Latest / UK Column Radio / Iran, China, Taiwan & the New World Order | Silk and Steel

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Iran, China, Taiwan & the New World Order | Silk and Steel · UK Column Radio

• 0:06
  Speaker 1: Good day.
• 0:06
  Speaker 2: This is dimitrilescaris coming to you from Kalamata, Greece for
• 0:09
  Speaker 2: Reason to Resist on May nineteenth, twenty twenty six. We're
• 0:13
  Speaker 2: very pleased to be joined today for the first time
• 0:16
  Speaker 2: by Carl Jah. Carl is a Sijuan born political commentator, journalist,
• 0:21
  Speaker 2: and podcast hosts renowned for his insights into China's history, culture,
• 0:24
  Speaker 2: and politics. Born in China shortly after Maltzanongga's death in
• 0:28
  Speaker 2: seventy six, Carl grew up between China and the United
• 0:32
  Speaker 2: States before settling in Bali, Indonesia, where he currently resides,
• 0:36
  Speaker 2: and he hosts the popular Silk and Steel podcast, which
• 0:40
  Speaker 2: challenges Western narratives on China. Thank you so much for
• 0:43
  Speaker 2: joining us today, Carl.
• 0:44
  Speaker 1: My pleasure, Dmitri So.
• 0:47
  Speaker 2: Carl, I'd like to begin with the economic conditions in Indonesia,
• 0:52
  Speaker 2: where you currently reside. Numerous states in South Asia are
• 0:57
  Speaker 2: struggling to varying degrees to cope with constraints in the
• 1:01
  Speaker 2: supply of oil and gas and other essential commodities due
• 1:03
  Speaker 2: to the situation in the Strait of hortamus Uh At
• 1:06
  Speaker 2: the current time, How is Indonesia being affected.
• 1:10
  Speaker 1: It's not doing so great because one thing is an
• 1:15
  Speaker 1: exchange rate. Now one dollar to Indonesian dollars to Indonesian rupia.
• 1:23
  Speaker 1: Exchange rate is at all time high. UH. That means
• 1:26
  Speaker 1: one dollar now buys a lot more Indonesian rupia. And
• 1:31
  Speaker 1: Indonesia is a country that actually depends a lot on imports.
• 1:35
  Speaker 1: We're using dollars uh. Indonesia is actually a very resource
• 1:40
  Speaker 1: rich country. It has oil, it has gas, it has rubber,
• 1:43
  Speaker 1: it has goal, you name it. But the problem Indonesia
• 1:48
  Speaker 1: faces is like a lot of countries in the global South,
• 1:53
  Speaker 1: it has the resources, but it lacks the capital to
• 1:56
  Speaker 1: develop them. And for example, even though Indonesia has a
• 2:00
  Speaker 1: lot of oil, but Indonesia, what Indonesia do is the
• 2:05
  Speaker 1: exports the crude oil and imports refined petroleum products like gasoline, diesel, chemical,
• 2:13
  Speaker 1: fertilizers because there's not enough refining capability in Indonesia. This
• 2:19
  Speaker 1: is actually a situation that I find familiar to China
• 2:25
  Speaker 1: in the nineteen eighties because I grew up in China
• 2:27
  Speaker 1: in nineteen eighties. Back in nineteen eighties, China was doing
• 2:30
  Speaker 1: what Indonesia is doing today. It was exporting crude oil.
• 2:33
  Speaker 1: A lot of people didn't know about this, but China
• 2:36
  Speaker 1: is actually one of the world's largest oil producer. It
• 2:39
  Speaker 1: produces more oil than you. I think he rank number
• 2:44
  Speaker 1: five in the world oil production. But back in nineteen eighties,
• 2:47
  Speaker 1: China was a net crude oil exporter. It was exporting
• 2:51
  Speaker 1: crude oil to Japan, and it was importing gasoline, gasoline, diesel,
• 2:58
  Speaker 1: jet field chemical fertilizer because it did not have the
• 3:01
  Speaker 1: refining capabilities. And this is a situation Indonesia finds it today.
• 3:07
  Speaker 1: So it export crude oil cheaply. Well, now the crude
• 3:11
  Speaker 1: oil price gone up, but you know the these gas
• 3:14
  Speaker 1: diesel jets, your price gone up even more. And now
• 3:17
  Speaker 1: you have to import those back. And also it imports
• 3:24
  Speaker 1: ninety four percent its soybean, mostly from the United States,
• 3:28
  Speaker 1: which require against required dollars. So when the dollar goes
• 3:32
  Speaker 1: up in value versus Indonesian rupiah, this is pretty bad
• 3:38
  Speaker 1: for Indonesian economy. And so yeah, and this part a
• 3:43
  Speaker 1: major contributing factor is what's going on industry.
• 3:46
  Speaker 2: Or horror moves right now? And so have you seen
• 3:49
  Speaker 2: a drastic increase in the cost of living in Indonesia
• 3:52
  Speaker 2: since the war began in Iran?
• 3:57
  Speaker 1: There hasn't been Okay, so the government does subsidize the petrol.
• 4:02
  Speaker 1: So there there has been in price increases by the
• 4:06
  Speaker 1: day because of government subsidies. It's somewhat buffeted. But everything
• 4:12
  Speaker 1: else price has gone off, you know, food, basic, you know,
• 4:17
  Speaker 1: just basic groceries. Yeah, there's definitely there's an inflation going on.
• 4:24
  Speaker 2: So the Strait of Malica is a narrow stretch of
• 4:28
  Speaker 2: water nine hundred kilometers long and from sixty five to
• 4:32
  Speaker 2: two hundred and fifty kilometers wide. I understand between the
• 4:35
  Speaker 2: Melee Peninsula to the northeast and the Indonesian island of
• 4:39
  Speaker 2: Sumatra to the southwest, and it connects the Andaman Sea
• 4:44
  Speaker 2: in the Indian Ocean in the South China Sea, and
• 4:47
  Speaker 2: as the main shipping channel between the Indian Pacific Oceans,
• 4:50
  Speaker 2: it is one of the most important shipping lanes in
• 4:52
  Speaker 2: the world. And there have been suggestions that if Aram
• 4:55
  Speaker 2: succeeds in imposing a toll on ships passing through the
• 4:59
  Speaker 2: Strait of Moves, than Indonesia will follow suit and impose
• 5:03
  Speaker 2: a toll on ships passing through the Strait of Malaca.
• 5:07
  Speaker 2: Do you believe that's a serious possibility. Is this something
• 5:10
  Speaker 2: that's being discussed at a high level within the Indonesian
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  Speaker 2: political elite.
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  Speaker 1: This was first well, this was proposed by the Indonesian
• 5:20
  Speaker 1: Finance minister, but they very quickly walk back for obvious reasons,
• 5:24
  Speaker 1: because you know, this is a there a lot of
• 5:28
  Speaker 1: powers in this world that would not want to see
• 5:30
  Speaker 1: that happen, first of all, and so so I don't
• 5:34
  Speaker 1: think realistically, uh, you will happen because first of all,
• 5:41
  Speaker 1: United States would not want to see that happen. Uh,
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  Speaker 1: And US do is invested heavily on potentially controlling the
• 5:51
  Speaker 1: Strait of Malacca. This US Navy has for decades been
• 5:56
  Speaker 1: you know, through either through think tank papers or you know,
• 6:01
  Speaker 1: their own war games claim claim that they want to
• 6:07
  Speaker 1: invest in choking off the Strait of Malacca as a
• 6:09
  Speaker 1: potential choking point against Chinese energy supply because you know,
• 6:14
  Speaker 1: as as many people know, most of the Chinese oil
• 6:18
  Speaker 1: gas imports found either Middle East or Africa have to
• 6:23
  Speaker 1: go through the straight Malacca into South China. See and
• 6:27
  Speaker 1: and the you know that the idea that individual countries, uh,
• 6:31
  Speaker 1: you know, start to assert their sovereignty following the example
• 6:36
  Speaker 1: of Iran, this is not something that United States would
• 6:39
  Speaker 1: want to see. So I at the current point at
• 6:42
  Speaker 1: the current time, I don't see Indonesia will go openly
• 6:47
  Speaker 1: challenge the established norm yet.
