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028 - Chapter 14 Part 1 - Onward from Koto-ri · Marine Operations in Korea The Chosin Reservoir Campaign

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  Speaker 1: Chapter fourteen, Part one of US Marine Operations in Korea
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  Speaker 1: nineteen fifty to nineteen fifty three, Volume three, The Chosen
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  Speaker 1: Reservoir Campaign by Lynn Montross and Nicholas Canzona. This LibriVox
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  Speaker 1: recording is in the public domain. Onward from Kodo Re,
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  Speaker 1: the progress of the First Marine Division breakout depended in
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  Speaker 1: no small degree on the reliable communications provided by the
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  Speaker 1: division radio relay linking up Hagarou, koto Re, Chinhungnie and
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  Speaker 1: hung Nam. At fourteen forty on six December, the vehicles
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  Speaker 1: of the Hagaru relay terminal joined Division Train number one,
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  Speaker 1: whereupon the station at koto Re became in turn the terminal.
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  Speaker 1: This station was located on the highest point of ground,
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  Speaker 1: just south of the Koto Ri perimeter, and though it
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  Speaker 1: was outside the defense area, the Chinese did not bother
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  Speaker 1: it until the Marines were breaking camp. Then the opposition
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  Speaker 1: consisted of only harassm small arms fires instead of the
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  Speaker 1: attack which might have been expected. In fact, the enemy
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  Speaker 1: did not launch another large scale assault on Coto Ree
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  Speaker 1: after his costly repulse on the night of twenty eight
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  Speaker 1: to twenty nine November. Although the perimeter was surrounded throughout
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  Speaker 1: the first six days of December, incipient CCF attacks were
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  Speaker 1: broken up in the enemy's assembly areas. Excellent observation as
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  Speaker 1: well as casualty evacuation was provided by the oys taking
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  Speaker 1: off from the Codo Rea airstrip. They were the eyes
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  Speaker 1: of an impressive array of marine firepower tanks, four point
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  Speaker 1: two inch and eighty one millimeter mortars, as well as
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  Speaker 1: aircraft and Captain McClellan's easy battery of two eleven. The
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  Speaker 1: artillery one O fives and the mortars did a grand job,
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  Speaker 1: commented Major Bartley. They were always available, shifted their fires quickly, inaccurately,
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  Speaker 1: and serviced their pieces amazingly well in the cold weather.
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  Speaker 1: As a further asset, the Coto reperimeter was defended by
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  Speaker 1: an adequate numbers in comparison to Hagaroo during the first
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  Speaker 1: critical week of CCF attacks. On thirty November, when Baker
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  Speaker 1: Company of the first Tank Battalion returned to Kotoree after
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  Speaker 1: the Task Force Drysdale Battle, three platoons of tanks were
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  Speaker 1: added to the Dog Company platoon, already attached to two
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  Speaker 1: to one. The next day, Colonel Puller's rct I Minus
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  Speaker 1: was further strengthened by the arrival of the second Battalion
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  Speaker 1: of the thirty first Infantry seventh Infantry Division, the last
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  Speaker 1: unit to reach coto Ree from the south. These army
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  Speaker 1: troops had been ordered to Hagarou, but owing to the
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  Speaker 1: changing situation, they were directed by ten Corps on one
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  Speaker 1: December to remain at coto Ree. Under the operational control
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  Speaker 1: of Colonel Poller, two thirty one took over a sector
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  Speaker 1: at the southern end of the perimeter. Sporadic CCF small
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  Speaker 1: arms fire was received on each of the first six
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  Speaker 1: days of December, and enemy troop movements were observed at
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  Speaker 1: all points of the compass. On several occasions, a few
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  Speaker 1: mortars were lobbed into the perimeter. Not a single marine
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  Speaker 1: casualty was suffered during the period, though CCF losses were
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  Speaker 1: estimated at six hundred forty six killed and three hundred
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  Speaker 1: twenty two wounded. Daily air drops were required to keep
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  Speaker 1: the perimeter supplied with ammunition rations and other essentials. Captain
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  Speaker 1: Norman Vining, the battalion fact who had once been a
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  Speaker 1: carrier landing signal officer, guided planes to satisfactory drop zones
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  Speaker 1: with makeshift paddles. One day, a case of thirty caliber
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  Speaker 1: cartridges broke free from its shoot and hurtled through the
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  Speaker 1: top of Lieutenant Colonel Sutter's tent during a conference, narrowly
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  Speaker 1: missing several officers. It hit the straw at their feet
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  Speaker 1: and bounced high into the air before landing on a
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  Speaker 1: crate used as a table assembly of division at coto Ree.
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  Speaker 1: Cooto Ree being second only to Hagaroo as an advance base,
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  Speaker 1: Colonel Puller at times had responsibilities which are usually shouldered
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  Speaker 1: by an air On twenty nine November he had been
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  Speaker 1: the organizer of Task Force Drysdale, and on six December
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  Speaker 1: it became his task to make ready for the reception
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  Speaker 1: of the ten thousand troops from Hagaroo. Although the koto
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  Speaker 1: Ri perimeter was already overcrowded, Polar directed that hot food
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  Speaker 1: and warming tents be provided for all Hagaroo troops upon arrival.
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  Speaker 1: More than fourteen thousand men would then be organized for
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  Speaker 1: the next stage of the breakout. Strength estimates were as follows.
