Latest / Logic Library / 01 - Apology of Socrates - Plato
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- Apology by Plato Part one. How you, o Athenians have been affected by my accusers, I cannot tell, but I know that they almost made me forget who I was. So persuasively did they speak, And yet they have hardly uttered a word of truth. But of the many falsehoods told by them, there was one which quite amazed me. I mean, when they said that you should be upon your guard and not allow yourselves to be deceived by the force of my eloquence. To say this when they are certain to be detected as soon as I opened my lips and proved myself to be anything but a great speaker, did indeed appear to me most shameless, unless by the force of eloquence they mean the force of truth. For if such is their meaning, I admit that I am eloquent, But in how different a way from theirs. Well as I was saying, they have scarcely spoken the truth at all. But from me you shall hear the whole truth, not however, delivered after their manner and a set oration duly ornamented with words and phrases. No, by Heaven, but I shall use the words and arguments which occur to me at the moment, for I am confident in the justice of my cause, or I am certain that I am right in taking this course. At my time of life, I ought not to be appearing before you, o men of Athens, in the character of a juvenile orator. Let no one expected of me, and I must beg of you to grant me a favor. If I defend myself in my accustomed manner, and you hear me using the words which I have been in the habit of using in the aggarrel, at the tables of the money changes, or anywhere else, I would ask you not to be surprised and not to interrupt me on this account, for I am more than seventy years of age, and appearing now for the first time in the court of law. I am quite a stranger to the language of the place. And therefore I would have you regard me as if I were really a stranger, whom you would excuse if he spoke in his native tongue and after the fashion of his country. Am I making an unfair request of you. Never mind the manner which may or may not be good, but think only of the truth of my words, and give heed to that. Let the speaker speak truly, and the judge decide justly. And first I have to reply to the older charges and to my first accusers, and then I will go on to the latter ones. For of old I have had many accusers who have accused me falsely to you during many years, and I am more afraid of them than of Anaetis and his associates, who are dangerous too in their own way. But far more dangerous are the others who began when you were children and took possession of your minds with their falsehoods. Telling of one Socrates, a wise man who speculated about the heaven above, and searched into the earth beneath, and made the worse appear the better cause. The disseminators of this tale are the accusers whom I dread, for their hearers are apt to fancy that such enquirers do not believe in the existence of the gods. And they are many, and their charges against me are of ancient date, and they were made by them in the day when you were more impressible than you are now, in childhood, or it may have been in youth. And the cause, when heard went by default, for there was none to answer, and hardest of all, I do not know and cannot tell the names of my accusers, unless, in the chance case of a comic poet, all who from envy and malice have persuaded you, some of them having first convinced themselves. All this class of men are most difficult to deal with, for I cannot have them up here and cross examine them. And therefore I must simply fight with shadows in my own defense and argue. When there is no one who answers. I will ask you then to assume with me as I was saying, that my opponents are of two kinds, one recent, the other ancient, and I hope that you will see the propriety of my answering the latter first, for these accusations you heard long before the others, and much oftener. Well, then I must make my defense and endeavor to clear away in a short time a slander which has lasted a long time. May I succeed, if to succeed be for my good and yours, or likely to avail me in my cause. The task is not an easy one. I quite understand the nature of it, and so leaving the event with God in obedience to the law. I will now make my defense. I will begin at the beginning and ask, what is the accusation which has given rise to the slander of me, and in fact has encouraged meleitest to prove roof this charge against me. Well, what do the slanderers say? They shall be my prosecutors, and I will sum up their words in an affidavit. Socrates is an evil duel an, a curious person who searches into things under the earth and in heaven, and he makes the worse appear the better cause, and he teaches the aforesaid doctrines to others. Such is the nature of the accusation. It is just what you have yourselves seen in the comedy of Aristophanes, who has introduced a man, he calls Socrates going about and saying that he walks in air and talking a deal of nonsense concerning matters of which I do not pretend to know either much or little. Not that I mean to speak disparagingly of anyone who is a student of natural philosophy. I should be very sorry if Melidus could bring so grave a charge against me. But the simple truth