Latest / Beyond The Horizon / The United States Governments Brief In Response To Ghislaine Maxwell's Appeal Request (Part 3)
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
- 0:03In this episode, we're going to continue on taking a
- 0:06look at the United States government's brief in response to
- 0:10Glenn Maxwell's attempt to appeal her sentence. One. Maxwell is
- 0:15not entitled to enforce the NPA. As an initial matter,
- 0:19Maxwell has no right to invoke the protections of the NPA.
- 0:23Maxwell was not a signatory of the agreement. While the
- 0:26third party beneficiary doctrine is a tenant of contract law,
- 0:30its application to plea agreements under federal law is a
- 0:34separate question, because plea agreements differ from commercial contracts in
- 0:38meaningful respects United States versus Feldman, nine thirty nine F
- 0:42dot three d one eighty two, one eighty nine, Second Circuit,
- 0:45twenty nineteen. We have long recognized that plea agreements are
- 0:49significantly different from commercial contracts. It's doubtful that a third
- 0:53party beneficiary can enforce a plea agreement. See United States
- 0:57versus Lopez, ninety four F dot two d d thirty three,
- 1:00thirty seven for a Circuit nineteen ninety one, observing that
- 1:04we are unaware of authority supporting application of a third
- 1:08party beneficiary principles to a plea agreement in a criminal case.
- 1:12United States versus Mariama Viju Number fifteen R two forty
- 1:17twenty sixteen, w L one zero seven eight four to
- 1:21one at four nd Texas, January eleventh, twenty sixteen, explaining
- 1:27that the right to enforce a plea deal does not
- 1:29exist for its own sake. Rather, it is a means
- 1:32to achieve fairness in plea bargaining, and enforcement by third
- 1:36parties adds nothing to protecting the defendant's rights. In any event,
- 1:41even under the third party beneficiary law on which Maxwell relies,
- 1:46she would have to show that the original parties intended
- 1:48the agreement to directly benefit her as a third party.
- 1:52United States versus Wilson, two sixteen FT. Three d six
- 1:56forty five six sixty three seven Circuit two thousand, dooming
- 2:00without deciding that third party could enforce immunity agreement. See
- 2:05also United States versus. Florida International Airways Incorporated. Eight fifty
- 2:09three f supp two D twelve oh nine twelve twenty
- 2:13eight SD. Florida, twenty twelve. Third party must show that
- 2:17a direct and primary object of the contracting parties was
- 2:21to confer a benefit on the third party, quoting Bocheese
- 2:25versus Town of ponts Inlet, four h. Five ft. Three d.
- 2:28Nine sixty four nine eighty two eleven Circuit two thousand
- 2:32and five. Here Maxwell has failed to make the requisite
- 2:36showing she is not named in the provision naming four
- 2:39potential co conspirators, and she has offered no evidence that
- 2:42the parties to the NPA intended to confer a benefit
- 2:46on her. Specifically, Accordingly, Maxwell may not enforce the NPA two.
- 2:53The NPA's terms bind only the USAO SDFL. Even if
- 2:58Maxwell had a right to invoke the NBA protections, it
- 3:01would not bar the charges in this case. By its terms,
- 3:04the MPa only applies to prosecutions brought by the USAO SDFL.
- 3:10The agreement was signed on the authority of Alexander Acosta,
- 3:14United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, and
- 3:17in exchange for Epstein's plea in state court, the USAO
- 3:21SDFL agreed to defer prosecution in this district, that is,
- 3:25the Southern District of Florida. The USAO SDFL further promise
- 3:30that no prosecution by the Federal Bureau of the Investigation
- 3:34and the us Attorney's office will be instituted in this district.
- 3:38An agreement by the us AOSDFL not to prosecute Epstein
- 3:43in Southern District of Florida is an agreement intended to
- 3:46apply only to the USAO SDFL and only to the
- 3:51Southern District of Florida. Moreover, the agreement was signed by
- 3:56officials of the USAO SDFL and no other canpuments of
- 4:00the Department of Justice. Accordingly, the plain terms of the
- 4:03NPA may clear that the agreement only binds the USAO SDFL.
