Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / Trump's Latest Structural Shock: The 10% Credit Card Interest Rate Cap
Transcript
- 0:00Welcome to the Deep Dive. This week we are analyzing what
- 0:03happens when a well, a $1.23 trillion consumer lending market
- 0:09gets hit by a lightning bolt political decision.
- 0:12It was certainly sudden. On January 10th, 2026, President
- 0:15Trump proposed A1 year 10% cap on all credit card interest
- 0:20rates and he wanted it effective almost immediately, January
- 0:2420th. Which is just an incredibly
- 0:25compressed timeline. And when you look at the current
- 0:27market, I mean consumer interest rates, they're routinely
- 0:31hovering between what, 20 and 30%?
- 0:33Oh. Easily, for many people, even
- 0:35higher. So this proposal isn't just some
- 0:37minor adjustment, it's a seismic structural shift.
- 0:41It challenges the entire idea of risk based pricing in modern
- 0:45finance. It really does.
- 0:46We've pulled together a stack of sources covering the financial,
- 0:49the legal and the economic fallout for everyone from you,
- 0:52the consumer to, you know, tighten like JP Morgan Chase,
- 0:55Visa or PayPal. And our mission in this deep
- 0:58dive is to give you a clear map of the consequences because the
- 1:01exposure, it varies wildly across the financial sector,
- 1:05right? We really have to distinguish
- 1:06between three types of players. First, you've got the issuers
- 1:10like JP Morgan Chase or Capital One.
- 1:13They're the ones actually lending the money, so they hold
- 1:15all the credit risk, OK, the lenders.
- 1:17Second are the payment networks. That's your Visa and MasterCard.
- 1:20They just manage the digital rails.
- 1:22They move the money, but they don't hold the debt.
- 1:24So they're insulated from default risk.
- 1:27Exactly. And finally, you have the
- 1:29fintech hybrids like PayPal, who are sort of straddling that line
- 1:32between processing payments and actually offering credit.
- 1:35A bit of both. A bit of both, and to really
- 1:38understand and the gravity of this cap, we have to start with
- 1:40the most basic concept, the math.
- 1:43What does the math actually look like for banks right now?
- 1:46It really does come down to basic arithmetic, which you
- 1:49know, seems to have been completely ignored in the
- 1:51policies popular appeal it. Seems so.
- 1:53We know total credit card debt has surpassed $1.23 trillion and
- 1:59those high rates, I mean averages over 21%, subprime
- 2:03pushing 30, that's a function of high Fed rates and inflation.
- 2:06Right. Consumers are having to rely on
- 2:08that revolving debt. But those high rates aren't just
- 2:11pure profit. Banks need that margin that
- 2:14spread to cover 3 really critical costs.
- 2:17There's operating expenses, you know, running the tech servicing
- 2:21accounts just do our head. They need a return on capital
- 2:23for their investors. And most critically, they have
- 2:26to cover credit losses. The industry calls them net
- 2:29charge offs, or NCO's. Which is just a fancy way of
- 2:32saying the statistical chance that people simply won't pay you
- 2:35back. Exactly.
- 2:36And this is where the numbers get really stark.
- 2:39Right now, a bank's own cost of funds, what they pay to borrow
- 2:43money, is sitting in the 4 to 5% range.
- 2:46So you slap a 10% cap on the wreath they can charge that
- 2:50leaves them with what a 5 to 6% gross margin to cover all three
- 2:53of those costs we just mentioned?
- 2:55That already sounds tight. It is.
- 2:56And this is where the risk reality bites hardest for
- 2:59subprime borrowers. You know, people with FICO
- 3:01scores below roughly 660. The annualized charge off rates
- 3:05often exceed 10%. Wait, so the losses are higher
- 3:09than the margin? Sometimes pushing 15% in a
- 3:11downturn to do the subtraction. A 5% margin cannot cover a 12%
- 3:16loss rate. Yeah, it's it's mathematically
- 3:19impossible. So to put that in simpler terms
- 3:21for the listener, you're saying that under a 10% cap, a bank is
- 3:24mathematically guaranteed to lose money on roughly 1/3 of the
- 3:28American. Public.
- 3:29That's exactly right. This 10% cap, right, It's not
- 3:32really a price control. It is, mathematically speaking,
- 3:35a de facto regulatory ban on subprime credit card lending.