is, o Athenians, that I have nothing to do with physical speculations. Very many of those here present are witnesses to the truth of this, and to them I appeal. Speak, then, you who have heard me, and tell your neighbors, whether any of you have ever known me. Hold forth, in few words or in many, upon such matters. You hear their answer, and from what they say of this part of the charge, you will be able to judge of the truth of the rest. As little foundation is there for the report that I am a teacher and take money. This accusation has no more truth in it than the other. Although if a man were really able to instruct mankind to receive money for giving instruction, would, in my opinion, be an honor to him. There is Gorgeus of Leondium, and Prodecus of Seos, and Hippeus of Elis, who go the round of the cities and are able to persuade the young men to leave their own citizens by whom they might be taught for nothing, and come to them whom they not only pay, but are thankful if they may be allowed to pay them. There is at this time a Parian philosopher residing in Athens, of whom I have heard, and I came to hear of him. In this way, I came across a man who has spent a world of money on the sophists, Caius, the son of Hipponicus, And knowing that he had sons, I asked him, Carrius, I said, if your two sons were fowls or calves, there would be no difficulty in finding someone to put over them. We should hire a trainer of horses, or a farmer, probably, who would improve and perfect them in their own proper virtue and excellence. But as they are human beings, whom are you thinking of placing over them? Is there any one who understands human and political virtue? You must have thought about the matter, for you have sons. Is there any one there is? He said? Who is? He said I? And of what country? And what does he charge? Even a stoparian? He replied, He is the man and his charge is five mini? Happy is evenus? I said to myself, If he really has this wisdom and teaches at such a moderate charge, had I the same, I should have been very proud and conceited. But the truth is that I have no knowledge of the kind. I dare say Athenians, that some one among you will reply, yes, Socrates, but what is the origin of these accusations which are brought against you? There must have been something strange which you have been doing. All these rumors and this talk about you would never have arisen if you had been like other men. Tell us, then, what is the cause of them? For we should be sorry to judge hastily of you. Now I regard this as a fair challenge, and I will endeavor to explain to you the reason why I am called wise and have such an evil fame. Please to attend them. But although some of you may think that I am joking, I declare that I will tell you the entire truth. Men of Athens, This reputation of mine has come from a certain sort of wisdom which I possess. If you ask me what kind of wisdom, I reply, wisdom such as may perhaps be attained by man. For to that extent I am inclined to believe that I am wise, whereas the persons of whom I was speaking have a superhuman wisdom which I may fail to describe, because I have it not myself. And he who says that I have speaks falsely and is taking away my character. And here o men of Athens. I must beg you not to interrupt me, even if I seem to say something extravagant, for the word which I will speak is not mine. I will refer you to a witness who is worthy of credit. That witness shall be the God of Delphi. He will tell you about my wisdom if I have any, and of what sort it is. You must have known Chirophon. He was early a friend of mine and also a friend of yours, for he shared in the recent exile of the people and returned with you. Well. Charaphon, as you know, was very impetuous in all his doings, and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell him whether, as I was saying, I must beg you not to interrupt. He asked the oracle to tell him whether any one was wiser than I was, and the Pithian prophetess answered that there was no man wiser. Charaphon is dead himself, but his brother, who is in court, will confirm the truth of what I am saying. Why do I mention this because I am going to explain to you why I have such an evil name. When I heard the answer, I said to myself. What the God mean and what is the interpretation of his riddle? For I know that I have no wisdom, small or great? What then can he mean when he says that I am the wisest of men, and yet he is a god cannot lie that would be against his nature. After long consideration, I thought of a method of trying the question. I reflected that if I could only find a man wiser than myself, then I might go to the God with a refutation in my hand. I should say to him, here is a man who is wiser than I am, But you said that I was the wisest. Accordingly, I went to one who had the reputation of wisdom and observed him. His name I need not mention. He was a politician whom I selected for examination, and the result was as follows. When I began to talk with him, I could not help thinking that he was not really wise, although he was thought wise by many, and still wiser by himself. And thereupon I tried to explain to him that he thought himself wise but was not really wise. And the consequence was that he hated me, and his enmity was shared by several who were