Latest / Ryder Lee / FBI Negotiator - Gary Noesner - Waco Siege Negotiating with David Koresh
Transcript
- 0:05No, honey, movie's I a hun terrible no, no, but what's
- 0:15coming? Yeah? The ring finding the around our building and they're shooting at
- 0:24her and now come no arm off y'all tell you the children even there hear
- 0:28the cloth off? L tell me what's happening? Money her show? What
- 0:53a shot with more people on the right, blink not you can't at night?
- 1:07You come point a gunsla in the direction of my wife and my kids.
- 1:11Damn it. I'll meet you the door any time. And I'm sorry
- 1:15some of you guys got shot, but h hey, God'll have to sort
- 1:22that out. Would you tell me what? A few times in that world?
- 1:26I want to tell me what's to happen. I'm I gonna be around
- 1:30or whatever I try for anybody? Right, Well, maybe listen, don't
- 1:33you just been pinching school? But there's nothing to hurt to be moore with
- 1:38me? Called the plea? Right? How wrong? People like meet on
- 1:42the job of Okay, look very good, can people. But I'm just
- 1:48the intent ocaine. I feel the round of a woman like God, teach
- 1:53them. I didn't for them the time the FBI get involved. Now with
- 2:00it's kind of like getting into a fight with a couple of next door neighbors,
- 2:05and we're in there. You know, the little brother comes over and
- 2:07whips you, and then the big brother comes over to investigate. You know.
- 2:13Anyway, we'll trying to run the sooner. We're prepared to do whatever
- 2:16it takes. Stay here as long as it takes to settle this matter without
- 2:21further bloodship there there any of these tanks and stuff around here. I tell
- 2:24you what the American first, I'm the kind of guy. I'll stand in
- 2:30front of the tank. You can run over me, but I'll be bought
- 2:34in one of the tracks. No one's gonna hurt me or my families.
- 2:37That's that's that's that's American policy. Here. We are trying to reinforce to
- 2:42them that we are in charge of the situation, that the compound is under
- 2:47the complete control of the government. It is in fact no longer their compound.
- 2:53That we have the ability to exercise whatever control we want over that compound,
- 2:59and we will do that from various times to demonstrate to them the fact
- 3:02that that they are are impotent in uh in their ability to control their everyday
- 3:08lives. We realize that you have the ability, and it's not to allow
- 3:14you people to do something like that, erase all evidences. Why do you
- 3:19have the press so far back you can give me any kind of crap you
- 3:22want. I know, you know the reason we're not talking to the press.
- 3:25You people have got to cover your budge from what you did. And
- 3:30that's what's going on here. Understand, if you let the people need a
- 3:38girl scar, you don't burn our ability down. Don't shoot to have that
- 3:46time to time giving your people helps. Welcome back everyone tonight. We have
- 4:04a very special guest, FBI negotiator Gary Nestner. He retired from the FBI
- 4:12in two thousand and three following a thirty year career as an investigator, instructor,
- 4:15and negotiator and FBI hostage negotiator. For thirty three years of his career,
- 4:21he spent ten years as the bureau's chief negotiator. In his book,
- 4:27Stalling for Time, the FBI's Chief Hostage Negotiator, takes readers on a howering
- 4:31tour through many of the most famous hostage crisis in history of the modern FBI,
- 4:38including the Siege at Waco, the Montana Freeman standoff, in the DC
- 4:43sniper attacks. Gary Nestner, Welcome to the show. It's an honor and
- 4:46a privilege to have you. That's my pleasure to be with you today.
- 4:50So before we get into the fifty one day siege at Waco Mount Carmel in
- 4:57ninety three, what made you become a FBI hostage negotiator? Gary Well?
- 5:04I joined the FBI in nineteen seventy two, and around the mid seventies,
- 5:10the NYPD started sort of this new concept for responding to various crisis events.
- 5:16They called it hostas negotiations, and the FBI very quickly recognized it as pretty
- 5:23pretty good approach and something that we should embrace. And because the FBI's unique
- 5:30mission more so then but even today, has sort of spread the word around
- 5:34the country and internationally as well. So you know, in the intervening years
- 5:39it became, you know, enormously impactful and it's probably led to just literally
- 5:45thousands of lives being saved. But hearing about this new discipline early in my
- 5:50career, something about it appealed to me and seemed attractive as something I wanted
- 5:58to do as a sort of aside specially and in addition to being an investigator.
- 6:02So I got the training and you know, eventually worked it as a
- 6:08secondary function for many years, and that became full time and eventually the chief
- 6:11negotiator. And it was certainly all and more than I thought it would be.
- 6:17Yes, it's really interesting now whenever you look at these events that were
- 6:24kind of leading up to Waco, it's very interesting the amount of distrust that's
- 6:31brewing against the FBI and government organizations in general. You know, starting with
- 6:36the jfk assassination November twenty two, nineteen sixty three, the FBI totally botched
- 6:44that investigation. In the American public wanted answers that the FBI didn't or couldn't
- 6:49provide, which created a lot of conspiracy theories. And that might be the
- 6:57cause of the original conspiracy theory because the distrust and non transparent nature of government
- 7:02institutions. And then we have the Cold War, which created all this fear
- 7:06and panic from an outside force. And then this one which is very important
- 7:13to mention is the way cults were being portrayed and looked at around the time
- 7:17too. You know, the Satanic Panic days, Jim Jones, the Jonestown
- 7:23cult, where you know, the death toll was reported to be over nine
- 7:26hundred from a mass suicide and then we have the Ruby Ridge event in August
- 7:32of ninety two where Randy Weaver's son Samuel Weaver was killed and Vicky Weaver was
- 7:39killed by the FBI sniper. Now, it was portrayed that you were at
- 7:44Ruby Ridge in the Waco docuseriies on paramount, but you weren't actually there.
- 7:49Correct, that's correct, that's correct. Well, you know your comment there.
- 7:54I mean, it's it covers a lot of territory. I mean,
- 7:57the FBI has always had a I think an interesting relationship with American people.
- 8:01I think go back to the early years, and you know, with jag
- 8:05Or Hoover, he built something quite unique and quite special and required much more
- 8:11education and science in the application of crime. The organization has never been perfect
- 8:16and has always made mistakes along the way, but by and large it earned
- 8:20i think rightfully so, the respect of the American people. But you know,
- 8:26as the years have evolved and some of the FBI's mistakes, and it's
- 8:31a human organization, it's a great organization, great people, but it does
- 8:35make mistakes have really come to roost. And of course now currently there's a
- 8:41there's a political element to it that there are those who are against the government
- 8:46no matter what the government does, and they think the government's evil and out
- 8:50to get them and take away their rights, whatever it might be. That's
- 8:54kind of nonsensical when you really know the facts. But there's a lot of
- 8:58people that embrace that. And there's others today that for their own political gain,
- 9:03have decided to attack the FBI because the FBI is doing its job and
- 9:07investigating them, I mean, such as the case with Trump. So it's
- 9:11a it's a complex issue, and when you go back to a Ruby Ridge
- 9:13or a Waco, these are very complex issues, and you know, people
- 9:18often forget that many prison riots and even right wing malicious standoffs that the FBI
- 9:26managed quite successfully before Ruby Ridge and Waco. In fact, I would I
- 9:31would suggest that the primary lesson learned from Ruby Ridge and Waco was for the
- 9:39FBI to do things again as we always had done before them. Those two
- 9:45incidents were really because of some personnel issues involved. We're really departures from doing
- 9:50things that we had gained a reputation of being the best in the world are
- 9:54doing. But it shows you how one one person in a leadership position who's
- 9:58not well trained or prepared can really create some significant reputational damage to an organization
- 10:07and has real life consequences obviously. So yeah, so it's a complex issue.
