Latest / Straight Talk Southeast Asia / EP163: China’s Changing Military Role in Southeast Asia with Dr Ian Chong
Transcript
- 0:04Speaker 1: Welcome to Straight Talk Southeast Asia. This is a podcast
- 0:07Speaker 1: that covers current developments in the region, particular countries, domestic politics,
- 0:12Speaker 1: as well as regional issues. We look in depth at
- 0:15Speaker 1: what is happening, why it might be happening. We speak
- 0:19Speaker 1: to analysts, academics from the region, based in the region,
- 0:22Speaker 1: and to better understand what's happening and what might be
- 0:26Speaker 1: the projections of what's happening ahead. I'm Bridget Welsh. I'm
- 0:32Speaker 1: a political analyst and academic who's worked on Southeast Asia
- 0:35Speaker 1: for many decades. I was raised here. I'm living here.
- 0:39Speaker 1: And very importantly, I care about what's happening in the region.
- 0:42Speaker 1: Thanks for joining me. Welcome to Straight Talk Southeast Asia.
- 0:50Speaker 1: You're here with Bridget Welch, and this is episode 44
- 0:53Speaker 1: here in season four. Thank you, listeners, for tuning into
- 0:57Speaker 1: these conversations. I look forward to when my co-host, Sakabuza,
- 1:01Speaker 1: can return. This week, we're going to focus in on
- 1:05Speaker 1: China's security in Southeast Asia, looking carefully at how that's
- 1:11Speaker 1: changing and evolving with a very prominent scholar, Ian Chong.
- 1:16Speaker 1: Before we do that, however, we're going to look at
- 1:18Speaker 1: the issues that have impacted Southeast Asia this week. It
- 1:22Speaker 1: was an eventful one. Attention was riveted about what happened
- 1:27Speaker 1: in Indonesia. where the wiretapping scandal has had important ramifications
- 1:32Speaker 1: and ripples across Indonesian politics. It speaks to a broader
- 1:37Speaker 1: shift in the Prabowo-Jokowi relationship. But we saw a lot
- 1:42Speaker 1: of military troops, tens of thousands of troops come into Jakarta,
- 1:46Speaker 1: mostly from the Marines. We've seen investigations, alleged wiretapping of
- 1:52Speaker 1: President Prabowo's subianto, and almost 40 other prominent figures. according
- 1:58Speaker 1: to the Republica recent release of lists. This has led
- 2:03Speaker 1: to charges of potential treason and attempts to overthrow the government.
- 2:08Speaker 1: The main suspect is the former national police chief who
- 2:11Speaker 1: had been appointed by Joko Iwadodo, and he was fired
- 2:15Speaker 1: along with others, four senior officers as suspects. There were
- 2:19Speaker 1: also protests that came out to support President Prabowo as well.
- 2:25Speaker 1: This elite split has had elite mobilization, raised very serious
- 2:30Speaker 1: questions about what's happening in Indonesia's political crisis at the top,
- 2:36Speaker 1: and what this means for Indonesia moving forward. Not too
- 2:40Speaker 1: far away, there's another political elite crisis, and that involves
- 2:45Speaker 1: the pardon of Najib Razak, former Prime Minister of Malaysia,
- 2:50Speaker 1: who has now received two different pardons for the SRC case,
- 2:54Speaker 1: has now moved from Kajang Prison to his house, and
- 2:58Speaker 1: he is now under house arrest, although the exact rules
- 3:01Speaker 1: of that remain ambiguous. This came after dispute over the
- 3:06Speaker 1: technical wording of the order, which was settled at the
- 3:09Speaker 1: high court. He's received house arrest for his SRC case
- 3:13Speaker 1: until August 2028, after which he's to serve the sentence
- 3:18Speaker 1: for the 1MDB case and how that evolves in the
- 3:21Speaker 1: appeal process. This crisis raises questions about the rule of law,
- 3:27Speaker 1: about the role of elites. It moves the 1MDB case
- 3:30Speaker 1: again center stage and Najib's role in Malaysian politics. How
- 3:36Speaker 1: it's going to impact voters and the society is something
- 3:39Speaker 1: that is going to be evolving. But what has happened
- 3:43Speaker 1: is that it has intensified conflict within Anwar's broader coalition.
