Latest / The Plato Library / Gorgias Gorgias Part 2
Transcript
- 0:02Speaker 1: CHIROPHON. You hear the audience cheering, Gorgias and Socrates, which
- 0:07Speaker 1: shows their desire to listen to you, and for myself,
- 0:29Speaker 1: Heaven forbid that I should have any business on hand
- 0:32Speaker 1: which would take me away from a discussion so interesting
- 0:36Speaker 1: and so ably maintained. Calicles By the gods, Chyrophon, although
- 0:43Speaker 1: I have been present at many discussions, I doubt whether
- 0:47Speaker 1: I was ever so much delighted before, and therefore, if
- 0:50Speaker 1: you go on discoursing all day, I shall be the
- 0:53Speaker 1: better pleased. Socrates I may truly say, Calicles, that I
- 0:59Speaker 1: am willing, if Gorgias is. Gorgias. After all this, Socrates,
- 1:07Speaker 1: I should be disgraced if I refused, especially as I
- 1:11Speaker 1: have promised to answer all comers. In accordance with the
- 1:14Speaker 1: wishes of the company, then, do you begin and ask
- 1:18Speaker 1: of me any question which you like? Socrates. Let me
- 1:24Speaker 1: tell you then, Gorgias, what surprises me in your words.
- 1:29Speaker 1: Though I dare say that you may be right, and
- 1:32Speaker 1: I may have misunderstood your meaning, you say that you
- 1:36Speaker 1: can make any man who will learn of you a rhetorician. Gorgias. Yes. Socrates.
- 1:45Speaker 1: Do you mean that you will teach him to gain
- 1:47Speaker 1: the ears of the multitude on any subject, and this
- 1:51Speaker 1: not by instruction, but by persuasion? Gorgias. Quite so. Socrates.
- 1:59Speaker 1: You were saying, in fact, that the rhetorician will have
- 2:02Speaker 1: greater powers of persuasion than the physician even in a
- 2:05Speaker 1: matter of health? Gorgias. Yes, with the multitude, that is. Socrates.
- 2:14Speaker 1: You mean to say, with the ignorant, for with those
- 2:17Speaker 1: who know he cannot be supposed to have greater powers
- 2:20Speaker 1: of persuasion? Gorgias. Very true. Socrates. But if he is
- 2:26Speaker 1: to have more power of persuasion than the physician, he
- 2:30Speaker 1: will have greater power than he who knows. Gorgias Certainly
- 2:36Speaker 1: Socrates Although he is not a physician, is he? Gorgias
- 2:41Speaker 1: No Socrates And he who is not a physician must, obviously,
- 2:47Speaker 1: be ignorant of what the physician knows. Gorgias Clearly Socrates
- 2:54Speaker 1: Then When the rhetorician is more persuasive than the physician,
- 2:59Speaker 1: the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he
- 3:03Speaker 1: who has knowledge. Is not that the inference? In the
- 3:08Speaker 1: case supposed, yes. And the same holds of the relation
- 3:15Speaker 1: of rhetoric to all the other arts. The rhetorician need
- 3:19Speaker 1: not know the truth about things. He has only to
- 3:22Speaker 1: discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has
- 3:26Speaker 1: more knowledge than those who know. Gorgias. Yes, Socrates, and
- 3:31Speaker 1: is not this a great comfort, not to have learned
- 3:35Speaker 1: the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only, and
- 3:38Speaker 1: yet to be in no way inferior to the professors
- 3:41Speaker 1: of them? Socrates. Whether the rhetorician is or not inferior
- 3:47Speaker 1: on this account is a question which we will hereafter
- 3:50Speaker 1: examine if the enquiry is likely to be of any
- 3:53Speaker 1: service to us. But I would rather begin by asking
- 3:57Speaker 1: whether he is or is not as ignorant of the
- 4:00Speaker 1: just and unjust, base and honourable, good and evil, as
- 4:06Speaker 1: he is of medicine and the other arts. I mean
- 4:09Speaker 1: to say, does he really know anything of what is
- 4:12Speaker 1: good and evil, base or honourable, just or unjust in them,
- 4:17Speaker 1: or has he only a way with the ignorant of
- 4:19Speaker 1: persuading them that he, not knowing, is to be esteemed
- 4:23Speaker 1: to know more about these things than someone else who knows.
- 4:28Speaker 1: Or must the pupil know these things and come to
- 4:31Speaker 1: you knowing them before he can acquire the art of rhetoric?
