Latest / Faster, Please! — The Podcast / 📈 How economic growth can defeat authoritarianism: My interview with Dalibor Rohac, author of ‘Unshackled’
Transcript
- 0:00SPEAKER_01: Welcome to Faster Please!, the podcast, the audio-visual companion of my Faster Please!
- 0:04SPEAKER_01: Newsletter.
- 0:05SPEAKER_01: I'm your host, Jim Pethokoukis.
- 0:07SPEAKER_01: My guest this episode is Dalibor Rojaj.
- 0:10SPEAKER_01: Dalibor is a Director of Global Research at GlobSec and
- 0:13SPEAKER_01: a long-time Senior Research Fellow at International Relations at the University
- 0:17SPEAKER_01: of Buckingham.
- 0:18SPEAKER_01: Recently,
- 0:19SPEAKER_01: he wrote a great book called Unshackled,
- 0:21SPEAKER_01: which focuses on how economic power is inseparable from geopolitical strength.
- 0:26SPEAKER_01: Today, we talk about that book,
- 0:28SPEAKER_01: what will determine U.S.
- 0:29SPEAKER_01: economic strength decades from now,
- 0:31SPEAKER_01: and whether the economic challenges facing the West today are really tougher than
- 0:35SPEAKER_01: the ones it's faced in the past.
- 0:38SPEAKER_01: Hope you enjoy it.
- 0:40SPEAKER_01: Albor, welcome to the podcast.
- 0:42SPEAKER_00: Thanks for having me.
- 0:43SPEAKER_01: Now, the book is called, Unshackled, How Economic Growth Can Defeat the World's Dictators.
- 0:49SPEAKER_01: And having written a book myself, there was a lot of back and forth about the title.
- 0:53SPEAKER_01: And when I read sort of the,
- 0:55SPEAKER_01: I guess the subtitle of the book,
- 0:57SPEAKER_01: in my mind,
- 0:58SPEAKER_01: what I hear,
- 0:59SPEAKER_01: like in my brain, I hear,
- 1:01SPEAKER_01: how economic growth in the West can defeat the world's dictators
- 1:06SPEAKER_01: and stop authoritarianism from rising in the West.
- 1:12SPEAKER_01: I feel like,
- 1:14SPEAKER_01: A little bit like that's what you're saying,
- 1:18SPEAKER_01: and that you see the West,
- 1:21SPEAKER_01: I guess,
- 1:21SPEAKER_01: broadly on a worrisome path,
- 1:25SPEAKER_01: which is not only worrisome for the countries of the West,
- 1:27SPEAKER_01: and we can talk about what the West means in a bit,
- 1:30SPEAKER_01: worrisome for the West, but also worrisome for the world in general.
- 1:34SPEAKER_00: I think that's a fair summary.
- 1:36SPEAKER_00: So first on the subject of the title,
- 1:40SPEAKER_00: I started with something completely different,
- 1:43SPEAKER_00: something that had to do with the new Cold War.
- 1:46SPEAKER_00: And I showed it to a couple of people, including friends of ours at the ER.
- 1:50SPEAKER_00: And they were very dismissive,
- 1:51SPEAKER_00: so they sent me back to the drawing board and the best I could come up
- 1:56SPEAKER_00: with was this kind of two-path title with Unshackled providing the kind
- 2:03SPEAKER_00: of initial pitch and the subheader providing a sort of slightly expanded version of
- 2:09SPEAKER_00: the argument.
- 2:10SPEAKER_00: In the end, it is an argument that has a sort of domestic component to it.
- 2:16SPEAKER_00: It has a geopolitical component to it.
- 2:18SPEAKER_00: I mean, it's a little kind of unwieldy to put into a 30-second elevator pitch.
- 2:25SPEAKER_00: But I think there are two parts to it.
- 2:27SPEAKER_00: One is just how powerful is the collective West in the United States
- 2:31SPEAKER_00: and how good Steward, are we of that power?
- 2:36SPEAKER_00: And are we using it wisely or not?
- 2:39SPEAKER_00: And the answer to the first question is relatively straightforward and somewhat optimistic.
- 2:43SPEAKER_00: The answer to the second question,
- 2:45SPEAKER_00: I think,
- 2:46SPEAKER_00: is somewhat more concerning and it's a call to action,
- 2:52SPEAKER_00: if you will, for people of goodwill on both sides of the political spectrum.
- 3:00SPEAKER_01: I raise the issue, maybe we'll take a step back, of the West.
- 3:06SPEAKER_01: What is the West?
- 3:08SPEAKER_01: I guess, growing up in the Cold War, I thought of the West as basically NATO.