- 3:49Speaker 1: We can see the attacks between DAP and UMNO The
- 3:52Speaker 1: passive-aggressive attacks between PKR and UMNO are very sharper and
- 3:59Speaker 1: intensifying in what I've called a cascade of politics in Malaysia,
- 4:05Speaker 1: where we've seen over three elections, this intensive conflict evolving.
- 4:11Speaker 1: As in Indonesia, the elite deals are now under serious strain,
- 4:17Speaker 1: and this is something we're going to be watching very
- 4:19Speaker 1: closely in Malaysian politics. This is all happening during a
- 4:24Speaker 1: state election of Malacca, with very interesting spillovers, concerns about
- 4:30Speaker 1: who is responsible, the powers of the royalty, the precedents
- 4:34Speaker 1: that are being set for the rule of law. Elite
- 4:38Speaker 1: crises are also present in Philippines, where Sarah Duterte's trial
- 4:43Speaker 1: has now resumed. She has had a number of charges removed.
- 4:48Speaker 1: There is only one major charge, Article 2, which alleges
- 4:51Speaker 1: that she has unexplained wealth, incomplete asset declaration, and prohibited
- 4:56Speaker 1: business interests. We'll see how this moves forward. There's been
- 5:01Speaker 1: a new chief justice been appointed in the Philippines. We're
- 5:04Speaker 1: going to see how this plays out in the Senate itself.
- 5:07Speaker 1: And it's going to be very interesting to watch how
- 5:10Speaker 1: the impeachment trial evolves. She will be presenting her defense.
- 5:15Speaker 1: To the north in Thailand. there been concerns over the
- 5:18Speaker 1: Parliament and the Senate. Speaker Sofron Saram, who was nominated
- 5:23Speaker 1: by the Prime Minister's party, Pumjaitai, has now limited the
- 5:27Speaker 1: powers of parliamentary subcommittees. This has received a significant backlash.
- 5:33Speaker 1: He's now been asked to explain this. This is also
- 5:37Speaker 1: raising questions of whether or not this is limiting the
- 5:39Speaker 1: powers of different elements in the Senate, trying to consolidate
- 5:43Speaker 1: power in a particular way. All of these elite issues
- 5:47Speaker 1: reflect ongoing splits that are taking place at the elite
- 5:51Speaker 1: level across Southeast Asian politics. In Myanmar, however, the crises
- 5:56Speaker 1: and issues are much more pronounced on ordinary citizens. We've
- 6:01Speaker 1: had very worrying military offenses continue. There was an air
- 6:06Speaker 1: attack on a school in Sagaing. Children, including a newborn,
- 6:11Speaker 1: were killed. This is a gentle but not so gentle
- 6:15Speaker 1: reminder of the continued violence that the military is inflicting
- 6:21Speaker 1: on ordinary citizens in Myanmar, and the violence is taking
- 6:24Speaker 1: place with a peace very elusive. The junta has now
- 6:29Speaker 1: announced by-elections to be held as part of their continued
- 6:33Speaker 1: attempt to hold selections in a country where they still
- 6:38Speaker 1: lack serious legitimacy. Next week, we'll be looking out for
- 6:43Speaker 1: What's happening in the Rohingya crimes against humanity case, we're
- 6:46Speaker 1: expecting a decision early next week. Thank you very much
- 6:51Speaker 1: for tuning in to the conversations here on Strike Talk.
- 6:54Speaker 1: I hope you enjoy the conversation with Ian. I always
- 6:57Speaker 1: find him to be a very thoughtful and very informed scholar,
- 7:02Speaker 1: and it's always a pleasure to have him here on
- 7:04Speaker 1: Straight Talk Southeast Asia. I look forward to speaking to
- 7:06Speaker 1: you next week. We're here. with Associate Professor Ian Chong.
- 7:12Speaker 1: He is based at NUS in Singapore. He's a non-resident
- 7:16Speaker 1: fellow at Carnegie China. Ian, thank you so much for
- 7:19Speaker 1: being here on Straight Talk Southeast Asia.
- 7:22Speaker 2: My pleasure.
- 7:22Speaker 3: It's great to be here.