- 10:11I agree absolutely. Now, did they consult you at any time during
- 10:16the eleven day standoff Ruby Ridge? Now what happened with Ruby Ridge. At
- 10:22the time of Ruby Ridge, they were two full time houses negotiators in the
- 10:28FBI. There's several three hundred, three hundred and fifty I think negotiators spread
- 10:33throughout the field, and negotiation for them, as it is for the SWAT
- 10:37people, is a part time function. If there is an event to bank
- 10:41robbery, skyjacking, they roll out on behalf of the FBI and respond.
- 10:46We only had two of us at Quantico at the time of Ruby Ridge,
- 10:52and we managed the program for all the others, training, guidance, so
- 10:58forth, operations. I was literally out of the country on an anniversary trip
- 11:03with my wife overseas and when Ruby Ridge occurred, so my partner was sent
- 11:09out to Ruby Ridge. So I was I was not there as you suggested.
- 11:13The twenty eighteen Paramount, a six part mini series, showed me there.
- 11:20And the reason they did that is because I was portrayed in the series
- 11:24by the actor the Great actor Michael Shannon, and they needed to get him
- 11:28in the first episode, so they wrote me into that incident doing the things
- 11:35that in fact my partner actually did. And I wasn't, you know,
- 11:39particularly happy with that or comfortable with that. But one of the things I
- 11:41learned, when someone buys your book rights, then you have some influence,
- 11:46but you don't have control. And you know, Hollywood, I think they
- 11:50did a very good job on that series, but there's some things about it
- 11:52that I disagreed with, and some portrayals I would have seen I'd like to
- 11:56see done differently. But yeah, and one of the things about to be
- 12:00ridge, as tragic as it was, you know, it started off between
- 12:05the Marshall Service trying to execute a ward for atf shootout that resulted in Sammy
- 12:13Weaver being killed in one of the Marshals, and then you know, the
- 12:16FBI was deployed out there with its postage Rescue team. It's tactical team,
- 12:22it's a national counter terrorism tactical team, and very quickly it accelerated and the
- 12:30FBI ended up shooting and wounding Weaver and one of his friends, and as
- 12:35they were running back into the cabin, one of those bullets went through a
- 12:37door and behind the door was Dicky Weaver, and it killed it while she's
- 12:41sitting there holding her baby. And it's unbelievably tragic event. And but what
- 12:48people forget is that situation was resolved peacefully through negotiations after about eight days whatever
- 12:54it was, despite a horrendous situation that the negotiators arrived at. It's kind
- 13:01of hard to make friends with somebody when you've shot them and their wives killed
- 13:05and their son's been killed, whether you were involved or responsible for that or
- 13:09not. In the case of the Sun, so you know that that had
- 13:13not fully been resolved legally or otherwise. Six months later when Waco occurred and
- 13:18we ended up having some of the same, in my view, deficient leadership
- 13:24decision making that really contributed greatly to the outcome. Did you did you think
- 13:31that Ruby Ridge was well? You just said that it was successful after they
- 13:37got Randy and his daughter out of there peacefully. Would that be considered in
- 13:43your personal views as successful? You know, no, I didn't mean to
- 13:50suggest I thought the incident was successful. I'm just saying it was successfully negotiated.
- 13:54I mean it, in many respects shows the value and power of negotiations
- 14:03that despite these horrendous conditions that had taken place before, communication was open.
- 14:11Despite that, nonetheless, negotiations were able to resolve it peacefully. And that
- 14:16accrues to my partner and the team he had out there. So I think
- 14:22that's just an important note to make. No success when I mean, when
- 14:28innocent lives are lost, it's never it's never a success, right, Thanks
- 14:31for clearing that up. Would there have been anything I know this is Hyperbolean
- 14:37conjecture, but there have been anything that you would have done differently at the
- 14:41standoff Ruby Bridge if you were there were there negotiations between brandy and and the
- 14:48FBI during the eleven days at all, Yes, there were later on.
- 14:54But what I would have done differently is I wouldn't have started out with a
- 15:01what they call rules of engagement that essentially said FBI marksmen could shoot anybody they
- 15:07saw with a weapon. I mean, not only is that the wrong approach,
- 15:13but it's also illegal. It's unconstitutional. You know, an FBI agent,
- 15:18a police officer is allowed to use deadly force only to save their life
- 15:22or the life of someone else. You can't just shoot somebody because they have
- 15:26a gun or they've done something bad prior, so that I think was a
- 15:33terrible set of instructions that FBI personnel were given and sent up the mountain,
- 15:39and those conditions presented themselves, and sure enough shots were fired, and it
- 15:43just made an already bad situation with Sammy Weaver having been killed by the marshals,
- 15:50just made a bad situation worse. So I would have started out with
- 15:52negotiations. We always say it's easy to move, easier to move from negotiations
- 15:58to tactics if absolutely necessary. It's very hard to start off with tactics that
- 16:03go badly and then succeed with negotiations. Do we know what kind of warrant
- 16:10was signed for the Weavers? What kind of warrant that was? Was that
- 16:15a no knock warrant? Was it a knock warrant? Like? What kind
- 16:18of warrant was that for them? I don't I mean, you know,
- 16:22I'm not the authority on this, but I don't believe it was a search
- 16:26warrant, you know, knock or no knock. I think it was an
- 16:30arrest warrant. Randy Weaver had been arrested by ATF for illegally modifying a shotgun
- 16:37and as I understand it, they were hoping to turn him as an informant
- 16:41to help penetrate anti government, dangerous right wing militia folks. Well we were
- 16:48failed. Refused to cooperate with them and help help Jusan. He held up,
- 16:53hide it out, hide it out, hit out. Listen to me,
- 17:00be tired to hide out in his mountain retreat rather than show up at
- 17:04court as as as ordered. So because he failed to show, they issued
- 17:11the arrest warrant. So that's what the Marshalls were trying to do on behalf
- 17:14of ATF. They were trying to arrest him. Of course, that's when
- 17:17the shootout occurred and Marshall was killed and Sammy Weaver, the boy was killed,
- 17:22and then just set in motion a terrible set of circumstances. I only
- 17:27asked that because I want to get into Waco. Here. In February twenty
- 17:33eight, nineteen ninety three, the ATF approaches Mount Carmel And now I know
- 17:38you're not involved with the ATF for that initial raid, but as a FBI
- 17:45agent, I'm sure you could tell us how a warrant works and what you're
- 17:49supposed to do as a law enforcement agency. When you're given a knock search
- 17:55warrant, right, And from my understanding, that's what the warrant was for
- 18:00Mel Carmel was a knock search warrant. Christ You know, I don't know
- 18:07the particulars of the warrant, so I won't I won't speak to that,
- 18:11but I do know they were trying to execute an arrest warrant for David Koresh
- 18:15and the search warrant for the premises to confiscate the weapons that had been illegally
- 18:19modified from semi automatic to fully automatic, which is against federal law. Now,
- 18:26the biggest criticisms of ATFRE are twofold. One that they probably would have
- 18:32been well advised to try to arrest Koresh when he was away from the compound,
- 18:37and some an ATF suggested he never left the compound. Other information I
- 18:41read suggest he left regularly. I don't know the truth. I wasn't involved
- 18:45in at that point in time. The other issue was that they're subject to
- 18:51criticism. Is it became clear that they lost the element of surprise. A
- 18:59news who was found out about the raid and was going out to cover it
- 19:03and they didn't. They got lost, and they asked a local mailman for
- 19:07directions, and that mailman happened to be David Koresh's brother in law, a
- 19:11rural postal deliveryman who lived in the compound. So he came back and said,
- 19:15they're coming, They're they're on the way. So when the ATF showed
- 19:19up to execute the rest warrants and the search warrant, you know, a
- 19:25gunfight ensued. Now both sides say the other fired first. I don't know.
