Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [Mastermind] 1966 Warren Buffett to Partnership Letter
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- 0:001966 will carry a full story on this current control situation.
- 0:05At this time, it is enough to say that we are delighted with
- 0:08both the acquisition cost and the business operation and even
- 0:12happier about the people we have managing the business investment
- 0:15companies. We regularly compare our results
- 0:18with the two largest open end investment companies, mutual
- 0:21funds that follow a policy of being typically 95 to 100%
- 0:27invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified
- 0:30closed and investment companies. These four companies,
- 0:34Massachusetts Investors Trust Investors Stock Fund, Tri
- 0:38Continental Corporation and Lehman Corporation manage over
- 0:42$4 billion and are probably typical of most of the $30
- 0:46billion investment company industry.
- 0:48Their results are shown in the following table.
- 0:51My opinion is that this performance roughly parallels
- 0:54that of the overwhelming majority of other investment
- 0:57advisory organizations, which handle, in aggregate, vastly
- 1:01greater sums. Year Massachusetts Inv Investors
- 1:05Lehman 2 Tricont 2 Dow Limited Trust One Stock One Partners
- 1:101957 - 11.4% - 12.4% - 11.4% - 2.4% - 8.4 percent 9.3%.
- 1:22195842.747.540.833.238.532.219599.0 Ten point 38.18.420.0.
- 1:37Twenty .91960 - 1.0 - 0.62 Point.
- 1:43Five 2.8 - 6 Point. 218.6 196125.624.923.622.522 point.
- 1:55435.91962 - 9.8 - 13.4 - 14.4 - 10.0 - 7.611 point. 9196320.0
- 2:09Sixteen point. 523.718 point. 720.630 point. 519-6415. 2.914
- 2:18Point 314 Point zero. 13.618 Point 722.3 First half 1965 zero
- 2:27.0 -. 0.62 Point 70.00.89.380 Cumulative 114.9100 Two point
- 2:37eight 111.7100 Fifteen point four, 133.2. 449.7 Results
- 2:47annual 9.48.79.29.510.522.2 Compounded rate 1 computed from
- 2:55changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of
- 2:59record during year 2 from 1965. Moody's Bank and Finance manual
- 3:04for 1957 to 64 estimated for first half 1965.
- 3:10Last year I mentioned that the performance of these companies
- 3:13in some ways resembles the activity of a doc sitting on a
- 3:16pond. When the water, the market
- 3:18rises, the duck rises. When it falls, back goes the
- 3:22duck. The water level was virtually
- 3:25unchanged during the first half of 1965.
- 3:28The ducks, as you can see from the table, are still sitting on
- 3:32the pond. As I mentioned earlier in the
- 3:34letter, the ebb of the tide in May and June also substantially
- 3:37affected us. Nevertheless, the fact we had
- 3:40flapped our wings a few times in the preceding four months
- 3:44enabled us to gain a little altitude on the rest of the
- 3:47flock utilizing a somewhat more restrained lexicon.
- 3:51James H Laurie, director of the University of Chicago's Center
- 3:55for Research and Security Prices, was quoted in the May
- 3:5825th, 1965 Wall Street Journal as saying there is no evidence
- 4:04that mutual funds select stocks better than by the random
- 4:07method. Of course, the beauty of the
- 4:10American economic scene has been that random results have been
- 4:13pretty darned good results. The water level has been rising.
- 4:17In our opinion, the probabilities are that over a
- 4:19long period of time it will continue to rise, though
- 4:23certainly not without important interruptions.
- 4:26It will be our policy, however, to endeavor to swim strongly
- 4:31with or against the tide. If our performance declines to a
- 4:34level you can achieve by floating on your back, we will
- 4:37turn in our suits. Advance Payments and Advance
- 4:41Withdrawals We accept advance payments from partners and
- 4:44prospective partners at 6% interest from date of receipt
- 4:48until the end of the year. While there is no obligation to
- 4:51convert such advance payments to a partnership interest at the
- 4:55end of the year, this should be the intent at the time it is
- 4:58paid to us. Similarly, we allow partners to
- 5:01withdraw up to 20% of their partnership account prior to
- 5:04year end and charge them 6% from date of withdrawal until year
- 5:09end when it is charged against their capital account.
- 5:11Again, it is not intended that partners use us like a bank, but
- 5:16that they use the withdrawal right for a truly unexpected
- 5:19need for funds. Predictable needs for funds,
- 5:22such as quarterly federal tax payments should be handled by a
- 5:26beginning of the year reduction in capital rather than through
- 5:29advance withdrawals from BPL during the year.
- 5:32The withdrawal privilege is to provide for the unanticipated.
- 5:37The willingness to borrow through advance payments and
- 5:39lend through advance withdrawals at the same 6% rate may sound
- 5:44downright on Buffett like you can be sure it doesn't start my
- 5:47adrenaline flowing. Certainly, such a no spread
- 5:50arbitrage is devoid of the commercial overtones an observer
- 5:53might impute to the preponderance of our
- 5:56transactions. Nevertheless, we think it makes
- 5:59sense and is in the best interest of all partners.
- 6:02The partner who has a large investment in indirect ownership
- 6:06of a group of liquid assets should have some liquidity
- 6:09present in his partnership interest other than at year end.
- 6:12As a practical matter, we are reasonably certain 81 that
- 6:16advance withdrawals will be far more than covered by advance
- 6:19payments. For example, on June 30th, 1965
- 6:23we had $98,851.00 of advance withdrawals and $652,931.00 of
- 6:31advance payments. Why then the willingness to pay
- 6:346% for the net of advance payments over advanced
- 6:37withdrawals when we can borrow from commercial banks at
- 6:41substantially lower rates? The answer is that we expect on
- 6:44a long term basis to earn better than 6%.
- 6:47The general partners allocation is 0 unless we do, although it
- 6:51is largely a matter of chance whether we achieve the 6% figure
- 6:55in any short period. Moreover, I can adopt A
- 6:58different attitude regarding the investment of money that can be
- 7:02expected to soon be a part of our equity capital than I can on
- 7:05short term borrowed money. The advance payments have the
- 7:08added advantage to us of spreading the investment of new
- 7:12money over the year rather than having it hit us all at once in
- 7:15January. On the other hand, 6% is more
- 7:19than can be obtained in short term dollar secure investments
- 7:22by our partners, so I consider it mutually profitable.
- 7:25Miscellaneous. The bold expansion program to
- 7:28909 square feet described in the annual letter was carried off
- 7:32without a hitch. The Pepsi's never even got warm.
- 7:36John Harding joined us in April and is continuing the record
- 7:39whereby all the actions in the personnel field half been
- 7:43winning once as in past years. We will have a letter out about
- 7:47November 1st to partners and those who have indicated it
- 7:50interest to me by that time in becoming partners with the
- 7:53commitment letter for 1966, estimate of the 1965 tax
- 7:58situation, etcetera. Cordially, Warren E Buffett, 82
- 8:03Buffett Partnership Ltd, 810 Kiewit Plaza, Omaha 31,
- 8:08Nebraska, November 1st, 1965 to my partners for 1966.
- 8:14Enclosed are 1/2 copies or the commitment letter for 1966, one
- 8:19to be kept by you and one return to us.
- 8:22You may amend the commitment letter right up to midnight
- 8:25December 31st. So get it back to us early and
- 8:29if it needs to be changed just let us know by letter or phone.
- 8:33Commitment letters become final on December 31st.
- 8:37Every year I get a number or calls in the first week in
- 8:40January expressing a desire to add to the January 1st capital.
- 8:44This can't be done to a copy of our ever popular The Ground
- 8:48rules. It is essential that we see eye
- 8:51to eye on the matters covered therein.