- 7:24Speaker 1: You follow China closely, particularly China's relationship with Southeast Asia.
- 7:29Speaker 1: It is multifaceted. I wanted to focus on what's happening
- 7:34Speaker 1: in the security realm because I think There are a
- 7:36Speaker 1: lot of unknowns. As you said in our earlier conversations,
- 7:40Speaker 1: there is more opaqueness about what is going on. What
- 7:44Speaker 1: are the trends in how China is engaging with Southeast
- 7:47Speaker 1: Asia from a security and from a military perspective?
- 7:51Speaker 3: There are a couple of angles you can take this.
- 7:55Speaker 3: Some actors, notably the Philippines, maybe to some degree Vietnam, there.
- 8:00Speaker 2: Is an increased level of robustness.
- 8:04Speaker 3: Some would call abrasiveness. you have PRC military and paramilitary vessels, aircraft,
- 8:11Speaker 3: trying to challenge contested areas. That sort of contact has
- 8:16Speaker 3: a lot more friction. In other parts of Southeast Asia,
- 8:20Speaker 3: you have varying degrees of cooperation, more training also done
- 8:26Speaker 3: by the People's Liberation Army in places like Laos and
- 8:30Speaker 3: in Cambodia. In Myanmar, there seems to be more active
- 8:35Speaker 3: support of the military in more direct ways, arms and
- 8:39Speaker 3: so on and so forth. There are different aspects. The
- 8:42Speaker 3: different countries across Southeast Asia are treated differently.
- 8:46Speaker 1: That's really an important point you're making is that there
- 8:49Speaker 1: is no one formula. There is very different dynamics. And
- 8:52Speaker 1: many of these relationships between China and Southeast Asia are
- 8:56Speaker 1: bilateral relations with individual countries as opposed to the region
- 8:59Speaker 1: as a whole. Let's talk about the South China Sea.
- 9:04Speaker 1: We read about it all the time. I think we've
- 9:06Speaker 1: almost become numb to what's happening in terms of the
- 9:09Speaker 1: interventions and the conflicts and the small incidents that seem
- 9:13Speaker 1: to be normalized. What are the concerns now about the Paracels,
- 9:18Speaker 1: the Spratlys, the Scarborough Shoal, and the South?
- 9:22Speaker 2: We are seeing a lot going on.
- 9:24Speaker 3: The way that China is treating each of these areas,
- 9:26Speaker 3: depending on who the disputant is, is a bit different.
- 9:30Speaker 3: With regard to the Philippines, there is more direct challenging
- 9:34Speaker 3: of Philippine control, trying to establish the impression, if not
- 9:39Speaker 3: the fact, of PRC control and administration. There is a
- 9:44Speaker 3: little bit of that with Vietnam, but not as much
- 9:47Speaker 3: as with the Philippines. The Philippines seems to be the
- 9:49Speaker 3: main focus. The disputed area with Brunei, Brunei is pretty quiet.
- 9:54Speaker 3: They're a pretty small actor. With Malaysia, it's fairly interesting
- 9:58Speaker 3: because you have... Putrajaya that is trying not to talk
- 10:02Speaker 3: up some of the incidents where you have Chinese Coast
- 10:06Speaker 3: Guard or other kinds of vessels near contested waters and areas.
- 10:10Speaker 3: You also do have sometimes what look like information coming
- 10:15Speaker 3: out from MMA or the Navy or private citizens that
- 10:19Speaker 3: show images of PRC vessels near Malaysian-claimed waters or inside
- 10:25Speaker 3: some of these places, but there's not much of an
- 10:28Speaker 3: official response. In the case of Indonesia, it's been fairly
- 10:32Speaker 3: mixed in the sense that there's been what might be
- 10:36Speaker 3: a shift in Indonesia's position, maybe not, it's quite unclear.
- 10:40Speaker 3: You saw President Prabowo talk about shelving disputes and working
- 10:45Speaker 3: on joint development. with the PRC in disputed waters. That
- 10:49Speaker 3: actually runs against long-standing Indonesian policy of not recognizing a dispute,
- 10:56Speaker 3: because from that perspective, PRC claims on the Nine-Dash Lines
- 11:00Speaker 3: have no legal standing. Therefore, a legal dispute cannot exist.
