Latest / Saigalseatrade Podcast / Inside the Mechanics of the Global Oil System - Part 1
Transcript
- 0:10Hello, everyone, and welcome back to the Segal Sea Trade
- 0:13Podcast. I'm Shruti, your host today, and
- 0:16I'm very excited to see how today's conversation unfolds
- 0:20because we're going to explore a very interesting perspective on
- 0:23the oil market. And I'm joined by none other
- 0:26than Mr. Sandesh Khan that. So, Sandesh, welcome back to the
- 0:29podcast. Thanks Shruti.
- 0:31Thanks for inviting me once again.
- 0:32It's pleasure to be here. A lot of the market seems to
- 0:37believe that if Donald Trump wants low oil prices, then oil
- 0:41will simply stay low. From a market structure
- 0:44perspective. Why do you think that logic is
- 0:47fundamentally flawed? Well, Shruti, that logic is
- 0:50flawed because it assumes oil prices are set by intent rather
- 0:56than structure. And oil has never worked that
- 1:00way. So even if Donald Trump wants
- 1:02low prices, he doesn't control the marginal barrel or let's
- 1:07say, the cost curve or the timing of the investment cycle.
- 1:12So oil prices are set where global supply meets global
- 1:16demand and then it's adjusted by the logistics, inventories and
- 1:21then the expectations from the market.
- 1:23And it's not by executive preference.
- 1:27So the presidents, they can job on sanctions, release SPR
- 1:31barrels, which we have seen in the previous administration or
- 1:34even like today, we are seeing pressure allies, But none of
- 1:38that overrides the geology or the declining rates or the
- 1:42capital discipline or even the demand growth.
- 1:45So the market clears where it clears, regardless of who
- 1:49occupies the Oval Office. So what do you think
- 1:53specifically kept oil cheap during Trump 1.0 that had
- 1:57nothing to do with policy? Well, I will say that what
- 2:00actually kept oil cheap during Trump 1.0 had very little to do
- 2:06with the policy and in addition to that almost everything to do
- 2:11with the timing because the shale revolution around 15 years
- 2:14ago, it finally hit the full stride.
- 2:17So US shale break evens very closer to dollar 40s.
- 2:21Then the interest rates were lower, the capital was abundant
- 2:25and then the balance sheets were loose.
- 2:28And then there was a market structure where small
- 2:31independent producers, they want to increase the production and
- 2:36the core strategy was like that, increase the production and then
- 2:39sell those assets to the big oil majors.
- 2:42And that is why the producers were chasing growth at any cost.
- 2:46So every price rally it triggered an immediate supply
- 2:50response. And also before moving forward,
- 2:53I just have to mention that the technology involvement and the
- 2:57Technical Support from the US market was higher.
- 3:02So we have seen some of the technical replications
- 3:05implemented very fast and very cost effective.
- 3:09At the same time. OPEC, it had just come off a
- 3:12failed market share war and global inventories, they were
- 3:17bloated and even the global demand growth was decent but not
- 3:20explosive. So Trump, he inherited a system
- 3:25which is already structurally biased towards the oversupply.
- 3:29So he didn't create that environment, he arrived at the
- 3:33peak of it. Also tell us which past
- 3:36presidents also wanted cheap oil, but they actually failed to
- 3:40prevent price spikes. Well, I could go on, but let me
- 3:45summarize this. History will tell you that a
- 3:48full of presidents who desperately wanted cheap oil and
- 3:52still watch the prices explode. So Nixon wanted cheap oil and
- 3:57then he got the 1973 shock. I'm talking about the oil
- 4:01embargo from the Arab states or US.
- 4:04And then Carter. He wanted cheap oil and lived
- 4:08through the second oil crisis. Then we have George Bush wanted
- 4:12cheap oil and saw a price run 2 dollar 147.
- 4:16And then Obama wanted cheap oil and faced repeated spikes
- 4:20before, you know, shale kind of a bail the system out.
- 4:24So wanting the low oil prices has never been the missing
- 4:28ingredient. So the constraint is always the
- 4:30supply system and not the political will.