- 19:27I wasn't there, but in any respect, it quickly explode into the
- 19:34you know, the biggest gun battle since the Civil War in the United States.
- 19:37And you know, four ATF agents were killed, seventeen wounded. There
- 19:44was I think five dividians killed in the shootout. So it was a terrible,
- 19:48terrible event, and it took quite a while to establish a cease fire
- 19:52and allow ATF to recover its dead and wounded and depart from the property,
- 19:57you know, And it was about to time that the FBI was given the
- 20:02task of deploying and resolving the conflict. Any you know, homicide against the
- 20:10federal agent, regardless of the agency, is investigated by the FBI. So
- 20:14that's what brought us into it. Now, from my understanding, Gary,
- 20:18the only reason that the ATF called for a ceasefire was because of the ATF
- 20:26ran out of AMMO and the people inside of Mount Carmel were on the phone
- 20:30with the police pretty much from the start of this calling for a ceasefire,
- 20:34which is very curious to me, which again this is just speculation and hyperbole.
- 20:41But what if what would have happened if they didn't run out of ammo?
- 20:47Right? How long would that of gunfight have went on for? And
- 20:51how many more people would have died in that initial raid? I mean,
- 20:55would the ATF have killed everyone inside of Mount Carmel that day if they wouldn't
- 20:59have ran out of ammo. I'm not so sure that it's accurate that they
- 21:03ran out of ammunition. I think they were running very, very low.
- 21:07But and I'm sure some of the agents who discharged more firems, web bullets
- 21:14and the others may have run out. But I don't know that everyone was
- 21:15out of ammunition. They may well have been, but I've never heard that
- 21:19per se but running low certainly, you know, I think both sides at
- 21:23that point in time wanted a ceasefire, and there were two telephone lines inside
- 21:29the compound and you know, McLennan County Sheriff Lieutenant Larry Lynch was on the
- 21:36initial line and spoke with Wayne Martin, one of the attorneys who lived inside
- 21:41the compound, who had a phone line to use for his legal practice.
- 21:45So you know, through that conduit a ceasefire was established and certainly in the
- 21:52interest of both sides. Now, at what point did you just mentioned that
- 21:57the FBI got involved shortly after the atf raid. How long after that initial
- 22:03raid did you become involved at in the siege? Yeah, I mean I
- 22:10think within a couple hours of the shootout, you know, and it's not
- 22:15surprising any of these big situations, there's a lack of information and clarity about
- 22:19what's going on. But you know, within a couple hours, my boss
- 22:23at the FBI called me up and gave me a thumbnail sketch of what had
- 22:29happened out there and told me to make my way to an airport where we
- 22:33keep some FBI planes and to fly out there to run the negotiations. And
- 22:40you know, armed with very little information about who the Davidians were and how
- 22:44this all happened, I got on the plane and went out. I'm sure
- 22:48when you got there, you were more briefed into the incident. What was
- 22:55that initial thing that was said to you and that that initial briefing when you
- 23:00got there about the situation at mal Colonel Well, you know, basically it's
- 23:07described to me. It's kind of what it was. I mean, it's
- 23:08a pretty desperate situation. There's been a significant loss of life, which is
- 23:15always a terrible way to start off. You know, as negotiators, we
- 23:18like to leverage the fact that no one's been hurt yet, so no reason
- 23:22to act or behave dangerously and ourself destructively. But in this case we dealt
- 23:27with had to deal with the fact that we've already had significant loss of life.
- 23:33What gave me some encouragement was the fact that ceasefire had been in place
- 23:38and held for several hours I think by the time I was arrived, and
- 23:45the tone and the emotional aspects of the situation had somewhat stabilized, and Koresh
- 23:55had even I think when I arrived. By the time I arrived, had
- 23:59released some children. So I took all of these as positive signs that,
- 24:03you know, hopefully we could work with this guy and avoid further bloodshed and
- 24:07get everyone out safely. That certainly was the goal. Now, what was
- 24:11the negotiations like with David Koresh? From the ones I've listened to, it
- 24:17seemed like a lot of talk of the Bible and religious symbolism. What was
- 24:22that like from your end? And how did the FBI react to a lot
- 24:29of his Bible and religious theology. Well, Koresh could be all over the
- 24:36place. I mean there were times where he was he clearly was. He
- 24:40had been wounded seriously in the shootout. He had a bullet that creased his
- 24:45wrist behind the thumb and then traveled on in and out of his side around
- 24:51the waist. So he was insignificant discomfort. So there's sometimes that was quite
- 24:57evident in speaking him that he was, you know, selffring and he was
- 25:02in pain. There were times where he would be extremely angry, angry at
- 25:07what atf did Why did you do that? You didn't need to do this,
- 25:11so forth and so on. As things progressed, there was you know,
- 25:15longer periods where he would you know, be very trying to be manipulative
- 25:22with us and and sort of justify everything he'd done in the larger religious context.
- 25:27He had his own unique end times kind of prophecy, and that's what
- 25:33he talked to his people. This is, you know, the forces of
- 25:37Zion coming against us, and you know we're all going to die and and
- 25:42come back again. So in essence, unwittingly, the at f Or Eights
- 25:48ort of reinforced this apocalyptic philosophy that he'd been sharing with his followers for quite
- 25:55some time. But I guess I'm not really answering your question. Koresh was
- 25:59all over the place, and what we quickly learned, much of the chagrin
- 26:03of some of the religious scholars who have criticized us, is we didn't achieve
- 26:10anything when we talked about religion. When we kept him in the here and
- 26:15now we were able to get him to release children and subsequently even adults.