- 11:05Speaker 3: There were efforts to fudge, backtrack from President Polo's statements.
- 11:10Speaker 2: That's sort of unclear.
- 11:11Speaker 3: You do have reports of PRC Coast Guard going into
- 11:15Speaker 3: Indonesian-claimed areas in the northern Tunisia, really the EEZ, you
- 11:20Speaker 3: have an Indonesian military and Coast Guard presence becoming more
- 11:25Speaker 3: pronounced in those areas as well. It seems that depending
- 11:29Speaker 3: on who the disputant is, how they respond to the PRC,
- 11:32Speaker 3: PRC actions in those waters might be a little bit different.
- 11:37Speaker 1: Again, variation. But one can generally see that there's been
- 11:40Speaker 1: much more proactive engagement of China in the South China Sea.
- 11:44Speaker 1: The range of number of clashes have increased overall.
- 11:47Speaker 3: Oh, it depends on what you mean by proactive engagement, right?
- 11:51Speaker 3: If you mean the Philippines, that is very proactive in
- 11:53Speaker 3: some sense. But if you look at the efforts to
- 11:57Speaker 3: do some of the humanitarian assistance, disaster relief stuff that
- 12:00Speaker 3: Indonesia sometimes engages in, well, that is proactive too in
- 12:03Speaker 3: a different way.
- 12:04Speaker 1: Well, activists and multiple friends, as you've suggested. Let's talk
- 12:09Speaker 1: about China's military presence in the region. That has also
- 12:12Speaker 1: really changed in recent time. There are now military bases
- 12:16Speaker 1: in the region, the Coco Islands in Chau Piu in Myanmar,
- 12:21Speaker 1: and also the Rim Naval Base in Cambodia. How do
- 12:24Speaker 1: you see these bases impacting the region? Are they just
- 12:27Speaker 1: an extension of strong bilateral ties between these respective countries
- 12:32Speaker 1: and China? Or is this a broader security agenda of
- 12:37Speaker 1: which China feels that it's important to put themselves in
- 12:40Speaker 1: the region in a different way?
- 12:42Speaker 3: So I think in the broader sense, the PRC is
- 12:45Speaker 3: following the pattern of many great powers, where they have
- 12:48Speaker 3: economic interests, they have political ties, and then they realize
- 12:52Speaker 3: that they need a security presence to shore up those ties,
- 12:56Speaker 3: to protect those interests. What we're seeing in the Cocos
- 12:59Speaker 3: Islands and Chokpyu and Ream fall into that category. You
- 13:02Speaker 3: could make an argument about Bamkun, the airbase in Laos
- 13:06Speaker 3: as well. But then on the Indian Ocean side and
- 13:09Speaker 3: the South China Sea side, Those bases serve somewhat different purposes.
- 13:14Speaker 2: The PRC has established a port.
- 13:16Speaker 3: With a pipeline from Chokpyu, and I think that's a
- 13:19Speaker 3: way for them to get around the so-called Malacca Strait dilemma,
- 13:22Speaker 3: where they might get choked off on the sea lanes
- 13:26Speaker 3: from Malacca, but also Sunda and all that. Myanmar provides
- 13:29Speaker 3: an alternative route where you could get oil and gas
- 13:33Speaker 3: into the PRC. That is important for those purposes. It
- 13:37Speaker 3: also allows the PRC places to stop over as they
- 13:41Speaker 3: move toward the Middle East as they try to establish
- 13:45Speaker 3: more of a presence in the Indian Ocean. It would
- 13:47Speaker 3: connect up to their presence in Djibouti, for instance. Ream,
- 13:51Speaker 3: on the South China Sea side, I think it's a
- 13:53Speaker 3: bit different. Yes, it provides a place to stop over.
- 13:57Speaker 2: It is, I think, less.
- 13:58Speaker 3: Important in the sense that you do have closer Chinese
- 14:01Speaker 3: bases in Chinese territory, in Hainan, on the South China
- 14:05Speaker 3: Sea side. You would also have PRC military facilities in
- 14:10Speaker 3: these maritime features that they've reclaimed and put airstrips on
- 14:13Speaker 3: and all that. Rim Bay provides a stopover point. It
- 14:17Speaker 3: provides an area where they can engage with the Cambodian
- 14:21Speaker 3: military a lot more. But I think the purposes are
- 14:24Speaker 3: not exactly the same as what you see on the
- 14:26Speaker 3: Indian Ocean side.
