Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / Warren Buffett 13F: Berkshire Hathaway Ends Selling Streak With Alphabet
Transcript
- 0:00For like 14 consecutive quarters, the largest balance
- 0:03sheet in financial history has essentially been a glacier.
- 0:06Just sitting. There, right?
- 0:07Just sitting there accumulating mass and mostly just watching
- 0:11the surrounding landscape. I mean, observers got so used to
- 0:14Berkshire Hathaway stockpiling cash and selling off equities
- 0:17that it basically became the new normal.
- 0:19Yeah, people just assumed the glacier was simply never going
- 0:21to move. Exactly.
- 0:23But then in the second quarter of 2026, the ice cracked.
- 0:27They unleashed nearly $20 billion into the market.
- 0:31So today's mission is to unpack their newly released Q22026 Form
- 0:3513F filing. We're going to really look under
- 0:38the hood to see what they bought, what they trimmed, and
- 0:40honestly, far more importantly, the economic mechanics behind
- 0:43why they finally decided to make a massive move.
- 0:46Right before we map out this shift, I need to share this with
- 0:48you to access more Advanced Research companion for modern
- 0:52intelligent investors and leverage our latest Deep Values
- 0:55agents. Welcome to download Deep Values
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- 1:08Disclaimer All analysis is based on publicly available sources
- 1:12and may be subject to revisions or differing interpretations.
- 1:16All contents from this channel is for research and
- 1:18entertainment purposes only and does not constitute any
- 1:21investment or financial advice or service.
- 1:24Conduct your own due diligence before making investment
- 1:26financial decisions. So setting the stage for the
- 1:29specific 13 F really requires us to look past just the raw dollar
- 1:33amount. Which are huge obviously.
- 1:34Right. They're massive, but we are
- 1:36reverse engineering a capital allocation engine here.
- 1:39We want to understand how value is spotted in an incredibly
- 1:42complex, macro heavy modern economy.
- 1:44Yeah, this isn't just about mimicking stock picks.
- 1:46Exactly. It's about adopting a framework.
- 1:49Which means we should probably quickly level set on what that
- 1:53framework actually looks like today.
- 1:55Because, you know, most people tuning into this deep dive
- 1:57already know the lore. The whole shift away from the
- 2:00early days. Right, Benjamin Graham's early
- 2:02cigar butt investing style. I mean buying distressed, soggy
- 2:06companies trading below their liquidation value.
- 2:09That just doesn't scale when you have hundreds of billions to
- 2:12deploy. No, it really doesn't.
- 2:14Today, they aren't looking for discarded scraps at a garage
- 2:16sale, they're looking to own the fundamental infrastructure of
- 2:20the economy. But what always strikes me when
- 2:23reviewing the sources is how ruthlessly they define a
- 2:26profitable business. Oh, absolutely.
- 2:28Specifically through their metric of owner earnings, yes.
- 2:32They completely ignore standard Wall Street profit metrics.
- 2:35Because standard accounting net income often just obscures the
- 2:38actual economic reality of a business.
- 2:41I mean it relies on non cash accruals and historical cost
- 2:44conventions. Things that look great on a
- 2:46quarterly earnings press release.
- 2:48Right, but they don't translate to actual cash in the vault.
- 2:51So Berkshire strips all that away to find the true free cash
- 2:54flow. They take net income, add back
- 2:57depreciation and amortization. Because those are essentially
- 3:00just paper expenses for past investments, right?
- 3:02Not actual cash leaving the door today.
- 3:04Exactly. And then they subtract changes
- 3:07in networking capital and crucially, they subtract
- 3:10maintenance capital expenditures.
- 3:12And that last piece, maintenance CapEx, that seems to be the
- 3:15ultimate filter for them. It really is.
- 3:17It's. The difference between capital
- 3:19spent on growth and capital spent just to survive.
- 3:23Like if a company owns a fleet of delivery trucks and they have
- 3:27to spend a billion dollars a year just to replace the trucks
- 3:29with blown engines so they don't lose revenue, that is
- 3:32maintenance CapEx. It's a treadmill.
- 3:34Yeah, it doesn't generate new profit, it just prevents a total
- 3:39collapse. They want businesses that can
- 3:41convert like 80 to 100% of their net income into actual
- 3:46distributable cash. Without needing to constantly
- 3:48tap the debt markets just to keep the lights on.