• 6:53
  Speaker 2: So let's then focus on the Straight of Hotamus. During
• 6:56
  Speaker 2: Trump's recent visit to China, it was widely order that
• 7:01
  Speaker 2: senior Chinese officials agreed with the Trump regime that it
• 7:04
  Speaker 2: on should not be permitted to impose tolls on ships
• 7:08
  Speaker 2: passing through the Strait of Hotemos. Do you understand that
• 7:11
  Speaker 2: to be in fact China's official position, and if so,
• 7:15
  Speaker 2: how do you think that that is affecting or will
• 7:18
  Speaker 2: affect relations with Iran, Because after all, the Iranian government
• 7:22
  Speaker 2: seems quite determined to retain control of the Strait of
• 7:25
  Speaker 2: Hotemus and to impose tolls on ships that pass through it.
• 7:29
  Speaker 1: That's correct. So first of all, this is what we
• 7:34
  Speaker 1: got from this is reporting on what the Trump administration
• 7:38
  Speaker 1: said they have agreed with the Chinese. You know, I
• 7:42
  Speaker 1: rather wait for the Chinese official readout to come out,
• 7:46
  Speaker 1: and still so because to Trump administration at this point
• 7:49
  Speaker 1: have zero credibility. And well, what I can see is
• 7:54
  Speaker 1: that China would like to return to the pre war
• 7:58
  Speaker 1: conditions into the trade hor moose because as I mentioned,
• 8:02
  Speaker 1: China do derive a lot of its energy import from
• 8:06
  Speaker 1: the from the Persian Golf region China. China is about
• 8:08
  Speaker 1: eighty six percent UH energy self sufficient, but it imports
• 8:14
  Speaker 1: the rest, which is about fourteen percent of its energy.
• 8:17
  Speaker 1: And out of the fourteen percent of the energy China
• 8:20
  Speaker 1: does import, half of that is oil. And and again
• 8:24
  Speaker 1: another fifty percent of that oil come from the Persian Golf.
• 8:28
  Speaker 1: So China has a big interest to see the you know,
• 8:31
  Speaker 1: the traffic through the person of strato hormose return to
• 8:37
  Speaker 1: the pre war level. So again I think they I
• 8:41
  Speaker 1: can't see they will just agree with United States and principle,
• 8:46
  Speaker 1: it's something that you know, they can throw the Trump
• 8:50
  Speaker 1: administration a bone, But I don't see China lifting any
• 8:54
  Speaker 1: fingers to help the United States to implement that. I mean,
• 8:58
  Speaker 1: like I how right now, US has no way of
• 9:01
  Speaker 1: opening the Serrieto home moves. That's why they're trying to
• 9:04
  Speaker 1: seek help funk even China. But I don't see. I
• 9:09
  Speaker 1: don't see China is going to step in and somehow
• 9:13
  Speaker 1: pressure you wrong to give up on their control of
• 9:15
  Speaker 1: the straet or moves. I mean, China can issue a
• 9:18
  Speaker 1: statement of what they want to see happen, but would
• 9:23
  Speaker 1: they help United States to achieve its aim in the
• 9:26
  Speaker 1: straetor home moves. No, obviously not.
• 9:30
  Speaker 2: At the same time, there's no, I mean, there's certainly
• 9:33
  Speaker 2: it's quite clear that China and Iran attached considerable importance
• 9:36
  Speaker 2: to their relations, But it's also true that China has
• 9:39
  Speaker 2: important economic relations with other Persian Gulf states. Most notably,
• 9:44
  Speaker 2: it is I believe, the largest importer of Saudi crude,
• 9:48
  Speaker 2: and presumably this puts China in a delicate position in
• 9:51
  Speaker 2: the current circumstances, because Saudi is clearly aligned with the
• 9:55
  Speaker 2: United States and has allowed its airspace and military bases
• 10:00
  Speaker 2: basis in Saudi territory to be used to facilitate the
• 10:02
  Speaker 2: legal US attacks on Iran. So could you talk to
• 10:05
  Speaker 2: us about the nature of the relationship between Iran and
• 10:08
  Speaker 2: China and how, in your view, China's balancing these competing interests,
• 10:14
  Speaker 2: and in particular views, do you think China views its
• 10:17
  Speaker 2: relations with Iran as being more important to its national
• 10:21
  Speaker 2: interest in its relations with other Gulf states.
• 10:24
  Speaker 1: Yeah, that's a good question, because China did does have
• 10:28
  Speaker 1: a traditionally friendly relationship with Uran. I mean, you stretch
• 10:33
  Speaker 1: all the way to the seventies, but China at the
• 10:37
  Speaker 1: same time, as you mentioned, it has interests in the
• 10:41
  Speaker 1: rest of the Golf States. China has a lot. You know,
• 10:45
  Speaker 1: if you look at the China's oil imports, it's the
• 10:48
  Speaker 1: number one destined origin country of Chinese imported oil is Russia,
• 10:53
  Speaker 1: of course, but number two is Saudi Arabia, and Iran
• 10:57
  Speaker 1: would be a distant second, thirt distance third. Because what
• 11:04
  Speaker 1: we have the data from twenty twenty four and twenty
• 11:07
  Speaker 1: twenty five, it says the top three countries that China
• 11:10
  Speaker 1: imports oil from is Russia, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia. But
• 11:16
  Speaker 1: you know, Malaysia is oil producing country, but it doesn't
• 11:19
  Speaker 1: produce oil in that kind of quantity. So what really
• 11:22
  Speaker 1: happened is a lot of Uranian oil and Venezuelan and oil.
• 11:25
  Speaker 1: They're being carried by so called the Shadow Fleet that
• 11:29
  Speaker 1: travels through the Strait of Malacca into South China Sea,
• 11:33
  Speaker 1: where those oil gets offloaded to different tankers than that
• 11:37
  Speaker 1: get relabeled as Malaysian oil to export to China. And
• 11:42
  Speaker 1: we know that figure. For twenty twenty four, China imported
• 11:46
  Speaker 1: thirteen percent of its oil for Malaysia. In twenty twenty five,
• 11:50
  Speaker 1: a little bit less about eleven percent of the oil
• 11:53
  Speaker 1: foam Malaysia. Most of that is actually probably Iranian oil.
• 11:58
  Speaker 1: So China obviously have to place a balancing act because
• 12:04
  Speaker 1: it imports a lot of oil phone in Saudi Arabia.
• 12:06
  Speaker 1: It imports a lot of natural gas from Qatar he
• 12:09
  Speaker 1: put up. It has a lot of investment, you know,
• 12:12
  Speaker 1: majority of Chinese investment directly to where West Asia is
• 12:17
  Speaker 1: actually in UAE, and UAE is right now like completely
• 12:22
  Speaker 1: getting bombarded by by Iranian jones and missiles. So so
• 12:27
  Speaker 1: so China always play has to play a balancing act.
• 12:31
  Speaker 1: I mean, one reason China was able to broken the
• 12:34
  Speaker 1: Saudi Iran piece deal several years earlier is because China
• 12:39
  Speaker 1: maintained a friendly ship, a friendly relationship with both Iran
• 12:43
  Speaker 1: and Saudi Arabia. But at the same time, China also
• 12:48
  Speaker 1: understands that the reason you if you, if you wrong fails.
