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Bloody Beaches The Marines at Peleliu - Gordon D. Gayle · My Life on the Plains

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  Speaker 1: Chapter one of Bloody Beaches the Marines at Pelelu. This
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  Speaker 1: is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the
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  Speaker 1: public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit
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  Speaker 1: LibriVox dot org. Bloody Beaches the Marines at Pelelu by
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  Speaker 1: Gordon D.
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  Speaker 2: Gale.
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  Speaker 1: On d Day, fifteen September nineteen forty four, five infantry
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  Speaker 1: battalions of the first Marine Division's first, fifth, and seventh
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  Speaker 1: Marines in Amphibian tractors LVTs lumbered across six to eight
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  Speaker 1: hundred yards of coral reef fringing smoking reportedly smashed Peleliu
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  Speaker 1: in the Palaw Island Group and toward five selected landing beaches.
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  Speaker 1: That westward anchor of the one thousand mile long Caroline
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  Speaker 1: Archipelago was viewed by some US planners as obstacles or
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  Speaker 1: threats to continued advances against Japan's Pacific Empire. The Marines
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  Speaker 1: in the LVTs had been told that their commanding general, Major.
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  Speaker 2: General William H.
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  Speaker 1: Ruperts, believed that the operation would be tough but quick,
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  Speaker 1: in large part because of the devastating quantity and quality
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  Speaker 1: of naval gunfire and dive bombing scheduled to precede their
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  Speaker 1: assault landing on some mines were the grim images of
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  Speaker 1: their sister Second Marine Division's bloody assault across the reefs
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  Speaker 1: at Tarawa many months earlier. But First Division marines, peering
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  Speaker 1: over the gunwales of their landing craft saw an awesome
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  Speaker 1: scene of blasting and churning earth along the shore. Smoke, dust,
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  Speaker 1: and the geysers caused by exploding bombs in large caliber
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  Speaker 1: naval shells gave optimists some hope that the defenders would
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  Speaker 1: become casualties from such preparatory fires. At worst, they would
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  Speaker 1: be too stunned to respond quickly and effectively to the
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  Speaker 1: hundreds of on rushing marines about to land in their
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  Speaker 1: midst Just ahead of the first wave of troops carrying
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  Speaker 1: LVTs was a wave of armored Amphibian tractors lvtas mounting
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  Speaker 1: seventy five millimeter howitzers. They were tasked to take under
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  Speaker 1: fire any surviving strong points or weapons which appeared at
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  Speaker 1: the beach As the following troops landed, and just ahead
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  Speaker 1: of the armored tractors, as the naval gunfire lifted toward
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  Speaker 1: deeper targets, flew a line of U s Navy fighter
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  Speaker 1: aircraft strafing north and south along the length of the
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  Speaker 1: beach defenses parallel to the assault waves, trying to keep
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  Speaker 1: all beach defenders subdued and intimidated as the Marines closed
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  Speaker 1: the defenses. Meanwhile, to blind enemy observation and limit Japanese
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  Speaker 1: fire upon the landing waves, naval gunfire was shifted to
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  Speaker 1: the hill mass of northeast of the landing beaches. The
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  Speaker 1: massif later to be called Umerbrogo Pocket, was the first
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  Speaker 1: of two deadly imponderables as yet unknown to the division
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  Speaker 1: commander and his planners. Although General Rupertus had been on
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  Speaker 1: temporary duty in Washington during most of his divisions planning
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  Speaker 1: for the Pelulu landing, he had been well briefed for
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  Speaker 1: the operation. The first imponderable involved the real character of Umerbrogel,
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  Speaker 1: which aerial photos indicated as a rather gently rounded north
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  Speaker 1: south hill commanding the landing beaches some two thousand to
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  Speaker 1: four thousand yards distant. Viewed in these early photos, the
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  Speaker 1: elevated terrain appeared clothed in jungle scrub, which was almost
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  Speaker 1: entirely removed by the preparatory bombardment and then subsequent heavy
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  Speaker 1: artillery fire directed at it. Instead of a gently rounded hill,
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  Speaker 1: the Umerbrogel area was in fact a complex system of
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  Speaker 1: sharply uplifted coral ridges, knobs, valleys, and sinkholes.
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  Speaker 2: It rose above the level.
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  Speaker 1: Remainder of the island from fifty to three hundred feet
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  Speaker 1: and provided excellent emplacements.
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  Speaker 2: For cave and tunnel defenses.
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  Speaker 1: The Japanese had made the most of what this terrain
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  Speaker 1: provided during their extensive period of occupation and defensive preparations.
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  Speaker 1: The second imponderable facing the Marines was the plan developed
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  Speaker 1: by Colonel Coneo Nakagawa, the officer who was to command
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  Speaker 1: the force on Pelelu, and his superior, Lieutenant General sade
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  Speaker 1: In Away back on corr Their concept of defense had
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  Speaker 1: changed considerably from that which was experienced by General Rupertus
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  Speaker 1: at Guadalcanal in Cape Gloucester, and in fact negated his
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  Speaker 1: concept of a tough but quick campaign.
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  Speaker 2: Instead of relying upon.
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  Speaker 1: A presumed moral superiority to defeat the attackers at the
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  Speaker 1: beach and then to use Bushido's spirit and Banzai tactics
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  Speaker 1: to throw any survivors back into the sea, Pelulu's defenders
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  Speaker 1: would delay the attacking Marines as long as they could
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  Speaker 1: attempting to bleed them as heavily as possible, rather than
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  Speaker 1: depending upon spiritual superiority. They would combine the devilish terrain
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  Speaker 1: with the stubborn discipline Japanese soldiers to relinquish Pelelu at
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  Speaker 1: the highest cost to the invaders. This unpleasant surprise for
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  Speaker 1: the Marines marked a new and important adjustment to the
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  Speaker 1: Japanese tactics which were employed earlier in the life.
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  Speaker 2: Little or nothing during the.
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  Speaker 1: Trip into the beaches and the touchdown revealed the character
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  Speaker 1: of the revised Japanese tactical plan. To the five marine
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  Speaker 1: assault battalions. Bouncing across almost half a mile of coral
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  Speaker 1: fronting the landing beaches White one and two, Orange one,
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  Speaker 1: two and three, the tractors passed several hundred mines intended
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  Speaker 1: to destroy any craft which approached or ran over them.
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  Speaker 1: These mines were aerial bombs set to be detonated by
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  Speaker 1: wire control from observation points on shore. However, the preliminary
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  Speaker 1: bombardment had so disrupted the wire controls and so blinded
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  Speaker 1: the observers that the defensive mining did little to slower
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  Speaker 1: destroy the assaulting tractors. As the tractors neared the beaches,
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  Speaker 1: they came under indirect fire from mortars and artillery. Indirect
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  Speaker 1: fire against moving targets generates more apprehension than damage, and
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  Speaker 1: only a few vehicles were lost to that phase of
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  Speaker 1: Japanese defense. Such fire did, however, demonstrate that the preliminary
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  Speaker 1: bombardment had not disposed of all the enemy's heavy fire capability.
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  Speaker 1: More disturbingly, as the leading waves near the beaches, the
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  Speaker 1: LVTs were hit by heavy infilating artillery and anti boat
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  Speaker 1: gun fire coming from concealed bunkers on north and south
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  Speaker 1: flanking points. The defenses on the left north flank of
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  Speaker 1: Beach White I, assaulted by the third Battalion, First Marines
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  Speaker 1: Lieutenant Colonel Stephen V. Sable, were especially deadly and effective.
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  Speaker 1: They disrupted the critical regimental and division left flank, especially
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  Speaker 1: costly to the larger landing plan. These guns shortly thereafter
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  Speaker 1: knocked out tractors carrying important elements of the battalions and
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  Speaker 1: the regiment's commanding control personnel and equipment. The battalion and
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  Speaker 1: then the regimental commander both found themselves ashore in a
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  Speaker 1: brutally vicious beach fight without the means of communication necessary
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  Speaker 1: to comprehend their situations fully or to take the needed
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  Speaker 1: remedial measures. The critical mission to seize the point dominating
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  Speaker 1: the division left flank had gone to one of the
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  Speaker 1: first Regiment's most experienced company commanders, Captain George P. Hunt,
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  Speaker 1: a veteran of Guadalcanal in New Britain who after the
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  Speaker 1: war became a long serving managing editor of Life magazine.
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  Speaker 1: Hunt had developed plans involving specific assignments for each element
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  Speaker 1: of his company. These had been rehearsed until every individual
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  Speaker 1: knew his role in how it fit into the company plan,
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  Speaker 1: each understood his mission's criticality. D Day and HR brought
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  Speaker 1: heavier than expected casualties. One of the company's platoons was
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  Speaker 1: pinned down all day in the fighting at the beach.
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  Speaker 1: The survivors of the rest of the company wheeled left,
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  Speaker 1: as planned, onto the flanking point. Moving grimly ahead, they
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  Speaker 1: pressed assaults upon the many defensive emplacements. Embrasures in the
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  Speaker 1: pillboxes and casements were blanketed with small firearms and smoke,
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  Speaker 1: then attacked with demolitions and rifle grenades. A climax came
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  Speaker 1: at the principal casement, from which the largest and most
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  Speaker 1: effective artillery fire had been hitting LVTs on the flanks
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  Speaker 1: of following landing waves. A rifle grenade hit the gun
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  Speaker 1: muzzle itself and ricocheted into the casement, setting off explosions
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  Speaker 1: and flames. Japanese defenders ran out the rear of the blockhouse,
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  Speaker 1: their clothing on fire and ammunition exploding in their belts.
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  Speaker 1: That flight had been anticipated, and some of Hunt's marines
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  Speaker 1: were in position to cut them down. At dusk, Hunt's
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  Speaker 1: Company K held the point, but by then the marines
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  Speaker 1: had been reduced to platoon strength with no adjacent units
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  Speaker 1: in contact. Only the sketchy radio communications got through to
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  Speaker 1: bring in supporting fires and desperately needed resupply. One LVT
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  Speaker 1: got into the beach just before dark with grenades, mortar shells,
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  Speaker 1: and water. It evacuated casualties as it departed. The ammunition
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  Speaker 1: made the difference in that night's furious struggle against Japanese.
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  Speaker 1: Determined to recapture the point the next afternoon, Lieutenant Colonel
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  Speaker 1: Raymond G. Davis's One one moved its Company B to
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  Speaker 1: establish contact with Hunt to help hang on to the
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  Speaker 1: bitterly contested positions. Hunt's company also regained the survivors of
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  Speaker 1: the platoon which had been pinned at the beach fight
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  Speaker 1: Throughout D Day of equal importance, the company regained artillery
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  Speaker 1: and naval gunfire communications, which proved critical during the second night.
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  Speaker 1: That night, the Japanese organized another and heavier two companies
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  Speaker 1: counterattack directed at the Marines at the point. It was
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  Speaker 1: narrowly defeated. By mid morning, D plus two Hunt survivors,
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  Speaker 1: together with Company B.
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  Speaker 2: One one, owned the.
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  Speaker 1: Point and could look out upon some five hundred Japanese
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  Speaker 1: who had died defending or trying to retake it. To
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  Speaker 1: the right of uller struggling third Battalion, His second Battalion,
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  Speaker 1: Lieutenant Colonel Russell E. Hansewett's commanding met artillery and mortar
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  Speaker 1: opposition in landing, as well as machine gun fire from
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  Speaker 1: still effective beach defenders. The same was true for fifth
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  Speaker 1: Marines to assault battalions Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Boyd's one
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  Speaker 1: five and Lieutenant Colonel Austin C. Schaffner's three five, which
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  Speaker 1: fought through the beach defenses and toward the edge of
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  Speaker 1: the clearing, looking east over the airfield area on the
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  Speaker 1: division's right flank. Orange three Major Edward H. Hurst's three
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  Speaker 1: seven had to cross directly in front of a commanding
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  Speaker 1: defensive fortification flanking the beach, as had Marines in the
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  Speaker 1: flanking position on the point. Fortunately, it was not as
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  Speaker 1: close as the point position and did not inflict such
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  Speaker 1: heavy damage. Nevertheless, its infilating fire, together with some natural
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  Speaker 1: obstructions on the beach, caused Company K three seven to
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  Speaker 1: land left of its plan life landing beach onto the
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  Speaker 1: right half of beach Orange two three five's beach. In
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  Speaker 1: addition to being out of position and out of contact
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  Speaker 1: with the company to its right, Company K three seven
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  Speaker 1: became intermingled with Company K three five, a condition fraught
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  Speaker 1: with confusion and delay. Major Hearst necessarily spent time regrouping
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  Speaker 1: his separated battalion, using as a coordinating line a large
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  Speaker 1: anti tank ditch astride his line of advance. His eastward
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  Speaker 1: advance then resumed, somewhat delayed by his efforts to regroup.
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  Speaker 1: Any delay was anathema to the division commander, who visualized
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  Speaker 1: momentum as key to his success. The division scheme of
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  Speaker 1: maneuver on the right called for the seventh Marines, Colonel
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  Speaker 1: Hermann h. Henniken, to land two battalions in column both
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  Speaker 1: over beach Orange three. As Hearst's landing battalion advanced, it
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  Speaker 1: was to be followed and traced by Lieutenant Colonel John J.
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  Speaker 1: Gormley's one seven. Gormiley's unit was to tie into Hearst's
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  Speaker 1: right flank and reorient southeast and south as the.
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  Speaker 2: Area was uncovered.
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  Speaker 1: He was then to attack southeast and south with his
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  Speaker 1: left on Hearst's right and his own right on the beach.
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  Speaker 1: After Hearst's battalion reached the opposite shore, both were to
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  Speaker 1: attack south, defending Scarlet one in Scarlet two the southern
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  Speaker 1: landing beaches. At the end of a bloody first hour,
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  Speaker 1: all five battalions were ashore. The closer each battalion was
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  Speaker 1: to Umerbrogel, the more tenuous was its hold on the
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  Speaker 1: shallow beachhead. During the next two hours, three of the
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  Speaker 1: division's four remaining battalions would join the assault and press
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  Speaker 1: for the momentum General Rupertus deemed essential. Following close behind
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  Speaker 1: Sables three to one, the first Marine's Colonel Poehler landed
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  Speaker 1: his forward command group. As always, he was eager to
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  Speaker 1: be close to the battle, even if that location deprived
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  Speaker 1: him of some capacity to develop full supporting fires. With
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  Speaker 1: limited communications, and now with inadequate numbers of LVT's for
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  Speaker 1: follow on waves, he struggled to ascertain and improve his
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  Speaker 1: regiment situation. His left unit, company K three to one,
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  Speaker 1: had two of its platoons desperately struggling to gain dominance
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  Speaker 1: at the point, Polar's plan to land Major Davis's first
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  Speaker 1: battalion behind Sables three to one to reinforce the fight
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  Speaker 1: for the left flank was thwarted by the h hour
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  Speaker 1: losses in LVTs. Davis's companies had to be landed singly,
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  Speaker 1: and his battalion committed piecemeal.
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  Speaker 2: To the action.
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  Speaker 1: On the regiment's right. Han Sowitz's two to one was
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  Speaker 1: hotly engaged but making progress toward capture of the west
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  Speaker 1: edges of the scrub, which looked out onto the airfield area.
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  Speaker 1: He was tied on his right into Boyd's one five,
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  Speaker 1: which was similarly engaged in the beachhead southern sector. The
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  Speaker 1: landing of Gormley's one to seven was delay aid somewhat
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  Speaker 1: by its earlier losses in LVT's That telling effect of
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  Speaker 1: early opposition would be felt throughout the remainder of the day.
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  Speaker 1: Most of Gormley's battalion landed on the correct Orange three beach,
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  Speaker 1: but a few of his troops were driven leftward by
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  Speaker 1: the still infilating fire from the south flank of the
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  Speaker 1: beach and landed on Orange two in the fifth Marine
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  Speaker 1: zone of action. Gormley's battalion was brought fully together behind
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  Speaker 1: three to seven, however, and as Hearst's leading three seven
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  Speaker 1: was able to advance east, Gormley's one to seven attacks
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  Speaker 1: southeast and south against prepared positions. Hannakin's battle against heavy
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  Speaker 1: opposition from both east and south developed approximately as planned. Suddenly,
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  Speaker 1: in mid afternoon the opposition grew much heavier. Hearst three
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  Speaker 1: seven ran into a blockhouse long on the Marines map,
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  Speaker 1: which had been reported destroyed by pre landing naval gunfire
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  Speaker 1: as a similar situation later met on Pollar's inland advance.
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  Speaker 1: The blockhouse showed little evidence of ever having been visited
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  Speaker 1: by heavy fire. Preparations to attack and reduce this blockhouse
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  Speaker 1: further delayed the seventh Marines advance, and the commanding General
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  Speaker 1: fretted further about loss of momentum. End of chapter one,
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  Speaker 1: Chapter two of Bloody Beaches, the Marines at Pelelou by
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  Speaker 1: Gordon D.
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  Speaker 2: Gale.
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  Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Sidebars the
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  Speaker 1: divisions and their commanders. The Pelelou operation was to be
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  Speaker 1: conducted by two divisions, one Marine and one Army in
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  Speaker 1: the Pacific area since mid nineteen forty two. The first
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  Speaker 1: Marine Division was a veteran combat tested organization which launched
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  Speaker 1: the first offensive landing in the Pacific War when it
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  Speaker 1: attacked Guadalcanal on seven August nineteen forty two. After a
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  Speaker 1: period in Australia of rest, recuperation and training of newly
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  Speaker 1: joined Marines, the division made its second amphibious assault on
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  Speaker 1: twenty six December nineteen forty three at Cape Gloucester on
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  Speaker 1: New Britain Island. When the division landed on Peleliu. Its
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  Speaker 1: regiments first, fifth and seventh Marines All Infantry and eleventh
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  Speaker 1: Marines Artillery contained officers and enlisted Marine veterans of both landings,
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  Speaker 1: as well as new troops. Before World War II ended,
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  Speaker 1: the First Division was to participate in one last battle,
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  Speaker 1: the landing on Okinawa. Major General William H. Rupertess, the
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  Speaker 1: First Division commander, had been with the division since early
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  Speaker 1: nineteen forty two. As a brigadier general, he was the
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  Speaker 1: assistant division commander to Major General Alexandre A.
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  Speaker 2: Vandergriff.
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  Speaker 1: During the Guadalcanal Campaign. He took command of the division
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  Speaker 1: for the Cape Gloucester Operation. Liberdess was commissioned in nineteen
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  Speaker 1: thirteen and served as commander of a marine ships detachment
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  Speaker 1: in World War I. During subsequent years, he was assigned
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  Speaker 1: duty in Haiti and China. Following the Pelelu Campaign, he
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  Speaker 1: was named commandant of the Marine Corps schools in Quantico.
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  Speaker 1: General Rupertus died of a heart attack on twenty five
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  Speaker 1: March nineteen forty five, while still on active duty. The
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  Speaker 1: Army's eighty first Infantry Division, the Wildcats, was formed in
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  Speaker 1: August nineteen seventeen at Camp Jackson, South Carolina. It saw
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  Speaker 1: action in France at the Meuse Argonne in World War I,
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  Speaker 1: and was deactivated following the end of the war. The
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  Speaker 1: division was reactivated in June nineteen forty two. It went
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  Speaker 1: to several Pacific training bases before its first combat assignment,
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  Speaker 1: the landing on on Goower. After securing on Gower, it
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  Speaker 1: relieved units of the first Marine Division on Pelelu when
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  Speaker 1: Peleulu was secure, the Wildcats began training for Operation Olympic,
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  Speaker 1: the assault on Japan proper. The Japanese surrendered unconditionally after
• 18:08
  Speaker 1: suffering two atomic bomb attacks as a result. Instead of
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  Speaker 1: invading Japan, the eighty first occupied it. On ten January,
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  Speaker 1: the eighty first Infantry Division was once more deactivated. Major
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  Speaker 1: General Paul J. Mueller, U S. Army, the commander of
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  Speaker 1: the eighty first Division, was a graduate of the famous
• 18:29
  Speaker 1: West Point Class of nineteen fifteen. He commanded an infantry
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  Speaker 1: battalion in France and World War One, and during the
• 18:37
  Speaker 1: interwar period he had a succession of assignments to infantry commands,
• 18:41
  Speaker 1: staff billets, and schools. In August nineteen forty one, he
• 18:45
  Speaker 1: assumed command of the eighty first Infantry Division at Fort Rucker, Alabama,
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  Speaker 1: and moved his division during its training period successfully from
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  Speaker 1: Florida to Tennessee to California before its commitment to the
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  Speaker 1: Battle of Angour and Pelelu. General Mueller served on active
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  Speaker 1: duty until nineteen fifty four, when he retired. He died
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  Speaker 1: in nineteen sixty four. The changing nature of Japanese tactics
• 19:14
  Speaker 1: Japan launched its December nineteen forty one surprise attacks and
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  Speaker 1: the expectation that its forces could quickly seize a forward
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  Speaker 1: line of Pacific and Asian Empire. Thereafter, it expected to
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  Speaker 1: defend these territories stubbornly enough to tire and bleed the Allies,
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  Speaker 1: and then to negotiate a recognition of Japanese hegemony. This
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  Speaker 1: strategic concept was synchronized with the fanatic Japanese spirit of bushido.
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  Speaker 1: Faith in their army's moral superiority over lesser races led
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  Speaker 1: the Japanese to expect nineteenth century Bonzi tactics to lead
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  Speaker 1: invariably to success. Expectations and experience meshed until their nineteen
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  Speaker 1: forty two encounters with the Allies, particularly with Americans in
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  Speaker 1: the Solomons. Thereafter, it took several campaigns to internalize the
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  Speaker 1: lessons of defeat by modern infantry weapons in the hands
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  Speaker 1: of the determined Allies. To Americans, these Japanese misconceptions were
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  Speaker 1: alarming but cost effective. It was easier and less costly
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  Speaker 1: to mow down Bonzai attacks than to dig stubborn defenders
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  Speaker 1: out of fortified positions. By spring of nineteen forty four,
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  Speaker 1: the lessons had permeated to the highest levels of Japan's
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  Speaker 1: Army command. When General Hadeki Tojo instructed General in Away
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  Speaker 1: to defend the Palaws deliberately and conservatively, he was bringing
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  Speaker 1: Japanese tactics into support of Japanese strategy. Henceforth, Japanese soldiers
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  Speaker 1: would dig in and hunker down to make their final
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  Speaker 1: defenses as costly as possible to the attacking Americans. Naval
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  Speaker 1: gunfire support.
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  Speaker 2: For pelelu.
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  Speaker 1: In their earlier operations, especially at Guadalcanal, the primary experience
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  Speaker 1: of First Division Marines with naval gunfire was at the
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  Speaker 1: receiving end on New Britain.
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  Speaker 2: The character and.
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  Speaker 1: Disposition of Japanese defenses did not call for extensive pre
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  Speaker 1: landing fire support, nor did subsequent operations as shore. The
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  Speaker 1: naval gunfire to which the Guadalcanal veterans were exposed frequently
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  Speaker 1: in heavily damaged planes and installations ashore. Its effect upon
• 21:25
  Speaker 1: dug in Marines was frightening and sobering, but rarely destructive.