- 3:14SPEAKER_01: It was the United States,
- 3:15SPEAKER_01: it was Western Europe, and I guess you could include Japan, but that was the West.
- 3:20SPEAKER_01: What is the West today?
- 3:24SPEAKER_00: So it's very much a contested concept.
- 3:30SPEAKER_01: Is Ukraine part of the West?
- 3:34SPEAKER_00: Right.
- 3:34SPEAKER_00: And so I think actually that's the question that's being kind of resolved on
- 3:38SPEAKER_00: the battlefields of Ukraine right now.
- 3:40SPEAKER_00: So, you know,
- 3:41SPEAKER_00: Ukraine,
- 3:41SPEAKER_00: should it lose the war,
- 3:43SPEAKER_00: might end up being peeled away from the West and might end up in a very sad spot,
- 3:48SPEAKER_00: if you But should it be able to defend itself,
- 3:53SPEAKER_00: I think it would be part of the collective West.
- 3:55SPEAKER_00: For me, the West is not defined geographically,
- 3:58SPEAKER_00: it's not defined in ethnic terms, it's not defined in cultural terms.
- 4:04SPEAKER_00: Substack, Substack, James Pethokoukis, jamespethokoukis, jamespethokoukis.
- 4:19SPEAKER_00: As meaningful the distinction between autocracy and liberal democracy,
- 4:23SPEAKER_00: between free markets and state capitalism or planned economy.
- 4:28SPEAKER_00: And I think countries that do have those sort of institutions that have enabled the
- 4:34SPEAKER_00: The rise of the West,
- 4:37SPEAKER_00: places like the UK and the United States,
- 4:41SPEAKER_00: and the opening up of our political systems,
- 4:44SPEAKER_00: they can be in Asia,
- 4:45SPEAKER_00: there's Japan,
- 4:45SPEAKER_00: there's South Korea,
- 4:47SPEAKER_00: there's Australia,
- 4:48SPEAKER_00: and I think they are very much part of As much as we are here in Europe or in
- 4:53SPEAKER_00: the United States.
- 4:55SPEAKER_00: And in a way,
- 4:57SPEAKER_00: there is a battle that is geopolitical between the collective West
- 5:01SPEAKER_00: and our adversaries that I expand on in the book.
- 5:04SPEAKER_00: Russia, China, Iran,
- 5:07SPEAKER_00: North Korea,
- 5:07SPEAKER_00: I think have an ambition to scale back the power of the collective West,
- 5:12SPEAKER_00: but we are simultaneously having a sort of battle inside the West
- 5:16SPEAKER_00: about what it means to be a liberal democracy and what it means to govern.
- 5:20SPEAKER_01: Is Taiwan a member of the West?
- 5:21SPEAKER_00: From my perspective, it is.
- 5:23SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
- 5:23SPEAKER_00: I mean, the problem, of course, is it's not formally part of our alliance system.
- 5:28SPEAKER_00: There are these sort of questions about its recognition as part of the part of the UN system.
- 5:34SPEAKER_00: But to me, and I have never been to Taiwan.
- 5:37SPEAKER_00: But everybody who visits Taiwan is really impressed by the dedication of
- 5:41SPEAKER_00: the Taiwanese to their democracy,
- 5:43SPEAKER_00: to their freedom,
- 5:45SPEAKER_00: to the external innovation that they have pursued within their political system as
- 5:49SPEAKER_00: a solution to the internal political divisions and troubles.
- 5:54SPEAKER_00: There's a lot of that Taiwan has to teach the rest of the world when it comes
- 5:58SPEAKER_00: to technology, when it comes to democratic governance as well.
- 6:04SPEAKER_01: Certainly for Not to sort of place myself in sort of the center of this debate,
- 6:08SPEAKER_01: but throughout my life,
- 6:12SPEAKER_01: at least when I understood the wider world, the West has sort of been on the march.
- 6:21SPEAKER_01: Has the West ever shrunk?
- 6:26SPEAKER_01: You mentioned peeling off Ukraine.
- 6:29SPEAKER_01: Has any Western country ever been peeled off and become a non- So for that
- 6:35SPEAKER_01: to happen, whether it is Ukraine,
- 6:38SPEAKER_01: and you can argue,
- 6:39SPEAKER_01: I would argue is now certainly part of the West,
- 6:41SPEAKER_01: or Taiwan, which I would get like, that to me, that would be a historic moment.
- 6:49SPEAKER_01: And you can argue that whether it is or isn't.
- 6:51SPEAKER_01: So not only do I think that'd be a historic moment, I think it would be a very bad moment.
- 6:56SPEAKER_00: What we've seen in my lifetime was obviously the expansion of liberal democracy
- 7:00SPEAKER_00: and freedom,
- 7:01SPEAKER_00: the fall of communism in Eastern Europe,
- 7:03SPEAKER_00: the absorption of these countries into the EU and NATO.