present, and heard me. So I left him, saying to myself as I went away, well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really beautiful and good, I am better off than he is, for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows. I neither know nor think that I know. In the latter particular. Then I seemed to have slightly the advantage of him. Then I went to another who had still higher pretensions to wisdom, and my conclusion was exactly the same. Whereupon I made another enemy of him, and of many others beside him. Then I went to one man after another, being not unconscious of the enmity which I provoked. And I lamented and feared this, But necessity was laid upon me. The word of God, I thought, ought to be considered first, And I said to myself, go, I must to all who appeared to know and find out the meaning of the oracle. And I swear to you Athenians, by the dog I swear, for I must tell you the truth. The result of my mission was just this. I found that the men most in repute were all but the most foolish, and that others less esteemed were really wiser and better I will tell you the tale of my wanderings and of the herculean labors, as I may call them, which I endured, only to find at last the oracle irrefutable. After the politicians, I went to the poets, tragic, dithyrambic and all sorts, and there I said to myself, you will be instantly detected. Now you will find out that you are more ignorant than they are. Accordingly, I took them some of the most elaborate passages in their own writings and asked what was the meaning of them, thinking that they would teach me something? Will you believe me? I am almost ashamed to confess the truth, but I must say that there is hardly a person present who would not have talked better about their poetry than they did themselves. Then I knew that not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration. They are like diviners and soothsayers, who also say many fine things, but do not understand the meaning of them. The poets appeared to me to be much in the same case. And I further observed that, upon the strength of their poetry, they believed themselves to be the wisest of men in other things in which they were not wise. So I departed, conceiving myself to be superior to them, for the same reason that I was superior to the politicians. At last I went to the artisans. I was conscious that I knew nothing at all, as I may say that I was sure that they knew many fine things. And here I was not mistaken, for they did know many things of which I was ignorant, and in this they certainly were wiser than I was. But I observed that even the good artisans fell into the same error as the poets. Because they were good workmen, they thought that they also knew all sorts of high matters, and this defect in them overshadowed their wisdom. And therefore I asked myself on behalf of the oracle, whether I would like to be as I was, neither having their knowledge nor their ignorance, or like them in both. And I made answer to myself and to the Oracle that I was better off as I was. This inquisition has led to my having many enemies of the worst and most dangerous kind, and has given occasion also to many calumnies. And I am called wise for my hearers always imagined that I myself possessed the wisdom which I find wanting in other's. But the truth is, oh Men of Athens, that God only is wise. And by his answer he intends to show that the wisdom of men is worth little or nothing. He is not speaking of Socrates. He is only using my name by way of illustration, as if he said he, O, Men is the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing. And so I go about the world, obedient to the God, and search and make inquiry into the wisdom of anyone, whether citizen or stranger, who appears to be wise. And if he is not wise, then, in vindication of the oracle, I show him that he is not wise. And my occupation quite absorbs me, and I have no time to give either to any public matter of interest, or to any concern of my own. But I am in utter poverty by reason of my devotion to the God. There is another thing. Young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come about me of their own accord. They like to hear the pretenders examined, and they often imitate me and proceed to examine others. There are plenty of persons, as they quickly discover, who think that they know something, but really know little or nothing. And then those who are examined by them, instead of being angry with themselves, are angry with me. This confounded Socrates. They say, this villainous misleader of youth. And then if somebody ask them, why what evil does he practice or teach? They do not know and cannot tell. But in order that they may not appear to be a loss, they repeat the ready made charges which are used against all philosophers, about teaching things up in the clouds and under the earth, and having no gods, and making the worse appear the better cause, for they do not like to confess that their pretense of knowledge has been detected, which is the truth. And as they are numerous, and ambitious and energetic, and are drawn up in battle array, and have persuasive tongues, they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate calumny. And this is the reason why my three accusers, Melitus and Anneitis and Lycan