• 21:30
  Speaker 1: During the planning for Pelulu, the division staff initially had
• 21:34
  Speaker 1: no trained naval gunfire and GF planner. When one arrived,
• 21:39
  Speaker 1: he was hampered by the cumbersome communications link back to
• 21:43
  Speaker 1: higher headquarters Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith's Fleet Marine Force
• 21:47
  Speaker 1: Pacific FMF Pack and Honolulu, which would provide the essential
• 21:52
  Speaker 1: targeting information for the division's NNGF plan. FMF PACK also
• 21:57
  Speaker 1: would plan and allocate the available gunfire resources to the
• 22:01
  Speaker 1: targets deemed important by the division staff's planners. The preoccupation
• 22:06
  Speaker 1: of FMF Pack with the ongoing Marianas campaigns, as well
• 22:10
  Speaker 1: as illness on the staff of Rear Admiral JESSEB. Oldendorf,
• 22:14
  Speaker 1: Commander Naval Gunfire Support Group, further limited and constrained the preparations.
• 22:21
  Speaker 1: Heavy ammunition expenditures in the Marianas reduced ammunition availability for pelelu. Surprisingly,
• 22:28
  Speaker 1: during the delivery of US preparatory fires, there was no
• 22:32
  Speaker 1: Japanese response. This prompted Oldendorff to report all known targets
• 22:37
  Speaker 1: destroyed and to cancel preparatory fires scheduled for d plus three.
• 22:42
  Speaker 1: An unintentional benefit of this uncoordinated change in naval gunfire
• 22:47
  Speaker 1: plan may have resulted in there being more shells available
• 22:50
  Speaker 1: for post landing NNGF support, But the costliest effect of
• 22:55
  Speaker 1: inadequate NGNGF was that the flanking positions north and south
• 22:59
  Speaker 1: of the landing baches were not taken out. The selection
• 23:03
  Speaker 1: of naval gunfire targets could certainly have been done with
• 23:06
  Speaker 1: more careful attention. Colonel Lewis B. Poehler, the first Marine's commander,
• 23:11
  Speaker 1: had specifically asked for the destruction of the positions dominating
• 23:15
  Speaker 1: his landing on the division left flanks. Failure to do
• 23:19
  Speaker 1: so was paid for in blood, courage, and time. During
• 23:22
  Speaker 1: the critical battle for the point subsequent to D Day,
• 23:26
  Speaker 1: there were numerous instances of well called and delivered naval
• 23:30
  Speaker 1: gunfire support night illumination during the night of fifteen to
• 23:34
  Speaker 1: sixteen September, the destruction of two major blockhouses earlier reported destroyed,
• 23:39
  Speaker 1: and effective support of the nasibus.
• 23:41
  Speaker 2: Landing toward the end of the battle. End of chapter two.
• 23:53
  Speaker 1: Chapter three of Bloody Beaches the Marines at Peleloup by
• 23:57
  Speaker 1: Gordon D.
• 23:57
  Speaker 2: Gale.
• 23:58
  Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. The Japanese
• 24:03
  Speaker 1: defenses on the enemy side, Lieutenant General Sade Nawe, a
• 24:09
  Speaker 1: fifth generation warrior of stout military reputation, commanding the fourteenth
• 24:14
  Speaker 1: Infantry Division fresh from the Kwangtung Army in China, met
• 24:19
  Speaker 1: in Tokyo in March nineteen forty four with Japanese Premier
• 24:22
  Speaker 1: Hideki Tojo, who was also Minister of War. Tojo had
• 24:27
  Speaker 1: concluded that Japan was no longer able to hold the
• 24:30
  Speaker 1: Plaws against growing Allied naval dominance in the Western Pacific. Instead,
• 24:35
  Speaker 1: he had decided to sell the Plaws to the United
• 24:38
  Speaker 1: States at the highest possible cost to Americans in blood
• 24:41
  Speaker 1: and time. He ordered in Awe to take his division
• 24:44
  Speaker 1: to the Palaws, to take command of all Japanese forces there,
• 24:48
  Speaker 1: and to defend the Palaw Islands as long as possible,
• 24:51
  Speaker 1: denying its use to the Americans, and killing as many
• 24:54
  Speaker 1: as possible in the undertaking. As his division sailed to
• 24:58
  Speaker 1: the Palaws, flew ahead, reconnoitered his new locale by air
• 25:03
  Speaker 1: for two days, and concluded that Pelelu, with satellite air
• 25:06
  Speaker 1: strips on Angauer and Niasbus, was.
• 25:09
  Speaker 2: The key to his defense.
• 25:12
  Speaker 1: Earlier US attention to Pelelu during the Task Force fifty
• 25:15
  Speaker 1: eight March strikes seemed to confirm that judgment to defend
• 25:19
  Speaker 1: Peleliu in a way immediately settled upon a commander, a mission,
• 25:23
  Speaker 1: and a force level. Pelolu had for some time been
• 25:27
  Speaker 1: under occupation and administrative command of a rear Admiral, who
• 25:31
  Speaker 1: had use of his forces construction resources and capability to
• 25:34
  Speaker 1: build blockhouses and many reinforced concrete structures above ground, while
• 25:39
  Speaker 1: improving existing caves and tunnels under Pelulu's rich concealment of
• 25:43
  Speaker 1: overlying jungle, scrub and vines. In these underground installations, the
• 25:48
  Speaker 1: Admiral's personnel had well survived the Task Force fifty eight
• 25:52
  Speaker 1: March attacks. Above ground planes and installations were demolished. As
• 25:58
  Speaker 1: Task Force fifty eight parted. The Japanese emerged, repaired what
• 26:02
  Speaker 1: they could, but continued to focus upon underground installations together
• 26:08
  Speaker 1: with a few Korean labor troops. Their numbers totaled about
• 26:11
  Speaker 1: seven thousand, most of them lacking training and leadership for
• 26:14
  Speaker 1: infantry action. Leadership arrived in the person of Colonel Nakagawa
• 26:19
  Speaker 1: with his sixty five hundred man Second Infantry Regiment Reinforced.
• 26:24
  Speaker 1: They had long battle experience in China. They were armed
• 26:28
  Speaker 1: with twenty four seventy five millimeter artillery pieces, some thirteen
• 26:32
  Speaker 1: to fifteen light tanks, about one hundred and fifty cow
• 26:35
  Speaker 1: machine guns, fifteen eighty one millimeter heavy mortars, and about
• 26:39
  Speaker 1: thirty dual purpose anti aircraft guns. Already on the island
• 26:44
  Speaker 1: were a large number of very heavy one hundred forty
• 26:47
  Speaker 1: one millimeter mortars, naval anti aircraft guns, and rudimentary rocket
• 26:52
  Speaker 1: launchers for sending up large unguided naval shells. Most significant,
• 26:57
  Speaker 1: the regiment had Colonel Nakagawa and his battle discipline officers
• 27:01
  Speaker 1: and non commissioned officers. Nakagawa had already been awarded nine
• 27:06
  Speaker 1: medals for leadership against the Chinese and was viewed as
• 27:09
  Speaker 1: a comer within his officer corps. Immediately upon arrival, Nakagawa
• 27:15
  Speaker 1: reconnoitered his prospective battle area from the ground and from
• 27:18
  Speaker 1: the air. He identified the western beaches, the Marines, White
• 27:23
  Speaker 1: and Orange Beaches as the most probable landing sites. He
• 27:27
  Speaker 1: immediately ordered his troops to dig in and construct beach defenses.
• 27:32
  Speaker 1: At this time, a bureaucratic conflict arose. Vice Admiral Siichi
• 27:37
  Speaker 1: E two, who was the senior officer and the senior
• 27:40
  Speaker 1: naval officer on Pelelu, resented being subordinate to an army
• 27:44
  Speaker 1: officer much junior to him. From corror, Lieutenant General Inoway
• 27:49
  Speaker 1: dispatched Major General Kanjuro Mai to Pelelu to assume island
• 27:53
  Speaker 1: command and to maintain liaison with Colonel Nakagawa. Murai was young,
• 27:59
  Speaker 1: highly recard guarded, and as the personal representative of Lieutenant
• 28:02
  Speaker 1: General Innuwe, was considered senior.
• 28:05
  Speaker 2: To the Admiral.
• 28:06
  Speaker 1: He left Nakagawa's operational mission firmly in Knackagawa's hands, as
• 28:11
  Speaker 1: Innuay intended. Throughout the campaign, Nakagawa exercised operational control and
• 28:17
  Speaker 1: was assisted and counseled, but not commanded by General Muri.
• 28:22
  Speaker 1: Nakagawa had a sound appreciation of his mission, of the situation,
• 28:26
  Speaker 1: and of American firepower. He turned his attention to the
• 28:30
  Speaker 1: fullest use of his principal advantage, the terrain. He so
• 28:34
  Speaker 1: deployed and installed his forces to inflict all possible damage
• 28:38
  Speaker 1: and casualties during the anticipated landing, and then to defend
• 28:42
  Speaker 1: in depth for as long as possible on Pelulu that
• 28:46
  Speaker 1: offered a vertical as well as a horizontal dimension to
• 28:49
  Speaker 1: the defense. He surveyed and registered artillery and mortar weapons
• 28:53
  Speaker 1: over the width and depth of the reef off both
• 28:56
  Speaker 1: eastern and western beaches, with planned heavy concentrations along the
• 29:00
  Speaker 1: fringe of the western reef. In this he anticipated the
• 29:04
  Speaker 1: American need to transfer follow on waves from landing craft
• 29:08
  Speaker 1: to the reef crossing amphibian vehicles. He registered weapons on
• 29:13
  Speaker 1: and immediately inland from the water's edge to subject landing
• 29:17
  Speaker 1: troops to a hail of fire. Offshore, he laid five
• 29:21
  Speaker 1: hundred wire controlled mines. Colonel Nakagawa directed construction of beach
• 29:26
  Speaker 1: obstacles using rails and logs, and ordered anti tank ditches dug.
• 29:31
  Speaker 1: He emplaced troops in machine gun and mortar pits along
• 29:34
  Speaker 1: and inland from the beaches, augmented by all the available
• 29:38
  Speaker 1: barbed wire. On the north and south flanks of the beach,
• 29:42
  Speaker 1: he constructed concrete emplacements to shelter and conceal anti tank
• 29:46
  Speaker 1: and anti boat artillery cited to enfilade the expected waves
• 29:50
  Speaker 1: of landing craft inland, he incorporated the already built blockhouse
• 29:55
  Speaker 1: and adjacent reinforced buildings into mutually supporting defensive comp with
• 30:00
  Speaker 1: interconnecting communication lines and trenches. Although believing the western beaches
• 30:06
  Speaker 1: to be the most probable route of attack, he did
• 30:08
  Speaker 1: not leave the southern Scarlet and eastern Purple Beaches undefended.
• 30:14
  Speaker 1: He committed one battalion to organize defenses in each area.
• 30:18
  Speaker 1: The Purple Beaches were thoroughly organized, with contingent orders to
• 30:22
  Speaker 1: the defenders to move into central Pelelu if the battle
• 30:25
  Speaker 1: developed from the west as expected, but the battalion committed
• 30:30
  Speaker 1: to the South Scarlet Beach had orders to defend those stronger,
• 30:34
  Speaker 1: more permanent emplacements. To the end, Nakagawa assigned about five
• 30:39
  Speaker 1: hundred infantry and artillery to defend the yesibus In about
• 30:42
  Speaker 1: one thousand naval personnel to defend Northern Pelelu. Not under
• 30:47
  Speaker 1: his command were the fifteen hundred Defenders of Angauer. The
• 30:51
  Speaker 1: major part of his force and effort was committed to
• 30:53
  Speaker 1: the five hundred caves, tunnels and firing embrasures in the
• 30:57
  Speaker 1: coral ridges of central Pelelu. The naval unit's extensive earlier
• 31:01
  Speaker 1: tunneling into the limestone ridges rendered occupants largely immune to
• 31:05
  Speaker 1: general bombardments. Only lucky hits into the mouths of caves
• 31:11
  Speaker 1: or point blank direct fire could damage the hidden defenses
• 31:14
  Speaker 1: and their troops. The tunnels were designed for or adapted
• 31:18
  Speaker 1: to various purposes barracks, command centers, hospitals, storage and ammunition magazines,
• 31:25
  Speaker 1: cooking areas complete with fresh water springs and seepage basins,
• 31:29
  Speaker 1: and of course fire and embrassures with elaborate concealment and
• 31:33
  Speaker 1: protective devices, including a few sliding steel doors. Colonel Knakagawa
• 31:39
  Speaker 1: expected very heavy pre landing bombardments. He expected his troops
• 31:43
  Speaker 1: to survive them and then to carry out his mission
• 31:46
  Speaker 1: of delaying in bleeding the Americans on corror. Lieutenant General
• 31:51
  Speaker 1: Ineway was busy with the bulk of his forces preparing
• 31:54
  Speaker 1: for expected attacks against Babothuop the Allied stalemate, and had
• 32:00
  Speaker 1: indeed called for invasion of Babothwop.
• 32:04
  Speaker 2: As the anticipated.
• 32:05
  Speaker 1: Invasion drew near, in a way issued a proclamation to
• 32:08
  Speaker 1: his troops, clearly reflecting Tojo's instructions to delay and bleed.
• 32:13
  Speaker 1: He pointed out the necessities to anticipate and endure the
• 32:16
  Speaker 1: naval bombardment and to use the terrain to inflict casualties
• 32:20
  Speaker 1: on the attackers, without actually ordering troops to die. He
• 32:24
  Speaker 1: included the words we are ready to die honorably. He
• 32:29
  Speaker 1: went on to say that dying and losing the territory
• 32:32
  Speaker 1: to the enemy might contribute to the opening of a
• 32:34
  Speaker 1: new phase of the war. End of chapter three, Chapter
• 32:45
  Speaker 1: four of Bloody Beaches, the Marines at Pelelup by Gordon D.
• 32:49
  Speaker 2: Gale.
• 32:50
  Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. The assault
• 32:55
  Speaker 1: in the center as the first Marines battle to secure
• 33:00
  Speaker 1: the left flank, and as the seventh Marines fought to
• 33:03
  Speaker 1: isolate and then reduce the Japanese defenses in the southern
• 33:06
  Speaker 1: end of Pelelu. The fifth Marines, Colonel Harold D. Harris commanding,
• 33:10
  Speaker 1: was charged to drive across the airfield, cut the island
• 33:14
  Speaker 1: in two, and then reorient north and drive to secure
• 33:17
  Speaker 1: the eastern.
• 33:17
  Speaker 2: Half of the island.
• 33:19
  Speaker 1: Shortly after the scheduled h plus one schedule, the second Battalion,
• 33:23
  Speaker 1: Fifth Marines, Major Gordon D. Gale commanding, landed over Beach
• 33:28
  Speaker 1: Orange two and traced behind three five. It moved directly
• 33:32
  Speaker 1: east through the dunes and scrub jungle, into and out
• 33:36
  Speaker 1: of the anti tank barrier and to the west edge
• 33:38
  Speaker 1: of the clearing surrounding the airfield. Passing through the lines
• 33:42
  Speaker 1: of three five, Gale's battalion attacked west against scattered resistance
• 33:47
  Speaker 1: from dugouts and bomb shelters near the southern end of
• 33:50
  Speaker 1: the airfield and through the scrub area slightly farther south.
• 33:54
  Speaker 1: The third Battalion's mission was to clear that scrub maintaining
• 33:58
  Speaker 1: contact with three seven on its rufe light, while two
• 34:00
  Speaker 1: five was to drive across the open area to reach
• 34:03
  Speaker 1: the far side of the island. Advancing in its center
• 34:07
  Speaker 1: and right, Two five battled completely across the island by
• 34:10
  Speaker 1: mid afternoon, Echelon di its left rearward to keep contact
• 34:14
  Speaker 1: with one five and move to reorient its attack northward.
• 34:19
  Speaker 1: The Second Battalion's right flank tied for a while into
• 34:22
  Speaker 1: three five in the woods to the south of the airfield,
• 34:24
  Speaker 1: but then lost contact. By this time, the anti tank
• 34:29
  Speaker 1: ditch along the center and right of Orange Beaches one
• 34:31
  Speaker 1: and two was notable for the number of command posts
• 34:34
  Speaker 1: located along its length. Schaffner's three to five was there,
• 34:39
  Speaker 1: as was Harris's fifth Marines Command Post, then an advance
• 34:43
  Speaker 1: element of the division command post under Brigadier General Oliver P. Smith,
• 34:48
  Speaker 1: The assistant Division Commander, landed and moved into the anti
• 34:52
  Speaker 1: tank ditch within sight of the airfield clearing area. Simultaneously,
• 34:57
  Speaker 1: important support weapons were moving ashore. The first Tank Battalion's
• 35:01
  Speaker 1: M forty eight A one Sherman medium tanks, one third
• 35:04
  Speaker 1: of which had been left behind at the last moment
• 35:07
  Speaker 1: because of inadequate shipping were landed as early as possible,
• 35:11
  Speaker 1: using a novel technique to cross the reef. The tank
• 35:15
  Speaker 1: landing scheme was developed in anticipation of early Japanese use
• 35:18
  Speaker 1: of their armor capability. Movement of this fire and logistical
• 35:23
  Speaker 1: support material onto a beach still close to and under
• 35:26
  Speaker 1: direct observation from the commanding umer Brogel heights was an
• 35:30
  Speaker 1: inescapable risk mandated by the Pelelu terrain. So long as
• 35:35
  Speaker 1: the enemy held observation from Umerbrogel over the airfield and
• 35:39
  Speaker 1: over the beach activity, there was no alternative to driving
• 35:42
  Speaker 1: ahead rapidly using such fire support as could be mustered
• 35:46
  Speaker 1: and coordinated. Continuing casualties at the beaches had to be
• 35:50
  Speaker 1: accepted to support the rapid advance. The commanding General's concern
• 35:55
  Speaker 1: for early momentum appeared to be imminently correct. Units on
• 35:59
  Speaker 1: the left had to assault toward the foot of Umerbrogl
• 36:02
  Speaker 1: ridges and quickly get to the commanding crests. In the center,
• 36:07
  Speaker 1: the fifth Marines had to make a fast advance to
• 36:09
  Speaker 1: secure other possible routes to outflank Umerbrogel. In the south,
• 36:14
  Speaker 1: the seventh Marines had to destroy immediately those now cut
• 36:17
  Speaker 1: off forces before becoming free to join the struggle against
• 36:20
  Speaker 1: Central Peleliu. The movement of the fifth Marines across the
• 36:24
  Speaker 1: airfield and to the western edge of the lagoon separating
• 36:27
  Speaker 1: the airfield from the eastern peninsula Beach Purple created a
• 36:31
  Speaker 1: line of attacking marines completely across the part of the island,
• 36:35
  Speaker 1: oriented both east and north toward what was believed to
• 36:38
  Speaker 1: be the major center of Japanese strength. The seventh Marines,
• 36:42
  Speaker 1: pushing east and south, completed splitting the enemy forces. Colonel
• 36:47
  Speaker 1: Hannikin's troops, fully engaged, were generally concealed against observation from
• 36:52
  Speaker 1: the enemy. Still north of the airfield and from the
• 36:55
  Speaker 1: heights of Umerbrogel, there was a gap between the Fifth's
• 36:59
  Speaker 1: right and the sevenths left, but it did not appear
• 37:01
  Speaker 1: to be in a critical sector. Nevertheless, it was by
• 37:06
  Speaker 1: now apparent that the D Day phase line objectives were
• 37:09
  Speaker 1: not going to be met in either the south or
• 37:11
  Speaker 1: the north. Alarmed at the loss of the desired momentum,
• 37:15
  Speaker 1: General Rupertess began committing his reserve. First, he ordered the
• 37:20
  Speaker 1: Division Reconnaissance Company ashore. Then, pressing commanders already on the island,
• 37:25
  Speaker 1: he ordered his one remaining uncommitted infantry battalion Lieutenant Colonel
• 37:29
  Speaker 1: Spencer S Berger's two seven to land. No Commander Ashore
• 37:34
  Speaker 1: felt a need for two seven, but Colonel Hannikin said
• 37:37
  Speaker 1: he could find an assembly area where it would not
• 37:39
  Speaker 1: be in the way. General Rupertus ordered it to land,
• 37:43
  Speaker 1: remarking to his staff that he had now shot his
• 37:46
  Speaker 1: bull Ashore. It was apparent that what was needed on
• 37:50
  Speaker 1: this hectic beachhead was not more troops, but more room
• 37:53
  Speaker 1: in which to maneuver and more artillery. General Rupertess began
• 37:58
  Speaker 1: to make plans to land himself and the main elements
• 38:01
  Speaker 1: of his command group. Advice from the ADC. Ashore and
• 38:05
  Speaker 1: his chief of Staff, Colonel John T. Selden, convinced Rupertess
• 38:09
  Speaker 1: to stay on the flagship. He compromised that decision by
• 38:13
  Speaker 1: ordering Colonel Selden ashore. By now, the shortage of LVTs
• 38:18
  Speaker 1: was frustrating the timely landing of following waves. In consequence,
• 38:23
  Speaker 1: neither Selden's small CP group nor Burgers two seven could
• 38:27
  Speaker 1: get past the transfer line in their landing craft and
• 38:30
  Speaker 1: had to return to their ships despite their orders to
• 38:33
  Speaker 1: land into this division posture. At about sixteen fifty, Colonel
• 38:38
  Speaker 1: Nakagawa launched his planned tank infantry counter attack. All marine
• 38:43
  Speaker 1: commanders had been alerted to the Japanese capability to make
• 38:46
  Speaker 1: an armored attack on D Day and were well prepared.
• 38:50
  Speaker 1: The attack emerged from the area north of the airfield
• 38:53
  Speaker 1: and headed south generally across the front of the first
• 38:56
  Speaker 1: Marines lines on the eastern edge of the airfield. Clearing
• 39:00
  Speaker 1: The attack moved directly into the fifth Marine sector, where
• 39:03
  Speaker 1: Boyd's one five was set in and stretched across the
• 39:06
  Speaker 1: southern area of the airfield. Marines in two to one
• 39:10
  Speaker 1: and one five took the attackers under fire infantry and
• 39:13
  Speaker 1: tanks alike. A bazooka gunner in two one's front hit
• 39:17
  Speaker 1: two of the tanks. The commanding officer of one five
• 39:21
  Speaker 1: had his tanks in dephil aid just behind his front lines.
• 39:25
  Speaker 1: They opened up on the Japanese armor, which ran through
• 39:28
  Speaker 1: the front lines and virtually into his forward command group.
• 39:32
  Speaker 1: Boyd's lines held fast, taking the attackers, infantry and tanks
• 39:36
  Speaker 1: alike under fire with all available weapons. Major John H.
• 39:41
  Speaker 1: Gustafson and two five's forward command posts midway across the
• 39:45
  Speaker 1: airfield had his tank platoon close at hand. Although the
• 39:49
  Speaker 1: enemy had not yet come into his zone of action,
• 39:52
  Speaker 1: he launched the platoon of tanks into the melee. Accounts
• 39:56
  Speaker 1: very as to just who shot what, but in a
• 39:58
  Speaker 1: very few minutes it was all over. The attacking tanks
• 40:02
  Speaker 1: were all destroyed and the Japanese infantry literally blown away.
• 40:07
  Speaker 1: Colonel Nakagawa's attack was courageous but proved to be a
• 40:11
  Speaker 1: total failure. Even where the tanks broke through the marine lines,
• 40:15
  Speaker 1: they induced no marine retreat. Instead, the Japanese armor became
• 40:20
  Speaker 1: the focus of anti tank fire of every sort and caliber.