- 3:51Furthermore, when you combine a business that requires very
- 3:53little capital to run with Berkshire's famous insurance
- 3:56float, the mechanics become incredibly powerful.
- 4:00The float is the secret sauce. It really is.
- 4:03When policyholders pay their auto or property insurance
- 4:07premiums upfront, Berkshire holds holds that cash to the
- 4:10flow until claims are paid out years later, if ever.
- 4:14Because their underwriting is historically so disciplined,
- 4:17they often make a profit just on the insurance operations alone.
- 4:20This means they are effectively being paid to hold billions of
- 4:24dollars of policyholder money. Which they then deploy into
- 4:28these low CapEx, high cash flowing businesses.
- 4:30Exactly. It is a structural leverage
- 4:34engine with a negative cost of capital.
- 4:36Wait, a negative cost of capital is just wild when you think
- 4:39about it. Yeah, but they don't just dump
- 4:40that negative cost leverage into any cash flowing business.
- 4:44The business has to have a penetrable Moat.
- 4:47Right, and the sources highlight four specific types they hunt
- 4:50for. Brand habituation.
- 4:52That's where the consumer doesn't even look at the price
- 4:54tag. Then you have two sided network
- 4:56effects. That's where a platform becomes
- 4:59exponentially more valuable, with each new user basically
- 5:03starving out competitors. Yeah, and you have regulatory
- 5:05licenses and toll bridge positioning acting as the
- 5:08unavoidable gatekeeper in a market.
- 5:10And finally, structural cost advantages, which are usually
- 5:13just derived from sheer scale. But the ultimate test of any of
- 5:17those 4 moats is pricing power, isn't it?
- 5:19Absolutely. When inflation drives up the
- 5:22cost of raw materials and labor, a business without a Moat has to
- 5:26eat those costs. Because raising prices would
- 5:27just send customers running to a competitor, right?
- 5:30But a business with a true Moat can pass 100% of that inflation
- 5:34directly to the consumer without losing market share.
- 5:37So applying that framework, the Moat the owner runnings, the
- 5:40negative cost float. That brings us to the Q 22026
- 5:44strategic inflection point. The great unfreezing.
- 5:47The great unfreezing For 14 quarters, Berkshire was a net
- 5:50seller of equities. They viewed the broader market
- 5:53as fundamentally overpriced. But in Q2, under CEO Greg Abel's
- 5:58operational leadership, the posture flipped.
- 6:00And the shift in capital velocity was dramatic.
- 6:03Global 13 F equity assets expanded to $299.25 billion.
- 6:08Right. They executed $23.47 billion in
- 6:12gross equity purchases against only 3.69 billion in disposals.
- 6:17Wow. So that results in a net
- 6:19purchase of $19.77 billion that officially snaps that multi year
- 6:24selling streak. And didn't they also buy back
- 6:27their own stock? Yeah, they repurchase over $4.5
- 6:30billion of their own Berkshire Class B stock at roughly $486 a
- 6:34share. Let's contextualize that volume,
- 6:36though, because I look at their balance sheet and even after
- 6:39deploying $20 billion into the market and buying back their own
- 6:42stock, they're still sitting on $365.51 billion in cash in U.S.
- 6:47Treasury bills. It's a staggering amount of
- 6:49liquidity. It's larger than the GDP of
- 6:51entire nations. It's mathematically just a
- 6:53fraction of their war chest. Deploying 20 billion barely
- 6:56makes a dent in that liquidity. So does it even matter?
- 6:58Well, the raw percentage of the Total War chest matters less
- 7:01than the directional signal it sends to the market.
- 7:03OK, how so? Berkshire does not deploy
- 7:06capital to meet a quota, and they certainly don't do it to
- 7:09appease analysts who complain about their cash drag, right?
- 7:11They don't care about Wall Street.
- 7:12Pressure. Exactly.
- 7:14So the fact that Greg Abel and Warren Buffett signed off on a
- 7:17$20 billion deployment indicates they finally located assets
- 7:21trading at a discernible discount to intrinsic value.
- 7:25They saw an inefficiency in the market that they could actually
- 7:28exploit at scale. Precisely.