- 8:53If you have different views, fine, yours may be better, but
- 8:57you shouldn't be in the partnership.
- 8:59Please particularly note Ground Rule 7.
- 9:02This has been added this year, reflecting A moderate shift in
- 9:05my attitude over a period of time.
- 9:07It represents A decidedly unconventional but logical in my
- 9:11opinion when applied to our operation approach and is
- 9:15therefore specifically called to your attention.
- 9:17Any withdrawals will be paid January 5th.
- 9:20You may withdraw any amount you desire from $100 up to your
- 9:24entire equity. Similarly, additions can be for
- 9:28any amount and should reach us by January 10th.
- 9:31In the event you are disposing of anything, this will give you
- 9:34a chance to have the transaction in 1966 if that appears to be
- 9:39advantageous for tax reasons. If additions reach us in
- 9:42November, they take on the status of advance payments and
- 9:46draw 6% interest until year end. This is not true of additions
- 9:50reaching us in December. The partnership owns a
- 9:53controlling interest in Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated,
- 9:56a publicly traded security. As mentioned in my mid year
- 10:00letter, asset values and earning power are the dominant factors
- 10:04affecting the valuation of a controlling interest in a
- 10:07business. Market price, which governs
- 10:10valuation of minority interest positions, is of little or no
- 10:15importance in valuing A controlling interest.
- 10:18We will value our position in Berkshire Hathaway at your end
- 10:21at a price halfway between net current asset value and book
- 10:25value. Because of the nature of our
- 10:27receivables and inventory, this in effect amounts to valuation
- 10:32of our current assets at 100 cents on that dollar in our
- 10:35fixed assets at $0.50 on the dollar.
- 10:38Such a value, in my opinion, is fair to both adding and
- 10:41withdrawing partners. It may be either of lower than
- 10:44market value at the time. As I write this, we are orbiting
- 10:48in quite satisfactory fashion. Our margin over the Dow is well
- 10:52above average and even those Neanderthal partners who utilize
- 10:56such crude yardsticks as net profit would fine performance
- 11:00satisfactory. This is all, of course, subject
- 11:03to substantial change by your end.
- 11:05If anything needs clarification, call or write John Harding who
- 11:09is in charge of deconfusing partners.
- 11:12The tax situation is about as reported in the August letter,
- 11:16but if you would like John to make the calculation for you, he
- 11:19will be glad to do it cordially. Warren E Buffett 83 PS We are
- 11:25continuing our no prize policy for the last ones to get their
- 11:28commitment letters back to us. It will make things easier for
- 11:32us if you get it back pronto. If you want to make changes
- 11:35later before January LST, just give us a call and we'll amend
- 11:39it for you. 84 Buffett Partnership Ltd 810 Kiwit Plaza,
- 11:45Omaha 31, Nebraska January 20th, 1966 Our performance in 1965 our
- 11:52War on Poverty was successful. In 1965 especially, we were
- 11:57$12,304,060 less poor at the end of the year.
- 12:02Last year, under a section in the annual letter entitled Our
- 12:05Goal. Please particularly note it was
- 12:08not our promise. I stated we were trying to
- 12:11achieve an average advantage relative to the Dow of 10
- 12:14percentage points per annum for BPL before allocation to the
- 12:18general partner, again with large amplitudes in that margin
- 12:21from perhaps 10 percentage points worse than the Dow in a
- 12:25bad year to 25 percentage points better when everything clicks.
- 12:29My fallibility as a forecaster was quickly demonstrated when
- 12:32the first year fell outside my parameters.
- 12:35We achieved our widest margin over the Dow in the history of
- 12:39BPL with an overall gain of 47.2%, compared to an overall
- 12:45gain, including dividends, which would have been received through
- 12:48ownership of the Dow, of 14.2% for the Dow.
- 12:52Naturally, no rider likes to be publicly humiliated by such a
- 12:56mistake. It is unlikely to be repeated.
- 12:59The following summarizes the year by year performance of the
- 13:02Dow, the performance of the partnership before allocation,
- 13:051/4 of the excess over 6% to the general partner, and the results
- 13:10for limited partners. Year Overall results from
- 13:13partnership Results to Limited Partners Dow 1 Results Three
- 13:181957 - 8.4 percent 10.4 percent 9.3%. 195838.5 percent 40.9
- 13:27percent 32.2% Nineteen 5920 percent 25.9 percent 20.9
- 13:34percent 1960 - 6.2 percent 22.8 percent 18.6% Nineteen 6122.4
- 13:44percent 45.9 percent 35.9% 1962 - 7.6 percent 13.9 percent 11.9%
- 13:55Nineteen 6320.6 percent 38.7% Thirty .5% Nineteen 6418.7
- 14:04percent 27.8 percent 22.3% Nineteen 6514.2 percent 47.2
- 14:12percent 36.9%. 1 based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow
- 14:17plus dividends that would have been received through ownership
- 14:21of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete
- 14:24years of partnership activity. 2 For 1957 to 61 consists of
- 14:30combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships
- 14:33operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but
- 14:37before distributions to partners or allocations to the general
- 14:41partner. 3 For 1957 to 61 computed on the basis of the
- 14:46preceding column of partnership results, allowing for allocation
- 14:50to the general partner based upon the present partnership
- 14:53agreement but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
- 14:58On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are 85 year.
- 15:03Overall Results from Partnership Results Limited Partners Dow
- 15:06Results 1957 - 8.4 percent 10.4 percent 9.3 percent 19575826.9
- 15:17percent 55.6% Forty 4.5% 19575952.3 percent 95.9% Seventy
- 15:274.7 percent 19576042.9 percent 140.6 percent 107.2 percent
- 15:361950760174 .9 percent 251 percent 181.6% 19576261.6
- 15:47percent 299.8 percent 215.1 percent 1950760395 .1 percent
- 15:56454.5 percent 311.2% 1957 Sixty 4131.3 percent 608.7 percent
- 16:08402.9 percent 1957 Sixty 5164.1 percent 943.2 percent 588.5%
- 16:20annual compounded 11.4 percent 29.8 percent 23.9% rate.
- 16:27After last year, the question naturally arises.
- 16:30What do we do for an encore? A disadvantage of this business
- 16:33is that it does not possess momentum to any significant
- 16:37degree. If General Motors accounts for
- 16:3954% of domestic new car registrations in 1965, it is a
- 16:44pretty safe bet that they're going to come fairly close to
- 16:47that figure in 1966 due to owner loyalties, dealer capabilities,
- 16:52productive capacity, consumer image, etcetera.
- 16:55Not so for BPL. We start from scratch each year
- 16:59with everything valued at market when the gun goes off.
- 17:02Partners in 1966, new or old, benefit to only a very limited
- 17:08extent from the efforts of 1964 and 1965.
- 17:12The success of past methods and ideas does not transfer forward
- 17:16to future ones. I continue to hope on a longer
- 17:19range basis for the sort of achievement outlined in the our
- 17:22Goal section of last year's letter.
- 17:25Copies still available. However, those who believe 1965
- 17:29results can be achieved with any frequency are probably attending
- 17:33weekly meetings of the Halley's Comet Observers Club.
- 17:36We are going to have lost years and are going to have years
- 17:39inferior to the DAO, no doubt about it, but I continue to
- 17:43believe we can achieve average performance superior to the.
- 17:46DAO in the future. If my expectation regarding this
- 17:49should change, you will hear immediately.