• 40:25
  Speaker 1: The light Japanese tanks were literally blown apart. More than
• 40:28
  Speaker 1: a hundred were reported destroyed. That figure, of course, reflected
• 40:33
  Speaker 1: the amount of fire directed their way. Each Marine grenadier,
• 40:37
  Speaker 1: anti tank gunner and tanker thought he had killed the
• 40:40
  Speaker 1: tank at which he shot, and so reported. With the
• 40:44
  Speaker 1: counter attack over and the Japanese in apparent disarray, two
• 40:48
  Speaker 1: five immediately resumed its attack, moving north along the eastern
• 40:52
  Speaker 1: half of the airfield. The battalion advanced halfway up the
• 40:56
  Speaker 1: length of the airfield, clearing before it stopped to organize
• 40:59
  Speaker 1: for the It was the maximum advance of the day
• 41:03
  Speaker 1: over the most favorable terrain in the division front. It
• 41:07
  Speaker 1: provided needed space for artillery and logistic deployment to support
• 41:11
  Speaker 1: the continuation of the attack the next day. However, that
• 41:16
  Speaker 1: relatively advanced position had an open right south flank, which
• 41:20
  Speaker 1: corresponded to a hole in the regimental command structure. At
• 41:24
  Speaker 1: that stage, three five was supposed to maintain the contact
• 41:27
  Speaker 1: between north facing two five and south oriented three seven,
• 41:32
  Speaker 1: but three fives battalion command and control had been completely
• 41:35
  Speaker 1: knocked out by seventeen hundred. The battalion executive officer, Major
• 41:40
  Speaker 1: Robert m Ash had been killed earlier in the day
• 41:43
  Speaker 1: by a direct hit upon his landing LVT. About the
• 41:48
  Speaker 1: time of the Japanese tank attack, a mortar barrage hit
• 41:51
  Speaker 1: the three to five CP in the anti tank ditch
• 41:53
  Speaker 1: near the beach, killing several staff and prompting the evacuation
• 41:57
  Speaker 1: of the battalion commander. As of seventeen hundred, the three
• 42:01
  Speaker 1: companies of three five were not in contact with each other,
• 42:05
  Speaker 1: nor with the battalions to their right and left. The
• 42:08
  Speaker 1: fifth Marine's commanding officer ordered his executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel
• 42:13
  Speaker 1: Lewis W. Walt, to take command of three five and
• 42:16
  Speaker 1: to redeploy so as to close the gap between fifth
• 42:19
  Speaker 1: and seventh Marines, Major Gale moved two five's reserve company
• 42:23
  Speaker 1: to his right flank and to provide a tie in position.
• 42:27
  Speaker 1: Walt located and tied in his three to five companies
• 42:30
  Speaker 1: to build a more continuous regimental line. By twenty two thirty,
• 42:35
  Speaker 1: he had affected the tie in just in time. Beginning then,
• 42:40
  Speaker 1: the salient which the fifth Marines had carved between Pelelouse
• 42:43
  Speaker 1: central and southern defenders, came under a series of sharp
• 42:46
  Speaker 1: counter attacks that continued throughout the night. The attacks came
• 42:51
  Speaker 1: from both north and south. None of them enjoyed any
• 42:54
  Speaker 1: notable success, but they were persistent enough to require resupply
• 42:58
  Speaker 1: of ammunition to forbid companies. Dawn revealed scores of Japanese
• 43:03
  Speaker 1: bodies north of the marine lines. Elsewhere across the First
• 43:08
  Speaker 1: Division's front there were more potentially threatening night counter attacks.
• 43:12
  Speaker 1: None of them succeeded in driving Marines back or in
• 43:15
  Speaker 1: penetrating the lines in significant strength. The most serious attack
• 43:20
  Speaker 1: came against the Company K three to one position on
• 43:22
  Speaker 1: the point at the first Marine's left. In the south,
• 43:27
  Speaker 1: the seventh Marines experienced significant night attacks from the Japanese
• 43:30
  Speaker 1: battalion opposing it, but the Marines there were in comfortable strength,
• 43:35
  Speaker 1: had communications to bring in fire support, including naval gunfire illumination.
• 43:41
  Speaker 1: They turned back all attacks without a crisis developing. At
• 43:45
  Speaker 1: the end of the first twelve hours ashore, the First
• 43:48
  Speaker 1: Marine Division held its beachhead across the intended front. Only
• 43:52
  Speaker 1: in the center did the depth approximate that which had
• 43:55
  Speaker 1: been planned. The position was strong everywhere except on the
• 43:59
  Speaker 1: ex stream left flank. General Smith, from his forward command post,
• 44:04
  Speaker 1: was in communication with all three regimental commanders. The report
• 44:09
  Speaker 1: he received from Colonel Poehler on the left did not
• 44:12
  Speaker 1: afford an adequate perception of First Marine's tenuous hold on
• 44:16
  Speaker 1: the point. That reflected Colonel Poller's own limited information. The
• 44:21
  Speaker 1: other two regimental reports reflected the situations adequately. In addition
• 44:26
  Speaker 1: to the three infantry regiments, the first Division had almost
• 44:29
  Speaker 1: three battalions of light artillery ashore and emplaced. All thirty
• 44:34
  Speaker 1: tanks were ashore. The shore party was functioning on the beach,
• 44:38
  Speaker 1: albeit under full daylight observation by the enemy and under
• 44:42
  Speaker 1: intermittent enemy fire. The division necessarily had to continue at
• 44:46
  Speaker 1: full press on D plus one. The objective was to
• 44:50
  Speaker 1: capture the commanding crests on the left to gain maneuver
• 44:54
  Speaker 1: opportunities in the center and to finish off the isolated
• 44:57
  Speaker 1: defenders in the south lea. These two colonels on Pelelu
• 45:01
  Speaker 1: ended their workday with firm misconceptions of their situations and
• 45:05
  Speaker 1: with correspondingly inaccurate reports to their superiors. At day's end,
• 45:11
  Speaker 1: when General Smith finally got a telephone wire into the
• 45:14
  Speaker 1: first Marine CP, he was told that the regiment had
• 45:17
  Speaker 1: a firm hold on its beachhead and was approximately on
• 45:20
  Speaker 1: the one objective line he was not told about, and
• 45:24
  Speaker 1: Colonel Poehler was not fully aware of the gaps in
• 45:27
  Speaker 1: his lines nor the gravity of the company k three
• 45:30
  Speaker 1: to one struggle on the point where only thirty eight
• 45:33
  Speaker 1: Marines were battling to retain the position. Colonel Nakagawa, on
• 45:38
  Speaker 1: the other hand, had reported that the landing attempt by
• 45:41
  Speaker 1: the Marines had been put to route inconsistently. He had
• 45:45
  Speaker 1: also reported that his brave counterattack force had thrown the
• 45:48
  Speaker 1: enemy into the sea sidebars a horrible place. Among the
• 45:58
  Speaker 1: few civilian news correspondents who chose to share the fate
• 46:01
  Speaker 1: of the Marines on shore on Pelelu was Robert Pepper
• 46:04
  Speaker 1: Martin of Time, who furnished the following description of what
• 46:08
  Speaker 1: it was like there. Pelolou is a horrible place. The
• 46:12
  Speaker 1: heat is stifling and rainfalls intermittently, the muggy rain that
• 46:16
  Speaker 1: brings no relief, only greater misery. The coral rocks soak
• 46:20
  Speaker 1: up the heat during the day, and it is only
• 46:22
  Speaker 1: slightly cooler at night. Marines are in the finest possible
• 46:25
  Speaker 1: physical condition, but they wilted on Pelelu. By the fourth day.
• 46:30
  Speaker 1: There were as many casualties from heat prostration as from wounds.
• 46:34
  Speaker 1: Pelolu is incomparably worse than Guam in its bloodiness, terror climate,
• 46:39
  Speaker 1: and the incomprehensible tenacity of the Japs for sheer brutality
• 46:44
  Speaker 1: and fatigue. I think it surpasses anything yet seen in
• 46:47
  Speaker 1: the Pacific, certainly from the standpoint of numbers of troops
• 46:50
  Speaker 1: involved in the time taken to make the island secure.
• 46:54
  Speaker 1: On the second day, the temperature reached one hundred five
• 46:56
  Speaker 1: degrees in the shade, and there was very little shade
• 46:59
  Speaker 1: in most plays is where the fighting was going on,
• 47:02
  Speaker 1: and arguably no breeze at all anywhere. It lingered around
• 47:06
  Speaker 1: that level of heat as the days dragged by temperatures
• 47:09
  Speaker 1: as high as one hundred and fifteen were recorded. Water
• 47:13
  Speaker 1: supply presented a serious problem from the outset. This had
• 47:17
  Speaker 1: been anticipated, and in actual fact the solution proved less
• 47:21
  Speaker 1: difficult than expected. The engineers soon discovered that productive wells
• 47:25
  Speaker 1: could be drilled almost anywhere on the comparatively low ground,
• 47:28
  Speaker 1: and personnel semi permanently stationed near the beach found that
• 47:32
  Speaker 1: even shallow holes dug in the sand would yield an
• 47:35
  Speaker 1: only mildly repulsive liquid, which could be purified for drinking
• 47:38
  Speaker 1: with halozone tablets. But it continued necessary to supply the
• 47:43
  Speaker 1: assault troops by means of scoured out oil drums and
• 47:46
  Speaker 1: five gallon field cans. Unfortunately, steaming out the oil drums
• 47:51
  Speaker 1: did not remove all the oil, with the result that
• 47:54
  Speaker 1: many or most of the troops drinking water from the
• 47:57
  Speaker 1: drums were sickened. When the captains of the ships in
• 48:00
  Speaker 1: the transport area learned of this and of the shortage
• 48:03
  Speaker 1: of water, they rushed cases of fruit and fruit drinks
• 48:06
  Speaker 1: to the beaches to ease the problem somewhat. The water
• 48:10
  Speaker 1: situation presented a problem even in the case of troops
• 48:13
  Speaker 1: operating on comparatively level and open ground. Once the fighting
• 48:17
  Speaker 1: entered the ridges, terrain difficult merely to traverse without having
• 48:21
  Speaker 1: to fight. The debility rate shot upwards so alarmingly that
• 48:25
  Speaker 1: an emergency call was sent to all the ships offshore
• 48:28
  Speaker 1: to requisition every available salt tablet for issue to the
• 48:31
  Speaker 1: first Marines. The statement that heat prostrations equaled wound casualties
• 48:37
  Speaker 1: is apt to be misleading. Most of those evacuated were
• 48:41
  Speaker 1: returned to duty after a day or two of rest
• 48:44
  Speaker 1: and rehabilitation. Hence their absence from the front lines did
• 48:48
  Speaker 1: not permanently impair the combat efficiency of their units. But
• 48:53
  Speaker 1: such numerous cases did strain the already overburdened medical core elements.
• 48:59
  Speaker 1: Special reef crossing techniques. Inasmuch as pele loose fringing reef
• 49:05
  Speaker 1: would not permit landing craft within seven hundred yards of
• 49:08
  Speaker 1: the beach, such craft deposited tanks at.
• 49:11
  Speaker 2: The reef's edge.
• 49:13
  Speaker 1: There The depths permitted tanks to operate in most areas
• 49:16
  Speaker 1: without being submerged, but not in all. A plan was
• 49:20
  Speaker 1: devised to form tanks into small columns, each to be
• 49:24
  Speaker 1: led by an LVT. So long as the LVT was
• 49:28
  Speaker 1: grounded on the reef, the tanks could follow in trace,
• 49:32
  Speaker 1: but when the LVT encountered a depth which floated it,
• 49:35
  Speaker 1: the tanks halted while the LVT literally felt out a
• 49:39
  Speaker 1: suitable shallow path. Then the tanks followed still in small columns,
• 49:44
  Speaker 1: and so arrived at the shore at the earliest possible hour.
• 49:48
  Speaker 1: The technique was one of the keys to timely employment
• 49:51
  Speaker 1: of armor ashore. Before D Day was over, two other
• 49:55
  Speaker 1: reef crossing innovations were used.
• 49:57
  Speaker 2: On D Day.
• 49:58
  Speaker 1: A large number of MP aphibious trailers were incorporated into
• 50:02
  Speaker 1: the logistic plan to be towed behind landing craft and
• 50:05
  Speaker 1: later at reef's edge, they would be taken in tow
• 50:08
  Speaker 1: by amphibian tractors. Ashore trucks took them into tow, enabling
• 50:14
  Speaker 1: critical supplies to be moved well forward to supply points
• 50:18
  Speaker 1: just in rear of the fighting. Newly available crawler cranes
• 50:22
  Speaker 1: were emplaced on barges near the reef's edge. They could
• 50:26
  Speaker 1: lift nets full of ammunition and other vital supplies from
• 50:29
  Speaker 1: boats to tractors at the transfer line. Other such crawler
• 50:34
  Speaker 1: cranes were landed early and positioned by the shore party
• 50:37
  Speaker 1: to lift net loads from LVTs to trucks for expeditious
• 50:40
  Speaker 1: delivery forward end of chapter four Chapter five of Bloody
• 50:52
  Speaker 1: Beaches The Marines at Peleloup by Gordon D.
• 50:55
  Speaker 2: Gale.
• 50:56
  Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. The assault continues.
• 51:04
  Speaker 1: With the dawn of a new day. The two opposing
• 51:06
  Speaker 1: commanders at pelelu awoke from whatever sleep they may have
• 51:09
  Speaker 1: gotten to face immediate grim prospects. General Rupertess, having been
• 51:15
  Speaker 1: frustrated by his earlier effort to land his division reserve
• 51:18
  Speaker 1: into the southern sector of his beachhead, was now aware
• 51:21
  Speaker 1: that his northern sector stood most in need of help,
• 51:24
  Speaker 1: specifically on the extreme left flank. Rupertus ordered two seven
• 51:29
  Speaker 1: into Pullar sector for employment there. At Division headquarters Afloat,
• 51:34
  Speaker 1: more had been learned about the extent of Marine D
• 51:37
  Speaker 1: Day casualties one thy one hundred eleven, of whom two
• 51:41
  Speaker 1: hundred nine were killed in action KIA. While this was
• 51:45
  Speaker 1: not a hefty percentage of the total reinforced divisional strength,
• 51:48
  Speaker 1: the number was grim in terms of cutting edge strength.
• 51:52
  Speaker 1: Most of those one thousand, one hundred eleven casualties had
• 51:55
  Speaker 1: been suffered in eight of the division's nine infantry battalions
• 52:00
  Speaker 1: SAP in the center Rupertess was not yet on the
• 52:03
  Speaker 1: one Line, the first of eight planned phase lines. Having
• 52:07
  Speaker 1: received less than a comprehensive view of the first marine situation,
• 52:11
  Speaker 1: Rupertess was more determined than ever to move ashore quickly,
• 52:14
  Speaker 1: to see what he could, and to do whatever he
• 52:17
  Speaker 1: could to reignite the lost momentum. That he would have
• 52:20
  Speaker 1: to operate with a gimpy leg from a sandy trench
• 52:23
  Speaker 1: within a beach area still under light but frequent fire
• 52:26
  Speaker 1: seemed less a consideration to him than his need to
• 52:29
  Speaker 1: see and to know. General Rupertess had broken his ankle
• 52:33
  Speaker 1: in a pre assault training exercise and his foot was
• 52:36
  Speaker 1: in a cast for the entire operation. Over on Colonel
• 52:40
  Speaker 1: Knackagowis side, despite the incredible reports being sent out from
• 52:44
  Speaker 1: his headquarters, he could see from his high ground a
• 52:47
  Speaker 1: quite different situation. The landing force had not been put
• 52:51
  Speaker 1: to route ashore, and under his view was a division
• 52:55
  Speaker 1: of American Marines deployed across two miles of beachhead. They
• 53:00
  Speaker 1: had been punished on D Day, but were preparing to
• 53:03
  Speaker 1: renew the fight. Predictably, their attack would be launched behind
• 53:07
  Speaker 1: a hail of naval gunfire, artillery and aerial attacks they
• 53:12
  Speaker 1: would be supported by US tanks, which had so readily
• 53:15
  Speaker 1: dispatched the Japanese armor on D Day. In his own
• 53:19
  Speaker 1: D Day counter attack, Nakagawa had lost roughly one of
• 53:22
  Speaker 1: his five infantry battalions. Elsewhere, he had lost hundreds of
• 53:27
  Speaker 1: his beach defenders in fighting across the front throughout D
• 53:30
  Speaker 1: Day and in his uniformly unsuccessful night attacks against the beachhead. Nevertheless,
• 53:36
  Speaker 1: he still had several thousand determined warriors trained and armed.
• 53:41
  Speaker 1: They were deployed throughout strong and well protected defensive complexes
• 53:45
  Speaker 1: and fortifications with ample underground support facilities. All were armed
• 53:50
  Speaker 1: with the discipline and determination to kill many Americans. As
• 53:55
  Speaker 1: he had known from the start, Nakagawa's advantage lay in
• 53:58
  Speaker 1: the terrain and in his his occupation and organization of
• 54:01
  Speaker 1: that terrain. For the present and until that time when
• 54:05
  Speaker 1: he would be driven from the Umerbrogo Cress, which commanded
• 54:08
  Speaker 1: the airfield clearing, he held a dominating position. He had
• 54:13
  Speaker 1: impressive observation over his attackers and hidden fire to strike
• 54:17
  Speaker 1: with dangerous effect. His forces were largely invisible to the
• 54:21
  Speaker 1: Americans and relatively impervious to their fire superiority. His prospects
• 54:27
  Speaker 1: for continuing to hold key terrain components seemed good. The
• 54:31
  Speaker 1: Marines were attacking fortified positions against which careful and precise
• 54:35
  Speaker 1: fire preparations were needed. They were, especially on the left,
• 54:40
  Speaker 1: under extreme pressure to assault rapidly, with more emphasis upon
• 54:44
  Speaker 1: speed than upon careful preparation. With enemy observation and weapons
• 54:49
  Speaker 1: dominating the entire Marine position, stain in place was to
• 54:52
  Speaker 1: invite being picked off at the hidden enemy's leisure. General
• 54:57
  Speaker 1: Rupertess's concern for momentum remained valid. This placed the burden
• 55:01
  Speaker 1: of rapid advance primarily upon the First Marines on the left,
• 55:05
  Speaker 1: and secondarily upon the Fifth in the airfield area in
• 55:09
  Speaker 1: the south. The Seventh Marines already held its edge of
• 55:12
  Speaker 1: the airfield's terrain. The scrub jungle largely screened the regiment
• 55:17
  Speaker 1: from observation, and it was opposed by defenses oriented toward
• 55:20
  Speaker 1: the sea away from the airfield. Puller's First Marines, which
• 55:25
  Speaker 1: had already suffered the most casualties on D Day, still
• 55:28
  Speaker 1: faced the toughest terrain and positions It had to attack,
• 55:33
  Speaker 1: relieve Company K three to one on the point and
• 55:35
  Speaker 1: assault the ridges of Umerbrogel south to north. Supporting that assault,
• 55:41
  Speaker 1: Hanswetes had to swing his east facing two to one
• 55:44
  Speaker 1: leftward and to capture and clear the built up area
• 55:47
  Speaker 1: between the airfield and the ridges. This his battalion did
• 55:51
  Speaker 1: on d plus one and two, with the fifth Marines
• 55:54
  Speaker 1: assisting in its zone on the right. But then he
• 55:57
  Speaker 1: was at the foot of the commanding ridges and joined
• 56:00
  Speaker 1: in the deadly claw, scratch and scramble attack of Davis's
• 56:03
  Speaker 1: one one against the Japanese on and in the ridges.
• 56:07
  Speaker 2: As Colonel Poehler was.
• 56:08
  Speaker 1: Able to close the gaps on his left and swing
• 56:11
  Speaker 1: his entire regiment toward the north, he pivoted on Sables.
• 56:15
  Speaker 2: Three to one On the left.
• 56:17
  Speaker 1: Sable, aided by Company B one one, established contact with
• 56:21
  Speaker 1: and reinforced Company K on the point. Then he headed
• 56:25
  Speaker 1: north with his left on the beach and his right
• 56:28
  Speaker 1: near the west road, along the foot of the westernmost
• 56:31
  Speaker 1: features of the Umerbrogel complex. In Sables sector, the terrain
• 56:36
  Speaker 1: permitted tank support and offered more chances for maneuver than
• 56:39
  Speaker 1: were afforded in the ridges further to the right. Hard
• 56:43
  Speaker 1: fighting was involved, but after D Day Sables battalion was
• 56:47
  Speaker 1: able to move north faster than the units on his
• 56:49
  Speaker 1: right his advance against the enemy was limited by the
• 56:53
  Speaker 1: necessity to keep contact with Davis's.
• 56:55
  Speaker 2: One to one on his right.
• 56:57
  Speaker 1: The relative rates of movement along the bound between Sable's
• 57:01
  Speaker 1: flatter and more open zone and Davis's very rough zone
• 57:04
  Speaker 1: of action brought the first pressing need for reserves. Tactically,
• 57:09
  Speaker 1: there was clear necessity to press east into and over
• 57:12
  Speaker 1: the rough terrain and systematically reduce the complex defenses that
• 57:18
  Speaker 1: job Davis's one to one han, Sowetz's two to one
• 57:21
  Speaker 1: and Burger's two seven did, but more troops than Sable
• 57:25
  Speaker 1: had also were needed to advance north through the open terrain,
• 57:28
  Speaker 1: to begin encirclement of the rough Umerbrogel area, and to
• 57:32
  Speaker 1: find avenues into the puzzle of that rugged landscape. By
• 57:36
  Speaker 1: seventeen September, the reserves were badly needed along the First
• 57:40
  Speaker 1: Division's left west axis of advance, but on seventeen September
• 57:46
  Speaker 1: neither the division nor three amphibious corps had reserves as
• 57:50
  Speaker 1: Sables three to one fought up the easier terrain on
• 57:53
  Speaker 1: the first Marines left, Davis's one one drove into the
• 57:56
  Speaker 1: center with his left on the break between Coral Ridge
• 58:00
  Speaker 1: country and sables More open, flat zone. Among his early
• 58:04
  Speaker 1: surprises as he approached the foot of the ridge area
• 58:07
  Speaker 1: was another of the blockhouses Admiral Oldendorf had reportedly destroyed
• 58:12
  Speaker 1: with pre d day gunfire. Although it had been on
• 58:16
  Speaker 1: the planning map for weeks, those who first encountered it
• 58:19
  Speaker 1: reported the emplacement as not having a mark on it.
• 58:23
  Speaker 1: The blockhouse was part of an impressive defense complex. It
• 58:27
  Speaker 1: was connected to and supported by a web of pill
• 58:30
  Speaker 1: boxes and emplacements, which it in turn supported. The walls
• 58:35
  Speaker 1: were four feet thick of reinforced concrete. Happily, Davis was
• 58:40
  Speaker 1: given a naval gunfire support team, which called in the
• 58:42
  Speaker 1: fires of the USS Mississippi. Between them, they made fairly
• 58:47
  Speaker 1: short work of the entire complex, and one one could
• 58:50
  Speaker 1: advance until it ran into the far more insoluble Japanese
• 58:54
  Speaker 1: ridge defense systems. Major Davis, who was to earn a
• 58:58
  Speaker 1: Medal of Honor in the Korean War in nineteen fifty,
• 59:01
  Speaker 1: set of the attack into and along or across those ridges.