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  Speaker 1: Marine Garrison at koto Ree two thousand, six hundred and
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  Speaker 1: forty US Army units at koto Ree one thousand, five
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  Speaker 1: hundred thirty five Royal Marine Commandos at koto Rie twenty
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  Speaker 1: five Marines arriving from Hagaroo, nine thousand, forty six US
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  Speaker 1: Army troops arriving from Hagaroo, eight hundred eighteen Royal Marine
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  Speaker 1: Commandos arriving from Hagaroo, one hundred twenty five Rock Police
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  Speaker 1: attached to our RCT five forty total fourteen thy two
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  Speaker 1: hundred twenty nine. Puller dealt with the problem of casualty
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  Speaker 1: evacuation at Codo Ree by ordering that the oy strip
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  Speaker 1: be lengthened so that larger aircraft could land. The engineers
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  Speaker 1: of Charlie Company started the job on six December, and
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  Speaker 1: progress speeded up as the Dog Company engineers arrived next
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  Speaker 1: day from Hagaroo with their heavy equipment. The strip had
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  Speaker 1: been widened by forty feet and extended by three hundred
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  Speaker 1: on seven December, when the first TBM landed. These planes
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  Speaker 1: had been borrowed from the Navy and First MAW administrative
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  Speaker 1: flight lines and assigned to VMO six. They could fly
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  Speaker 1: out several litter patients and as many as nine ambulatory cases.
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  Speaker 1: Captain Alfred F. Mccayleb Junior of VMO six and First
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  Speaker 1: Lieutenant Truman Clark of VMFN five thirteen evacuated a total
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  Speaker 1: of one hundred three casualties. The carrier Landing Training of
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  Speaker 1: the Marine stood them in go instead, as Captain Malcolm G.
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  Speaker 1: Moncrieff Junior, a qualified landing Signal officer of vm F
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  Speaker 1: three twelve, directed the TBMs to their landings at coto
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  Speaker 1: Ree with paddles. The clearing station established at coto Ree
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  Speaker 1: by Company D of the First Medical Battalion, Lieutenant Commander
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  Speaker 1: Gustav T. Anderson Medical Corps U. S. Navy, had a
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  Speaker 1: normal bed capacity of only sixty but somehow continued to
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  Speaker 1: handle a total of eight hundred and thirty two cases,
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  Speaker 1: including non battle casualties. The Company D Medics were assisted
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  Speaker 1: during their last few days at koto Ree by Captain Herring,
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  Speaker 1: the division surgeon, and Commander Howard A. Johnson, Medical Corps U. S. Navy,
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  Speaker 1: the CEO of the First Medical Battalion. Captain Richard S. Silvis,
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  Speaker 1: Medical Corps U. S. Navy, surgeon of the second Marine
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  Speaker 1: Division on temporary duty in Korea as an observer, also
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  Speaker 1: took an active part. Surgical assistance was welcomed by the
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  Speaker 1: Company D medics since operation that coto Ree were performed
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  Speaker 1: under the most difficult conditions, only tents being available for patients.
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  Speaker 1: The hundreds of casualties brought from Hagarou added to the
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  Speaker 1: necessity for speedy evacuation. About two hundred cases were flown
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  Speaker 1: out on the seventh by TBMs and Liaison aircraft. By
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  Speaker 1: the following morning, the engineers had lengthened the OI strip
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  Speaker 1: to one thousand, seven hundred and fifty feet, but a
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  Speaker 1: heavy snowfall put an end to nearly all air activity.
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  Speaker 1: In spite of the risks involved, one Air Force C
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  Speaker 1: forty seven did get through to coto Ree, where it
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  Speaker 1: could be heard but not seen, while circling blindly about
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  Speaker 1: the perimeter. By a miracle, the plane landed safely and
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  Speaker 1: took off with nineteen casualties. The following day saw air
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  Speaker 1: evacuation of casualties in full swing, with about two hundred
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  Speaker 1: and twenty five being flown out to clear the hospital
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  Speaker 1: tents of all serious cases. Activation of Task Force Dog.
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  Speaker 1: A large tent in the middle of the perimeter served
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  Speaker 1: both as office and sleeping quarters for General Smith and
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  Speaker 1: his staff. Planning was immediately resumed after they arrived at
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  Speaker 1: Kotoree on the afternoon of six December, before leaving Hagarou.
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  Speaker 1: It had been recognized that the enemy might be saving
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  Speaker 1: his main effort for the mountainous ten mile stretch from
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  Speaker 1: Koto Ree to Chinhungnie. In such terrain, a mere CCF
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  Speaker 1: platoon could do a great deal of mischief, and the
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  Speaker 1: planners agreed that it would be necessary for one to
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  Speaker 1: one to attack northward from Chinhung Knee and clear the road.
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  Speaker 1: This meant that the battalion must be relieved by an
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  Speaker 1: army unit, and a request was made verbally to General Almond.
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  Speaker 1: Tencorps had received orders on one December for the third
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  Speaker 1: Infantry Division to assemble in the Wanson area, prepared for
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  Speaker 1: further operations, possibly to join eighth Army in West Korea.