- 3:40A ban, it guarantees a loss on every every single dollar led to
- 3:44that entire segment, and that's why the market reacted
- 3:46instantly. Stocks like Synchrony Financial,
- 3:48they specialize in this kind of credit.
- 3:50They dropped over 10% the day this was announced.
- 3:52The market did the math OK, so we know the financial
- 3:55consequences are existential for some, but this all hinges on
- 3:58legal feasibility. How exactly would such a radical
- 4:02measure become law in a week? Could the president just do this
- 4:05with an executive order? That would be the path for speed
- 4:08for sure, and the most likely tool they'd try to use is
- 4:11something called the International Emergency Economic
- 4:13Powers Act, or i.e, EPA. I.e.
- 4:16EPA. I've heard of that for like
- 4:18foreign sanctions. Exactly.
- 4:19It's historically used to regulate international
- 4:22transactions, sanctioning foreign banks, freezing assets
- 4:25during national emergencies. So wait, why would they try to
- 4:29stretch an ACT does designed to fight international threats to
- 4:32cover my domestic credit card bill?
- 4:34And that is the core legal vulnerability.
- 4:37What's fascinating here is that IEP explicitly requires the
- 4:42threat to originate in whole or substantial part outside the
- 4:46United States. Which this clearly doesn't.
- 4:48Not at all. High domestic credit card rates
- 4:50are a purely domestic issue. They're a result of our own
- 4:53market and our Federal Reserve policy.
- 4:55They just don't meet that foreign source requirement.
- 4:58So the banks would sue immediately.
- 5:00Immediately. And they'd also challenge it
- 5:01under the major questions doctrine.
- 5:04This is a recent Supreme Court precedent that says Congress has
- 5:07to explicitly authorize the president to take actions of
- 5:10vast economic and political significance.
- 5:12And capping a $1.23 trillion market definitely qualifies.
- 5:17It certainly does. It's hard to imagine the
- 5:19executive branch winning that legal fight.
- 5:21So that path seems shaky, which means the real path would have
- 5:25to run through Congress, where historically banking lobbyists
- 5:28have always killed these kinds of proposals.
- 5:31They have, but the political winds are different now.
- 5:35Right, you have the strange populist horseshoe effect.
- 5:38You've seen the far left, like Senator Bernie Sanders, and the
- 5:42populist right, like Senator Josh Hawley, both align on this.
- 5:46They've introduced similar capping acts before.
- 5:48That political alignment is real, but the banking lobby
- 5:51still sees legislative passage as a, quote, low probability
- 5:56risk. However, if a law were passed,
- 5:59it would fundamentally reshape the entire American banking
- 6:01structure. Overnight.
- 6:03How so? It would pre empt the decades
- 6:05old Marquette Supreme Court precedent.
- 6:07And for the listener who hasn't been tracking obscure legal
- 6:09precedents, why is Marquette so fundamental?
- 6:12Because Marquette is the foundation of modern credit card
- 6:14industry, that 1978 ruling let's national banks export their home
- 6:18state's rules, or lack of rules on interest rate caps, to
- 6:22borrowers nationwide. So that's why so many credit
- 6:25card companies are based in places like Delaware and South
- 6:27Dakota. That's exactly why, if Congress
- 6:30preempts Marquette, that whole system breaks down.
- 6:33It would effectively let every state impose its own cap.
- 6:36Again, a total decentralization. That is a huge point.
- 6:40So the key take away for you, the listener, is that even if
- 6:44immediate implementation is legally fragile, the threat of
- 6:48the capital loan forces banks and regulators to change their
- 6:51behavior. Right.
- 6:52It's sort of Damocles. And that forced behavioral
- 6:55change leads us right into the mechanics of market dislocation.
- 6:59Economically, when you impose A binding price ceiling like this,
- 7:02you get 2 inevitable outcomes, credit rationing and the
- 7:06waterbed effect. OK, let's break those down.
- 7:08Credit rationing first. It's simple.
- 7:10Since banks can't raise rates to cover the risk of default, they
- 7:13have only one rational choice left.
- 7:15Deny credit. Deny credit.
- 7:16They'll just stop lending to anyone with a FICO score below
- 7:19that 660 or 700 range. Yeah, this instantly kicks the
- 7:22bottom third of the US adult population out of the prime
- 7:25credit market. And we don't have to guess what
- 7:27that looks like. We have a real world lab in the
- 7:29state of Arkansas. We do.
