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006 - Years of Stalemate Part 1 · Korean War - Brief Histories

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Speaker 1: Section six. The Korean War Years of Stalemate July nineteen
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Speaker 1: fifty one through July nineteen fifty three, Part one by
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Speaker 1: Andrew J. Bertel. This Librivok recording is in the public
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Speaker 1: domain introduction. The Korean War was the first major armed
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Speaker 1: clash between free World and communist forces as the so
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Speaker 1: called Cold War turned hot. The half century that now
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Speaker 1: separates us from that conflict, however, has dimmed our collective memory.
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Speaker 1: Many Korean War veterans have considered themselves forgotten their place
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Speaker 1: in history. Sandwich between the sheer size of World War
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Speaker 1: Two in the fierce controversies of the Vietnam War. The
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Speaker 1: recently built Korean War Veterans Memorial on the National Mall
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Speaker 1: and the upcoming fiftieth anniversary commemorative events should not provide
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Speaker 1: well deserved recognition. I hope that this series of brochures
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Speaker 1: on the campaigns of the Korean War will have a
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Speaker 1: similar effect. The Korean War still has much to teach
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Speaker 1: us about military preparedness, about global strategy, about combined operations
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Speaker 1: in a military alliance facing blatant aggression, and about the
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Speaker 1: courage and perseverance of the individual soldier. The modern world
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Speaker 1: still lives with the consequences of a dividic Korea and
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Speaker 1: with a militarily strong, economically weak, and unpredictable North Korea.
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Speaker 1: The Korean War was waged on land, on sea, and
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Speaker 1: in the air over and near the Korean Peninsula. It
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Speaker 1: lasted three years, the first of which was a seesaw
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Speaker 1: struggle for control of the peninsula, followed by two years
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Speaker 1: of positional warfare as a backdrop to extend its ceasefire negotiations.
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Speaker 1: The following essay is one of five accessible and readable
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Speaker 1: studies designed to enhance understanding of the United States Army
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Speaker 1: role and achievements in the Korean Conflict. During the next
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Speaker 1: several years, the Army will be involved in many fiftieth
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Speaker 1: anniversary activities, from public ceremonies and staff rights to professional
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Speaker 1: development discussions and formal classroom training. The commemoration will be
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Speaker 1: supported by the publication of various materials to help educate
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Speaker 1: Americans about the war. These works will provide great opportunities
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Speaker 1: to learn about this important period in the Army's heritage
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Speaker 1: of service to the nation. This brochure was prepared in
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Speaker 1: the United States Army Center of Military History by Andrew J.
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Speaker 1: Bertel I hope this absorbing account, with its list of
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Speaker 1: further readings, will stimulate further study and reflection. A complete
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Speaker 1: listing of the Center of Military History's available works on
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Speaker 1: the Korean War is included in the Centre's online catalog www,
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Speaker 1: dot Army Dot, mill Slash, CMHFE and PG Slash Catalog
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Speaker 1: Slash Brochure HTM. John S. Brown, Brigadier General, USA, Chief
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Speaker 1: of Military History. Years of Stalemate July nineteen fifty one
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Speaker 1: through July nineteen fifty three. The first twelve months of
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Speaker 1: the Korean War June nineteen fifty through June nineteen fifty
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Speaker 1: one had been characterized by dramatic changes in the battle
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Speaker 1: front as the opposing army swept up and down the
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Speaker 1: length of the Korean peninsula. This war of movement virtually
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Speaker 1: ended on ten July nineteen fifty one, when representatives from
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Speaker 1: the war and parties met in a restaurant in k
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Speaker 1: Song to negotiate an end to the war. Although the
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Speaker 1: two principal parties to the conflict, the governments of the
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Speaker 1: Democratic People's Republic of Korea North Korea and the Republic
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Speaker 1: of Korea are Okay or South Korea, were more than
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Speaker 1: willing to fight to the death. Their chief patrons, the
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Speaker 1: People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union on the
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Speaker 1: one hand, and the United States and the United Nations
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Speaker 1: UN on the other, were not Twelve months of bloody
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Speaker 1: fighting had convinced Mauseetung, Joseph V. Stalin, and Harry S.
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Speaker 1: Truman that it was no longer in their respective national
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Speaker 1: interests to try and win a total victory in Korea.
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Speaker 1: The costs and terms of men and materiel were too great,
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Speaker 1: as were the risks that the conflict might escalate into
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Speaker 1: a wider global conflagration. Consequently, they compelled their respective Korean
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Speaker 1: allies to accept truce talks as the price for their
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Speaker 1: continued military, economic, and diplomatic support for the soldiers at
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Speaker 1: the front and the people back home. The commencement of
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Speaker 1: negotiations raised hopes that the war would soon be over,
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Speaker 1: but such was not to be. While desirous of peace,
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Speaker 1: neither side was willing to sacrifice poor principles or objectives
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Speaker 1: to obtain it. The task of finding common ground was
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Speaker 1: further complicated by the Communist philosophy of regarding negotiations as war.
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Speaker 1: By other means, This tactic significantly impeded the negotiations, and
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Speaker 1: while the negotiators engaged in verbal combat around the conference table,
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Speaker 1: the soldiers in the field continued to fight and die
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Speaker 1: for two more long and tortuous years strategic setting. The
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Speaker 1: advent of truce talks in July nineteen fifty one came
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Speaker 1: on the heels of a successful United Nations offensive that
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Speaker 1: had not only cleared most of South Korea of Communist forces,
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Speaker 1: but captured limited areas of North Korea as well. By
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Speaker 1: ten July, the front lines ran obliquely across the Korean
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Speaker 1: Peninsula from the northeast to the southwest, and the East
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Speaker 1: Yuan lines anchored on the Sea of Japan, butt midway
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Speaker 1: between the North Korean towns of Kosong and Khansong. From there,
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Speaker 1: the front fell south to the Punch Bowl, a large
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Speaker 1: circular valley rimmed with jagged mountains, before heading west across
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Speaker 1: the Razorback Taibek Mountains to the Iron Triangle, a strategic
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Speaker 1: communications hub around the towns of Pyongyang, Kubwa, and Chorwan.