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  Speaker 1: Although General Almond initiated execution of the order immediately, he
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  Speaker 1: sent the highest ranking Marine officer on his staff, Colonel Forty,
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  Speaker 1: and the Corps G two, Lieutenant Colonel William W. Quinn
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  Speaker 1: to Tokyo to explain the implications of the wodraw to
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  Speaker 1: this army division from Northeast Korea. Following a conference with
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  Speaker 1: General Hickey, GHQ Chief of Staff, the division was released
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  Speaker 1: back to ten Corps on the third and General Almond
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  Speaker 1: ordered it to return to the ham Hung area to
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  Speaker 1: protect this vital port area and to assist the breakout
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  Speaker 1: of the First Marine Division by relieving one to one
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  Speaker 1: at Chinhung Nie at twenty one fifteen On six December,
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  Speaker 1: the First Marine Division requested by dispatch that the relief
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  Speaker 1: be completed the next day in order to free one
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  Speaker 1: one for the attack to the north. The relief column,
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  Speaker 1: designated Task Force Dog and commanded by Brigadier General Armistead D.
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  Speaker 1: Mead ADC of the third Infantry Division, consisted of the
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  Speaker 1: third Battalion, seventh Infantry, the ninety second Armored Field Artillery Battalion,
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  Speaker 1: plus detachments of engineers, signalman and anti aircraft troops. Brushing
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  Speaker 1: aside some Chinese roadblocks, it arrived at Chinhung Knee on
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  Speaker 1: the afternoon of the seventh and relieved one to one immediately.
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  Speaker 1: Air drop of bridge sections, another problem which the First
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  Speaker 1: Marine Division planners had faced at Hagaroo, called for an
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  Speaker 1: engineering solution. As early as four December, the commanding General
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  Speaker 1: was notified that a critical bridge three and a half
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  Speaker 1: miles south of Coto Ree had been blown by the
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  Speaker 1: enemy for the third time. At this point, water from
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  Speaker 1: the chosen reservoir was discharged from a tunnel into four
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  Speaker 1: pen stocks, or large steel pipes, which descended sharply down
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  Speaker 1: the mountain side to the turbines of the power plant
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  Speaker 1: in the valley below. Where the pipes crossed the road,
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  Speaker 1: they were covered on the uphill side by a concrete
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  Speaker 1: gatehouse without a floor. On the downhill side was the
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  Speaker 1: one way bridge over the penstocks, which the enemy had
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  Speaker 1: thrice destroyed. Between the cliff and the sheer dropped down
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  Speaker 1: the mountain side, there was no possibility of a bypass.
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  Speaker 1: Thus the gap of sixteen feet twenty four feet counting
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  Speaker 1: the abutments must be spanned if the division was to
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  Speaker 1: bring out its vehicles, tanks and guns. Following the destruction
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  Speaker 1: of the original concrete bridge, the enemy had blown a
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  Speaker 1: temporary wooden structure and an m two steel treadway span
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  Speaker 1: installed by Army engineers. No prefabricated bridging was available at Hagarou,
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  Speaker 1: and time did not permit the construction of a timber
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  Speaker 1: trestle bridge. The possibility of bailey bridge sections was considered,
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  Speaker 1: but rejected for technical reasons. Finally, after a detailed study
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  Speaker 1: of the break from the air on six December, Lieutenant
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  Speaker 1: Colonel Partridge estimated that four sections of an M two
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  Speaker 1: steel treadway bridge would be required. Prospects did not appear
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  Speaker 1: bright when a bridge section was badly damaged on the
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  Speaker 1: sixth after being test dropped at Yanpo by an Air
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  Speaker 1: Force C one nineteen. Nevertheless, it was decided to go
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  Speaker 1: out ahead the next day with the drop at Codo Ree.
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  Speaker 1: There were four US Army treadway bridge brockway trucks at
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  Speaker 1: coto Ree, two of which were operative. After conferring with
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  Speaker 1: First Lieutenant George A. Babe of the first Engineer Battalion
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  Speaker 1: and Colonel Hugh D. McGaw of the one hundred eighty
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  Speaker 1: fifth Engineer Sea Battalion, US Army, Partridge decided to request
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  Speaker 1: a drop of eight sections in order to have a
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  Speaker 1: one hundred percent margin of safety in case of damage.
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  Speaker 1: After analyzing the causes of the unsuccessful test drop, Captain
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  Speaker 1: Blasingame of the Air Delivery Platoon had larger parachutes flown
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  Speaker 1: to Yanpo from Japan, accompanied by Captain Cecil W. Hospilhorn
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  Speaker 1: US Army and a special crew of Army parachute riggers.
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  Speaker 1: Blasingame and one hundred man worked detail from the first
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  Speaker 1: Amphibian Tractor Battalion worked all night at Yampo to make
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  Speaker 1: ready for the drop next day by eight one nineteens
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  Speaker 1: of the Air Force at zero nine thirty on seven
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  Speaker 1: in December, three of the twenty five hundred pound bridge
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  Speaker 1: sections were dropped inside the Coto reperimeter and recovered by
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  Speaker 1: the Brockway trucks. The remaining five sections were delivered by nude,
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  Speaker 1: one of them falling into the hands of the Chinese
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  Speaker 1: and one being damaged. Plywood center sections were also dropped
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  Speaker 1: so that the bridge could accommodate any type of marine
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  Speaker 1: wheel or tracked vehicle. Thus, the tanks could cross on
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  Speaker 1: the metal spans only, while the trucks could manage with
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  Speaker 1: one wheel on the metal span and the other on
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  Speaker 1: the plywood center. All the necessary equipment having been assembled
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  Speaker 1: at Coto Ree by the late afternoon of the seventh,
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  Speaker 1: the next problem was to transport it three and a
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  Speaker 1: half miles to the bridge site. Colonel Bowser, the Division
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  Speaker 1: G three, directed the engineers to coordinate their movements with
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  Speaker 1: the progress made by RCT seven. The following morning, Lieutenant
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  Speaker 1: Colonel Partridge attended a briefing conducted by Colonel Litzenburg on
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  Speaker 1: the eve of the assault, and it was agreed that
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  Speaker 1: the trucks with the bridge section would accompany the regimental train.