• 59:05
  Speaker 1: It was the most difficult assignment I have ever seen.
• 59:09
  Speaker 1: During the first Marine's action. In the first four days
• 59:11
  Speaker 1: of the campaign, all three of its battalions battled alongside
• 59:15
  Speaker 1: and up onto Umerbrogel's terrible cave filled coral ridges. Berger's
• 59:21
  Speaker 1: two seven, initially in Division reserve but assigned to the
• 59:24
  Speaker 1: First Marines on D plus one, was immediately thrown into
• 59:28
  Speaker 1: the struggle. Pullar fed two separate companies of the battalion
• 59:32
  Speaker 1: into the fight piecemeal. Shortly thereafter, two seven was given
• 59:36
  Speaker 1: a central zone of action between Colonel Poeller's first and
• 59:40
  Speaker 1: second battalions. The First Marines continued attacking on a four
• 59:44
  Speaker 1: battalion front about one thousand yards wide, against stubborn and
• 59:48
  Speaker 1: able defenders in underground caves and fortifications within an incredible
• 59:53
  Speaker 1: jumble of ridges and cliffs. Every advance opened the advancing
• 59:58
  Speaker 1: Marines to new fire from heretof hidden positions on flanks,
• 1:00:02
  Speaker 1: in rear, in caves above or below newly one ground.
• 1:00:06
  Speaker 1: Nothing better illustrated the tactical dilemmas posed by Umerbrogel than
• 1:00:10
  Speaker 1: did the nineteen September seizure of than withdraw from Hill
• 1:00:14
  Speaker 1: one hundred, a ridge bordering the so called Horseshoe Valley
• 1:00:18
  Speaker 1: at the eastern limit of the pocket. It lay in
• 1:00:21
  Speaker 1: the sector of Lieutenant Colonel Hanswitz's second Battalion, First Marines,
• 1:00:25
  Speaker 1: to which company B of Major Ray Davis's first battalion
• 1:00:29
  Speaker 1: was attached Company B one one, having landed with two
• 1:00:33
  Speaker 1: hundred and forty two men, had ninety men left when
• 1:00:36
  Speaker 1: its commander, Captain Everett P. Pope, received Hanswitz's order to
• 1:00:40
  Speaker 1: take what the Marines were then calling Hill one hundred,
• 1:00:44
  Speaker 1: the Japanese called it Higashiyama East Mountain. Initially supported by tanks,
• 1:00:50
  Speaker 1: Pope's company lost that support when the two leading tanks
• 1:00:53
  Speaker 1: slipped off and approached causeway. Continuing with only mortar support
• 1:00:58
  Speaker 1: and into the face of heavy defense mortar and machine
• 1:01:01
  Speaker 1: gun fire, Pope's marines reached the summit near twilight, only
• 1:01:05
  Speaker 1: to discover that the ridge's northeast extension led to still
• 1:01:08
  Speaker 1: higher ground from which its defenders were pouring fire upon
• 1:01:11
  Speaker 1: the contested.
• 1:01:12
  Speaker 2: Hill one hundred.
• 1:01:14
  Speaker 1: Equally threatening was fire from the enemy caves inside the
• 1:01:17
  Speaker 1: parallel ridge to the west called Five Brothers. In the
• 1:01:22
  Speaker 1: settling darkness, Pope's men, liberally supported by two ones heavy mortars,
• 1:01:26
  Speaker 1: were able to hang on Throughout the night. There was
• 1:01:30
  Speaker 1: a series of enemy probes and counterattacks onto the ridge top.
• 1:01:35
  Speaker 1: They were beaten off by the supporting mortars and by
• 1:01:37
  Speaker 1: hand to hand brawls involving not only rifles but also
• 1:01:40
  Speaker 1: knives and even rocks thrown intermittently with grenades as supplies
• 1:01:45
  Speaker 1: of them ran low. Pope's men were still clinging to
• 1:01:49
  Speaker 1: the ridge top when dawn broke, but the number of
• 1:01:51
  Speaker 1: unwounded Marines.
• 1:01:52
  Speaker 2: Was by now down to eight.
• 1:01:55
  Speaker 1: Pope was ordered to withdraw and was able to take
• 1:01:57
  Speaker 1: his wounded out, but the dead he had to lea
• 1:02:00
  Speaker 1: on the ridge, not to be recovered until three October,
• 1:02:03
  Speaker 1: when the ridge was finally recaptured for good. This action
• 1:02:07
  Speaker 1: was illustrative and prophetic of the Japanese Defender's skillful use
• 1:02:11
  Speaker 1: of mutually supporting positions throughout Umerbrogel. By d plus four,
• 1:02:17
  Speaker 1: the First Marines was a regiment in name only, having
• 1:02:20
  Speaker 1: suffered fifteen hundred casualties. This fact led to a serious
• 1:02:24
  Speaker 1: disagreement between General Rupertess, who kept urging Polar onward, and
• 1:02:29
  Speaker 1: the General Superior, Major General Roy S. Geiger, three Amphibious
• 1:02:33
  Speaker 1: Corps commander. Based on his own experiences in commanding major
• 1:02:37
  Speaker 1: ground operations at Bogainville and Guam, Geiger was very aware
• 1:02:42
  Speaker 1: of the lowered combat efficiency such losses impose upon a
• 1:02:45
  Speaker 1: committed combat unit. On twenty one September, after visiting Colonel
• 1:02:50
  Speaker 1: Poller and his forward CP and observing his exhausted condition
• 1:02:54
  Speaker 1: and that of his troops, Geiger conferred in the First
• 1:02:57
  Speaker 1: Division CP with Rupertess and some of his staff. Rupertess
• 1:03:02
  Speaker 1: was still not willing to admit that his division needed reinforcement,
• 1:03:05
  Speaker 1: but Geiger overruled him. He ordered the newly available three
• 1:03:10
  Speaker 1: twenty first Regiment Combat Team RCT eighty, First Infantry Division,
• 1:03:15
  Speaker 1: then on Angouur, to be attached to the Marine Division.
• 1:03:19
  Speaker 1: Geiger further ordered Rupertess to stand down the First Marines
• 1:03:23
  Speaker 1: and to send them back to Pavuvu, the division's rear
• 1:03:26
  Speaker 1: area base in the Russell Islands. On twenty one September
• 1:03:30
  Speaker 1: d plus five, Rupertus had ordered his seventh Marines to
• 1:03:34
  Speaker 1: relieve what was left of the first and second battalions
• 1:03:37
  Speaker 1: of the First Marines. By then, the First Marines was
• 1:03:40
  Speaker 1: reporting one thousand, seven hundred forty nine casualties. It reported
• 1:03:45
  Speaker 1: killing an estimated three thy nine hundred forty two Japanese,
• 1:03:49
  Speaker 1: the capture of ten defended coral ridges, the destruction of
• 1:03:52
  Speaker 1: three blockhouses, twenty two pill boxes, thirteen anti tank guns,
• 1:03:57
  Speaker 1: and one hundred forty four defended caves. In that fighting,
• 1:04:01
  Speaker 1: the assault battalions had captured much of the crests required
• 1:04:04
  Speaker 1: to deny the enemy observation in effective fire on the
• 1:04:07
  Speaker 1: airfield and logistic areas. Light aircraft had begun operating on
• 1:04:12
  Speaker 1: D plus five from Pelelouse, scarred and still under repair airfield.
• 1:04:17
  Speaker 1: With Purple Beach and American control, the division's logistical lifeline
• 1:04:22
  Speaker 1: was assured. Although the Japanese still had some observation over
• 1:04:26
  Speaker 1: the now operating airfield in rear areas, their reduced capability
• 1:04:30
  Speaker 1: was to harass rather than to threaten. Furthermore, the marine
• 1:04:34
  Speaker 1: front lines in the yumer Brogel had by now reached
• 1:04:37
  Speaker 1: close to what proved to be the final Japanese defensive positions.
• 1:04:42
  Speaker 1: Intelligence then available didn't tell that, but the terrain and
• 1:04:45
  Speaker 1: situation suggested that the assault requirements had been met and
• 1:04:49
  Speaker 1: that in the umer Brogel it was time for siege tactics.
• 1:04:53
  Speaker 1: The Japanese defenders also learned that when aerial observers were overhead,
• 1:04:58
  Speaker 1: they were no longer free to run their weapon out
• 1:05:00
  Speaker 1: of their caves and fire barrages toward the beach or
• 1:05:03
  Speaker 1: toward the airfield. When they tried to get off more
• 1:05:06
  Speaker 1: than a round or two, they could count on quick
• 1:05:08
  Speaker 1: counter battery or a much dreaded aerial attack from carrier
• 1:05:12
  Speaker 1: base planes or after twenty four September, from marine attack
• 1:05:17
  Speaker 1: planes operating from the field on pelelu sidebar a paucity
• 1:05:24
  Speaker 1: of reserves. Planning for the seizure of the Southern Palaws
• 1:05:30
  Speaker 1: a Gower and Pelelu Nisibus had been the responsibility of
• 1:05:33
  Speaker 1: three Amphibious Corps Major General roy ESQE. Geiger, but General
• 1:05:38
  Speaker 1: Geiger and his staff had been fully occupied during their
• 1:05:41
  Speaker 1: critical planning weeks up to including the capture of Guam
• 1:05:45
  Speaker 1: from twenty one July to ten August. The Guam operation
• 1:05:49
  Speaker 1: ended more than a month later than originally contemplated. Meanwhile,
• 1:05:54
  Speaker 1: someone else had to fill the core planning function for
• 1:05:57
  Speaker 1: the pala undertaking. A temporary headquarters X Ray Corps under
• 1:06:02
  Speaker 1: Major General Julian C. Smith was established. The two major
• 1:06:07
  Speaker 1: tactical tasks of the Southern Polaw operation were assigned to
• 1:06:10
  Speaker 1: the Army eighty first Infantry Division Angower and the first
• 1:06:14
  Speaker 1: Marine Division Pelelou Nisibus. The eighty first Division was also
• 1:06:20
  Speaker 1: tasked to set aside one RCT as corps reserve. This
• 1:06:24
  Speaker 1: partition of division level planning effort was convenient, but it
• 1:06:28
  Speaker 1: slipped into a gross imbalance and force allocation which was
• 1:06:31
  Speaker 1: neither recognized nor corrected as plans progressed toward operations. The
• 1:06:37
  Speaker 1: first Marine Division had nine infantry battalions with which to
• 1:06:40
  Speaker 1: attack more than ten thousand defending Japanese on Pelelu. Major
• 1:06:45
  Speaker 1: General Paul J. Mueller's eighty first Infantry Division had six
• 1:06:48
  Speaker 1: infantry battalions with which to attack fifteen hundred earlier reported
• 1:06:53
  Speaker 1: as twenty five hundred Japanese defenders on Angoer. Terrain and
• 1:06:58
  Speaker 1: circumstances on the two objective islands were similarly imbalanced. Pelelu
• 1:07:03
  Speaker 1: was considerably larger and had more complex terrain, its defensive
• 1:07:08
  Speaker 1: fortifications were obviously far more developed, and it offered fewer
• 1:07:12
  Speaker 1: predictable landing beaches.
• 1:07:14
  Speaker 2: Than on Goower.
• 1:07:16
  Speaker 1: Only the subsequent rapid shifting of plans and higher level
• 1:07:19
  Speaker 1: responsibilities can account for such force allocation imbalance not having
• 1:07:23
  Speaker 1: been corrected at core or expeditionary troops level. The effect
• 1:07:28
  Speaker 1: of all these imbalances was still further magnified between thirteen
• 1:07:32
  Speaker 1: and seventeen September higher level changes in plans and naval decisions,
• 1:07:38
  Speaker 1: stripped three corps.
• 1:07:39
  Speaker 2: Of all its reserves.
• 1:07:42
  Speaker 1: End of chapter five, Chapter six of Bloody Beaches The
• 1:07:51
  Speaker 1: Marines at Pelelu by Gordon D.
• 1:07:54
  Speaker 2: Gale.
• 1:07:54
  Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. The early
• 1:07:59
  Speaker 1: battle in the division center on d plus one, when
• 1:08:04
  Speaker 1: the First Marines had launched their costly Umer Brogel assault,
• 1:08:08
  Speaker 1: the Fifth Marines on its right also faced an assault situation,
• 1:08:11
  Speaker 1: but one of substantially less opposition and easier terrain. Lieutenant
• 1:08:16
  Speaker 1: Colonel Boyd's one to five had to fight across the
• 1:08:19
  Speaker 1: airfield from southwest to northeast and through the built up
• 1:08:23
  Speaker 1: area similar to that which faced Hanswitz's two to one.
• 1:08:27
  Speaker 1: The battalion was subjected to observe fire from the Umerbrogel
• 1:08:30
  Speaker 1: and to small arms fire from Japanese defenders in the
• 1:08:33
  Speaker 1: rubble field built up area. Boyd's coordinated tank infantry attack
• 1:08:38
  Speaker 1: quickly carried the day. He soon had control of that
• 1:08:42
  Speaker 1: area and the east west Cross Island road, which could
• 1:08:46
  Speaker 1: lead the Fifth toward its next objective, the eastern peninsula
• 1:08:50
  Speaker 1: of Pelelu. On the Fifth Marine's right, two five had.
• 1:08:53
  Speaker 2: A more difficult time.
• 1:08:55
  Speaker 1: Its progress was stubbornly opposed by infantry from the woods
• 1:08:59
  Speaker 1: on an its right and by artillery from Umerbrogel, which
• 1:09:03
  Speaker 1: took a particular interest in the tanks two five was
• 1:09:05
  Speaker 1: using to support its attack along the edge of the woods.
• 1:09:09
  Speaker 1: Whether the Japanese infantry in those woods had been posted
• 1:09:13
  Speaker 1: to defend that position or whether they were just arriving
• 1:09:16
  Speaker 1: Japanese infantry from the D Day counter attack was never established.
• 1:09:21
  Speaker 1: The fight took all day and inflicted heavier casualties on
• 1:09:24
  Speaker 1: Gale's battalion than.
• 1:09:26
  Speaker 2: Had D Day.
• 1:09:27
  Speaker 1: By dusk, two five had battled beyond the north end
• 1:09:30
  Speaker 1: of the airfield and halted for the night near the woods,
• 1:09:33
  Speaker 1: concealing the approaches to the Eastern Peninsula. As the two
• 1:09:37
  Speaker 1: battalion attack of the fifth Marines D plus one was
• 1:09:41
  Speaker 1: heavily engaged on its front and right, the regimental headquarters
• 1:09:44
  Speaker 1: near the beach was hit by an artillery barrage, which
• 1:09:48
  Speaker 1: coupled with D day's loss of three five's commanding officer
• 1:09:51
  Speaker 1: and executive officer, engendered a significant rearrangement in command assignments.
• 1:09:57
  Speaker 1: The early D plus one barrage hit the regiment CP
• 1:10:01
  Speaker 1: took out numbers of the staff and buried the regimental
• 1:10:03
  Speaker 1: commander in the crumbling Japanese anti tank trench in which
• 1:10:07
  Speaker 1: the CP was sheltered. Fortunately, the burial was temporary, and
• 1:10:12
  Speaker 1: Colonel Harris emerged with a twisted and battered leg but still.
• 1:10:16
  Speaker 2: Able to hobble.
• 1:10:18
  Speaker 1: Two of his principal staff officers were casualties and his
• 1:10:21
  Speaker 1: sergeant major killed. Harris elected not to be evacuated, but
• 1:10:26
  Speaker 1: he needed help in the regimental CP. Ordering Lieutenant Colonel
• 1:10:30
  Speaker 1: Walt Back from the third Battalion to the Regimental CP,
• 1:10:33
  Speaker 1: Harris directed the commanding officer of two five to send
• 1:10:37
  Speaker 1: his executive officer, Major John H. Gustafson to take command
• 1:10:41
  Speaker 1: of three five. Then Harris directed Boy to send his
• 1:10:45
  Speaker 1: one to five operations officer, Major Hiromopi to join three
• 1:10:49
  Speaker 1: five as Gustufson's executive officer. Fortunately, three to five was
• 1:10:55
  Speaker 1: having a relatively quiet day, unlike its hair raising regrouping
• 1:10:59
  Speaker 1: on the night of D Day. After daylight, as two
• 1:11:02
  Speaker 1: five attacked north, three five stretched along the east edge
• 1:11:06
  Speaker 1: of the Mangrove Lagoon, which separated Peleloo from the eastern Peninsula.
• 1:11:11
  Speaker 1: In that position, three five also tied into three seven
• 1:11:14
  Speaker 1: as the battalion attacks south. Thus three five protected each
• 1:11:19
  Speaker 1: regiment's flank against any Japanese movement across the intervening water
• 1:11:23
  Speaker 1: and into the rear of the attacking battalions. No such
• 1:11:27
  Speaker 1: threat developed, and as the afternoon grew on, there emerged
• 1:11:30
  Speaker 1: a more pressing employment for three five. As Walt returned
• 1:11:35
  Speaker 1: to his post beside the now only semi mobile Harris
• 1:11:38
  Speaker 1: Major Gustafson was told to get three five into position
• 1:11:42
  Speaker 1: to bolster and then relieve one five as it closed
• 1:11:45
  Speaker 1: in on its two objectives. Throughout the next day D
• 1:11:49
  Speaker 1: plus two, the fifth Marines kept tied in with the
• 1:11:52
  Speaker 1: First Marines on its left and captured some control of
• 1:11:55
  Speaker 1: the foot of the East Road.
• 1:11:58
  Speaker 2: On the right.
• 1:11:59
  Speaker 1: Two five hacked and combed its way through the jungle
• 1:12:01
  Speaker 1: and mangrove north of the airfield, alongside the road leading
• 1:12:05
  Speaker 1: toward the Eastern Peninsula. The thick scrub, nearly impenetrable, reduced
• 1:12:10
  Speaker 1: progress to a crawl. It compensated by concealing most of
• 1:12:15
  Speaker 1: the advancing Marines from enemy observation. From high ground to
• 1:12:18
  Speaker 1: two fives north and northwest, the Fifth Marine's forward position
• 1:12:23
  Speaker 1: generally coincided with the northeast sector of the airfield. Earlier mentioned.
• 1:12:28
  Speaker 1: Possession of that visual boundary meant that in most places
• 1:12:31
  Speaker 1: on the regimental right front line, Marines were spared the
• 1:12:35
  Speaker 1: hostile observation and directed fire from Umerbrogel. As with the
• 1:12:40
  Speaker 1: seventh Marines largely hidden in the jungle of the south,
• 1:12:43
  Speaker 1: this lessened the need for headlong assault. There would now
• 1:12:47
  Speaker 1: be freedom to maneuver more deliberately and to coordinate supporting
• 1:12:51
  Speaker 1: fire more carefully. The seventh Marine's complete destruction of enemy
• 1:12:56
  Speaker 1: in the south.
• 1:12:59
  Speaker 2: In the south from.
• 1:13:00
  Speaker 1: D plus one through D plus three, the seventh Marines
• 1:13:03
  Speaker 1: was in vigorous assault against extensive fortifications in the rear
• 1:13:07
  Speaker 1: of the Scarlet Beaches. These were defended by a full battalion,
• 1:13:12
  Speaker 1: the elite second Battalion, fifteenth Regiment. Although isolated and surrounded
• 1:13:17
  Speaker 1: by the Marines, the battalion demonstrated its skill in its
• 1:13:21
  Speaker 1: understanding of Colonel Nakagawa's orders and mission to sell Pelelu
• 1:13:25
  Speaker 1: at the highest possible price. The seventh Marines attacked with
• 1:13:30
  Speaker 1: three seven on the left and one seven on the right.
• 1:13:33
  Speaker 1: They enjoyed the advantage of attacking the extensive and well
• 1:13:36
  Speaker 1: prepared defenses from the rear, and they had both heavy
• 1:13:39
  Speaker 1: fire support and the terrain for limited maneuver in their favor.
• 1:13:44
  Speaker 1: Both sides fought bitterly, but by fifteen thirty on eighteen
• 1:13:47
  Speaker 1: September D plus three, the battle was substantially over. The
• 1:13:52
  Speaker 1: Marines had destroyed an elite Japanese reinforced infantry battalion well
• 1:13:57
  Speaker 1: positioned in a heavily fortified stronghold. Colonel Hannakin reported to
• 1:14:02
  Speaker 1: General Ruperdess that the seventh Marines objectives he had set
• 1:14:05
  Speaker 1: for D Day were all in hand. The naval gunfire
• 1:14:09
  Speaker 1: preparation had been significantly less than planned. The difference had
• 1:14:13
  Speaker 1: been made up by time and by the courage, skill,
• 1:14:16
  Speaker 1: and additional casualties of the infantry companies of one seven
• 1:14:20
  Speaker 1: and three seven. Now the seventh Marines, whose second battalion
• 1:14:25
  Speaker 1: was already in the thick of the fight for Umabrogel,
• 1:14:27
  Speaker 1: was about to move out of its own successful battle
• 1:14:30
  Speaker 1: area and into a costly assault which by this time
• 1:14:34
  Speaker 1: might have been more economically conducted as a siege maneuver
• 1:14:39
  Speaker 1: and opportunity. As the seventh Marines moved to its mission,
• 1:14:45
  Speaker 1: the fifth Marines was again successfully opening up opportunities on
• 1:14:49
  Speaker 1: Pelulu's eastern lobster Claw Peninsula. Most of those opportunities, unfortunately,
• 1:14:55
  Speaker 1: were never exploited. By the end of D plus two,
• 1:14:59
  Speaker 1: the Fifth Marine stood at the approach to the Eastern
• 1:15:01
  Speaker 1: Peninsula and astride the East Road, just east of the
• 1:15:05
  Speaker 1: First Marine's terrible struggle in Umerbrogel. It had fought somewhat
• 1:15:09
  Speaker 1: clear of the galling fires from Umerbrogel and planned an
• 1:15:13
  Speaker 1: assault on the Eastern Peninsula across a narrow causeway which
• 1:15:17
  Speaker 1: the Japanese should certainly defend. Then a D plus three
• 1:15:21
  Speaker 1: reconnaissance of the causeway revealed that the causeway was not defended.
• 1:15:26
  Speaker 1: The second Battalion hastened to seize the opportunity and moved
• 1:15:30
  Speaker 1: across in strength. The attack was hit by its own
• 1:15:33
  Speaker 1: supporting fires. The Ford Battalion CP Group was strafed by
• 1:15:38
  Speaker 1: Navy planes and then hit by artillery air burst, causing
• 1:15:42
  Speaker 1: the loss of eighteen battalion headquarters personnel to friendly fire. Nevertheless,
• 1:15:48
  Speaker 1: a bridge had across the causeway was well established on
• 1:15:51
  Speaker 1: D plus three, and the Fifth Mariness Colonel Harris, moved
• 1:15:54
  Speaker 1: to exploit it. During the afternoon. He thinned his forces
• 1:15:59
  Speaker 1: holding the East Road sector, gave the former three to
• 1:16:02
  Speaker 1: five mission to Company L three five, and gave the
• 1:16:05
  Speaker 1: remainder of three five a new mission. He ordered Gustafson
• 1:16:09
  Speaker 1: into a position within the bridge had established by two five,
• 1:16:13
  Speaker 1: and further ordered both battalions then to capture and clear
• 1:16:16
  Speaker 1: the Eastern Peninsula. Earlier, he had expected such an attack
• 1:16:20
  Speaker 1: to be against the strong defending forces originally reported on
• 1:16:24
  Speaker 1: the Eastern Peninsula. However, the apparent reduction of defending forces
• 1:16:29
  Speaker 1: now appeared to offer an opportunity to seize Purple Beach quickly,
• 1:16:33
  Speaker 1: a logistic prize of some significance. Harris knew that the
• 1:16:37
  Speaker 1: division would need to shift its logistical access to Purple
• 1:16:41
  Speaker 1: Beach away from the fire from Umerbrogel and away from
• 1:16:44
  Speaker 1: the threat of westerly storms. Before dark, Gustafson moved two
• 1:16:49
  Speaker 1: of his three five companies across the causeway and moved
• 1:16:53
  Speaker 1: his own CP group in with the two five CP,
• 1:16:56
  Speaker 1: where the two commanders jointly planned the next day's advance.