• 12:54
  Speaker 1: If you know the the regime change goal of United
• 12:57
  Speaker 1: States gets achieved in Iran, then that would allow United
• 13:02
  Speaker 1: States to marshal'st resources to concentrate on China. This is
• 13:06
  Speaker 1: why China would not like to see your own fail,
• 13:09
  Speaker 1: same way China would not like to see Russia fail
• 13:13
  Speaker 1: in Ukraine. This is why China has been throwing a
• 13:16
  Speaker 1: lifeline to Russia as well as you run, China purchased
• 13:20
  Speaker 1: ninety of the Iranian oil exports now. At the same time,
• 13:26
  Speaker 1: what China would like to do is like to go
• 13:29
  Speaker 1: back to the pre war situation where it can freely
• 13:35
  Speaker 1: import its oil fron from the Golf. Before the war,
• 13:40
  Speaker 1: from the Golf reaching produce exports about twenty million barrels
• 13:44
  Speaker 1: of oil per day, and now there's only about four
• 13:48
  Speaker 1: point five million barrels are getting out through the Saudi
• 13:52
  Speaker 1: pipeline that goes to the Red Sea. And so there's
• 13:56
  Speaker 1: this and the you know, the Qatar gas up only
• 14:00
  Speaker 1: up to very recently there wasn't any Qutar gas coming out.
• 14:04
  Speaker 1: It's just just I think last week there was a
• 14:06
  Speaker 1: couple uh Qatar L and G tankers start to sell
• 14:10
  Speaker 1: to wur Pakistan, and I think that was allowed by
• 14:13
  Speaker 1: Iran because Iran's own relationship with Pakistan, and so obviously
• 14:19
  Speaker 1: China would like to see the blockade lifted at some
• 14:22
  Speaker 1: point as soon as possible. Actually, so by stating that
• 14:26
  Speaker 1: in principle, I mean it's it's that that is what
• 14:31
  Speaker 1: China wants, but it doesn't mean China is necessarily on
• 14:34
  Speaker 1: the US side, that he want to see the straight
• 14:38
  Speaker 1: of homus situation resolve, but not necessarily result in US's favor,
• 14:44
  Speaker 1: So that there are two different things. This is what
• 14:46
  Speaker 1: I'm trying to say.
• 14:48
  Speaker 2: You mentioned that, you know, if iron Feil the US
• 14:51
  Speaker 2: martial arts resources focused on China, That's unquestionably true. But
• 14:55
  Speaker 2: I would also suggest that, and I'm curious to have
• 14:59
  Speaker 2: you reaction to this. It's also the fact that if
• 15:04
  Speaker 2: Iran were to fall, effectively, the United States directly or
• 15:07
  Speaker 2: indirectly would control the resources of West Asia. There would
• 15:11
  Speaker 2: be no meaningful opposition to US congemony. It would also
• 15:15
  Speaker 2: effectively control the key trade routes in West Asia. And
• 15:20
  Speaker 2: so I've had this debate with people like John Helmer
• 15:23
  Speaker 2: in my program, who has suggested that the Chinese government
• 15:28
  Speaker 2: is effectively playing a double game and is stabbing the
• 15:32
  Speaker 2: Iranian government in the back. It's this is something that
• 15:34
  Speaker 2: I myself. I'm not convinced of this at all. What
• 15:37
  Speaker 2: I think is that China has a powerful incentive to
• 15:42
  Speaker 2: ensure that Iran doesn't fall, but it also has a
• 15:44
  Speaker 2: powerful incentive to publicly maintain a position of neutrality to
• 15:50
  Speaker 2: the greatest possible degree, and to conceal in its own
• 15:54
  Speaker 2: national interests the particular forms of aid that it might
• 15:58
  Speaker 2: be providing to Iran. Also your assessment, Carl.
• 16:02
  Speaker 1: Yes, this is actually the same position China adopted towards
• 16:07
  Speaker 1: the recurrent conflict. In China has publicly slaved we are
• 16:10
  Speaker 1: not we're not encouraging iSER side. We're not supplying weapons
• 16:16
  Speaker 1: to iSER side of the conflict. But at the same time,
• 16:19
  Speaker 1: if you look at you know what US is complaining
• 16:22
  Speaker 1: about is China supplying the so called dual use items
• 16:26
  Speaker 1: which semiconductors in gym, joining engine parts, join components, those
• 16:34
  Speaker 1: things China is supplying Russia. But it's it's it's it's
• 16:40
  Speaker 1: for China. There's a plausible deniability. Say, we're not supplying
• 16:44
  Speaker 1: weapons to to to Russia, which is not supplying Finnish
• 16:48
  Speaker 1: weapons to Russia, same way China is not supplying Finnish
• 16:52
  Speaker 1: weapon to your wrong. Instead, China supplied your wrong with
• 16:56
  Speaker 1: chemical precursors that your wrong needs to manufacturers, which is
• 17:01
  Speaker 1: the main Yuranian arsenal against US Israel attack, so I
• 17:07
  Speaker 1: might read is the same as yours, and China is
• 17:09
  Speaker 1: playing a balancing game to allow it to, you know,
• 17:15
  Speaker 1: maintain as much a neutrality stands, but at the same
• 17:20
  Speaker 1: time still help its allies like Yuran and Russia. Yeah, right.
• 17:25
  Speaker 2: And there's been a lot of speculation in the media,
• 17:29
  Speaker 2: both corporate and alternative media about what exactly China is
• 17:33
  Speaker 2: providing to Iran by way of assistance. And so, for example,
• 17:39
  Speaker 2: we saw a report recently, I think this was in
• 17:42
  Speaker 2: the corporate press in the United States based on intelligence sources.
• 17:46
  Speaker 3: That.
• 17:48
  Speaker 2: China is providing weaponry, finished weaponry, but it's going through
• 17:52
  Speaker 2: third countries, it's not being delivered directly. So that kind
• 17:56
  Speaker 2: of thing. What I'm interested in knowing, Carl is let's
• 18:00
  Speaker 2: let's just talk about hard facts. What we know with
• 18:03
  Speaker 2: reasonably reliable, objective evidence. What can you say with confidence.
• 18:07
  Speaker 2: You mentioned a couple of things, chemical precursors. What can
• 18:10
  Speaker 2: you say with confidence based upon the hard facts, hard
• 18:13
  Speaker 2: evidence that China is providing to Iran at this particular time.
• 18:18
  Speaker 1: China is probably providing satellite intelligence to Iran, including satellite targeting.
• 18:24
  Speaker 1: Urung has gotten very good in this wrong even compared
• 18:28
  Speaker 1: to the Twelve Days War last year. They know where
• 18:32
  Speaker 1: to hit, what to hit. Even the US personnels in
• 18:36
  Speaker 1: like hiding out in hotels in UAE, and they obviously
• 18:42
  Speaker 1: Iran has very good human intelligence on the ground. There's
• 18:47
  Speaker 1: no denying yet, but I think Uran also got plenty
• 18:51
  Speaker 1: of help for access to the Salite intelligence. This is
• 18:54
  Speaker 1: why recently US is putting out another sanction a Chinese
• 19:00
  Speaker 1: satellite provides a satellite map provider company for that specifically
• 19:06
  Speaker 1: claim that China is providing the Salite intelligence too.
• 19:10
  Speaker 2: Yra, Let's talk about another country in the region and
• 19:15
  Speaker 2: its relations with China, and that is Israel. You know,
• 19:18
  Speaker 2: on the one hand, China's government has been quite critical
• 19:23
  Speaker 2: of Israel's heinous atrocities against the Palestinian people, It's rampant
• 19:28
  Speaker 2: violations of international law. It has been one of the
• 19:31
  Speaker 2: more outspoken governments in the world actually when it comes
• 19:35
  Speaker 2: to defending the rights of Palestinians. But it does maintain
• 19:39
  Speaker 2: significant economic relations with Israel. At least the most recent
• 19:43
  Speaker 2: data that I saw suggested that it is, if not
• 19:46
  Speaker 2: the largest trading partner, one of the one or two
• 19:48
  Speaker 2: largest trading partners of Israel. What do you think China's
• 19:52
  Speaker 2: calculus is there? If the government recognizes and clearly it
• 19:56
  Speaker 2: does that Israel Is just fagrantly violating international law. Repspective Palestinians,
• 20:04
  Speaker 2: why do you think it continues to maintain economic relations
• 20:07
  Speaker 2: with Israel.