- 17:52Investment companies. We regularly compare our results
- 17:55with the two largest open end investment companies, mutual
- 17:58funds that follow a policy of being typically 95 percent, 100%
- 18:04invested in common stocks and the two largest diversified
- 18:08closed end investment companies. These four companies,
- 18:11Massachusetts Investors Trust Investor Stock Fund,
- 18:14Tricontinental Corporation and Lehman Corporation, manage over
- 18:18$5 billion, are owned by about 600,000 shareholders and are
- 18:23probably typical of most of the $35 billion investment company
- 18:27industry. My opinion is that their results
- 18:30roughly parallel those of the overwhelming majority of other
- 18:34investment advisory organizations, which handle in
- 18:37aggregate vastly greater sums. The purpose of this tabulation
- 18:41is to illustrate that the Dow is no pushover as an index of
- 18:44investment achievement. The advisory talent managing
- 18:48just the four companies shown commands annual fees of about
- 18:52$10 million, and this represents a very small fraction of the
- 18:56professional investment management industry.
- 18:59The public batting average of this highly paid and widely
- 19:02respected talent indicates performance a shade below that
- 19:06of the Dow. An unmanaged index.
- 19:09Yearly results year Massachusetts Inv Investors.
- 19:13Lehman 2 Tricont Dow Limited 86 Trust One Stock, 1-2 Partners.
- 19:191957 - 11.4% - 12.4% - 11.4% - 2.4% - 8.4 percent 9.3 percent
- 19:30195842.7 percent 47.5% Forty .8 percent 33.2 percent 38.5
- 19:39percent 32.2% 19599 percent 10.3 percent 8.1 percent 8.4 percent
- 19:4820 percent 20.9 percent 1960 - 1.0% - 0.6% Two .5 percent 2.8%
- 19:58- 6.2 percent 18.6%. 196125.6 percent 24.9 percent 23.6
- 20:07percent 22.5 percent 22.4 percent 35.9 percent 1962 - 9.8%
- 20:16- 13.4% - 14.4% - 10.0% - 7.6 percent 11.9% 196320 percent
- 20:2716.5 percent 23.7 percent 18.3 percent 20.6% Thirty .5%
- 20:36Nineteen 6415.9 percent 14.3 percent 13.6 percent 12.6
- 20:43percent 18.7 percent 22.3% 196510.2 percent 9.8% Nineteen
- 20:51percent 10.7 percent 14.2 percent 36.9%.
- 20:57One computed from changes in asset value plus any
- 21:00distributions to holders of record during year 2 from 1965.
- 21:04Moody's Bank and Finance Manual for 1957 to 64 Estimated for
- 21:091965 compounded year Massachusetts Inv Investors
- 21:15Lehman 2. Tricont Dow Limited Trust One
- 21:18Stock 1-2 Partners 1957 - 11.4% - 12.4% - 11.4% - 2.4% - 8.4
- 21:30percent 9.3%. 19575826.4 percent 29.2 percent 24.7% Thirty
- 21:39percent 26.9% Forty 4.5 percent 1950750937 .8 percent 42.5
- 21:48percent 34.8% Forty .9% Fifty 2.3 percent 74.7% 19576036.4
- 21:59percent 41.6% Thirty 8.2 percent 44.8 percent 42.9 percent 107.2
- 22:07percent 1950760171 .3 percent 76.9% Seventy .8 percent 77.4
- 22:17percent 74.9 percent 181.6% 19576254.5 percent 53.2 percent
- 22:2746.2 percent 59.7 percent 61.6 percent 215.1 percent 19576385.4
- 22:38percent 78.5% Eighty .8 percent 88.9 percent 94.9 percent 311.2%
- 22:471957 Sixty 4114.9 percent 104 percent 105.4 percent 112.7
- 22:56percent 131.3 percent 402.9 percent 1957 Sixty 5136.8
- 23:05percent 124 percent 145.3 percent 138.4 percent 164.1
- 23:13percent 588.5% Annual 10.1 percent 9.4 percent 10.5 percent
- 23:2110.1 percent 11.4 percent 23.9%. Compounded rate, A number of the
- 23:28largest investment advisory operations managing in some
- 23:32cases well into the billions of dollars also manage investment
- 23:36companies partly as a convenience for smaller clients
- 23:39and partly as a public showcase. The results of these funds
- 23:43roughly parallel those of the four funds on which we report.
- 23:47I strongly believe in measurement.
- 23:49The investment managers mentioned above utilize
- 23:52measurement constantly in their activities.
- 23:54They constantly study changes in market shares, profit margins,
- 23:58return on capital etcetera. There entire decision making
- 24:02process is geared to measurement of management's industries,
- 24:06comparative yields, etcetera. I am sure they keep score on
- 24:10their new business efforts as well as the profitability of
- 24:13their advisory operation. What then can be more
- 24:16fundamental than the measurement in turn of investment ideas and
- 24:20decisions? I certainly do not believe the
- 24:23standards I utilize and wish my partners to utilize in measuring
- 24:27my performance are the applicable ones for all money
- 24:30managers. But I certainly do believe
- 24:33anyone engaged in the management of money should have a standard
- 24:36of measurement and that both he and the party whose money is
- 24:40managed should have a clear understanding why it is the
- 24:43appropriate standard, what time period should be utilized,
- 24:46etcetera. Frank Block put it very well in
- 24:49the November December 1965 issue of the Financial Analyst
- 24:53Journal. Speaking of measurement of
- 24:55investment performance, he said, However, the fact is that
- 24:59literature suffers a yawning hiatus in this subject.
- 25:03If investment management organizations sought always the
- 25:06best performance, there would be nothing unique in careful
- 25:10measurement of investment results.
- 25:12It does not matter that the customer has failed to ask for a
- 25:15formal presentation of the results.
- 25:17Pride alone should be sufficient to demand that each or us
- 25:21determine objectively the quality of his recommendations.
- 25:24This can hardly be done without precise knowledge 87 of the
- 25:29outcome. Once this knowledge is in hand,
- 25:32it should be possible to extend the analysis to some point at
- 25:35which patterns of weakness and strength begin to assert
- 25:38themselves. We criticize a corporate
- 25:41management for failure to use the best of tools to keep it
- 25:44aware of the progress of a complicated industrial
- 25:47organization. We can hardly be excused for
- 25:51failure to provide ourselves with equal tools to show the
- 25:54efficiency of our own efforts to handle other people's money.
- 25:58Thus, it is our dreary duty to report that systems of
- 26:01performance measurement are not automatically included in the
- 26:05data processing programs of most investment management
- 26:08organizations. The sad fact is that some seem
- 26:11to prefer not to know how well or poorly they are doing.
- 26:14Frankly, I have several selfish reasons for insisting that we
- 26:17apply a yardstick and that we both utilize the same yardstick.
- 26:22Naturally, I get a kick out of beating par.
- 26:24In the lyrical words of Casey Stengel, show me a good loser
- 26:28and I'll show you a loser. More importantly, I ensure that
- 26:32I will not get blamed for the wrong reason.
- 26:34Having losing years, but only for the right reason.
- 26:37Doing poorer than the Dow, knowing partners will grade me
- 26:40on the right basis helps me do a better job.
- 26:43Finally, setting up the relevant yardsticks ahead of time ensures
- 26:46that we will all get out of this business if the results become
- 26:49mediocre or worse. It means that past successes
- 26:53cannot cloud judgement of current results.
- 26:56It should reduce the chance of ingenious rationalizations of
- 26:59inept performance. Bad lighting has been bothering
- 27:02me at the bridge table lately. While this masochistic approach
- 27:06to measurement may not sound like much of an advantage, I can
- 27:10assure you from my observations of business entities that such
- 27:13evaluation would have accomplished a great deal in
- 27:16many investment and industrial organizations.
- 27:20So if you are evaluating others or yourself in the investment
- 27:24field, think out some standards, apply them, interpret them.
