Latest / Philosophy / 022 - XXII Ethics
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- 0:00Speaker 1: Chapter twenty two of Philosophy by Bertrand Russell. The Sleebrivox
- 0:04Speaker 1: recording is in the public domain ethics. Ethics is traditionally
- 0:10Speaker 1: department of philosophy, and that is my reason for discussing it.
- 0:14Speaker 1: I hardly think myself that it ought to be included
- 0:17Speaker 1: in the domain of philosophy. But to prove this would
- 0:20Speaker 1: take as long as to discuss the subject itself, and
- 0:23Speaker 1: would be less interesting. As a provisional definition, we may
- 0:28Speaker 1: take ethics to consist of general principles which help to
- 0:32Speaker 1: determine rules of conduct. It is not the business of
- 0:35Speaker 1: ethics to say how a person should act in such
- 0:38Speaker 1: and such specific circumstances. That is the province of casuistry.
- 0:44Speaker 1: The word casuistry has acquired bad connotations as a result
- 0:48Speaker 1: of the Protestant and Jansenist attacks on the Jesuits, but
- 0:52Speaker 1: in its old and proper sense, it represents a perfectly
- 0:56Speaker 1: legitimate study. Take say, the question in what circumstances is
- 1:02Speaker 1: it right to tell a lie? Some people unthinkingly would
- 1:06Speaker 1: say never, But this answer cannot be seriously defended. Everybody
- 1:12Speaker 1: admits that you should lie if you meet a homicidal
- 1:15Speaker 1: maniac pursuing a man with a view to murdering him,
- 1:18Speaker 1: and he asks you whether the man has passed your way.
- 1:21Speaker 1: It is admitted that lying is a legitimate branch of
- 1:25Speaker 1: the art of warfare. Also that priests may lie to
- 1:28Speaker 1: guard the secrets of the confessional, and doctors to protect
- 1:32Speaker 1: the professional confidences of their patients. All such questions belong
- 1:37Speaker 1: to casuistry in the old sense, and it is evident
- 1:40Speaker 1: that they are questions deserving to be asked and answered.
- 1:44Speaker 1: But they do not belong to ethics in the sense
- 1:47Speaker 1: in which this study has been included in philosophy. It
- 1:50Speaker 1: is not the business of ethics to arrive at actual
- 1:53Speaker 1: rules of conduct, such as thou shalt not steal. This
- 1:57Speaker 1: is the province of morals. Ethics is expected to provide
- 2:02Speaker 1: a basis from which such rules can be deduced. The
- 2:06Speaker 1: rules of morals differ according to the age, the race,
- 2:09Speaker 1: and the creed of the community concerned, to an extent
- 2:12Speaker 1: that is hardly realized by those who have neither traveled
- 2:16Speaker 1: nor studied anthropology. Even within a homogeneous community, differences of
- 2:21Speaker 1: opinion arise. Should a man kill his wife's lover. The
- 2:26Speaker 1: church says no, the law says no, and common sense
- 2:30Speaker 1: says no, yet many people would say yes, and juries
- 2:34Speaker 1: often refuse to condemn. These doubtful cases arise when a
- 2:39Speaker 1: moral rule is in the process of changing, but ethics
- 2:43Speaker 1: is concerned with something more general than moral rules and
- 2:47Speaker 1: less subject to change. It is true that in a
- 2:50Speaker 1: given community, an ethic which does not lead to the
- 2:54Speaker 1: moral rules accepted by that community is considered immoral. It does, not,
- 2:59Speaker 1: of course, course, follow that such an ethic is in
- 3:02Speaker 1: fact false, since the moral rules of that community may
- 3:06Speaker 1: be undesirable. Some tribes of head hunters hold that no
- 3:10Speaker 1: man should marry until he can bring to the wedding
- 3:13Speaker 1: the head of an enemy slain by himself. Those who
- 3:17Speaker 1: question this moral rule are held to be encouraging license
- 3:21Speaker 1: and lowering the standard of manliness. Nevertheless, we should not
- 3:25Speaker 1: demand of an ethic that it should justify the moral
- 3:28Speaker 1: rules of headhunters. Perhaps the best way to approach the
- 3:32Speaker 1: subject of ethics is to ask what has meant when
- 3:35Speaker 1: a person says YOU ought to do so and so,
- 3:39Speaker 1: or I ought to do so and so. Primarily, a
- 3:43Speaker 1: sentence of this sort has an emotional content. It means
- 3:47Speaker 1: this is the act towards which I feel the emotion
- 3:50Speaker 1: of approval. But we do not wish to leave the
- 3:53Speaker 1: matter there. We want to find something more objective and
- 3:57Speaker 1: systematic and constant than a personal emotion. The ethical teacher says,
- 4:04Speaker 1: you ought to approve acts of such and such kinds.