have set upon me. Melitus, who has a quarra with me on behalf of the poets annitas On behalf of the craftsmen and politicians, lichan On behalf of the rhetoricicians. And as I said at the beginning, I cannot expect to get rid of such a mass of calumny all in a moment. And this, o Men of Athens, is the truth and the whole truth. I have concealed nothing, I have dissembled nothing. And yet I know that my plainness of speech makes them hate me. And what is their hatred but a proof that I am speaking the truth. Hence has arisen the prejudice against me, and this is the reason for it. As you will find out, either in this or in any future inquiry. I have said enough in my defense against the first class of my accusers. I turn to the second class. They are headed by Melitus, that good man and true lover of his country. As he calls himself against these two, I must try to make a defense. But there thereafter, David be read. It contains something of this kind. It says that Socrates is a doer of evil, who corrupts the youth, and who does not believe in the gods of the state, but has other new divinities of his own. Such is the charge, and now let us examine the particular counts. He says that I am a doer of evil and corrupt the youth. But I say, o, men of Athens, that Melitus is a doer of evil in that he pretends to be in earnest when he is only in jest, and is so eager to bring men to try from a pretended zeal an interest about matters in which he really never had the smallest interest. And the truth of this I will endeavor to prove to you. Come hither, Melitus, and let me ask a question of you. You think a great deal about the improvement of youth? Yes, I do. Or tell the judges then, who is their improver? For you must know, as you have taken the pains to discover the corrupter, and are citing and accusing me before them. Speak then, and tell the judges who their improver is. Observe Melitus that you are silent and have nothing to say. But is not this rather disgraceful and a very considerable proof of what I was saying, that you have no interest in the matter. Speak up, friend, and tell us who their improver is. The laws, But that my good sir, is not my meaning. I want to know who the person is who, in the first place knows the laws? The judges, Socrates, who are present in court. What do you mean to say, Melitus, that they are able to instruct an im? I prove, youth, certainly they are what all of them? Or some only not others? All of them? By the Goddess Harry, that is good news. There are plenty of improvers, then, And what do you say of the audience. Do they improve them? Yes? They do? And the senators, Yes, the senators improve them. But perhaps the members of the assembly corrupt them? Or do they too improve them? They improve them? Then every Athenian improves and elevates them all with the exception of myself, and I alone am their corruptor. Is that what you affirm? That is what I stoutly affirm. I am very unfortunate if you are right. But suppose I ask you a question, how about horses? Does one man do them harm and all the world good? Is not the exact opposite the truth? One man is able to do them good, or at least not many. The trainer of horses, that is to say, does them good? And others who have to do with them rather injure them. Is that not true, Melitus, of horses or of any other animals? Most assuredly, it is whether you and a knight to say yes or no. Happy indeed, would be the condition of youth if they had one corruptor, only than all the rest of the world were their improvers. But you, Melitas, have sufficiently shown that you never had a thought about the young. Your carelessness is seen in your not caring about the very things which you bring against me. And now, Melitus, I will ask you another question. By zeus, I will which is better to live among bad citizens or among good ones? And a friend, I say, the question is one which may be easily answered. Do not the good do their neighbors good? And the bad do them evil? Certainly? And is there anyone who would rather be injured than benefited by those who live with them? Answer, my good friend, the law requires you to answer, does anyone like to be injured? Certainly? Not? And when you accuse me of corrupting and deteriorating the youth, do you allege that I corrupt them intentionally or unintentionally? Intentionally? I say, but you have just admitted that the good do their neighbors good? And the evil do them evil? Now is that a truth which your superior wisdom is recognized thus early in life? And am I, at my age in such darkness and ignorance as not to know that if a man with whom I have to live is corrupted by me, I am very likely to be harmed by him. And yet I corrupt him, and intentionally too. You say, although neither I nor any other human being is ever likely to be convinced by you. But either I do not corrupt them, or I corrupt them unintentionally, And on either view of the case, you lie. If my offense is unintentional, the law has no cognizance of unintentional offenses. You ought to have taken me privately and warned and admonished me, for if I had been better advised, I should have left off doing what I only did unintentionally, No doubt I should. But you would have nothing to say to me, and refused to teach me. And now you bring me up in this court, which is a place not