- 7:07SPEAKER_00: More recently, there have been backsliding, right?
- 7:09SPEAKER_00: So there have been questions about the place of Hungary.
- 7:11SPEAKER_00: We see these worrisome trends.
- 7:41SPEAKER_00: They're not necessarily irreversible and many of them actually are unfolding within
- 7:45SPEAKER_00: the countries of the West.
- 7:46SPEAKER_00: I mean, we'll have consequential elections in European countries next year.
- 7:52SPEAKER_00: We might have some of these populist challenges.
- 7:57SPEAKER_00: We might also see them governing much in the way Viktor Orban governed
- 8:02SPEAKER_00: and perhaps some of those trajectories will end up in unhappy places for the future.
- 8:10SPEAKER_00: For the Western Alliance.
- 8:13SPEAKER_00: And to me,
- 8:13SPEAKER_00: I think the most consequential of those obviously is,
- 8:15SPEAKER_00: is the path followed by the United States.
- 8:17SPEAKER_00: Like we are the most powerful country of this system.
- 8:20SPEAKER_00: I mean, it's,
- 8:20SPEAKER_00: I think it's a big,
- 8:22SPEAKER_00: big and very much an open question whether the Alliance system is correct.
- 8:25SPEAKER_00: So I think the stakes in the US are just much higher than anywhere else.
- 8:28SPEAKER_00: I think we can deal with...
- 8:44SPEAKER_00: You know, troubled democracy in Hungary or democratic backsliding in Turkey.
- 8:49SPEAKER_00: I guess Turkey would be one of those cases where there has been a sort
- 8:53SPEAKER_00: of significant shift away from the Western Alliance and away from democracy.
- 8:59SPEAKER_00: But if we see a similar shift sustain itself in the United States,
- 9:03SPEAKER_00: I think the world will be in a lot more trouble, even relative to the status quo.
- 9:10SPEAKER_01: I want to get that.
- 9:12SPEAKER_01: But before we do, I...
- 9:15SPEAKER_01: Again, for most of my life,
- 9:16SPEAKER_01: it seemed obvious that it was a good thing that
- 9:24SPEAKER_01: the number of people living
- 9:27SPEAKER_01: in either a liberal democracy or in countries that would certainly seem to be on
- 9:31SPEAKER_01: that path,
- 9:32SPEAKER_01: that that was inherently a good thing that would make a safer,
- 9:36SPEAKER_01: more prosperous world.
- 9:38SPEAKER_01: I think there are certainly people in the United States
- 9:42SPEAKER_01: who don't necessarily Think that's true.
- 9:46SPEAKER_01: Don't care if that's true.
- 9:47SPEAKER_01: Don't think it really matters what the government of Hungary is,
- 9:51SPEAKER_01: or don't think it really matters if the government of Italy, that we're fine.
- 9:59SPEAKER_01: I mean, that as long as we have a booming economy here and we're spending money
- 10:03SPEAKER_01: in defense here,
- 10:04SPEAKER_01: what happens in the rest of the world,
- 10:08SPEAKER_01: as long as we can sell them stuff, it doesn't matter.
- 10:12SPEAKER_00: I mean, it's one of those kind of long term back and forth within
- 10:16SPEAKER_00: the American public debate, right?
- 10:19SPEAKER_00: Since the inception,
- 10:20SPEAKER_00: the United States was sort of founded on this tension between how much of a role in
- 10:26SPEAKER_00: the international There was President Washington's farewell address that cautioned
- 10:32SPEAKER_00: against entangling alliances with European nations,
- 10:36SPEAKER_00: and then a few years later you had the United States policing the Mediterranean
- 10:40SPEAKER_00: and fighting wars.
- 10:42SPEAKER_00: And in the 19th century, I mean,
- 10:45SPEAKER_00: the United States obviously dealt with lots of internal issues,
- 10:51SPEAKER_00: wasn't really sort of looking across the ocean necessarily,
- 10:55SPEAKER_00: but you already had a movement I think it was very much present in
- 11:00SPEAKER_00: the public debate throughout America's existence.
- 11:12SPEAKER_00: It kind of goes back and forth.
- 11:13SPEAKER_00: I think the important distinguishing fact about the present day is that,
- 11:17SPEAKER_00: whereas in earlier days,
- 11:20SPEAKER_00: people did not necessarily look for U.S.
- 11:21SPEAKER_00: leadership,
- 11:22SPEAKER_00: we've now built this infrastructure,
- 11:25SPEAKER_00: this system of alliances,
- 11:26SPEAKER_00: international institutions,
- 11:28SPEAKER_00: trading system that kind of relies on us kind of underwriting it.