- 4:08Speaker 1: He generally gives reasons for this view, and we have
- 4:11Speaker 1: to examine what sorts of reasons are possible. We are
- 4:15Speaker 1: here on very ancient ground. Socrates was concerned mainly with ethics.
- 4:21Speaker 1: Plato and Aristotle both discussed the subject at length. Before
- 4:25Speaker 1: their time, Confucius and Buddha had each founded a religion
- 4:29Speaker 1: consisting almost entirely of ethical teaching, though in the case
- 4:34Speaker 1: of Buddhism there was afterwards a growth of theological doctrine.
- 4:39Speaker 1: The views of the ancients on ethics are better worth
- 4:42Speaker 1: studying than their views on, say, physical science. The subject
- 4:47Speaker 1: has not yet proved amenable to exact reasoning, and we
- 4:50Speaker 1: cannot boast that the moderns have as yet rendered their
- 4:54Speaker 1: predecessors obsolete. Historically, virtue consisted at first of obedience to authority,
- 5:01Speaker 1: whether that of the gods, the government, or custom. Those
- 5:05Speaker 1: who disobeyed authority suffered obvious penalties. This is still the
- 5:10Speaker 1: view of Hegel, to whom virtue consists in obedience to
- 5:14Speaker 1: the state. There are, however, different forms of this theory,
- 5:18Speaker 1: and the objections to them are different. In its more
- 5:21Speaker 1: primitive form, the theory is unaware that different authorities take
- 5:26Speaker 1: different views as to what constitutes virtue, and it therefore
- 5:30Speaker 1: universalizes the practice of the community in which the theorizer lives.
- 5:35Speaker 1: When other ages and nations are found to have different customs,
- 5:39Speaker 1: these are condemned as abominations. Let us consider this view first.
- 5:45Speaker 1: The view we are now to examine is the theory
- 5:48Speaker 1: that there are certain rules of conduct, for example, the Decalogue,
- 5:52Speaker 1: which determine virtue in all situations. The person who keeps
- 5:57Speaker 1: all the rules is perfectly virtuous. The person who fails
- 6:01Speaker 1: in this is wicked in proportion to the frequency of
- 6:04Speaker 1: his failures. There are several objections to this as the
- 6:08Speaker 1: basis of ethics. In the first place, the rules can
- 6:12Speaker 1: hardly cover the whole field of human conduct. For example,
- 6:16Speaker 1: there is nothing in the Decalogue to show whether we
- 6:19Speaker 1: ought to have a gold standard or not. Accordingly, those
- 6:23Speaker 1: who hold this view regard some questions as moral issues,
- 6:27Speaker 1: while others do not have this character. That means, in practice,
- 6:32Speaker 1: that in regard to moral issues, we ought to act
- 6:35Speaker 1: in a certain way, regardless of consequences, while in other
- 6:39Speaker 1: matters we ought to consider which course will do the
- 6:41Speaker 1: most good. Thus, in effect, we are driven to adopt
- 6:46Speaker 1: two different ethical systems, one where the code has spoken,
- 6:51Speaker 1: the other where it is silent. This is unsatisfactory to
- 6:55Speaker 1: a philosopher. The second objection to such a view is
- 6:59Speaker 1: suggested by the first. We all feel that certain results
- 7:03Speaker 1: are desirable and others undesirable. But a code of conduct
- 7:07Speaker 1: which takes no account of circumstances will have sometimes the
- 7:11Speaker 1: sort of consequences we think desirable and sometimes the sort
- 7:15Speaker 1: we think undesirable. Take, for example, the precept thou shalt
- 7:20Speaker 1: not kill all respectable people hold that this does not
- 7:24Speaker 1: apply when the state orders a person to kill. On
- 7:28Speaker 1: this ground, among others, the New York School Board recently
- 7:32Speaker 1: refused to sanction the teaching of the Decalogue in schools.