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Speaker 1: From here, the front dropped south once again through the
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Speaker 1: Imjin River Valley till it reached the Yellow Sea at
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Speaker 1: a point roughly twenty miles north of Seoul. Manning this
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Speaker 1: line were over five hundred and fifty four thousand Yuan soldiers,
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Speaker 1: approximately two hundred and fifty three thousand Americans, including the
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Speaker 1: first Marine, first Cavalry, and second, third, seventh, twenty fourth
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Speaker 1: and twenty fifth Infantry divisions, two hundred and seventy three
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Speaker 1: thousand South Koreans, and twenty eight thousand men drawn from
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Speaker 1: eighteen countries Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Great Britain, Greece, India, Luxembourg,
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Speaker 1: the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey,
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Speaker 1: and the Union of South Africa. Facing them were over
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Speaker 1: four hundred and fifty nine thousand communist troops, more than
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Speaker 1: half of whom were soldiers of the Chinese People's Liberation
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Speaker 1: Army PLA. Since the political leaders of the two war
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Speaker 1: and coalitions had signaled their willingness to help fighting, the
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Speaker 1: generals on both sides proved reluctant to engage in any
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Speaker 1: major new undertakings. For the most part, the commander of
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Speaker 1: Yuan Forces, General Matthew b Ridgeway, and his principal subordinate
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Speaker 1: General James, a Van Fleet Army commander, confine their activities
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Speaker 1: to strengthen a UN positions and conducting limited probes of
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Speaker 1: enemy lines. Their Communist counterparts adopted a similar policy. Consequently,
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Speaker 1: the two sides exchanged artillery fire, conducted raids and patrols,
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Speaker 1: and occasionally attempted to seize a mountain peak here or there.
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Speaker 1: But for the most part, the battle lines remain relatively static.
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Speaker 1: So two unfortunately did the positions of the truce negotiators,
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Speaker 1: who were unable to make any progress on the peace
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Speaker 1: front during the summer. The chief stumbling block was the
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Speaker 1: inability of the parties to agree on a ceasefire line.
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Speaker 1: The Communists argued for a return to the status quo ante,
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Speaker 1: that is, that the two armies withdraw their forces to
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Speaker 1: the pre war boundary line along the thirtieth parallel. This
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Speaker 1: was not an unreasonable position, since the combat lines were
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Speaker 1: out all that far from the thirty eighth parallel. The UN, however,
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Speaker 1: refused to agree to a restoration of the old border
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Speaker 1: on the grounds that it was indefensible in many places.
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Speaker 1: Current UN positions were much more defensible, and a more
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Speaker 1: defensible border was clearly advantageous, not only in protecting South
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Speaker 1: Korea in the present conflict, but in discouraging future Communist digression. Consequently,
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Speaker 1: UN negotiators argued in favor of adopting the current line
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Speaker 1: of contact as the ceasefire line. A deadlock immediately ensued,
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Speaker 1: with the Communists employ every conceivable artifice to undermine the
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Speaker 1: UN position. They argued over every point large and small,
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Speaker 1: procedural as well as substantive, in an effort to wear
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Speaker 1: down the UN negotiators. They hurled insults and engaged in
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Speaker 1: hours of empty posturing. They released scurrilous propaganda, stage provocation incidents,
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Speaker 1: and exploited any misstep or accident on the part of
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Speaker 1: the UN to their full advantage, all in an effort
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Speaker 1: to embarrass, discredit, and entrap the UN negotiators. While more
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Speaker 1: restrained in their behavior, the American led negotiating team refused
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Speaker 1: to be intimidated by Communist negotiating tactics. When the two
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Speaker 1: sides finally tired of trading accusations, they would sit and
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Speaker 1: stare at each other over the conference table in absolute
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Speaker 1: silence for hours on end. Finally, on twenty three August,
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Speaker 1: the Communists broke off the negotiations. Operations the UN's summer
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Speaker 1: fall offensive July through November nineteen fifty one. If the
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Speaker 1: Chinese and North Koreans had hoped to intimidate the United
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Speaker 1: Nations into making concessions, they were very much mistaken. Rather
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Speaker 1: than rewarding Communist misbehavior by beseeching the enemy to return
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Speaker 1: to the bargaining table, the United Nations Command decided to
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Speaker 1: chastise him by launching a limited offensive in the late
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Speaker 1: summer and early fall of nineteen fifty one. Militarily, the
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Speaker 1: offensive was justified on the grounds that it would allow
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Speaker 1: UN forces to shorten and straighten sections of their lines,
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Speaker 1: acquire better defensive terrain, and deny the enemy key vantage
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Speaker 1: points from which he could observe and target UN positions.
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Speaker 1: But the offensive also had a political point to make
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Speaker 1: that the United Nations would not be stampeded into accepting
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Speaker 1: Communist proposals. Much of the heaviest fighting revolved around the
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Speaker 1: Punch Bowl, which served as an important Communist staging area.
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Speaker 1: The United Nations first initiated limited operations to seize the
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Speaker 1: high grounds surrounding the Punch Bowl in late July. By
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Speaker 1: mid August, the battle had begun to intensify around them.
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Speaker 1: Three interconnected hills southwest of the Punch Bowl that would
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Speaker 1: soon be known collectively as Bloody Ridge. Three days after
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Speaker 1: the Communists walked out of the Qui Song talks, the
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Speaker 1: Rok seventh Division captured Bloody Ridge after a week of
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Speaker 1: heavy combat. Was a short lived triumph, for the following day,
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Speaker 1: the North Koreans recaptured the mountain in a fierce counter attack.