- 27:28If you do not feel our standard, a minimum of a three-year test
- 27:31versus the Dow is an applicable 1, you should not be in the
- 27:34partnership. If you do feel it is applicable,
- 27:37you should be able to take the minus years with equanimity in
- 27:41the visceral regions as well as the cerebral regions as long as
- 27:45we are surpassing the results of the Dow.
- 27:47The Sorrows of Compounding Usually at this point in my
- 27:51letter, I have paused to modestly attempt to set straight
- 27:54the historical errors of the last four or 500 years.
- 27:58While it might seem difficult to accomplish this in only a few
- 28:01paragraphs a year, I feel I have done my share to reshape world
- 28:05opinion on Columbus, Isabella Francis I, Peter Minuit, and the
- 28:10Manhattan Indians. A byproduct of this endeavor has
- 28:13been to demonstrate the overwhelming power of compound
- 28:17interest. To ensure reader attention, I
- 28:19have entitled these essays The Joys of Compounding.
- 28:23The Sharp eyed may notice a slight change this year, a
- 28:26decent rate. Better, we have an indecent rate
- 28:28of compound. Plus, the addition of
- 28:30substantial new money has brought our beginning capital
- 28:34this year to $43,645,000. Several times in the past I have
- 28:40raised the question whether increasing amounts of capital
- 28:43would harm our investment performance.
- 28:46Each time I have answered negatively and promised you that
- 28:49if my opinion changed, I would promptly report it.
- 28:52I do not feel that increased capital has hurt our operation
- 28:55to date. As a matter of fact, I believe
- 28:57that we have done somewhat better during the past few years
- 29:01with the capital we have had in the partnership than we would
- 29:03have done if we had been working with a substantially smaller
- 29:07amount. This was due to the partly
- 29:09fortuitous development of several investments that were
- 29:12just the right size for us, big enough to be significant and
- 29:16small enough to handle. I now feel that we are much
- 29:19closer to the point where increased size may prove
- 29:22disadvantageous. I don't want to ascribe too much
- 29:25precision to that statement since there are many variables
- 29:28involved. What may be the optimum size
- 29:31under some market and business circumstances can be
- 29:34substantially more or less than optimum under other
- 29:37circumstances. There have been a few times in
- 29:40the past when, on a very short term basis, I have felt it would
- 29:43have been advantageous to be smaller, but substantially more
- 29:47times when the converse was true. 88 Nevertheless, as
- 29:51circumstances presently appear, I feel substantially greater
- 29:55size is more likely to harm future results than to help
- 29:58them. This might not be true for my
- 30:00own personal results, but it is likely to be true for your
- 30:04results. Therefore, unless it appears
- 30:07that circumstances have changed under some conditions, added
- 30:10capital would improve results, or unless new partners can bring
- 30:14some asset to the partnership other than simply capital, I
- 30:17intend to admit no additional partners to BPL.
- 30:21The only way to make this effective is to apply it across
- 30:24the board, and I have notified Susie that if we have any more
- 30:27children, it is up to her to find some other partnership for
- 30:30them. Because I anticipate that
- 30:32withdrawals for taxes, among other reasons, may well approach
- 30:36additions by present partners, and also because I visualize the
- 30:40curve of expectable performance sloping only very mildly as
- 30:44capital increases, I presently see no reason why we should
- 30:48restrict capital additions by existing partners.
- 30:51The medically oriented probably will interpret this entire
- 30:54section as conclusive evidence that an effective anthropyroid
- 30:58pill has been developed. Trends in our business Last
- 31:02year, I discussed our various categories of investments.
- 31:05Knowing the penalties for cruel and unusual punishments, I will
- 31:09skip a rehash of the characteristics of each
- 31:11category, but merely refer you to last year's letter.
- 31:15However, a few words should be said to bring you up to date on
- 31:18the various segments of the business and perhaps to give you
- 31:22a better insight into their strengths and weaknesses.
- 31:25The workout business has become very spasmodic.
- 31:28We were able to employ an average of only about $6 million
- 31:32during the year in the workout section and this involved only a
- 31:36very limited number of situations.
- 31:38Although we earned about $1,410,000 or about 23% on
- 31:44average capital employed. This is calculated on and all
- 31:47equity basis. Borrowed money is appropriate in
- 31:50most workout situations and we utilize it which improves our
- 31:54rate of return above this percentage.
- 31:57Over half of this was earned from one situation.
- 32:00I think it unlikely that a really interesting rate of
- 32:02return can be earned consistently on large sums of
- 32:06money in this business under present conditions.
- 32:09Nevertheless, we will continue to try to remain alert for the
- 32:12occasional important opportunity and probably continue to utilize
- 32:17a few of the smaller opportunities where we like the
- 32:19probabilities. The general's private owner
- 32:22basis category was very good to us in 1965.
- 32:26Opportunities in this area have become more scarce with a rising
- 32:30Dow, but when they come along, they are often quite
- 32:33significant. I mentioned at the start of last
- 32:36year that we were the largest stockholder of three companies
- 32:39in this category. Our largest year end 1964
- 32:43investment in this category was disposed of a 1965 pursuant to a
- 32:48tender offer resulting in a realized gain for BPL of
- 32:51$3,188,000. At year end 1964, we had
- 32:57unrealized appreciation in this investment of $451,000.
- 33:03Therefore, the economic gain attributable to 1965 for this
- 33:07transaction was only $2,737,000 even though the entire tax
- 33:14effect fell in that year. I mentioned these figures to
- 33:17illustrate how our realized gain for tax purposes in any year
- 33:21bears no necessary relationship to our economic gain.
- 33:25The fundamental concept underlying the Generals private
- 33:28owner category is demonstrated by the above case.
- 33:32Private owner was quite willing and in our opinion quite wise to
- 33:36pay a price for control of the business, which isolated stock
- 33:39buyers were not willing to pay for very small fractions of the
- 33:43business. This has been a quite common
- 33:45condition in the securities markets over many years and
- 33:48although purchases in this category workout satisfactorily
- 33:52in terms of just general stock market behavior, there is the
- 33:56occasional dramatic profit due to corporate action such as the
- 33:59one above 89 that controls section of our business received
- 34:04a transfer member from our private owner category.
- 34:07Shares in Berkshire Hathaway had been acquired since November
- 34:101962 on much the same line of reasoning as prevailed in the
- 34:15security mentioned above. In the case of Berkshire,
- 34:18however, we ended up purchasing enough stock to assume a
- 34:21controlling position ourselves, rather than the more usual case
- 34:25of either selling our stock in the market or to another single
- 34:29buyer. Our purchases of Berkshire
- 34:31started at a price of 7.60 dollars per share in 1962.
- 34:36This price partially reflected large losses incurred by the
- 34:39prior management in closing some of the mills made obsolete by
- 34:43changing conditions within the textile business which the old
- 34:47management had been quite slow to recognize.
- 34:49In the post war period the company had slid downhill a
- 34:53considerable distance, having hit a peak in 1948 when about 29
- 34:57dollars 12 million was earned before tax and about 11,000
- 35:02workers were employed. This reflected output from 11
- 35:05mills. At the time we acquired control
- 35:07in spring of 1965, Berkshire was down to two mills and about 2300
- 35:13employees. It was a very pleasant surprise
- 35:16to find that the remaining units had excellent management
- 35:19personnel and we have not had to bring a single man from the
- 35:22outside into the operation. In relation to our beginning
- 35:26acquisition cost of 7.60 dollars per share.
- 35:29The average cost however was 14.86 dollars per share
- 35:34reflecting very heavy purchases in early 1965.
- 35:38The company on December 31st 1965 had net working capital
- 35:43alone before placing any value on the plants and equipment of
- 35:47about $19.00 per share. Berkshire is a delight to own.