- 26:18You know, we got while I was there the first half, we got
- 26:21thirty five people out, including twenty one children. I think religious scholars tend
- 26:26to believe that they know the Bible so well that if someone will just hear
- 26:32their interpretation as surely they'll understand and see it the way they do. And
- 26:37you know, we've kind of learned in this business that's that's a bit of
- 26:40a fool's errand you can't really talk someone out of the core ideology. But
- 26:45you know, if you look at David koresh As on a pie chart,
- 26:48you know there there was probably a sliver, I don't know how big,
- 26:52it was, maybe a quarter, maybe twenty percent that represented his core religious
- 26:59beliefs. And when you're there, you got nothing done. So we would
- 27:03try to move him off of that, and that's when we accomplish things.
- 27:10So, you know, I strongly push back from some of the religious scholars
- 27:15that just so well, if you would just let me talk to him,
- 27:17I could have explained to him that he's interpreting the Book of Revelation improperly,
- 27:21and you know that's that's sort of silly. The man's been preaching his whole
- 27:23life. He's steeped in the Bible ideology. You know, I don't think
- 27:30I'll give you this example. If you get one hundred people in the room
- 27:33and fifty um or pro life and fifty um or pro choice, and they
- 27:37can talk all night and go back and forth, and at the end of
- 27:38the night, fifty will be pro life and fifty will be pro choice.
- 27:42You know, there's just some core things that people believe that you're really not
- 27:48going to get them to change. So what you do instead is look for
- 27:52areas of commonality and areas that you can agree on, even if it takes
- 27:56you away from the major prevail issue. Was there ever a point in time
- 28:03where the FBI thought that it might be in their best interest to introduce a
- 28:07religious scholar to try and talk to David krush Never? Never that is,
- 28:15well, let me put it to you this way. At the turn of
- 28:19the century, you know, two thousand I went to Israel to speak at
- 28:23a conference, and the Israelis were quite worried about at the change of the
- 28:27millennium that there were some American religious groups that had little compounds in Israel,
- 28:33and they were scared that these people would trigger violence to to start the end
- 28:38times. And in this conference I was at, there was religious scholars and
- 28:45academicians and others, and allow the religious scholars made the same argument that you
- 28:49did. Why don't you let us if this happens, nobody knows, you
- 28:53know, the Bible like we do, let us talk to these people.
- 28:56And then I listened to this for a while and I said, well,
- 29:00let's move it to a realistic situation. It's your son or daughter and a
- 29:03religious zealous holding a knife through the throat. Do you want to just drag
- 29:07some scholar from Yeshiva University to see how he can do or are you going
- 29:12to pick you know, and I named a negotiator in Israel that's done this
- 29:15two hundred times successfully. You know it's your child and their life is on
- 29:19the line. Are you going to go with somebody who knows how to speak
- 29:22to somebody in crisis and the few situations and create relationships where you can influence
- 29:26their behavior, or you're going to go with an untrained person because they have
- 29:30a religious degree on the wall in their office. And I think it's a
- 29:34no brainer. Talk to us about the first people that left Melt Carmel from
- 29:42your negotiations with David Koresh. Well, of course he lets some children out
- 29:48fairly early. And you know, people can argue over where they negotiated out.
- 29:56Did he just let them out as a negotiator, we don't make the
- 29:59distinguished distinction for us. Anyone that comes out during the negotiation process is a
- 30:03negotiation and success. Some would suggest that he was, and I think there's
- 30:11some validity of this. He was letting some of the children go who were
- 30:14not his naturally born children, with the purpose of securing the loyalty of their
- 30:19parents. So instead of having parents in there worried about their children and perhaps
- 30:27surrendering to save the lives of their children, now that he extracted the children
- 30:32from the situation, he could rely on their full measure of loyalty, fighting
- 30:38to the death. I think that that argument has a lot of merit.
- 30:44He never released any of the children, and he personally fathered, but we
- 30:48didn't really care. Why a life is a life. A child as a
- 30:52child, and there's twenty one of them who are alive today because of you
- 30:56know, the way we're able to work with him to make that happen.
- 30:59And again, you know, another fourteen adults came out in addition, and
- 31:04that was from their own choice. So you know, it was a struggle.
- 31:11And if you've read anything on this or seeing any of the television shows
- 31:15or whatever, there was great disagreement within the FBI about the negotiation approach versus
- 31:22a more strident, tactical pressure approach. As a negotiator, my team and
- 31:30I knew that it's what we call the paradox of power. The hearder you
- 31:33push them, more likely it is, you get resistance. So we fought
- 31:37against that as hard as we could. We won some battles and we lost
- 31:41some battles. But it was a costly, lengthy affair. It was costing
- 31:45an enormous amount of money. It was a lot of public criticism of the
- 31:49FBI. What's taken so long? Once these people are coops and nuts,
- 31:53just go in there and get them. And of course every person that said
- 31:56that later on said, you know, well, why did you do what
- 31:59you did? You know, if you're damned if you do, damned if
- 32:00you don't. But we did have significant internal disagreements and that did contribute to
- 32:08the outcome. Now that being said, I've always been quite clear in my
- 32:15mind that David Koresh is ultimately responsible. Now, we every single day,
- 32:19if you've listened to the tapes of the conversations, we encouraged them to come
- 32:22out. We made accommodations for him, We made representations about him being able
- 32:28to meet his followers, you know, all these kinds of things. We
- 32:32did everything we could to convince him to do the right thing by his people,
- 32:36and at the end of the day, he didn't. And you know,
- 32:39so, yes, it's fine to blame the FBI for some activities that
- 32:45certainly should not have happened. But that's different. You know, my colleagues
- 32:49in the FBI who were there, they tend to say, wait a minute,
- 32:52he was a bad guy, therefore we're all good. Well, life
- 32:54is more complicated. Life is black. It's not black and white. It's
- 32:58great. And the fact that he was bad guy and responsible doesn't mean that
- 33:02we didn't make mistakes. So that's the complexity that, in my judgment,
- 33:07very few people seem to appreciate. There's it seems to be a rush to
- 33:12draw sides on this, and these are just nice religious people minding their own
- 33:15business and big old bat old government came out decided to kill them, you
- 33:20know. And then there's the side that says these people were coops and nuts
- 33:22and got what they deserved. And neither one of those, you know,
- 33:27polarizing positions are really inaccurate reflection of the situation. At what point did you
- 33:35realize, as an individual, Gary that the people inside of Mount Carmel weren't
- 33:42necessarily being held there against their will, and that several of them did and
- 33:49could leave if they wanted, and did not have an effect on you and
- 33:55your negotiation tactics. Well, it did. I mean, we we certainly
- 34:01hoped that we couldn't come to an agree with Koresh as sort of a grand
- 34:07strategy, as it were, to convince him to come out. But while
- 34:12doing that, we were constantly working at ways to sort of erode his hypnotic
- 34:16sway over his followers. And I think that's not an unfair way to depict
- 34:21it. These folks were by and large pretty naive, extremely loyal to him.
- 34:27Most of them still are. They're still waiting for him to come back.