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  Speaker 1: First Lieutenant E Wall D. Von Ord's first platoon of
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  Speaker 1: Company D engineers was designated as the escort. First Lieutenant
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  Speaker 1: Charles C. Ward's engineers led the seventh Marines trains. Both
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  Speaker 1: platoons were assigned the task of installing the bridge sections.
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  Speaker 1: Division planning for attack. On the assumption that the gap
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  Speaker 1: over the Penstocks would be successfully spanned, the First Marine
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  Speaker 1: Division issued Operation Order twenty six DASH fifty at eighteen
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  Speaker 1: fifty on seven December. Although the last operation order had
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  Speaker 1: specified the Hamhung area as the objective, it was found
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  Speaker 1: necessary at CODO ree to give more explicit instructions for
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  Speaker 1: the advance to the southward. The plan was simple, recognizing
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  Speaker 1: the sharp cleft and function in pass as the most
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  Speaker 1: difficult defile of the entire breakout. General Smith ordered the
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  Speaker 1: seizure of the heights overlooking the pass from the north
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  Speaker 1: end of Hilltenant, dominating the road through the pass. In
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  Speaker 1: its details, the plan shaped up as follows. One RCT
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  Speaker 1: seven reinforced with the Provisional Army Battalion to attack south
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  Speaker 1: from coto Ree at zero eight hundred on eight December
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  Speaker 1: and seize objectives A and B, the first being the
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  Speaker 1: southern extension of Hill thirteen twenty eight, about twenty five
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  Speaker 1: hundred yards southwest of cote Rie, and the other the
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  Speaker 1: second nose due south of cota Rie two. RCT five
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  Speaker 1: to attack and cize Objective D Hill fourteen fifty seven,
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  Speaker 1: two and a half miles south of cotea Rie, while
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  Speaker 1: RCT seven continued its attack and seized Objective C, a
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  Speaker 1: nose dominating the MSR two and three, fourth miles south
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  Speaker 1: of cotal Rie three At zero eight hundred. As RCT
• 15:51
  Speaker 1: seven jumped off at codo Rie, the first battalion of
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  Speaker 1: RCT one was to attack from Chin Hung Knee and
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  Speaker 1: seize Objective E Hill ten eighty one, three miles to
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  Speaker 1: the north. Four RCT one less the first battalion, but
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  Speaker 1: reinforced by two thirty one, was to protect coto Re
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  Speaker 1: until the division and regimental trains cleared, whereupon it was
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  Speaker 1: to relieve RCTs five and seven on objectives A, B,
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  Speaker 1: C and D five. Upon relief by RCT one, RCTs
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  Speaker 1: five and seven were to proceed south along the MSR
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  Speaker 1: to the ham Hung area. Six. RCT one was to
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  Speaker 1: follow RCT five and protect the division rear artillery plans
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  Speaker 1: provided for one battery of two eleven and one of
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  Speaker 1: three eleven to answer the calls of RCT seven for
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  Speaker 1: supporting fires. The other batteries of three eleven were to
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  Speaker 1: move south with the motor column, while two batteries of
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  Speaker 1: one to eleven supported RCT five. The remaining battery of
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  Speaker 1: three eleven was attached to two eleven with a mission
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  Speaker 1: of moving south to Chinhung Knee and taking a position
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  Speaker 1: from which to support the withdraw of RCT I as
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  Speaker 1: rear guard. Easy battery of two eleven left behind at
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  Speaker 1: coto Ree was laid to fire to the north and west,
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  Speaker 1: while Fox Battery of two eleven and the ninety second
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  Speaker 1: Armored Field Artillery Battalion at Chinhung Knee supported the attack
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  Speaker 1: of one to one on Hill ten eighty one. The
• 17:19
  Speaker 1: plan of the first mall for air support was essentially
• 17:22
  Speaker 1: the same as the one which provided so effective during
• 17:25
  Speaker 1: the advance from Hagaroo to koto Ree. An objective lesson
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  Speaker 1: of that movement had been the personnel and equipment losses
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  Speaker 1: suffered by the division trains as a consequence of a
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  Speaker 1: late start. The planners were determined not to repeat this mistake.
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  Speaker 1: As a further precautionary measure, General Smith directed that the
• 17:44
  Speaker 1: tanks formed the last elements of the motor column. Thus,
• 17:48
  Speaker 1: in the event of a breakdown on the twisting single
• 17:50
  Speaker 1: lane road, it would not be necessary to abandon all
• 17:53
  Speaker 1: the vehicles behind a crippled tank. As for the enemy situation,
• 17:58
  Speaker 1: G two summaries indicate that early in December, the CCF
• 18:02
  Speaker 1: twenty sixth Corps, consisting of the seventy sixth, seventy seventh,
• 18:06
  Speaker 1: and seventy eighth Divisions, reinforced by the ninety fourth Division
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  Speaker 1: of the thirty second Corps, had moved down from the
• 18:13
  Speaker 1: north and taken positions on the east side of the
• 18:15
  Speaker 1: MSR between Hagaroo and koto Rie. There they relieved the
• 18:20
  Speaker 1: sixtieth Division, which moved into the area south of koto Rie.