- 7:29Which leads directly to the most surprising inefficiency they
- 7:33found, because the biggest splash of the quarter wasn't a
- 7:36railroad, a traditional bank or a consumer staple.
- 7:40No, it was the alphabet anomaly. Alphabet Anomaly Berkshire
- 7:44aggressively expanded its stake in one of the largest tech
- 7:46companies on the planet. They increase their Class A
- 7:49holding by over 45%. And they boosted their Class C
- 7:52holding by a staggering 658%. That is just massive.
- 7:57The combined Alphabet investment now sits at $37.76 billion.
- 8:02Which catapults Alphabet into their third largest position.
- 8:05It now makes up 12.62% of their entire equity portfolio.
- 8:09And, you know, the execution of this trade is honestly just as
- 8:14fascinating as the thesis behind it.
- 8:16Oh, definitely, because you can't just buy $10 billion worth
- 8:20of a single stock on the open market.
- 8:21Right. No.
- 8:22You'd trigger algorithmic alarms and drive the price up against
- 8:25yourself. Right.
- 8:26So, the sources revealed they negotiated a direct private
- 8:29placement. They secured a massive block of
- 8:33shares and an approximate 6.5% discount to prevailing market
- 8:37prices. That is the ultimate luxury of
- 8:40having $365 billion in cash. You don't have to buy through a
- 8:45retail broker. You can just call the company
- 8:47and negotiate wholesale pricing. Yeah.
- 8:50Must be nice, but you know, the underlying asset still seems
- 8:53kind of counterintuitive to the classic Berkshire ethos.
- 8:57Well, historically they avoided technology because they
- 9:00preferred businesses within a predictable circle of
- 9:02competence. Businesses where you can
- 9:04confidently project consumer behavior 10 years out, like
- 9:08chewing gum or soda. Right, the classic Coca-Cola
- 9:10mold. Yeah, but the pivot here is
- 9:12recognizing that Alphabet is no longer an unpredictable,
- 9:15speculative tech venture. It's pretty entrenched at this
- 9:18point. Exactly.
- 9:19The internal thesis views Alphabet entirely through the
- 9:22lens of the regulatory license and toll bridge Moat we
- 9:25discussed earlier. Alphabet essentially provides
- 9:28the underlying infrastructure of the digital economy.
- 9:31So search YouTube, all of that. Yes, Google Search maintains a
- 9:3690% share of global Internet querying, YouTube commands the
- 9:41streaming attention economy, and Google Cloud provides the
- 9:45essential compute architecture for enterprise operations.
- 9:48So it's the modern equivalent of owning the only bridge out of
- 9:51town. Exactly.
- 9:52If a business wants to exist and be found by consumables in the
- 9:55modern economy, they are functionally required to pay the
- 9:59Google advertising toll. It's a digital utility.
- 10:01And because they negotiated that private placement, they acquired
- 10:04this global monopoly at roughly 17 to 20 times forward earnings.
- 10:08Oh, wow. Yeah, when you factor in
- 10:09Alphabets free cash flow generation, that valuation
- 10:12offers a massive margin of safety.
- 10:14OK, so while they were acquiring digital real estate at a
- 10:16discount, their activity in literal real estate and consumer
- 10:20finance reveals a very specific macroeconomic stance.
- 10:25The sector rotation in Q2 was absolutely ruthless.
- 10:29It was they drastically reduced their long held stake in Bank of
- 10:33America by over 30 million shares.
- 10:35They slashed their position in Capital One Financial by 58%.
- 10:39And trimmed Ally Financial by nearly 7%.
- 10:42Oh, and they entirely liquidated their remaining shares of
- 10:45Consolation Brands. But simultaneously, they were
- 10:47funneling capital directly into the housing sector.
- 10:50Yeah, they executed an all cash $6.8 billion buyout of a home
- 10:54builder named Taylor Morrison and they increased their
- 10:58existing stake in Lennar Corporation, but almost 30%.
- 11:01Plus initiating a brand new position in Dr. Horton, they
- 11:05also picked up 17.5 million shares of Delta Airlines.
- 11:09So looking at this aggressive selling of unsecured consumer
- 11:12credit paired with the aggressive buying of national
- 11:15home builders, it really points to a very distinct economic bet.