- 14:30Speaker 1: Hope you're enjoying listening to this episode. If you want
- 14:32Speaker 1: to find out more about previous episodes, you can reach
- 14:35Speaker 1: this on the website, straighttalksoutheastasia.com. The link should also be
- 14:39Speaker 1: available in the show notes. If you want to contribute
- 14:42Speaker 1: to the production costs of the podcast, you can hit
- 14:46Speaker 1: the link, buy me a coffee. Every little penny counts.
- 14:49Speaker 1: All that money will not go to me, but go
- 14:52Speaker 1: to the producers who are helping me to put the
- 14:54Speaker 1: show together. Thanks for listening. Let's also talk about the
- 14:59Speaker 1: recently opened Bankun Air Base in Laos. Why is this important?
- 15:04Speaker 1: This is also extended military presence, but in a different way.
- 15:09Speaker 2: It's an air base. It's not a port.
- 15:11Speaker 3: Air forces work very differently from naval forces. They don't
- 15:15Speaker 3: establish a presence in the same way. They don't project
- 15:17Speaker 3: force in the same way. This has to do in
- 15:20Speaker 3: part with the PRC trying to establish more of a
- 15:23Speaker 3: presence in mainland Southeast Asia. They do have increasing interests there,
- 15:30Speaker 3: including in Laos with their rail, with their efforts to
- 15:33Speaker 3: extract minerals. The Bamkin Air Base's facilities are fairly new,
- 15:36Speaker 3: but from what I understand, it seems to focus quite
- 15:39Speaker 3: a bit on training. What that does is to provide
- 15:43Speaker 3: an opportunity for China to tie in Laos with their
- 15:47Speaker 3: own defense establishment. Arguably, that's what they were trying to
- 15:50Speaker 3: do with Cambodia as well. In that sense, it's not
- 15:53Speaker 3: just the physical presence. It's about trying to train, trying
- 15:58Speaker 3: to draw in the Laotians more into Beijing's orbit.
- 16:04Speaker 1: Yes, it's very interesting to see, again, how strategic they
- 16:08Speaker 1: work with certain countries in the region. Let's talk about
- 16:12Speaker 1: China's military relationships. Here, too, I see a lot more
- 16:16Speaker 1: warming of a lot more countries in terms of training programs.
- 16:20Speaker 1: even countries that have been more resistant to working with China,
- 16:24Speaker 1: we can see that relations have shifted. What are the
- 16:26Speaker 1: drivers of this and how do you see this evolving?
- 16:30Speaker 2: There are a few things going on here.
- 16:32Speaker 3: On the one hand, China has been quite insistent on
- 16:35Speaker 3: trying to do military-to-military contact. You see that with Indonesia,
- 16:40Speaker 3: you see that with Singapore, you see that with Thailand.
- 16:43Speaker 3: In these cases, there's also a lot of demand from
- 16:47Speaker 3: these Southeast Asian states to work with China to send
- 16:50Speaker 3: a signal that they are willing to accommodate Beijing, that
- 16:55Speaker 3: they're willing to work with Beijing and are not a
- 16:58Speaker 3: threat to Beijing's interest. There are bilateral reasons for that
- 17:02Speaker 3: increased activity. The Tai case is interesting to me because
- 17:06Speaker 3: of all of China's military-to-military relations in Southeast Asia, it
- 17:10Speaker 3: is by far the most sophisticated.
- 17:12Speaker 2: They have these.
- 17:13Speaker 3: Regular exercises between the Thai military and the PRC military,
- 17:18Speaker 3: their naval and all that. But I think the most
- 17:19Speaker 3: interesting bit is the Air Force part. Now, the Air
- 17:22Speaker 3: Force part, what you see is that the Thais will
- 17:25Speaker 3: bring their Gripens and also their airborne early warning aircraft
- 17:30Speaker 3: up there. It provides a very good dissimilar training experience
- 17:33Speaker 3: for the PLA. They get a sense of how countries
- 17:38Speaker 3: whose militaries use, broadly speaking, NATO type tactics and equipment.