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Speaker 1: Determined to wrest the heavily fortified bastion from the Communists,
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Speaker 1: van Fleet ordered the U S Second Infantry Divisions ninth
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Speaker 1: Infantry to scale the ridge. The battle reached for ten
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Speaker 1: days as the North Koreans repulsed one assault after another
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Speaker 1: by the increasingly exhausted and depleted ninth Infantry. Finally, on
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Speaker 1: five September, the North Koreans abandoned the ridge after Yuan
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Speaker 1: forces seceded and outflanking it. Approximately fifteen thousand North Koreans
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Speaker 1: and two thousand, seven hundred UN soldiers were killed, wounded,
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Speaker 1: or captured on Bloody Ridge's slopes. After withdrawing from Bloody Ridge,
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Speaker 1: the North Korean set up new positions just fifteen hundred
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Speaker 1: yards away, on a seven mile long hill mass that
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Speaker 1: was soon to earn the name Heartbreak Ridge. If anything,
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Speaker 1: the enemy's defenses were even more formidable here than on
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Speaker 1: Bloody Ridge. Unfortunately, the Second Division's acting commander, Brigadier General
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Speaker 1: Thomas Deschazzo, in his immediate superior, Major General Clovis E. Byers,
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Speaker 1: the tenth Corps commander, seriously underestimated the strength of the
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Speaker 1: North Korean position. They ordered a lone infantry regiment, the
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Speaker 1: twenty third Infantry and its attached French battalion to make
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Speaker 1: what would prove to be an ill conceived assault straight
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Speaker 1: up heartbreaks heavily fortified slopes. The attack began on thirteen
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Speaker 1: September and quickly deteriorated into a familiar pattern. First, American aircraft,
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Speaker 1: tanks and artillery would pummel the ridge for hours on end,
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Speaker 1: turning the already barren hillside into a cratered moonscape. Next,
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Speaker 1: the twenty thirds infantrymen would clamber up the mountain's rocky slopes,
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Speaker 1: taking out one enemy bunker after another by direct assault.
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Speaker 1: Those who survived to reach the crest arrived exhausted and
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Speaker 1: low on ammunition. Then the inevitable counter attack would come,
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Speaker 1: wave after wave of North Koreans determined to recapture the
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Speaker 1: lost ground at any cost. Many of these counter attacks
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Speaker 1: were conducted at night by fresh troops that the enemy
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Speaker 1: was able to bring up under the shelter of neighboring hills.
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Speaker 1: Battles begun by bomb, bullet, and shell were inevitably finished
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Speaker 1: by grenade, trench, knife, and fist. As formal military engagements
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Speaker 1: degenerated into desperate hand to hand brawls, sometimes dawn broke
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Speaker 1: to reveal the defenders still holding the mountain top. Just
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Speaker 1: as often, however, the enemy was able to overwhelm the
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Speaker 1: tired and depleted Americans, tumbling the survivors back down the hill,
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Speaker 1: where after a brief pause to rest, replenish ammunition, and
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Speaker 1: absorb replacements, they would climb back up the ridge to
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Speaker 1: repeat the process all over again. And so the battle progressed,
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Speaker 1: crawling up the hill, stumbling back down, and crawling up
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Speaker 1: once again, day after day, night after night, for two weeks.
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Speaker 1: Because of the constricting terrain and the narrow confines of
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Speaker 1: the objectives, units were committed piecemeal to the fray, one platoon,
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Speaker 1: company or battalion at a time. Once a particular element
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Speaker 1: had been so ground up that it could no longer
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Speaker 1: stand the strain, a fresh unit would take its place,
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Speaker 1: and then another and another, until the twenty third Infantry
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Speaker 1: as a whole was fairly well shattered. Finally, on twenty
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Speaker 1: seventh September, the second Division's new commander, Major General Robert N. Young,
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Speaker 1: called a halt to the fiasco on Heartbreak Ridge as
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Speaker 1: American planners reconsidered their strategy. The twenty third Infantry's failure
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Speaker 1: to capture Heartbreak Ridge had not come from a lack
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Speaker 1: of valor. It took extreme bravery to advance up Heartbreaks
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Speaker 1: unforgiving slopes under intense enemy fire, and when things did
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Speaker 1: not go right, it took equal courage to take a
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Speaker 1: stand so that others might live. One person who took
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Speaker 1: such a stand was Private first Class Herbert K. Pililau,
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Speaker 1: a quiet six foot tall Hawaiian. Pililoo's outfit company C
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Speaker 1: first Battalion, twenty third Infantry was clinging to a small
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Speaker 1: stretch of Heartbreak's Ridge top on the night of seventeen
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Speaker 1: September when a battalion of North Koreans came charging out
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Speaker 1: of the darkness from an adjacent hill. The company fought valiantly,
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Speaker 1: but a shortage of ammunition soon compelled it to retreat
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Speaker 1: down the mountain. After receiving reinforcements and a new issue
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Speaker 1: of ammunition, the Americans advanced back up the ridge. North
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Speaker 1: Korean fire broke the first assault, but Company Sea soon
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Speaker 1: regrouped and advanced again, recapturing the crest by dawn. The
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Speaker 1: pendulum of war soon reversed its course, however, and by
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Speaker 1: midday the men of Company Sea were once again fighting
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Speaker 1: for their lives. As the North Korean battalion surged back
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Speaker 1: up the hill. Running low on ammunition, the company commander
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Speaker 1: called retreat. Pililau volunteered to remain behind to cover the
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Speaker 1: withdrawal as his buddies scrambled to safety. Pililao wielded his
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Speaker 1: Browning automatic rifle with great effect until he too had
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Speaker 1: run out of ammunition. He then started throwing grenades, and
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Speaker 1: when those were exhausted, he pulled out his trench knife
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Speaker 1: and fought on until a group of North Korean soldiers
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Speaker 1: shot and bayoneted him, while his comrades looked on helplessly
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Speaker 1: from a sheltered position two hundred yards down the slope.
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Speaker 1: Determined to avenge his death, the men of Company Sea
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Speaker 1: swept back up the mountain. When they recaptured the position,
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Speaker 1: they found over forty dead North Koreans clustered around Pilolau's corpse.
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Speaker 1: Pililaw's sacrifice had saved his comrades, and for that a
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Speaker 1: grateful nation posthumously awarded him the Medal of Honor. Yet
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Speaker 1: his valiant act could not alter the tactical situation on
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Speaker 1: the hill. As long as the North Koreans could continue
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Speaker 1: to reinforce and resupply their garrison on the ridge, it
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Speaker 1: would be nearly impossible for the Americans to take the mountain.