- 11:32SPEAKER_00: And as Bob Kagan from Brookings said,
- 11:35SPEAKER_00: It is simply true that America is just too big for the world and
- 11:41SPEAKER_00: the world is too small for America to be able to effectively disentangle itself
- 11:46SPEAKER_00: from what's happening elsewhere.
- 11:48SPEAKER_00: And so, yes, there's very little in terms of direct security threats.
- 11:52SPEAKER_00: I mean,
- 11:53SPEAKER_00: it's difficult to invade the United States from the outside and we are lucky to have
- 11:57SPEAKER_00: the sort of neighbors that we have, both to the south and to the north.
- 12:02SPEAKER_00: But we can't extricate ourselves from what's happening in the world.
- 12:06SPEAKER_00: And I think the case of the First World War and the Second World War are kind
- 12:10SPEAKER_00: of demonstrations of that.
- 12:11SPEAKER_00: We try to stay out.
- 12:13SPEAKER_00: In the first case, we just found it intolerable that freedom of navigation was being extricated.
- 12:17SPEAKER_00: And so I think the lesson that
- 12:32SPEAKER_00: That those generations learned was the correct one that is much easier
- 12:36SPEAKER_00: and much cheaper to sustain the system of alliances and tripwires and invest
- 12:41SPEAKER_00: into relationships with allies that can prevent these threats from rising
- 12:45SPEAKER_00: than having to do the firefighting on that massive industrial scale that we had
- 12:50SPEAKER_00: to both in 1917 and later in the Second World War.
- 12:57SPEAKER_01: As you write in the book,
- 12:58SPEAKER_01: sort of the West's,
- 13:00SPEAKER_01: the secret sauce of our success is,
- 13:03SPEAKER_01: you know,
- 13:05SPEAKER_01: maybe not a surprising list of people,
- 13:07SPEAKER_01: but liberal democracy,
- 13:08SPEAKER_01: rule of law,
- 13:09SPEAKER_01: openness to trade,
- 13:10SPEAKER_01: immigration,
- 13:13SPEAKER_01: a relationship with each other that is about shared values,
- 13:17SPEAKER_01: not just sort of extraction, you know, what we can get from each other.
- 13:21SPEAKER_01: That list,
- 13:22SPEAKER_01: all of those things,
- 13:23SPEAKER_01: we'll start with the United States,
- 13:25SPEAKER_01: all of those things seem to be on the retreat and not valued the way they were
- 13:32SPEAKER_01: by large segments of, I think, really both political parties.
- 13:41SPEAKER_01: Adam Smith said there's much ruin in a nation.
- 13:44SPEAKER_01: How much ruin is left in the United States?
- 13:47SPEAKER_00: I think that's a good question.
- 13:48SPEAKER_00: I think we are all asking that question ourselves and I'm not going to make sort
- 13:54SPEAKER_00: of sweeping predictions.
- 13:55SPEAKER_00: I don't have a sort of grand theory of history in my back pocket that I can show
- 14:00SPEAKER_00: to you,
- 14:00SPEAKER_00: but I see all these kind of controls that you're looking at kind of blinking in
- 14:05SPEAKER_00: the wrong direction.
- 14:08SPEAKER_00: And I think there is some urgency with which we have to kind
- 14:10SPEAKER_00: of create intellectual political coalitions to defend some of these things.
- 14:17SPEAKER_00: We might need to kind of learn things,
- 14:19SPEAKER_00: relearn things the hard way,
- 14:21SPEAKER_00: but I very much hope that it won't be necessary and that people will kind
- 14:24SPEAKER_00: of understand what is at stake.
- 14:32SPEAKER_00: The most immediate perhaps pressure point is the federal budget.
- 14:34SPEAKER_00: I mean like if you are spending more on financing your debt than on the Department
- 14:38SPEAKER_00: of Defense,
- 14:40SPEAKER_00: you're placing yourself in a very poor position to fight a major conflict and we see
- 14:44SPEAKER_00: that in the difficulties we have replenishing Munition stocks in the fight
- 14:49SPEAKER_00: against Iran, which is not even a sort of second-tier power.
- 14:53SPEAKER_00: And the idea that we could sort of fight an industrial-scale war with
- 14:58SPEAKER_00: a power like China, I think looks increasingly precarious.
- 15:01SPEAKER_00: And I wonder if perhaps some sort of shock will get Washington and Congress to act
- 15:10SPEAKER_00: on this,
- 15:10SPEAKER_00: because Currently,
- 15:12SPEAKER_00: we are on a real trajectory in which it will be both our allies and our adversaries
- 15:19SPEAKER_00: that will start discounting not just our stability and predictability as a power,
- 15:26SPEAKER_00: but our power itself, our ability to get things done on the global stage.