- 4:35Speaker 1: If he is ignorant, you who are the teacher of
- 4:37Speaker 1: rhetoric will not teach him. It is not your business,
- 4:41Speaker 1: but you will make him seem to the multitude to
- 4:44Speaker 1: know them when he does not know them, and seem
- 4:48Speaker 1: to be a good man when he is not. Or
- 4:52Speaker 1: will you be unable to teach him rhetoric at all,
- 4:55Speaker 1: unless he knows the truth of these things first? What
- 4:58Speaker 1: is to be said about all this? By heavens, Gorgias,
- 5:02Speaker 1: I wish that you would reveal to me the power
- 5:04Speaker 1: of rhetoric, as you were saying that you would. Gorgias, well, Socrates,
- 5:11Speaker 1: I suppose that if the pupil does chance not to
- 5:14Speaker 1: know them, he will have to learn of me these
- 5:17Speaker 1: things as well. Socrates, say no more. for there you
- 5:22Speaker 1: are right. And so he whom you make a rhetorician
- 5:26Speaker 1: must either know the nature of the just and unjust already,
- 5:30Speaker 1: or he must be taught by you. Gorgias. Certainly. Socrates. Well,
- 5:36Speaker 1: and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter? Gorgias. Yes. Socrates.
- 5:45Speaker 1: And he who has learned music, a musician? Gorgias. Yes. Socrates.
- 5:51Speaker 1: And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in
- 5:54Speaker 1: like manner. He who has learned anything whatever is that
- 5:58Speaker 1: which his knowledge makes him. Gorgias. Certainly. Socrates. And in
- 6:04Speaker 1: the same way, he who has learned what is just
- 6:08Speaker 1: is just. Gorgias. To be sure. Socrates. And he who
- 6:14Speaker 1: is just may be supposed to do what is just. Gorgias. Yes. Socrates.
- 6:23Speaker 1: And must not the just man always desire to do
- 6:26Speaker 1: what is just? Gorgias. That is clearly the inference. Socrates. Surely, then,
- 6:33Speaker 1: the just man will never consent to do injustice. Gorgias.
- 6:38Speaker 1: Certainly not. Socrates. And according to the argument the rhetorician
- 6:44Speaker 1: must be a just man? Gorgias. Yes. Socrates. and will
- 6:50Speaker 1: therefore never be willing to do injustice. Gorgias. Clearly not. Socrates.
- 6:58Speaker 1: But do you remember saying just now that the trainer
- 7:01Speaker 1: is not to be accused or banished if the pugilist
- 7:04Speaker 1: makes a wrong use of his pugilistic art? And in
- 7:07Speaker 1: like manner, if the rhetorician makes a bad and unjust
- 7:11Speaker 1: use of his rhetoric, that is not to be laid
- 7:14Speaker 1: to the charge of his teacher, who is not to
- 7:16Speaker 1: be banished, but the wrongdoer himself. who made a bad
- 7:20Speaker 1: use of his rhetoric. He is to be banished. Was
- 7:23Speaker 1: not that said? Gorgias. Yes, it was. Socrates. But now
- 7:29Speaker 1: we are affirming that the aforesaid rhetorician will never have
- 7:33Speaker 1: done injustice at all. Gorgias. True. Socrates. And at the
- 7:40Speaker 1: very outset, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric treated of discourse, not,
- 7:46Speaker 1: like arithmetic, about odd and even, but about just and unjust.
- 7:52Speaker 1: Was not this said? Gorgias, yes. Socrates, I was thinking
- 7:58Speaker 1: at the time, when I heard you saying so, that rhetoric,
- 8:02Speaker 1: which is always discoursing about justice, could not possibly be
- 8:06Speaker 1: an unjust thing. But when you added, shortly afterwards, that
- 8:10Speaker 1: the rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric, I
- 8:13Speaker 1: noted with surprise the inconsistency into which you had fallen.
- 8:18Speaker 1: And I said, that if you thought as i did
- 8:21Speaker 1: that there was a gain in being refuted there would
- 8:25Speaker 1: be an advantage in going on with the question but
- 8:29Speaker 1: if not i would leave off and in the course
- 8:33Speaker 1: of our investigations as you will see yourself the rhetorician
- 8:37Speaker 1: has been acknowledged to be incapable of making an unjust
- 8:41Speaker 1: use of rhetoric or of willingness to do injustice by
- 8:45Speaker 1: the dog there will be a great deal of discussion
- 8:50Speaker 1: before we get at the truth of all this. Paulus.