- 35:51There is no question that the state of the textile industry is
- 35:54the dominant factor in determining the earning power of
- 35:58the business, but we are most fortunate to have Ken Chase
- 36:01running the business in a first class manner and we also have
- 36:05several of the best salespeople in the business heading up this
- 36:08end of their respective divisions.
- 36:10While a Berkshire is hardly going to be as profitable as a
- 36:13Xerox, Fairchild camera or National video in a hypertense
- 36:17market, it is a very comfort able sort of thing to own, as my
- 36:21West Coast philosopher says it is.
- 36:24While they have a diet consisting of oatmeal as well as
- 36:26cream puffs. Because of our controlling
- 36:29interest, our investment in Berkshire is valued for our
- 36:32audit as a business, not as a marketable security.
- 36:36If Berkshire advances $5 per share in the market, it does BPL
- 36:40no good. Our holdings are not going to be
- 36:43sold. Similarly, if it goes down $5
- 36:46per share, it is not meaningful to us.
- 36:48The value of our holding is determined directly by the value
- 36:52of the business. I received no divine inspiration
- 36:55in that valuation of our holdings.
- 36:58Maybe the owners of the three wonder stocks mentioned above do
- 37:01receive such a message in respect to their holdings.
- 37:05I feel I would need something at least that reliable to sleep
- 37:08well at present prices. I attempt to apply a
- 37:11conservative valuation based upon my knowledge of assets,
- 37:15earning, power, industry conditions, competitive
- 37:18position, etcetera. We would not be a seller of our
- 37:20holdings at such a figure, but neither would we be a seller of
- 37:24the other items in our portfolio at year end valuations,
- 37:27otherwise we would already have sold them.
- 37:30Our final category is generals, relatively undervalued.
- 37:34This category has been growing in relative importance as
- 37:37opportunities in the other categories become less frequent.
- 37:41Frankly, operating in this field is somewhat more ethereal than
- 37:45operating in the other 3 categories, and I'm just not an
- 37:48ethereal sort. Therefore, I feel
- 37:51accomplishments here are less solid and perhaps less
- 37:54meaningful for future projections than in the other
- 37:57categories. Nevertheless, our results in
- 37:591965 were quite good in the relatively undervalued group,
- 38:04partly due to implementation of the technique referred to in
- 38:07last year's letter, which serves to reduce risk and potentially
- 38:11augment gains. It should reduce risk in any
- 38:14year, and it definitely augmented the gains in 1965.
- 38:19It is necessary to point out that results in this category
- 38:22were greatly affected for the better by only two investments.
- 38:26Candor also demands I point out that during 1965 we had our
- 38:30worst single investment experience in the history of BPL
- 38:34on one idea in this group, 90 Overall, we had more than our
- 38:38share of good breaks in 1965. We did not have a great quantity
- 38:42of ideas, but the quality, with the one important exception
- 38:46mentioned above, was very good and circumstances developed
- 38:50which accelerated the timetable in several.
- 38:53I do not have a great flood of good ideas as I go into 1966,
- 38:57although again, I believe I have at least several potentially
- 39:01good ideas of substantial size. Much depends on weather.
- 39:04Market conditions are favorable for obtaining a larger position.
- 39:08All in all, however, you should recognize that more came out of
- 39:12the pipeline in 1965 and went in diversification last year.
- 39:17In commenting on the inability of the overwhelming majority of
- 39:21investment managers to achieve performance superior to that of
- 39:24pure chance, I ascribed it primarily to the product of one
- 39:28group decisions. My perhaps jaundiced view is
- 39:32that it is close to impossible for outstanding investment
- 39:35management to come from a group of any size with all parties
- 39:39really participating in decisions to a desire to conform
- 39:42to the policies and to and extent the portfolios of other
- 39:46large well regarded organizations. 3IN institutional
- 39:50framework whereby average is safe and the personal rewards
- 39:54for independent action are in no way commensurate with the
- 39:57general risk attached to such action for an adherence to
- 40:01certain diversification practices which are irrational.
- 40:05And finally and importantly, 5 inertia this year in the
- 40:08material which went out in November.
- 40:11Has specifically called your attention to a new ground rule
- 40:14reading 7. We diversify substantially less
- 40:17than most investment operations. We might invest up to 40% of our
- 40:22net worth in a single security under conditions coupling an
- 40:25extremely high probability that our facts and reasoning are
- 40:29correct, with a very low probability that anything could
- 40:32drastically change the underlying value of the
- 40:35investment. We are obviously following a
- 40:38policy regarding diversification which differs markedly from that
- 40:42of practically all public investment operations.
- 40:45Frankly, there is nothing I would like better than to have
- 40:4750 different investment opportunities, all of which have
- 40:51a mathematical expectation. This term reflects the range of
- 40:55all possible relative performances, including negative
- 40:58ones, adjusted for the probability of each no yawning
- 41:02please of achieving performance surpassing the Dow by say 15
- 41:07percentage points per annum. If the 50 individual
- 41:10expectations were not inter correlated, what happens to 1 is
- 41:13associated with what happens to the other.
- 41:15I could put 2% of our capital into each one and sit back with
- 41:20a very high degree of certainty that our overall results would
- 41:24be very close to such a 15 percentage point advantage.
- 41:28It doesn't work that way. We have to work extremely hard
- 41:31to find just a very few attractive investment
- 41:33situations. Such a situation by definition
- 41:37is 1, where my expectation defined as above, a performance
- 41:40is at least 10 percentage points.
- 41:42Per. And I'm superior to the Dow
- 41:44among the few we do find the expectations vary substantially.
- 41:49The question always is how much do I put in #1 ranked by
- 41:53expectation of relative performance and how much do I
- 41:56put in #8? This depends to a great degree
- 41:59on the wideness of the spread between the mathematical
- 42:02expectation of #1 versus #8. It also depends upon the
- 42:07probability that number one could turn in a really poor
- 42:10relative performance. 2 securities could have equal
- 42:13mathematical expectations, but one might have .05 chance of
- 42:18performing 15 percentage points or more worse than the Dow, and
- 42:22the second might have only .01 chance of such performance.
- 42:26The wider range of expectation in the first case reduces the
- 42:30desirability of heavy concentration in it.
- 42:33The above may make the whole operation sound very precise.
- 42:37It isn't. Nevertheless, our business is
- 42:39that of ascertaining facts and then applying experience and
- 42:43reason to such facts to reach expectations.
- 42:47Imprecise and emotionally influenced as our attempts may
- 42:50be, that is what the business is all about.
- 42:53The results of many years 91 of decision making and securities
- 42:58will demonstrate how well you are doing on making such
- 43:00calculations, whether you consciously realize you're
- 43:04making the calculations or not. I believe the investor operates
- 43:08at a distinct advantage when he is aware of what path his
- 43:11thought process is following. There is one thing of which I
- 43:14can assure you, if good performance of the fund is even
- 43:18a minor objective, any portfolio encompassing 100 stocks, whether
- 43:22the manager is handling $1000 or $1 billion, is not being
- 43:27operated logically. The addition of the 100 stock
- 43:30simply can't reduce the potential variance in portfolio
- 43:34performance sufficiently to compensate for the negative
- 43:37effect its inclusion has on the overall portfolio expectation.
- 43:42Anyone owning such numbers of securities after presumably
- 43:45studying their investment merit, and I don't care how prestigious
- 43:49their labels, is following what I call the NOAA School of
- 43:52Investing 2 of everything, such investors should be piloting
- 43:56ARCS. While NOAA may have been acting
- 43:58in accord with certain time tested biological principles,
- 44:02the investors have left the track regarding mathematical
- 44:05principles. I only made it through plane
- 44:08geometry, but with one exception.