- 4:09Maxwell's argument that the NPA binds the USAO SDNY relies
- 4:14on a separate provision of the agreement, which says that
- 4:17the United States also agrees that it will not institute
- 4:21any criminal charges against any potential co conspirators of Epstein,
- 4:25including but not limited to a list of four individuals
- 4:29does not include the defendant. But her argument that the
- 4:32term United States means the entire federal government requires the
- 4:36term to be read in isolation. As Judge Nathan explained,
- 4:41terms like the United States or the government are common
- 4:44shorthand for a single US Attorney's office, and the plea
- 4:47agreement need not painstakingly spell out the Office of the
- 4:51United States Attorney for such and such district in every
- 4:54instance to make clear that it applies only to the
- 4:57district where it was signed two ft three d at
- 5:02one twenty. The mere use of the term government in
- 5:05the plea agreement does not create an affirmative appearance that
- 5:08the agreement contemplated barring districts other than the particular district
- 5:13entering into the agreement. United States versus Gonzales, ninety three
- 5:17f Dot app x two sixty eight two seventy Second Circuit,
- 5:22two thousand and four. Although paragraph twelve b uses the
- 5:25term United States rather than the term government, this is
- 5:29a distinction from our prior case law without difference. Reading
- 5:34the NPA as a whole confirms that conclusion. The very
- 5:38next sentence of the agreement states that the federal grand
- 5:41jury investigation will be suspended. The grand jury investigation is
- 5:46the one that USAOSDFL agreed to defer in the same agreement,
- 5:51and not any potential federal grand jury investigations in other districts. Furthermore,
- 5:57the NPA elsewhere refers to the United States on occasion
- 6:01that could only mean the USAO SDFL. For instance, the
- 6:05NPA commits the United States, that is, the USAO SDFL
- 6:09to providing EPSTEIN with a list of victims A. One
- 6:12seventy seven. The United States shall provide Epstein's attorneys with
- 6:16a list of individuals whom it has identified as victims.
- 6:19Another provision states that the NPA will not be made
- 6:23part of the public record and commits the United States again,
- 6:26the us AOSDFL to providing notice to EPSTEIN if it
- 6:30receives a Freedom of Information Act request requiring disclosure of
- 6:34the agreement A one seventy eight. The mere fact that
- 6:39the co conspirators provision of the NPA use the phrase
- 6:42United States rather than US Attorney's Office is not evidence
- 6:46at the party's intended an unusually broad immunity provision see
- 6:51Kerstang versus John Wiley and Sons, Incorporated, five sixty eight
- 6:55US five nineteen five forty twenty thirteen. We are not aware, however,
- 7:00of any canon interpretation that forbids interpreting different words used
- 7:05in different parts of the same statute to mean roughly
- 7:08the same thing, as Judge Nathan concluded. Given the repeated
- 7:12limitations of the commitments in the NPA to the USAO SDFL,
- 7:17including the commitment not to prosecute Epstein. It's not plausible
- 7:21that the parties intended to drastically expand the agreement's scope
- 7:25in the single sentence on the prosecution of co conspirators
- 7:29without clearly saying so. Maxwell also points to the NPA
- 7:33provision stating that Epstein seeks to resolve globally his state
- 7:37and federal criminal liability. Based on that statement, Maxwell argues
- 7:41that Epstein's purpose in negotiating the NPA was to obtain
- 7:44a global resolution that would, among other things, provide maximum
- 7:48protection for any alleged co conspirators. But the cited provision
- 7:53only says that Epstein sought to resolve his liability, not
- 7:57anyone else's. Furthermore, under Maxwell's reading, Epstein bargained for a
- 8:01truly global resolution only for his co conspirators and limited
- 8:05his own global resolution expressly to the USAO SDFL. There
- 8:10is no reason to believe that Epstein expressly sought and
- 8:14obtained broader immunity for his co conspirators than he did
- 8:17for himself. Lacking any support in the text of the
- 8:21NPA itself, Maxwell attempts to show the NPA applies here
- 8:25based on the negotiations between defendant and Prosecutor Russo eight
- 8:29oh one f. Dot two d At six twenty six.