- 7:37Speaker 1: A third objection is that it may be asked how
- 7:40Speaker 1: the moral rules are known. The usual answer historically is
- 7:45Speaker 1: that they are known by revelation and tradition, But these
- 7:48Speaker 1: are extra philosophical sources of knowledge. The philosopher cannot but
- 7:53Speaker 1: observe that there have been many revelations, and that it
- 7:57Speaker 1: is not clear why he should adopt one rather than another.
- 8:01Speaker 1: To this, it may be replied that conscience is a
- 8:04Speaker 1: personal revelation to each individual, and invariably tells him what
- 8:09Speaker 1: is right and what is wrong. The difficulty of this
- 8:13Speaker 1: view is that conscience changes from age to age. Most
- 8:17Speaker 1: people nowadays consider it wrong to burn a man alive
- 8:21Speaker 1: for disagreeing with them in metaphysics, but formerly this was
- 8:25Speaker 1: held to be a highly meritorious act, provided it was
- 8:28Speaker 1: done in the interests of the right metaphysics, no one
- 8:32Speaker 1: who has studied the history of moral ideas can regard
- 8:36Speaker 1: conscience as invariably right. Thus we are driven to abandon
- 8:40Speaker 1: the attempt to define virtue by means of a set
- 8:43Speaker 1: of rules of conduct. There is, however, another form of
- 8:47Speaker 1: the view that virtue consists in obedience to authority. This
- 8:52Speaker 1: may be called the administrator's ethic. A Roman or Anglo
- 8:56Speaker 1: Indian procounsul would define virtue as obedience to the moral
- 9:00Speaker 1: code of the community to which a man happens to belong.
- 9:04Speaker 1: No matter how moral codes may differ, a man should
- 9:07Speaker 1: always obey that of his own time and place and creed.
- 9:12Speaker 1: A Mohammedan, for instance, would not be regarded as wicked
- 9:16Speaker 1: for practicing polygamy, but an Englishman would, even if he
- 9:20Speaker 1: lived in a Mohammedan country. This view makes social conformity
- 9:25Speaker 1: the essence of virtue, or, as with Hegel, regards virtue
- 9:29Speaker 1: as obedience to the government. The difficulty of such theories
- 9:33Speaker 1: is that they make it impossible to apply ethical predicates
- 9:37Speaker 1: to authority. We cannot find any meaning for the statement
- 9:41Speaker 1: that a custom is good or that the government is bad.
- 9:45Speaker 1: The view is appropriate to desputs in their willing slaves.
- 9:49Speaker 1: It cannot survive in a progressive democracy. We come a
- 9:54Speaker 1: little nearer to a correct view when we define right
- 9:57Speaker 1: conduct by the motive or state of mind of the agent.
- 10:01Speaker 1: According to this theory, acts inspired by certain emotions are
- 10:05Speaker 1: good and those inspired by certain other emotions are bad.
- 10:10Speaker 1: Mystics hold this view and have accordingly a certain contempt
- 10:14Speaker 1: for the letter of the law. Broadly speaking, it would
- 10:18Speaker 1: be held that acts inspired by love are good and
- 10:21Speaker 1: those inspired by hate are bad. In practice, I hold
- 10:26Speaker 1: this view to be right, but philosophically I regard it
- 10:29Speaker 1: as deducible from something more fundamental. All the theories we
- 10:34Speaker 1: have hitherto considered are opposed to those which judge the
- 10:38Speaker 1: rightness or wrongness of conduct by its consequences. Of these,
- 10:43Speaker 1: the most famous is the utilitarian philosophy, which maintained that
- 10:47Speaker 1: happiness is the good, and that we ought to act
- 10:50Speaker 1: so as to maximize the balance of happiness over unhappiness
- 10:54Speaker 1: in the world. I would not myself regard happiness as
- 10:58Speaker 1: an adequate definition of the good, but I should agree
- 11:01Speaker 1: that conduct ought to be judged by its consequences. I
- 11:06Speaker 1: do not mean, of course, that in every practical exigency
- 11:10Speaker 1: of daily life, we should attempt to think out the
- 11:13Speaker 1: results of this or that line of conduct, because if
- 11:16Speaker 1: we did, the opportunity for action would often be passed
- 11:19Speaker 1: before our calculations were finished. But I do mean that
- 11:23Speaker 1: the received moral code, insofar as it is taught in
- 11:27Speaker 1: education and embodied in public opinion or the criminal law,
- 11:31Speaker 1: should be carefully examined in each generation to see whether
- 11:34Speaker 1: it still serves to achieve desirable ends, and if not,
- 11:39Speaker 1: in what respects it needs to be amended. The moral code,
- 11:43Speaker 1: in short, like the legal code, should adapt itself to
- 11:46Speaker 1: changing circumstances, keeping the public good always as its motive.