• 1:17:00
  Speaker 1: Hoping for little resistance, they directed rapid movement, but armed
• 1:17:04
  Speaker 1: their point units with war dog sections to guard against ambush.
• 1:17:09
  Speaker 1: Their lead companies moved out just after dawn. In the
• 1:17:13
  Speaker 1: three five sector, there was an ambush, but the war
• 1:17:16
  Speaker 1: dogs warned of and effectively thwarted the attempted surprise. By
• 1:17:22
  Speaker 1: the end of D plus four, the two battalions had
• 1:17:24
  Speaker 1: cleared the main body of the eastern Peninsula and had
• 1:17:27
  Speaker 1: reached Purple Beach from the rear. The defenses were most impressive,
• 1:17:32
  Speaker 1: but many were unmanned. Those enemy troops encountered seemed more
• 1:17:36
  Speaker 1: interested in hiding than in fighting, leading to speculation that
• 1:17:40
  Speaker 1: Nakagawas trained infantry had been moved west to the fight
• 1:17:43
  Speaker 1: on D day and or D plus one. By D
• 1:17:47
  Speaker 1: plus five, Purple Beach was cleared, as were the long
• 1:17:50
  Speaker 1: peninsulas southwest and northeast of Purple Beach. On D plus six,
• 1:17:56
  Speaker 1: two five seized the two islands immediately north of the
• 1:17:59
  Speaker 1: north east Peninsula, and the next day occupied the small
• 1:18:03
  Speaker 1: unmanned islet just one thousand yards east of the northern
• 1:18:06
  Speaker 1: ridges of Pelulu. From that position and positions elsewhere on
• 1:18:11
  Speaker 1: the other islands and nearing Guardlock, there appeared to be
• 1:18:15
  Speaker 1: many opportunities to attack by fire against the cave infested
• 1:18:19
  Speaker 1: nor south ridges of central.
• 1:18:21
  Speaker 2: And northern Pelolu.
• 1:18:23
  Speaker 1: Such positioning of heavy weapons would be very difficult, but
• 1:18:27
  Speaker 1: relative to the intense infantry battles underway a numbrgle, such
• 1:18:31
  Speaker 1: difficulties seemed acceptable. Many of the prospective targets could have
• 1:18:36
  Speaker 1: been vulnerable to direct flat trajectory fire across the front
• 1:18:40
  Speaker 1: of US units advancing north and central Pelulu cores. Artillery
• 1:18:45
  Speaker 1: units had conducted such direct fire training before embarking for
• 1:18:48
  Speaker 1: the Pelelu campaign. Such tactical advantages and opportunities from the
• 1:18:53
  Speaker 1: Eastern Peninsula were advocated but never exploited. Only later in
• 1:18:58
  Speaker 1: the fighting for Northern Pelelu was the Fifth Marines able
• 1:19:02
  Speaker 1: to secure point blank heavy single gunfire support encirclement of
• 1:19:08
  Speaker 1: the umer Brogl pocket. With southern and Eastern Pelelu captured,
• 1:19:14
  Speaker 1: there now began an encirclement of the Japanese defenders in
• 1:19:17
  Speaker 1: Central Pelelu and an attack against the Japanese defending Northern
• 1:19:21
  Speaker 1: Pelelu in nearby Nisibus and Kangaru. This was the obvious
• 1:19:26
  Speaker 1: next tactical face.
• 1:19:28
  Speaker 2: For combat on Pelelu.
• 1:19:30
  Speaker 1: However, securing it was less necessary for the basic Pelulu
• 1:19:33
  Speaker 1: tactical and strategic goals than for the mopping up of
• 1:19:36
  Speaker 1: the island. As the First Marine Division's Assistant commander, Brigader
• 1:19:41
  Speaker 1: General Oliver P. Smith later phrased it. By the end
• 1:19:44
  Speaker 1: of the first week, the division had control of everything
• 1:19:47
  Speaker 1: on the island that it then needed or later used.
• 1:19:51
  Speaker 1: The airfield had been seized, was under repair and improvement,
• 1:19:55
  Speaker 1: and in use. It was no longer any threat if
• 1:19:58
  Speaker 1: it had ever been. To MacArthur's long heralded return to
• 1:20:02
  Speaker 1: the Philippines. Pelulu's best logistical beach Purple, had been secured,
• 1:20:07
  Speaker 1: providing a secure logistic access to the main battle areas.
• 1:20:12
  Speaker 1: The Japanese defenders, in their caves and in northern Pelelu
• 1:20:16
  Speaker 1: and on Nisibus retained some capability to harass American rear installations,
• 1:20:21
  Speaker 1: but that were sharply curtailed by Marines counterfire. Only two
• 1:20:26
  Speaker 1: significant Japanese capabilities remained. They could bitterly resist from their
• 1:20:31
  Speaker 1: cave positions, and they had a limited capability to reinforce
• 1:20:35
  Speaker 1: Pelelu from Babothwop. Such reinforcement can only be by small
• 1:20:40
  Speaker 1: unit infiltration, which faced US naval screening operations in the area. Likewise,
• 1:20:46
  Speaker 1: American encirclement of the stubborn Umerbrogo Pocket faced two obstacles.
• 1:20:52
  Speaker 1: First was the lack of additional maneuver regiments from three
• 1:20:55
  Speaker 1: amphibious corps reserve. General Geiger in fact had no core reserve,
• 1:21:00
  Speaker 1: pending the release of some units from the forces involved
• 1:21:03
  Speaker 1: in the seizure of Onower. That landing by the eighty
• 1:21:07
  Speaker 1: first Infantry Division less the three twenty third RCT had
• 1:21:11
  Speaker 1: been launched on seventeen September, after which.
• 1:21:14
  Speaker 2: There was no core reserve.
• 1:21:17
  Speaker 1: The operation on Ongower, the planning which attended it, and
• 1:21:20
  Speaker 1: the decision on its timing, impacted heavily upon the Pelelu operation.
• 1:21:26
  Speaker 1: The naval planners early on proposed landing on Onower before Pelelu.
• 1:21:31
  Speaker 1: Only when Major General Julian C. Smith, commanding Expeditionary Troops
• 1:21:36
  Speaker 1: X RAY Planning Group, explained that such timing would invite
• 1:21:39
  Speaker 1: the numerous Japanese in northern Polaw to reinforce Pelelu. Was
• 1:21:44
  Speaker 1: it agreed that Onower be assaulted only after the Pelelu
• 1:21:47
  Speaker 1: landing was assured of success. However, the Ongour landing was
• 1:21:52
  Speaker 1: initiated before the Pelulu landing had been clearly resolved. The
• 1:21:56
  Speaker 1: commanding General of the eighty first Division wanted to land
• 1:21:59
  Speaker 1: as is possible, and he was supported in his view
• 1:22:02
  Speaker 1: by his Naval Task Unit commander, Rear Admiral William H. P.
• 1:22:06
  Speaker 2: Blandy.
• 1:22:08
  Speaker 1: Opposing the September date for the Ongour landing was Marine
• 1:22:12
  Speaker 1: Major General Julian Smith. Smith argued that committing the element
• 1:22:17
  Speaker 1: of three Corps reserved before the Pelelou operation was more
• 1:22:20
  Speaker 1: fully developed would be premature. His advice was ignored by
• 1:22:25
  Speaker 1: Vice Admiral Theodore S.
• 1:22:26
  Speaker 2: Wilkinson.
• 1:22:28
  Speaker 1: A related decision on seventeen September committed the three corps
• 1:22:32
  Speaker 1: final reserve to the Eulithie landing. The task was assigned
• 1:22:36
  Speaker 1: to the Western Attack Force, which was ordered to seize
• 1:22:39
  Speaker 1: Ulithi with available resources. Over General Smith's advice, Wilkinson chose
• 1:22:45
  Speaker 1: to commit the entire three twenty third RCT, the eighty
• 1:22:49
  Speaker 1: first Division's.
• 1:22:50
  Speaker 2: Other maneuver element.
• 1:22:52
  Speaker 1: The three twenty first subsequently and successfully occupied and undefended Eulithi,
• 1:22:57
  Speaker 1: while reserves were sorely needed at Peleliu. By twenty September,
• 1:23:02
  Speaker 1: the eighty first Division had defeated or cornered all survivors
• 1:23:05
  Speaker 1: of Onower's fourteen hundred defenders. The eighty first commander declared
• 1:23:10
  Speaker 1: Ongower secure. He tasked his three twenty second RCT to
• 1:23:15
  Speaker 1: complete the mop up and report it to General Geiger
• 1:23:18
  Speaker 1: that the three twenty first RCT was available for further operations.
• 1:23:23
  Speaker 1: The lack of enough troops to begin encircling Umerbrogel was
• 1:23:26
  Speaker 1: no longer an obstacle. The other obstacle to reinforcing the
• 1:23:31
  Speaker 1: division on Pelelu and encircling the pocket lay in the
• 1:23:34
  Speaker 1: thinking of General Rupertess, who clung to a belief that
• 1:23:37
  Speaker 1: his marines could do it without help from the army.
• 1:23:41
  Speaker 1: The three Corps plan tasked the eighty first Division to
• 1:23:44
  Speaker 1: reinforce the Marines in seizing Pelelu and then to relieve
• 1:23:47
  Speaker 1: the first Marine Division for mop up, but the General
• 1:23:50
  Speaker 1: continued to exhort his commanders to hurry up. Earlier, General
• 1:23:55
  Speaker 1: Rupertess and Colonel Poehler had shrugged off a suggestion from
• 1:23:58
  Speaker 1: the fifth Marine's bucket Hit Harris that they take a
• 1:24:01
  Speaker 1: look at the Umerbrogel Pocket from the newly available light
• 1:24:04
  Speaker 1: planes of Marine Observation Squadron three. Harris's own aerial reconnaissance,
• 1:24:10
  Speaker 1: made immediately after those planes arrived on nineteen September, had
• 1:24:14
  Speaker 1: altered his view of the Umerbrogel from sober to grave.
• 1:24:19
  Speaker 2: It convinced him.
• 1:24:20
  Speaker 1: That attacking the pocket from the north would be less
• 1:24:23
  Speaker 1: costly than the originally planned and ordered attempts from south
• 1:24:27
  Speaker 1: to north. Both Polar and Ruperdess responded to Harris that
• 1:24:31
  Speaker 1: they had their maps. The pre landing scheme of maneuver
• 1:24:36
  Speaker 1: was built on the tactical concept that after capturing the airfield,
• 1:24:40
  Speaker 1: the first marine division would push north along a line
• 1:24:43
  Speaker 1: across the width of the main or western part of
• 1:24:46
  Speaker 1: the island, once abreast of the southern edge of Umerbrogel.
• 1:24:50
  Speaker 1: That concept and maneuver scheme were reflected in a series
• 1:24:54
  Speaker 1: of four west to east phase lines indicating an expected
• 1:24:58
  Speaker 1: linear advance south tod Clearly, it was expected that the
• 1:25:03
  Speaker 1: advance along the flatter zones west and east of Umerbrogel
• 1:25:07
  Speaker 1: would be at approximately the same pace as that along
• 1:25:10
  Speaker 1: the high central ground of Peleliu. Such thinking may have
• 1:25:14
  Speaker 1: been consistent with Rupertus's prediction of a three day assault.
• 1:25:19
  Speaker 1: Developments in sable sector to the west and in the
• 1:25:22
  Speaker 1: fifth marine sector to the east apparently did not change
• 1:25:25
  Speaker 1: division level thinking until additional forces became available. Such a
• 1:25:30
  Speaker 1: linear advance may have seemed all that was possible. Even so,
• 1:25:35
  Speaker 1: there was no apparent re examination of the plan south
• 1:25:38
  Speaker 1: to north linear advance, and for days after the pocket
• 1:25:42
  Speaker 1: was sealed off at its northernmost extremity, the division commander
• 1:25:46
  Speaker 1: kept ordering attacks from south to north, generally following the
• 1:25:50
  Speaker 1: initial landing plan. As had been revealed to Bucky Harris
• 1:25:54
  Speaker 1: in his early aerial reconnaissance of the umer Brogel Pocket.
• 1:25:58
  Speaker 1: Such attacks would offer little but casualties. Troops heavily supported
• 1:26:03
  Speaker 1: could advance into the Horseshoe and into Death Valley, but
• 1:26:07
  Speaker 1: the positions they reached then proved untenable, and withdraw was
• 1:26:10
  Speaker 1: usual at day's end. Some part of this thinking may
• 1:26:14
  Speaker 1: have well come from the inadequacies of the map in use.
• 1:26:19
  Speaker 1: The Fifth Marines in early October produced a new and
• 1:26:21
  Speaker 1: more representative sketch map. It located and identified the details
• 1:26:26
  Speaker 1: within Umerbrogel sufficiently to facilitate maneuver and fire coordination. The
• 1:26:32
  Speaker 1: mapping effort incidentally led to the misnaming of Hanswitz's Hill
• 1:26:37
  Speaker 1: one hundred, where Captain Everett P. Pope earned his Medal
• 1:26:40
  Speaker 1: of Honor. The fifth Mapping team, launched after Harris's regiment
• 1:26:45
  Speaker 1: was committed against the pocket, encountered Lieutenant Colonel Walt, the
• 1:26:49
  Speaker 1: regimental executive officer, on Hill one hundred. During their sketching
• 1:26:53
  Speaker 1: and so named the hill. Even after General Geiger had
• 1:26:57
  Speaker 1: ordered General Rupertess on twenty one September to stand down
• 1:27:00
  Speaker 1: polar shattered first Marines, General Rupertus expressed the belief that
• 1:27:05
  Speaker 1: his marines alone would shortly clear the entire island. After
• 1:27:10
  Speaker 1: taking a closer look at the situation on the ground,
• 1:27:13
  Speaker 1: Geiger ordered RCT three twenty one from Angauer and attached
• 1:27:17
  Speaker 1: it to the Marine Division. Encirclement of the Yumerbrogo Pocket
• 1:27:21
  Speaker 1: now became tactically feasible. Capture of northern Pelelu and the
• 1:27:26
  Speaker 1: Esibus became more pressing with the discovery on twenty three
• 1:27:29
  Speaker 1: September that some part of the enemy's substantial troop strength
• 1:27:33
  Speaker 1: in the northern Palaws was being infiltrated by barge from
• 1:27:36
  Speaker 1: Corr and Babotwop into northern Pelelu. Although the naval patrol
• 1:27:42
  Speaker 1: set to protect against just that reinforcing action had discovered
• 1:27:45
  Speaker 1: and destroyed some of the Japanese barges, most enemy troops
• 1:27:49
  Speaker 1: seemed to have waited ashore. On the early morning of
• 1:27:51
  Speaker 1: twenty three September, Colonel Nakagawa suddenly had reinforcements in the
• 1:27:56
  Speaker 1: form of a partially mauled Infantry Battalion in North Pelelu
• 1:28:02
  Speaker 1: end of chapter six, Chapter seven of Bloody Beaches the
• 1:28:12
  Speaker 1: Marines at Pelelu by Gordon D.
• 1:28:14
  Speaker 2: Gale.
• 1:28:15
  Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Encirclement of
• 1:28:20
  Speaker 1: Umerbrogel and seizure of Northern Pelelu, a plan to encircle
• 1:28:26
  Speaker 1: the pocket and deny reinforcement to northern Pelolu was immediately formulated.
• 1:28:32
  Speaker 1: General Rupertess's staff was closely attended by selected three core
• 1:28:36
  Speaker 1: staff officers, and General Geiger also was present. The plan
• 1:28:41
  Speaker 1: called for two regiments to move up the west Road,
• 1:28:43
  Speaker 1: the Army three twenty first Infantry leading the attack and
• 1:28:46
  Speaker 1: the fifth Marines following. The Marines were to pass through
• 1:28:50
  Speaker 1: the Army unit after it had gone beyond the pocket
• 1:28:53
  Speaker 1: on its right, and the fifth would continue then to
• 1:28:56
  Speaker 1: take northern Pelolu and Nisibus. The First RCT by now
• 1:29:01
  Speaker 1: battle tested, was tasked to push up the west Road
• 1:29:05
  Speaker 1: alongside and just atop the western edge of Coral Uplift,
• 1:29:08
  Speaker 1: which marked the topographical boundary between the flat Western Plain
• 1:29:13
  Speaker 1: and the uplifted Coral Plateau. That plateau about three hundred
• 1:29:18
  Speaker 1: yards west to east constituted the western shoulder of the pocket.
• 1:29:22
  Speaker 1: The plateau rose some thirty to eighty feet above the
• 1:29:25
  Speaker 1: West Road. Its western edge or cliff, was a jumble
• 1:29:30
  Speaker 1: of knobs and small ridges which dominated the West Road
• 1:29:33
  Speaker 1: and would have to be seized and clear to permit
• 1:29:36
  Speaker 1: unharassed use of the road. Once the three twenty first
• 1:29:40
  Speaker 1: RCT was past this uplift and the pocket which had bounded,
• 1:29:44
  Speaker 1: it was to probe east in search of any routes
• 1:29:47
  Speaker 1: east through the six hundred yards necessary to reach the
• 1:29:49
  Speaker 1: eastern edge of that portion of Pelelu. Any opportunities in
• 1:29:54
  Speaker 1: that direction were to be exploited to encircle the pocket
• 1:29:57
  Speaker 1: on the north behind the three twenty five RCT. The
• 1:30:01
  Speaker 1: Fifth Marines followed, pressed through and attacked into northern Pelelou
• 1:30:06
  Speaker 1: Hannakin's Seventh Marines relieved the First, which was standing down
• 1:30:10
  Speaker 1: to the eastern peninsula, also relieving the Fifth Marines of
• 1:30:13
  Speaker 1: their then passive security role. The Fifth was then tasked
• 1:30:18
  Speaker 1: to capture northern Pelelu and to seize Nisibis Kangaru. The
• 1:30:23
  Speaker 1: maneuver would involve the use of the West Road, first
• 1:30:26
  Speaker 1: as a tactical route north, then as the line of
• 1:30:28
  Speaker 1: communications for continued operations.
• 1:30:31
  Speaker 2: To the north.
• 1:30:32
  Speaker 1: The road was comparatively open for a distance about halfway
• 1:30:36
  Speaker 1: four hundred yards to the northern limit of the pocket,
• 1:30:39
  Speaker 1: and paralleled by the ragged cliff which constituted the western
• 1:30:43
  Speaker 1: shoulder of the uplifted plateau. That feature was no level plateau,
• 1:30:48
  Speaker 1: but a veritable moonscape of coral knobs, karst and sinkholes.
• 1:30:53
  Speaker 1: It had no defined ridges or pattern. The sinkholes varied
• 1:30:58
  Speaker 1: from room size to house size, ten to thirty feet
• 1:31:01
  Speaker 1: in depth, and jungle and vine covered. The plateau was
• 1:31:05
  Speaker 1: generally thirty to one hundred feet above the plane of
• 1:31:07
  Speaker 1: the road. Some two hundred to three hundred yards further
• 1:31:11
  Speaker 1: to the east, it dropped precipitously off into a sheer cliff,
• 1:31:15
  Speaker 1: called the China Wall by those marines who looked up
• 1:31:17
  Speaker 1: to it from the southern and eastern approaches.
• 1:31:20
  Speaker 2: To the pocket.
• 1:31:22
  Speaker 1: To them, that wall was the western edge of the pocket,
• 1:31:25
  Speaker 1: and the coral plateau was a virtually impassable shoulder of
• 1:31:28
  Speaker 1: the pocket. The plateau was totally impenetrable by vehicles. The
• 1:31:34
  Speaker 1: coral sinkholes and uplifted knobs forced any infantry moving through
• 1:31:38
  Speaker 1: to crawl climb or clamber down into successive small terrain
• 1:31:43
  Speaker 1: compartments of rough and jagged surfaces. Evacuating any casualties would
• 1:31:48
  Speaker 1: involve unavoidable rough handling of stretchers and their wounded passengers.
• 1:31:54
  Speaker 1: The area was occupied and defended by scattered small units
• 1:31:57
  Speaker 1: and individuals who did not sally forth and who bitterly
• 1:32:00
  Speaker 1: resisted movement into their moonscape. When Americans moved along the
• 1:32:05
  Speaker 1: West Road, these Japanese ignored individuals took under fire only
• 1:32:09
  Speaker 1: groups or individuals which appeared to them to be rich targets.
• 1:32:14
  Speaker 1: The only tactical option along the West Road was to
• 1:32:16
  Speaker 1: seize and hold the coral spires and cliffs commanding the road,
• 1:32:20
  Speaker 1: and to defend such positions against infiltraders. Once those heights
• 1:32:25
  Speaker 1: were seized, troop units and trucks could move along West
• 1:32:28
  Speaker 1: Road until seized. The cliff offered concealment and some cover
• 1:32:33
  Speaker 1: to occupying Japanese. Until those cliff positions were seized and held,
• 1:32:38
  Speaker 1: the Japanese therein could be only temporarily silenced by heavy
• 1:32:42
  Speaker 1: fire power. Until they were driven from their commanding positions,
• 1:32:47
  Speaker 1: the road could not be treated as truly open. Those
• 1:32:50
  Speaker 1: terrain conditions existed for three quarters of a mile along
• 1:32:54
  Speaker 1: the west road. There, Abreast the north end of the pocket,
• 1:32:58
  Speaker 1: the plateau of Coral Sink coals merged into a more
• 1:33:01
  Speaker 1: systematic group of limestone ridges. These ridges trended slightly northeast,
• 1:33:07
  Speaker 1: broadening the coastal strip to an east west width of
• 1:33:10
  Speaker 1: two hundred to four hundred yards into that meylu. The
• 1:33:14
  Speaker 1: three twenty first RCT was launched on twenty three September
• 1:33:18
  Speaker 1: behind an hour long intensive naval gunfire and artillery preparation
• 1:33:22
  Speaker 1: against the high ground commanding the west road. The initial
• 1:33:26
  Speaker 1: army reconnaissance patrols moved generally west of the road, somewhat
• 1:33:30
  Speaker 1: screened from any Japanese still on the cliff just east
• 1:33:33
  Speaker 1: of the road by vegetation and small terrain features. These
• 1:33:37
  Speaker 1: tactics worked until larger units of the second Battalion three
• 1:33:40
  Speaker 1: twenty first moved out astride the west road. Then they
• 1:33:44
  Speaker 1: experienced galling fire from the heights above the road. The
• 1:33:48
  Speaker 1: three twenty first Second Battalion had relieved third Battalion First
• 1:33:52
  Speaker 1: Marines along an east west line across the road and
• 1:33:55
  Speaker 1: up onto the heights just above the road. Near that point,
• 1:33:59
  Speaker 1: the first Marines had been tied into the forward left
• 1:34:02
  Speaker 1: flank of third Battalion, seventh Marines. The orders for the
• 1:34:06
  Speaker 1: advance called for three seven to follow behind elements of
• 1:34:09
  Speaker 1: two three twenty one along the high ground as the
• 1:34:12
  Speaker 1: soldiers seized the succeeding west edge of the cliff and
• 1:34:15
  Speaker 1: advanced northward. However, the advanced elements along the ridge were
• 1:34:20
  Speaker 1: immediately outpaced by the other two three twenty one elements
• 1:34:24
  Speaker 1: in the flat to their west. Instead of fighting north
• 1:34:28
  Speaker 1: to seize the ridge, units responsible for that cliff abandoned it,
• 1:34:32
  Speaker 1: sidestepping down to the road. They then advanced along the
• 1:34:36
  Speaker 1: road and soon reported that three seven was not keeping
• 1:34:39
  Speaker 1: contact along the high ground. On orders from Colonel Hannaken,
• 1:34:44
  Speaker 1: the seventh Marines commanding officer, three seven then captured the
• 1:34:47
  Speaker 1: high ground which two three twenty one had abandoned, but
• 1:34:50
  Speaker 1: at a cost which did little for inner service relations. Thereafter,
• 1:34:55
  Speaker 1: three seven was gradually further committed along the ridge within
• 1:34:59
  Speaker 1: the three twenty five first zone of action. This, of course,
• 1:35:03
  Speaker 1: stretched three to seven, which still had to maintain contact
• 1:35:06
  Speaker 1: on its right in the seventh Marine zone, generally facing
• 1:35:09
  Speaker 1: the southern shoulders of the umer Brogo Pocket further north
• 1:35:13
  Speaker 1: as the three twenty first pressed on, it was able
• 1:35:16
  Speaker 1: to regain some of the heights above its axis of advance,
• 1:35:20
  Speaker 1: and thereafter held.
