Latest / Kingpins & Sicarios: Crime Documentary / Wachovia: What Did It Admit About Three Hundred Seventy-Three Billion Dollars in Wires?
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: A federal judge in Miami approved a deal with Wachovia
- 0:03Speaker 1: Bank on the 17th of March 2010. The bank handled
- 0:06Speaker 1: more than $ 373 billion in wires for Mexican currency exchange houses.
- 0:11Speaker 1: Planes bought through those accounts were seized with over 20,000
- 0:15Speaker 1: kilograms of cocaine. How could that happen? The bank signed
- 0:18Speaker 1: a statement of facts. It agreed never to contradict it.
- 0:21Speaker 1: Follow that statement from the first plane to the last page,
- 0:25Speaker 1: and you learn what investigators traced, what the bank watched,
- 0:28Speaker 1: what it did not watch, and what the judge was
- 0:30Speaker 1: told it cost. It began in June of 2005. Prosecutors
- 0:36Speaker 1: in the Southern District of Florida, the Drug Enforcement Administration,
- 0:39Speaker 1: and the Internal Revenue Service opened an investigation. They were
- 0:43Speaker 1: looking at wire transfers sent to the United States from Mexico.
- 0:46Speaker 1: The wires had one use. They paid for aircraft bought
- 0:49Speaker 1: in the United States. Those aircraft then moved narcotics out
- 0:52Speaker 1: of drug-producing countries for sale in the United States. Investigators
- 0:57Speaker 1: followed the wires backward They led to correspondent accounts at Wachovia.
- 1:01Speaker 1: The accounts belonged to Mexican currency exchange houses, which are
- 1:04Speaker 1: called Casas de Cambio. A Wachovia business unit in its
- 1:07Speaker 1: Miami offices ran those accounts. Here is how the money moved.
- 1:11Speaker 1: On numerous occasions, the statement says, a drug trafficking organization
- 1:15Speaker 1: put cash into an exchange house. The exchange house then
- 1:17Speaker 1: wired that money through its Wachovia account using false identities.
- 1:21Speaker 1: The wire paid for an airplane. In one case, 10
- 1:24Speaker 1: wires crossed Wachovia over two days. They went into an
- 1:27Speaker 1: escrow account held by an aircraft broker. Four people and
- 1:30Speaker 1: one business sent them. Every amount was a round number.
- 1:33Speaker 1: None of the senders had any connection to the aircraft.
- 1:36Speaker 1: None had any connection to the company said to own it.
- 1:39Speaker 1: The investigation found that the people's identities were false and
- 1:42Speaker 1: that the business was a shell. That plane was later
- 1:44Speaker 1: seized with about 2,000 kilograms of cocaine aboard. In another case,
- 1:49Speaker 1: one exchange house sent eight wires into a broker's account
- 1:52Speaker 1: on a single day. One sender was credited with four
- 1:55Speaker 1: of them. Two were for $ 49, 000 and two were for $ 51, 000.
- 1:59Speaker 1: A second sender was credited with the other four. Each
- 2:01Speaker 1: was for exactly $ 50, 000. The next day, a different exchange
- 2:05Speaker 1: house sent 10 more wires to the same broker. Each
- 2:08Speaker 1: one was for $ 50, 000. That money was meant for an airplane.
- 2:12Speaker 1: Law enforcement seized it before the sale was finished. Again,
- 2:15Speaker 1: the identities of the senders were false. Add up the
- 2:20Speaker 1: aircraft money and the statement gives a number. Nearly $ 13
- 2:24Speaker 1: million went through Wachovia accounts to buy planes. At least
- 2:28Speaker 1: four of those planes were seized by foreign police working
- 2:30Speaker 1: with the United States between 2004 and 2007. More than 20,000
- 2:36Speaker 1: kilograms of cocaine came out of them. The wires that
- 2:39Speaker 1: bought planes were a small part of the flow. To
- 2:41Speaker 1: see the rest, start with what an exchange house is.
- 2:46Speaker 1: An exchange house is not a bank. It is a
- 2:48Speaker 1: licensed business that swaps one currency for another. It does
- 2:51Speaker 1: not hold deposits, it does not keep checking or savings accounts,
- 2:54Speaker 1: and it does not lend. The statement says a central
- 2:57Speaker 1: function is to let people in Mexico wire the value
- 3:00Speaker 1: of their money to bank accounts in the United States.