- 34:31And Koresh was a master narcissistic, malignant, narcissick manipulator. There's there's
- 34:37just no question on that whatsoever. And you know, he lived a pretty
- 34:42good life in there, being the king of the roost and told everybody what
- 34:45to do, when to do it, how to do it. And they
- 34:47all truly thought he spoke to God, you know, and he was the
- 34:52prophet or the Messiah or whoever you want to characterize it. So it was
- 34:55it was pretty tough to break that. But but we we were trying to
- 35:00show people that we weren't the bad evil people that he prophesies, that we
- 35:07were decent people. We even set a videotape in of us negotiators at a
- 35:12certain point say hey, I have a family too, and I love my
- 35:15family. I know you love your family, and we don't want to see
- 35:16anybody get hurt. And you know, there's a lot of really innovative and
- 35:22quality initiatives that the FBI negotiation team took. In fact, I'm more proud
- 35:27of that than anything I've ever done in my thirty year career. It's also
- 35:30the incident that probably has had the biggest emotional impact on me too. But
- 35:36I'm quite proud of the negotiation team. And despite a very difficult, challenging
- 35:42person in David Koresh and some pretty poor decision making in my opinion by fbion
- 35:47SENE management, were nonetheless still accomplished getting thirty five people out, and in
- 35:52my strong opinion, I believe we could have got many many more out if
- 35:59counter undercutting tactical action had not sort of pulled a rug out from unders.
- 36:05So there are again people in the FBI that will say, well, it
- 36:07ended the only way it was going to end, and nothing we did or
- 36:10didn't do we change the outcome. I just simply don't agree with that.
- 36:15How far into the siege was the FBI looking at this as like a hostage
- 36:24situation because one of these people. They never looked at it as a hostage
- 36:30situation ever. You know, you may have heard of an FBI command or
- 36:36make a in the net press conspiens say the children were hostages of the situation.
- 36:40As negotiators, we know what a hostage situation is. A hostage situation
- 36:45is a very specific subset. It's someone making a demand to obtain something they
- 36:51can't get on their own and threatening to harm somebody if they don't get it.
- 36:54They weren't threatened any of their followers in there, and frankly, they
- 36:59had no subsident demands go away and leave us, a known as not a
- 37:01subsident demand, So it was not a hausted situation. We didn't look at
- 37:06it as a hausag situation, and I think many people mistakenly feel as though
- 37:12that was the biggest problem we had. The FBI didn't understand what they were
- 37:15dealing with, and that's just ignorant and reflective of people that have no idea
- 37:21the sophistication at which our negotiation operations run and what we knew and didn't know.
- 37:27But the Hostage and Rescue Team was still there, right, That's just
- 37:31their name. I mean, they were created mindful of hastage situations. But
- 37:37when you really break down the various operations that the hostage Rescue Team does,
- 37:43very little of it actually involves actual haustage situations. It's just it's just their
- 37:49name. You could call them the FBI Super Swat Team and that would probably
- 37:52be more accurate than calling them the hostage Rescue Team. Now, you just
- 37:59mentioned this few minutes ago, and from my understanding, Gary, there were
- 38:04let's say, all the teams weren't on the same page. There were discrepancies
- 38:09between the FBI tactical team and the good negotiation teams, and the two teams
- 38:15were kind of at odds with each other. And from your understanding and you
- 38:21being there, what were some of the main issues between the negotiation team and
- 38:28the tactical team. Yeah, good question. I think some outside critics have
- 38:32said, you know, the negotiators and the tactical people weren't talking, they
- 38:36weren't communicating, and that's totally false. I mean, we had a tactical
- 38:40team member in the negotiation room the entire time relaying everything we are doing.
- 38:46The problem we had, in my view is the leadership of the hostage rescue
- 38:52team at the time had a fundamentally different philosophical approach to resolving conflict. He
- 39:00felt as though we could tighten the news as it were, and force these
- 39:07people out, compel them to come out. And as a negotiator, I
- 39:12think I mentioned it earlier. It's the paradox of power. The harder we
- 39:14push, the more resistance we get. You've got a more or less sweet
- 39:17talk of people. You can't threaten them out. You know. It's for
- 39:22example, if you were in your home, you know, holding a hostage
- 39:27or threatening your family, and I'm negotiating with you and I say please come
- 39:31out, and you say no, And I go forward with the tank and
- 39:34I crush your brand new car in the driveway? Are you feeling good about
- 39:37me or worse? And you know, I think the answer is pretty clear
- 39:42to anybody. That's not the way you create a relationship of trust. But
- 39:45what had happened some years before Ruby Ridge, the hostage Rescue Team conducted a
- 39:52very significant tactical rescue at the Talladega prison ride. And because of that,
- 40:00I believe the leadership, not only of the Haunted rescue team, but of
- 40:05the people at headquarters that deployed them, I felt as though this particular leader
- 40:09had the answers for resolving major situations. And the same person, I think
- 40:16made that bad decision at Ruby Ridge and yet still was on the job at
- 40:20Waco. And I think that's that's the area where the FBI can rightfully be
- 40:24criticized the most, because without this person's efforts that served to undercut the negotiations
- 40:31at the Waco situation could have ended quite differently in my view. Now,
- 40:37let's talk about the first time Crush said that he and the people of Mount
- 40:43Carmel were going to leave. What happened in that situation, because from my
- 40:47understanding, you guys had were you the negotiator at that time? Whenever he
- 40:52said that he was going to leave, and he had everyone in the hallway
- 40:54and the FBI had buses off front ready to get all the people out and
- 41:00take them away. What happened in that well, I ran in the coach.
- 41:04I spoke to Kresh the first night for about ten hours because I was
- 41:07one of the first negotiators that got out there from the FBI. But my
- 41:09job is the boss, So the negotiation team is not to be the guy
- 41:14on the phone, but rather to run the strategy and direct the operations of
- 41:17all the negotiations. So I wasn't on the phone when that happened. But
- 41:22what you're referring to is about two or three days into it, Koresh wanted
- 41:28to make a national broadcast and promised us that he would come out peacefully after
- 41:34we did that, and we were concerned that it would be a jonestown sort
- 41:38of last Will and Testament, and then they killed themselves, and so we
- 41:42said we couldn't put him on live TV, but if he recorded a message,
- 41:45we'd listened to it and we would see if we could get it played
- 41:50if he included a message in the message that he would basfullly come out with
- 41:54all his people after that happened, and sure enough, he made that recording,
- 42:00convinced the unseen Commander to allow us to have it played over the Christian
- 42:05Broadcast network, and it was played nationally and we had the buses, as
- 42:10you suggest, lined up. We know factually that the children were lined up
- 42:15with all their backpacks and their personal items. People were ready to come out,
- 42:20and then Koresh, you know, reportedly was told by God to wait.
- 42:27We thought it was a convenient intervention at that time. But I am
- 42:30being sarcastic, but he didn't come out. Now, as a negotiator,
- 42:37I'm used to being lied to or people trying to manipulate us. So when
- 42:43things like that happened, we go back to the drawing board and we say,
- 42:45hey, we did everything you said. We followed our part of the
- 42:49bargain, and you didn't. You know, so you know you need to
- 42:53step up the plate and live up to your word. So that's the line
- 42:59we would have taken. But when Koresh did not come out as promised,
- 43:02and it became clear when he told us God had told him to wait.