• 1:35:21
  Speaker 2: On to them.
• 1:35:22
  Speaker 1: Abreast the northern end of Umerbrogo Pocket, where the sinkhole
• 1:35:26
  Speaker 1: terrain blended into more regular ridge lines, the three twenty
• 1:35:29
  Speaker 1: first captured parts of a key feature, Hill one hundred,
• 1:35:34
  Speaker 1: together with an adjacent hill just east of East Road
• 1:35:37
  Speaker 1: and designated Hill B. That position constituted the northern cap.
• 1:35:41
  Speaker 2: Of the umer Brogo Pocket.
• 1:35:43
  Speaker 1: Seizing Hill B and consolidating the partial hold on Hill
• 1:35:47
  Speaker 1: one hundred would occupy the three twenty first for the
• 1:35:50
  Speaker 1: next three days. As the regiment probed this eastern path
• 1:35:55
  Speaker 1: across the north end of Umerbrogel, it also pushed patrols
• 1:35:58
  Speaker 1: north up the West Road in the vicinity of the
• 1:36:01
  Speaker 1: building's designated radio station, it reached a promising road junction.
• 1:36:07
  Speaker 1: It was, in fact the junction of West and East roads.
• 1:36:11
  Speaker 1: Colonel Robert F. Dark, commanding officer of RCT three twenty one,
• 1:36:15
  Speaker 1: determined to exploit that route back south to add a
• 1:36:18
  Speaker 1: new direction to his attack upon Hill one hundred, He'll b.
• 1:36:23
  Speaker 1: He organized a mobile task force heavy in armour and flamethrowers,
• 1:36:27
  Speaker 1: designated Task Force Nil, named after Captain George C.
• 1:36:31
  Speaker 2: Neil.
• 1:36:32
  Speaker 1: He sent it circling southeast and south to join two
• 1:36:36
  Speaker 1: three twenty one's efforts at the Hill one hundred hill
• 1:36:38
  Speaker 1: be scene below that battle. The seventh Marines continued pressure
• 1:36:43
  Speaker 1: on the south and east fronts of the pocket, but
• 1:36:45
  Speaker 1: still attacking south to north. As those efforts were under way,
• 1:36:50
  Speaker 1: the Fifth Marines was ordered into the developing campaign for
• 1:36:53
  Speaker 1: Northern Pelulu. Now relieved by the First Marines of its
• 1:36:57
  Speaker 1: passive security mission on the eastern Peninsula and its nearby
• 1:37:01
  Speaker 1: three small islands, the Fifth moved over the west road
• 1:37:04
  Speaker 1: to sidestep the three twenty first action and seize northern Pelelu.
• 1:37:09
  Speaker 1: Having received the division order at eleven hundred, the fifth
• 1:37:12
  Speaker 1: motored marched and waited off the northeastern islets two and
• 1:37:16
  Speaker 1: along the west road. By thirteen hundred, its first battalion
• 1:37:21
  Speaker 1: was passing through the three twenty first lines at ger Koru,
• 1:37:25
  Speaker 1: moving to attack the radio station installations discovered by three
• 1:37:28
  Speaker 1: twenty first patrols the previous afternoon. In this area, the
• 1:37:33
  Speaker 1: Fifth Marines found flat ground, some open and some covered
• 1:37:36
  Speaker 1: with palm trees. The ground was broken by the familiar
• 1:37:40
  Speaker 1: limestone ridges, but with the critical tactical difference that most
• 1:37:44
  Speaker 1: of the ridges stood alone. Attackers were not always exposed
• 1:37:49
  Speaker 1: to flanking fires from mutually supporting defenses in adjacent and
• 1:37:53
  Speaker 1: or parallel ridges as in the Umerbrogel. The Japanese had
• 1:37:57
  Speaker 1: prepared the northern ridges for defense as early as they
• 1:38:00
  Speaker 1: had done in the Umerbrogel, with extensive tunnels and concealed
• 1:38:04
  Speaker 1: gun positions. However, the positions could be attacked individually with
• 1:38:09
  Speaker 1: deliberate tank, flamethrower and demolition tactics. Further, it developed that
• 1:38:15
  Speaker 1: the defenders were not all trained infantrymen, many were from
• 1:38:18
  Speaker 1: naval construction units on the U S side of the fight.
• 1:38:22
  Speaker 1: A weighty command factor shaped the campaign into.
• 1:38:25
  Speaker 2: Northern Pelelu Colonel Harold D. Bucky.
• 1:38:29
  Speaker 1: Harris was determined to develop all available firepower fully before
• 1:38:33
  Speaker 1: sending his infantry into assault. His aerial reconnaissance earlier had
• 1:38:38
  Speaker 1: acquainted him with an understanding of the terrain. This knowledge
• 1:38:42
  Speaker 1: strengthened his resolve to continue using all available firepower and
• 1:38:46
  Speaker 1: employing deliberate tactics as he pursued his regiment's assigned missions.
• 1:38:52
  Speaker 1: On the afternoon of twenty five September one to five
• 1:38:55
  Speaker 1: seized the radio station complex and the near portion of
• 1:38:58
  Speaker 1: a hill commanding it. When three five arrived, it was
• 1:39:02
  Speaker 1: directed to seize the next high ground to the east
• 1:39:05
  Speaker 1: of one five's position. Then, when two five closed, it
• 1:39:09
  Speaker 1: tied into the right of three five's position and extended
• 1:39:12
  Speaker 1: the regimental line back to the beach. This effectively broke
• 1:39:17
  Speaker 1: contact with the three twenty first operations to the south,
• 1:39:20
  Speaker 1: but fulfilled Colonel Harris's plans to advance north as rapidly
• 1:39:24
  Speaker 1: as possible without overextending his lines. By suddenly establishing this
• 1:39:30
  Speaker 1: regimental beachhead, the fifth Marines had surprised the defenders with
• 1:39:34
  Speaker 1: strong forces challenging the cave defenses and in position to
• 1:39:37
  Speaker 1: engage them fully on the next day. The following day,
• 1:39:42
  Speaker 1: twenty six September, as the three twenty first launched its
• 1:39:45
  Speaker 1: three pronged attack against Hill one hundred, Hill B northern
• 1:39:49
  Speaker 1: cap of the Yumerbrogeo pocket, and the fifth Marines attacked
• 1:39:52
  Speaker 1: four hills running east to west across Pelulu, dubbed Hills one, two,
• 1:39:57
  Speaker 1: three and Radar Hill in Hill Row. The row was
• 1:40:01
  Speaker 1: perpendicular to and south of the last northern ridge, Amiango Mountain.
• 1:40:07
  Speaker 1: These hills in the ridge were defended by some fifteen
• 1:40:10
  Speaker 1: hundred infantry artillery men, naval engineers, and the shot up
• 1:40:14
  Speaker 1: reinforcing infantry battalion, which landed the night of twenty three
• 1:40:17
  Speaker 1: September in caves and interconnected tunnels within the ridge and
• 1:40:21
  Speaker 1: the hills. As the fight for hill Row developed, Colonel
• 1:40:25
  Speaker 1: Harrison his second battalion sidestepped west of hill Row and
• 1:40:29
  Speaker 1: begin an attack on the Amiango Ridge to the north.
• 1:40:33
  Speaker 1: Before dark, the second Battalion had taken the southern end
• 1:40:37
  Speaker 1: and crest of the ridge, but was under severe fire
• 1:40:39
  Speaker 1: from cave positions in the central and northwestern slopes.
• 1:40:43
  Speaker 2: Of the ridge.
• 1:40:44
  Speaker 1: What was not yet appreciated was that the Marines were
• 1:40:47
  Speaker 1: confronting the most comprehensive set of caves and tunnels on Peleulu.
• 1:40:52
  Speaker 1: They were trying to invade the home and defensive position
• 1:40:55
  Speaker 1: of a long established naval construction unit, most of whose
• 1:40:59
  Speaker 1: members were better miners than infantry men. As dark fell,
• 1:41:03
  Speaker 1: the second battalion cut itself loose from the units to
• 1:41:06
  Speaker 1: its south and formed a small battalion beachhead for the night.
• 1:41:11
  Speaker 1: The next morning, as the second Battalion, fifth Marines tried
• 1:41:14
  Speaker 1: to move along the route leading to the northern nose
• 1:41:16
  Speaker 1: of Amiangle Ridge, it ran into a wide and deep
• 1:41:20
  Speaker 1: anti tank ditch, which denied the attacking infantry the close
• 1:41:23
  Speaker 1: tank support they had so successfully used earlier. At this point,
• 1:41:28
  Speaker 1: the fifth Marine's command asked again for point blank artillery.
• 1:41:33
  Speaker 1: This time Division headquarters responded favorably. During the night of
• 1:41:37
  Speaker 1: twenty seven September, Major George V. Hannah's eighth one hundred
• 1:41:41
  Speaker 1: and fifty five millimeter Gun Battalion moved one of its
• 1:41:44
  Speaker 1: pieces into position in two to five sector. The gun
• 1:41:48
  Speaker 1: was about one hundred eighty yards from the face of
• 1:41:51
  Speaker 1: Amiangle Ridge. The sight of that threat at dawn elicited
• 1:41:55
  Speaker 1: enemy machine gun fire, which inflicted some casualties upon the
• 1:41:59
  Speaker 1: artillery men. This fire was quickly suppressed by marine infantry
• 1:42:03
  Speaker 1: fire and then by the one hundred fifty five millimeter
• 1:42:06
  Speaker 1: gun itself.
• 1:42:08
  Speaker 2: Throughout the morning, the.
• 1:42:09
  Speaker 1: Heavy one hundred fifty five millimeter fire played across the
• 1:42:12
  Speaker 1: face of Amiangle Ridge, destroying or closing all identified caves
• 1:42:17
  Speaker 1: on the west face except for one. That latter was
• 1:42:20
  Speaker 1: a tunnel mouth down at ground level and on the
• 1:42:23
  Speaker 1: northwestern base of the hill. It was too close to
• 1:42:27
  Speaker 1: friendly lines to permit the gun to take it under fire,
• 1:42:30
  Speaker 1: but by then tanks had neutralized the tunnel mouth and
• 1:42:34
  Speaker 1: a tank bulldozer filled in a portion of the anti
• 1:42:37
  Speaker 1: tank ditch. This allowed two five's tank infantry teams to
• 1:42:41
  Speaker 1: close on the tunnel mouth, to blast and bulldoze it closed,
• 1:42:44
  Speaker 1: and to press on around the northern nose of Amiangle. Simultaneously,
• 1:42:50
  Speaker 1: marine swept over the slopes above the tunnel and seized
• 1:42:53
  Speaker 1: the crest of the small mountain. The term seizure is
• 1:42:56
  Speaker 1: qualified for although two five held the outside of the hill,
• 1:43:00
  Speaker 1: the stubborn Japanese defenders still held the inside. A maze
• 1:43:04
  Speaker 1: of interconnected tunnels extended throughout the length and breadth of
• 1:43:08
  Speaker 1: the amiangl Ridge. From time to time, the Japanese inside
• 1:43:12
  Speaker 1: the mountain would blast open a previously close caver tunnel
• 1:43:15
  Speaker 1: mouth and sortie to challenge the Marines. Notwithstanding their surprise effect,
• 1:43:21
  Speaker 1: these counter attacks provided a rare and welcome opportunity for
• 1:43:25
  Speaker 1: the Marines actually to see their enemy in daylight. Such
• 1:43:29
  Speaker 1: tactics were inconsistent with the general Japanese strategy for Pelelu
• 1:43:33
  Speaker 1: and somewhat shortened the fight for the northern end of
• 1:43:36
  Speaker 1: the island. As that fighting progressed, the fifth Marines assembled
• 1:43:40
  Speaker 1: its third battalion, supporting tanks, Amphibian tractors, and the entire
• 1:43:45
  Speaker 1: panopoly of naval gunfire and air support to launch a
• 1:43:48
  Speaker 1: short ashore operation to seize Nisibus and Kangaru, six hundred
• 1:43:53
  Speaker 1: yards north of Pelelu on twenty eight September. There followed
• 1:43:57
  Speaker 1: an operation which was made to look but which in
• 1:44:01
  Speaker 1: fact involved a single reinforced but depleted battalion against some
• 1:44:05
  Speaker 1: five hundred prepared and entrenched Japanese infantry for some thirty
• 1:44:10
  Speaker 1: five hours. The battalion conducted the most cost effective single
• 1:44:14
  Speaker 1: battalion operation of the entire Pelelu campaign. Much of the
• 1:44:19
  Speaker 1: credit for such effectiveness was due to supporting aviation. VMF
• 1:44:23
  Speaker 1: one fourteen under Major Robert F. Cowboy Stout had landed
• 1:44:28
  Speaker 1: on Pelelu's airstrip just three days prior to this landing
• 1:44:31
  Speaker 1: and immediately undertook its primary service mission supporting marine ground operations.
• 1:44:38
  Speaker 1: The Nisibus landing was the first in the Pacific War
• 1:44:41
  Speaker 1: for which the entire air support of the landing was
• 1:44:44
  Speaker 1: provided by marine aviation. As the LVTs entered the water
• 1:44:48
  Speaker 1: from Pelelu shore, the naval gunfire prematurely lifted to the
• 1:44:52
  Speaker 1: alarm of the assault troops. Stout's pilots immediately recognized the
• 1:44:57
  Speaker 1: situation resumed their strafing of knees ucibus until the LVTs
• 1:45:01
  Speaker 1: were within thirty yards of the beach. They flew so
• 1:45:05
  Speaker 1: low that the watching Marines expected some of them to
• 1:45:07
  Speaker 1: shoot each other down by their ricochets. This action so
• 1:45:12
  Speaker 1: kept the Japanese defenders down that the Marines and the
• 1:45:15
  Speaker 1: leading waves were upon them before they recovered from the
• 1:45:17
  Speaker 1: shock of the strafing planes. The third Battalion got ashore
• 1:45:22
  Speaker 1: with no casualties, thus enabled to knock out all the
• 1:45:26
  Speaker 1: Japanese in beach defenses immediately. It turned its attention to
• 1:45:29
  Speaker 1: the cave positions and the ridges and blockhouses. The ridges here,
• 1:45:34
  Speaker 1: as with those on Northern Pelelu, stood individually, not as
• 1:45:38
  Speaker 1: part of complex ridge systems. This denied their defender's opportunities
• 1:45:44
  Speaker 1: for a mutual defense between cave positions. The attacking companies
• 1:45:48
  Speaker 1: of three to five could use supporting tanks and concentrate
• 1:45:51
  Speaker 1: all fire means upon each defensive system without being taken
• 1:45:55
  Speaker 1: under fire from their flanks and rear. By nightfall on
• 1:45:59
  Speaker 1: twenty eight September, three five had overrun most of the opposition.
• 1:46:04
  Speaker 1: On twenty nine September. There was a day of mopping
• 1:46:06
  Speaker 1: up before Nisibus was declared secure at fifteen hundred. As planned,
• 1:46:12
  Speaker 1: the island was turned over to two three twenty one
• 1:46:15
  Speaker 1: and three five was moved to Division reserve in the
• 1:46:18
  Speaker 1: Angardo Loloch area. Seizure of Nisabus by one depleted infantry
• 1:46:23
  Speaker 1: battalion gave a dramatic illustration of an enduring principle of war,
• 1:46:27
  Speaker 1: the effective concentration of means to support that battalion. General
• 1:46:33
  Speaker 1: Rupertess concentrated the bulk of all his available firepower, a battleship,
• 1:46:38
  Speaker 1: two cruisers, most of the divisional and corps artillery, virtually
• 1:46:42
  Speaker 1: all of the divisions remaining armour, armor, amphibian tractors, all
• 1:46:46
  Speaker 1: troop carrying amphibian tractors, and all marine aviation on Peleliu.
• 1:46:52
  Speaker 1: Such concentrated support enabled the heavily depleted third Battalion, Fifth
• 1:46:56
  Speaker 1: Marines to quickly seize Nisibus, destroying four hundred and sixty
• 1:47:00
  Speaker 1: three of Colonel Nakagawa's battle hardened and well in placed
• 1:47:04
  Speaker 1: warriors in thirty six hours at a cost of forty
• 1:47:07
  Speaker 1: eight American casualties. Other maneuver elements on Pelelu also were
• 1:47:12
  Speaker 1: attacking during those thirty six hours, but add an intensity
• 1:47:16
  Speaker 1: adjusted to the limited support consequent upon General Rupertus's all
• 1:47:20
  Speaker 1: out support of the day's primary objective. As three to
• 1:47:24
  Speaker 1: five was clearing the Esibus, the rest of the fifth
• 1:47:27
  Speaker 1: Marines was fighting the Japanese still in northeast Pelelu. After
• 1:47:31
  Speaker 1: capturing Akarakoro Point beyond Amiango Mountain, two five turned south.
• 1:47:38
  Speaker 1: It swept through the defenses east of that mountain with
• 1:47:40
  Speaker 1: demolitions and flame throwers, then moved south toward Radar Hill,
• 1:47:45
  Speaker 1: the eastern stronghold of Hill Row. That feature was under
• 1:47:49
  Speaker 1: attack from the south and west.
• 1:47:50
  Speaker 2: By one to five.
• 1:47:52
  Speaker 1: After two days, the two battalions were in command of
• 1:47:55
  Speaker 1: the scene, at least on the top side of the hills.
• 1:47:59
  Speaker 1: Inside them, there still remained stubborn Japanese defenders who continued
• 1:48:03
  Speaker 1: to resist the contest for Radar Hill, as did the
• 1:48:06
  Speaker 1: defenders within Amiango Mountain's extensive tunnels. All could be silenced
• 1:48:11
  Speaker 1: when the cave or tunnel mouse were blasted closed. As
• 1:48:15
  Speaker 1: these operations were in progress, the three twenty first at
• 1:48:18
  Speaker 1: the north end of Umerbrogel completed seizing Hills one hundred
• 1:48:22
  Speaker 1: and Hill B, then cleared out the ridge camilleonlol Mountain
• 1:48:26
  Speaker 1: and rode north from there to the area of Fifth
• 1:48:28
  Speaker 1: Marines operations. On thirty September, the three twenty first relieved
• 1:48:34
  Speaker 1: the first and second battalions of the Fifth Marines in
• 1:48:36
  Speaker 1: northern Pelelu. That regiment reassembled in the Ingardo Loloch area
• 1:48:41
  Speaker 1: before it became once more necessary to commit it to
• 1:48:44
  Speaker 1: the Umerbrogel Pocket. End of chapter seven Chapter eight of
• 1:48:56
  Speaker 1: Bloody Beaches the Marines at Pelelu by Gordon D.
• 1:48:59
  Speaker 2: Gale.
• 1:49:00
  Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. The umer
• 1:49:05
  Speaker 1: Brogo Pocket peleloose character distilled in a very real sense.
• 1:49:11
  Speaker 1: The umer Brogo Pocket typified the worst features of the
• 1:49:14
  Speaker 1: post D Day campaign for Pelelu. It provided the scene
• 1:49:18
  Speaker 1: of some of Pelulu's worst and most costly fighting, and
• 1:49:21
  Speaker 1: of some of the campaign's best and worst tactical judgments.
• 1:49:26
  Speaker 1: Its terrain was the most difficult and challenging on the island.
• 1:49:30
  Speaker 1: Pre landing planning did not perceive the pocket for what
• 1:49:33
  Speaker 1: it was, a complex cave in ridge fortress suitable to
• 1:49:36
  Speaker 1: a fanatic and suicidal defense plans for the seizure of
• 1:49:41
  Speaker 1: the area treated the pocket's complex terrain as oversimplified, time
• 1:49:46
  Speaker 1: phased linear objectives to be seized concurrently with the flat
• 1:49:49
  Speaker 1: terrain abutting it to the east and west. The southern
• 1:49:53
  Speaker 1: slopes generally called Bloody Nose, dominated the landing beaches and
• 1:49:58
  Speaker 1: airfield over which the had to be approached. After those
• 1:50:03
  Speaker 1: heights were conquered by the heroic and costly assaults of
• 1:50:06
  Speaker 1: Poehler's first Marines, with Burgers two seven attached, and after
• 1:50:10
  Speaker 1: the division had set in artillery, which was controlled by
• 1:50:13
  Speaker 1: aerial observers overhead, the situation changed radically. The Pocket's defenders
• 1:50:19
  Speaker 1: thereafter retained only the capability to harass and delay the Americans,
• 1:50:23
  Speaker 1: to annoy them with intermittent attacks by fire and with
• 1:50:26
  Speaker 1: nighttime raids, but after d plus four, umer Brogel's defenders
• 1:50:31
  Speaker 1: could no longer seriously threaten the division's mission. Nevertheless, after
• 1:50:37
  Speaker 1: the critical enemy observation sites were seized, general Rupertess kept
• 1:50:41
  Speaker 1: urging momentum, as though the seizure of the pocket were
• 1:50:44
  Speaker 1: as urgent as had been seizure of the commanding heights
• 1:50:47
  Speaker 1: guarding it from the south. The stubborn character of the
• 1:50:51
  Speaker 1: terrain and its determined defenders became entwined with the determined
• 1:50:55
  Speaker 1: character of the general commanding the first Marine Division. This
• 1:50:59
  Speaker 1: admixture was sorted out only by time and by the
• 1:51:02
  Speaker 1: reluctant intercession of General Geiger. Most of the offensive effort
• 1:51:06
  Speaker 1: into the pocket between twenty one and twenty nine September
• 1:51:09
  Speaker 1: was directed from south to north into the mouths or
• 1:51:12
  Speaker 1: up onto the ridges of the twin box canyons which
• 1:51:15
  Speaker 1: defined the pocket. Infantry, supported by tanks, air and flame
• 1:51:20
  Speaker 1: throwing LVTs, could penetrate the low ground, but generally then
• 1:51:23
  Speaker 1: found themselves surrounded on three sides. Japanese positions inside the
• 1:51:29
  Speaker 1: ridges of the canyons, hidden from observation and protected in
• 1:51:32
  Speaker 1: their caves, were quite capable of making the captured low
• 1:51:35
  Speaker 1: ground untenable. Other attacks aimed at seizing the heights of
• 1:51:40
  Speaker 1: the eastern ridges, while initially successful in that small infantry
• 1:51:44
  Speaker 1: units could scramble up onto the bare ridge tops, thereafter
• 1:51:48
  Speaker 1: came under fire from facing parallel ridges and caves. They
• 1:51:52
  Speaker 1: were subject to strong knight counter attacks from Japanese who
• 1:51:55
  Speaker 1: left their caves under cover of darkness. During twenty septem
• 1:52:00
  Speaker 1: number d plus five. The seventh Marines had relieved the
• 1:52:03
  Speaker 1: First Marines along the south and southwestern fronts of the pocket,
• 1:52:07
  Speaker 1: and on the twenty first, the third and first Battalions
• 1:52:09
  Speaker 1: resumed the attack into the pocket from southwest and south.
