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24 - The Republic - Plato · The Philosophy Insights Collection

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Book six, Part four. What he said, is there a knowledge still
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higher than this? Higher than justice and the other virtues? Yes? I
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said there is, and of the virtues too. We must behold not the
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outline merely, as at present, nothing short of the most finished picture should
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satisfy us. When little things are elaborated with an infinity of pains in order
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that they may appear in their full beauty and utmost clearness. How ridiculous that
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we should not think the highest truths worthy of attaining the highest accuracy, A
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right noble thought. But do you suppose that we shall refrain from asking you
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what is this highest knowledge? Nay? I said, ask if you will.
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But I am certain that you have heard the answer many times. And
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now you either do not understand me, or, as I rather think,
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you are disposed to be troublesome. For or you have often been told that
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the idea of good is the highest knowledge, and that all other things become
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useful and advantageous only by their use of this, you can hardly be ignorant
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that of this I was about to speak, concerning which, as you have
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often heard me say, we know so little, and without which any other
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knowledge or possession of any kind will profit us nothing. Do you think that
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the possession of all other things is of any value if we do not possess
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the good or the knowledge of all other things, if we have no knowledge
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of beauty and goodness, assuredly not. You are further aware that most people
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affirm pleasure to be the good, but the finer sort of wits say it
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is knowledge. Yes, And you are aware too that the latter cannot explain
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what they mean by knowledge, but are obliged, after all to say knowledge
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of the good. How ridiculous. Yes, I said that they should begin
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by reproaching us with our ignorance of the good, and then presume our knowledge
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of it. For the good they define to be knowledge of the good,
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just as if we understood them when they use the term good. This is,
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of course ridiculous, most true, he said, And those who make
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pleasure their good are in equal perplexity, for they are compelled to admit that
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there are bad pleasures as well as good, certainly, and therefore to acknowledge
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that bad and good are the same. True. There can be no doubt
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about the numerous difficulties in which this question is involved. There can be none.
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Further, do we not see that many are willing to do, or
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to have, or to seem to be what is just and honorable without the
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reality. But no one is satisfied with the appearance of good. The reality
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is what they seek. In the case of the good, appearance is despised
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by every one. Very true, he said, of this, then,
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which every soul of man pursues and makes the end of all his actions,
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having a presentiment that there is such an end, and yet hesitating because neither
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knowing the nature, nor having the same assurance of this as of other things,
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and therefore losing whatever good there is in other things. Of a principle
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such and so great as this ought the best man in our state, to
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whom everything is entrusted to be in the darkness of ignorance. Certainly not,
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he said, I am sure. I said that he who does not know
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how the beautiful and the just are likewise good, will be but a sorry
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guardian of them. And I suspect that no one who is ignorant of the
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good will have a true knowledge of them. That he said is a shrewd
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suspicion of yours. And if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge,
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our state will be perfectly ordered, of course, he replied, But
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I wish that you would tell me whether you conceive this supreme principle of the
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good to be knowledge or pleasure, or different from either. Aye, I
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said, I knew all along that a fastidious gentleman like you would not be
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contented with the thoughts of other people about these matters, True, Socrates,
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But I must say that one who like you has passed a lifetime in the
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study of philosophy should not be always repeating the opinions of others and never telling
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his own. Well, but has any one a right to say positively what
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he does not know? Not, he said, with the assurance of positive
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certainty. He has no right to do that. But he may say what
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he thinks as a matter of opinion. And do you not know I said
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that all mere opinions are bad, and the best of them blind. You
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would not deny that those who have any true notion without intelligence are only like
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blind men who feel their way along the road. Very true, And do
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you wish to behold what is blind and crooked and base when others will tell
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you of brightness and beauty? Still I must implore you, Socrates said,
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glaucon not to turn away just as you are reaching the goal. If you
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will only give such an explanation of the good as you have already given of
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justice and temperance and the other virtues, we shall be satisfied. Yes,
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my friend, and I shall be at least equally satisfied. But I cannot
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help fearing that I shall fail, and that my indiscreet zeal will bring ridicule
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upon me. No, sweet sirs, let us not at present ask what
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is the actual nature of the good, For to reach what is now in
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my thoughts would be an effort too great for me. But of that child
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of the good who is likest him, I would fain speak if I could
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be sure that you wished to hear. Otherwise, not by all means,
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he said, tell us about the child, and you shall remain in our
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debt for the account of the parent. I do indeed wish, I replied
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that I could pay, and you receive the account of the parent, and
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not as now of the offspring. Only take, however, this letter by
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way of interest, and at the same time have a care that I do
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not render a false account, although I have no intention of deceiving you.