- 3:03Speaker 1: The statement says that nature of the business gave money
- 3:05Speaker 1: launderers a way to move drug dollars from Mexico into
- 3:08Speaker 1: the American banking system. The Drug Enforcement Administration had described
- 3:13Speaker 1: one route. Dollars earned in the United States were carried
- 3:15Speaker 1: to Mexico and sold to an exchange house for pesos.
- 3:19Speaker 1: The trafficker got pesos without having to risk structuring the
- 3:22Speaker 1: money into a bank. The exchange house got something too.
- 3:25Speaker 1: It got a valuable source of discounted dollars, then it
- 3:27Speaker 1: wired those dollars into accounts at banks such as Wachovia.
- 3:31Speaker 1: Wachovia sold the exchange house's three services. The first was wires.
- 3:35Speaker 1: An exchange house could send money through Wachovia for its
- 3:38Speaker 1: customers in Mexico to recipients anywhere in the world. The
- 3:41Speaker 1: second was bulk cash. Exchange houses collected large amounts of
- 3:45Speaker 1: American dollars in Mexico. Those dollars were physically carried into
- 3:48Speaker 1: the United States by armoured car or by a method
- 3:51Speaker 1: the exchange house chose. Once inside the country, the money
- 3:54Speaker 1: was deposited at the Federal Reserve. The third was a pouch.
- 3:58Speaker 1: Exchange houses took in cheques and travellers' cheques from their customers.
- 4:01Speaker 1: They gathered the items into a pouch and sent it
- 4:03Speaker 1: to Wachovia for deposit. In about May of 2005, Wachovia
- 4:06Speaker 1: added a faster option. An exchange house could scan each
- 4:11Speaker 1: item and send the files electronically for credit. That product
- 4:14Speaker 1: was called remote deposit capture. The statement gives the totals
- 4:17Speaker 1: for three years, from the 1st of May 2004 to
- 4:20Speaker 1: the 31st of May 2007. In wires, at least $ 373 billion.
- 4:21Speaker 1: In bulk cash, at least $ 4, 700, 000, 000. In remote deposit capture,
- 4:23Speaker 1: about $ 47, 000, 000, 000. That last figure covers all of Wachovia's correspondent
- 4:25Speaker 1: banking customers. the Mexican exchange houses were among them. What
- 4:42Speaker 1: had the bank been told? According to the statement, the
- 4:45Speaker 1: warnings were years old and public. In 1996, the Drug
- 4:48Speaker 1: Enforcement Administration and federal regulators began publicly pointing at the
- 4:52Speaker 1: laundering risk of Mexican exchange houses. Miami, where Wachovia ran
- 4:57Speaker 1: this business, had been designated a high-intensity money laundering area
- 5:01Speaker 1: and a high-intensity drug trafficking area. In 2005, Mexico was
- 5:05Speaker 1: designated a high-risk source of money laundering. with a particular
- 5:08Speaker 1: focus on exchange houses. In April of 2006, the Treasury's
- 5:12Speaker 1: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network sent its own warning to American banks.
- 5:16Speaker 1: It listed activities that could point to laundering. Bulk cash
- 5:19Speaker 1: moved back from Mexico was one. Exchange house wires to
- 5:23Speaker 1: places with no clear business link were another. Third-party items
- 5:26Speaker 1: with sequential numbers were a third. The statement says that
- 5:29Speaker 1: by 2004, Wachovia understood the risk of doing business with
- 5:33Speaker 1: the exchange houses. By July of 2005, it knew that
- 5:36Speaker 1: other large American banks were leaving the business over laundering concerns.
- 5:41Speaker 1: Wachovia did not leave. In September of 2005, it bought
- 5:44Speaker 1: the right to solicit the international correspondent banking customers of
- 5:48Speaker 1: Union Bank of California. Wachovia knew that Union Bank was
- 5:51Speaker 1: exiting the exchange house market because of money laundering problems.
- 5:56Speaker 1: Wachovia also hired at least one person who had held
- 5:58Speaker 1: a significant role in Union Bank's exchange house business. After
- 6:02Speaker 1: Union Bank left, the statement says, Wachovia's business volume increased notably.
- 6:06Speaker 1: From September of 2005 to December of 2007, Wachovia served
- 6:11Speaker 1: 22 exchange houses. One of them was Casa de Cambio Puebla.