- 43:07While I was disappointed, the negotiation team was disappointed. The tactical commander announcing
- 43:13commander were absolutely limited and angry, and they set armored vehicles for it to
- 43:20do some destructive stuff, which then prompted the Davidians to say, you promised
- 43:23you would after the ceasefire, you'd stay off our property, and here you
- 43:28are doing this. So it just it just ratcheted up the whole confrontation.
- 43:35How did the FBI get access to these tanks? Because from my understanding,
- 43:40Gary, that there has to be some sort of other charge or some suspecting
- 43:47of different kinds of activity other than just converting semi automatic weapons into automatic weapons
- 43:54to actually give tanks to out a siege to surround the building. Is that
- 44:00correct? You have to have some kind of you know, I don't know.
- 44:05I'd read somewhere that there's some legal provision that charges had to relate to
- 44:10drugs or something like that, and I don't know if that's the case.
- 44:15But possecomitatis is a law that prevents the military from enforcing civilian law, but
- 44:21there are far less restrictions on the military lending equipment to law enforcement, And
- 44:25that's essentially what happened here. The gun barrels had been removed from the broad
- 44:30Bradley vehicles, you know, to demonstrate that these were not offensive weapons.
- 44:36The terrain around the compound was wide opened. They had inside two fifty caliber
- 44:42sniper rifles, which are quite formidable and can you shoot around over a mile.
- 44:49So the FBI personnel surrounding the area had had inadequate protection. So that
- 44:54was one of the reasons they brought the vehicles in. Did it serve to
- 45:00unintentionally to ratchet up to the tension, no doubt. How far away was
- 45:07your unit, the negotiation unit from Mount Carmel. Could you see Mount Carmel
- 45:14and what was happening from where you were the negotiation team, No, we
- 45:17were I don't know, three to five miles away. I forget what the
- 45:21distance is. But we did have CCTV cameras that we could watch the front
- 45:25of the compound from the negotiation room. The FBI commandeer the Texas Technical Community
- 45:32College, which is a college where they used to form an air force base
- 45:37in Waco, and it's used to train people as for jobs in the military
- 45:44to repair large aircraft C five and so forth. So that's that's where the
- 45:50command post was set up. That's where we were located. The postage rescue
- 45:53team was up forward around the compound, and that is part of the problem.
- 45:58I think that did contribute to to the misunderstandings that took place between the
- 46:04two key components. Now, Dick de garon Koresh's lawyer, how many he
- 46:10was allowed to enter in the Mount Charmel. He was one of the only
- 46:14civilians that was able to actually get inside of Mount Kronmeel, correct, Yeah,
- 46:21I mean that was after I left I wasn't involved in that, but
- 46:24the Garren had been contacted as an understanded by Koresh's mother and asked to represent
- 46:34him. He approached the FBI, and initially FBI command I didn't even know
- 46:37about this part, had refused his involvement. We would not typically allow a
- 46:44defense attorney to go inside of what one could classify as an active crime scene.
- 46:51But eventually, as time wore on and other initiatives did not seem to
- 46:57be burying any fruit, they decided to allow him in another attorney to go
- 47:01inside because, frankly, the NPI felt is if Koresh felt he had a
- 47:09legitimate defense against the charges, that that would encourage him to come out again.
- 47:15Another example of us trying to be very creative and do things that would
- 47:19satisfy the questions he had and give him a rationale for coming out and submitting
- 47:25to the courts, which is what we wanted all along. At what point
- 47:30were you no longer a part of the negotiations. You said that you had
- 47:35left before Dick de Garon got involved, and they had this understanding that Koresh
- 47:42was going to write his interpretation of the Seven Seals, and a manuscript and
- 47:45after he was done writing this, they would all come out in like a
- 47:49single file line. What point did in the siege were you no longer a
- 47:55part of the negotiations. I was rotated out, in essence, exactly at
- 48:00the halfway point twenty six days. And what brought that about is candidly,
- 48:07I was seen by some at FBI headquarters as an impediment to stronger, more
- 48:15in your face tactical action. And I'm guilty as charged. I was an
- 48:17impediment to that, and I did resist that, sometimes quite effectively. Other
- 48:22times I didn't win those battles. But we have a system in the FBI
- 48:27where three weeks negotiators rotate out to get rest, we bring other people in.
- 48:32So I had been there now a month longer than anyone except for a
- 48:37local negotiator Byron Sage. So I think they used that as an excuse for
- 48:43me to rotate out. But in essence, I mean, I know that
- 48:47they wanted me no longer being an obstacle to proceeding the way they wanted to.
- 48:53And sure enough, after I left, no one else came out for
- 49:00the remainder of the siege. And you would ask me another question, Oh
- 49:05about the When the lawyers did go in again after I departed, Koresh said
- 49:12he would come out as soon as he interpreted the seven seals. Well,
- 49:15the FBI waited and waited, kept making inquiries, you know, and began
- 49:21to believe, probably correctly, that it was just a stall and Koresh really
- 49:25wasn't working on him. There's some information to suggest he had written something down
- 49:30on the first seal, but we had also heard from his primary deputy,
- 49:36Steve Snyder, that he hadn't really seen any work he had done on that.
- 49:40So the officials became convinced that this was just a stalling technique for Koresh
- 49:47and that and then they i think convinced themselves that the children were in deteriorating
- 49:53health situations. They sort of played that card with Janet Reno, who was
- 49:59a new Attorney General and who made her career working on matters related to abusive
- 50:04children, so she was quite sympathetic to that argument. We know that Koresh
- 50:08fathered many children with underage girls, but we had no information that dad sexual
- 50:16abuse was ongoing during the crisis. But the picture painted to Janet Reno I
- 50:22think convinced her that, you know, we had to move sooner than later,
- 50:25and that's what happened. Did you have any idea? Was there any
- 50:30whisperings from the FBI before you left the scene that they were going to gas
- 50:40It was discussed as an option, but there was no there was no clear
- 50:45plan to do so when I left. Were there any other options were being
- 50:52discussed by the FBI other than gassing mont Karma. Yeah, that's one of
- 50:58the things people don't quite understand. Enforcement in reality, and a situation like
- 51:01this really doesn't have a lot of tools. I mean, we have negotiations,
- 51:05which is successful in the ninety percentiles, and we have tactical intervention when
- 51:13you know, we fear there's going to be loss of life, it's turned
- 51:15violent, you know, we have to do an emergency rescue, whatever it
- 51:19is. But between those two there's not an abundance of options to choose from.
- 51:28And the insertion of tear gas is one of those. Now people who
- 51:31criticized it because children, women are inside, and I'm not defending it,
- 51:37but I will say this, tear gas is used not I mean fairly commonly
- 51:42in the United States by police departments at all levels, and it rarely starts
- 51:46any fire and it's not. It's a fairly effective tool to get people to,
- 51:52you know, to exit a building that they're in and they're just scared
- 51:58to come out of or don't want to come out of for what ever reason.