- 11:52Speaker 1: If so, we have to consider in what the public
- 11:55Speaker 1: good consists. According to this view, right conduct is not
- 12:01Speaker 1: an autonomous concept, but means conduct calculated to produce desirable results.
- 12:07Speaker 1: It will be right, let us say, to act so
- 12:10Speaker 1: as to make people happy and intelligent, but wrong to
- 12:14Speaker 1: act so as to make them unhappy and stupid. We
- 12:17Speaker 1: have to ask ourselves how we can discover what constitutes
- 12:21Speaker 1: the ends of right conduct. There is a view advocated,
- 12:26Speaker 1: for example, by doctor G. E. Moore, that good is
- 12:30Speaker 1: an indefinable notion, and that we know a priori certain
- 12:34Speaker 1: general propositions about the kinds of things that are good
- 12:37Speaker 1: on their own account. Such things as happiness, knowledge, appreciation
- 12:42Speaker 1: of beauty are known to be good. According to doctor Moore,
- 12:46Speaker 1: it is also known that we ought to act so
- 12:49Speaker 1: as to create what is good and prevent what is bad.
- 12:53Speaker 1: I formerly held this view myself, but I was led
- 12:56Speaker 1: to abandon it, partly by mister Santayana's winds of doctrine.
- 13:01Speaker 1: I now think that good and bad are derivative from desire.
- 13:06Speaker 1: I do not mean quite simply that the good is
- 13:08Speaker 1: the desired, because men's desires conflict and good is to
- 13:14Speaker 1: my mind, mainly a social concept designed to find an
- 13:17Speaker 1: issue from this conflict. The conflict, however, is not only
- 13:21Speaker 1: between the desires of different men, but between incompatible desires
- 13:26Speaker 1: of one man at different times or even at the
- 13:29Speaker 1: same time, and even if he is solitary, like Robinson Crusoe.
- 13:34Speaker 1: Let us see how the concept of good emerges from
- 13:37Speaker 1: reflection or conflicts of desires. We will begin with Robinson Crusoe.
- 13:43Speaker 1: In him, there will be conflicts, for example, between fatigue
- 13:47Speaker 1: and hunger, particularly between fatigue at one time and foreseen
- 13:52Speaker 1: hunger at another. The effort which he will require in
- 13:56Speaker 1: order to work when he is tired, with a view
- 13:58Speaker 1: to providing food on another occasion, has all the characteristics
- 14:02Speaker 1: of what is called a moral effort. We think better
- 14:06Speaker 1: of a man who makes the effort than of one
- 14:08Speaker 1: who does not, and the making of it requires self control.
- 14:13Speaker 1: For some reason, this sort of thing is called not
- 14:16Speaker 1: morals but morale. The distinction, however, seems to me illusory.