• 1:52:14
  Speaker 1: These attacks achieved limited initial successes behind heavy fire support
• 1:52:19
  Speaker 1: and smoke, but succeeded only in advancing to positions which
• 1:52:22
  Speaker 1: grew untenable after the supporting fire and smoke was lifted.
• 1:52:27
  Speaker 1: Assault troops had to be withdrawn under renewed fire support
• 1:52:30
  Speaker 1: to approximately their jump off positions. There was little to
• 1:52:34
  Speaker 1: show for the day's valiant efforts. Attacks the next day,
• 1:52:38
  Speaker 1: twenty two September against the west shoulder of the pocket
• 1:52:42
  Speaker 1: from the West Road up to the Western Box Canyon,
• 1:52:46
  Speaker 1: Wildcat Bowl and toward Higashiyama Hill one forty, all liberally
• 1:52:51
  Speaker 1: supported with firepower, again produced early advances, most of which
• 1:52:55
  Speaker 1: had to be surrendered at day's end as all three
• 1:52:58
  Speaker 1: attacking groups came under and crew fire from the Japanese.
• 1:53:01
  Speaker 1: Hidden in mutually supporting cave positions. The seventh Marines had,
• 1:53:06
  Speaker 1: unbeknown to it, reached within about one hundred yards of
• 1:53:10
  Speaker 1: Colonel Knakagawa's final command cave position. However, many supporting ridges
• 1:53:16
  Speaker 1: and hilltops would have to be reduced before a direct
• 1:53:18
  Speaker 1: attack upon the cave could have any hope of success.
• 1:53:22
  Speaker 1: The fight for Umerbrogo Pocket had devolved into a siege
• 1:53:26
  Speaker 1: situation to be reduced only by siege tactics, but the
• 1:53:30
  Speaker 1: first Marine Division's commander continued to cling to his belief
• 1:53:34
  Speaker 1: that there would be a breakthrough against the enemy's opposition.
• 1:53:38
  Speaker 1: He insisted that continued battalion and regimental assaults would bring victory.
• 1:53:42
  Speaker 1: Very shortly when the three twenty first probes eastward near
• 1:53:46
  Speaker 1: the northern end of the pocket brought them within grasp
• 1:53:48
  Speaker 1: of sealing off that pocket from the north, they deployed
• 1:53:51
  Speaker 1: two battalions second and third, facing eastward to complete the encirclement.
• 1:53:57
  Speaker 1: This attack against h'll be the stuff Opper at the
• 1:54:00
  Speaker 1: northern end of the pocket absorbed the three twenty first
• 1:54:03
  Speaker 1: infantryes full attention through twenty sixth September. As the fifth
• 1:54:07
  Speaker 1: Marines was fighting in northern Pelulu, the seventh Marines continued
• 1:54:11
  Speaker 1: pressuring the pocket from the south and guarding it on
• 1:54:14
  Speaker 1: the west. With the three twenty first victory on the
• 1:54:18
  Speaker 1: twenty sixth, that unit's mission was expanded to press into
• 1:54:21
  Speaker 1: the pocket.
• 1:54:22
  Speaker 2: From the north.
• 1:54:24
  Speaker 1: This it did while simultaneously clearing out the sporadically defended Camilleonlo.
• 1:54:29
  Speaker 2: Ridge to its north.
• 1:54:32
  Speaker 1: Its attack south from Hillby and adjacent ridges made very
• 1:54:35
  Speaker 1: limited progress, but permitted some consolidation of the American hold
• 1:54:39
  Speaker 1: along the north side of the pocket, now four hundred
• 1:54:42
  Speaker 1: yards wide in that zone. On twenty nine September, the
• 1:54:46
  Speaker 1: seventh Marines was ordered to relieve the army unit in
• 1:54:48
  Speaker 1: that northern sector to relieve two seven and three seven
• 1:54:53
  Speaker 1: of their now largely static guard positions along the west
• 1:54:56
  Speaker 1: and southwest sectors of the pocket. The division stripped hundreds
• 1:54:59
  Speaker 1: of non infantry from combat support units Artillery Engineer Pioneer
• 1:55:05
  Speaker 1: and formed them into two composite infantillery units under eleventh
• 1:55:10
  Speaker 1: Marines Lieutenant Colonel Richard B. Evans and the fifth Marine's
• 1:55:13
  Speaker 1: Major Herald TA.
• 1:55:15
  Speaker 2: Richmond.
• 1:55:15
  Speaker 1: They were assigned to maintain the static hold in the
• 1:55:18
  Speaker 1: sectors earlier held by two seven and three seven. They
• 1:55:22
  Speaker 1: faced the Kars Plateau between the West Road and the pocket.
• 1:55:26
  Speaker 1: The seventh Marines's flexibility restored by this relief, its first
• 1:55:30
  Speaker 1: and third battalions relieved the three twenty first units on
• 1:55:33
  Speaker 1: twenty nine September along the north edge of the pocket.
• 1:55:37
  Speaker 1: Then on the thirtieth they pushed south, secure and improved
• 1:55:41
  Speaker 1: control of Boyd Ridge in its southern extension, variously called
• 1:55:45
  Speaker 1: Hill one hundred, Pope's Ridge, or walt Ridge. The latter
• 1:55:49
  Speaker 1: dominated the East Road, but Japanese defenders remained in caves
• 1:55:53
  Speaker 1: on the west side. The seventh Marines's partial hold on
• 1:55:57
  Speaker 1: Pope Ridge gave limited control of East Road and thereby
• 1:56:00
  Speaker 1: stabilized the east side of the pocket, but the US
• 1:56:04
  Speaker 1: hold over the area needed improvement. On three October, reinforced
• 1:56:09
  Speaker 1: by the Attached three five back from Nisibus, the seventh
• 1:56:13
  Speaker 1: Regiment organized a four battalion attack. The plan called for
• 1:56:17
  Speaker 1: one seven and three seven to attack from the north
• 1:56:20
  Speaker 1: against Boyd Ridge and the smaller ridges to its west,
• 1:56:24
  Speaker 1: while two seven would attack Pope walt Ridge from the south.
• 1:56:28
  Speaker 1: The Attached three to five was ordered to make a
• 1:56:31
  Speaker 1: diversionary attack from the south into the Horseshoe Canyon and
• 1:56:34
  Speaker 1: its guardian five sisters on its west. This regimental attack
• 1:56:38
  Speaker 1: against the pocket committed four infantry battalions, all now closer
• 1:56:42
  Speaker 1: to company than battalion strength, against the heights near the
• 1:56:46
  Speaker 1: southern end of the pocket five Sisters and the Ridges
• 1:56:49
  Speaker 1: at the eastern shoulder of the pocket Pope and Boyd Ridges.
• 1:56:53
  Speaker 1: After heavy casualties, the attack succeeded, but the Five Sisters,
• 1:56:58
  Speaker 1: four of which three five scales, were untenable and had
• 1:57:01
  Speaker 1: to be abandoned after their seizure. The next day, for October,
• 1:57:06
  Speaker 1: the seventh Marines, with three to five still attached, made
• 1:57:09
  Speaker 1: one more general attack in the south again to seize
• 1:57:12
  Speaker 1: then give up positions on the Five Sisters in the
• 1:57:16
  Speaker 1: north to try to advance and consolidate the positions there
• 1:57:19
  Speaker 1: earlier seized In that for October action. The third Battalion
• 1:57:24
  Speaker 1: seventh Marines push led to an unexpectedly rapid advance which
• 1:57:28
  Speaker 1: it pressed to get up onto Hill one twenty. It
• 1:57:31
  Speaker 1: was hoped that this would provide a good jump off
• 1:57:33
  Speaker 1: for the next day's operation against the next ridge to
• 1:57:36
  Speaker 1: the west. However, Hill one twenty, as with so many
• 1:57:41
  Speaker 1: others in the Yumerbrogel, was then under enemy crossfire, which
• 1:57:44
  Speaker 1: made it completely untenable. The attacking company was withdrawn with
• 1:57:49
  Speaker 1: heavy casualties. Among these casualties was Captain James V. JMO Shanley,
• 1:57:55
  Speaker 1: commanding Company L his company was attacking Ridge when several
• 1:58:01
  Speaker 1: of his men fell wounded. Shanley dashed forward under heavy fire,
• 1:58:06
  Speaker 1: rescued two of the men and brought them to safety
• 1:58:08
  Speaker 1: behind a tank. He then rushed back to help a
• 1:58:12
  Speaker 1: third when a mortar round landed immediately behind him, mortally
• 1:58:16
  Speaker 1: wounding him. His executive officer, Lieutenant Harold J. Collins, ran
• 1:58:21
  Speaker 1: out to rescue him, only to fall by his side,
• 1:58:24
  Speaker 1: instantly killed by a Japanese anti tank round. For his heroism,
• 1:58:29
  Speaker 1: Captain Shanley was awarded a Gold Star second for the
• 1:58:32
  Speaker 1: Navy Cross he had earned at Cape Gloucester, New Britain.
• 1:58:36
  Speaker 1: There his company was in the lead in seizing Hill
• 1:58:39
  Speaker 1: six sixty, a key terrain feature in the Borgen Bay area.
• 1:58:43
  Speaker 2: The seventh Marines had now been in the.
• 1:58:45
  Speaker 1: Terrible Umerbrogel struggle for two weeks. General Rupertus decided to
• 1:58:50
  Speaker 1: relieve it. Of course, General Geiger also suggested. Still determined
• 1:58:55
  Speaker 1: to secure the pocket with marines, General rupert Has turned
• 1:58:58
  Speaker 1: to his only remaining Marine Resps regiment, the fifth. Colonel
• 1:59:02
  Speaker 1: Harris brought two firm concepts to this final effort for
• 1:59:05
  Speaker 1: his fifth Marines. First, the attack would be from the north,
• 1:59:10
  Speaker 1: an approach, which offered the greatest opportunity to chip off
• 1:59:13
  Speaker 1: one terrain compartment or one ridge at a time. His
• 1:59:17
  Speaker 1: first battalion positions along the east side of the pocket
• 1:59:20
  Speaker 1: would be held statically, perhaps incrementally adjusted or improved. No
• 1:59:25
  Speaker 1: attacks would be launched from the south, where the third
• 1:59:28
  Speaker 1: Battalion was positioned in reserve. Colonel Harris's aerial reconnaissance during
• 1:59:33
  Speaker 1: the first week on Pelulu had convinced him that siege
• 1:59:36
  Speaker 1: tactics would be required to clear the multitude of mutually
• 1:59:39
  Speaker 1: defended positions within Umerbrogel. As he had earlier expressed himself
• 1:59:44
  Speaker 1: in the presence of the Corps and division commanders visiting
• 1:59:47
  Speaker 1: his regimental CP Harris continued with his policy to be
• 1:59:51
  Speaker 1: lavish with ammunition and stingy with men's lives. He was
• 1:59:56
  Speaker 1: in a strong command position to prepare support thoroughly before
• 1:59:59
  Speaker 1: ordering it advances. The second Battalion, fifth Marines relieved third Battalion,
• 2:00:04
  Speaker 1: seventh Marines in position on five October, but did nothing
• 2:00:08
  Speaker 1: but reconnoiter positions where heavier firepower could come into play.
• 2:00:13
  Speaker 1: Engineer dozers were brought up to prepare paths into the
• 2:00:16
  Speaker 1: north ends of the box, canyons along which LVT flamethrowers
• 2:00:21
  Speaker 1: and tanks could later operate. A light artillery battery was
• 2:00:25
  Speaker 1: emplaced along the West Road to fire point blank into
• 2:00:28
  Speaker 1: the west facing cliffs at the north end of the pocket,
• 2:00:31
  Speaker 1: as were weapons carriers and tanks. Later, troublesome sections of
• 2:00:36
  Speaker 1: certain cliffs were literally demolished by direct fire and the
• 2:00:39
  Speaker 1: rubble dozed into a ramp for tanks to climb toward
• 2:00:42
  Speaker 1: better firing positions. Light mortars were used extensively to strip
• 2:00:47
  Speaker 1: vegetation from areas in which firing caves were suspected, and
• 2:00:51
  Speaker 1: planes loaded with napalm filled belly tanks were used to
• 2:00:54
  Speaker 1: bomb suspected targets just south of the key Hill one forty,
• 2:00:58
  Speaker 1: which two five had selected as its key objective. As
• 2:01:02
  Speaker 1: two five picked off successive firing positions in the north
• 2:01:06
  Speaker 1: three to five on seven October sent a tank sortie
• 2:01:09
  Speaker 1: into the Horseshoe. This time the mission was not to
• 2:01:12
  Speaker 1: season hold, but to destroy by fire all identifiable targets
• 2:01:17
  Speaker 1: on the faces of the five Sisters and on the
• 2:01:19
  Speaker 1: western lower face of Hill one hundred Pope Ridge. When
• 2:01:24
  Speaker 1: all ammunition was expended, the tanks withdrew to rearmed and returned,
• 2:01:28
  Speaker 1: accompanied by LVT flame throwing tanks and guarded by small
• 2:01:32
  Speaker 1: infantry fire teams. Considerably more destruction was effected. A large
• 2:01:38
  Speaker 1: number of Japanese were killed in caves, and many of
• 2:01:40
  Speaker 1: the Japanese heavy weapons in those caves were silenced. Previous
• 2:01:45
  Speaker 1: to this time, some single artillery pieces firing from within
• 2:01:48
  Speaker 1: the horseshoe had occasionally harassed the airfield. No such nuisance
• 2:01:53
  Speaker 1: attacks occurred after the seven October tank sorties. For the
• 2:01:57
  Speaker 1: next six days, the fifth Marin's HEADQ afforded all available
• 2:02:01
  Speaker 1: support to small incremental advances by two five from the north.
• 2:02:06
  Speaker 1: Light mortars were repeatedly used to clear all vegetation from
• 2:02:09
  Speaker 1: small objectives and routes of advance. Both tanks and artillery
• 2:02:14
  Speaker 1: were used at point blank ranges to fire into all
• 2:02:17
  Speaker 1: suspected caves or rough coral areas. Aerial bombardment with napalm
• 2:02:22
  Speaker 1: was used to clear vegetation and hopefully drive some defenders
• 2:02:26
  Speaker 1: further back into their caves. All advances were very limited,
• 2:02:30
  Speaker 1: aimed simply at seizing new firing positions. Advances were made
• 2:02:35
  Speaker 1: by squads or small platoons. The last position seized Hill
• 2:02:40
  Speaker 1: one forty just north of the Five Brothers afforded a
• 2:02:44
  Speaker 1: firing site to which a seventy five millimeters pack howitzer
• 2:02:47
  Speaker 1: was wrestled in disassembled mode, reassembled, sand bagged, and then
• 2:02:52
  Speaker 1: effectively fired. From its then commanding position. It could fire
• 2:02:56
  Speaker 1: into the mouth of a very large cave at the
• 2:02:58
  Speaker 1: base of the next ridge, from which serious fire had
• 2:03:01
  Speaker 1: been received for days. Sandbagging this piece into position posted
• 2:03:06
  Speaker 1: special problems, since the only available loose sand or dirt
• 2:03:10
  Speaker 1: had to be carried from the beach or occasional debris slides. Nevertheless,
• 2:03:15
  Speaker 1: the use of sandbags in forward infantry positions began to
• 2:03:19
  Speaker 1: be used increasingly, and the technique was later improved and
• 2:03:22
  Speaker 1: widely used when any First Infantry Division soldiers took over
• 2:03:26
  Speaker 1: further reduction of the pocket. By this mode of careful advance,
• 2:03:31
  Speaker 1: a number of small knobs and ridges at the head
• 2:03:33
  Speaker 1: of the two murderous box canyons were seized. Direct fire
• 2:03:37
  Speaker 1: could be laid into the west face of Walt and
• 2:03:40
  Speaker 1: Boyd ridges, whose tops were occupied by one to five,
• 2:03:43
  Speaker 1: but those cave filled western slopes were protected by other
• 2:03:47
  Speaker 1: caves on the opposite parallel ridge known as Five Brothers.
• 2:03:51
  Speaker 1: A week of such siege like activity pushed the northern
• 2:03:54
  Speaker 1: boundary of the pocket another five hundred yards south. On
• 2:03:58
  Speaker 1: twelve October, the the third Battalion, fifth Marines was called
• 2:04:02
  Speaker 1: in to relieve second Battalion, fifth Marines. The relief was
• 2:04:06
  Speaker 1: seriously marred, primarily because the forward positions being relieved were
• 2:04:10
  Speaker 1: so close to the opposing enemy. The incoming troops, including
• 2:04:14
  Speaker 1: a company commander, were picked off by snipers during this exchange,
• 2:04:18
  Speaker 1: and a small group of enemy reoccupied a position earlier
• 2:04:22
  Speaker 1: subdued by frequent interdiction fires. Despite these losses and interruptions,
• 2:04:27
  Speaker 1: the relief was completed on schedule, and on thirteen October,
• 2:04:31
  Speaker 1: three to five continued the slow and deliberate wedging forward
• 2:04:35
  Speaker 1: directly south of Hill one forty. There seemed no feasible
• 2:04:38
  Speaker 1: axis for advance, so three five's axis was shifted southwest,
• 2:04:43
  Speaker 1: approximately paralleling the West Road and into the Coral badlands
• 2:04:47
  Speaker 1: in front of the containing lines manned by the composite
• 2:04:50
  Speaker 1: groups guarding West Road. While the composite groups held in place,
• 2:04:55
  Speaker 1: three five operated across their front north to south. By
• 2:04:59
  Speaker 1: this means, as the Coral badlands were cleared out for
• 2:05:02
  Speaker 1: an average east to west depth of seventy five to
• 2:05:05
  Speaker 1: one hundred fifty yards along some five hundred yards of
• 2:05:08
  Speaker 1: the north south front. This terrain, earlier judged unsuitable for
• 2:05:13
  Speaker 1: any but the costliest and most difficult advance, was now
• 2:05:16
  Speaker 1: traversed with the aid of preparatory fire scouring by napalm bombs.
• 2:05:21
  Speaker 1: Major Cowboy stouts VMF one fourteen. Pilots's bombs fell breathtakingly
• 2:05:27
  Speaker 1: close to both the advancing three five front and to
• 2:05:29
  Speaker 1: the stationary composite units holding just east of West Road.
• 2:05:34
  Speaker 1: A similar effort was then launched from the south by
• 2:05:36
  Speaker 1: what was left of Lieutenant Colonel John Gormley's one seven.
• 2:05:41
  Speaker 1: Together these two advances seized and emptied about one half
• 2:05:44
  Speaker 1: of the depth of the coral bad lands between West
• 2:05:47
  Speaker 1: Road and the China Wall. This clearing action allowed the
• 2:05:51
  Speaker 1: composite infantillary unit to advance its lines eastward and then
• 2:05:55
  Speaker 1: hold as far as the infantry had cleared toward the
• 2:05:58
  Speaker 1: back of China Wall. Overall, the actions of the fifth
• 2:06:03
  Speaker 1: and seventh Marines in October had reduced the pocket to
• 2:06:06
  Speaker 1: an oval some eight hundred yards north to south and
• 2:06:09
  Speaker 1: four hundred to five hundred yards east to west. According
• 2:06:12
  Speaker 1: to Colonel Knackagawa's contemporaneous radio report back to Korr he
• 2:06:17
  Speaker 1: still had some seven hundred defenders within the pocket, of
• 2:06:20
  Speaker 1: which only eighty percent were effective. In early October, some
• 2:06:25
  Speaker 1: wag had suggested that the pocket situation be clarified by
• 2:06:28
  Speaker 1: enclosing it with barbed wire and designating it as a
• 2:06:31
  Speaker 1: prisoner of war enclosure spoken in bitter jests. The concept
• 2:06:36
  Speaker 1: did recognize that the pocket no longer counted in the
• 2:06:39
  Speaker 1: strategic balance nor in completing the effective seizure of Pelelu,
• 2:06:44
  Speaker 1: but it still weighed significantly in the mind of Major
• 2:06:47
  Speaker 1: General Rupertess, who wanted to subdue the pocket before turning
• 2:06:50
  Speaker 1: over to Major General Mueller. The eighty first Divisions previously
• 2:06:54
  Speaker 1: specified mopping up task. In point of fact, Rupertess's successful
• 2:06:59
  Speaker 1: seize Nisibus and Northern Pelelu had terminated the enemy capability
• 2:07:04
  Speaker 1: to reinforce the now isolated Japanese on Pelelu. Creation of
• 2:07:08
  Speaker 1: that tactical situation had effectively secured Pelelu without pressing for
• 2:07:14
  Speaker 1: a declaration that Pelelu had been effectively secured, which would
• 2:07:17
  Speaker 1: have formalized the completion of the first Marine Division's mission.
• 2:07:21
  Speaker 1: General Geiger had for some days suggested that in continuing
• 2:07:24
  Speaker 1: his attacks into the pocket, Rupertus relief first the fifth
• 2:07:28
  Speaker 1: then the seventh Marines with his largest and freshest infantry regiment,
• 2:07:32
  Speaker 1: the three twenty first RCT still attached to First Marine Division.
• 2:07:37
  Speaker 1: To all such suggestions, General Rupertus replied that his Marines
• 2:07:41
  Speaker 1: would very shortly subdue the pocket. Two events now overtook
• 2:07:46
  Speaker 1: General Rupertess's confidence. First, the eighty first Division was made
• 2:07:51
  Speaker 1: whole by the return of its three twenty third RCT,
• 2:07:54
  Speaker 1: fresh from its critically important seizure of Ulithi. Second, the
• 2:07:59
  Speaker 1: perception that pelelou was effectively secured was validated by a
• 2:08:03
  Speaker 1: message which so stated from Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander
• 2:08:07
  Speaker 1: in chief Pacific Fleet, Commander in chief Pacific Ocean Areas.