- 44:10I have carefully screened out the mathematicians from our
- 44:13partnership. Of course, the fact that someone
- 44:15else is behaving illogically and owning 100 securities doesn't
- 44:19prove our case. While they may be wrong and over
- 44:22diversifying, we have to affirmatively reason through a
- 44:25proper diversification policy. In terms of our objectives, the
- 44:30optimum portfolio depends on the various expectations of choices
- 44:34available and the degree of variance in performance which is
- 44:37tolerable. The greater the number of
- 44:39selections, the less will be the average year to year variation
- 44:43in actual versus expected results.
- 44:45Also the lower will be the expected results assuming
- 44:49different choices have different expectations of performance.
- 44:52I am willing to give up quite a bit in terms of leveling of year
- 44:55to year results. Remember, when I talk of
- 44:57results, I am talking of performance relative to the Dow
- 45:01in order to achieve better overall long term performance.
- 45:04Simply stated, this means I am willing to concentrate quite
- 45:08heavily in what I believe to be the best investment
- 45:11opportunities, recognizing very well that this may cause an
- 45:14occasional very sour year, 1, somewhat more sour probably than
- 45:19if I had diversified more. While this means our results
- 45:22will bounce around more, I think it also means that our long term
- 45:26margin of superiority should be greater.
- 45:28You have already seen some examples of this.
- 45:31Our margin versus the Dow has ranged from 2.4 percentage
- 45:35points in 1958 to 33.0 points in 1965.
- 45:40If you check this against the deviations of the funds listed
- 45:43on page three, you will find our variations have a much wider
- 45:46amplitude. I could have operated in such a
- 45:49manner as to reduce our amplitude, but I would also have
- 45:52reduced our overall performance somewhat, although it still
- 45:55would have substantially exceeded that of the investment
- 45:58companies. Looking back and continuing to
- 46:01think this problem through, I feel that if anything I should
- 46:05have concentrated slightly more than I have in the past, hence
- 46:08the new ground rule and this long winded explanation.
- 46:12Again, let me state that this is somewhat unconventional
- 46:15reasoning. This doesn't make it right or
- 46:17wrong. It does.
- 46:19I mean you have to do your own thinking on it and you may well
- 46:22have a different opinion if you do.
- 46:24The partnership is not the place for you.
- 46:26We are obviously only going to go to 40% in very rare
- 46:30situations. This rarity of course is what
- 46:34makes it necessary that we concentrate so heavily when we
- 46:37see such an opportunity. We probably have had only 5 or 6
- 46:41situations in the nine year history of the partnership where
- 46:44we have exceeded 25%. Any such situations are going to
- 46:49have to promise very significantly superior
- 46:51performance relative to the Dow compared to other opportunities
- 46:55available at the time. They are also going to have to
- 46:58possess such superior qualitative and or quantitative
- 47:01factors that the chance of serious permanent loss is
- 47:04minimal. Anything can happen on a short
- 47:07term quotational basis which partially explains the greater
- 47:10risk of widen year to year variation in results.
- 47:14In selecting the limit to which I will go in anyone investment,
- 47:17I attempt to reduce to a tiny figure the probability that the
- 47:21single investment or group if there is intercorrelation can
- 47:25produce a result 92 for our total portfolio that would be
- 47:29more than 10 percentage points poorer than the Dow.
- 47:32We presently have two situations in the over 25% category 1A
- 47:37controlled company and the other a large company where we will
- 47:40never take an active part. It is worth pointing out that
- 47:43our performance in 1965 was overwhelmingly the product of
- 47:47five investment situations. The 1965 gains in some cases
- 47:52there were also gains applicable to the same holding in prior
- 47:55years from these situations range from about $800,000 to
- 48:00about 3 dollars 12 million. If you should take the overall
- 48:03performance of our five smallest general investments in 1965, the
- 48:08results are lackluster. I chose a very charitable
- 48:11adjective. Interestingly enough, the
- 48:14literature of investment management is virtually devoid
- 48:17of material relative to deductive calculation of optimal
- 48:21diversification. All texts counsel adequate
- 48:24diversification, but the ones who quantify adequate virtually
- 48:28never explain how they arrive at their conclusion.
- 48:31Hence, for our summation on over diversification, we turn to that
- 48:35eminent academician, Billy Rose, who says you've got a harem of
- 48:3970 girls, you don't get to know any of them very well.
- 48:44Miscellaneous. Last year we boldly announced an
- 48:47expansion move encompassing an additional 227 fourteen square
- 48:52feet. Older partners shook their
- 48:54heads. I feel that our gain from
- 48:56operations in 1965 of $12,304,060 indicates that we
- 49:03did not overextend ourselves. Fortunately, we didn't sign a
- 49:07percentage lease. Operationally, things have never
- 49:10been running more smoothly, and I think our present setup
- 49:13unquestionably lets me devote a higher percentage of my time to
- 49:17thinking about the investment process than virtually anyone
- 49:20else in the money management business.
- 49:23This, of course, is the result of really outstanding personnel
- 49:27and cooperative partners. John Harding has taken complete
- 49:30charge of all administrative operations with splendid
- 49:33results. Bill Scott continues to develop
- 49:37detailed information on investments which substantially
- 49:40enhances our net profit figure. Beth Feehan, Donna Walter and
- 49:44Elizabeth Hainan, who joined us in November, have all handled
- 49:47large work load. Secretary's note Amen accurately
- 49:52and efficiently. The above people, their spouses,
- 49:551 apiece and children have a combined investment in the
- 49:58partnership of over $600,000. Susie and I have an investment
- 50:03of $6,849,936 which should keep me from slipping away to the
- 50:10movies in the afternoon. This represents virtually our
- 50:13entire net worth with the exception of our continued
- 50:17holding of Mid Continent Tab Card, a local company into which
- 50:21I bought in 1960 when it had less than 10 stockholders.
- 50:25Additionally, my relatives consisting of three children,
- 50:29mother, two sisters, two brothers in law, father-in-law,
- 50:333 aunts, 2 uncles, 5 cousins and six nieces and nephews have
- 50:38interests in BPL directly or indirectly totaling $2,708,233.
- 50:46So don't get any ideas about voting a change in the
- 50:49partnership name. Pete Marwick Mitchell and
- 50:52Company has done the customary excellent job of expediting the
- 50:55audit and tax information. This requires great effort and
- 50:59ability and they supply both. This year a computer was brought
- 51:03to bear on our problems and naturally I was a little worried
- 51:07someone else would come out as the general partner.
- 51:09However, it all worked quite smoothly.
- 51:12Within the coming two weeks, you will receive 1 a tax letter
- 51:16giving you all BPL information needed for your 1965 federal
- 51:20income tax return. This letter is the only item
- 51:23that counts for tax purposes. 2 An audit from Pete Marwick
- 51:28Mitchell and Company for 1965 setting forth the operations and
- 51:33financial 93 position of BPL as well as your own capital
- 51:37account. 3A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your
- 51:41BPL interest on 1166. This is identical with IT
- 51:45figures developed in the audit. Let me know if anything in this
- 51:49letter or that occurs during the year needs clarifying.
- 51:52It is difficult to anticipate all of the questions you may
- 51:55have and if there is anything that is confusing, I want to
- 51:59hear about it. For instance, we received an
- 52:01excellent suggestion last year from a partner regarding the
- 52:04presentation of the reconciliation of Personal
- 52:07Capital accounts. My next letter will be about
- 52:10July 15th, summarizing the first how 1F of this year cordially.