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Speaker 1: After belatedly recognizing this fact, the Second Division crafted a
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Speaker 1: new plant. They called for a full division assault on
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Speaker 1: the valleys and hills adjacent to Heartbreak to cut the
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Speaker 1: ridge off from further reinforcement. Spearheading this new offensive would
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Speaker 1: be the division's seventy second Tank Battalion, whose mission was
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Speaker 1: to push up the Moundungnee Valley west of Heartbreak to
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Speaker 1: destroy enemy supply dumps in the vicinity of the town
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Speaker 1: of Mukdungnie. It was a bold plan, but one that
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Speaker 1: could not be accomplished until away had been found To
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Speaker 1: get these seventy seconds M four A three E eight
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Speaker 1: Sherman tanks into the valley. The only existing road was
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Speaker 1: little more than a track that could not bear the
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Speaker 1: weight of the Shermans. Moreover, it was heavily mined and
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Speaker 1: blocked by a six foot high rock barrier built by
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Speaker 1: the North Koreans using nothing but shovels and explosives. The
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Speaker 1: men of the second Division's second Engineer Combat Battalion braved
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Speaker 1: enemy fire to clear these obstacles and build an improved roadway.
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Speaker 1: While they worked, the division's three infantry regiments ninth, thirty eighth,
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Speaker 1: and twenty third launched coordinated assaults on Heartbreak Ridge and
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Speaker 1: the adjacent hills. By ten October, everything was ready for
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Speaker 1: the big raid. The sudden onslaught of a battalion of
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Speaker 1: tanks racing up the valley took the enemy by surprise.
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Speaker 1: By coincidence, the thrust came just when the Chinese two
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Speaker 1: hundred and fourth Division was moving up to relieve the
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Speaker 1: North Koreans on Heartbreak. Caught in the open, the Chinese
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Speaker 1: division suffered heavy casualties from the American tanks. For the
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Speaker 1: next five days, the Shermans roared up and down the
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Speaker 1: Mung Dungni Valley, overrunning supply dumps, bawling troop concentrations, and
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Speaker 1: destroying approximately three hundred and fifty bunkers on Heartbreak and
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Speaker 1: in the surrounding hills and valleys. A smaller tank infantry
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Speaker 1: team scoured the Satte Ri Valley east of the ridge,
20:47
Speaker 1: thereby completing the encirclement and eliminating any hope of reinforcement
20:51
Speaker 1: for the beleaguered North Koreans on Heartbreak. The armoured thrust
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Speaker 1: turned the tide of the battle, but plenty of hard
20:58
Speaker 1: fighting remained for the U S Infantry before French soldiers
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Speaker 1: captured the last commune at Bastion on the Ridge. On
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Speaker 1: thirteen October, after a month of nearly continuous combat, the
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Speaker 1: second Division was finally king of the hill. All total,
21:13
Speaker 1: the division suffered over three thousand, seven hundred casualties, nearly
21:18
Speaker 1: half of whom came from the twenty third Infantry and
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Speaker 1: its attached French battalion. Conversely, the Americans estimated that they
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Speaker 1: had inflicted twenty five thousand casualties on the enemy in
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Speaker 1: and around Heartbreak Ridge. While the Punch Bowl was the
21:34
Speaker 1: scene of some of the hardest fighting during the un
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Speaker 1: Summerfall Offensive, the United Nations was not idle. Elsewhere along
21:42
Speaker 1: the east coast, South Korean troops seceded in pushing north
21:46
Speaker 1: to the outskirts of Kosam, while in the west, five
21:50
Speaker 1: UN divisions r OK First, British, First Commonwealth and U
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Speaker 1: S First Cavalry and third and twenty fifth Infantry advanced
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Speaker 1: approximately four miles along a forty mile wide front from
22:03
Speaker 1: Queisan to Chorwan, thereby gaining greater security for the vital
22:08
Speaker 1: Soul Chorwan Railway. By late October, UN operations had seceded
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Speaker 1: in securing most of the commanded ground along the length
22:17
Speaker 1: of the front. The price of these gains had not
22:20
Speaker 1: been cheap, approximately forty thousand UN casualties, Yet the enemy
22:25
Speaker 1: had suffered even more, and the determination demonstrated by the
22:29
Speaker 1: United Nations Command in taking the offensive was probably a
22:34
Speaker 1: key factor in persuading the Communists to return to the
22:37
Speaker 1: bargaining table. Renewed talks diminished fighting the Second Korean winter
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Speaker 1: November nineteen fifty one through April nineteen fifty two. On
22:51
Speaker 1: twenty five October, UN and Communist negotiators reconvened the truce
22:56
Speaker 1: talks at a new location, a collection of tents in
22:59
Speaker 1: the tiny village of pan Munjom, six miles east of Kaesom.
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Speaker 1: After some sparring, the Communists dropped their demand for a
23:09
Speaker 1: return to the thirty eighth parallel and accepted the UN
23:13
Speaker 1: position that the cease fire line be drawn along the
23:16
Speaker 1: current line of contact. In exchange, the UN bowed to
23:19
Speaker 1: Communist demands that a truce line be agreed upon prior
23:23
Speaker 1: to the resolution of other outstanding issues. To avoid the
23:28
Speaker 1: danger that the Communists might stop negotiating once a line
23:31
Speaker 1: had been established, the Americans insisted that both sides be
23:35
Speaker 1: permitted to continue fighting until all outstanding questions had been resolved.
23:41
Speaker 1: The two sides also agreed that the proposed Armsicist line
23:45
Speaker 1: would only be valid for thirty days. Should a final
23:48
Speaker 1: truce not be arrived at within that time, then the
23:51
Speaker 1: agreement over the line of demarcation would be invalid. Still,
23:57
Speaker 1: the willingness of the United Nations to accept the car
24:00
Speaker 1: Line of Contact as the final line of demarcation between
24:03
Speaker 1: the two Koreas represented a significant windfall for the Communists,
24:08
Speaker 1: for it served as a fairly strong indicator that the
24:11
Speaker 1: United Nations had no desire to press deeper into North Korea.
24:16
Speaker 1: The termination of the UN offensive and The resumption of
24:19
Speaker 1: truce talks in late October had a noticeably calming effect
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Speaker 1: on the front. On twelve November, Ridgeway instructed van Fleet
24:28
Speaker 1: to assume an active defense. Thereafter, offensive operations were to
24:33
Speaker 1: be limited to those actions necessary to strengthen Yun lines.
24:38
Speaker 1: When the Armises negotiators formally embraced the Line of Demarcation
24:42
Speaker 1: accords on twenty seven November, van Fleet went one step
24:46
Speaker 1: further by prohibiting his subordinates from initiating any offensive operations
24:52
Speaker 1: other than counter attacks to recapture ground loss to an
24:56
Speaker 1: enemy attack. The Communists likewise refrained from under Tai making
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Speaker 1: major actions, and the resulting lull gave the United Nations
25:04
Speaker 1: the opportunity to accomplish a major chain in battlefield line up.