- 52:00And that's I think was the thinkings. Not trying to kill them,
- 52:04it is trying to get them to come out and surrender. Now, you
- 52:08know, the other big issue that always comes up who started the fire?
- 52:12And it irritates me a bit that even some of the TV shows I was
- 52:15involved, and I don't believe make that definitive case. But we know quite
- 52:20clearly the Davidians started the fire. Now they started because the FBI inserted tear
- 52:23gas. And there are people, I think perhaps some guests on your show
- 52:28that said, we didn't start the fires, but they did. You know,
- 52:31there's microphone recordings from inside from microphones we put in that said, you
- 52:37know, spread the fuel and so forth and so on. The day after
- 52:39the fire, Graham Craddock, one of the surviving Davidians, testified before grand
- 52:45jury and he said, I didn't start the fires, and I didn't see
- 52:47anybody starting, but I heard them yell spread the kerosene. Light the fires.
- 52:52I mean the fire start in three places simultaneously. There's a lot of
- 52:58compelling information, But again, those who want to hold onto the narrative at
- 53:02big old government all of a sudden got tired after fifty one days and said,
- 53:07let's burn the place down and kill everybody. I mean, it's just
- 53:09naive and ignorant. Is cus gas different than regular tear gas? I mean
- 53:19tear gas is sort of a just a generic term. You know, there's
- 53:25different kinds of gas. I don't I'm not an expert in that area.
- 53:30It's pretty powerful stuff. I mean, every certainly in my training is an
- 53:32FBI gen. I had to be gased, and it's it's extremely uncomfortable,
- 53:37and I certainly wouldn't stay inside a building that had tear gas. I'd probably
- 53:42be the first person out of there. It's it's pretty bad stuff. Yeah,
- 53:45it's just interesting the amount of cus gas that they use. And for
- 53:52my understanding of my research, almost every time that CS gas like this,
- 54:00this brand of gas that they used to gas moll caramel has been used indoors,
- 54:05has always resulted in some sort of fire. So I would think that
- 54:10that's just not true, that it's not even remotely true. What starts a
- 54:16fire is if there's a pyrotechnic The gas itself doesn't start a fire, and
- 54:22you know there has to be a pyrotechnic thing. They didn't use that a
- 54:27way or they pumped the gas in for that reason. There were some shotgun
- 54:30ferret rounds, but those don't start a fire. No. Again, law
- 54:37enforcement used a CS gas all the time and it doesn't start fires regularly.
- 54:42I mean, I know one of the television movies made that suggestion, and
- 54:45it's just it's just not correct. And you know, again, I'm not
- 54:47here to defend the use of the gas or to try to be pretend like
- 54:52I'm an expert on it, but it's just not what happened. And you
- 54:57know, I'm a little irritated that people continue to tell that story. You
- 55:00know, Koresh ordered the fires. I mean, it's unequivocal. I'm just
- 55:06trying to get your side on I'm a neutral party here. I wasn't there,
- 55:09I wasn't involved. I don't know what's going on. I'm just trying
- 55:12to get everyone's side, yeah, of the story here and trying to figure
- 55:15it out. And I questioning the appropriateness of gas. Is a legitimate question,
- 55:22you know, and that's fine. I think we should have that debate.
- 55:27But I think I think to suggests that either it was purposeful or that
- 55:34that's clearly what started the fire. It's just it's just not accurate. Um.
- 55:38Well, something changed with the FBI, because I've seen a videotape of
- 55:44the head of the FBI. I would have to research and see who it
- 55:46was during one of the press conferences where he was basically saying that they're willing
- 55:52to take all the time that's needed, all the time possible to get these
- 55:57people out of Mount Carmel. So something changed between him saying that and then
- 56:02the result in the gassing of mal Carmel. They either lost patients, there
- 56:08was something going on, but some kind of switch flipped there where they were
- 56:14no longer interested in getting the residents of malt Carmel out peacefully and they took
- 56:20a tactical approach. Would you agree with that? Not the last part of
- 56:24what you said. I mean, I think they were. They always remained
- 56:28interested in getting them to come out peacefully, and I think the argument Day
- 56:31would make it was their hope that the gas would force them out. There's
- 56:37not a lot of non lethal options, and gas is not a lethal option,
- 56:42not considered legally or otherwise. But going back to what you said earlier
- 56:46about losing patients a lot, I don't think there's any question of that.
- 56:50I think senior government officials they were spending you know, I don't know,
- 56:53a million dollars a day in nineteen ninety three money. They had hundreds and
- 56:59hundreds a long forcement personnel tied up. The FBI was getting an awful lot
- 57:04of criticism from politicians and others. What's taking so long? Why are you
- 57:07spending the money on all these crazy people. So all that stuff is a
- 57:12contributive factor to decision making, but I think clearly some FBI decision makers became
- 57:16impatient. I don't think there's any question. I wouldn't I wouldn't argue against
- 57:21that. Yeah, it's it's really interesting that that's the way that it would
- 57:28have played out. Now, what would you have Would you have been willing
- 57:32to wait there the entire time and try and negotiate with David Koresh and get
- 57:37as many people out as possible, or if you would have been stayed on
- 57:43at the siege, would you have stayed there as long as it takes I
- 57:46would have stayed as long as they wanted me to be there. But I
- 57:51remember telling the Onseen commander of the day I left, I said, no
- 57:53one else is coming out. And the reason I told him that is because
- 57:58the tactical actions that had been taken literally were the straw that broke the camel's
- 58:05back. They had once too often responded to positive movement from the Davidians in
- 58:13a negative way. And to give you an example, on the I believe
- 58:16it was the seventeenth of March, we had seven adults come out. I
- 58:24mean it was a huge negotiation success. We were we had a theory called
- 58:29trickle flow gush that we were again probably not going to have a grand resolution,
- 58:34but we would slowly begin to erode correcious support and have people come out.