- 6:16Speaker 1: What did the bank do with the wires? The statement
- 6:19Speaker 1: describes the system. A computer generated alerts every month. The
- 6:23Speaker 1: alerts were based on rules Wachovia set. Anti-money laundering staff
- 6:27Speaker 1: in the bank's Philadelphia office were supposed to investigate them.
- 6:30Speaker 1: The statement says the scrutiny was limited by personnel and budget.
- 6:34Speaker 1: The number of alerts the system was designed to produce
- 6:36Speaker 1: each month was set in advance. The number depended partly
- 6:40Speaker 1: on how many investigators were available to review them. There
- 6:43Speaker 1: was one more limit. An investigator could not carry a
- 6:46Speaker 1: case into the next month. Whatever was started in one
- 6:48Speaker 1: month had to be finished within that month. The result,
- 6:51Speaker 1: the statement says, was an understaffed unit in Philadelphia that
- 6:55Speaker 1: could not keep up with the volume of wires. The
- 6:57Speaker 1: suspicious activity went effectively unmonitored. All $ 373 billion in wires
- 7:03Speaker 1: were watched this way. The bank had also collected information
- 7:06Speaker 1: about its customers. It knew who the exchange houses said
- 7:10Speaker 1: they were, where their money came from, and what activity
- 7:12Speaker 1: to expect from them. But the statement says that information
- 7:16Speaker 1: was not given to the anti-money laundering staff. Nobody compared
- 7:19Speaker 1: the actual activity to what the customers had said to expect.
- 7:25Speaker 1: Then there was the cash. Wachovia had no written formal
- 7:27Speaker 1: policy for monitoring bulk cash. Staff did not look at
- 7:31Speaker 1: the denominations of the bills. They did not look at
- 7:33Speaker 1: which region of Mexico the cash came from. They did
- 7:36Speaker 1: not compare each month's total against what the customer had
- 7:38Speaker 1: said to expect. The exchange houses were sending more than expected.
- 7:42Speaker 1: Many of them exceeded their expected monthly cash activity by
- 7:45Speaker 1: at least 50%. The statement gives the total. At least
- 7:49Speaker 1: $ 4 billion. $ 700 million in bulk cash from the exchange
- 7:53Speaker 1: houses passed through Wachovia between May of 2004 and May
- 7:57Speaker 1: of 2007, with essentially no monitoring for money laundering. The
- 8:01Speaker 1: scanned deposits were worse. Wachovia launched remote deposit capture in
- 8:06Speaker 1: the summer of 2005. According to the statement, it never
- 8:09Speaker 1: reviewed a single one of those deposits until about November
- 8:12Speaker 1: of 2007. In that time, about $ 47 billion came in
- 8:14Speaker 1: that way. The items included traveller's cheques, third-party cheques and
- 8:20Speaker 1: money orders. None was examined for structuring or for the
- 8:23Speaker 1: other common signs of laundering. The traveller's cheques show a
- 8:28Speaker 1: rule the bank wrote for itself. In 2005, someone warned
- 8:32Speaker 1: the bank that Exchange Houses was sending large quantities of
- 8:35Speaker 1: sequentially numbered traveller's cheques. The bank sent its customers a letter.
- 8:39Speaker 1: It said that, because of strict anti-money laundering rules, it
- 8:43Speaker 1: would limit bulk deposits of traveller's cheques. The letter set
- 8:46Speaker 1: a ceiling. No deposit could contain a series of sequentially
- 8:50Speaker 1: numbered checks worth more than $ 10, 500. But the bank built
- 8:54Speaker 1: no internal policy to carry out the rule. It built
- 8:57Speaker 1: no monitoring to enforce it, from April of 2005 to
- 9:00Speaker 1: May of 2007. The statement says Wachovia accepted more than 1,000
- 9:05Speaker 1: pouch deposits holding thousands of sequentially numbered travellers' checks. The
- 9:09Speaker 1: pouches were reviewed late. Because of budget and staffing, deposit
- 9:13Speaker 1: items were often examined three to six months after the deposit.
- 9:16Speaker 1: Any suspicious activity report that followed would describe transactions that
- 9:20Speaker 1: were months old. Later, a voluntary review by Washcovia covered
- 9:24Speaker 1: April of 2005 through May of 2007. Thirteen exchange houses
- 9:28Speaker 1: had put more than $ 20 million in sequentially numbered traveller's
- 9:32Speaker 1: cheques through the bank. That broke the bank's own policy.