25:10
Speaker 1: Between December nineteen fifty one and February nineteen fifty two,
25:14
Speaker 1: the United States withdrew the first Cavalry and twenty fourth
25:18
Speaker 1: Infantry Divisions from Korea and replaced them with two National
25:22
Speaker 1: Guard formations, the fortieth and forty fifth Infantry divisions. Ridgeway
25:28
Speaker 1: had been reluctant to make the swap, fearing that the
25:30
Speaker 1: newly trained divisions would not be as effective as the
25:34
Speaker 1: two veteran units they were replacing. In fact, the U
25:37
Speaker 1: and commander had recommended that the two Guard divisions be
25:41
Speaker 1: kept at their staging areas in Japan as a source
25:45
Speaker 1: of individual replacements for the divisions already in Korea, but
25:49
Speaker 1: Army Chief of Staff General J. Lolton Collins insisted that
25:53
Speaker 1: the National Guard divisions deployed to Korea intact. Not to
25:58
Speaker 1: do so, Collins maintained, would trigger a rancorous public debate
26:02
Speaker 1: over the Guard's role and fuel allegations that the Army
26:05
Speaker 1: did not trust its own mobilization training system. Fortunately, the
26:10
Speaker 1: changeover went smoothly, and soon the two new divisions, which
26:15
Speaker 1: largely consisted of draftees led by a cadre of National guardsmen,
26:19
Speaker 1: were performing just as well as the regular units they
26:22
Speaker 1: had replaced, units that by this time in the war
26:25
Speaker 1: likewise contained large numbers of replacements and draftees. While the
26:31
Speaker 1: Army realigned its order of battle, the Panmunjom negotiators struggled
26:36
Speaker 1: to finalize the truce agreement in time to meet the
26:39
Speaker 1: thirty day deadline. When they failed in this, they agreed
26:42
Speaker 1: to extend the deadline by an additional two weeks, but
26:46
Speaker 1: this deadline also came and went without noticeable progress. By
26:50
Speaker 1: this point, however, winter had fully set in, making a
26:54
Speaker 1: renewal of major operations problematic. At best. Raids and patrols continue,
27:00
Speaker 1: if for no other reason than to prevent inaction from
27:03
Speaker 1: dowing the troop's combat edge, but overall the level of
27:06
Speaker 1: combat was minimal. The decline in activity was accompanied by
27:11
Speaker 1: a precipitous drop in UN casualties, from about twenty thousand
27:16
Speaker 1: during the month of October to under three thousand per
27:19
Speaker 1: month between December nineteen fifty one and April nineteen fifty two.
27:25
Speaker 1: All in all, the commanders on both sides seemed content
27:28
Speaker 1: to sit out the winter and let the negotiators do
27:30
Speaker 1: the heavy fighting, and fight they did, although a number
27:34
Speaker 1: of issues separated UN and Communist negotiators. The chief stumbling
27:39
Speaker 1: block to the arrangement of a final armistice during the
27:42
Speaker 1: winter of nineteen fifty one nineteen fifty two revolved around
27:46
Speaker 1: the exchange of prisoners. At first glance, there appeared to
27:49
Speaker 1: be nothing to argue about, since the Geneva Conventions of
27:53
Speaker 1: nineteen forty nine, by which both sides had pledged to abide,
27:58
Speaker 1: called for the immediate and complete exchange of all prisoners
28:01
Speaker 1: upon the conclusion of hostilities. This seemingly straightforward principle, however,
28:08
Speaker 1: disturbed many Americans. To begin with, you and prisoner of
28:12
Speaker 1: war POW camps held over forty thousand South Koreans, many
28:18
Speaker 1: of whom had been impressed into communist's service and who
28:21
Speaker 1: had no desire to be sent north upon the conclusion
28:24
Speaker 1: of the war. Moreover, a considerable number of North Korean
28:28
Speaker 1: and Chinese prisoners had also expressed a desire not to
28:32
Speaker 1: return to their homelands. This was particularly true of the
28:36
Speaker 1: Chinese POWs, some of whom were anti communists, whom the
28:41
Speaker 1: Communists had forcibly inducted into their army. Many Americans recoiled
28:45
Speaker 1: at the notion of returning such men into the hands
28:48
Speaker 1: of their oppressors, and for several months American policymakers wrestled
28:53
Speaker 1: with the POW question. Acquiescing to a total exchange of prisoners,
28:59
Speaker 1: as called for by the Geneva Conventions, would quickly settle
29:03
Speaker 1: the issue and pave the way for a final agreement
29:06
Speaker 1: ending the hostilities. On the other hand, the desire of
29:10
Speaker 1: enemy soldiers not to return to their homelands was clearly
29:13
Speaker 1: a useful propaganda weapon for the West in a wider
29:17
Speaker 1: Cold War. Establishing the right of prisoners to choose their
29:22
Speaker 1: own destinies might also pay significant dividends in any future
29:26
Speaker 1: war with the Communists, as many enemy soldiers might desert
29:31
Speaker 1: or surrender if they knew that they would not be
29:33
Speaker 1: forced to return to their Communists controlled homelands afterward. But
29:37
Speaker 1: no one suffered any delusion about how the Communists would
29:40
Speaker 1: react to the voluntary repatriation concept. The newly established governments
29:46
Speaker 1: of North Korea and the People's Republic of China were
29:49
Speaker 1: extremely sensitive to anything that even remotely challenged their legitimacy.
29:55
Speaker 1: This was especially true of the Communist Chinese government and Peking,
29:59
Speaker 1: which would undoubtedly recoil at the suggestion that some of
30:03
Speaker 1: its former soldiers be turned over to its mortal enemy,
30:06
Speaker 1: the rival Chinese Nationalist government on Taiwan. Clearly, then, any
30:11
Speaker 1: attempt to assert voluntary repatriation would complicate the truce negotiations
30:17
Speaker 1: in prolonged war. Ultimately, it was the moral aspect of
30:22
Speaker 1: the question which decided President Harry S. Truman. In the
30:27
Speaker 1: name of Allied amity, President Truman had dutifully repatriated Soviet
30:32
Speaker 1: citizens who had fallen into American hands after World War II.