- 15:32SPEAKER_01: I mean, the idea of that maybe it will take a shock.
- 15:35SPEAKER_01: Well, we're seeing sort of that scenario play out in Europe where there's been a shock.
- 15:40SPEAKER_01: You know, the Russian-Ukraine war is a shock.
- 15:43SPEAKER_01: Let me read something that the FT columnist Janan Ganesh recently wrote.
- 15:47SPEAKER_01: He said...
- 15:49SPEAKER_01: Up until now,
- 15:50SPEAKER_01: the case for growth was that,
- 15:52SPEAKER_01: without it, Europe would become a bit poorer over time.
- 15:56SPEAKER_01: But that was never enough for voters to accept the upfront pain of,
- 16:01SPEAKER_01: say, welfare cuts or lighter job protections.
- 16:05SPEAKER_01: The prospect of national economic decline was too far off and
- 16:09SPEAKER_01: the starting point too high, so various reform packages came to almost naught.
- 16:15SPEAKER_01: Now, the case for growth is that without it, Europe cannot deter its mortal enemies.
- 16:22SPEAKER_01: The economic question has become an existential one.
- 16:25SPEAKER_01: The politics might be lining up for pro-growth reform as it hasn't for almost half a century.
- 16:32SPEAKER_01: What do you think of that analysis?
- 16:34SPEAKER_01: I wonder how true it is.
- 16:37SPEAKER_00: I mean, I'm trying to remember whether Mr. Ganesh got an advanced copy of the book.
- 16:42SPEAKER_00: He might have been on the list.
- 16:44SPEAKER_00: I think I underwrite, I can sort of sign every word of that analysis.
- 16:49SPEAKER_00: I think growth is as much a strategic variable.
- 16:52SPEAKER_00: As it is an economic one.
- 16:54SPEAKER_00: The impetus for writing the book actually came for me initially from the observation
- 16:58SPEAKER_00: that in the wake of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine,
- 17:01SPEAKER_00: we in the United States and Europe,
- 17:03SPEAKER_00: we struggled to build a broader coalition of nations To hold Russia accountable,
- 17:09SPEAKER_00: we really failed to put economic pressure on India,
- 17:12SPEAKER_00: Indonesia,
- 17:13SPEAKER_00: Brazil and others to stop buying Russian oil to sign up to our program of sanctions.
- 17:17SPEAKER_00: And part of it was obviously the fact that our economic weight has declined relative
- 17:23SPEAKER_00: to the rest of the world over time.
- 17:26SPEAKER_00: But also that we didn't really have any sort of sticks and carrots.
- 17:30SPEAKER_00: So it's about kind of domestic economic dynamism.
- 17:33SPEAKER_00: It's about kind of the appeal of our economies as a place to do business with
- 17:37SPEAKER_00: and invest in and build ties with.
- 17:41SPEAKER_00: And also about the kind of trade nimbyism,
- 17:45SPEAKER_00: if you will,
- 17:45SPEAKER_00: the sort of inability of us to strike kind of intelligent trading
- 17:51SPEAKER_00: and investment kind of partnerships and relations with the rest of the world.
- 17:56SPEAKER_00: Two things are kind of connected,
- 17:58SPEAKER_00: that we've kind of done a very poor job on both of those fronts,
- 18:02SPEAKER_00: that we, again,
- 18:05SPEAKER_00: don't have enough kind of internal dynamism to be appealing kind of inherently
- 18:09SPEAKER_00: and intrinsically for countries to line up behind our leadership.
- 18:14SPEAKER_00: And we also just haven't really nurtured that kind of toolbox that we need
- 18:19SPEAKER_00: to build lasting partnerships.
- 18:21SPEAKER_00: And yeah, we're going to pay the price for that.
- 18:25SPEAKER_01: When I was looking at your book,
- 18:26SPEAKER_01: and I was looking at that column by Janan Ganesh,
- 18:30SPEAKER_01: what popped in my brain was a poll.
- 18:32SPEAKER_01: It was a poll in the United Kingdom of people under 30,
- 18:36SPEAKER_01: and half of them said they would never take up arms for their country.
- 18:41SPEAKER_01: They would not fight.
- 18:43SPEAKER_01: And I'm wondering how widespread that is in Europe broadly.
- 18:52SPEAKER_01: So does the notion...
- 18:54SPEAKER_01: of a potential Russian invasion.
- 18:58SPEAKER_01: Is that, is that, is that startling enough?