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Yes, we will take all the care that we can proceed. Yes,
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I said, But I must first come to an understanding with you, and
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remind you of what I have mentioned in the course of this discussion, and
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at many other times, what the old story, That there is a many
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beautiful, and a many good, and so of other things which we describe
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and define. To all of them the term many is applied, true,
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he said, And there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and
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of other things to which the term many is applied, there is an absolute,
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for they may be brought under a single idea, which is called the
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essence of each. Very true, The many, as we say, are
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seen but not known, and the ideas are known but not seen exactly.
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And what is the organ with which we see the visible things? The sight?
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He said? And with the hearing, I said, we hear,
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and with the other senses perceive the other objects of sense. True, But
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have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex piece of
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workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived. No, I never have,
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he said, Then, reflect has the ear or voice need of any
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thing or additional nature in order that the one may be able to hear and
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the other to be heard. Nothing of the sort. No, indeed,
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I replied, And the same is true of most, if not all,
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the other senses. You would not say that any of them requires such an
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addition, certainly not. But you see that without the addition of some other
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nature there is no seeing or being seen. How do you mean sight being
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as I conceive in the eyes, and he who has eyes wanting to see
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color being also present in them. Still, unless there be a third nature
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specially adapted to the purpose, the owner of the eyes will see nothing,
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and the colors will be invisible. Of what nature are you speaking of that
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which you term light? I replied, True, he said, noble then
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is the bond which links together sight and visibility, and great beyond other bonds
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by no small difference of nature. For light is their bond, and light
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is no ignoble thing. Nay, he said, the reverse of ignoble,
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and which I said, of the gods in heaven, which you say was
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the lord of this element? Whose is that light which makes the eye to
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see perfectly and the visible to appear? You mean the Son, as you
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and all mankind say, May not the relation of sight to this deity be
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described as follows. How, neither sight nor the eye in which sight resides
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is the sun. No. Yet, of all the organs of sense,
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the eye is the most like the sun, by far the most like.
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And the power which the eye possesses is a sort of affluence which is dispensed
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from the sun. Exactly. Then, the Sun is not sight, but
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the author of sight, who is recognized by sight. True, he said,
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And this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom
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the good beget in his own likeness to be in the visible world in relation
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to sight and the things of sight. What the good is in the intellectual
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world in relation to mind and the things of mind? Will you be a
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little more explicit? He said? Why you know? I said that the
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eyes when a person directs them towards objects on which the light of day is
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no longer shining, but the moon and stars only see dimly and are nearly
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blind. They seem to have no clearness of vision in them. Very true.
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But when they are directed towards objects on which the sun shines, they
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see clearly, and there is sight in them, certainly. And the soul
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is like the eye, when resting upon that on which truth and being shine.
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The soul perceives and understands, and is radiant with intelligence. But when
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turned towards the twilight of becoming and perishing, then she has opinion only,
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and goes blinking about, and is first of one opinion and then of another,
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and seems to have no intelligence. Just so, now, that which
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imparts truth to the known, and the power of knowing to the knower,
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is what I would have you term the idea of good, And this you
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will deem to be the cause of science and of truth, in so far
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as the latter becomes the subject of knowledge. Beautiful too, as are both
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truth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this other nature as more
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beautiful than either. And as in the previous instance, light and sight may
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be truly said to be like the sun, and yet not to be the
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sun, so in this other sphere, science and truth may be deemed to
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be like the good, but not the good. The good has a place
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of honor yet higher. What a wonder of beauty that must be, he
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said, which is the author of science and truth, and yet surpasses them
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in beauty. For you surely cannot mean to say that pleasure is the Good
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God forbid, I replied, But may I ask you to consider the image
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in another point of view? In what point of view you would say,
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would ye not, that the Sun is not only the author of visibility in
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all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth, though he himself
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is not generation. Certainly, in like manner, the Good may be said
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to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of
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their being an essence. And yet the Good is not essence, but far
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exceeds essence in dignity and power, Bloggin said, with a ludicrous earnestness by
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the light of heaven. How amazing, yes, I said, And the
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exaggeration may be set down to you, for you made me utter my fancies,
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and pray continue to utter them at any rate. Let us hear if
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there is anything more to be said about the similitude of the Sun. Yes,
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I said, there is a great deal more then amid nothing, however