• 2:08:12
  Speaker 1: Major General Geiger was directed to turnover command to Major
• 2:08:15
  Speaker 1: General Mueller, whose eighty first Division was now directed to
• 2:08:18
  Speaker 1: relieve the First Marine Division to mop up and to
• 2:08:21
  Speaker 1: Garrison pelelu As long Planned. Rear Admiral George E. Fort,
• 2:08:27
  Speaker 1: Rear Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson's successor as commander of operations
• 2:08:31
  Speaker 1: in the Polaws, was directed to turn over that responsibility
• 2:08:35
  Speaker 1: to Vice Admiral John H. Hoover, a sub area commander.
• 2:08:39
  Speaker 1: When relieved by the eighty first Division, the First Marine
• 2:08:42
  Speaker 1: Division would embark for return to Pavuvu. During the movement
• 2:08:46
  Speaker 1: and turnover tactical operations, Ashore necessarily remained under First Marine
• 2:08:51
  Speaker 1: Division control until the eighty first Division could move its
• 2:08:54
  Speaker 1: command posts from Ongauer. General Mueller established his CP near
• 2:08:59
  Speaker 1: Pellow Loose Purple Beach on twenty October. The Wildcat Division
• 2:09:04
  Speaker 1: thereupon acquired custody of the Pocket and responsibility for final
• 2:09:08
  Speaker 1: reduction of its determined abled battered defenders. Meanwhile, the relief
• 2:09:14
  Speaker 1: of the fifth Marines by the three twenty first RCT
• 2:09:16
  Speaker 1: took place on fifteen and sixteen October. While that relief
• 2:09:21
  Speaker 1: was in progress, Lieutenant Colonel Gormley's one seven was still
• 2:09:24
  Speaker 1: engaged in the earlier described Coraal bad Lands action to
• 2:09:28
  Speaker 1: make possible the eastward movement of the containing lines protecting
• 2:09:32
  Speaker 1: west Road. The relief of one seven was accordingly delayed
• 2:09:36
  Speaker 1: until the next day. On seventeen October, a full strength
• 2:09:40
  Speaker 1: Company B one three twenty three, newly arrived from Eulethi,
• 2:09:44
  Speaker 1: relieved Gormley's surviving battalion approximately man for man end of
• 2:09:51
  Speaker 1: chapter eight Chapter nine of Bloody Beaches the Marines at
• 2:10:01
  Speaker 1: Pelelou by Gordon D.
• 2:10:02
  Speaker 2: Gale.
• 2:10:03
  Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Post assault
• 2:10:08
  Speaker 1: operations in the Plaws. When on twenty October Major General
• 2:10:14
  Speaker 1: Mueller became responsible for mopping up on pelelu he addressed
• 2:10:18
  Speaker 1: the tactical problem as a siege situation and directed his
• 2:10:22
  Speaker 1: troops to proceed accordingly. Over a period of nearly six weeks,
• 2:10:26
  Speaker 1: his two regiments, the three twenty second and three twenty
• 2:10:30
  Speaker 1: third Infantry plus two three twenty one did just that.
• 2:10:34
  Speaker 1: They used sandbags as an assault device, carrying sand up
• 2:10:38
  Speaker 1: from the beaches and inching the filled sandbags forward to
• 2:10:41
  Speaker 1: press ever nearer to positions from which to attack by fire.
• 2:10:44
  Speaker 1: The Japanese caves and dug in strong points. They made
• 2:10:49
  Speaker 1: liberal use of tanks and flamethrowers, even improving upon the
• 2:10:52
  Speaker 1: vehicle mounted flame thrower. They thrust a gasoline pipeline forward
• 2:10:57
  Speaker 1: from a road bound gasoline truck. They enabling them with
• 2:11:01
  Speaker 1: booster pumps to throw napalm hundreds of feet ahead into
• 2:11:04
  Speaker 1: Japanese defensive areas. Noting the effectiveness of the seventy five
• 2:11:09
  Speaker 1: millimeters pack howitzer, which the Marines had wrestled up to
• 2:11:12
  Speaker 1: Hill one forty. They sought and found other sites to
• 2:11:15
  Speaker 1: which they moved pack howitzers and from which they fired
• 2:11:18
  Speaker 1: point blank into defending caves. To support their growing need
• 2:11:22
  Speaker 1: for sandbags on ridge stop foxholes, their engineers strung high
• 2:11:26
  Speaker 1: lines to transport sand and ammo and rations up to
• 2:11:30
  Speaker 1: such peaks and ridge tops. Notwithstanding these deliberate siege tactics,
• 2:11:35
  Speaker 1: the eighty first troops still faced death and maiming as
• 2:11:38
  Speaker 1: they ground down the bitter and stubborn Japanese defenses. The
• 2:11:43
  Speaker 1: siege of the umer Brogo Pocket consumed the full efforts
• 2:11:46
  Speaker 1: of the eighty first Divisions three twenty second RCT and
• 2:11:49
  Speaker 1: three twenty third RCT, as well as two three twenty
• 2:11:52
  Speaker 1: one until twenty seven November nineteen forty four d plus
• 2:11:56
  Speaker 1: seventy three. This prolonged Sie drop eneration was carried on
• 2:12:01
  Speaker 1: within twenty five miles of a much larger force of
• 2:12:03
  Speaker 1: some twenty five thousand Japanese soldiers in the northern Plaws.
• 2:12:08
  Speaker 1: Minor infiltrations aside, those Japanese were isolated by US Navy
• 2:12:13
  Speaker 1: patrols and by regular bombing from Marine Aircraft Group eleven
• 2:12:17
  Speaker 1: operating from Pelelu difficult and costly. As the American advances were,
• 2:12:22
  Speaker 1: the Japanese defenders in their underground positions had a similarly
• 2:12:26
  Speaker 1: demanding an even more discouraging situation. Water was low, sanitation
• 2:12:32
  Speaker 1: was crude to nonexistent, rations were short, and ammunition was
• 2:12:36
  Speaker 1: even scarcer. As time wore on, some of the Japanese,
• 2:12:41
  Speaker 1: when afforded opportunity, chose to leave their defenses and undertake feudal,
• 2:12:46
  Speaker 1: usually suicidal.
• 2:12:47
  Speaker 2: Night attacks.
• 2:12:49
  Speaker 1: A very few succeeded in being captured. Toward late November,
• 2:12:54
  Speaker 1: even Major General Muri apparently came to this point of view,
• 2:12:58
  Speaker 1: Still not in command, he nevertheless proposed in a radio
• 2:13:02
  Speaker 1: message to Lieutenant General inuway On Corr a Bonzai finale
• 2:13:06
  Speaker 1: for their prolonged defense, but General Inoway turned down the proposal.
• 2:13:12
  Speaker 1: By this time, Nakagawa's only exterior communications were by radio
• 2:13:16
  Speaker 1: to Korer. As he had anticipated, all local wire communications
• 2:13:21
  Speaker 1: had been destroyed. He had issued mission orders to carry
• 2:13:25
  Speaker 1: his units through the final phase of defense. As the
• 2:13:29
  Speaker 1: tanks and infantry carefully pressed their relentless advances, the eighty
• 2:13:33
  Speaker 1: first Division's engineers pressed forward and improved the roads and
• 2:13:36
  Speaker 1: ramps leading into or toward the heart of the Japanese
• 2:13:39
  Speaker 1: final positions. This facilitated the tank and flamethrower attacks to
• 2:13:44
  Speaker 1: systematically reduce each cave in position as the infantry pushed
• 2:13:48
  Speaker 1: its sandbag foxholes forward. On twenty four November, Colonel Nakagawa
• 2:13:54
  Speaker 1: sent his final message to his superior on CORER. He
• 2:13:57
  Speaker 1: advised that he had burned the colors of the second
• 2:14:00
  Speaker 1: Infantry Regiment. He said that the final fifty six men
• 2:14:03
  Speaker 1: had been split into seventeen infiltration parties to slip through
• 2:14:07
  Speaker 1: the American positions and to attack the enemy everywhere. During
• 2:14:11
  Speaker 1: the night of twenty four to twenty five November, twenty
• 2:14:14
  Speaker 1: five Japanese, including two officers, were killed. Another soldier was
• 2:14:20
  Speaker 1: captured the following morning. His interrogation, together with post war
• 2:14:25
  Speaker 1: records and interviews, led to his conclusion that Colonel Nakagawa
• 2:14:29
  Speaker 1: and Major General Muri died in the CP in ritual suicide.
• 2:14:34
  Speaker 1: The final two day advance of the eighty first Division
• 2:14:37
  Speaker 1: soldiers was truly and literally a mopping up operation. It
• 2:14:41
  Speaker 1: was carefully conducted to search out any hold up opposition.
• 2:14:46
  Speaker 1: By midday on twenty seven November, the north moving units,
• 2:14:50
  Speaker 1: guarded on the east by other army units, met face
• 2:14:53
  Speaker 1: to face with the battalion moving south near the Japanese
• 2:14:56
  Speaker 1: CP later located the three twenty thirds come out. Colonel
• 2:15:01
  Speaker 1: Arthur P. Watson reported to General Mueller that the operation
• 2:15:05
  Speaker 1: was over.
• 2:15:06
  Speaker 2: Not quite.
• 2:15:08
  Speaker 1: Marine air on Pelelu continued to attack the Japanese positions
• 2:15:11
  Speaker 1: in Corps and Babytwop, joining the patrolling Navy units, and
• 2:15:15
  Speaker 1: destroying or bottling up any remaining Japanese forces in the
• 2:15:19
  Speaker 1: Northern Palaws. A late casualty in that action was the
• 2:15:23
  Speaker 1: indomitable Major Robert F. Cowboy Stout, whose vmf iein fourteen
• 2:15:27
  Speaker 1: had delivered so much effective air support to the ground
• 2:15:30
  Speaker 1: combat on Pelelu. The stubborn determination of the Japanese to
• 2:15:35
  Speaker 1: carry out their Emperor's war aims was starkly symbolized by
• 2:15:38
  Speaker 1: the last thirty three prisoners captured on Pelelu. In March
• 2:15:42
  Speaker 1: nineteen forty seven, a small marine guard attached to a
• 2:15:46
  Speaker 1: small naval garrison on the island encountered unmistakable signs of
• 2:15:50
  Speaker 1: a Japanese military presence in a cave in the umer Brogel.
• 2:15:54
  Speaker 1: Patrolling an ambushes produced a straggler, a Japanese seaman, who
• 2:15:58
  Speaker 1: told of thirty three remaining Japanese under the military command
• 2:16:02
  Speaker 1: of Lieutenant Tadamichi Yamaguchi. Although the straggler reported some dissension
• 2:16:07
  Speaker 1: within the ranks of that varied group, it seemed that
• 2:16:10
  Speaker 1: a final Banzai attack was under consideration. The Navy garrison
• 2:16:14
  Speaker 1: commander moved all Navy personnel and some thirty five dependents
• 2:16:19
  Speaker 1: to a secure area and sent to Guam for reinforcements.
• 2:16:22
  Speaker 1: In a Japanese War crimes witness Rear Admiral Michio Sumikawa.
• 2:16:27
  Speaker 1: The admiral flew in and traveled by jeep along the
• 2:16:30
  Speaker 1: roads near the suspected cave positions. Through a loudspeaker, he
• 2:16:35
  Speaker 1: recited the then existing situation.
• 2:16:38
  Speaker 2: No response.
• 2:16:40
  Speaker 1: Finally, the Japanese seamen who had originally surrendered went back
• 2:16:43
  Speaker 1: to the cave, armed with letters from Japanese families and
• 2:16:46
  Speaker 1: former officers from the Palaws advising the holdouts of.
• 2:16:50
  Speaker 2: The end of the war.
• 2:16:52
  Speaker 1: On twenty one April nineteen forty seven, the holdouts formerly surrendered.
• 2:16:57
  Speaker 1: Lieutenant Yamaguchi led twenty six soldiers to a position in
• 2:17:00
  Speaker 1: front of eighty battle dress Marines. He bowed and handed
• 2:17:04
  Speaker 1: his sword to the American naval commander on the scene.
• 2:17:09
  Speaker 1: Was the seizure of Pelelu necessary costs versus benefits? What
• 2:17:15
  Speaker 1: advantages to the United States war effort grew from the
• 2:17:18
  Speaker 1: conquest of Pelelu. It assured absolute domination of all the Polaws,
• 2:17:24
  Speaker 1: thereby adding marginally to the security of MacArthur's right flank
• 2:17:28
  Speaker 1: as he continued westward then northward from New Guinea into
• 2:17:32
  Speaker 1: his Philippines campaign. Within the Polaws group, it destroyed facilities
• 2:17:37
  Speaker 1: which survived Admiral Mark A. Mitcher's devastating strike of March
• 2:17:41
  Speaker 1: nineteen forty four. It ensured total denial of support to
• 2:17:45
  Speaker 1: the enemy from Corps submarine basing facilities, incrementally decreasing the
• 2:17:50
  Speaker 1: already waning Japanese submarine capability east of the Philippines. The
• 2:17:55
  Speaker 1: United States position on Pelelu completed the neutralization of some
• 2:17:59
  Speaker 1: twenty five five thousand Japanese troops in northern Polaw. The
• 2:18:03
  Speaker 1: landing on Pelulu did not contribute to the Regimental Landing
• 2:18:07
  Speaker 1: Team RLT three twenty three unopposed seizure of Euleithi. Admiral
• 2:18:12
  Speaker 1: William F. Halsey had earlier believed that his force could
• 2:18:15
  Speaker 1: seize Euleithi without first seizing Pelelu. The most visible benefit
• 2:18:20
  Speaker 1: of a subdued Pelelu lay in its use as a
• 2:18:23
  Speaker 1: link in the flight path and line of communications from
• 2:18:26
  Speaker 1: Hawaii and from the Marianas to the Philippines. The holding
• 2:18:31
  Speaker 1: was a convenience, but not a necessity. Such judgment could
• 2:18:35
  Speaker 1: be disputed, however, by the survivors of the Indianapolis's twenty
• 2:18:40
  Speaker 1: nine July nineteen forty five sinking, Having delivered atomic bomb
• 2:18:44
  Speaker 1: parts to Tinnian shortly before the ship was headed for
• 2:18:48
  Speaker 1: the Philippines when it was suddenly torpedoed at night. The
• 2:18:52
  Speaker 1: ship went down in twelve minutes, and no report of
• 2:18:55
  Speaker 1: the contact or sinking was received. The fourth day after
• 2:18:59
  Speaker 1: the sinking, its three hundred sixteen survivors from a crew
• 2:19:02
  Speaker 1: of one thousand, one hundred ninety six were cited by
• 2:19:05
  Speaker 1: a Navy patrol bomber working out of Pelelu. The sighting
• 2:19:10
  Speaker 1: led directly to their rescue and most certainly would not
• 2:19:13
  Speaker 1: have occurred but for American occupation of Pelelu. What did
• 2:19:17
  Speaker 1: the seizure of Pelelu cost? Marine casualties numbered six thousand
• 2:19:22
  Speaker 1: five hundred twenty six, including Navy cormen and doctors, of
• 2:19:26
  Speaker 1: whom one thousand, two hundred fifty two were killed. The
• 2:19:29
  Speaker 1: eighty first Division totaled three thousand, eighty nine casualties, of
• 2:19:33
  Speaker 1: whom four hundred four were killed in action. Total US
• 2:19:37
  Speaker 1: troop casualties was nine thousand, six hundred and fifteen for Pelelu,
• 2:19:40
  Speaker 1: Angaur and Nisbus, with one thousand, six hundred fifty six dead.
• 2:19:45
  Speaker 1: By inflicting that many casualties, the Japanese were successful in
• 2:19:49
  Speaker 1: implementing their long standing delay and bleed strategy. The actions
• 2:19:54
  Speaker 1: cost them an estimated ten thousand, nine hundred casualties, all
• 2:19:57
  Speaker 1: but a tiny fraction killed. Just two hundred two prisoners
• 2:20:02
  Speaker 1: of war were captured, only nineteen of whom were Japanese military,
• 2:20:06
  Speaker 1: seven Army, twelve Navy. The others were laborers, largely Korean.
• 2:20:12
  Speaker 1: Among the Japanese military defenders, less than two per thousand
• 2:20:16
  Speaker 1: were captured. The costs at Pelelu held warnings of plenty
• 2:20:20
  Speaker 1: for the remaining Allied operations to be conducted across the
• 2:20:24
  Speaker 1: Pacific to Japan, even with total local air and naval superiority,
• 2:20:29
  Speaker 1: With lavish naval gunfire and bombs with the dreaded napalm weaponry,
• 2:20:34
  Speaker 1: and with a four to one troop superiority. The seizure
• 2:20:37
  Speaker 1: of Pelelu consumed one American casualty in one thousand, five
• 2:20:41
  Speaker 1: hundred eighty nine rounds of heavy and light troop ammunition
• 2:20:44
  Speaker 1: for each single Japanese defender killed or driven from his
• 2:20:47
  Speaker 1: prepared position. A few months later, the attacks on Iwo,
• 2:20:52
  Speaker 1: Jima and Okinawa would confirm this grim calculus of war
• 2:20:55
  Speaker 1: against determined Japanese defenders ably led in prepared defense. The
• 2:21:01
  Speaker 1: question of whether the Pelelu operation was necessary remains moot
• 2:21:05
  Speaker 1: even today, some fifty two years after the one September
• 2:21:08
  Speaker 1: nineteen forty four landing. The heroism and exemplary conduct of
• 2:21:13
  Speaker 1: the first Marine Division, its Marines and Navy cormen, and
• 2:21:17
  Speaker 1: the soldiers of the eighty first Infantry Division on that
• 2:21:20
  Speaker 1: miserable island is written in the record, but there is
• 2:21:23
  Speaker 1: an enduring question of whether the capture of Pelelu was essential,
• 2:21:27
  Speaker 1: especially in view of Admiral William F. Halsey's recommendation through
• 2:21:31
  Speaker 1: Admiral Nimitz to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on thirteen
• 2:21:34
  Speaker 1: September nineteen forty four two days before d Day that
• 2:21:38
  Speaker 1: the landing be canceled. By that time it was too late,
• 2:21:43
  Speaker 1: and Pelelieu was added to the long list of battles
• 2:21:46
  Speaker 1: in which marines fought and suffered and prevailed. Sidebars Tom
• 2:21:54
  Speaker 1: Lee's Paintings. Tom Lee, the artist of the paintings which
• 2:21:59
  Speaker 1: ill straight this pamphlet, wrote of his experiences on pelelu
• 2:22:03
  Speaker 1: in Battle Stations, published in nineteen eighty eight by still
• 2:22:07
  Speaker 1: Point Press in Dallas. Some of the sketches from this
• 2:22:10
  Speaker 1: book were reproduced with commentary in volume fourteen, number two
• 2:22:14
  Speaker 1: of Discovery, a journal published by the University of Texas
• 2:22:18
  Speaker 1: at Austin. In this issue, James Jones, author of From
• 2:22:22
  Speaker 1: Here to Eternity, wrote, Lee was one of the artists
• 2:22:26
  Speaker 1: put in the field by life. Various of his works
• 2:22:29
  Speaker 1: appeared in the magazine, and up until the time he
• 2:22:32
  Speaker 1: went into Pellu, most of them could be pretty well
• 2:22:34
  Speaker 1: classified as excellently done but high grade propaganda. There was
• 2:22:39
  Speaker 1: very little American blood, very little tension, very little horror.
• 2:22:44
  Speaker 1: Mostly it was what could be called the Bravo America
• 2:22:47
  Speaker 1: and this is your boy type of war art. His
• 2:22:50
  Speaker 1: almost photographic style easily lent itself to that type of work,
• 2:22:55
  Speaker 1: but something apparently happened to Lee after going into Pellu.
• 2:22:59
  Speaker 1: The pictures painted out of his Pellu experience show a
• 2:23:02
  Speaker 1: new approach. There is the tension of terror in the
• 2:23:05
  Speaker 1: bodies here. The distorted facial expressions of the men under
• 2:23:08
  Speaker 1: fire show it too. One of the most famous, of course,
• 2:23:12
  Speaker 1: is the two thousand yard stare portrait of a young
• 2:23:15
  Speaker 1: marine who has had all or more than he can take.
• 2:23:18
  Speaker 1: The staring eyes, the slack lips, the sleepwalker stance. I've
• 2:23:23
  Speaker 1: seen men with that look on their faces. I've had
• 2:23:26
  Speaker 1: it on my own face. It feels stiff, and the
• 2:23:29
  Speaker 1: muscles don't want to work right. When you try to
• 2:23:31
  Speaker 1: smile or show expression or talk mercifully, you're out of
• 2:23:36
  Speaker 1: it for a while, unmercifully down in the center of
• 2:23:39
  Speaker 1: that numbness, though you know you will have to come
• 2:23:42
  Speaker 1: back eventually. Reprinted by permission of Discovery the University of
• 2:23:46
  Speaker 1: Texas at Austin. Tom Lee's artwork in this pamphlet is
• 2:23:50
  Speaker 1: reproduced with the permission of the artist. The captions under
• 2:23:53
  Speaker 1: each of Lee's paintings are the artist's own words.
• 2:23:57
  Speaker 2: Benis M.
• 2:23:58
  Speaker 1: Frank for extraordinary heroism. The secretary of the Navy awarded
• 2:24:05
  Speaker 1: the Presidential Unit Citation to the first Marine Division and
• 2:24:08
  Speaker 1: its reinforcing organizations for extraordinary heroism in action against enemy
• 2:24:13
  Speaker 1: Japanese forces at Pelelu and the YESIBUS from September fifteen
• 2:24:17
  Speaker 1: to twenty nine, nineteen forty four. In addition, Marine Aircraft
• 2:24:22
  Speaker 1: Group eleven and the third one hundred fifty five millimeter
• 2:24:25
  Speaker 1: Howitzer Battalion were awarded the Navy Unit Commendation On an
• 2:24:29
  Speaker 1: individual basis. Sixty nine participants in the Battle for Pelelu
• 2:24:33
  Speaker 1: were decorated with the Navy Cross, the second senior most
• 2:24:36
  Speaker 1: combat award in the Naval Service. The nation's highest award,
• 2:24:41
  Speaker 1: the Medal of Honor, was presented to eight Marines.
• 2:24:44
  Speaker 2: In the Fight for Pelelu.
• 2:24:46
  Speaker 1: Five were decorated posthumously, Corporal Lewis K. Bossel USMC one five,
• 2:24:53
  Speaker 1: posthumous Private first Class Arthur J. Jackson, USMC three seven,
• 2:24:59
  Speaker 1: Private first time Class Richard E. Krause, USMCR eighth, Amphibian
• 2:25:04
  Speaker 1: Tractor Battalion, Posthumous Private first Class John D. New USMC
• 2:25:10
  Speaker 1: two seven, posthumous Private first Class Wesley Phelps, USMCR three seven,
• 2:25:17
  Speaker 1: Posthumous Captain Everett P. Pope USMC one one, Private first
• 2:25:23
  Speaker 1: Class Charles H. Rohon, USMCR two seven posthumous and First
• 2:25:28
  Speaker 1: Lieutenant Carlton R. Rowe, USMCR one five. End of chapter nine,
• 2:25:38
  Speaker 1: end of Bloody Beaches The Marines at pelelu by Gordon D.
• 2:25:41
  Speaker 1: Gale read by Aaron Bennett