• 20:08
  Speaker 1: Well, I can provide a historical perspective of Chinese relationship
• 20:12
  Speaker 1: with his Israel. For the most of the for the decades,
• 20:18
  Speaker 1: all the way up to nineteen ninety, China did not
• 20:22
  Speaker 1: recognize Israel. You know, I remember this. I lived in
• 20:27
  Speaker 1: China in nineteen eighties at that time. You know you
• 20:30
  Speaker 1: can't Israelis cannot travel to China with an Israeli passport.
• 20:34
  Speaker 1: They will have to use some other passport to get
• 20:37
  Speaker 1: to China because China didn't recognize Israel. And China was
• 20:40
  Speaker 1: one of the first to recognize that Palestinian state in
• 20:43
  Speaker 1: nineteen eighty eight. They had a pals standing embassy in
• 20:47
  Speaker 1: Beijing back then, and I remember yasar Era fact regularly
• 20:53
  Speaker 1: visited China all the way through the nineteen eighties. There
• 20:57
  Speaker 1: was a big shift in nineteen ninety for very for
• 21:03
  Speaker 1: many reasons. One one, is China faced internal isolation, international
• 21:09
  Speaker 1: isolation following the Camp and Square protests, and so China
• 21:14
  Speaker 1: trying to break out this diplomatic isolation. At the same time,
• 21:19
  Speaker 1: there was a negotiated peace settlement between the PLO and
• 21:24
  Speaker 1: the Israelis that led to the Oslo Accord in I
• 21:28
  Speaker 1: think it was nineteen ninety two. And so following that,
• 21:32
  Speaker 1: China established relationship with Israel, you know, because I mean
• 21:39
  Speaker 1: at that time also the reason is China can be
• 21:42
  Speaker 1: can be more pro Pilestainian than Palestinians. At that time,
• 21:45
  Speaker 1: it looks like Oslo Accord was going to stick, you know,
• 21:49
  Speaker 1: before what everything that happened next and then in the
• 21:55
  Speaker 1: early nineteen nineties, there was a so after nineteen eighty
• 21:59
  Speaker 1: nine Cameron Square incident, the China was under international armsteam
• 22:06
  Speaker 1: brgle from most of the Western countries and Israel. After
• 22:11
  Speaker 1: China established relationship with Israel in the early nineteen nineties,
• 22:15
  Speaker 1: Israel became a vector for China to get access to
• 22:20
  Speaker 1: Western military technology because Israeli didn't care. They just want
• 22:25
  Speaker 1: you know, if you pay them, they will sell it
• 22:27
  Speaker 1: to you. And that's how there was a famously Israeli
• 22:32
  Speaker 1: they were trying to develop their own indigenous fighter project
• 22:37
  Speaker 1: based on F sixteen. This was a lobby fighter project,
• 22:42
  Speaker 1: but there was a pressure from the United States for
• 22:45
  Speaker 1: Israel to cancel it. So Israel decided, you know, okay,
• 22:49
  Speaker 1: we'll just sell the designs to the Chinese, and that
• 22:53
  Speaker 1: supposedly give China a lot of a leg up in
• 22:57
  Speaker 1: developing their own indigenous ten fighter program. So so there
• 23:02
  Speaker 1: were there was that cooperation. But around two thousand, early
• 23:08
  Speaker 1: two thousand and up to twenty ten, this is when
• 23:11
  Speaker 1: United States really stepped in and tell tell Israel you
• 23:15
  Speaker 1: have to stop that. You you you, there's no like,
• 23:18
  Speaker 1: we don't want you to be serve as a back
• 23:20
  Speaker 1: door to fundel our technology military technology to China. So
• 23:26
  Speaker 1: by by twenty tens that that can't do. It has
• 23:31
  Speaker 1: basically stopped. So be fun for the period of nineteen
• 23:34
  Speaker 1: ninety two, like twenty tens, Israel was one of the
• 23:39
  Speaker 1: back door channel for for for China to access Western
• 23:43
  Speaker 1: but particularly American technology. After twenty ten, though that that
• 23:49
  Speaker 1: this is the part where because this is the when
• 23:51
  Speaker 1: China was pushing for its boutant role initiative, and this
• 23:55
  Speaker 1: is how China got into the development of Hypa Port.
• 24:01
  Speaker 1: But as I understand, the new hypha Port is actually
• 24:06
  Speaker 1: been taken over by by Indian Conglamorate that I there
• 24:14
  Speaker 1: that might there might be a difference between like different terminals.
• 24:17
  Speaker 1: But but my understanding, the new Hypha port is under
• 24:20
  Speaker 1: Indian management. But China is economically involved with Israel because
• 24:26
  Speaker 1: just as a lot of countries in the world, their
• 24:29
  Speaker 1: largest trading partner is with China. Israel was no exception.
• 24:34
  Speaker 1: Now why China did not place sanctioned on Israel. This
• 24:40
  Speaker 1: your gas is as good as mine. I My guess
• 24:44
  Speaker 1: is China did not want to openly antagonize Israel's biggest sponsor,
• 24:53
  Speaker 1: which is United States, because the four up to very recently,
• 24:58
  Speaker 1: China is trying to adopt a consolidatory stance towards the US.
• 25:04
  Speaker 1: It's trying to avoid conflict. You know. Chijinping actually brought
• 25:08
  Speaker 1: up the soucidities traps again during the during the meeting
• 25:13
  Speaker 1: with Trump. He said, you know, we don't have to
• 25:15
  Speaker 1: fall into the trap. We do not have to fall
• 25:18
  Speaker 1: into this conflict. So so they's right, probably right, right
• 25:23
  Speaker 1: fully see that Israel do have a lot of influence
• 25:25
  Speaker 1: in the United States, and by placing open sanctions on
• 25:32
  Speaker 1: Israel would lead to worst, you know, even worsening ties
• 25:36
  Speaker 1: with the United States. I mean, it is the ties
• 25:39
  Speaker 1: with the United States. It is already pretty bad, So
• 25:43
  Speaker 1: that's my guess. My guess is just this is they
• 25:46
  Speaker 1: want to avoid UH a more open confrontation with United
• 25:52
  Speaker 1: States on that front, So Carl h.
• 25:56
  Speaker 2: This past week I managed to gain access to a
• 25:59
  Speaker 2: conference in Athens that was designed to promote deeper ties
• 26:03
  Speaker 2: between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus. And there were some senior
• 26:08
  Speaker 2: government officials from both the Greek and Israeli governments. There
• 26:12
  Speaker 2: a number of heavy hitters from the private sector, including
• 26:16
  Speaker 2: the chairman of Israel Shipyards and the chairman of Israel
• 26:20
  Speaker 2: Ports Authorities. And the overarching preoccupation of everybody who spoke
• 26:25
  Speaker 2: at this conference was something called IMEC, which is the
• 26:29
  Speaker 2: India Middle East Eural Corridor. Now I have to confess
• 26:34
  Speaker 2: my ignorance. I had heard of this thing before, but
• 26:37
  Speaker 2: I really didn't care much about it. And then when
• 26:40
  Speaker 2: I was in or Had, I taken the time to
• 26:43
  Speaker 2: investigate it. But these people seemed so obsessed with this
• 26:46
  Speaker 2: project that I began to take a much closer look
• 26:49
  Speaker 2: at it. One of the things I found in the
• 26:52
  Speaker 2: course of my research was an article on the Atlantic
• 26:54
  Speaker 2: Council which presented this thing as an alternative to the
• 26:58
  Speaker 2: Belton Road initiative. And what I also discovered was that
• 27:03
  Speaker 2: this thing is, in my opinion at this stage, largely
• 27:06
  Speaker 2: a pipe train, if I can put it that way,
• 27:09
  Speaker 2: in part because not only for this reason, but in
• 27:12
  Speaker 2: part because it's supposed to pass through the Strait of
• 27:14
  Speaker 2: Hormuz and now that is now under the control of RAND.