- 17:44Speaker 3: The Thais can't bring out the F-16s because of U.S. restrictions,
- 17:46Speaker 3: but I think with the Gripens, you can get a
- 17:48Speaker 3: pretty good sense. It's technologically pretty sophisticated. Singapore case, for instance,
- 17:54Speaker 3: there's been increasing contact, I think in part because Singapore
- 17:57Speaker 3: wants to assure Beijing. Beijing has also wanted to see
- 18:02Speaker 3: more of what Singapore has been doing, and Singapore is
- 18:04Speaker 3: eager to avoid giving Beijing an impression that it just
- 18:08Speaker 3: works with the U.S. because of the increasing apprehensions that
- 18:12Speaker 3: Beijing have about the U.S., the intensification of major power rivalry.
- 18:16Speaker 3: That has been for a long time focused on some
- 18:19Speaker 3: special operations stuff, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, basically army, infantry stuff.
- 18:25Speaker 3: If you have lots of people running around, it looks impressive,
- 18:28Speaker 3: but you don't have to show as much sensitive equipment.
- 18:31Speaker 3: But I think Beijing understands that. They've been pushing for
- 18:34Speaker 3: more some naval things, sensors and operations. Using those sensors
- 18:39Speaker 3: might become more exposed.
- 18:42Speaker 1: Malaysia and Indonesia?
- 18:44Speaker 3: They do have exercises with the PRC as well. They're
- 18:49Speaker 3: quite separate countries with different concerns. I mean, for the Malaysians,
- 18:51Speaker 3: I think they're quite eager to play nice with Beijing.
- 18:55Speaker 3: They want to have a good working relationship with Beijing.
- 18:58Speaker 3: They want to show that they are good partners in
- 19:00Speaker 3: a way. I think that military component is part of it.
- 19:06Speaker 3: Although for the Malaysians, They are more at ease in
- 19:10Speaker 3: some ways with the PRC. They've also bought PRC military equipment.
- 19:14Speaker 3: The Indonesians have a very different outlook. Their memory of
- 19:20Speaker 3: being practically abandoned by the United States after 1998, with
- 19:26Speaker 3: the cutoff of military sales and training and all that,
- 19:30Speaker 3: has gotten them to think that they need to diversify very,
- 19:33Speaker 3: very significantly in terms of their.
- 19:35Speaker 2: Procurement, in terms of their training.
- 19:38Speaker 3: They are looking at the PRC as one of the
- 19:43Speaker 3: ways that they can diversify. They've also looked at the Europeans,
- 19:47Speaker 3: notably the French, the Koreans, the Russians, etc. There's an
- 19:51Speaker 3: aspect of that with the Indonesian engagement that's a bit different.
- 19:55Speaker 3: Under the current Indonesian administration, there is an intensification of
- 20:00Speaker 3: this desire to diversify that also spills over into procurement
- 20:06Speaker 3: decisions as well. I think the Indonesians while they're stepping
- 20:10Speaker 3: up their engagement with the PPRC, they are at the
- 20:13Speaker 3: same time stepping up their engagement with the U.S. So
- 20:15Speaker 3: you have the Super Garuda Shield exercise that they have
- 20:18Speaker 3: that's pretty big. For the Indonesians, what is also worth
- 20:23Speaker 3: noting is sometimes they're very concentrated on their own needs.
- 20:28Speaker 3: That means that they don't pay attention as much to
- 20:31Speaker 3: what else might be going on around them. There was
- 20:33Speaker 3: this passage exercise between the Indonesian Navy and the PLA
- 20:39Speaker 3: in waters east of Taiwan recently, which was actually quite
- 20:42Speaker 3: interesting because a passage exercise, for the most part, is
- 20:47Speaker 3: a pretty low-key exchange showing that we're coming this way,
- 20:50Speaker 3: you're coming this way, so we want to signal to
- 20:53Speaker 3: each other, we want to avoid any unsafe navigation or
- 20:57Speaker 3: incidents happening.
- 20:58Speaker 2: It's a pretty standard exercise. The PRC.