- 58:38So I think the seven people coming out on the seventeen, or excuse
- 58:42me, that was actually the twenty first, it was a validation of that
- 58:46theory. But without consultation, without knowledge, tanks were ordered forward to crush
- 58:52cars and get in their face. I mean, this runs against every philosophical
- 59:01principle the FBI has long believed in that the negotiation coordinates have to work in
- 59:06tight coordination. One compliments doesn't contradict the other. And yet in this particular
- 59:12scenario, that was an outrageous Let me give you example. I remember telling
- 59:19you on seeing Commander about fellow named Padlow. And you know, you train
- 59:23an animal to do something, and you reward it, you reward it,
- 59:28and that encourages the repetition of that positive behavior. I made the comment to
- 59:34him that we have the equivalent of we've trained the dog to bring us the
- 59:37newspaper every day, and now that he's learned to do it, we've kicked
- 59:40him in the nuts when he does it. Well, guess what, the
- 59:43dog's not going to bring the paper to you anymore. And that's just about
- 59:46a basic of psychology as you can get. I don't know how it could
- 59:52be any more simpler than that. Yet the frustration from the aunt Seen decision
- 59:59makers was that's not enough people, it's not happening quick enough. We'll be
- 1:00:02here till Christmas at this rate. But you know, to your larger question,
- 1:00:07had things been done the way I wanted and my team wanted, I
- 1:00:13believe we would have gotten a great many more people out, perhaps everyone,
- 1:00:15perhaps even Koresh. Three years later, we had a similar siege in Montana
- 1:00:21that lasted eighty five days. And in that instance, the director of the
- 1:00:25FBI said, negotiators, you're in the lead. You tell us how to
- 1:00:29do this, and we did. No shots fired, nobody heard. It
- 1:00:31took eighty five days, everybody came out. Lawsuits, no reputational damage,
- 1:00:37no court litigation. That's the way to do it, and that's the way
- 1:00:43we should have done it. Awake and Ruby Ridge, how did you get
- 1:00:47those people out? Was it all negotiations? There wasn't any gas involved in
- 1:00:52getting those people out, Ruby Ridge. No, the other one that you
- 1:00:57just mentioned, oh, Montana, No, no, no gas. We
- 1:01:00just we used intermediaries to initially create an avenue communication with people that refused to
- 1:01:08talk to the government, and they said we had no jurisdiction over them,
- 1:01:12so we had to use intermediaries to open up a dialogue. We were patient,
- 1:01:15we gave them. We actually allowed again in case we're allowed some attorneys
- 1:01:20to go in to defend them, to convince them that they had the opportunity
- 1:01:25to defend what they had done in court, you know, and we did
- 1:01:30some other things to convince them that it was in their best interests to begin
- 1:01:35to negotiate. And I'm very proud of that incident because it was it was
- 1:01:39vital that the FBI returned back to the way things had been done before Ruby
- 1:01:45Ridge and Waco, and to show that clever, creative patient negotiations. Would
- 1:01:52you know, almost all instances bring us the outcome that we wanted. Thanks
- 1:02:00much, Gary, I just have one last question for you, and I'm
- 1:02:01gonna let you go. So in the Paramount docuse series, and I know
- 1:02:07that TV shows and movies take a lot of liberties with a lot of things,
- 1:02:12but is suggested in the Waco aftermath that after Waco the FBI started taking
- 1:02:23their forces to foreign terrorism. Is that any way true because you're still part
- 1:02:30of the FBI until two thousand and three. Did they start focusing more on
- 1:02:34foreign terrorism after Waco or was there still You just mentioned Montana and that was
- 1:02:38after Waco and there was kind of a domestic terrorist action. But is that
- 1:02:45true? Did they start looking at more foreign terrorism after Waco or was there
- 1:02:51still a concerted effort toward domestic terrorism as well? No, I think the
- 1:02:55FBI did turn towards a deeper concern for intern national terrorism, but the US
- 1:03:02a big outfit. We can walk and chew gum at the same time.
- 1:03:05I think there's people want to say the story, well, everybody dropped what
- 1:03:08they were doing in domestic terrorism and they just started working international now. I
- 1:03:13mean after Waco, you know, many of us throughout the FBI at all
- 1:03:17levels, were remained very concerned about anti government sentiment. We had a siege
- 1:03:24you know, many years before Ruby Richard Waco had in Arkansas with a right
- 1:03:29wing militia across the Sword in the Arm of the Lord. We had dealt
- 1:03:32with anti government folks for quite some time and we were certainly where the threat
- 1:03:37they posed. I think Waco kind of served as as a bit of an
- 1:03:43incentive for those groups to be a little bit more vocal. Sheriff Jack Carwell,
- 1:03:49who was the sheriff of mcleanic County during Waco, I think, said
- 1:03:52it very well that Waco wasn't what caused them to step up the anti government.
- 1:04:00It just became a rationale for doing what they wanted to do. Anyway,
- 1:04:04So this movement had had been around it. I mean he went back
- 1:04:08certainly to Bill Clinton coming in office and later Obama. There you know,
- 1:04:12there's certain you know, Christian identity right wing. Um, you know,
- 1:04:16goofballs. There's no shortage of them in the country. And we still we
- 1:04:20certainly saw him on January sixth, and you know, it's an issue that's
- 1:04:24going to be dealt with for some time in my opinion, but you know,
- 1:04:29um, yeah, so I think, yes, the FI certainly devote
- 1:04:33a lot of resources to what was perceived as really emerging in big threat international
- 1:04:39terrorism, but we didn't stop being concerned about domestic terrorism. Did some resources
- 1:04:45get reallocated? I mean, I don't know budgetarily if one budget was cut
- 1:04:49to enhance another, but I know it in where I worked in the FBI,
- 1:04:54we we never ceased having a concern about the domestic issues. I remember
- 1:04:59Oklahoma said bombing two years after Waco. I was up at the FBI headquarters.
- 1:05:03And this may speak to your question that I remember spoke speaking to the
- 1:05:09number two men in the FBI and he said, you know, this really
- 1:05:12has the earmarks of international terrorism. And I said, no, boss,
- 1:05:15I said, this is the anniversary at Waco. You may not be aware
- 1:05:18of that. I am. It's also Hitler's birthday. I said, this
- 1:05:23is this is going to be homegrown, This is going to be right wing
- 1:05:29anti government stuff, and certainly you know with Timothy McVeigh that was in fact
- 1:05:32the case. Thanks so much for your time here this evening, Gary,
- 1:05:38I really appreciate you. You now is your opportunity to let people know where
- 1:05:42they can purchase your book or anything else you would like to plug. Yeah,
- 1:05:46I mean they certainly go to my website www dot Gary Nessner all one
- 1:05:53word in osnru dot com, you know, with articles I've written and links
- 1:06:01to podcasts and documentaries and so forth. As you mentioned there. Twenty eighteen,
- 1:06:08Paramount did a six part series called Waco, which you know I was
- 1:06:14involved in. I think it's very good. There's things about it that I
- 1:06:16would have liked seeing differently. And then this year, in the last several
- 1:06:20months, Netflix came out with a three part documentary which I think is probably
- 1:06:28the most comprehensive examination of Waco of anything I've seen. There's probably been a
- 1:06:33dozen Waco documentaries through the intervening years, but this one is far and away,
- 1:06:38in my opinion, the most accurate and detailed and informative. And then
- 1:06:45Showtime came out with the second season of the Paramount Show. Again, Paramount
- 1:06:49and Showtime both by a Viacom the their dramatic series. There's a lot of
- 1:06:55liberties taken and there's things that you know, depicts of me by actor Michael
- 1:07:00Shannon, great actor, a great friend. But you know, a lot
- 1:07:03of that stuff is fictionalized. But they're good shows and you can learn some
- 1:07:06things from them. But I think that documentary, I must say, but
- 1:07:10those are really looking for an accurate account of what happened. That's something that
- 1:07:14they should take in. And I hope they enjoyed the dramatic series as well,
- 1:07:17So that's kind of it. Thanks so much, Gary. The links
- 1:07:20to Gary's website will be in the description of this video. For everyone else,
- 1:07:25thanks for watching and listening. Much love to everyone in the chat.
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