• 27:17
  Speaker 2: So what is your view about the IMEC, How real
• 27:21
  Speaker 2: is this thing? What do you think China's view about
• 27:24
  Speaker 2: it is, How is this going to affect, if at all?
• 27:26
  Speaker 2: The Belton Road initiative.
• 27:29
  Speaker 1: The IMEC was seriously floated around during the Biden administration,
• 27:32
  Speaker 1: and as you pointed out, has always been taulted as
• 27:35
  Speaker 1: an alternative to the bout and Row initiative because the
• 27:40
  Speaker 1: United States felt lead has to uh, you know, counter
• 27:45
  Speaker 1: the Chinese influence in the region. And the idea is
• 27:51
  Speaker 1: to have this corridor that linked India through the GCC countries.
• 27:56
  Speaker 1: I have a real connection that will traverse GCC country
• 28:00
  Speaker 1: connects to Israel and from Israel Port Hyphah Hypha port
• 28:06
  Speaker 1: to Europe. Now, first of all, it's kind of the
• 28:10
  Speaker 1: whole idea is kind of economically dubious because you know why,
• 28:14
  Speaker 1: you have to go unload your ships go through straight horblees,
• 28:19
  Speaker 1: unload your ships, put it on on training and then
• 28:23
  Speaker 1: then do another unloading at Hypha Port and then ship
• 28:28
  Speaker 1: when you can just have your ship sail to you know,
• 28:35
  Speaker 1: Red Sea. But I guess one one rationale motivation provided
• 28:41
  Speaker 1: was because the Hooties were shutting down the Red Sea
• 28:45
  Speaker 1: traffic at that point, so that that maybe that was
• 28:48
  Speaker 1: made a games some currency.
• 28:50
  Speaker 2: But actually they launched it, I'm sorry to interrupted. They
• 28:52
  Speaker 2: launched it in September twenty twenty three, which was before
• 28:56
  Speaker 2: the before the genocide began. So apparently they thought back
• 29:01
  Speaker 2: then that it made it can exist. But sorry, sorry
• 29:04
  Speaker 2: to drup. Please continue.
• 29:05
  Speaker 1: Yeah, no, I mean give me a normal situations if
• 29:08
  Speaker 1: there's no war. I mean, it doesn't really make too
• 29:11
  Speaker 1: much sense, but they they thought, I think it does
• 29:14
  Speaker 1: a couple of things. One is up here that Biden
• 29:16
  Speaker 1: administration is doing something and you know, to counter the
• 29:20
  Speaker 1: Chinese influence. And two it's too further buying the GCC
• 29:24
  Speaker 1: countries to to Israel. I mean that that's the whole
• 29:28
  Speaker 1: Abra and the courts is all about, is to first
• 29:31
  Speaker 1: get get the GCC country to recognize normalized ties with Israel,
• 29:36
  Speaker 1: and then get other majority Muslim countries, including Indonesia, to
• 29:41
  Speaker 1: to to recognize Israel, basically to quash the whole pilestaining
• 29:45
  Speaker 1: self determination. And I think that's actually why one of
• 29:50
  Speaker 1: the reasons why October seventh have to happen, because it
• 29:54
  Speaker 1: happened that the way after the aftermats of October seventh,
• 29:58
  Speaker 1: basically the whole a bra A core expansion project was kapou.
• 30:03
  Speaker 1: You know, no, no, no Arab street would allow their
• 30:06
  Speaker 1: rulers to to to formalize such a deal with Israel anymore.
• 30:12
  Speaker 1: But but you know, I is very much. Yeah, it
• 30:17
  Speaker 1: was very much entwined with that project, and because that
• 30:21
  Speaker 1: that will bind again g c C countries and Israel
• 30:25
  Speaker 1: align their interests together. But yeah, I agree with you
• 30:29
  Speaker 1: that under those current situations, I mean, god, it's it's
• 30:35
  Speaker 1: it's it's a non secretor.
• 30:39
  Speaker 2: Yeah, this doesn't stop the Greek government from investing enormous
• 30:42
  Speaker 2: time and energy in this pipe. But hey, what what
• 30:46
  Speaker 2: can I say about that?
• 30:48
  Speaker 1: So I my gas is also no, I mean you
• 30:51
  Speaker 1: you you probably know more about my guess is also
• 30:54
  Speaker 1: they they thought this might be a way to curry
• 30:57
  Speaker 1: favor with the United States, and I think there is
• 31:01
  Speaker 1: some more gas field, right, there's some gas field in
• 31:05
  Speaker 1: the in the in the mid eastern Mediterranean that Israel
• 31:09
  Speaker 1: want to have a share, and I guess it falls
• 31:14
  Speaker 1: between Israel and Cyprus. I mean, maybe that's part of it.
• 31:17
  Speaker 1: I don't know.
• 31:18
  Speaker 2: Yeah, it is, I'm sure that's true. So let's switch
• 31:22
  Speaker 2: to a region of the world closer to China. I
• 31:26
  Speaker 2: want to talk to you about Trump's recent visit to
• 31:29
  Speaker 2: China and Taiwan. Again, we saw reports that, you know,
• 31:36
  Speaker 2: Trump is kind of he was I'm trying to find
• 31:40
  Speaker 2: the right words to describe it here, but that he
• 31:42
  Speaker 2: made conciliatory noises vis of the Taiwan tried to sort
• 31:46
  Speaker 2: of reassure the Chinese government that the United States isn't
• 31:50
  Speaker 2: going to make trouble in that part of the world.
• 31:53
  Speaker 2: Do you think that there has been a shift, a
• 31:56
  Speaker 2: real shift and one that will endure in the US
• 32:00
  Speaker 2: government's approach to the Taiwan issue.
• 32:03
  Speaker 1: Well, I don't think they will stop selling weapons to Taiwan,
• 32:07
  Speaker 1: because you know, that's that's one of the core interests
• 32:09
  Speaker 1: to the US military industrial complex. I mean, selling weapons
• 32:14
  Speaker 1: to Taiwan is not even about defending Taiwan, like they
• 32:18
  Speaker 1: ostensibly claim, because what actually happened in practice is Taiwan
• 32:22
  Speaker 1: yearly pay upfront, they pay billions of dollars and then
• 32:26
  Speaker 1: they take delivery like twenty years later. And this is
• 32:29
  Speaker 1: due to the state of military industrial complex in the
• 32:33
  Speaker 1: United States. You know, the capacity is simply not there.
• 32:38
  Speaker 1: And so everybody eve and everybody in Taiwan no, you know,
• 32:41
  Speaker 1: there's all these weapon purchases kind of a paying protection
• 32:45
  Speaker 1: money to get on the good side of the US government,
• 32:49
  Speaker 1: so they will take sides with Taiwan, and they don't.
• 32:52
  Speaker 1: They don't, they don't depend they don't you know, they
• 32:54
  Speaker 1: don't expect those weapon platform to do anything, if anything,
• 32:58
  Speaker 1: they expect, you know, America. You know, by purchasing this weapon,
• 33:02
  Speaker 1: maybe will United States will agree to intervene directly militarily.
• 33:08
  Speaker 1: But at this point, I think there's a very that's
• 33:13
  Speaker 1: very unlikely scenario, given what happened in the street or Homos.