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slight. I will do my best, I said, But I should think
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that a great deal will have to be omitted. I hope not, he
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said. You have to imagine then, that there are two ruling powers,
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and that one of them is set over the intellectual world the other of the
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visible. I do not say Heaven, lest you should fancy that I am
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playing upon the name. May I suppose that you have this distinction of the
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visible and intelligible fixed in your mind. I have now take a line which
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has been cut into two unequal parts, and divide each of them again in
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the same proportion. And suppose the two main divisions to answer, one to
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the visible and the other to the intelligible. And then compare the subdivisions in
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respect of their clearness and want of clearness. And you will find that the
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first section in the sphere of the visible consists of images, and by images
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I mean in the first place shadows, and in the second place reflections in
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water, and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the like. Do
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you understand, yes, I understand. Imagine now the other section, of
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which this is only the resemblance, to include the animals which we see,
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and everything that grows or is made very good. Would you not admit that
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both the sections of this division have different degrees of truth, and that the
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copy is to the original, as the sphere of opinion is the sphere of
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knowledge. Most undoubtedly, next proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere
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of the intellectual is to be divided. In what manner? Thus there are
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two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the figures given by
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the former division as images. The inquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead
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of going upwards to a principle, descends to the other end. In the
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higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses and goes up to
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a principle, which is above hypotheses, making no use of images, as
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in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves.
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I do not quite understand your meaning, he said, Then I will try
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again. You will understand me better when I have made some preliminary remarks.
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You are aware that students of geometry, arithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume
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the odd and the even, and the figures and three kinds of angles and
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alike in their several branches with signs. These are their hypotheses, which they
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and everybody are supposed to know, And therefore they do not deign to give
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any account of them, either to themselves or others. But they begin with
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them and go on until they arrive at last, and in a consistent manner
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at their conclusion. Yes, he said, I know, and do you
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not know also, that although they make use of the visible forms and reasons
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about them, they are thinking not of these, but of the ideals which
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they resemble, not of the figures which they draw, but of the absolute
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square and the absolute diameter, and so on. The forms which they draw
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or make, and which have shadows and reflection in water of their own,
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are converted by them into images. But they are really seeking to behold the
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things themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the mind.
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That is true, and of this kind I spoke as the intelligible, although
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in the search after it the soul is compelled to use hypotheses, not ascending
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to a first principle because she is unable to rise above the region of hypothesis,
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but employing the objects of which the shadows below are resemblances in their turn
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as images, they having a relation to the shadows and reflections of them,
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a greater distinctness and therefore a higher value. I understand, he said,
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that you are speaking of the province of geometry in the sister arts, And
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when I speak of the other division of the intelligible. You will understand me
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to speak of that other sort of knowledge, which reason herself attains by the
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power of dialectic, using the hypotheses, not as first principles, but only
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as hypotheses, that is to say, as steps and points of departure into
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a world which is above hyper prothesies, in order that she may soar beyond
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them to the first principle of the whole, and clinging to this, and
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then to that which depends on this, by successive steps, she descends again,
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without the aid of any sensible object, from ideas, through ideas,
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and in ideas, she ends. I understand you, he replied, not
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perfectly, for you seem to me to be describing a task which is really
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tremendous. But at any rate, I understand you to say that knowledge and
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being which the signs of dialectic contemplates are clearer than the notions of the arts,
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as they are termed, which proceed from hypotheses. Only these are also
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contemplated by the understanding, and not by the senses. Yet, because they
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start from hypotheses and do not ascend to a principle, those who contemplate them
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appear to you not to exercise the higher reason upon them, although when a
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first principle is added to them, they are cognizible by the higher reason and
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the habit which is concerned with geometry and the cognate sciences. I suppose that
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you would term understanding and not reason, as being intermediate between opinion and reason.
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You have quite conceived my meaning, I said, And now, corresponding
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to these four divisions, let there be four faculties in the soul, reason
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answering to the highest, understanding to the second, faith or conviction to the
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third, and perception of shadows to the last. And let there be a
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scale of them. And let us suppose that the several faculties have clearness in
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the same degree that their objects have truth. I understand, he replied,
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and give my assent and accept your arrangement. End of Book six