of instruction but of punishment. It will be very clear to you Athenians, as I was saying that Melitas has no care at all, great or small about the matter. But still I should like to know, Melitus, in what I am affirmed to corrupt the young? I suppose you mean, as I infer from your indictment, that I teach them not to acknowledge the gods which the state acknowledges, but some other new divinities or spiritual agencies in their stead. These are the lessons by which I corrupt the youth. As you say, yes, that I say emphatically, then by the gods, Meleitus, of whom we are speaking, tell me and the court in somewhat plainer terms, what you mean. For I do not as yet understand whether you affirm that I teach other men to acknowledge some gods, and therefore that I do believe in gods, or am not an entire atheist. This you do not lay to my charge. But only you say that they are not the same gods which the city recognizes. The charge is that they are different gods? Or do you mean that I am an atheist simply and a teacher of atheism? I mean the latter, that you are a complete atheist. What an extraordinary statement. Why do you think so, Belitis? Do you mean that I do not believe in the godhead of the Sun or moon, like other men. I assure you, judges that he does not, for he says that the sun is stone in the moon earth. Friend, Melitus, you think that you are accusing Anaxagoras when you have but a bad opinion of the judges. If you fancy them illiterate to such a degree, is not to know that these doctrines are found in the books of Anaxagoras the Clasomanian, which are full of them. And so forsooth the youth are said to be taught them by Socrates, when there are not unfrequently exhibitions of them at the theater, and they might pay their money and laugh at Socrates if he pretends to father these extraordinary views. And so, Melitus, you really think that I do not believe in any god. I swear by Zeus that you believe absolutely and none at all. Nobody will believe you, Melitus, And I am pretty sure that you do not believe yourself. I cannot help thinking men of Athens that Melitas is reckless and impudent, and that he has written this indictment in a spirit of mere wantonness and youthful bravado. Has he not compounded a riddle. Thinking to try me, he said to him, I shall see whether the wide Socrates will discover my facetious contradiction, or whether I shall be able to deceive him in the rest of them. For he certainly does appear to me to contradict himself in the indictment, as much as if he said that Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods, and yet of believing in them. But this is not like the person who is in earnest. I should like you, o, men of Athens, to join me in examining what I conceive to be his inconsistency. And do you, Melitus answer? And I must remind the audience of my request that they would not make a disturbance if I speak in my accustomed manner. Did ever man, Melitus believe in the existence of human beings and not of human things? I wish Men of Athens, that he would answer and not be always trying to get up an interruption. Did ever any man believe in horsemanship and not in horses, in flute playing and not in flute players. No, my friend, I will answer to you and to the court as you refuse to answer, for yourself. There is no man who ever did. But now please to answer the next question. Can a man believe in spiritual and divine agencies and not in spirits or demigods? Me cannot, how lucky I am to have extracted that answer by the assistance of the court. But then you swear in the indictment that I teach and believe in divine or spiritual agencies, new or old, no matter, for that at any rate, I believe in spiritual rual agencies, so you say and swear in the affidavit. And yet, if I believe in divine beings, how can I help believing in spirits or demigods? Must I not? To be sure? I must, And therefore I may assume that your silence gives consent. Now, what are spirits or demigods? Are they not either gods or the sons of gods? Certainly they are. But this is what I call the facetious riddle invented by you. The demigods or spirits are gods. And you say first that I do not believe in gods, and then again that I do believe in gods, that is if I believe in demigods. For if the demigods are the illegitimate sons of gods, whether by the nymphs or by any other mothers of whom they are said to be the sons. What human being will ever believe that there are no gods? If they are the sons of gods, You might as well affirm the existence of mules and deny that of horses and asses. Such nonsense, Melitus could only have been intended by you to make trial of me. You have put this into the indictment because you had nothing real of which to accuse me. But no one who has a particle of understanding will ever be convinced by you that the same men can believe in divine and superhuman beings and yet not believe that there are gods and demigods and heroes. I have said enough in answer to the charge of Melitus, and the elaborate defense is unnecessary. But I know only too well how many are the enmities which I have incurred. Then this is what will be my destruction if I am destroyed. Not malitis, not yet, and i'd but the envy and distraction of the world, which has been the death of many good men, and will probably be the death of many