• 33:17
  Speaker 1: You know, if the United States cannot take on you wrong,
• 33:19
  Speaker 1: forget forget about taking on China on the Taiwan straight straight,
• 33:23
  Speaker 1: you know, because China has magnitude more missiles and more
• 33:27
  Speaker 1: advanced missiles in than than You're wrong and and just
• 33:31
  Speaker 1: look at how those eleven military US military basis got
• 33:35
  Speaker 1: rendered uninhabitable in the in the Gulf region. This that
• 33:39
  Speaker 1: would be the same fate of all the US bases
• 33:41
  Speaker 1: in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines if the ship hits
• 33:44
  Speaker 1: the fan. So I think that one. You know, Trump
• 33:49
  Speaker 1: has been very conciliatory on this trip. He has been
• 33:52
  Speaker 1: on his best behavior. I think one thing that compel
• 33:56
  Speaker 1: him to do so is the realization that, you know,
• 34:00
  Speaker 1: they no longer hold the upper hands when you come
• 34:03
  Speaker 1: to negotiation with China. And you know, compared to what
• 34:07
  Speaker 1: Trump said about Taiwan versus Biden is actually a big
• 34:11
  Speaker 1: difference because there was a you know, this is Biden
• 34:15
  Speaker 1: went to meet with Shijimping and then right around that
• 34:18
  Speaker 1: time when we interview on American TV, he was asked
• 34:22
  Speaker 1: if the United States would come to defend Taiwan gets
• 34:26
  Speaker 1: a Chinese attack, and He's say yes, and then you
• 34:29
  Speaker 1: just see, like Tony Flincoln just go because like he
• 34:35
  Speaker 1: just he just like blow apart the decade long American
• 34:39
  Speaker 1: strategic ambiguity on Taiwan, and the White House staff had
• 34:45
  Speaker 1: to walk back Biden's statements like Okay, he didn't he
• 34:49
  Speaker 1: didn't understand the question. You know, he's just denial, old man.
• 34:52
  Speaker 1: And and so Trump has been very carefully avoiding the
• 34:56
  Speaker 1: whole UH. You know that that same line up questions.
• 35:00
  Speaker 1: There was a time when he was asked spefically if
• 35:03
  Speaker 1: he brought out the issue of Taiwan was in the
• 35:06
  Speaker 1: talk with hijin pain. He just pretended he didn't hear
• 35:10
  Speaker 1: it and moved on. And so I think the the
• 35:16
  Speaker 1: most important result of this meeting is probably there will
• 35:19
  Speaker 1: be somewhat stability in the China American relationship UH in
• 35:25
  Speaker 1: the immediate future. I think both sides have recognized they
• 35:28
  Speaker 1: need to put a floor on the free fall of
• 35:31
  Speaker 1: the of the bilateral relationship so far, especially after in
• 35:36
  Speaker 1: the aftermath of the tariff war earlier, and and and
• 35:41
  Speaker 1: and besides, the United States is quite busy involved in this,
• 35:46
  Speaker 1: in this misadventure in in in West Asia. He cannot
• 35:50
  Speaker 1: afford to UH antagonize China at this particular point. So
• 35:54
  Speaker 1: I think I think we can look forward pop possibility
• 35:58
  Speaker 1: of a more stabilized UH Sino American relationship in the
• 36:03
  Speaker 1: I say in the immediate future, because look, we're dealing
• 36:06
  Speaker 1: with a chomp administration here. So who knows when he's
• 36:09
  Speaker 1: going to change his mind, right, but maybe maybe in
• 36:12
  Speaker 1: the next month will be okay.
• 36:15
  Speaker 2: Yeah, it's like a box of chocolates. You never know
• 36:16
  Speaker 2: what you're going to find inside. So his forrest Gump said, Uh,
• 36:22
  Speaker 2: I want to talk to you about an interesting uh
• 36:25
  Speaker 2: meeting UH that the leader of the Taiwanese opposition had.
• 36:30
  Speaker 2: I believe it was in China, just a few days
• 36:32
  Speaker 2: before Trump arrived there. And her name is Changi one,
• 36:38
  Speaker 2: and she is the chair of the Kuomintang or km
• 36:42
  Speaker 2: TEA party, and she said she interesting comments. She doesn't
• 36:46
  Speaker 2: she didn't want her party didn't want Taiwan to become
• 36:50
  Speaker 2: the next Ukraine. And she talked about peaceful and cooperative
• 36:55
  Speaker 2: coexistence with both the government in mainland China and with Washington.
• 37:01
  Speaker 2: Could you talk to us about the politics on the
• 37:04
  Speaker 2: island of Taiwan and and you know, how do you
• 37:07
  Speaker 2: see the politics unfolding in the years ahead? How strong
• 37:11
  Speaker 2: is the sentiment for uh, let's say, detente with the
• 37:16
  Speaker 2: government in mainland China and even with you know, an
• 37:20
  Speaker 2: unambiguous reunification of the the two political systems.
• 37:26
  Speaker 1: Yeah, I mean there is a tectonic plate shift in
• 37:30
  Speaker 1: the Taiwan politics. You know, for years the Taiwan has
• 37:33
  Speaker 1: kind of the political scene has kind of drifted toward
• 37:37
  Speaker 1: leaning towards separation from from mainland China. But given what
• 37:41
  Speaker 1: they have witnessed in the Ukraine War, there are saner
• 37:45
  Speaker 1: heads that that that has starting to prevail. You know,
• 37:49
  Speaker 1: she made send you when made up very sensible comments
• 37:52
  Speaker 1: like if you really love Taiwan, you do not want
• 37:56
  Speaker 1: Taiwan to be turned into a battlefield. You know, we
• 37:59
  Speaker 1: do not want to be the Ukraine in East Asia,
• 38:01
  Speaker 1: which makes sense. And and the you know, the Taiwan
• 38:05
  Speaker 1: has you know, she's also from the party the KMT
• 38:09
  Speaker 1: or Woman Down Party that sometimes in English translations translates
• 38:13
  Speaker 1: into the Chinese Nationalist Party. So they they are you know,
• 38:17
  Speaker 1: by their origin. You know, there weren't there weren't the
• 38:21
  Speaker 1: Pro Independence Party versus the current ruling party of Taiwan,
• 38:26
  Speaker 1: the DPP, the Democratic Progressive Party, which in its party
• 38:30
  Speaker 1: platform says it advocates Taiwan independence. But then when they
• 38:36
  Speaker 1: got elected into power, they try to whistle out of this.
• 38:39
  Speaker 1: They say, well, okay, well the Republic of China on
• 38:43
  Speaker 1: Taiwan is already independent, so we don't have to declare
• 38:46
  Speaker 1: independence anymore, which just means status quo and so essentially
• 38:53
  Speaker 1: both parties, uh, you know, they're both status quo parties,
• 38:58
  Speaker 1: but there are some minor differences, is you know, the
• 39:02
  Speaker 1: DPP they do play on kind of divide and conquer strategy,
• 39:10
  Speaker 1: especially along ethnic lines because Taiwan's population, you know, eighty
• 39:16
  Speaker 1: five percent of the Taiwan's population are descended from the
• 39:20
  Speaker 1: family who were already living in Taiwan before nineteen forty nine,
• 39:25
  Speaker 1: and then fifteen percent of the Taiwan population are the
• 39:29
  Speaker 1: descendants of those people who came from mainland China as
• 39:34
  Speaker 1: a result of the Chinese Civil War when KMT or
• 39:37
  Speaker 1: Chinese Nationalist Party was defeated by the Communists, and they
• 39:41
  Speaker 1: and the KMT when they first came to Taiwan, they
• 39:47
  Speaker 1: kind they rule on their a military dictatorship from nineteen
• 39:50
  Speaker 1: forty basically from the nineteen forties to nineteen eighty seven.
• 39:54
  Speaker 1: Nineteen eighty seven is when Marshall Law finally ended on Taiwan,
• 40:00
  Speaker 1: and so that created a lot of bad memories among
• 40:02
  Speaker 1: the local population that feel all these carpetbaggers from mainland
• 40:06
  Speaker 1: China came over and then loaded themselves over the locals,
• 40:11
  Speaker 1: and and and DPP kind of weaponized that historical memory
• 40:16
  Speaker 1: and and and make it made it like made it
• 40:19
  Speaker 1: versus a local versus the mainlanders, you know, and and
• 40:22
  Speaker 1: by extension also mainland China where all these mainlanders come from. Uh.