- 4:32So do you think this belief about presidential control more
- 4:35political storytelling than market analysis?
- 4:38Well, I would say that the belief that precedence control
- 4:42over oil prices is far closer to the political storytelling than
- 4:48the market analysis. And most of the time it's a
- 4:52narrative. Then it gets retrofitted after
- 4:55the fact because when prices fall, leaders take the credit.
- 4:59And when the prices rise, they blame the geopolitics, they
- 5:03blame speculators, they blame producers.
- 5:06But you know what? The cycles turn because of the
- 5:09underinvestment and cost inflation, depletion of the
- 5:13assets, depletion of the reserves and then there are the
- 5:18scenarios where the demand surprises presents.
- 5:21So right now the dangerous mistake is assuming Trump 2.0,
- 5:27that is the second term inherits the same cost structure, then in
- 5:31addition to that the same shell elasticity, and at the same time
- 5:35he also inherits the same spare capacity, which was a backdrop
- 5:41as equivalent to his first. And when those structural
- 5:45differences assert themselves, the market won't care who
- 5:49promised what. Well, that's a really
- 5:50interesting perspective that you have unfolded.
- 5:53But let me ask you, some argue Trump didn't control oil prices.
- 5:58Where does the truth actually sit?
- 6:00Well, Shruti, I would say that the truth sits much closer to
- 6:05structure than to personality because Donald Trump didn't
- 6:09control oil prices, but he absolutely influenced the
- 6:13behaviour at the margin. And let me tell you specifically
- 6:17in the early part of his first term, OPEC didn't open the tab
- 6:21simply because Trump tweeted. They did it because the market
- 6:25context made that pressure credible.
- 6:27Shale basin was surging of inventories.
- 6:30They were all time high. And then OPEC was already
- 6:34terrified of losing long term market share.
- 6:36Trump's pressure didn't create the decision.
- 6:39It accelerated the one, which made sense anyway.
- 6:45So in that case, Sandesh, how much of OpEx response was fear
- 6:49of US retaliation VS internal market share logic?
- 6:53So Shruti, when you break it down, OpEx response was far more
- 6:58about the internal market share which is defence than fear of US
- 7:03retaliation I would say. So the cartel they had just
- 7:07lived through 2014 and 2016 collapse and the lesson they
- 7:13took away wasn't cut harder. It was don't hand the market to
- 7:18Shell. That is, don't hand the market
- 7:20share to the US and Saudi Arabia, one of the largest
- 7:24producer in the OPEC, in particular, understood that if
- 7:27it prop prices too aggressively, the US shale would simply
- 7:32backfill the Kurds. And then the Trump rhetoric gave
- 7:35a political cover for a strategy OPEC was already inclined to
- 7:41pursue. But it wasn't the root cause of
- 7:43it. Well then, do you think
- 7:45Washington still has the same leverage over OPEC in 2026?
- 7:50Well, As for Washington's leverage in 2026, it's in my
- 7:56opinion materially weaker because the US no longer sits in
- 8:01the world of abundant spare capacity or ultra low shale
- 8:04break events. And even the cooperative
- 8:07geopolitics for US shale is disciplined, its capital
- 8:12constrained and OPEC Plus is far more fragmented but also more
- 8:16cynical. And then we have a lot of new
- 8:20developments outside OPEC and we all know the significant impact
- 8:24it will have in the coming years, specifically from Jayana
- 8:27and others. And then let's think from the
- 8:31perspective of Saudi Arabia, because Saudi Arabia today is
- 8:34less interested in pleasing Washington and more focused on
- 8:40revenue stability and then the fiscal break evens and long term
- 8:44monetization. So the leverage that existed in
- 8:472017 was a function of timing and not the permanent US power.
- 8:53So if that's the case, would OPEC still behave the same way
- 8:56today if prices started running? So would OPEC have the same way
- 9:01today if prices started running? I would say almost certainly
- 9:06not. If prices rally now, it would
- 9:09likely be because inventories are tightening and spare
- 9:12capacity is genuinely constrained, not because demand
- 9:16is overheating in an already oversupplied system.