- 19:00SPEAKER_01: Do people sort of believe in like the European project,
- 19:05SPEAKER_01: not just the EU,
- 19:05SPEAKER_01: but as a,
- 19:06SPEAKER_01: as a place of freedom enough to like sacrifice economically to, to,
- 19:12SPEAKER_01: to rearm or sacrifice of,
- 19:15SPEAKER_01: they have a more disruptive dynamic economy, which,
- 19:18SPEAKER_01: you know,
- 19:19SPEAKER_01: of course means,
- 19:19SPEAKER_01: you know, which is adds a little bit more uncertainty into the economy.
- 19:23SPEAKER_01: Are, are, Are people willing to fight for all that stuff?
- 19:27SPEAKER_01: Do they care enough?
- 19:29SPEAKER_00: It really depends on what you mean by Europe and Europeans.
- 19:32SPEAKER_00: So I think you have to kind of judge this on a case-by-case basis.
- 19:36SPEAKER_01: I assume Poland will.
- 19:38SPEAKER_00: A place like Poland,
- 19:39SPEAKER_00: which has been spending consistently between 3.5%, 4%,
- 19:44SPEAKER_00: 5% of GDP on defense,
- 19:45SPEAKER_00: which has a dynamically growing economy that has now joined the G20 group
- 19:50SPEAKER_00: of most advanced industrial nations.
- 19:53SPEAKER_00: I would sort of group Poland, the Baltic States, the Nordics.
- 20:13SPEAKER_00: In that category.
- 20:14SPEAKER_00: And unfortunately, the further west you go, I think the more complacency you see.
- 20:19SPEAKER_00: I mean, I was recently at a conference in Austria,
- 20:23SPEAKER_00: beautiful place,
- 20:25SPEAKER_00: lots of young German speaking people, both from Austria and Germany.
- 20:29SPEAKER_00: And I had the sense that people wanted to be kind of like left in their illusions
- 20:34SPEAKER_00: and kind of,
- 20:35SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 20:37SPEAKER_00: Much of the rhetoric kind of reminded me of the stuff you would hear
- 20:40SPEAKER_00: at conferences 10 years ago about multilateralism and just getting along and solving
- 20:45SPEAKER_00: the climate issue and preserving the advances of the welfare state.
- 20:51SPEAKER_00: It isn't the same sort of urgency that you hear when you go further east.
- 20:54SPEAKER_00: And I think one of the challenges that Europe has and the European project has is
- 20:58SPEAKER_00: to arrive at a common perception of risk and threat and just waking people out
- 21:04SPEAKER_00: of this complacency.
- 21:06SPEAKER_00: I mean, it's much harder than in the United States.
- 21:08SPEAKER_00: In the US,
- 21:09SPEAKER_00: there is a sort of national public debate,
- 21:12SPEAKER_00: which is, you know, there's one language, there are national media outlets.
- 21:17SPEAKER_00: Europe is balkanized.
- 21:18SPEAKER_00: You have 27 different political systems.
- 21:22SPEAKER_00: Politicians responding to different constituencies.
- 21:27SPEAKER_00: But I think Russia is making it easier for a common sense of threat to emerge.
- 21:34SPEAKER_00: I mean, you now have cyber attacks.
- 21:36SPEAKER_00: Across Europe you had drones deployed against German airports.
- 21:40SPEAKER_00: You had Russians trying to blow stuff up.
- 21:43SPEAKER_00: You have the Chinese that use the sales of goods.
- 21:51SPEAKER_00: Such as buses and trains to basically conduct espionage in Europe.
- 21:58SPEAKER_00: It was revealed that Jutong buses in Norway,
- 22:01SPEAKER_00: for example,
- 22:02SPEAKER_00: use facial recognition cameras and And connect to all the mobile devices
- 22:08SPEAKER_00: that you try to plug and charge on the bus.
- 22:10SPEAKER_00: So I think people across Europe are waking up to these new realities and you see
- 22:17SPEAKER_00: that in the surge in defense spending,
- 22:20SPEAKER_00: you see that in this There's a renewed urgency around the growth agenda.
- 22:25SPEAKER_00: Recently,
- 22:26SPEAKER_00: a group of economists around Mario Draghi launched the so-called Ryan Group,
- 22:30SPEAKER_00: which is trying to basically push for the creation of
- 22:33SPEAKER_00: a genuinely single capital market in Europe.
- 22:36SPEAKER_00: I recall reading it with an interview with an EU official who said that
- 23:04SPEAKER_01: Europe's competitive advantage was regulation,
- 23:08SPEAKER_01: that that was their economic suit,
- 23:11SPEAKER_01: was regulation, which I thought was a little disheartening.
- 23:17SPEAKER_01: I don't think I'd want that to be my country's superpower, economically regulation.