• 40:27
  Speaker 1: And So that is kind of the difference between the
• 40:29
  Speaker 1: two the two parties, the k m T, they they
• 40:33
  Speaker 1: are kind of seeing as the mainlander party, so they
• 40:36
  Speaker 1: can't really like you know, position themselves as they openly
• 40:41
  Speaker 1: Taiwan Independent, the Independence Party. So so but but but
• 40:46
  Speaker 1: but now what's interesting is Taiwan is no longer a
• 40:50
  Speaker 1: two party uh uh uh a place because now there's
• 40:55
  Speaker 1: a third party that emerge. And in fact, it's because
• 40:58
  Speaker 1: the emergence of the third party that's split the vote
• 41:00
  Speaker 1: of the opposition that allow the current Taiwan leader to
• 41:06
  Speaker 1: win light Chindo to win presidency with only forty percent
• 41:11
  Speaker 1: of the vote, you know, even sixty sixty percent of
• 41:14
  Speaker 1: the electorate voted for other parties. But because it was
• 41:18
  Speaker 1: split between other two opposition parties, that still allow DPP
• 41:22
  Speaker 1: to rule. So now the interesting to watch is the
• 41:28
  Speaker 1: coming election municipal election in this year twenty twenty six,
• 41:34
  Speaker 1: and then following that will be their presidential election in
• 41:38
  Speaker 1: twenty twenty eight. So Kim t has a very good
• 41:41
  Speaker 1: chance to win. You know, it's their election to lose
• 41:44
  Speaker 1: because the people. The DPP party has been powerful over
• 41:48
  Speaker 1: a decade. People are getting sick and tired of them
• 41:51
  Speaker 1: because they haven't really done anything to improve the economic prospect,
• 41:56
  Speaker 1: especially of the young people because Taiwan. Taiwan is facing
• 42:00
  Speaker 1: the same problem of a lot of advance economies in
• 42:02
  Speaker 1: the West, like the housing prices are high. The young
• 42:07
  Speaker 1: people that can't afford a place to live, and they
• 42:10
  Speaker 1: don't have a good job prospect in the job market.
• 42:13
  Speaker 1: They don't have they did look they can't look forward
• 42:17
  Speaker 1: to a better economic future. So they're stagnation. There's hollowing out.
• 42:22
  Speaker 1: The only thing that Taiwan has right now is TSMC,
• 42:26
  Speaker 1: the Taiwan's semiconductor industry, and which United States is actively
• 42:31
  Speaker 1: sabotaging because they they made t SMC to move production
• 42:37
  Speaker 1: to Arizona and make them do a tech tech transfer
• 42:41
  Speaker 1: with Intel, you know, which is not not not great
• 42:44
  Speaker 1: for Taiwan. And Trump Trump also comment hit on this.
• 42:48
  Speaker 1: He said, Taiwan, they still are They're still hard technology.
• 42:52
  Speaker 1: There's still hard stemiconductor industry.
• 42:55
  Speaker 3: I't like that, but that is the main pillar of
• 42:59
  Speaker 3: the Wan economy right now, you know if H and
• 43:02
  Speaker 3: that is being under pressure by bye bye bye, by
• 43:06
  Speaker 3: Trump's policies.
• 43:07
  Speaker 1: And and also because you know the Taiwan economies depends
• 43:11
  Speaker 1: so much on TSMC, it's also depends how heavily right
• 43:16
  Speaker 1: now on the ongoing AI bubble because Nvidia, other AI
• 43:21
  Speaker 1: chips and Apple, all the chips are getting made in
• 43:25
  Speaker 1: Taiwan and UH. If the AI bubble burst, this is
• 43:30
  Speaker 1: going to be bad, not not only be back for
• 43:31
  Speaker 1: the United States, because you will be terrible for for
• 43:34
  Speaker 1: Taiwan because they had been cut off on their one
• 43:38
  Speaker 1: of their biggest market, which is China. This was under
• 43:41
  Speaker 1: Trump's UH semiconductor sanction against China, TSMC was no longer
• 43:46
  Speaker 1: allowed to make chips for UH mainland companies like Huawei,
• 43:52
  Speaker 1: et cetera. So so now they're they're depending on exclusively
• 43:57
  Speaker 1: on the AI boom or I call AI bubble, which sustainable.
• 44:04
  Speaker 2: It's just it's just mind blowing that the United States
• 44:06
  Speaker 2: would be able to blocks from like China. It's just crazy.
• 44:14
  Speaker 1: But this is how the US sanction work. Because US
• 44:19
  Speaker 1: secondary sanction is is essentially a global sanction. It says,
• 44:22
  Speaker 1: any companies that use any US technology, or if you
• 44:27
  Speaker 1: use US dollar as transaction, then you are liable to
• 44:32
  Speaker 1: our sanction laws, then we can sanction you, and you
• 44:34
  Speaker 1: have That's why you have to follow our rule. That's
• 44:36
  Speaker 1: why when the US put the sanction on five Chinese
• 44:41
  Speaker 1: oil refineries for deal for for buying you running oil,
• 44:47
  Speaker 1: China had to issue a counter block measure to tell
• 44:50
  Speaker 1: the Chinese companies, hey, you don't need to apply, you
• 44:55
  Speaker 1: don't need to obey the American laws. But normally, if
• 44:59
  Speaker 1: the Chinese government didn't step in, it means that even
• 45:04
  Speaker 1: the Chinese companies will try to refrain from the doing
• 45:06
  Speaker 1: doing business with those Chinese refiners because they easier have
• 45:10
  Speaker 1: some oversea operation that dealing in the US dollars or
• 45:15
  Speaker 1: uh you know they have, uh, they have some business
• 45:18
  Speaker 1: in the United States that that they might be worried
• 45:20
  Speaker 1: about that that that makes them so So you a
• 45:23
  Speaker 1: US law that require a Chinese company in China to
• 45:28
  Speaker 1: boycott a Chinese oil refinery, I mean, which is ridiculous.
• 45:32
  Speaker 1: That's when the that's why Chinese government finally stepped in,
• 45:35
  Speaker 1: like whoa whoa wa. You know we don't. We don't
• 45:37
  Speaker 1: buy that ship here like you guys are not you
• 45:40
  Speaker 1: are you guys are specifically older not to obey those
• 45:43
  Speaker 1: U s anctions. You better continue to do business with
• 45:46
  Speaker 1: those Chinese refineries or else we will get them. We
• 45:50
  Speaker 1: will get you. Yeah.
• 45:51
  Speaker 2: This this effectively forces uh a decoupling of the economies,
• 45:56
  Speaker 2: does it not, to the extent that there is conflicting legislation,
• 45:58
  Speaker 2: These corporations that have to use in which jurisdiction they're
• 46:02
  Speaker 2: going to operate, they can't choose both. Do you think
• 46:07
  Speaker 2: this is the start of some or maybe it's not
• 46:10
  Speaker 2: the start. Maybe we're well into the process of decoupling
• 46:12
  Speaker 2: of the Chinese and American economies because of the aggressive
• 46:16
  Speaker 2: extra territorial application of US law by both the democratic
• 46:22
  Speaker 2: regimes and the Republican regimes.
• 46:24
  Speaker 1: Well, I think that decoupling is going to be very difficult.