- 52:15Warren E Buffett 94 Buffett Partnership Ltd 610 Kiewit Plaza
- 52:22Omaha, NE 68131 Telephone 0424110 July 12th, 1966 First
- 52:31Half Performance During the first half of 1966, the Dow
- 52:35Jones Industrial Average here and after called, the Dow
- 52:38declined from 969.26 to 870.10. If one had owned the Dow during
- 52:46this period, dividends of approximately 14.70 would have
- 52:50been received, reducing the overall loss of the Dow to about
- 52:548.7%. It is my objective and my hope,
- 52:58but not my prediction, that we achieve over a long period of
- 53:01time an average yearly advantage of 10 percentage points relative
- 53:05to the Dow. During the first half, we did
- 53:08considerably better than expected, with an overall gain
- 53:11of approximately 8. .2%. Such results should be regarded
- 53:16as decidedly abnormal. I have previously complimented
- 53:19partners on the good-natured tolerance they display and
- 53:22shrugging off such unexpected positive variances.
- 53:26The nature of our business is such that over the years we will
- 53:29not disappoint the many of you who must also desire a test of
- 53:33your capacity for tolerance of negative variances.
- 53:37The following summarizes the year by year performance of the
- 53:39Dow, the performance of the partnership before allocation to
- 53:43the general partner and the results for limited partners.
- 53:47Year overall results from partnership results to limited
- 53:50partners Dow 1 results. Three 1957 - 8.4 percent 10.4
- 53:57percent 9.3%. Nineteen, 5838.5%.
- 54:02Forty .9 percent 32.2% 195920 percent 25.9 percent 20.9
- 54:10percent 1960 - 6.2 percent 22.8 percent 18.6% Nineteen 6122.4
- 54:19percent 45.9%. Thirty 5.9 percent 1962 - 7.6
- 54:26percent 13.9 percent 11.9% 196320.6 percent 38.7% Thirty
- 54:35.5% Nineteen 6418.7 percent 27.8 percent 22.3% Nineteen 6514.2
- 54:46percent 47.2 percent 36.9% First half of 1966 - 8.7 percent 8.2
- 54:55percent 7.7% Cumulative results 141.1 percent 1028.7 percent
- 55:03641.5% Annual compounded 9.7 percent 29 percent 23.5% rate 1
- 55:12based on yearly. Changes in the value of the Dow
- 55:15plus dividends that would have been received through ownership
- 55:18of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete
- 55:22years of partnership activity. 2 for 1957 to 61 consists of
- 55:27combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships
- 55:31operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but
- 55:35before distributions to partners or allocations to the general
- 55:38partner. 3 for 1957 to 61 computed on the basis of the
- 55:44preceding column of partnership results, allowing for allocation
- 55:48to the general partner based upon the present partnership
- 55:51agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
- 55:55Even Samsung gets clipped occasionally.
- 55:57If you had invested 100.000 dollars on January 1st equally
- 56:02amount. 95 a The world's largest auto company General Motors B
- 56:08The world's largest oil company Standard of New Jersey C the
- 56:12world's largest retailing company Sears.
- 56:14Roebuck. D the world's largest chemical
- 56:17company DuPont. E The world's largest steel
- 56:21company US Steel F the world's largest stockholder owned
- 56:25insurance company Aetna G the world's largest public utility
- 56:29American Telephone and Telegraph H the world's largest bank, Bank
- 56:33of America. Your total portfolio, including
- 56:36dividends received, would have been worth $83,370 on June 30th
- 56:42for a loss of 16.6%. The total market value on
- 56:46January 1st of these eight giants was well over $100
- 56:50billion. Every one of them was selling
- 56:52lower on June 30th. Investment Companies On the next
- 56:56page, we bring up to date our regular comparison with the
- 56:59results of the two largest open end investment companies mutual
- 57:03funds that follow a policy of being typically 95 to 100%
- 57:09invested in common stocks and the two largest diversified
- 57:12closed end investment companies. Yearly Results Year
- 57:16Massachusetts Inv Investors Lehman 2 Tricont Dow Limited
- 57:21Trust One Stock 1-2 Partners. 1957 - 11.4% - 12.4% - 11.4% -
- 57:312.4% - 8.4 percent 9.3 percent 195842.7 percent 47.5% Forty .8
- 57:41percent 33.2 percent 38.5 percent 32.2 percent 19599
- 57:48percent 10.3 percent 8.1 percent 8.4 percent 20% 20.9 percent.
- 57:551960 - 1.0% - 0.6% Two .5 percent 2.8% - 6.2 percent 18.6%
- 58:06Nineteen 6125.6 percent 24.9 percent 23.6 percent 22.5
- 58:14percent 22.4 percent 35.9% 1962 - 9.8% - 13.4% - 14.4% - 10.0% -
- 58:277.6 percent 11.9% Nineteen 6320 percent 16.5 percent 23.7
- 58:35percent 18.3 percent 20.6% Thirty .5% 196415.9 percent 14.3
- 58:44percent 13.6 percent 12.6 percent 18.7 percent 22.3%
- 58:52Nineteen 6510.2 percent 9.8% Nineteen percent 10.7 percent
- 58:5814.2 percent 36.9% First half -7.9% - 7.9% - 1.0% - 5.2% - 8.7
- 59:11percent 7.7 percent 1966 Cumulative 118.1 percent 106.3
- 59:18percent 142.8 percent 126.9 percent 141.1 percent 641.5%
- 59:27Results Annual 8.6% Seven point 9 percent 9.8% Nine percent 9.7
- 59:35percent 23.5% compounded. Rate 1 computed from changes in
- 59:40asset value plus any distributions to holders of
- 59:43record during year 2 from 1966. Moody's Bank and Finance Manual
- 59:48for 1957 to 1965 estimated for first half of 1966.
- 59:55Proponents of institutional investing frequently cite its
- 59:58conservative nature. If conservative is interpreted
- 1:00:01to mean productive of results varying only slightly from
- 1:00:05average experience, I believe the characterization is proper.
- 1:00:09Such results are almost bound to flow from wide diversification
- 1:00:13among high grade securities since over a long period.
- 1:00:18Average experience is likely to be good experience.
- 1:00:21There is nothing wrong with the typical investor utilizing this
- 1:00:24form of investment medium. 96 However, I believe that
- 1:00:29conservatism is more properly interpreted to mean subject to
- 1:00:33substantially less temporary or permanent shrinkage in value
- 1:00:37than total experience. This simply has not been
- 1:00:40achieved, as the record of the four largest funds presently
- 1:00:44managing over $5 billion illustrates.
- 1:00:47Specifically, the Dow declined in 195719601962 and the first
- 1:00:54half of 1966. Accumulating the shrinkage in
- 1:00:57the Dow during the three full year periods produces a decline
- 1:01:01of 20.6%. Following a similar technique
- 1:01:05for the four largest funds produces declines of 9.7 percent
- 1:01:1020.9. Percent, 22.3% and 24.6%,
- 1:01:15including the interim performance for the first half
- 1:01:18of 1966 results in a decline in the Dow of 27.5% and for the
- 1:01:24funds declines of 14.4 percent, 23.1 percent, 27.1% and 30.6%.
- 1:01:32Such funds, and I believe their results are quite typical of
- 1:01:35institutional experience. In common, stocks seem to meet
- 1:01:39the 1st the definition of conservatism, but not the second
- 1:01:42one. Most investors would climb a
- 1:01:44rung intellectually if they clearly delineated between the
- 1:01:48above 2 interpretations of conservatism.
- 1:01:51The first might be better labeled conventionalism.
- 1:01:54What it really says is that when others are making money in the
- 1:01:58general run of securities, so will we into about the same
- 1:02:01degree. When they are losing money will
- 1:02:04do it at about the same rate. This is not to be equated with
- 1:02:07when others are making it will make as much, and when they are
- 1:02:11losing it, we will lose less. Very few investment programs
- 1:02:15accomplish the latter. We certainly don't promise it,
- 1:02:18but we do intend to keep trying. I have always felt our objective
- 1:02:21should be somewhat loftier than those Herman Hickman articulated
- 1:02:25during the desperate years when Yale was losing 8 games a
- 1:02:29season, said Herman. I see my job as one of keeping
- 1:02:32the alumni sullen but not mutinous.