- 21:02Speaker 3: played up that exercise in terms of suggesting that it
- 21:06Speaker 3: meant Indonesia's recognition that it had ownership of waters east
- 21:10Speaker 3: of Taiwan. Waters east of Taiwan is massive Pacific Ocean.
- 21:14Speaker 2: So how close they were actually to.
- 21:15Speaker 3: Taiwan is not entirely known. Could be within the EEZ,
- 21:19Speaker 3: but that's 200 nautical miles. But the PRC put out
- 21:23Speaker 3: that impression. Then the Indonesians seemed to struggle to respond.
- 21:27Speaker 3: It took them a day and a half to come
- 21:29Speaker 3: up with a response.
- 21:30Speaker 2: Where they said, well, it's just a passage exercise.
- 21:32Speaker 3: That suggests to me that Indonesians are very focused on themselves.
- 21:36Speaker 3: They sometimes are a little less sensitive to how their
- 21:40Speaker 3: actions with the PRC can be read or manipulated to
- 21:45Speaker 3: be read more broadly.
- 21:48Speaker 1: What is China's vision of how its role should be
- 21:51Speaker 1: here in Southeast Asia from a military security perspective? And
- 21:54Speaker 1: has that changed?
- 21:56Speaker 3: I don't think the vision has changed.
- 21:59Speaker 2: The ability to push.
- 22:00Speaker 3: Forward that vision has. If you look at the way
- 22:04Speaker 3: Beijing has talked about the waters from essentially the west
- 22:10Speaker 3: of Japan, west of Taiwan, the west of Philippines, so
- 22:14Speaker 3: this would include all the South China Sea, they've been
- 22:16Speaker 3: talking about not wanting extra-regional actors to have a role here.
- 22:21Speaker 3: That suggests they don't see the U.S. Navy or any
- 22:26Speaker 3: other Navy, the Australians, etc., who's not a resident actor,
- 22:29Speaker 3: as they would call it, to participate. have a regular
- 22:33Speaker 3: permanent presence. They are wary that a presence by militaries
- 22:41Speaker 3: that are unfriendly could put pressure on their coast, potentially
- 22:46Speaker 3: disrupt their very extended sea lanes of communication, which would
- 22:50Speaker 3: include shipping, marine cables as well.
- 22:54Speaker 2: That's been pretty long-standing.
- 22:56Speaker 3: That lies behind some of their South China Sea claims
- 22:59Speaker 3: as well. What has changed is their increased naval capacity.
- 23:04Speaker 3: They now have, by numbers, the largest navy in the world.
- 23:08Speaker 3: They have increased their technological capability. They're able to project
- 23:14Speaker 3: force a lot more. They've reclaimed these features and maritime
- 23:18Speaker 3: features in the South China Sea, and they fortified them
- 23:21Speaker 3: so they could have a lot of reach. There's been
- 23:24Speaker 3: some estimation by think tanks such as CSIS in Washington, D.C.,
- 23:29Speaker 3: and Aircraft ranges, missile ranges, when you look at these features,
- 23:34Speaker 3: they can extend all the way to Indonesia and Singapore.
- 23:38Speaker 2: That's pretty robust. It's a progression.
- 23:41Speaker 3: I think we're seeing the results of those efforts over
- 23:45Speaker 3: perhaps decades.
- 23:47Speaker 1: What should we be looking out for ahead with regard
- 23:50Speaker 1: to China's military engagement with the region? Are there things
- 23:54Speaker 1: that will potentially be flashpoints or things that potentially, or
- 23:58Speaker 1: trends that we're going to see continue or change?
- 24:01Speaker 3: I think Beijing wants to have a robust presence. They
- 24:04Speaker 3: want to be able to veto anything they see as
- 24:06Speaker 3: potentially hostile against them. And I think that's part of
- 24:09Speaker 3: the military engagement. Also the paramilitary presence, if you're drawing
- 24:14Speaker 3: things like Coast Guard and Maritime Militia, which it's in
- 24:17Speaker 3: this gray area, whether they're military or non-military. That aside,
- 24:21Speaker 3: Beijing also does want to assure the neighbors that it can,
- 24:27Speaker 3: while putting pressure on the neighbors that it can't. such
- 24:30Speaker 3: as the Philippines, because the belief is that its overwhelming
- 24:34Speaker 3: material strengths will allow the PRC to overcome whatever resistance.
