Latest / ACLED Audio / REPORT: The end of peace talks risks exposing Colombia’s southwest transport industry to increasing violence
Transcript
- 0:06SPEAKER_00: The end of peace talks risks exposing Colombia's southwest transport industry to increasing violence.
- 0:13SPEAKER_00: Executive Summary Colombia's southwestern border departments of Nariño and Putumayo have come under renewed military focus under President Abelardo de la Espriea's new government after years of declining violence levels, coinciding with peace talks between former President Gustavo Petro's government and armed groups.
- 0:35SPEAKER_00: The departments are important hubs for the trade and transportation of agricultural products to the central parts of the country and neighboring Ecuador.
- 0:45SPEAKER_00: At the same time, they are notable centers of coca production, drug trafficking, and illegal mining.
- 0:52SPEAKER_00: In pursuing a militarized approach to armed groups in these border departments, De la Espria has soothed tensions with neighboring Ecuador's president Daniel Naboa, who had actively opposed negotiations with armed groups under Petro's government.
- 1:08SPEAKER_00: De la Espria's abandonment of negotiations in favor of a country-wide military offensive against armed groups is likely to result in an increase in violence in the remainder of 2026.
- 1:22SPEAKER_00: The transportation sector is particularly at risk and will likely be more exposed to armed groups threats and sabotage of the main highways, both in these departments and in departments such as Cauca, further along the Patilla River.
- 1:38SPEAKER_00: By contrast, if coupled with measures to address the structural causes of conflict, improved coordination between Colombia and Ecuador is likely to help weaken armed groups in the coming year or two, benefiting cross-border trade.
- 1:54SPEAKER_00: Peace negotiations curbed violence in Colombia's southwest, but did not solve the root causes of conflict.
- 2:02SPEAKER_00: Nariño and Putumayo are two of Colombia's departments with the most coca crops.
- 2:08SPEAKER_00: They also have strategic drug trafficking routes toward Ecuador and the Pacific Ocean.
- 2:13SPEAKER_00: Refer to the map in the report for details.
- 2:17SPEAKER_00: Apart from coca production and drug trafficking, the illegal extraction of gold and other minerals in municipalities such as Barbacoas, El Charco, Santa Barbara, Roberto Payan, and Maguy Payan in Nariño, as well as in municipalities located on the banks of the Putumayo River, provides another important source of income for armed groups.
- 2:42SPEAKER_00: Because of the strategic importance of these departments, de la Esprieja has positioned them at the forefront of a militarized policy shift toward armed groups in line with Noboa's approach and distinct from Petro's total peace policy.
- 2:59SPEAKER_00: Between late August and early September, de la Plia ended regional peace talks with Comandos de Frontera and Comuneros del Sur, extradited the Comandos de Frontera leader to the United States, and announced that the Comuneros del Sur leader would also be extradited to the U.S.
- 3:18SPEAKER_00: once arrested.
- 3:19SPEAKER_00: Under Petro, the Colombian government had struck partial disarmament deals with Comuneros del Sur, a group that split from the National Liberation Army in May 2024, in Nariño and the Comandos de Frontera, an offshoot of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC, dissidents of the Second Marquitalia, in Putumayo.
- 3:44SPEAKER_00: These deals precipitated the handover of more than 500 explosives by Comuneros del Sur in Nariño and the Comandos de Fronteras' handover of 14 tons of weapons and the movement of 99 of its members to a temporary location zone, ZUT, in Valle del Guamuez, Putumayo, to begin a demobilization process.
- 4:08SPEAKER_00: De la Espria's policy shift has since prompted 50 militants stationed in the ZUT to leave.
- 4:16SPEAKER_00: De la Espria's termination of negotiations has prompted concerns about a resurgence of violence, as peace talks had contributed to curbing political violence levels by half.
- 4:28SPEAKER_00: The monthly average of armed group violence dropped from 24 events in 2023 to 12 in the first nine months of 2026.
- 4:38SPEAKER_00: This was driven by a sustained decrease across all dimensions of violence, particularly the targeting of civilians, as both Comandos de Frontera and Comuneros del Sur were likely signaling goodwill by not compromising one of the most sensitive points of the agenda, human rights.
- 4:58SPEAKER_00: Refer to the table in the report for details.
- 5:01SPEAKER_00: Average number of violent events involving armed groups per month in Nariño and Putumayo.
- 5:08SPEAKER_00: The decrease in violence in the Nariño and Putumayo departments was partly eclipsed by renewed efforts by FARS Central General Staff, EMC, dissidents, whose negotiations with the Petro administration derailed in April 2024 to take control of strategic drug trafficking corridors and mining sites.
