears to
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  check on the inmates in the shoe, as the acting
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  Evening Watch Activities Lieutenant explained, unlike inmates in general population,
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  shoe inmates cannot approach a supervisor because they are confined
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  within a cell. Further, the GOP lieutenant training which the
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  Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant attended in twenty eleven, taught the
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  operations lieutenants were required to visit the shoe at least
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  once during each shift, and that this visit it will
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  be substantially more than just entering the unit, signing the logbook,
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  and talking with staff. Instead, operations lieutenants were trained to,
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  among other things, walk through each range or tier, inspect
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  logs and reports, observe activities, and periodically observe counts within
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  the shoe. The OIG found that the failure of the
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  Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant and the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant
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  to adequately supervise shoe staff, and of the Morning Watch
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  Operations Lieutenant to adequately conduct the lieutenant round in the Shoe,
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  which contributed to the shoe staff's failure to conduct mandatory
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  rounds and counts, constituted a job performance failure. Part c
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  mcc New York staff allowed Epstein to place an unmonitored
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  telephone call on August ninth. The OIG's investigation and review
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  revealed that on the night before death, Epstein placed an unrecorded,
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  unmonitored telephone call using a non inmate telephone system line
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  from six fifty eight pm to seven nineteen pm. Other
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  than an mcc New York call log, no other BOP
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  records exist regarding this unmonitored call, including the identity of
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  the person Epstein called, or a summary of the conversation.
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  Federal regulations require that the warden of each BOP institution
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  established procedures to monitor inmate telephone conversations, which is done
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  to preserve the security and orderly management of the institution
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  and to protect the public. For safety and security reasons,
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  BOP policy requires that all inmate telephone calls be made
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  through the inmate telephone system. BOP policy recognizes that, on
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  rare occasion, in times of crisis, inmates may be permitted
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  to make a telephone call outside of the inmate telephone system.
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  In such circumstances, the telephone must be placed in a
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  secure area eg. A locked office, and must be set
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  to record telephone calls. Additionally, the staff members coordinating the
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  call must notify the BOPS Special Investigative Services via email,
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  providing the inmates name and register number, the date and
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  time of the call, the number and name of the
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  individual called, and the reason for the call. The Special
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  Investigative Services must enter this information into the telephone recording
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  system within seven days. The OIG's investigation determined that on
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  August ninth, twenty nineteen, Epstein asked to call his mother.
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  The unit manager told the OIG that after Epstein's attorney
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  visited had concluded, he agreed to allow Epstein to place
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  a telephone call on an unrecorded legal line. The unit
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  manager explained that it was his understanding that Epstein did
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  not have the ability to place a telephone call through
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  the Inmate telephone system. The OIG's investigation established both that
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  Epstein's mother was deceased at the time he asked a telephoner,
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  and that Epstein had been assigned the necessary documentation that
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  would have allowed him to place calls through the Inmate
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  telephone system, although he did not take the necessary steps
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  to complete the setup process that would have given him
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  the ability to place calls through that system. The captain
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  told the OIG that when the unit manager was escorting
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  Epstein from his attorney visit back to the shoe and
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  epstein requested call was discussed, he told the unit manager
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  that Epstein's telephone call had to be monitored and logged.
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  The unit manager told the OIG that he escorted Epstein
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  from his attorney visit to the shower area of the shoe,
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  where he connected a telephone into an unrecorded legal line
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  and dialed the phone number provided by Epstein. The unit
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  manager said that when a mail answered the call, he
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  handed the telephone to Epstein and then left mcc New
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  York for the day because his shift had ended. Before
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  leaving the shoe, the unit manager said he told the
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  evening watch shoe officer in charge, the material handler, and Noel,
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  who were at the shoe officer's station, to make sure
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  Epstein got his fifteen minutes on the telephone, but he
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  did not instruct them to monitor the telephone call. The
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  unit manager admitted that he did not verify the recipient
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  of the telephone call, and that neither he nor anyone
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  monitored or logged the telephone call as required. The OIG
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  found that the unit manager violated BOP policy by allowing
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  Epstein to make an unrecorded, end unmonitored telephone call, and
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  by failing to verify the telephone call recipient, monitor and
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  log the call. We further found that the unit manager
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  exercised poor judgment when he left New York while Epstein
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  was still on the telephone call that the unit manager
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  had arranged, and failed to instruct the evening watch shoe
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  officer in charge the material handler or NOEL, to monitor
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  the call. All Right, so we're gonna wrap it there, folks,
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  and when we pick up in the next episode, we're
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  going to look at part D. Mcc New York staff
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  failed to conduct and document cell searches and eliminate safety
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  hazards in epstein cell on August ninth, leaving Epstein with
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  excessive linens in his cell. All of the information that
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  goes with this episode can be found in the description
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  box