- 14:23Speaker 1: Robinson Crusoe is bound to realize that he has many desires,
- 14:27Speaker 1: each of which is stronger at one time than at another,
- 14:30Speaker 1: and that if he always acts upon the one that
- 14:33Speaker 1: is strongest at the moment, he may defeat others that
- 14:36Speaker 1: are stronger in the long run. So far only intelligence
- 14:40Speaker 1: is involved, but one may assume that with the progress
- 14:43Speaker 1: of intelligence there goes a growing desire for a harmonious life,
- 14:48Speaker 1: i e. A life in which action is dominated by
- 14:52Speaker 1: consistent quasi permanent desires. Again, some desires, in addition to
- 14:58Speaker 1: the desire for a harmonious life life, are more likely
- 15:01Speaker 1: to lead to harmony than certain other desires. Intellectual curiosity,
- 15:07Speaker 1: for example, affords a mildly diffused satisfaction, whereas drugs provide
- 15:13Speaker 1: ecstasy followed by despair. If we arrive unexpectedly in Robinson
- 15:18Speaker 1: Crusoe's Island and find him studying botany, we shall think
- 15:22Speaker 1: better of him than if we find him dead, drunk
- 15:24Speaker 1: on his last bottle of whiskey. All this belongs to morals,
- 15:29Speaker 1: although it is purely self regarding. When we come to
- 15:33Speaker 1: considering men in society, moral questions become both more important
- 15:38Speaker 1: and more difficult, because conflicts between the desires of different
- 15:42Speaker 1: persons are harder to resolve than internal conflicts among the
- 15:46Speaker 1: desires of one person. There are some distinctions to be made. First,
- 15:52Speaker 1: there is the difference between the point of view of
- 15:54Speaker 1: the neutral authority contemplating a squabble in which it is
- 15:58Speaker 1: not interested, and the point of view of the disputants themselves.
- 16:02Speaker 1: Then there is the distinction between what we wish people
- 16:05Speaker 1: to do and what we wish them to feel. In
- 16:08Speaker 1: the way of emotions and desires. The view of authority
- 16:12Speaker 1: everywhere is that squabbles to which it is not a
- 16:15Speaker 1: party are undesirable, but that in the squabbles to which
- 16:19Speaker 1: it is a party, virtue consists in promoting the victory
- 16:22Speaker 1: of authority. In the latter respect, it is acting not
- 16:26Speaker 1: as an authority, but merely as a combination of quarrelsome
- 16:30Speaker 1: individuals who think it more profitable to quarrel with outsiders
- 16:34Speaker 1: than with each other. We will therefore ignore this aspect
- 16:38Speaker 1: of authority and consider its action only when it is
- 16:42Speaker 1: a neutral. In this case, it aims at preventing quarrels
- 16:46Speaker 1: by punishing those who begin them, or sometimes by punishing
- 16:49Speaker 1: both parties. Monsieur Houk, the Jesuit missionary who wrote a
- 16:53Speaker 1: fascinating account of his travels in China, Tartary, and Tibet
- 16:58Speaker 1: about eighty years ago, relate it's an amusing conversation he
- 17:01Speaker 1: had with a mandarin Monsieur Houk, had remarked that Chinese
- 17:06Speaker 1: justice was dilatory, expensive and corrupt. The mandarin explained that
- 17:11Speaker 1: it had been made so in obedience to an imperial
- 17:15Speaker 1: edict setting forth that the subjects of the Son of
- 17:18Speaker 1: Heaven had become too much addicted to litigation and must
- 17:21Speaker 1: be led to abandon this practice. The rescript then proceeded
- 17:26Speaker 1: to suggest to magistrates and judges the desirability of the
- 17:29Speaker 1: above defects as a means of diminishing the number of lawsuits.
- 17:34Speaker 1: It appeared that the Emperor's commands had been faithfully obeyed
- 17:38Speaker 1: in this respect, more so than in some others. Another
- 17:43Speaker 1: method adopted by public authorities to prevent the impulse towards
- 17:47Speaker 1: internal quarrels is the creation of esprit de corps, public spirit, patriotism, etc.
- 17:54Speaker 1: I e. A concentration of quarrelsome impulses or persons outside
- 17:59Speaker 1: the group over which it rules. Such a method obviously
- 18:03Speaker 1: is partial and external. It would not be open to
- 18:07Speaker 1: a worldwide democratic authority. Should this ever come into existence,
- 18:12Speaker 1: such an authority would have to adopt better methods of
- 18:15Speaker 1: producing harmony. It would also have a higher claim to
- 18:19Speaker 1: the obedience of citizens than some authorities have at present.