- 7:30Arkansas has a constitutional usury cap of 17%.
- 7:34Which is much higher than 10, 10%.
- 7:35Far less restrictive, and yet research shows it created a
- 7:39credit desert. Mainstream banks just abandoned
- 7:42the subprime market there. And what happened to those
- 7:44people is so important. They didn't stop needing credit,
- 7:47they just shifted their borrowing to, well, non bank
- 7:51alternatives, right? Title loans, payday lenders,
- 7:54pawn shops, rent to own centers. We're talking about transactions
- 7:58where the effect of APR can easily exceed 100% once you
- 8:04factor in all the fees. It's the exact opposite of the
- 8:07policy stated goal. Which brings us to the second
- 8:09reaction, the waterbed effect. If you push down on one side of
- 8:13the market, in this case interest revenue, the other side
- 8:16has to come up. Margin will be found somewhere
- 8:18else. Banks will seek it elsewhere.
- 8:20You don't eliminate the cost of doing business, you just
- 8:22transfer it. This leads directly to what you
- 8:24could call the fee ification of finance.
- 8:26And this would hit consumers who pay off their balances every
- 8:29month, the transactors. Absolutely.
- 8:32We're talking about the rapid reintroduction of significant
- 8:35annual fees on just standard no frills cards, maybe 50 to $100 a
- 8:39year, just to cover the costs that interest no longer
- 8:42subsidizes. And crucially, massive reward
- 8:45devaluation. You have to remember your cash
- 8:47back, your travel points. That whole rewards ecosystem is
- 8:51cross subsidized by the high interest paid by people who
- 8:54carry a balance. The revolvers.
- 8:56If that interest revenue dries up those rewards, they get
- 8:59severely cut or they just disappear.
- 9:01If that subsidy ends, we've fundamentally changed how banks
- 9:04make money. And this kind of tectonic shift,
- 9:07it impacts the biggest players in very different ways.
- 9:10Let's start with JP Morgan Chase JM, the biggest of the mall.
- 9:13JM is huge, but even for them, card services is a primary
- 9:17driver of their net interest income, their Nii.
- 9:19That's pure lending profit. That segment generated $7.2
- 9:23billion in revenue in Q32025 alone.
- 9:27A sudden 10% cap could wipe out an estimated 2 to $2.5 billion
- 9:31from that quarterly. That's a material hit, but our
- 9:33sources suggest JPM is actually the best positioned issuer to
- 9:37adapt. Why is that?
- 9:38It's their size and their customer base.
- 9:40It's highly affluent, very diversified.
- 9:42They don't live and die by subprime revenue, so.
- 9:45What do they do They. 'D immediately de risk their
- 9:47asset book. They'd close or freeze lines for
- 9:50non prime customers to just get those high charge offs off their
- 9:54books. Their strategic pivot is to
- 9:56fully embrace the Transactor model.
- 9:59So they essentially turn the credit card into a luxury good
- 10:03for the wealthy, for people who pay their balances every month.
- 10:05Exactly. For those customers, GPM stays
- 10:08profitable by hiking fees and linking the product to other
- 10:11services. You'd see the annual fee for a
- 10:13Chase Sapphire Reserve, maybe it goes from 550 to $800 just to
- 10:18keep that rewards ecosystem afloat.
- 10:20And they can link it to wealth management.
- 10:22Right. They can subsidized that low 10%
- 10:24yield with money they make on deposits or investment accounts.
- 10:27They survive because they can pivot.
- 10:29No. Contrast that resilience with
- 10:31the well, the existential threat faced by the modeling issuer,
- 10:35specifically Capital One and Synchrony.
- 10:37Yeah, this is a different world. Capital One, or COF, is the
- 10:41largest subprime lender among the major banks.
- 10:44About 30% of its portfolio is in that risky category.
- 10:47So that math problem we talked about hits some square in the
- 10:49face. It completely neutralizes their
- 10:51famous analytical data advantage.
- 10:54Data can't make a mathematically unprofitable loan profitable.
- 10:58They'd face massive balance sheet shrinkage.
- 11:00Our sources suggest they'd have to purge 20 to 30% of their
- 11:04accounts. Ouch.
- 11:06But for Synchrony Financial, it's even worse.