- 5:31SPEAKER_00: This translated into a surge in clashes between the EMC and other armed groups and security forces.
- 5:39SPEAKER_00: This was also felt in neighboring Cauca, where the EMC carried out several attacks along the Pan American Highway in 2025 and 2026 in an attempt to demonstrate force and territorial control.
- 5:54SPEAKER_00: The resurgence of EMC-related violence in Nariño and Cauca disrupted a key freight transportation route in this region.
- 6:03SPEAKER_00: Refer to the map in the report for details.
- 6:06SPEAKER_00: This is particularly notable in Cauca, where the EMC has regularly planted explosives along the highway, resulting in damage to the road, frequent closures, and casualties, as seen with the detonation of a car bomb in April 2026 in the El Tunel sector that resulted in 21 fatalities.
- 6:28SPEAKER_00: Meanwhile, in Narino, the EMC has disrupted the highway in the Taminango municipality using similar methods.
- 6:37SPEAKER_00: Outlook: Coordinated military pressure risks increasing violence against transporters, but might create opportunities for stability down the road.
- 6:48SPEAKER_00: In the remaining months of 2026, violence levels and lethality in Nariño and Putumayo are likely to increase due to intensified military pressure against armed groups and their illicit sources of revenue.
- 7:04SPEAKER_00: Although no major military operations have targeted Comuneros del Sur and Comandos de Frontera so far this year, the end of peace negotiations, the extradition warrants on its leaders, and a militarized approach toward armed groups elsewhere in the country, as seen with the recent militarization of Cúcuta, indicate that it is a matter of time before the military carries out large-scale operations against these groups, especially in municipalities with a concentration of illicit crops and cocaine production, such as Puerto Assis, Valle del Guamuez, and San Miguel, located along the border in Putumayo, and in municipalities in the Triangulo de Telembi and the Pacific coast in Nariño.
- 7:53SPEAKER_00: This, in turn, will prompt armed groups to retaliate against security forces, reversing the trends of violence reduction achieved by the previous administration.
- 8:04SPEAKER_00: This approach also poses risks to key transportation routes, particularly along the Pan American Highway in Nariño, as well as to others, including the route connecting the department's capital, Pasto, with Tumaco's port and the roads connecting Putumayo's capital with Nariño, Valle del Guamuez, and Puerto Armed groups are likely to carry out attacks along these routes in retaliation for military operations, demonstrating their capacity to exert territorial control, disrupt economic activity, and affect transporters.
- 8:42SPEAKER_00: This has already happened in Cauca, where roads toward the border with Ecuador and cargo drivers are being affected.
- 8:50SPEAKER_00: Key factors affecting longer-term trends.
- 8:53SPEAKER_00: Cooperation between Ecuador and Colombia.
- 8:57SPEAKER_00: Following years of opposing security policies, the alignment between De la Espria and Noboa on security policies and their membership in the U.S.
- 9:07SPEAKER_00: Shield of the Americas is likely to boost operational coordination between the two militaries.
- 9:14SPEAKER_00: While Ecuadorian authorities announced that they would carry out joint military operations with Colombia in August, they have only conducted joint military exercises so far.
- 9:25SPEAKER_00: If military operations materialize and are accompanied by investment in formal economies, greater institutional presence through social and development programs, strengthening of judicial and police bodies, and a legal framework for demobilization, both countries have an opportunity to disrupt armed groups' finances and weaken their capabilities in the long run.
- 9:49SPEAKER_00: This will benefit commerce, logistics, and economic development along the border.
- 9:55SPEAKER_00: However, this would most likely lead to increased clashes between state forces and armed groups in the short term in both Colombia and Ecuador, where Colombian groups like Comandos de Frontera either already have a presence or can shift in response to military pressure.
- 10:14SPEAKER_00: Intergroup competition.
- 10:16SPEAKER_00: Unless the government can act quickly to apply military pressure on armed groups in the region and devise an effective strategy to target their revenue sources, it is likely that violence stemming from disputes between non-state armed groups in Putumayo and Nariño will once again increase.
- 10:36SPEAKER_00: Without the incentive of negotiations to curb their expansion, Comuneros del Sur and Comandos de Frontera are in a position to take advantage of an apparent temporary lull in military operations targeting them in order to expand into territories under the influence of rival organizations to gain a hold of illicit economies, prompting an open armed confrontation with other groups.
- 11:03SPEAKER_00: This can, in turn, lead to increased violence targeting civilians, displacement, and confinement.