more, there is no danger of my being the last of them. Someone will say, and are you not ashamed, Socrates of a course of life which is likely to bring you to an untimely end? To him, I may fairly answer, there you are mistaken. A man who is good for anything ought not to calculate the chance of living or dying. He ought only to consider whether in doing anything he is doing right or wrong, acting the part of a good man or of a bad Whereas, upon your view, the heroes who fell at Troy were not good for much, and the son of thirties above all, who altogether despised danger in comparison with disgrace. When he was eager to slay Hector, his goddess Mother said to him that if he avenged his companion Patroclus and slew Hector, he would die himself. Fate, she said, in these or the like words, waits for you next after Hector. He received this warning utterly despised danger and death, and instead of fearing them, feared rather to live in dishonor than not to avenge his friend. Let me die forthwith, he replies, and be avenged of my enemy, rather than abide here by the beaked ships, a laughing stock, and a burden of the earth. Had Achilles any thought of death and danger? For wherever a man's place is, whether the place which he has chosen or that in which he has been placed by a commander, there he ought to remain in the eye of danger, he should not think of death, or of anything but of disgrace. And this, O, Men of Athens, is a true saying. Strange indeed would be my conduct, O, Men of Athens, If I, who, when I was ordered by the generals whom you chose to command me at Potidea and Amphipolis and Delium, remained where they placed me like any other man facing death. If now, when as I conceive and imagine, God orders me to fulfill the philosopher's mission of searching into himself and other men, I were to desert my post through fear of death or any other fear, that would indeed be strange, and I might be justly arraigned in court for denying the existence of the gods. If I disobeyed the oracle because I was afraid of death, fancying that I was wise when I was not wise. For the fear of death is indeed the pretense of wisdom, and not real wisdom, being a pretense of knowing the unknown. And no one knows whether death, which men in their fear apprehend to be the greatest evil, may not be the greatest good. Is not this ignorance of a disgraceful sort, the ignorance which is the conceit that a man knows what he does not know. And in this respect only I believe myself to differ from men in general, and may perhaps claim to be wiser than they are. Whereas I know but little of the world below. I do not suppose that I know. But I do know that injustice and disobedience to a better, whether God or man, is evil and dishonorable. And I will never fear or avoid a possible good rather than a certain evil. And therefore, if you let me go now and are not convinced by anaidis who said that since I have been prosecuted, I must be put to death, or if not, that I ought never to have been prosecuted at all, and that if I escape now, your sons will all be utterly ruined by listening to my words. If you say to me, Socrates, this time we will not mind Anidis, and you shall be let off, but upon one condition that you are not to inquire and speculate in this way anymore, and that if you are caught doing so again, you shall die. If this was the condition on which you let me go, I should reply, Men of Athens, I honor and love you, but I shall obey God rather than you. And while I have life and strength, I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of philosophy, exhorting anyone whom I meet, and saying to him after my manner, you, my friend, a citizen of the great and mighty and wise city of Athens, are you not ashamed of heaping up the greatest amount of money and honor and reputation, and caring so little about wisdom and truth and the greatest improvement of the soul, which you never regard or heed at all. And if the person with whom I am arguing says, yes, but I do care, then I do not leave him or let him go at once. But I proceed to interrogate and examined and cross examine him. And if I think that he has no virtue in him, but only says that he has, I reproach him with undervaluing the greater and overvaluing the less. And I shall repeat eat the same words to every one whom I meet, young and old, citizen and alien, but especially to the citizens, inasmuch as they are my brethren. For know that this is the command of God. Then I believe that no greater good has ever happened in the state than my service to the God. For I do nothing but go about persuading you, all old and young alike, not to take thought for your persons or your properties, but first and chiefly, to care about the greatest improvement of the soul. I tell you that virtue is not given by money, but that from virtue comes money and every other good of man, public as well as private. This is my teaching. And if this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth, I am a mischievous person. But if any one says that this is not my teaching, he is speaking an untruth. Wherefore, o, men of Athens, I say to you, do as Anitis bids, or not as Anitis bids, and either acquit me or not. But whichever you do, understand that I shall never alter my ways, not even if I have to die many times. End of Part one,