30:36
Speaker 1: Much to his dismay, the Soviet government had mistreated, imprisoned,
30:40
Speaker 1: or even killed many of the returnees. Truman had no
30:44
Speaker 1: desire to repeat this heart wrenching experience if he could
30:48
Speaker 1: avoid it. In a war that was being fought in
30:50
Speaker 1: the name of national self determination and human liberty, he
30:54
Speaker 1: found it unconscionable to forcibly return people to totalitarian society. Consequently,
31:01
Speaker 1: after much soul searching, Truman made voluntary repatriation a central
31:07
Speaker 1: tenet of America's negotiating position in February nineteen fifty two.
31:13
Speaker 1: Truman's decision met with cries of anger from the Communists,
31:17
Speaker 1: who accused the United States of violating the Geneva Accords,
31:22
Speaker 1: despite the fact that they themselves routinely violated the treaty's
31:25
Speaker 1: most basic precepts regarding the treatment of prisoners. Undaunted, the
31:31
Speaker 1: United Nations proceeded to lay the groundwork for allowing anti
31:35
Speaker 1: Communist prisoners to avoid involuntary repatriation. To begin with, it
31:41
Speaker 1: reclassified the more than forty thousand South Koreans being held
31:45
Speaker 1: in Yuan compounds as civilian internees rather than prisoners of war,
31:51
Speaker 1: a categorization which would allow them to be eventually released
31:55
Speaker 1: in the South. Next, the United Nations began to screen
31:59
Speaker 1: all of its prisoners to identify those who wished to
32:03
Speaker 1: return to their homelands after the war and those who
32:06
Speaker 1: did not. These screening processes aggravated tensions inside the pow camps,
32:12
Speaker 1: which were already the site of frequent altercations between pro
32:17
Speaker 1: and anti communist prisoners. Guided by Communist agents who had
32:22
Speaker 1: deliberately allowed themselves to be captured in order to infiltrate
32:26
Speaker 1: the camps, pro communist prisoners staged a series of increasingly
32:30
Speaker 1: violent uprisings during the spring of nineteen fifty two, much
32:34
Speaker 1: to the embarrassment of UN officials. Nevertheless, the screenings continued.
32:39
Speaker 1: In April nineteen fifty two, UN officials revealed the results.
32:44
Speaker 1: Only seventy thousand of the one hundred and seventy thousand
32:48
Speaker 1: civil and military prisoners then held by the United Nations
32:52
Speaker 1: wished to return to North Korea and the People's Republic
32:55
Speaker 1: of China. The results of the initial survey stop to
33:00
Speaker 1: communists and New An officials alike. While the Communists were
33:03
Speaker 1: willing to accept the reclassification of South Koreans who had
33:07
Speaker 1: served in the ranks as civilian and toornees. The sheer
33:10
Speaker 1: number of POWs who purportedly wished to avoid repatriation represented
33:16
Speaker 1: an affront that they dared not ignore. The report thus
33:20
Speaker 1: drove the Communists to dig in their heels even further
33:23
Speaker 1: on the repatriation question, and they refused to accept anything
33:27
Speaker 1: short of a complete return of all their nationals to
33:30
Speaker 1: their control. Conversely, the survey also served to lock the
33:35
Speaker 1: United Nations into its position. Having asserted the principle of
33:39
Speaker 1: voluntary repatriation and demonstrated that a large number of individuals
33:44
Speaker 1: wished to take advantage of it, any retreat would represent
33:48
Speaker 1: a major political and moral defeat for the UN. With
33:52
Speaker 1: neither side willing to compromise, the armisist talks became hopelessly
33:56
Speaker 1: deadlocked over the POW question. To gain additional leverage on
34:03
Speaker 1: this issue, Communist authorities instructed their agents in the POW
34:07
Speaker 1: camps to step up their disruptive activities. Armed with a
34:12
Speaker 1: startling array of homemade weapons, pro communist elements deftly employed
34:17
Speaker 1: intimidation and violence to gain control of the interiors of
34:21
Speaker 1: many POW camps. Then, in early May, Communist prisoners scored
34:26
Speaker 1: a stunning coup, and they succeeded in capturing Brigadier General
34:30
Speaker 1: Francis T. Dodd, the commandant of the ewen's main pow
34:34
Speaker 1: camp at coje Do. To achieve his release, American authorities
34:39
Speaker 1: pledged to suspend additional repatriation screenings in a poorly worded
34:45
Speaker 1: communicate that seemed to substantiate Communist allegations that the UN
34:50
Speaker 1: had heretofore been mistreating prisoners. The episode humiliated the United
34:56
Speaker 1: Nations command and handed Communist negotiators in proper bagandis alike
35:01
Speaker 1: a new weapon that they wielded it with great zeal,
35:04
Speaker 1: both within the negotiating tent and on the larger stage
35:08
Speaker 1: of world public opinion. A return to war the summer
35:13
Speaker 1: fall campaigns May through November nineteen fifty two, as positions
35:20
Speaker 1: at the negotiating table hardened, spring thaws offered the prospect
35:24
Speaker 1: for renewed military operations. Neither side, however, showed much enthusiasm
35:30
Speaker 1: for such undertakings. Since the temple of the war had
35:33
Speaker 1: first begun to ebb after the initiation of trustaks in
35:38
Speaker 1: July nineteen fifty one, both sides had expended enormous amounts
35:43
Speaker 1: of effort to solidify their front line positions. The United
35:47
Speaker 1: Nations main line consisted of a nearly broken line of bunkers, trenches,
35:52
Speaker 1: and artillery emplacements that stretch for over one hundred fifty
35:56
Speaker 1: miles from one coast of Korea to the other. Communist
36:02
Speaker 1: defenses were even more impressive because of their overall inferiority
36:06
Speaker 1: and firepower. The Chinese and North Koreans had taken extraordinary
36:10
Speaker 1: efforts to harden their positions. They burrowed deep into the
36:14
Speaker 1: sides of mountains, creating intricate warrens of tunnels and caves
36:19
Speaker 1: capable of housing entire battalions of infantry. Communist bunkers were
36:25
Speaker 1: often more solidly built than UN emplacements and were usually
36:29
Speaker 1: impervious to anything but a direct hit by bomb or shell.