- 11:19It does. It demonstrates their strict
- 11:21adherence to capital allocation rationality.
- 11:24Meaning they're adjusting based on the macro environment.
- 11:27Right. Good management constantly
- 11:29prunes cyclical risks from the portfolio based on macroeconomic
- 11:32mechanics. Unsecured consumer lending, like
- 11:35credit cards or auto loans, is incredibly sensitive to economic
- 11:40downturns. Right, because if unemployment
- 11:43ticks up, or if inflation outpaces wage growth, the
- 11:46average consumer prioritizes their mortgage and groceries.
- 11:50Exactly. Unsecured credit card debt like
- 11:52the kind held by Capital One gets defaulted on 1st, so
- 11:55Berkshire is actively reducing exposure to that specific
- 12:00consumer vulnerability. And they're rotating that exact
- 12:02capital into businesses benefiting from a structural
- 12:05supply deficit because the US has fundamentally underbuilt
- 12:08single family homes for over a decade following the 2008
- 12:12financial crisis. We have a demographic wave of
- 12:14millennials entering their prime home buying years, meeting a
- 12:17historic shortage of inventory. But you know, it's not just
- 12:20about betting on the concept of housing.
- 12:22It's about the mechanical advantage of national home
- 12:24builders over local ones, because companies like Taylor,
- 12:27Morrison and Lennar don't really operate the way traditional
- 12:29construction companies do. No, they operate more like
- 12:32advanced financial institutions that just happen to deliver
- 12:35houses, right. Local home builders often have
- 12:38to borrow heavily to buy raw land.
- 12:40They take on massive balance sheet risk if the market slows
- 12:44down. They are stuck holding illiquid
- 12:46dirt while paying high interest rates.
- 12:48Which is a nightmare scenario, but the national builders use
- 12:52land banking, right? Exactly, they utilize land
- 12:55banking and option contracts. They basically pay a small fee
- 12:59for the right to buy the land later only taking ownership when
- 13:02they're actually ready to pour the foundation.
- 13:04That is brilliant. It drastically lowers their cost
- 13:08of capital and protects their downside, which perfectly aligns
- 13:11with Berkshire's mandate of minimizing maintenance capital
- 13:14and protecting the balance sheet.
- 13:16It's a perfect fit for their framework.
- 13:17So the Q2 narrative is really defined by seizing a digital
- 13:20toll bridge in Alphabet, mitigating consumer credit risk
- 13:24and capitalizing on the structural housing deficit.
- 13:27That sums it up. Yet despite moving 10s of
- 13:29billions of dollars across these sectors, the foundational
- 13:32pillars of Berkshire's portfolio remain entirely untouched.
- 13:36The immovable objects. Right.
- 13:38Apple remains the undisputed giant at nearly $65.9 billion.
- 13:43Still holding strong. Oh yeah, the fundamental driver
- 13:47there isn't just hardware sales, it's the 150% return on equity
- 13:51powered by their services ecosystem.
- 13:53Like the App Store and iCloud. Exactly.
- 13:56They represent recurring high margin revenue streams that
- 13:59decouple Apple from the cyclicality of simply convincing
- 14:02people to upgrade their iPhones every two years.
- 14:05Then you have American Express sitting at $51.2 billion and the
- 14:09mechanical advantage of Amex. It's completely different from a
- 14:12Visa or a MasterCard. How so?
- 14:14Well, Visa and MasterCard just operate the communication
- 14:16network between a merchants bank and a consumers bank.
- 14:19But American Express operates a closed loop network.
- 14:23They are the network, they are the card issuer, and they are
- 14:25the acquirer. I see.
- 14:27Yeah, that means when a transaction happens, Amec
- 14:29captures the fee from the merchant and the interest from
- 14:32the consumer. They're effectively double
- 14:34dipping the economics of the transaction.
- 14:36It's an incredibly powerful model, and of course, Coca-Cola
- 14:40remains untouched at $32.5 billion, acting as the ultimate
- 14:44inflation hedge due to its pure pricing power.
- 14:47But, you know, beyond those heavily publicized consumer
- 14:50Titans, the portfolio utilizes specialized, invisible
- 14:55monopolies that operate deep in the background of the global
- 14:58economy. Oh, absolutely.