- 18:24Speaker 1: What can we say from the point of view of
- 18:26Speaker 1: the disputants themselves. It is of course obvious that there
- 18:30Speaker 1: will be a greater total satisfaction when two people's desires
- 18:34Speaker 1: harmonize than when they conflict. But that is not an
- 18:37Speaker 1: argument which can be used to people who in fact
- 18:40Speaker 1: hate each other. One can argue that the one who
- 18:43Speaker 1: is going to be beaten would do well to give way,
- 18:46Speaker 1: but each will think that he himself is going to
- 18:48Speaker 1: be victorious. One can argue that there is more happiness
- 18:52Speaker 1: to be derived from love than from hate, but people
- 18:55Speaker 1: cannot love to order, and there is no satisfaction to
- 18:58Speaker 1: be derived from an insincere love. Nor is it always
- 19:03Speaker 1: true in an individual case that love brings more happiness
- 19:06Speaker 1: than hate. During and immediately after the war, those who
- 19:11Speaker 1: hated the Germans were happier than those who still regarded
- 19:14Speaker 1: them as human beings, because they could feel that what
- 19:18Speaker 1: was being done served a good purpose. I think, therefore,
- 19:22Speaker 1: that certain departments of morals, and those the most important,
- 19:26Speaker 1: cannot be inculcated from a personal point of view, but
- 19:29Speaker 1: only from the point of view of a neutral authority.
- 19:33Speaker 1: That is why I said that ethics is mainly social.
- 19:37Speaker 1: The attitude of a neutral authority, would, it seems to me,
- 19:41Speaker 1: be this. Men desire all sorts of things, and in
- 19:45Speaker 1: themselves all desires taken singly or on a level i e.
- 19:50Speaker 1: There is no reason to prefer the satisfaction of one
- 19:53Speaker 1: to the satisfaction of another. But when we consider not
- 19:57Speaker 1: a single desire, but a group of desires, there is
- 20:00Speaker 1: this difference that sometimes all the desires in a group
- 20:04Speaker 1: can be satisfied, whereas in other cases the satisfaction of
- 20:08Speaker 1: some of the desires in the group is incompatible with
- 20:11Speaker 1: that of the others. If A and B desire to
- 20:15Speaker 1: marry each other, both can have what they want. But
- 20:18Speaker 1: if they desire to kill each other, at most one
- 20:21Speaker 1: can succeed unless they are kill Kenny Katz. Therefore, the
- 20:25Speaker 1: former pair of desires is sociably preferable to the latter. Now,
- 20:30Speaker 1: our desires are a product of three factors, native disposition, education,
- 20:36Speaker 1: and present circumstances. The first factor is difficult to deal
- 20:40Speaker 1: with at present for lack of knowledge. The third is
- 20:43Speaker 1: brought into operation by means of the criminal law, economic motives,
- 20:48Speaker 1: and social praise and blame, which make it on the
- 20:51Speaker 1: whole to the interest of an individual in a community
- 20:54Speaker 1: to promote the interests of the dominant group in that community.
- 20:58Speaker 1: But this is done in an act external way, not
- 21:01Speaker 1: by creating good desires, but by producing a conflict of
- 21:05Speaker 1: greed and fear, in which it is hoped that fear
- 21:08Speaker 1: will win. The really vital method is education in the
- 21:12Speaker 1: large sense, in which it includes care of the body
- 21:15Speaker 1: and habit formation in the first few years. By means
- 21:19Speaker 1: of education, men's desires can be changed so that they
- 21:23Speaker 1: act spontaneously in a social fashion. To force a man
- 21:27Speaker 1: to curb his desires, as we do by the criminal
- 21:30Speaker 1: law is not nearly so satisfactory as to cause him
- 21:34Speaker 1: genuinely to feel the desires which promote socially harmonious conduct.
- 21:40Speaker 1: And this brings me to the last point with which
- 21:42Speaker 1: we are concerned, namely the distinction between feeling and doing.
- 21:48Speaker 1: No doubt, from a social point of view, the important
- 21:51Speaker 1: thing is what a man does. But it is impossible
- 21:54Speaker 1: to cause a man to do the right things consistently
- 21:58Speaker 1: unless he has the right desires. And the right desires
- 22:01Speaker 1: cannot be produced merely by praising them or by desiring
- 22:05Speaker 1: to have them. The technique of moral education is not
- 22:09Speaker 1: one of exhortation or explicit moral instruction. We can now
- 22:15Speaker 1: state the ethic at which we have arrived in abstract terms. Primarily,
- 22:20Speaker 1: we call something good when we desire it, and bad
- 22:23Speaker 1: when we have an aversion from it. But our use
- 22:26Speaker 1: of words is more constant than our desires, and therefore
- 22:30Speaker 1: we shall continue to call a thing good even at
- 22:32Speaker 1: moments when we are not actually desiring it, just as
- 22:36Speaker 1: we always call grass green even though sometimes it looks yellow.