- 1:02:35Hotschild Cone and Company During the first half, we and
- 1:02:39210% partners purchased all of the stock of Hotschild Cone and
- 1:02:43Company, a privately owned Baltimore department store.
- 1:02:47This is the first time in the history of the partnership that
- 1:02:50an entire business has been purchased by negotiation,
- 1:02:53although we have from time to time negotiated purchase of
- 1:02:57specific important blocks of marketable securities.
- 1:03:01However, no new principles are involved.
- 1:03:03The quantitative and qualitative aspects of the business are
- 1:03:07evaluated and weighed against price, both on an absolute basis
- 1:03:11and relative to other investment opportunities.
- 1:03:14HK learned to call it that. I didn't find out how to
- 1:03:17pronounce it until the deal was concluded.
- 1:03:19Stacks up fine in all respects. We have top notch people both
- 1:03:23from a personal and business standpoint handling the
- 1:03:25operation. Despite the edge that my
- 1:03:28extensive $0.75 an hour experience at the Penny store in
- 1:03:32Omaha some years back gives us, I became an authority on the
- 1:03:36Minimum Wage Act. They will continue to run the
- 1:03:38business as in the past. Even if the price had been
- 1:03:42cheaper, but the management had been run-of-the-mill, we would
- 1:03:45not have bought the business. It is impossible to avoid some
- 1:03:48public notice when a business with several thousand employees
- 1:03:52is acquired. However, it is important that
- 1:03:54you do not infer the degree of financial importance to BPL from
- 1:03:58its news value to the public. We have something over $50
- 1:04:02million invested primarily in marketable securities, of which
- 1:04:06only about 10% is represented by our net investment in HK.
- 1:04:11We have an investment of over three times this much in a
- 1:04:14marketable security where our ownership will never come to
- 1:04:17public attention. This is not to say an HK is not
- 1:04:21important, a 10% holding definitely is.
- 1:04:24However, it is not as significant relative to our
- 1:04:27total operation as it would be easy to think.
- 1:04:30I still prefer the iceberg approach toward investment
- 1:04:33disclosure. It is my intention to value HK
- 1:04:36at your end a cost plus our share of retained earnings since
- 1:04:39purchase. This policy will be followed in
- 1:04:42future years unless there is a demonstrable change in our
- 1:04:45position relative to other department stores or in other
- 1:04:49objective standards of value. Naturally, we wouldn't have
- 1:04:52purchased HK unless we felt the price was quite attractive.
- 1:04:56Therefore, a valuation policy based upon cost may somewhat
- 1:05:00undervalue our holdings. Nevertheless, it seems the most
- 1:05:04objective figure to apply. All of our investments usually
- 1:05:07appear undervalued to me, otherwise we wouldn't own them.
- 1:05:11Market Forecasting 97 Ground rule number six from our
- 1:05:15November packet says I am not in the business of predicting
- 1:05:18general stock market or business fluctuations.
- 1:05:21If you think I can do this or think it is essential to an
- 1:05:24investment program, you should not be in the partnership.
- 1:05:28Of course, this rule can be attacked as fuzzy, complex,
- 1:05:32ambiguous, vague, etcetera. Nevertheless, I think the point
- 1:05:36is well understood by the great majority of our partners.
- 1:05:40We don't buy and sell stocks based upon what other people
- 1:05:43think the stock market is going to do.
- 1:05:45I never have an opinion, but rather upon what we think the
- 1:05:49company is going to do. The course of the stock market
- 1:05:51will determine to a great degree when we will be right, but the
- 1:05:55accuracy of our analysis of the company will largely determine
- 1:05:59whether we will be right. In other words, we tend to
- 1:06:02concentrate on what should happen, not when it should
- 1:06:05happen. In our department store
- 1:06:06business, I can say with considerable assurance that
- 1:06:09December will be better than July.
- 1:06:11Notice how sophisticated I have already become about retailing.
- 1:06:15What really counts is whether December is better than last
- 1:06:18December by a margin greater than our competitors and what we
- 1:06:21are doing to set the stage for future Decembers.
- 1:06:25However, in our partnership business, I not only can't say
- 1:06:28whether December will be better than July, but I can't even say
- 1:06:32that December won't produce a very large loss.
- 1:06:35It sometimes does. Our investments are simply not
- 1:06:38aware that it takes 365 to 14 days for the Earth to make it
- 1:06:43around the Sun. Even worse, they are not aware
- 1:06:46that your celestial orientation and that of the IRS requires
- 1:06:49that I report to you upon the conclusion of each orbit.
- 1:06:53The Earth's not ours. Therefore, we have to use a
- 1:06:56standard other than the calendar to measure our progress.
- 1:07:00This yardstick is obviously the general experience in securities
- 1:07:04as measured by the Dow. We have a strong feeling that
- 1:07:07this competitor will do quite decently over a period of years.
- 1:07:10Christmas will come even if it's in July.
- 1:07:13And if we keep beating our competitor, we will have to do
- 1:07:15something better than quite decently.
- 1:07:18It's something like a retailer measuring his sales gains and
- 1:07:21profit margins against Sears. Beat them every year and somehow
- 1:07:25you'll see daylight. I resurrect this market guessing
- 1:07:28section only because after the Dow declined from 995 at the
- 1:07:33peak in February to about 865 in May, I received a few calls from
- 1:07:38partners suggesting that they thought stocks were going a lot
- 1:07:41lower. This always raises 2 questions
- 1:07:44in my mind. One, if they knew in February
- 1:07:46that the Dow was going to 865 in May, why didn't they let me in
- 1:07:51on it then? And two, if they didn't know
- 1:07:53what was going to happen during that ensuing 3 months back in
- 1:07:56February, how do they know in May?
- 1:07:59There is also a voice or two after any hundred point or so
- 1:08:02decline suggesting we sell and wait until the future is
- 1:08:05clearer. Let me again suggest 2 points.
- 1:08:09One, the future has never been clear to me.
- 1:08:11Give us a call when the next few months are obvious to you, or
- 1:08:15for that matter the next few hours and no one ever seems to
- 1:08:18call after the market has gone up. 100 points to focus my
- 1:08:22attention on how unclear everything is, even though the
- 1:08:26view back in February doesn't look so clear in retrospect.
- 1:08:30If we start deciding based on guesses or emotions whether we
- 1:08:33will or won't participate in a business where we should have
- 1:08:37some long run edge, we're in trouble.
- 1:08:39We will not sell our interests in businesses stocks when they
- 1:08:42are attractively priced just because some astrologer thinks
- 1:08:46the quotations may go lower, even though such forecasts are
- 1:08:49obviously going to be right some of the time.
- 1:08:51Similarly, we will not buy fully priced securities because
- 1:08:55experts think prices are going higher.
- 1:08:58Who would think of buying or selling a private business
- 1:09:01because of someone's guess on the stock market?
- 1:09:03The availability of a question for your business interest.
- 1:09:06Stock should always be an asset to be utilized if desired.
- 1:09:10If it gets silly enough in either direction, you take
- 1:09:13advantage of it. It's availability should never
- 1:09:17be turned into a liability whereby its periodic aberrations
- 1:09:20in turn formulate your judgements.
- 1:09:23A marvelous articulation of this idea is contained in Chapter 2,
- 1:09:27The Investor and Stock Market Fluctuations of Benjamin
- 1:09:31Grahams, The Intelligent Investor.
- 1:09:33In my opinion, this chapter has more investment importance than
- 1:09:37anything else that has been written.
- 1:09:39We will have a letter out about November 1st with the Commitment
- 1:09:42Letter 4.