- 8:32In particular, Maxwell claims that the negotiating history of the
- 8:36NPA shows that senior levels of Main Justice were directly
- 8:40involved in the negotiation and approval of the NPA, even
- 8:44to the extent that the separate presentations were made to
- 8:47and approval of the NPA was obtained from the office
- 8:51of the Deputy Attorney General. This assertion, however, mischaracterizes the
- 8:55record and further underscores the absence of any senior approvals
- 9:00negotiating the NPA. The pages to which Maxwell cites described
- 9:04activities after the NPA was signed in which Justice Department
- 9:08officials in Washington refused to believe Epstein of his obligations
- 9:12under the NPA. The OPR report reflects that the obfice
- 9:16of the Deputy Attorney General reviewed the NPA, but only
- 9:19after it was signed, when Epstein tried to get out
- 9:22of it. Even then, however, those officials did not approve
- 9:25the NPA, statement by the Assistant Attorney General that she
- 9:29did not review approved the agreement either before or after
- 9:32it was signed. The Department, however, only reviewed the issue
- 9:36of federal jurisdiction and never reviewed the NPA or any
- 9:39specific provisions. Maxwell also cobbles together instances in which the
- 9:44USAO SDFL and the FBI in Florida enlisted the assistance
- 9:49of other components of the federal government or considered acting
- 9:53outside of Florida, such as the USAO sdfl's contact with
- 9:57witnesses in New York. These disparate and unconnected events do
- 10:02not show the USAO SDFL acted on behalf of the
- 10:05entire federal government when entering into the NPA, or that
- 10:09Epstein understood the USAO SDFL to be doing so. Maxwell
- 10:15also advances several arguments attempting to minimize or sidestep the
- 10:19court's precedent. For example, Maxwell argues that ANNABY applies only
- 10:23if the charges in the indictment are sufficiently distinct from
- 10:27the counts resolved by the earlier agreement, not so. The
- 10:31irrelevant portions of a NABBY concerned an argument by the
- 10:34defendants that, in seeking to have a plea agreement in
- 10:37the Eastern District of New York bar the pending charges
- 10:40in the Southern District of New York, they were seeking
- 10:43only the same protection accorded by the double jeopardy clause
- 10:47seven seventy one Ft. Two d At six seventy two.
- 10:50This Court rejected that argument, reasoning that even if the
- 10:54double jeopardy clause applied notwithstanding to the defendants that were
- 10:58never in jeopardy on these charges in the Eastern District,
- 11:02the defendants would not be entitled to relief because the
- 11:04pending charges extended for an additional two years and thus
- 11:08were not the same charges that were dismissed. Thus, Annaby
- 11:12did not hold that its rule that a plea agreement
- 11:15binds only the office of the United States Attorney for
- 11:18the district in which the plea is entered, unless it
- 11:20affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader restriction applies
- 11:25only if the charges are sufficiently distinct, and, as Judge
- 11:29Nathan recognized, no subsequent Second Circuit case applying an abbe
- 11:34has so held. Next, Maxwell argues that this court should
- 11:38disregard its own precedents and instead apply Eleventh Circuit law
- 11:42because the NPA was negotiated in Florida with Southern District
- 11:45of Florida prosecutors in exchange for Epstein's agreement to plead
- 11:49guilty in Florida State Court, but this court has consistently
- 11:52applied an abbe even when considering plea agreements from out
- 11:56of district districts. Prisco three ninety one at nine twenty
- 12:00one District of New Jersey, United States versus Asheroff three
- 12:04twenty twenty six twenty eight, Second Circuit, two thousand and nine,
- 12:09Eastern District of Virginia, Gonzales ninety three f. Appendix at
- 12:13two seventy District of New Mexico, United States versus Brown
- 12:17Number ninety nine, twelve thirty L two thousand and two
- 12:20WL three four two four four nine nine four at two,
- 12:24Second Circuit, two thousand and four, Southern District, Florida. These
- 12:27decisions are consistent with choice of law principles in criminal cases,
- 12:32where the governing law is always that of the forum
- 12:35state in the forum court has jurisdiction. American Conflicts Law
- 12:39three seventy five, fifth Edition, twenty twenty one. See two
- 12:42Attorney client privilege in the United States, Section twelve ten.