- 23:21SPEAKER_01: But then I was reading a New York Times piece the other day by
- 23:25SPEAKER_01: the Scottish historian,
- 23:26SPEAKER_01: author William Dalrymple,
- 23:28SPEAKER_01: Who was very admiring of the tough line taken by Beijing
- 23:34SPEAKER_01: against its technology companies.
- 23:36SPEAKER_01: Very admiring.
- 23:37SPEAKER_01: So when we talk about reform in Europe and Western Europe,
- 23:44SPEAKER_01: would reform really be market reform?
- 23:47SPEAKER_01: Or they might they look to the Chinese example of more government involvement as
- 23:51SPEAKER_01: the way to growth?
- 23:54SPEAKER_00: The problem with the approach that you described as using regulation
- 23:59SPEAKER_00: as your competitive advantage is that the Brussels effect,
- 24:03SPEAKER_00: as they called it,
- 24:04SPEAKER_00: worked only in so far as Europe was an attractive and economically dynamic place.
- 24:09SPEAKER_00: That if Brussels set the rules in a certain way,
- 24:11SPEAKER_00: it would force the companies from around the world to adjust and follow those rules.
- 24:19SPEAKER_00: More often encounter a situation in which Brussels writes the rules and say
- 24:23SPEAKER_00: the tech companies or the AI firms just work around it or just avoid
- 24:27SPEAKER_00: the European market altogether.
- 24:29SPEAKER_00: And I think that reality is slowly sinking in and I think that sort of sense
- 24:35SPEAKER_00: that We have to facilitate the diffusion of new technologies if we don't want
- 24:39SPEAKER_00: to be left at the periphery of the global economy is getting stronger.
- 24:43SPEAKER_00: I think people understand that Europe is not going to have its own frontier AI model.
- 24:49SPEAKER_00: It will be reliant on The transatlantic relationship is not in a good place,
- 24:55SPEAKER_00: but there is no constituency in Europe for trying to align Europe with the Chinese
- 25:03SPEAKER_00: when it comes to tech and tech governance.
- 25:06SPEAKER_00: That kind of absence of separation between Chinese corporations and
- 25:11SPEAKER_00: the Chinese state is freaking people out, irrespective of their politics.
- 25:16SPEAKER_00: And my hope is that once the transatlantic relationship gets to a more stable Yeah.
- 25:21SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
- 25:22SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
- 25:22SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
- 25:22SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
- 25:47SPEAKER_00: A trade deal between the EU and the United States.
- 25:50SPEAKER_00: We're planning for the US to lead the efforts to integrate the countries of
- 25:54SPEAKER_00: the Indo-Pacific, which is now the CPTPP.
- 25:58SPEAKER_00: And I think people will be sort of circumspect around the United States,
- 26:03SPEAKER_00: but I think there'll be always a door open for the US to come back and lead
- 26:08SPEAKER_00: that system again.
- 26:11SPEAKER_01: Can Europe reform without The U.S.
- 26:15SPEAKER_01: as at least a model for reform or without the U.S.
- 26:20SPEAKER_01: actually helping be a catalyst, you know, through, you know, through trade.
- 26:24SPEAKER_01: To what extent is the is the U.S.
- 26:26SPEAKER_01: and our stance on trade and is that does that make it harder for Europe to reform?
- 26:33SPEAKER_00: I mean, in some ways these things go in tandem.
- 26:35SPEAKER_00: So so the American turn away from from trade and efforts that trade liberalization has
- 26:42SPEAKER_00: Kind of coincided with an inward turn in Europe.
- 26:46SPEAKER_00: The EU has found it increasingly hard to get trade deals done,
- 26:51SPEAKER_00: whether it was with Canada or more recently with Mercosur.
- 26:55SPEAKER_00: But actually, they did get them done.
- 26:58SPEAKER_00: And you will see in a couple of days the Canadian Prime Minister attending the State
- 27:04SPEAKER_00: of the Union address delivered by the European Commission's president at
- 27:07SPEAKER_00: the European Parliament.
- 27:08SPEAKER_00: So when it comes to trade, I think we are sort of seeing a sort of reversal in Europe.
- 27:15SPEAKER_00: When it comes to domestic reforms,
- 27:18SPEAKER_00: I think the dire international situation can be a catalyst for change at
- 27:25SPEAKER_00: the European level.
- 27:27SPEAKER_00: This pressure to finish, complete the single market, to have a savings and investment union.
- 27:33SPEAKER_00: I mean, Europe has this massive stock of savings, much larger than in the United States.
- 27:37SPEAKER_00: Europeans just save more.
- 27:39SPEAKER_00: Most big part of the savings just sit.