- 9:20In that environment, opening the tabs aggressively, it would
- 9:24destroy the value without solving the underlying problem.
- 9:28I would say that yes, OPEC might add barrel tactically, but it
- 9:32wouldn't flirt the market the way it did during the Trump 1.0
- 9:37that is his previous term. So I would say that the key
- 9:41difference is this, that back then OPEC feared of losing
- 9:46relevance. And today it knows it still sets
- 9:49the marginal balance, and that changes how much pressure it's
- 9:54willing to absorb from any White House.
- 9:56Well, that was quite interesting, Sandesh.
- 9:58Now coming to US shale oil. It was like a shock absorber of
- 10:03the last cycle, but oil break evens for the shale oil averaged
- 10:07between 40 to $65. Now tell us what structurally
- 10:11changed in US shale that makes a repeat of 2017 to 2019 almost
- 10:17unlikely. Well, I would say that shale oil
- 10:21stopped being a shop observer the moment it stopped being a
- 10:25growth at any cost business because between 2017 and 2019
- 10:30the momentum was completely different.
- 10:33I have already discussed this that how the small producers
- 10:37want to increase the production substantially and then they want
- 10:41to sell those assets to oil measures and gain from the
- 10:46market. So US share was effectively
- 10:49subsidized by cheap capital because we all know that
- 10:53interest rates were lower. So the investors they were
- 10:57willing to fund negative free cash flows in exchange for the
- 11:00volume growth and you know that kind of a kept break evens
- 11:04artificially low. So like I said that model today
- 11:09is completely gone because the interest rates increases
- 11:13significantly. We have equity market lenders
- 11:17and boards all demand capital return first because they are
- 11:22looking at cash flow as a primary source.
- 11:26So that single change has fundamentally altered shale
- 11:30oil's response function. So even if the prices rise,
- 11:35producers no longer reflectively drill.
- 11:37So they ask whether the incremental barrel either
- 11:41improves the free cash flow or whether it grows the production.
- 11:45That's well said, but how did capital discipline permanently
- 11:49alter shale's response function? Well then the capital
- 11:53discipline, it didn't just slow the shale oil production, it
- 11:57reshaped its elasticity. So in the last cycle we have
- 12:01seen that average break even move from dollar fifty to dollar
- 12:05sixty trigger drinks almost immediately.
- 12:08So today the same price move mostly goes into the dividends
- 12:13and buybacks and then the balance sheet repair.
- 12:16So management teams are explicitly telling the investor
- 12:19that growth is capped even in constructive price environment.
- 12:24So that means the shell still respond to the price, but the
- 12:28supply curve is much more flatter.
- 12:30So it takes higher price and longer time frames to get the
- 12:33same volume response. So Sandesh, would you say the
- 12:37decline in rates and inventory quality are being underestimated
- 12:41by the market? Well declining rates and
- 12:45inventory quality are being underestimated over the years.
- 12:49So the best acreage in the Permian and the other core bases
- 12:54was drilled first and then what's left is still economic,
- 12:58but you know it requires more capital per barrel.
- 13:02We call it as bottom of the barrel cost and it delivers
- 13:06steeper decline. So we have assets those are
- 13:09segmented between legacy productions and non legacy
- 13:12production. So legacy production falls
- 13:16faster than the market assumes. So which means that if you have
- 13:20to maintain the flat output which already consumes a huge
- 13:25amount of capital, you have to focus on that first.
- 13:28So the idea that shale can surge again without massive
- 13:33reinvestment ignores the math of depletion.
- 13:35So, Sandesh, what would you say is the price at which shale
- 13:39actually responds meaningfully now?
- 13:41So As for the price that actually matters, shale doesn't
- 13:45really respond meaningfully. I would say until you are the
- 13:49range bound, 65 to $70 per barrel, and even then the
- 13:54response is measured, not explosive.