36:33
Speaker 1: They were also generally better sighted than UN bunkers and
36:36
Speaker 1: better concealed to avoid the prying eyes of hostile aviators,
36:41
Speaker 1: some the UN soldiers did not have to worry about. Finally,
36:45
Speaker 1: the Communists built in greater depth than their adversaries, not
36:49
Speaker 1: just below ground, but on top of it, as they
36:52
Speaker 1: typically extended their fortifications up to twenty miles behind their
36:56
Speaker 1: front line. These emplacements were manned by over a nine
37:00
Speaker 1: hundred thousand men, approximately two hundred thousand more soldiers than
37:04
Speaker 1: the United Nations had under arms in Korea over the winter.
37:10
Speaker 1: The Communists had also more than doubled the number of
37:13
Speaker 1: artillery pieces they had on the front lines, while the
37:16
Speaker 1: static nature of the war had likewise permitted them to
37:19
Speaker 1: improve their overall supply situation, notwithstanding the best efforts of
37:24
Speaker 1: U n aviators to interdict Communist supply lines. Thus, by
37:28
Speaker 1: the spring of nineteen fifty two, the U unfaced a
37:32
Speaker 1: well trained, battle hardened, robust opponent who could not be
37:35
Speaker 1: easily defeated. Since both sides had already indicated their willingness
37:41
Speaker 1: to settle the conflict roughly along the current front lines,
37:45
Speaker 1: neither side had any incentive to risk a major offensive
37:48
Speaker 1: against the other. This was especially true for the U
37:51
Speaker 1: and commanders, who, unlike their tutalitarian adversaries, always had to
37:56
Speaker 1: keep public opinion for most in their minds. Too many
38:00
Speaker 1: friendly casualties could undermine support for the war at home
38:04
Speaker 1: and forced the United Nations to acquiesce to Communist demands
38:08
Speaker 1: at the negotiating table. Consequently, General Mark W. Clark who
38:14
Speaker 1: replaced General Ridgeway as overall You and Commander in mid
38:18
Speaker 1: nineteen fifty two, kept you in offensive operations to a
38:22
Speaker 1: minimum to avoid unnecessary losses. The Communists, for whom human
38:27
Speaker 1: casualties were of less consequence, likewise eschewed the big offensive
38:32
Speaker 1: in the belief that they could just as easily erode
38:35
Speaker 1: the ewen's will to continue the struggle through the daily
38:38
Speaker 1: grind of trench warfare. Raids, patrols, bombardments, and limited objective
38:45
Speaker 1: attacks thus remained the order of the day, as both
38:48
Speaker 1: sides contented themselves with making light jabs at their adversary
38:53
Speaker 1: rather than attempting to land a knock out blow. The
38:57
Speaker 1: absence of grand offenses and sweeping movements, notwithstanding, service at
39:02
Speaker 1: the front was just as dangerous in nineteen fifty two
39:06
Speaker 1: as it had been during the more fluid stages of
39:08
Speaker 1: the war. By June, communist guns were hurling over six
39:13
Speaker 1: eight hundred shells a day at un positions. During particularly
39:17
Speaker 1: hot contested actions, Communist gunners occasionally fired as many as
39:22
Speaker 1: twenty four thousand rounds a day, un artillerous repaid the
39:26
Speaker 1: compliment five ten and sometimes even twenty four and still
39:30
Speaker 1: not a day went by when communists and un soldiers
39:34
Speaker 1: did not clash. Somewhere along the front line. One of
39:38
Speaker 1: the most common missions performed by un infantrymen was the
39:41
Speaker 1: small raid for the purpose of capturing enemy prisoners for interrogation.
39:46
Speaker 1: These operations were usually launched at night, were extremely dangerous, indeed,
39:52
Speaker 1: relatively few succeeded in capturing any prisoners. At this level,
39:57
Speaker 1: the war was a very personal affair, was man against man,
40:01
Speaker 1: rifle against grenade, fist against knife. Small unit fights required
40:06
Speaker 1: a great deal of courage, and sometimes the bravest men
40:09
Speaker 1: were those who did not carry a rifle at all.
40:12
Speaker 1: The medics. One such man was Sergeant David B. Bleak,
40:17
Speaker 1: a medical aidman attached to the fortieth Infantry Divisions two
40:21
Speaker 1: hundred and twenty third Infantry. On fourteen June nineteen fifty two,
40:26
Speaker 1: Sergeant Bleik volunteered to a company a patrol that was
40:30
Speaker 1: going out to capture enemy prisoners from a neighboring hill.
40:35
Speaker 1: As the patrol approached its objective, the enemy detected it
40:39
Speaker 1: and laid down an intense stream of automatic weapons in
40:42
Speaker 1: small arms fire. After attending to several soldiers cut down
40:47
Speaker 1: in the initial barrage, Sergeant Bleik resumed advancing up the
40:51
Speaker 1: hill with the rest of the patrols. He neared the crest,
40:54
Speaker 1: he came under fire from a small group of entrenched
40:57
Speaker 1: enemy soldiers. Without has a tar, he leaped into the
41:01
Speaker 1: trench and charged his assailants, killing two with his bare
41:05
Speaker 1: hands and a third with a trench knife. As he
41:08
Speaker 1: emerged from the emplacement, he saw a concussioned grenade fall
41:11
Speaker 1: in front of a comrade and used his body to
41:14
Speaker 1: shield the man from the blast. He then proceeded to
41:17
Speaker 1: administer to the wounded, even after being struck by an
41:20
Speaker 1: enemy bullet. When the order came to pull back, Sergeant
41:24
Speaker 1: Bleak ignored his wound and picked up an incapacitated companion.