- 27:47SPEAKER_00: There's also a significant home bias.
- 27:50SPEAKER_00: So if you are a pension fund in Italy or Germany,
- 27:53SPEAKER_00: you will be sort of invested predominantly in local Germany.
- 27:57SPEAKER_00: And the task ahead,
- 28:01SPEAKER_00: which I think everybody in Europe understands,
- 28:04SPEAKER_00: is that you have to kind of free up this capital market and also just push
- 28:09SPEAKER_00: against these cultural barriers and make sure That the capital can flow to where
- 28:13SPEAKER_00: the highest rate of return is.
- 28:15SPEAKER_00: And so there is a concerted effort to get this done.
- 28:19SPEAKER_00: I think it will get done eventually,
- 28:21SPEAKER_00: and I think it will make many of the other questions easier,
- 28:23SPEAKER_00: including the defense buildup,
- 28:25SPEAKER_00: because it's very difficult to sort of scale up a business if you don't have access
- 28:28SPEAKER_00: to a large and deep capital market, which in Europe's case is very fragmented.
- 28:38SPEAKER_01: Do we tend to overestimate
- 28:42SPEAKER_01: the Chinese system, its ability to generate economic growth?
- 28:51SPEAKER_01: I kind of think we do.
- 28:54SPEAKER_01: Granted,
- 28:55SPEAKER_01: when you see their latest AI models,
- 28:57SPEAKER_01: you're like, well,
- 28:57SPEAKER_01: they've figured out a different way to do technological progress and innovation.
- 29:04SPEAKER_01: But I wonder if that's actually a sustainable model that will prove itself in
- 29:09SPEAKER_01: the long term as more efficacious than a free enterprise model.
- 29:14SPEAKER_00: I think in the end,
- 29:15SPEAKER_00: I'm no expert on AI,
- 29:16SPEAKER_00: but I think in the end,
- 29:17SPEAKER_00: given the fierce nature of the competition,
- 29:21SPEAKER_00: I think it will turn out that the hardware constraints and the sort
- 29:26SPEAKER_00: of sophistication of those chips will More broadly,
- 29:29SPEAKER_00: in the book I talk about the Chinese economic model and about the mistakes we used
- 29:33SPEAKER_00: to make in the past.
- 29:44SPEAKER_00: Kind of misjudging,
- 29:45SPEAKER_00: let's say,
- 29:46SPEAKER_00: the Soviets during the Cold War,
- 29:48SPEAKER_00: assuming that all the numbers that they put forward were to be taken
- 29:52SPEAKER_00: at their face value.
- 29:54SPEAKER_00: And do look at China today.
- 29:56SPEAKER_00: Obviously, it's not a free country.
- 30:00SPEAKER_00: I think there are many doubts about the statistics that they publish when it comes
- 30:05SPEAKER_00: to population.
- 30:08SPEAKER_00: In any case, Chinese population is on a downward trajectory.
- 30:13SPEAKER_00: It peaked around 2020, 2021.
- 30:18SPEAKER_00: They are looking at a very kind of problematic future.
- 30:23SPEAKER_00: They invest an enormous proportion of their national income twice as much
- 30:29SPEAKER_00: as other advanced industrialized nations and much of it is invested
- 30:34SPEAKER_00: by political fiat.
- 30:36SPEAKER_00: There are real budget constraints.
- 30:38SPEAKER_00: I think it's a model that has a lot of weaknesses.
- 30:53SPEAKER_00: The most important of those is the sort of absence of separation between the sort
- 30:58SPEAKER_00: of private and the government run.
- 31:01SPEAKER_00: And I think, again,
- 31:03SPEAKER_00: like I sort of keep coming back to the importance of institutions and to And I think
- 31:08SPEAKER_00: in the end, I think institutions are our destiny.
- 31:10SPEAKER_00: And so therefore, from
- 31:23SPEAKER_00: Sufficiently long-term perspective, I'm very optimistic.
- 31:26SPEAKER_00: I do believe that whatever problems we face,
- 31:29SPEAKER_00: we'll be able to get out of those because we,
- 31:32SPEAKER_00: unlike our authoritarian adversaries,
- 31:34SPEAKER_00: can talk about them, we can organize politically, we can raise attention.
- 31:39SPEAKER_00: It sounds a little corny, but I'm a child of 1989.
- 31:43SPEAKER_00: I saw communism collapse in my home country.
- 31:46SPEAKER_00: I came to America.
- 31:48SPEAKER_00: I'm not losing faith about the sort of accomplishments of the free Western world.
- 31:54SPEAKER_01: Dale Bohr, thanks for coming on the podcast.
- 31:56SPEAKER_00: Jim, thank you so much.