• 46:28
  Speaker 1: This is why during the Trump meeting to China, he
• 46:31
  Speaker 1: brought all the American oligarchs, you know, from Apple to Nvidia,
• 46:37
  Speaker 1: Elon Musk, Micron Boying, Gigi Cargill, you know black Rock Blackstone,
• 46:45
  Speaker 1: you know Goldman Sachs, who is who of the American
• 46:48
  Speaker 1: oliguards all went into China because they recognized decoupling from
• 46:53
  Speaker 1: China is unrealistic. Even the US military industrial complex cannot
• 46:58
  Speaker 1: decouple from China because they read the rath On CEO said,
• 47:01
  Speaker 1: you know, like now we we still need parts and
• 47:04
  Speaker 1: components from from China. Another problem. One of the one
• 47:09
  Speaker 1: of the asks of the Trump administration, which I don't
• 47:12
  Speaker 1: think they got, was actually for China to lift their
• 47:15
  Speaker 1: export control on the rare earth to the American military
• 47:20
  Speaker 1: industrial complex. So currently the the China is still selling
• 47:25
  Speaker 1: rare earth, but only to civilian industries like the carmakers
• 47:30
  Speaker 1: because you need rare earth to to make the magnets
• 47:33
  Speaker 1: for the cars. But they they're the Chinese exporters are
• 47:38
  Speaker 1: not allowed to to to export to like raith the young
• 47:42
  Speaker 1: or or which make Boying kind of interesting, like it's boiling,
• 47:48
  Speaker 1: get to get to have the rare earth.
• 47:51
  Speaker 2: Uh.
• 47:51
  Speaker 1: But anyway, so it's up to the Chinese regulatory agency
• 47:56
  Speaker 1: to to figure that out. But but, but, but what
• 48:00
  Speaker 1: Trump wanted to is a general lift of the expert
• 48:02
  Speaker 1: control on Chinese where earth. We did not hear any
• 48:06
  Speaker 1: announcement to that effect, So I assume that just didn't happen. Yeah,
• 48:11
  Speaker 1: and this this is one of the way that you know,
• 48:14
  Speaker 1: you know people, this is how China do conduct its business.
• 48:18
  Speaker 1: You know, it sells chemical precursors to you wrong to
• 48:21
  Speaker 1: allow you wrong to make its missiles. But you will
• 48:24
  Speaker 1: not sell real earth to you know, raise the Young
• 48:27
  Speaker 1: or Lackey Martin to allow them to output, you know,
• 48:31
  Speaker 1: make more F thirty five's and Patriot missiles. So this
• 48:35
  Speaker 1: is how China plays game.
• 48:38
  Speaker 2: So finally, Carl, today President Vladimir Putin is traveling to
• 48:42
  Speaker 2: China for a two day summit. Just broadly speaking, what
• 48:46
  Speaker 2: do you think, uh, they aim to accomplish the Chinese
• 48:51
  Speaker 2: and Russian governments in this important visit.
• 48:54
  Speaker 1: Well, it's interesting the timing of it, right, you have
• 48:57
  Speaker 1: the Iranian Prime Minister and the and Vladimir Putin basically
• 49:02
  Speaker 1: Sandwich Trump in between. So I think there's a degree
• 49:06
  Speaker 1: of coordination between Iran and Russia and China on how
• 49:10
  Speaker 1: they can collectively deal with the United States. And they
• 49:15
  Speaker 1: probably also inform each other like how you know, so
• 49:20
  Speaker 1: there will be no surprises, you know how I'm like
• 49:23
  Speaker 1: whatever announcement that Trump administration is going to say, you know,
• 49:28
  Speaker 1: because because Trump is now. I just saw a Financial
• 49:31
  Speaker 1: Times article claiming that that that Trump that h Jinpin
• 49:36
  Speaker 1: reportedly said that that Putin will regret about the Ukraine
• 49:40
  Speaker 1: war to Trump, which I this is bogus. I mean,
• 49:45
  Speaker 1: like the timing of this article at the same time
• 49:48
  Speaker 1: when Putin is traveling to China. I mean, come on,
• 49:51
  Speaker 1: I just don't buy that.
• 49:54
  Speaker 2: Let me guess what it was based on two unnamed
• 49:57
  Speaker 2: officials from there. Sorry you were saying, yeah, yeah, I mean,
• 50:09
  Speaker 2: you know how how it goes. It's the same format,
• 50:12
  Speaker 2: but it is so so.
• 50:14
  Speaker 1: The the Russia China tie obviously has always been very important,
• 50:19
  Speaker 1: but now it's been made more important in light of
• 50:23
  Speaker 1: what happened in the street or Homos. Russia is gonna,
• 50:28
  Speaker 1: you know, China is probably going to increase its energy
• 50:31
  Speaker 1: imports from Russia, both oil and gas, and and and
• 50:37
  Speaker 1: and just just to make up for the for the
• 50:40
  Speaker 1: for the for the reduced uh inflow fund from the
• 50:45
  Speaker 1: Persian Gulf. And this is another another thing. That Trump
• 50:49
  Speaker 1: supposedly said that that China made the commitment could buy
• 50:53
  Speaker 1: American oil, which I guess that's possible because oil is
• 50:59
  Speaker 1: a globally tree commodity, you know, if China is unable
• 51:02
  Speaker 1: to get oil from perfect Golf, you will buy oil
• 51:05
  Speaker 1: from elsewhere. What it does, though, is just going to
• 51:09
  Speaker 1: raise the oil price globally because you know, even though
• 51:14
  Speaker 1: people a lot of people say okay, because the United
• 51:17
  Speaker 1: States has plenty of oil and gas, you know, us
• 51:20
  Speaker 1: will benefit from the current blockade on the trade or
• 51:23
  Speaker 1: most well, some people will benefit. The US big oil
• 51:28
  Speaker 1: majors will benefit. You know. Shel the company Shell, they
• 51:32
  Speaker 1: just release their quarterly earning reports for the first quarter
• 51:36
  Speaker 1: of twenty twenty six. They double their profit compared to
• 51:40
  Speaker 1: the last quarter. And this and that's from January, February
• 51:45
  Speaker 1: to March. The only March was you know, when the
• 51:47
  Speaker 1: war really got under the way. So their next quarter
• 51:51
  Speaker 1: earning report is going to be even more spectacular. But
• 51:54
  Speaker 1: this is bad news for everybody else who buy their product,
• 51:57
  Speaker 1: because everybody is everybody else is paying for it. This
• 52:01
  Speaker 1: is why you have reports of forty of American farmer
• 52:06
  Speaker 1: are declaring bank like forty five percent increase in the
• 52:09
  Speaker 1: farm bankruptcy in the United States, and seventy percent of
• 52:12
  Speaker 1: American farmers said they can no longer afford the increase
• 52:15
  Speaker 1: in the fertile the chemical fertilizers price and the diesel,
• 52:19
  Speaker 1: and the price is increase in the price diesel because
• 52:22
  Speaker 1: I say, like these these companies, they will export their
• 52:26
  Speaker 1: expensive American l in g elsewhere to make the profit,
• 52:30
  Speaker 1: you know, maybe to Europe. So the American farmer is
• 52:33
  Speaker 1: still not going to get their fertilizers and the and
• 52:36
  Speaker 1: and the and diesel to plant their crops, which gonna
• 52:41
  Speaker 1: be it's gonna be really bad for the end of
• 52:44
  Speaker 1: the year when because you know, the planting season is
• 52:48
  Speaker 1: almost over now, the spring planting season is almost over,
• 52:51
  Speaker 1: and that means one year we're gonna have crop shortages.
• 52:56
  Speaker 1: We're gonna have grain shortages at the end of the year.
• 52:59
  Speaker 2: Yeah, we're for a hell of a summer and of fall. Anyways, Carl,
• 53:03
  Speaker 2: it's been a great pleasure talking to you. Fascinating discussion.
• 53:07
  Speaker 2: Thank you for your insights, and I hope we can
• 53:08
  Speaker 2: have you back on the program soon to continue the
• 53:11
  Speaker 2: conversation for sure.
• 53:13
  Speaker 1: Thank you.
• 53:14
  Speaker 2: Thanks, and we're signing off today. On May nineteenth, twenty
• 53:17
  Speaker 2: twenty six,