41:29
Speaker 1: As he moved down the hill with his heavy burden,
41:31
Speaker 1: two enemy soldiers bore down on him with fixed bayonets. Undaunted,
41:36
Speaker 1: Bleek grabbed his two assailants and smacked their heads together
41:40
Speaker 1: before resuming his way back down the mountain carrying his
41:43
Speaker 1: wounded comrade. Sergeant Bleik's actions were so distinctive that June
41:48
Speaker 1: Day that they won him one of the one hundred
41:51
Speaker 1: and thirty one Medals of Honor awarded during the Korean war,
41:55
Speaker 1: Yet a day did not go by in which some
41:58
Speaker 1: American soldier did not risk his word for his comrades
42:01
Speaker 1: on some nameless Korean hillside. This was particularly true for
42:05
Speaker 1: those soldiers assigned to the outpost line, a string of
42:09
Speaker 1: strong points several thousand yards to the front of the
42:12
Speaker 1: Yuen's main battle positions. The typical outposts consisted of a
42:17
Speaker 1: number of bunkers and interconnecting trenches ringed with barbed wire
42:21
Speaker 1: and mines, perched precariously on the top of a barren,
42:25
Speaker 1: rocky hill. As the Yuen's most forward positions, the outposts
42:30
Speaker 1: acted as patrol basis in early warning stations. They also
42:34
Speaker 1: served as fortified outworks that controlled key terrain features overlooking
42:39
Speaker 1: Yun lines. As such, they represented the Yuan's first line
42:43
Speaker 1: of defense and were accorded great importance by UN and
42:47
Speaker 1: Communist commanders alike. Not surprisingly, the outposts were the scenes
42:52
Speaker 1: of some of the most vicious fighting of the war.
42:55
Speaker 1: While most of these actions were on a small scale,
42:58
Speaker 1: some of the biggest battles of nineteen fifty two revolved
43:02
Speaker 1: around efforts either to establish, defend, or retake these outposts.
43:08
Speaker 1: Operation counter provides one example of some of the larger
43:12
Speaker 1: outpost battles. During counter the forty fifth Infantry Division sought
43:17
Speaker 1: to establish twelve new outposts on high ground overlooking the
43:20
Speaker 1: division's main battle line outside of cho I. The division
43:25
Speaker 1: easily seized eleven of its twelve objectives during a night
43:28
Speaker 1: assault on six June, with the twelve falling into American
43:32
Speaker 1: hands six days later during a second phase attack. But
43:36
Speaker 1: if capturing the new outposts had been relatively easy, holding
43:40
Speaker 1: them would not be. The Chinese reacted violently to the
43:43
Speaker 1: American initiative, and by the end of June, the forty
43:47
Speaker 1: fifth Division had repulsed more than twenty Communist counter attacks
43:51
Speaker 1: on the newly established positions. Still the enemy came, and
43:55
Speaker 1: in mid July his persistence paid off when Chinese troops
43:59
Speaker 1: succeeded in pushing elements of the second Infantry Division off
44:03
Speaker 1: one of these outposts, a key mountain nine miles west
44:07
Speaker 1: of Chowan known as Old Baldy. Two companies from the
44:12
Speaker 1: twenty third Infantry recaptured the hill after bitter hand to
44:16
Speaker 1: hand fighting on one August, but in mid September the
44:19
Speaker 1: enemy again seized the hill, only to lose it several
44:23
Speaker 1: days later to a determined counter attack made by the
44:26
Speaker 1: thirty eighth Infantry in a platoon of tanks. The Savage
44:31
Speaker 1: Seesaw struggle atop old Baldy was repeated in one way
44:35
Speaker 1: or another on countless mountain peaks in ridges during nineteen
44:39
Speaker 1: fifty two, as the two sides struggled to gain ascendancy
44:43
Speaker 1: over the rugged no man's land that separated their respective
44:46
Speaker 1: battle lines. The heavy casualties incurred in these bitter outpost
44:52
Speaker 1: battles discouraged General Clarke from authorizing any new offenses after
44:58
Speaker 1: Operation counter This defensive mindedness rankled General van Fleet, who
45:04
Speaker 1: believed that the high casualties the United Nations was experiencing
45:08
Speaker 1: were due in part to the Yuens allowing the enemy
45:11
Speaker 1: to launch attacks when and where he wished. Van Fleet
45:15
Speaker 1: therefore pressed Clark to authorize additional limited offenses that would
45:19
Speaker 1: allow YUN forces to regain the initiative from the enemy
45:23
Speaker 1: and compel him to fight on American terms. One potential
45:28
Speaker 1: candidate for such an operation was Triangle Hill, a mountain
45:32
Speaker 1: three miles north of Coombeois. The United Nations was suffering
45:36
Speaker 1: heavy casualties in the area on account of the proximity
45:40
Speaker 1: of the opposing battle lines, which in some cases lay
45:43
Speaker 1: only two hundred yards apart. Seizing Triangle Hill and its
45:47
Speaker 1: neighbor Sniper Ridge would force the enemy to fall back
45:51
Speaker 1: over one thousand, two hundred yards to the next viable
45:55
Speaker 1: defensive position, thereby strengthening U N dominance over the sector
46:00
Speaker 1: and reducing friendly casualties. Finally, an offensive would also serve
46:05
Speaker 1: a political purpose. On eight October, un negotiators had walked
46:10
Speaker 1: out of the ARMISIS talks at of frustration over being
46:13
Speaker 1: unable to reach an accommodation with the enemy on the
46:16
Speaker 1: prisoner issue. With the talks now officially recessed and no
46:21
Speaker 1: hope in sight for a resolution of the conflict, a
46:24
Speaker 1: demonstration of un resolve seemed in order. Van Fleet was
46:28
Speaker 1: confident that, given sufficient support, two infantry battalions would be
46:33
Speaker 1: able to capture the Triangle Hill complex in just five
46:36
Speaker 1: days with about two hundred casualties. Swayed by van Fleet's arguments,
46:42
Speaker 1: Clark agreed to authorize the attack. On fourteen October, two
46:47
Speaker 1: hundred and eighty artillery pieces and over two hundred fighter
46:51
Speaker 1: bomber sorties began pummeling Triangle Hill. Unfortunately, Communist defenses proved
46:59
Speaker 1: tougher than exts inspected, and reinforcements had to be funneled
47:02
Speaker 1: in first one battalion, then another, and another. When the
47:07
Speaker 1: smoke finally cleared several weeks later, two UN infantry divisions,
47:12
Speaker 1: the u S seventh and the ROK second, had suffered
47:15
Speaker 1: over nine thousand casualties in an ultimately futile attempt to
47:20
Speaker 1: capture Triangle Hill. Estimates of Chinese casualties exceeded nineteen thousand men,
47:26
Speaker 1: but the Communists had the manpower for such fights and
47:29
Speaker 1: did not flinch from fleeing men into the breach to
47:32
Speaker 1: hold key terrain. The United Nations did not have such resources,
47:38
Speaker 1: and of Section six