- 8:55Speaker 1: And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are
- 9:00Speaker 1: now saying about rhetoric? What, because Gorgias was ashamed to
- 9:05Speaker 1: deny that the rhetorician knew the just and the honourable
- 9:08Speaker 1: and the good, and admitted that to anyone who came
- 9:12Speaker 1: to him ignorant of them he could teach them? And then,
- 9:16Speaker 1: Out of this admission there arose a contradiction, the thing
- 9:20Speaker 1: which you dearly love, and to which not he, but you,
- 9:24Speaker 1: brought the argument by your captious questions. Do you seriously
- 9:29Speaker 1: believe that there is any truth in all this? For
- 9:32Speaker 1: will anyone ever acknowledge that he does not know or
- 9:36Speaker 1: cannot teach the nature of justice? The truth is that
- 9:40Speaker 1: there is a great want of manners in bringing the
- 9:43Speaker 1: argument to such a pass. socrates illustrious polus the reason
- 9:50Speaker 1: why we provide ourselves with friends and children is that
- 9:54Speaker 1: when we get old and stumble a younger generation may
- 9:57Speaker 1: be at hand to set us on our legs again
- 10:00Speaker 1: in our words and in our actions. And now, if
- 10:04Speaker 1: I and Gorgias are stumbling, here are you who should
- 10:08Speaker 1: raise us up. And I for my part engage to
- 10:12Speaker 1: retract any error into which you may think that I
- 10:15Speaker 1: have fallen. Upon one condition. Paulus. What condition? Socrates, that
- 10:23Speaker 1: you contract, Paulus, the prolixity of speech in which you
- 10:27Speaker 1: indulged at first. Paulus, what? Do you mean that I
- 10:33Speaker 1: may not use as many words as I please? Socrates,
- 10:39Speaker 1: only to think, my friend, that having come on a
- 10:42Speaker 1: visit to Athens, which is the most free-spoken state in Hellas, you,
- 10:47Speaker 1: when you got there, and you alone, should be deprived
- 10:50Speaker 1: of the power of speech that would be hard indeed
- 10:54Speaker 1: but then consider my case shall not i be very
- 10:58Speaker 1: hardly used if when you are making a long oration
- 11:02Speaker 1: and refusing to answer what you are asked i am
- 11:05Speaker 1: compelled to stay and listen to you and may not
- 11:08Speaker 1: go away i say rather if you have a real
- 11:12Speaker 1: interest in the argument or to repeat my former expression
- 11:17Speaker 1: have any desire to set it on its legs, take
- 11:21Speaker 1: back any statement which you please, and in your turn
- 11:25Speaker 1: ask and answer, like myself and Gorgias, refute and be refuted.
- 11:32Speaker 1: For I suppose that you would claim to know what
- 11:35Speaker 1: Gorgias knows, would you not? Paulus. Yes. Socrates. And you,
- 11:43Speaker 1: like him, invite anyone to ask you about anything which
- 11:46Speaker 1: he pleases, and you will know how to answer him, Paulus,
- 11:50Speaker 1: to be sure. Socrates. And now, which will you do,
- 11:56Speaker 1: ask or answer? Paulus. I will ask, and do you
- 12:01Speaker 1: answer me, Socrates, the same question which Gorgias, as you suppose,
- 12:06Speaker 1: is unable to answer. What is rhetoric? Socrates. Do you
- 12:12Speaker 1: mean what sort of an art? Paulus. Yes. Socrates. To
- 12:18Speaker 1: say the truth, Paulus, it is not an art at all,
- 12:22Speaker 1: in my opinion. Paulus. Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric? Socrates.
- 12:30Speaker 1: A thing which, as I was lately reading in a
- 12:32Speaker 1: book of yours, you say that you have made an art. Paulus.
- 12:39Speaker 1: What thing? Socrates. I should say a sort of experience. Paulus,
- 12:46Speaker 1: does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience? Socrates,
- 12:51Speaker 1: that is my view, but you may be of another mind. Paulus,
- 12:55Speaker 1: an experience in what? Socrates, an experience in producing a
- 13:00Speaker 1: sort of delight and gratification. Paulus, and if able to
- 13:06Speaker 1: gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine thing? Socrates,
- 13:12Speaker 1: What are you saying, Paulus? Why do you ask me
- 13:15Speaker 1: whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, when I
- 13:18Speaker 1: have not as yet told you what rhetoric is? Paulus,
- 13:22Speaker 1: did I not hear you say that rhetoric was a
- 13:24Speaker 1: sort of experience? Socrates, will you, who are so desirous
- 13:30Speaker 1: to gratify others, afford a slight gratification to me? Paulus,
- 13:35Speaker 1: I will. Socrates, will you ask me what sort of
- 13:40Speaker 1: an art is cookery? Paulus. What sort of an art
- 13:45Speaker 1: is cookery? Socrates. Not an art at all, Paulus. Paulus.
- 13:50Speaker 1: What then? Socrates. I should say an experience. Paulus. In what?
- 13:57Speaker 1: I wish you would explain to me. Socrates. An experience
- 14:01Speaker 1: in producing a sort of delight and gratification, Paulus. Paulus.
- 14:07Speaker 1: Then are cookery and rhetoric the same? Socrates. No. they
- 14:12Speaker 1: are only different parts of the same profession. Paulus. Of
- 14:17Speaker 1: what profession? Socrates. I am afraid that the truth may
- 14:22Speaker 1: seem discourteous, and I hesitate to answer, lest Gorgias should
- 14:28Speaker 1: imagine that I am making fun of his own profession.