• 18:25
  Speaker 1: The seventy sixth and seventy seventh divisions occupied positions along
• 18:29
  Speaker 1: the MSR and the coto Rie area, while the seventy
• 18:32
  Speaker 1: eighth and ninety fourth divisions were apparently held in reserve.
• 18:36
  Speaker 1: Elements of the eighty ninth Division, operating from the mountainous
• 18:40
  Speaker 1: area southwest of koto Rie conducted harassing operations against the
• 18:44
  Speaker 1: MSR and the vicinity of Chinhungnie as well as Kotoree.
• 18:49
  Speaker 1: The sixtieth CCF Division held prepared positions on the high
• 18:52
  Speaker 1: grounds south of koto Ri, commanding functional in pass and
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  Speaker 1: the MSR leading to chinhung Nie. That these positions in
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  Speaker 1: included Hill ten eighty one. The dominating terrain feature was
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  Speaker 1: revealed by prisoners taken in the vicinity by patrols of
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  Speaker 1: the first Battalion, First Marines. Prior to eight December battle
• 19:12
  Speaker 1: of one to one in the Snowstorm, Division plans had
• 19:16
  Speaker 1: not called for the swirling snowstorm, which reduced visibility to
• 19:20
  Speaker 1: fifty feet and precluded air support at first light on
• 19:23
  Speaker 1: eight December. In spite of weather conditions, the assault battalions
• 19:27
  Speaker 1: of RCT seven moved out from Codo Rion's schedule after
• 19:31
  Speaker 1: one to one attack northward from chinhung Nie. The planners
• 19:35
  Speaker 1: had realized that the success of the movement to chinhung
• 19:37
  Speaker 1: Nie would depend to a large extent on the seizure
• 19:40
  Speaker 1: of objective e Hill ten eighty one. On two December,
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  Speaker 1: Lieutenant Colonel Schmuck had led a reconnaissance patrol into Functionalin
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  Speaker 1: pass as far north as this position. Citing large numbers
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  Speaker 1: of Chinese on both sides of the road, he called
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  Speaker 1: for artillery fires with good effect. The reconnaissance did much
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  Speaker 1: to establish Hill ten eighty one as the key terrain feature.
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  Speaker 1: Although one one had patrolled aggressively, the battalion had engaged
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  Speaker 1: in no large scale actions so far in the reservoir campaign.
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  Speaker 1: The men were fresh, well rested, and spoiling for a
• 20:15
  Speaker 1: fight when they moved out at zero two hundred on
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  Speaker 1: eight December from an assembly area south of Chinhungnee after
• 20:22
  Speaker 1: being relieved by Task Force Dog. Schmuck's battle plan provided
• 20:26
  Speaker 1: for three companies to advance in column along the MSR
• 20:29
  Speaker 1: and the pre dawn darkness. Since orders were to attack
• 20:33
  Speaker 1: at zero eight hundred, a start at zero two hundred
• 20:36
  Speaker 1: was considered necessary in order to make the six mile
• 20:39
  Speaker 1: approach march. Captain Ray's Charlie company in the lead was
• 20:44
  Speaker 1: to take Objective one, the southwestern knows of Hill tenity
• 20:48
  Speaker 1: one and hold it while the other two companies passed
• 20:51
  Speaker 1: through to carry out their missions. Captain Barrow's Able company
• 20:55
  Speaker 1: was to attack east of the MSR and fight its
• 20:58
  Speaker 1: way to the summit of Hill ten eighty one and
• 21:00
  Speaker 1: Captain Norrin's Baker Company to advance to the left flank
• 21:04
  Speaker 1: along the slopes between Barrow and the MSR. The combination
• 21:08
  Speaker 1: of snow and darkness reduced visibility almost to zero as
• 21:12
  Speaker 1: one one set out along the slippery MSR five hours
• 21:15
  Speaker 1: before daybreak. All heavy equipment had been sent to the
• 21:19
  Speaker 1: rear from Chinhung Knee, and the only vehicles were two
• 21:22
  Speaker 1: ambulances and a radio jeep, and the snow muffled silence
• 21:26
  Speaker 1: of the night. The men took on protective coloring as
• 21:29
  Speaker 1: feathery flakes clung to their parkas. Objective one was seized
• 21:33
  Speaker 1: shortly after dawn following a difficult approach march against negligible resistance.
• 21:39
  Speaker 1: The battalion commander prepared for the next phase by bringing
• 21:42
  Speaker 1: up eighty one millimeter mortars and an attached platoon of
• 21:46
  Speaker 1: four point two s and em placing those weapons in
• 21:48
  Speaker 1: race position. He also directed that the five attached army
• 21:53
  Speaker 1: self propelled quad fifty caliber and twin forty millimeter guns
• 21:57
  Speaker 1: of B Company fiftieth Triple A A D Battalion be
• 22:01
  Speaker 1: moved to a little rise off to the left of
• 22:03
  Speaker 1: the Road in the vicinity of the village of Pehujang.
• 22:07
  Speaker 1: From this position they covered the MSR as far as
• 22:10
  Speaker 1: the bridge over the pen Stocks. At ten hundred the
• 22:13
  Speaker 1: main attack was set in motion. Baker Company advanced along
• 22:17
  Speaker 1: the wooded western slope of Hill ten eighty one as
• 22:20
  Speaker 1: Barrow attacked up the hog back ridge leading to the summit.