- 22:40Speaker 1: And the laudatory associations of the word good may generate
- 22:44Speaker 1: a desire which would not otherwise exist. We may want
- 22:48Speaker 1: to eat caviare merely because we are told that it
- 22:51Speaker 1: is good. Moreover, the use of words is social, and
- 22:54Speaker 1: therefore we learn only to call a thing good except
- 22:58Speaker 1: in rare circumstances if if most of the people we
- 23:01Speaker 1: associate with it are also willing to call it good.
- 23:05Speaker 1: Thus good comes to apply to things desired by the
- 23:08Speaker 1: whole of a social group. It is evident therefore that
- 23:11Speaker 1: there can be more good in a world where the
- 23:14Speaker 1: desires of different individuals harmonize than in one way they conflict.
- 23:19Speaker 1: The supreme moral rule should therefore be act so as
- 23:24Speaker 1: to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires. This rule will
- 23:29Speaker 1: apply wherever a man's influence extends within himself, in his family,
- 23:35Speaker 1: his city, his country, even the world as a whole,
- 23:39Speaker 1: if he is able to influence it. There will be
- 23:42Speaker 1: two main methods to this end. First, to produce social
- 23:46Speaker 1: institutions under which the interests of different individuals or groups
- 23:51Speaker 1: conflict as little as possible. Second, to educate individuals in
- 23:57Speaker 1: such a way that their desires can be harmonized with
- 24:00Speaker 1: each other and with the desires of their neighbors. As
- 24:03Speaker 1: to the first method, I shall say nothing further, since
- 24:07Speaker 1: the questions that arise belong to politics and economics. As
- 24:11Speaker 1: to the second, the important period is the formative period
- 24:15Speaker 1: of childhood, during which there should be health, happiness, freedom,
- 24:19Speaker 1: and a gradual growth of self discipline through opportunities for
- 24:23Speaker 1: difficult achievement of a sort which is useful and yet
- 24:27Speaker 1: satisfies the impulse towards mastery of the environment. The desire
- 24:32Speaker 1: for power, which is present in most people and strongest
- 24:35Speaker 1: in the most vigorous, should be directed towards power over
- 24:39Speaker 1: things rather than over people. It is clear that if
- 24:44Speaker 1: harmonious desires are what we should seek. Love is better
- 24:48Speaker 1: than hate, since when two people love each other, both
- 24:51Speaker 1: can be satisfied, whereas when they hate each other, one
- 24:55Speaker 1: at most can achieve the object of his desire. It
- 24:59Speaker 1: is obvious also so that desire for knowledge is to
- 25:01Speaker 1: be encouraged, since the knowledge that a man acquires is
- 25:05Speaker 1: not obtained by taking it away from someone else, but
- 25:09Speaker 1: a desire for, say, large landed estates, can only be
- 25:13Speaker 1: satisfied in a small minority. Desire for power over other
- 25:18Speaker 1: people is a potent source of conflict, and is therefore
- 25:22Speaker 1: to be discouraged. A respect for the liberty of others
- 25:25Speaker 1: is one of the things that ought to be developed
- 25:28Speaker 1: by the right kind of education. The impulse towards personal
- 25:32Speaker 1: achievement ought to go into such things as artistic creation
- 25:36Speaker 1: or scientific discovery, or the promotion of useful institutions, in
- 25:41Speaker 1: a word, into activities that are creative rather than possessive knowledge,
- 25:47Speaker 1: which may do positive harm or men's desires conflict. For example,
- 25:51Speaker 1: by showing how to make war more deadly, will have
- 25:55Speaker 1: only good results in a world where men's desires harmonize,
- 25:58Speaker 1: since it tends to show how their common desires are
- 26:01Speaker 1: to be realized this conclusion may be summed up in
- 26:05Speaker 1: a single phrase. The good life is what inspired by
- 26:09Speaker 1: love and guided by knowledge. End of Chapter twenty two.