- 12:46Choice of law scholars have long recognized that criminal law
- 12:49local in nature, and it's settled that in criminal prosecutions,
- 12:53the court will routinely apply the substantiative law of the
- 12:57Forum American Conflicts Law three ninety In any event, eleven
- 13:02Circuit law would not support Maxwell's claim. Maxwell does not
- 13:05cite any Eleven Circuit decisions addressing when one U s
- 13:09Attorney's office is bound by a plea agreement with another
- 13:12US attorney's office, but in context, the Eleventh Circuit held
- 13:16that a US attorney's promise made in a plea agreement
- 13:19that a criminal defendant would not be deported was unenforceable
- 13:22because the US attorney lacked authority to make that promise.
- 13:26San Pedro VERSUS United States seventy nine FD ten sixty
- 13:30five ten seventy two Eleven Circuit nineteen ninety six. In
- 13:34the Eleventh Circuit were to apply the reasoning of san
- 13:37Pedro to the issue in this case, it would likely
- 13:39reach the same result because US attorneys only has authority
- 13:43to act within his district US Code twenty eight, section
- 13:47five forty seven, and must seek the approval of each
- 13:51affected US Attorney's office before entering into any non prosecution
- 13:54agreement that purports to bind another district See Justice Manual
- 13:58Section nine twenty seven six forty one. No district or
- 14:02division shall make any agreement, including any agreement not to prosecute,
- 14:07which purports to bind any other district or division, without
- 14:11the approval of the United States Attorneys in each affected
- 14:14district and or the appropriate Assistant Attorney General. Finally, Maxwell
- 14:19devotes much of her brief to criticizing an abby. But
- 14:23this Court's rule is sound, as it ensures that a
- 14:26criminal defendant or even as here a co conspirator, will
- 14:29not receive the windfall of immunity that was never intended
- 14:32by the parties to the original agreement, while leaving parties
- 14:36free to enter into legitimate multi district resolutions if they wish.
- 14:41Nor has Maxwell's parade of horribles come to pass in
- 14:45the decades since an ABBI was decided. Furthermore, the same
- 14:48rule has long been applied in the Seventh Circuit see
- 14:51Thompson versus United States four point thirty one, Appendix four
- 14:54ninety one, four ninety three seven Circuit twenty eleven, United
- 14:58States versus. Rourke, seventy four ft three D eight oh
- 15:02two eight oh seven and dot five seven Circuit nineteen
- 15:05ninety six. In any event, this Court need not engage
- 15:09in a point by a point analysis of the merits
- 15:11of an abby because it remains binding precedent see United
- 15:15States versus Wilkerson, three sixty one f. Dot three D
- 15:19seven seventeen seven thirty two, Second Circuit, two thousand and four. Thus,
- 15:24Epstein's NPA with the USAO SDFL does not bar this
- 15:29prosecution of Maxwell, and Judge Nathan correctly denied the motions
- 15:33to dismiss. All right, we're going to wrap up right here,
- 15:36and then the next episode we'll pick up where we
- 15:38left off, and that's with the District Court did not
- 15:41abuse its discretion in declining to conduct a hearing. All
- 15:46of the information that goes with this episode can be
- 15:49found in the description box.