- 24:41Speaker 3: You could apply that to the Philippines, to Vietnam, to Taiwan,
- 24:44Speaker 3: which sits to the north end of the South China Sea.
- 24:47Speaker 3: All that, it doesn't necessarily point towards any friction or flashpoint,
- 24:52Speaker 3: but should there be any conflict or escalation, increase in tensions,
- 24:58Speaker 3: then Beijing is in a much stronger position to put
- 25:01Speaker 3: pressure on other actors. It's best to lay this out
- 25:05Speaker 3: in a potential, in a very short example.
- 25:09Speaker 2: If you have any major.
- 25:11Speaker 3: Crisis involving the PRC and the US in, say, anywhere
- 25:16Speaker 3: from the East China Sea to Taiwan to the South
- 25:19Speaker 3: China Sea, Beijing.
- 25:21Speaker 2: Is worried about, say, US involvement.
- 25:23Speaker 3: The military engagement allows them to put more pressure on
- 25:26Speaker 3: regional states not to cooperate with the US. they are
- 25:29Speaker 3: able to deploy and project force in a way that
- 25:31Speaker 3: would complicate any potential U.S. and ally, Australian and all
- 25:35Speaker 3: that involvement. That's what perhaps lies behind some of this
- 25:39Speaker 3: military engagement as well, apart from the assurance and the
- 25:42Speaker 3: military diplomacy bits.
- 25:44Speaker 1: Anything else we should be keeping our eyes on with
- 25:47Speaker 1: regard to this China-Southeast Asia dynamic?
- 25:50Speaker 3: More engagement, including military engagement, to reduce the potential for
- 25:56Speaker 3: misunderstanding is good, but I think countries also have to
- 26:00Speaker 3: be aware that things can take a different turn very quickly.
- 26:04Speaker 3: If there is some sort of crisis anywhere from the
- 26:06Speaker 3: Korean Peninsula, it's very difficult for Southeast Asia to extricate itself.
- 26:12Speaker 3: Many capitals, apart from Manila and maybe Hanoi, believe that
- 26:17Speaker 3: they can sit out and escape, but that's not going
- 26:19Speaker 3: to be possible. Indonesia has been thinking somewhat about this,
- 26:23Speaker 3: closing archipelagic sea lanes, but that could also draw in escalation.
- 26:28Speaker 3: and draw potentially Indonesia into any conflict, which would affect
- 26:32Speaker 3: the rest of Southeast Asia. That depends on the South
- 26:34Speaker 3: China Seas. Myanmar, maybe Thailand, they do have an Indian
- 26:39Speaker 3: Ocean outlet with Malacca Strait and the South China Sea.
- 26:42Speaker 3: Everybody else would likely be drawn in, including Timor-Leste. They
- 26:46Speaker 3: need those sealings too.
- 26:48Speaker 1: This has been a very interesting conversation, Nguyen. Thank you
- 26:51Speaker 1: so much for being here. This is Dr. Ian Chong.
- 26:55Speaker 1: He is an assistant professor of political science at NUS,
- 26:58Speaker 1: and he's also a non-resident fellow at Carnegie China. Ian,
- 27:02Speaker 1: thank you so much for being here on Straight Talk
- 27:04Speaker 1: Southeast Asia.
- 27:05Speaker 2: My pleasure.
- 27:06Speaker 3: Thanks for having me on.
- 27:10Speaker 1: Thank you for listening to the episode. Subscribe to the
- 27:13Speaker 1: show on your favorite podcast listening app. If you'd like
- 27:16Speaker 1: to keep up to date on current Southeast Asian political affairs,
- 27:19Speaker 1: just keep following. This is Bridget Welsh. And I look
- 27:23Speaker 1: forward to connecting to you in the next episode. Straight
- 27:27Speaker 1: Talk Southeast Asia is produced by Norman Chella, a.k.a.
- 27:30Speaker 3: Norm.
- 27:31Speaker 1: And you can find him at thatsthenorm.com. Thanks so much
- 27:35Speaker 1: for listening.