• 22:24
  Speaker 1: The snowstorm fought on the side of the Marines by
• 22:26
  Speaker 1: hiding their movements from the Chinese occupying the high ground
• 22:30
  Speaker 1: east of the MSR. Around the Great Horseshoe Bend, where
• 22:32
  Speaker 1: the road passed under the cable car line, Norn's men
• 22:36
  Speaker 1: saw hundreds of enemy footprints but met only scattered opposition
• 22:39
  Speaker 1: until they came to the first CCF roadblock on their
• 22:42
  Speaker 1: left flank. There they were stopped by two machine guns,
• 22:46
  Speaker 1: but a marine patrol worked around on the uphill side
• 22:49
  Speaker 1: and routed the Communists with a machine gun and sixty
• 22:52
  Speaker 1: millimeter mortar attack. In the absence of air and artillery support,
• 22:56
  Speaker 1: the four point twos and eighty one millimeter mortars emplaced
• 22:59
  Speaker 1: in the Charlie Company position were called upon whenever visibility permitted.
• 23:04
  Speaker 1: Surprise was Norn's best resource. However, when Baker Company came
• 23:09
  Speaker 1: up against the CCF bunker complex on the western slope
• 23:12
  Speaker 1: of Hill ten eighty one. The enemy had so little
• 23:15
  Speaker 1: warning that the Marines found a kettle of rice cooking
• 23:18
  Speaker 1: in the largest bunker, an elaborate log and sandbag structure
• 23:22
  Speaker 1: which had evidently been a CCF command post. The entire
• 23:26
  Speaker 1: complex was taken after a brief but savage fight in
• 23:29
  Speaker 1: which all defenders were killed or routed. Schmuck set up
• 23:33
  Speaker 1: his CP in a captured bunker, where he and his
• 23:36
  Speaker 1: officers soon discovered that several regiments of Chinese lice had
• 23:39
  Speaker 1: not yet surrendered. Only enough daylight was left for the
• 23:43
  Speaker 1: sending out of patrols, whereupon Norn secured for the night.
• 23:48
  Speaker 1: His losses amounted to three killed and six wounded. Barrel's
• 23:52
  Speaker 1: men had no physical contact with Baker Company. While clawing
• 23:55
  Speaker 1: their way upward along an icy ridge line too narrow
• 23:58
  Speaker 1: for deployment, a sudden break in the snow afforded the
• 24:01
  Speaker 1: able company commander a glimpse of a CCF stronghold on
• 24:05
  Speaker 1: a knob between him and his objective, the topographical crest
• 24:08
  Speaker 1: of Hill ten eighty one. The drifting flakes cut off
• 24:12
  Speaker 1: the view before he could direct mortar fire, but Barrow
• 24:15
  Speaker 1: decided to attack without this support and rely upon surprise.
• 24:19
  Speaker 1: Advancing in column along the steep and narrow approach, he
• 24:23
  Speaker 1: sent Lieutenant Jones with two squads of the second platoon
• 24:26
  Speaker 1: to execute a wide, enveloping movement on the left. Lieutenant
• 24:31
  Speaker 1: McClellan's first platoon had a similar mission on the right.
• 24:35
  Speaker 1: Barrow himself led Staff Sergeant William Roach's third platoon in
• 24:39
  Speaker 1: a front attack. It took more than an hour for
• 24:42
  Speaker 1: the two flanking forces to get into position. Not until
• 24:46
  Speaker 1: they had worked well around the Chinese bunker complex, did
• 24:48
  Speaker 1: Barrow give the signal for attack, Perhaps because silence had
• 24:53
  Speaker 1: been enforced during the stealthy advance. The assault troops yelled
• 24:56
  Speaker 1: like Indians as they closed in on the foe. Out
• 25:00
  Speaker 1: of the snowstorm, Barrow's men erupted with maximum violence, and
• 25:04
  Speaker 1: the enemy was too stunned to put up much of
• 25:06
  Speaker 1: a fight. The only effective resistance came from a single
• 25:10
  Speaker 1: CCF machine gun, which caused most of the marine casualties
• 25:13
  Speaker 1: before Corporal Joseph Leeds and his fire team knocked it out,
• 25:17
  Speaker 1: killing nine Communists in the process. More than sixty enemy
• 25:21
  Speaker 1: bodies were counted after the Marines cleaned out the bunkers
• 25:24
  Speaker 1: and shot down fleeing Chinese. Barrow's losses were ten men
• 25:29
  Speaker 1: killed and eleven wounded. By this time, it was apparent
• 25:33
  Speaker 1: that the Chinese had held an integrated system of bunkers
• 25:36
  Speaker 1: and strong points extending to the summit of Hill ten
• 25:38
  Speaker 1: eighty one. The battalion had been strictly on its own
• 25:42
  Speaker 1: all day, all contact with the infantry of Task Force
• 25:45
  Speaker 1: Dog having ended with the relief when communications permitted. However,
• 25:51
  Speaker 1: one to one could count on the excellent direct support
• 25:54
  Speaker 1: of the ninety second Armoured Field Artillery Battalion U S Army,
• 25:58
  Speaker 1: commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Leon F. LaVoi. The Army cannoneers
• 26:03
  Speaker 1: had set up near Fox Battery of two eleven using
• 26:06
  Speaker 1: the fire controlled data of this marine artillery unit. The
• 26:09
  Speaker 1: night was clear, promising aaron artillery support in the morning
• 26:13
  Speaker 1: as able company consolidated in the captured CCF positions. Although
• 26:18
  Speaker 1: the battalion aid station was only seven hundred yards away,
• 26:22
  Speaker 1: the terrain was so difficult that litterbearers took several hours
• 26:25
  Speaker 1: to struggle down with the marine wounded. About midnight, the
• 26:29
  Speaker 1: Chinese interrupted with an attack and estimated platoon strength, but
• 26:33
  Speaker 1: Barrow's men drove them off with CCF losses of eighteen killed.