- 11:09For SYF, which specializes in high APR private label store
- 11:13cards, you know the ones often running at 29.99% in retail
- 11:17partnerships, the 10% cap is functionally an extinction event
- 11:21for their current business model.
- 11:23An extinction event. They can't pivot to wealth
- 11:25management like JPM. They're trapped.
- 11:27They'd be forced to renegotiate contracts with every single
- 11:30retail partner like Lowe's or Amazon who rely on that high
- 11:33interest credit to drive sales. OK, let's shift focus now to the
- 11:37defensive place. Visa and MasterCard, the payment
- 11:39networks, they don't lend money, so they don't hold the risk.
- 11:42Why are they so insulated? It comes down to what we call
- 11:45the volume velocity paradox. Yes, canceling 30 to 40% of
- 11:50subprime credit cards hurts transaction volume in the short
- 11:54term, of course. But those displaced consumers,
- 11:56they don't stop spending entirely.
- 11:58They just shift to the main substitute debit cards.
- 12:01Which also run on the Visa and MasterCard rails.
- 12:03Exactly. And this substitution actually
- 12:05favors Visa, which controls over 65% of the US debit market.
- 12:10They have other insulators too. Right.
- 12:11Crucial ones, continued cross-border volume growth from
- 12:14travel and ecommerce and their value added services segment.
- 12:17That's cybersecurity fraud detection.
- 12:20Consulting issuers trying to protect their razor thin 10%
- 12:23margins will actually need more of these services to minimize
- 12:27losses. That structural positioning
- 12:29makes them highly defensive. OK, finally, let's tackle the
- 12:33fintech wild card, PayPal. Its exposure seems mixed.
- 12:37Where's the pain and where's the opportunity?
- 12:39The short term pain is definitely linked to their
- 12:42partnership with Synchrony Bank for Co branded credit cards.
- 12:45Since the 10% cap obliterates the interest income, it
- 12:48collapses what's called the program return.
- 12:51So their revenue share from those products basically
- 12:53evaporate. It gets severely reduced, yes,
- 12:56but the silver lining is buy now, pay later or BNPL.
- 13:01Paypal's pay in four product is critically different.
- 13:05It's monetized via merchant fees, not consumer interest.
- 13:09And since there's no consumer interest being charged, these
- 13:12products may very well fall completely outside the scope of
- 13:15the 10% cap. So analysts are seeing this as
- 13:17creating a speculative opportunity for PayPal to grab a
- 13:21ton of market share. Precisely as millions of
- 13:23consumers get locked out of traditional credit cards,
- 13:26they'll seek other financing at the point of sale.
- 13:29PayPal, Affirm, other BNPL providers, they're perfectly
- 13:33positioned to capture that displaced demand.
- 13:35So if we. Connect this to the bigger
- 13:36picture. The policy just accelerates this
- 13:38huge market wide shift away from interest based consumer
- 13:41financing and towards fee and database models.
- 13:45So to bring this all together in a final synthesis, this proposed
- 13:4810% cap, it acts as a severe filter for quality and
- 13:51diversification. JPM and Visa, MasterCard are
- 13:54resilient defensive plays. PayPal is a speculative
- 13:57opportunity driven by that BNPL substitution, but Capital One
- 14:01and especially Synchrony, they face a structural breakage of
- 14:05their core business models. And the most dangerous
- 14:08consequence is what happens to the very consumers the policy
- 14:11was meant to help. Rather than making credit
- 14:14affordable for the poor, the policy would, through rationing,
- 14:17make regulated credit completely unavailable for the poor.
- 14:20And that pushes them somewhere. Else it accelerates a mass
- 14:23migration of risk from the regulated banking sector to the
- 14:26shadow banking sector. Payday lenders pawn shops these
- 14:30high cost, unregulated alternatives where the effect of
- 14:34APR are far far higher than 10%. That really is the ultimate
- 14:38unintended consequence. So given that the cap transforms
- 14:42the credit card into a luxury product for the affluent and
- 14:44forces the most vulnerable consumers into these high cost,
- 14:47unregulated shadow lenders, what systemic risks are created when
- 14:52millions of consumers are pushed outside the traditional
- 14:54regulated banking system where no one is even tracking the true
- 14:58level of debt? That's a question for you to
- 14:59Mull over as you see how this all develops.