- 14:32Speaker 1: For whether or no this is that art of rhetoric
- 14:35Speaker 1: which Gorgias practices, I really cannot tell. From what he
- 14:39Speaker 1: was just now saying, Nothing appeared of what he thought
- 14:42Speaker 1: of his art, but the rhetoric which I mean is
- 14:45Speaker 1: a part of a not very creditable whole. A part
- 14:51Speaker 1: of what, Socrates? Say what you mean, and never mind me.
- 14:58Speaker 1: In my opinion, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is
- 15:01Speaker 1: a part is not an art at all, but the
- 15:04Speaker 1: habit of a bold and ready wit, which knows how
- 15:08Speaker 1: to manage mankind, this habit I sum up under the
- 15:11Speaker 1: word flattery, and it appears to me to have many
- 15:15Speaker 1: other parts, one of which is cookery, which may seem
- 15:18Speaker 1: to be an art, but, as I maintain, is only
- 15:23Speaker 1: an experience or routine, and not an art. Another part
- 15:28Speaker 1: is rhetoric, and the art of attiring and sophistry are
- 15:32Speaker 1: two others. Thus there are four branches, and four different
- 15:36Speaker 1: things answering to them, and Paulus may ask if he likes,
- 15:41Speaker 1: for he has not as yet been informed what part
- 15:44Speaker 1: of flattery is rhetoric. He did not see that I
- 15:48Speaker 1: had not yet answered him when he proceeded to ask
- 15:51Speaker 1: a further question whether I do not think rhetoric a
- 15:54Speaker 1: fine thing. But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric
- 15:58Speaker 1: is a fine thing or not until I have first
- 16:02Speaker 1: answered what is rhetoric, for that would not be right, Paulus.
- 16:07Speaker 1: but I shall be happy to answer if you will
- 16:09Speaker 1: ask me what part of flattery is rhetoric. Paulus, I
- 16:15Speaker 1: will ask, and do you answer, what part of flattery
- 16:19Speaker 1: is rhetoric? Socrates, will you understand my answer? Rhetoric, according
- 16:26Speaker 1: to my view, is the ghost, or counterfeit, of a
- 16:30Speaker 1: part of politics. Paulus, and noble or ignoble? Socrates, ignoble,
- 16:39Speaker 1: I should say, if I am compelled to answer, for
- 16:42Speaker 1: I call what is bad ignoble, though I doubt whether
- 16:47Speaker 1: you understand what I was saying before. Gorgias, indeed, Socrates,
- 16:52Speaker 1: I cannot say that I understand myself. Socrates, I do
- 16:57Speaker 1: not wonder, Gorgias, for I have not as yet explained myself,
- 17:02Speaker 1: and our friend Paulus, colt by name and colt by nature,
- 17:06Speaker 1: is apt to run away. This is an untranslatable play
- 17:14Speaker 1: on the name Paulus, which means a colt. Gorgias, never
- 17:22Speaker 1: mind him, but explain to me what you mean by
- 17:26Speaker 1: saying that rhetoric is the counterfeit of a part of politics. Socrates,
- 17:32Speaker 1: I will try then to explain my notion of rhetoric
- 17:36Speaker 1: and if I am mistaken, my friend Paulus shall refute me.
- 17:40Speaker 1: We may assume the existence of bodies and of souls. Gorgias,
- 17:45Speaker 1: of course. Socrates, you would further admit that there is
- 17:50Speaker 1: a good condition of either of them? Gorgias, yes. Socrates,
- 17:56Speaker 1: which condition may not be really good, but good only
- 18:00Speaker 1: in appearance? I mean to say that there are many
- 18:04Speaker 1: persons who appear to be in good health, and whom
- 18:07Speaker 1: only a physician or trainer will discern, at first sight,
- 18:11Speaker 1: not to be in good health. Gorgias. True. Socrates. And
- 18:17Speaker 1: this applies not only to the body, but also to
- 18:20Speaker 1: the soul. In either, there may be that which gives
- 18:23Speaker 1: the appearance of health, and not the reality. Gorgias. Yes, certainly. Socrates.