• 26:38
  Speaker 1: The rest of the night passed quietly, and Baker Company
• 26:41
  Speaker 1: had no disturbance on the high ground overlooking the MSR
• 26:46
  Speaker 1: advance of RCT seven and RCT five. While these events
• 26:50
  Speaker 1: were taking place, the attack to the south from Codo
• 26:53
  Speaker 1: Ree also fell short of the day's objectives. Colonel Litzenberg's
• 26:58
  Speaker 1: plan called for two of his four battalions, the fourth
• 27:01
  Speaker 1: being the Provisional Battalion of Army Troops, to clear the
• 27:04
  Speaker 1: high ground on either side of the road so that
• 27:06
  Speaker 1: a third battalion could advance astride the MSR, followed by
• 27:10
  Speaker 1: the reserve Battalion and regimental train. Major Morris, commanding three seven,
• 27:15
  Speaker 1: had been assigned the task of attacking on the right
• 27:18
  Speaker 1: at zero eight hundred and seizing objective A the southernmost
• 27:22
  Speaker 1: of the cluster of hills known collectively as Hill thirteen
• 27:26
  Speaker 1: twenty eight. He made such slow progress against CCF and
• 27:30
  Speaker 1: small arms fire that at eleven hundred Colonel Litzenburg suggested
• 27:34
  Speaker 1: the commitments of three seven's reserve company. All three companies replied, Morris,
• 27:39
  Speaker 1: are up there. Fifty men from George, fifty men from
• 27:42
  Speaker 1: how thirty men from Item that's it. Early in the
• 27:46
  Speaker 1: afternoon of eight December, Litzenburg committed his reserve two seven
• 27:51
  Speaker 1: to assist three seven. Lockwood's battalion was on the road
• 27:55
  Speaker 1: south of three seven and attacked west in an attempt
• 27:59
  Speaker 1: to get in the rear of the enemy holding up
• 28:00
  Speaker 1: three seven. Easy in Fox companies attacked abreast, and by
• 28:05
  Speaker 1: eighteen hundred the two battalions had joined on the northeastern
• 28:08
  Speaker 1: slopes of the objective. In view of the approaching darkness, however,
• 28:13
  Speaker 1: the attack was postponed until morning, and the troops consolidated
• 28:17
  Speaker 1: for the night short of the objective, which was seized
• 28:19
  Speaker 1: the following morning. Litzenberg's plan for the seizure of the
• 28:23
  Speaker 1: heights overlooking the northern entrance to Functionland Pass provided for
• 28:27
  Speaker 1: the Army Provisional Battalion to take Objective B. The soldiers
• 28:31
  Speaker 1: jumped off at zero eight hundred on the left of
• 28:34
  Speaker 1: the MSR, supported by two tanks of the fifth Marin's
• 28:37
  Speaker 1: at Company. By zero nine hundred, the battalion had secured
• 28:41
  Speaker 1: its objective without meeting any resistance. Litzenberg then ordered a
• 28:46
  Speaker 1: further advance of eight hundred yards to the northwestern tip
• 28:49
  Speaker 1: of Hill fourteen fifty seven. At thirteen thirty, the Army
• 28:53
  Speaker 1: troops secured their second objective, still without resistance, and tied
• 28:57
  Speaker 1: in with one five for the night. En a Colonel
• 29:00
  Speaker 1: Davis having become regimental executive officer. After Dust was wounded,
• 29:05
  Speaker 1: Major Sawyer took over command of one seven. His plan
• 29:09
  Speaker 1: called for the battalion to advance about two thousand yards
• 29:12
  Speaker 1: down the road and wait for three seven to come
• 29:14
  Speaker 1: up on his right flank. Then the two battalions would
• 29:18
  Speaker 1: move along together. The first battalion jumped off at zero
• 29:22
  Speaker 1: eight hundred and reached its phase line without opposition. First
• 29:26
  Speaker 1: Lieutenant Bobby B. Bradley's platoon advanced down the road to
• 29:29
  Speaker 1: gain contact with the Chinese, while the remainder of the
• 29:32
  Speaker 1: battalion halted. When two seven began its attack in support
• 29:36
  Speaker 1: of three seven, Sawyer's battalion moved out Bradley's patrol. Having
• 29:41
  Speaker 1: run into opposition from the northern reaches of Hill thirteen
• 29:44
  Speaker 1: oh four, Companies A and C moved west of the
• 29:47
  Speaker 1: MSR in a double envelopment of the enemy position. Company
• 29:52
  Speaker 1: B continued the advance towards objective C meeting a heavy
• 29:55
  Speaker 1: crossfire from Chinese to their front, and on Hill thirteen
• 29:59
  Speaker 1: oh four, Lieutenant Kircaba was killed and Lieutenants chew een
• 30:04
  Speaker 1: Lee and Joseph r. Owen wounded. First Lieutenant William W.