- 9:35Speaker 1: Most of those cheques carried no legible name. About 64%
- 9:39Speaker 1: had unusual markings. The markings were handwritten or stamped with numbers,
- 9:44Speaker 1: letters or both. The statement calls the markings, the missing
- 9:47Speaker 1: signatures and the sequential numbers readily identifiable patterns of money
- 9:51Speaker 1: laundering activity. Reporters later told a related story. In April
- 9:57Speaker 1: of 2006, a DC-9 jet landed at the airport. in
- 10:00Speaker 1: Ciudad del Carmen in Mexico. Bloomberg Markets reported that soldiers
- 10:03Speaker 1: searched it and found 128 black suitcases. Inside was more
- 10:07Speaker 1: than five tons of cocaine. Bloomberg Markets also reported that
- 10:11Speaker 1: investigators found the smugglers had bought the DC-9 with laundered
- 10:15Speaker 1: money that moved through Wachovia and Bank of America. The
- 10:18Speaker 1: same article quotes a former employee. Martin Woods directed Wachovia's
- 10:22Speaker 1: anti-money laundering unit in London from 2006 to 2009. He
- 10:27Speaker 1: told Bloomberg he quit. He said executives ignored his documentation
- 10:30Speaker 1: showing drug dealers moving money through the bank's branch network.
- 10:36Speaker 1: Back at the bank, a second investigation began. In May
- 10:39Speaker 1: of 2007, the Southern District of Florida, the Internal Revenue
- 10:43Speaker 1: Service and the Drug Enforcement Administration began investigating Wachovia's compliance
- 10:47Speaker 1: program itself. The Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network joined. The
- 10:52Speaker 1: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ran a parallel examination.
- 10:56Speaker 1: Their finding covered May of 2003 through at least July
- 10:59Speaker 1: of 2007. The violations, the statement says, were serious and systemic.
- 11:04Speaker 1: They allowed customers to launder millions of dollars from the
- 11:07Speaker 1: sale of illegal narcotics. The investigators identified at least $ 110
- 11:12Speaker 1: million in drug proceeds that moved through the exchange house accounts.
- 11:16Speaker 1: The statement lists seven failures. There were no controls on
- 11:20Speaker 1: the return of nearly $ 14 billion in bulk cash for
- 11:22Speaker 1: exchange houses and other foreign correspondent customers. Over $ 40 billion
- 11:27Speaker 1: in monetary instruments went unmonitored for two years. It did
- 11:31Speaker 1: not carry out adequate due diligence on high-risk exchange houses.
- 11:34Speaker 1: It did not monitor their accounts well enough to meet
- 11:37Speaker 1: its reporting duties. It put no monitoring controls or limits
- 11:40Speaker 1: on sequentially numbered travellers' cheques, though its own policy called
- 11:44Speaker 1: for them. It did not detect and report suspicious wires
- 11:47Speaker 1: in time, and it had no effective audit coverage. The
- 11:50Speaker 1: charge was filed on the 12th of March 2010. It
- 11:53Speaker 1: was one count. Wachovia had willfully failed to maintain an
- 11:56Speaker 1: effective anti-money laundering programme. From May of 2003 to about
- 11:59Speaker 1: June of 2008, Wachovia waived indictment It accepted responsibility for
- 12:05Speaker 1: its conduct and for that of its employees as set
- 12:07Speaker 1: out in the statement. It agreed that, if prosecution ever resumed,
- 12:11Speaker 1: it would not contradict a word of those facts. The
- 12:16Speaker 1: same charging period covered a second set of accounts. From
- 12:19Speaker 1: 2003 to 2008, Wachovia kept accounts for third-party payment processors.
- 12:24Speaker 1: The processors handled remotely created checks. Those checks carry texts
- 12:28Speaker 1: such as Authorised by your Depositor, instead of the account
- 12:31Speaker 1: holder's signature. Telemarketers had obtained people's bank account details during
- 12:36Speaker 1: deceptive sales calls. Then they sent the details to the processors.