- 15:00The sources highlight positions in companies like Verisign and
- 15:03Moody's, which illustrate the toll bridge concept even more
- 15:06cleanly than Alphabet does. I love the Verisign holding.
- 15:09It is one of the most fascinating business models in
- 15:11existence. They hold the exclusive
- 15:14regulatory contract to manage the registry for all.com and.net
- 15:18domains globally. So basically every single time a
- 15:21business and individual or a massive corporation registers or
- 15:24renewsa.com website, Verisign collects a fee.
- 15:27Exactly. It is an unavoidable tax on the
- 15:29foundational infrastructure of the Internet, and because
- 15:32maintaining A centralized registry requires negligible
- 15:35physical infrastructure, their margins are just astronomical.
- 15:38They operate with roughly a 65% operating margin.
- 15:41With practically nonexistent maintenance CapEx.
- 15:44It's exactly what they look for, and Moody's functions with a
- 15:46similar structural inevitability.
- 15:49They operate in a global duopoly for credit ratings alongside S&P
- 15:53right If a major corporation, a municipality or a sovereign
- 15:57nation needs to issue debt to raise capital, institutional
- 16:00investors mathematically require a credit rating from an
- 16:03established agency to assess the risk.
- 16:05You literally cannot bypass. Them no, you can't.
- 16:08And once they're analysts construct the rating model, the
- 16:12marginal cost to issue that rating is functionally 0.
- 16:16They are an indispensable gatekeeper to the global debt
- 16:19markets, pulling in massive cash flows with virtually no
- 16:22requirement to reinvest that cash back into heavy machinery
- 16:25or inventory. Which really ties this entire
- 16:28analysis together. I mean, whether Berkshire is
- 16:30holding Apple, buying Alphabet at a multibillion dollar
- 16:33discount, or quietly collecting fees through Verisign, the core
- 16:37objective never changes. Identify businesses that convert
- 16:40the vast majority of their earnings into free cash flow.
- 16:43Ensure they're protected by an insurmountable Moat.
- 16:46And acquire them at a price that provides a margin of safety.
- 16:49Then you just let the 0 cost leverage of the insurance float
- 16:54compound those returns indefinitely.
- 16:56It's genius. And you know the utility of this
- 16:59framework extends far beyond just institutional capital
- 17:03allocation. You can apply these exact
- 17:06diagnostic questions to your own decision making.
- 17:09Absolutely. When you're evaluating a
- 17:11potential investment, are you looking at top line vanity
- 17:15metrics and buzzwords, or are you looking for the actual owner
- 17:18earnings underneath the accounting?
- 17:20You can even apply it to your own career trajectory.
- 17:22Like do you possess A structural Moat?
- 17:24That's a great point. Right.
- 17:25Do you have skills that provide pricing power in the labor
- 17:28market, or are you operating in a highly commoditized space
- 17:31where you can be easily replaced?
- 17:33Basically, are you a cigar butt or are you a toll bridge?
- 17:36It's a question everyone should ask themselves.
- 17:38For sure. And as a reminder, if you want
- 17:41to track market valuations and apply these exact principles to
- 17:44your own research, be sure to utilize the Deep Values app as
- 17:48well as the Buffett Indicator or Bubble Watch apps we noted
- 17:50earlier. They're excellent tools for
- 17:52maintaining rationality in a very noisy market.
- 17:56So the analysis of this 13 F filing leaves us with one
- 17:59critical lingering dynamic to consider.
- 18:02What's that? Greg Abel and Warren Buffett
- 18:05just deployed over $23 billion because the economic mechanics
- 18:10of specific assets finally aligned with their strict
- 18:12valuation. Models, it's a massive
- 18:14unfreezing for sure, but like we said earlier, it's still just a
- 18:17fraction of the total liquidity. Precisely.
- 18:20They still retain over $365 billion in cash and treasury
- 18:24bills, right? If a $23 billion acquisition
- 18:27spree is what happens when they spot a few localized
- 18:30inefficiencies in tech and housing, we have to ask
- 18:33ourselves something. OK.
- 18:34What magnitude of systemic market wide dislocation is
- 18:38Berkshire Hathaway actually preparing for to deploy the rest
- 18:41of it?