- 18:32Speaker 1: and now I will endeavour to explain to you more
- 18:34Speaker 1: clearly what I mean. The soul and body being two,
- 18:39Speaker 1: have two arts corresponding to them. There is the art
- 18:43Speaker 1: of politics, attending on the soul, and another art attending
- 18:47Speaker 1: on the body, of which I know no single name,
- 18:51Speaker 1: but which may be described as having two divisions, one
- 18:54Speaker 1: of them gymnastic and the other medicine. And in politics
- 18:59Speaker 1: there is a legislative part, which answers to gymnastic as
- 19:04Speaker 1: justice does to medicine, and the two parts run into
- 19:08Speaker 1: one another, justice having to do with the same subject
- 19:12Speaker 1: as legislation, and medicine with the same subject as gymnastic,
- 19:18Speaker 1: but with a difference. Now, seeing that there are these
- 19:23Speaker 1: four arts, two attending on the body and two on
- 19:27Speaker 1: the soul for their highest good, flattery knowing, or rather
- 19:31Speaker 1: guessing their natures has distributed herself into four shams or
- 19:37Speaker 1: simulations of them she puts on the likeness of some
- 19:41Speaker 1: one or other of them and pretends to be that
- 19:44Speaker 1: which she simulates and having no regard for men's highest
- 19:49Speaker 1: interests is ever making pleasure the bait of the unwary,
- 19:54Speaker 1: and deceiving them into the belief that she is of
- 19:58Speaker 1: the highest value to them, cookery simulates the disguise of medicine,
- 20:04Speaker 1: and pretends to know what food is the best for
- 20:06Speaker 1: the body, and if the physician and the cook had
- 20:10Speaker 1: to enter into a competition in which children were the
- 20:13Speaker 1: judges or men who had no more sense than children
- 20:17Speaker 1: as to which of them best understands the goodness or
- 20:21Speaker 1: badness of food the physician would be starved to death
- 20:25Speaker 1: a flattery i deem this to be and of an
- 20:28Speaker 1: ignoble sort polus for to you i am now addressing
- 20:31Speaker 1: myself because it aims at pleasure without any thought of
- 20:35Speaker 1: the best An art I do not call it, but
- 20:39Speaker 1: only an experience, because it is unable to explain or
- 20:43Speaker 1: to give a reason of the nature of its own applications,
- 20:47Speaker 1: and I do not call any irrational thing an art,
- 20:52Speaker 1: but if you dispute my words I am prepared to
- 20:55Speaker 1: argue in defence of them. Cookery, then, I maintain to
- 21:01Speaker 1: be a flattery which takes the form of medicine, and
- 21:04Speaker 1: tiring in like manner is a flattery which takes the
- 21:08Speaker 1: form of gymnastic, and is knavish, false, ignoble, illiberal, working
- 21:14Speaker 1: deceitfully by the help of lines, and colours, and enamels,
- 21:19Speaker 1: and garments, and making men affect a spurious beauty to
- 21:24Speaker 1: the neglect of the true beauty which is given by gymnastic.
- 21:29Speaker 1: I would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will
- 21:32Speaker 1: only say after the manner of the geometricians, for I
- 21:37Speaker 1: think that by this time you will be able to follow.
- 21:41Speaker 1: As tiring is to gymnastic, so cookery is to medicine,
- 21:47Speaker 1: or rather, as tiring is to gymnastic, so sophistry is
- 21:53Speaker 1: to legislation, and as cookery is to medicine, so rhetoric
- 22:00Speaker 1: is to justice. And this, I say, is the natural
- 22:05Speaker 1: difference between the rhetorician and the sophist, but by reason
- 22:09Speaker 1: of their near connection. They are apt to be jumbled
- 22:13Speaker 1: up together. Neither do they know what to make of themselves,
- 22:18Speaker 1: nor do other men know what to make of them.
- 22:21Speaker 1: For if the body presided over itself, and were not
- 22:24Speaker 1: under the guidance of the soul, and the soul did
- 22:27Speaker 1: not discern and discriminate between cookery and medicine, but the
- 22:31Speaker 1: body was made the judge of them, and the rule
- 22:34Speaker 1: of judgment was the bodily delight which was given by them,
- 22:38Speaker 1: then the word of Anaxagoras, that word with which you,
- 22:43Speaker 1: friend Paulus, are so well acquainted, would prevail far and wide.
- 22:49Speaker 1: Chaos would come again, and cookery, health, and medicine would
- 22:54Speaker 1: mingle in an indiscriminate mass. And now I have told
- 22:59Speaker 1: you my notion of rhetoric. which is, in relation to
- 23:02Speaker 1: the soul, what cookery is to the body. I may
- 23:07Speaker 1: have been inconsistent in making a long speech, when I
- 23:11Speaker 1: would not allow you to discourse at length. But I
- 23:14Speaker 1: think that I may be excused, because you did not
- 23:17Speaker 1: understand me, and could make no use of my answer
- 23:21Speaker 1: when I spoke shortly, and therefore I had to enter
- 23:25Speaker 1: into an explanation. And if I show an equal inability
- 23:29Speaker 1: to make use of yours, I hope that you will
- 23:32Speaker 1: speak at equal length, but if I am able to
- 23:35Speaker 1: understand you, let me have the benefit of your brevity,
- 23:39Speaker 1: as is only fair, and now you may do what
- 23:43Speaker 1: you please with my answer. Paulus, what do you mean?