- 12:40Speaker 1: Many of the checks came back. Customers or their banks
- 12:43Speaker 1: complained that they had not been authorized. In some cases,
- 12:46Speaker 1: more than 40% of the deposited checks were returned. Some
- 12:49Speaker 1: were coded unauthorized. Wachovia received information from inside and outside
- 12:53Speaker 1: the bank about the returns. It left the accounts open.
- 12:56Speaker 1: The statement says the bank profited from the fees it
- 12:59Speaker 1: charged to process the returned checks. Three processors deposited about
- 13:04Speaker 1: $ 418 million. In February of 2006, the government's action in
- 13:08Speaker 1: the Eastern District of Pennsylvania froze some of those accounts.
- 13:12Speaker 1: After that, Wachovia began ending the relationships. It also funded
- 13:16Speaker 1: a restitution program for the people whose checks were deposited.
- 13:21Speaker 1: The agreement carried a price. The bank acknowledged that more
- 13:24Speaker 1: than $ 110 million was involved in transactions that violated the
- 13:29Speaker 1: money laundering laws. It settled the government's forfeiture claims for
- 13:33Speaker 1: exactly $ 110 million. It also agreed to a fine of
- 13:37Speaker 1: $ 50 million paid to the Treasury under an order from
- 13:39Speaker 1: the controller of the currency. The total was $ 160 million.
- 13:44Speaker 1: Payment was due within five business days. The Financial Crimes
- 13:47Speaker 1: Enforcement Network assessed its own penalty of $ 110 million, which
- 13:52Speaker 1: the forfeiture satisfied. The fine was set at $ 50 million
- 13:55Speaker 1: for three reasons the agreement lists. The bank had taken
- 13:58Speaker 1: remedial actions. The company paying was Wells Fargo Bank while
- 14:02Speaker 1: the failures happened at Wachovia, and there was no evidence
- 14:05Speaker 1: or allegation that Wells Fargo Bank's own program was deficient.
- 14:09Speaker 1: Wells Fargo had acquired Wachovia at the end of 2008.
- 14:12Speaker 1: In its own statement that day, the company said Wachovia
- 14:15Speaker 1: had exited all of its relationships with foreign money exchange
- 14:18Speaker 1: houses by early 2008. United States Attorney Jeffrey Sloman whose
- 14:23Speaker 1: office brought the case, put it in one sentence. Corporate citizens,
- 14:27Speaker 1: no matter how big or powerful, must be held accountable
- 14:29Speaker 1: for their actions. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network's director, James Fries,
- 14:34Speaker 1: added a detail about size. In the recent past, he said,
- 14:37Speaker 1: Wachovia had been the fourth largest commercial bank in the
- 14:40Speaker 1: United States. The statement lists what the bank had already done.
- 14:46Speaker 1: It produced more than 8 million pages of documents. It
- 14:49Speaker 1: hired a new chief compliance officer in June of 2007.
- 14:52Speaker 1: and a new Bank Secrecy Act officer in April of 2008.
- 14:56Speaker 1: It also paid an independent consultant to review its transactions
- 14:59Speaker 1: with 13 exchange houses over three years. Then it filed
- 15:03Speaker 1: reports on that conduct. It filed more than 4,200 suspicious
- 15:07Speaker 1: activity reports on the exchange house's wires, covering $ 4. 3 billion.
- 15:12Speaker 1: It filed eight reports on bulk cash, covering more than
- 15:14Speaker 1: $ 4 billion. It filed 18 reports on sequentially numbered travelers' checks,
- 15:19Speaker 1: covering more than $ 23 million. The deal also gave the
- 15:23Speaker 1: bank 12 months. Prosecution of the charge was deferred. If
- 15:27Speaker 1: Wachovia complied in all material respects, the government would ask
- 15:31Speaker 1: for the charge to be dismissed with prejudice within 30
- 15:34Speaker 1: days after the 12 months ended. During that time, the
- 15:37Speaker 1: bank had to follow the remedial measures in the Comptroller's
- 15:39Speaker 1: Consent Order and give prosecutors any relevant records they asked for.
- 15:46Speaker 1: The deferral ran its course. On 6 April 2011, Judge
- 15:50Speaker 1: Joan Leonard signed an order of dismissal It dismissed the
- 15:53Speaker 1: single count against Wachovia Bank. The case was closed. The
- 15:56Speaker 1: charging document filed in Miami had listed one defendant from
- 15:59Speaker 1: its first page. It was the bank.