- 13:56So below that level producers can sustain output.
- 14:00But won't grow aggressively. And then the other side of coin
- 14:04is that crucially there is a big lag.
- 14:07So even if the price spike, rigs don't translate into barrels for
- 14:1119 to 18 months because that's the infrastructure and
- 14:16implementation lag. So this lag is what removes
- 14:20sales ability to instantly cap prices.
- 14:23So the market still treats shale like a light switch, but in
- 14:28reality it's become dimmer, slow, constrained and far less
- 14:32reliable as a shock observer. Well, that was an interesting
- 14:35debrief, Sandesh. And now on to our next question.
- 14:39We have with us, Smith on the podcast.
- 14:40Smith, welcome back to the podcast.
- 14:42Thanks Shruti, thanks for having me here.
- 14:44Well, Smith, right now the structure looks loose short
- 14:48term, but upstream investment is drying up again.
- 14:51And as it has been seen historically, why is that
- 14:53combination so dangerous? Please tell us.
- 14:56So let me walk you through this. The combination is dangerous is
- 15:00because it creates a false sense of security right before the
- 15:04system tightens. And when the market looks loose
- 15:07in the short term, we see prices soften, cash flows fall, and the
- 15:12boards pull back on the investments.
- 15:14But oil supplier doesn't respond instantly.
- 15:16The declining rates keep grinding away in the background,
- 15:19projects get deferred, and the future supply curve quietly
- 15:23collapses. By the time the market realizes
- 15:26what has happened, there's no fast way to fix it.
- 15:29And that's how you go from plenty of oil to where did the
- 15:33barrels go in the very short window.
- 15:35We also see this exact movie multiple times.
- 15:38The clearest example is the post 2014.
- 15:41After the price crash, the upstream investment was slashed
- 15:44for several years while the market felt oversupplied.
- 15:48Prices stayed depressed for longer than people expected, but
- 15:52the under investment showed up later, setting the stage for the
- 15:562018 run and the structural tightness that followed.
- 15:59So for another example, the late 1990's the oil was cheap,
- 16:04investment collapse after Asian financial crisis, and a few
- 16:08years later prices exploded in the early 2000s.
- 16:12And the pattern is always the same, apparent surplus First,
- 16:15Capital destruction next and shortage later.
- 16:18So Shruti, I just want to know your take, like how long it
- 16:21usually takes for an under investment to show up in prices?
- 16:25Well, Smith, if you ask me in terms of timing, I think under
- 16:29investment usually takes about 18 to 36 months to show up in
- 16:33prices, sometimes longer offshore.
- 16:36So shale responds faster than conventional, but even shale has
- 16:40a lag now and you see deep water oil sands and international
- 16:44projects operate on multi year timelines.
- 16:46So once those investment decisions are missed, the
- 16:49barrels are simply not there when demand recovers or say
- 16:53supply is disrupted. So I think that's why prices
- 16:56tend to overshoot on the upside once the squeeze begins.
- 17:00And having said that, the indicators that a squeeze is
- 17:04forming are subtle and very easy to miss.
- 17:08And you see global decline rates creeping higher, project
- 17:11sanctions falling into multi decade lows, reserve replacement
- 17:15ratios deteriorating, and spare capacity becoming more
- 17:18concentrated in fewer hands. So amidst all of this, you also
- 17:23start to see inventory draws that don't reverse seasonally
- 17:27and a forward curve that tightens even when spot prices
- 17:30look soft. So now the most important signal
- 17:32here I feel is when price weakness no longer stimulates
- 17:36investment. That's exactly the moment where
- 17:39market stops self correcting. And when that happens, the
- 17:43squeeze isn't obvious yet, but it's already logged in.
- 17:46Vaishweti, I agree with you and that was definitely an
- 17:49interesting take. So with that, I feel we come to
- 17:52an end to this episode and it was a conversation filled with
- 17:56interesting perspectives. And to all our listeners, do not
- 17:58forget to share and subscribe to our podcast.
- 18:01Until next time, navigate safely and stay tuned.