- 23:48Speaker 1: Do you think that rhetoric is flattery? Socrates, nay, I
- 23:53Speaker 1: said a part of flattery. If at your age, Paulus,
- 23:57Speaker 1: you cannot remember, what will you do by and by?
- 24:01Speaker 1: when you get older. Paulus. And are the good rhetoricians
- 24:06Speaker 1: meanly regarded in states, under the idea that they are flatterers? Socrates.
- 24:13Speaker 1: Is that a question, or the beginning of a speech? Paulus.
- 24:18Speaker 1: I am asking a question. Socrates. Then my answer is
- 24:22Speaker 1: that they are not regarded at all. Paulus. How not regarded?
- 24:28Speaker 1: Have they not very great power in states? Socrates, not
- 24:32Speaker 1: if you mean to say that power is a good
- 24:35Speaker 1: to the possessor. Paulus, and that is what I do
- 24:38Speaker 1: mean to say. Socrates, then, if so, I think that
- 24:43Speaker 1: they have the least power of all the citizens. Paulus, what?
- 24:47Speaker 1: Are they not like tyrants? They kill and despoil and
- 24:51Speaker 1: exile any one whom they please. Socrates, by the dog, Paulus,
- 24:57Speaker 1: I cannot make out at each deliverance of yours whether
- 25:00Speaker 1: you are giving an opinion of your own or asking
- 25:04Speaker 1: a question of me. Paulus, I am asking a question
- 25:08Speaker 1: of you. Socrates, yes, my friend, but you ask two
- 25:13Speaker 1: questions at once. Paulus, how two questions? Socrates, why, did
- 25:21Speaker 1: you not say just now that the rhetoricians are like tyrants,
- 25:26Speaker 1: and that they kill and despoil or exile any one
- 25:29Speaker 1: whom they please? Paulus, I did. Socrates, well then, I
- 25:34Speaker 1: say to you that here are two questions in one,
- 25:37Speaker 1: and I will answer both of them. And I tell you, Paulus,
- 25:41Speaker 1: that rhetoricians and tyrants have the least possible power in states.
- 25:46Speaker 1: As I was just now saying, for they do literally
- 25:49Speaker 1: nothing which they will, but only what they think best. Paulus,
- 25:55Speaker 1: and is not that a great power? Socrates, Paulus has
- 25:59Speaker 1: already said the reverse. Paulus said the reverse, nay, that
- 26:04Speaker 1: is what I assert. Socrates, no, by the great, what
- 26:09Speaker 1: you call him, not you, for you say that power
- 26:13Speaker 1: is a good to him who has the power. Paulus,
- 26:16Speaker 1: I do. Socrates, and would you maintain that if a
- 26:20Speaker 1: fool does what he thinks best, this is a good,
- 26:24Speaker 1: and would you call this great power? Paulus, I should not. Socrates.
- 26:31Speaker 1: Then you must prove that the rhetorician is not a fool,
- 26:34Speaker 1: and that rhetoric is an art and not a flattery.
- 26:38Speaker 1: And so you will have refuted me. But if you
- 26:41Speaker 1: leave me unrefuted, why, the rhetoricians, who do what they
- 26:46Speaker 1: think best in states, and the tyrants, will have nothing
- 26:49Speaker 1: upon which to congratulate themselves, if, as you say, power
- 26:54Speaker 1: be indeed a good admitting at the same time that
- 26:58Speaker 1: what is done without sense is an evil. Paulus. Yes,
- 27:03Speaker 1: I admit that. Socrates. How, then, can the rhetoricians or
- 27:08Speaker 1: the tyrants have great power in states, unless Paulus can
- 27:12Speaker 1: refute Socrates and prove to him that they do as
- 27:17Speaker 1: they will? Paulus. This fellow. Socrates. I say that they
- 27:24Speaker 1: do not do as they will. Now refute me. Paulus Why,
- 27:31Speaker 1: have you not already said that they do as they
- 27:33Speaker 1: think best? Socrates And I say so still. Paulus Then
- 27:39Speaker 1: surely they do as they will. Socrates I deny it.
- 27:43Speaker 1: Paulus But they do what they think best. Socrates I
- 27:49Speaker 1: Paulus That Socrates is monstrous and absurd. Socrates Good words,
- 27:56Speaker 1: good Paulus, as I may say in your own peculiar style.