• 30:08
  Speaker 1: Taylor took command and managed to clear the enemy from
• 30:11
  Speaker 1: his front just before dusk. Abel and Charlie companies faced
• 30:15
  Speaker 1: less resistance in overrunning the foxholes and two bunkers on
• 30:18
  Speaker 1: Hill thirteen oh four. With dusk falling, Sawyer did not
• 30:23
  Speaker 1: attempt a further advance. Abel and Charlie companies dug in
• 30:27
  Speaker 1: on Hill thirteen oh four while Baker set up a
• 30:30
  Speaker 1: perimeter slightly short of Objective C. The first serials of
• 30:34
  Speaker 1: the truck convoy had moved closely on the heels of
• 30:37
  Speaker 1: one seven and had to be backed up to a
• 30:39
  Speaker 1: level area near Objective A. There they formed a perimeter
• 30:43
  Speaker 1: reinforced by H and S and weapons companies of one
• 30:46
  Speaker 1: seven Division. Operation Order twenty six DASH fifty had directed
• 30:51
  Speaker 1: Lieutenant Colonel Murray's RCT five to await orders before attacking
• 30:55
  Speaker 1: Objective D. It was nearly noon on the eighth before
• 30:59
  Speaker 1: the first battalion in assault was directed to move out
• 31:02
  Speaker 1: from CODO ree. Lieutenant Colonel Stevens followed the MSR for
• 31:06
  Speaker 1: a mile, then sent two companies out to the left
• 31:09
  Speaker 1: to occupy the objective hill. Fourteen fifty seven, Baker Company
• 31:14
  Speaker 1: seized the intervening high ground and set up to cover
• 31:17
  Speaker 1: the attack of Charlie Company up the slopes of the
• 31:19
  Speaker 1: ridge leading to the objective. Charlie Company fell in with
• 31:23
  Speaker 1: a patrol from the Army Provisional Battalion attached to the
• 31:26
  Speaker 1: RCT seven, and the two combined forces to drive the
• 31:30
  Speaker 1: enemy off the high ground. About fifteen fifty A weak
• 31:34
  Speaker 1: Chinese counter attack was easily repulsed, and at seventeen hundred,
• 31:38
  Speaker 1: as darkness fell, Baker and Charlie Companies tied in with
• 31:41
  Speaker 1: the Army troops while Able Company formed its own perimeter
• 31:44
  Speaker 1: overlooking the MSR. In reserve. The forty first Commando moved
• 31:49
  Speaker 1: into the high ground behind one five to guard against infiltration.
• 31:54
  Speaker 1: The day's story would not be complete without reference to
• 31:56
  Speaker 1: the treadway bridge train, which moved out about fourteen hundred
• 32:00
  Speaker 1: on the eighth in the trace of one to seven.
• 32:03
  Speaker 1: Instructions were to install the sections at the first opportunity,
• 32:06
  Speaker 1: but the site had not been secured as darkness approached,
• 32:10
  Speaker 1: a few Chinese mortar rounds falling in the vicinity of
• 32:13
  Speaker 1: the vulnerable Brockway trucks influenced the decision to return them
• 32:17
  Speaker 1: closer to Codo Ree. Summing up the attacks of eight December,
• 32:21
  Speaker 1: weather and train had done more than the enemy to
• 32:24
  Speaker 1: prevent all assault units of the first Marine Division from
• 32:26
  Speaker 1: securing their assigned objectives. Casualties had not been heavy, however,
• 32:32
  Speaker 1: and for the most part the troops were in a
• 32:33
  Speaker 1: position for a renewal of their efforts in the morning.
• 32:37
  Speaker 1: As for the Codo reperimeter, the eighth had passed with
• 32:40
  Speaker 1: only scattered small arms fire being received by the second
• 32:43
  Speaker 1: and third Battalions of the First Marines in Division Reserve
• 32:48
  Speaker 1: all day. The Dog Company roadblock on the route to
• 32:50
  Speaker 1: Hagarou was like a damn holding back the human torrent
• 32:54
  Speaker 1: of Korean refugees. From this throng rose a low pitched
• 32:58
  Speaker 1: whale of misery as homeless men, the men, women and
• 33:01
  Speaker 1: children huddled without shelter in the snowstorm of the eighth
• 33:05
  Speaker 1: It was a distressing spectacle to the Marines in the perimeter.
• 33:08
  Speaker 1: Yet the refugees could not be omitted because of the
• 33:11
  Speaker 1: probability that Chinese soldiers had infiltrated among them, watching for
• 33:15
  Speaker 1: an opportunity to use hidden weapons. There was little the
• 33:19
  Speaker 1: Marines could offer by way of succor, except medical care.
• 33:22
  Speaker 1: In some instances. Two women gave birth there in the
• 33:26
  Speaker 1: bitterly cold night of the eighth with the assistance of
• 33:28
  Speaker 1: Navy medics. And the morning, the crowd of refugees, swollen
• 33:33
  Speaker 1: by new arrivals, waited with patience of the humble, to
• 33:36
  Speaker 1: follow the Marine rear guard to the sea coast. White
• 33:40
  Speaker 1: is the color of mourning in Korea, and snowflakes drifted
• 33:43
  Speaker 1: down gently over the common grave in which one hundred
• 33:46
  Speaker 1: seventeen Marines, soldiers and Royal Marine commandos were buried on
• 33:50
  Speaker 1: the eighth at Codo Rie. Lack of time had prevented
• 33:54
  Speaker 1: the digging of individual graves in the frozen soil. Although
• 33:58
  Speaker 1: the necessity of conducting a man glass burial was regretted,
• 34:01
  Speaker 1: all available space and planes and vehicles was needed for
• 34:04
  Speaker 1: the evacuation of casualties. End of Chapter fourteen, Part one
• 34:10
  Speaker 1: read by Aaron Bennett