- 28:00Speaker 1: But if you have any questions to ask of me,
- 28:03Speaker 1: either prove that I am in error, or give the
- 28:06Speaker 1: answer yourself. Paulus, very well, I am willing to answer
- 28:11Speaker 1: that I may know what you mean. Socrates, do men
- 28:16Speaker 1: appear to you to will that which they do, or
- 28:19Speaker 1: to will that further end for the sake of which
- 28:22Speaker 1: they do a thing? When they take medicine, for example,
- 28:26Speaker 1: at the bidding of a physician, do they will the
- 28:29Speaker 1: drinking of the medicine which is painful, or the health
- 28:32Speaker 1: for the sake of which they drink? Paulus. Clearly, the health. Socrates.
- 28:39Speaker 1: And when men go on a voyage or engage in business,
- 28:42Speaker 1: they do not will that which they are doing at
- 28:45Speaker 1: the time, for who would desire to take the risk
- 28:48Speaker 1: of a voyage or the trouble of business? But they will,
- 28:52Speaker 1: to have the wealth, for the sake of which they
- 28:55Speaker 1: go on a voyage. Paulus. Certainly. Socrates. And is not
- 29:00Speaker 1: this universally true? If a man does something for the
- 29:04Speaker 1: sake of something else, he wills not that which he does,
- 29:08Speaker 1: but that for the sake of which he does it. Paulus. Yes. Socrates.
- 29:14Speaker 1: And are not all things either good or evil? Or
- 29:18Speaker 1: intermediate and indifferent? Paulus. To be sure, Socrates. socrates wisdom
- 29:25Speaker 1: and health and wealth and the like you would call
- 29:28Speaker 1: goods and their opposites evils polus i should socrates and
- 29:36Speaker 1: the things which are neither good nor evil and which
- 29:38Speaker 1: partake sometimes of the nature of good, and at other
- 29:42Speaker 1: times of evil, or of neither, are such as sitting, walking, running, sailing,
- 29:49Speaker 1: or again wood, stones, and the like. These are the
- 29:53Speaker 1: things which you call neither good nor evil. Paulus, exactly so. Socrates,
- 30:00Speaker 1: Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good,
- 30:04Speaker 1: or the good for the sake of the indifferent? Paulus
- 30:08Speaker 1: Clearly the indifferent for the sake of the good. Socrates
- 30:13Speaker 1: When we walk, we walk for the sake of the good,
- 30:16Speaker 1: and under the idea that it is better to walk,
- 30:19Speaker 1: and when we stand, we stand equally for the sake
- 30:22Speaker 1: of the good. Paulus Yes Socrates And when we kill
- 30:28Speaker 1: a man, we kill him or exile him or despoil
- 30:31Speaker 1: him of his goods, because, as we think, it will
- 30:35Speaker 1: conduce to our good. Paulus, certainly. Socrates, men who do
- 30:42Speaker 1: any of these things do them for the sake of
- 30:44Speaker 1: the good. Paulus, yes. Socrates, and did we not admit
- 30:50Speaker 1: that in doing something for the sake of something else,
- 30:53Speaker 1: we do not will those things which we do but
- 30:57Speaker 1: that other thing for the sake of which we do them. Paulus,
- 31:01Speaker 1: most true. Socrates, then we do not will simply to
- 31:06Speaker 1: kill a man, or to exile him, or to despoil
- 31:09Speaker 1: him of his goods, but we will to do that
- 31:12Speaker 1: which conduces to our good. And if the act is
- 31:15Speaker 1: not conducive to our good, we do not will it.
- 31:19Speaker 1: For we will, as you say, that which is our good,
- 31:23Speaker 1: but that which is neither good nor evil, or simply evil.
- 31:27Speaker 1: we do not will. Why are you silent, Paulus? Am
- 31:30Speaker 1: I not right? Paulus, you are right. Socrates, hence we
- 31:37Speaker 1: may infer that if anyone, whether he be a tyrant
- 31:42Speaker 1: or a rhetorician, kills another or exiles another or deprives
- 31:47Speaker 1: him of his property under the idea that the act
- 31:51Speaker 1: is for his own interests when really not for his
- 31:55Speaker 1: own interests. he may be said to do what seems
- 31:58Speaker 1: best to him. Paulus, yes. Socrates, but does he do
- 32:04Speaker 1: what he wills if he does what is evil? Why
- 32:09Speaker 1: do you not answer? Paulus, well, I suppose not. Socrates, then,
- 32:16Speaker 1: if great power is a good as you allow, will
- 32:20Speaker 1: such a one have great power in the state? Paulus,
- 32:24Speaker 1: he will not. Socrates, Then I was right in saying
- 32:28Speaker 1: that a man may do what seems good to him
- 32:31Speaker 1: in a state, and not have great power, and not
- 32:34Speaker 1: do what he wills. Paulus As though you, Socrates, would
- 32:39Speaker 1: not like to have the power of doing what seemed
- 32:41Speaker 1: good to you in the state. Rather than not, you
- 32:46Speaker 1: would not be jealous when you saw anyone killing, or despoiling,
- 32:50Speaker 1: or imprisoning whom he pleased. Oh no! Socrates Justly or
- 32:57Speaker 1: unjustly do you mean? Paulus, in either case, is he
- 33:01Speaker 1: not equally to be envied? Socrates, forbear Paulus. Paulus, why forbear? Socrates,
- 33:11Speaker 1: because you ought not to envy wretches who are not
- 33:14Speaker 1: to be envied, but only to pity them. Paulus, and
- 33:18Speaker 1: are those of whom I spoke wretches? Socrates, yes, certainly
- 33:23Speaker 1: they are. Paulus, And so you think that he who
- 33:28Speaker 1: slays anyone whom he pleases, and justly slays him, is
- 33:32Speaker 1: pitiable and wretched? Socrates, no, I do not say that
- 33:37Speaker 1: of him, but neither do I think that he is
- 33:39Speaker 1: to be envied. Paulus, were you not saying just now
- 33:43Speaker 1: that he is wretched? Socrates, yes, my friend, if he
- 33:48Speaker 1: killed another unjustly, in which case he is also to
- 33:52Speaker 1: be pitied. and he is not to be envied if
- 33:55Speaker 1: he kill him justly. Paulus, at any rate you will
- 34:00Speaker 1: allow that he who is unjustly put to death is
- 34:03Speaker 1: wretched and to be pitied. Socrates, not so much Paulus
- 34:08Speaker 1: as he who kills him, and not so much as
- 34:11Speaker 1: he who is justly killed. Paulus, how can that be Socrates? Socrates,
- 34:18Speaker 1: that may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is
- 34:22Speaker 1: the greatest of evils. Paulus But is it the greatest?
- 34:28Speaker 1: Is not suffering injustice a greater evil? Socrates Certainly not.
- 34:33Speaker 1: Paulus Then would you rather suffer than do injustice? Socrates
- 34:40Speaker 1: I should not like either, but if I must choose
- 34:43Speaker 1: between them, I would rather suffer than do. Paulus then
- 34:49Speaker 1: you would not wish to be a tyrant? Socrates, not
- 34:53Speaker 1: if you mean by tyranny what I mean. Paulus, I mean,
- 34:58Speaker 1: as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems
- 35:01Speaker 1: good to you in a state, killing, banishing, doing in
- 35:06Speaker 1: all things as you like. Socrates, well then, illustrious friend,
- 35:13Speaker 1: when I have said my say, do you reply to me?
- 35:17Speaker 1: Suppose that I go into a crowded agora, and take
- 35:20Speaker 1: a dagger under my arm. Paulus, I say to you,
- 35:23Speaker 1: I have just acquired rare power, and become a tyrant.
- 35:27Speaker 1: For if I think that any of these men whom
- 35:30Speaker 1: you see ought to be put to death, the man
- 35:33Speaker 1: whom I have a mind to kill is as good
- 35:36Speaker 1: as dead. And if I am disposed to break his head,
- 35:39Speaker 1: or tear his garment, he will have his head broken,
- 35:43Speaker 1: or his garment torn, in an instant. Such is my
- 35:47Speaker 1: great power in this city. And if you do not
- 35:50Speaker 1: believe me, and I show you the dagger, you would
- 35:53Speaker 1: probably reply, Socrates, in that sort of way any one
- 35:59Speaker 1: may have great power. He may burn any house which
- 36:02Speaker 1: he pleases, and the docks and triremes of the Athenians,
- 36:07Speaker 1: and all their other vessels, whether public or private. But
- 36:12Speaker 1: can you believe that this mere doing, as you think best,
- 36:16Speaker 1: is great power? Paulus, certainly not such doing as this. Socrates,
- 36:24Speaker 1: but can you tell me why you disapprove of such
- 36:27Speaker 1: a power? Paulus, I can. Socrates, why then? Paulus, why?
- 36:36Speaker 1: Because he who did as you say would be certain
- 36:40Speaker 1: to be punished. Socrates, and punishment is an evil? Paulus, certainly. Socrates,
- 36:49Speaker 1: And you would admit once more, my good sir, that
- 36:53Speaker 1: great power is a benefit to a man if his
- 36:56Speaker 1: actions turn out to his advantage, and that this is
- 37:00Speaker 1: the meaning of great power, and if not, then his
- 37:03Speaker 1: power is an evil and is no power. But let
- 37:07Speaker 1: us look at the matter in another way. Do we
- 37:11Speaker 1: not acknowledge that the things of which we were speaking,
- 37:14Speaker 1: the infliction of death and exiles, and the deprivation of
- 37:19Speaker 1: property are sometimes a good and sometimes not a good. Paulus, certainly. Socrates,
- 37:28Speaker 1: about that you and I may be supposed to agree. Paulus, yes.
- 37:37Speaker 1: End of Part 6 Recording by Kevin Johnson