Latest / Beyond the Summit with Amir Golshani / Is the Iranian Regime Actually Close to Collapse? Aaron David Miller
Transcript
- Amir Golshani: Welcome back. Today we are joined by a man who has spent a quarter century in the room where it happens, serving six secretaries of state and navigating the most complex peace negotiations in modern history. He's a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment and voice of sober historical clarity in a world of loud opinions. But beyond the titles, he's a student of human nature and the endurance of nations. Aaron David Miller, it's an honor to have you on Beyond the Summit podcast. Aaron David Miller: Thanks, Amir. It's great to be here. Amir Golshani: Fantastic. You have spoken about how the Islamic Republic above all a survivalist entity. Historically, air campaigns and economic blockades haven't successfully toppled regimes. But right now, with the straight-up hormones at play and the economic pressure reaching an absolute boiling point, does the old survivalist playbook still work? Aaron David Miller: Yeah, I I guess the question is whether or not reached ⁓ proverbial boiling point. The scientist ⁓ William Zartman talks about what he describes as a hurting stalemate. When both sides believe that victories ⁓ is extremely and yet neither side has been brought to the cusp of that the pain they're under would them to consider diplomatic pathway out of this. I don't think we've reached a hurting stalemate yet. I think both the United States and Iran, number one, believe that their respective pain thresholds are capable of ⁓ absorbing more I think both have the conviction that they have escalatory steps that they can continue to take. So I don't see this juncture. ⁓ beginning the third month of the war next University of in Uppsala in Sweden studied every interstate since 1815. The average of ⁓ interstate conflict, wars last longer, is three to four months. So I don't foresee this conflict, however you want to describe it, as ending anytime soon. I think both sides are still determined find a way out that would hand them a post-conflict victory. And I think that's really critically important in the case of Iran. I don't think the Iranians are interested in restoring the status quo empty. I think they want to create a new security and a political reality in the post-conflict period, and that has been driven by their weaponization of geography. And in this part of the world, you know as well as I that geography is So I think that has been, in my the most potentially transformative aspect of this campaign. in this part of the world, you know as well as I that geography ⁓ is destiny. Amir Golshani: All right. What would be the rational next step by either side in your opinion? Aaron David Miller: I think Trump already announced, told Axios today, Barack Reveed of Axios, that intends to keep the ⁓ blockade, blockade on. And he an expression which in my judgment, for an American president to publicly say to a Muslim country and regime that the blockade has got them quote choking like a stuffed pig unquote. To have an American president use language like that, even though this is a brutal authoritarian repressive regime that tortures and prisons and its own citizens, that's ⁓ really an extraordinary phrase. this is a brutal authoritarian repressive regime that tortures and prisons murders its own citizens, Amir Golshani: My concern, Aaron, is the people of Iran. From 1979 revolution to the current blockade, the Iranian people have been the silent victims of every policy failure. After the brutal crackdowns we have seen recently, you have mentioned that with tens of thousands of lives lost. Is there From revolution to the current blockade, the Iranian people have been the silent victims of every policy failure. anyone in Washington actually advocating for 90 million Iranians or it's the end game strictly about regional stability and oil price. Aaron David Miller: I mean, I don't think this administration much about rights, democratization, the well-being. think that vision of the Middle East is epitomized by the Gulf. The states to him represent everything that's ⁓ of value in life. dealing with authoritarian powers. ⁓ who repress and suppress their own citizens. He's an authoritarian personality, much more comfortable with the MBSs and the MBZs of the world than he is of America's European democratic allies. Gulf represents money, oil, AI, crypto. see that best friend, Stephen Witkoff, launching this world liberty financial enterprise. see Jared Kushner, affinity partners bankrolled by the Saudis to the tune of $2 billion. I this is what Trump cares about. It is that he was probably the first American president during the extraordinary bold and courageous demonstrations by the Iranian people in January to offer ⁓ encouragement. He said, help is on the way, seize your institutions, we're going to hit them hard. yet he failed to deliver because you pointed out, the civilians other than those Lebanese who have suffered a consequence of Israel's prosecution of its war against Hezbollah, the who are suffering many as I know the death tolls ⁓ in the range of 2,000 civilians, Iranian civilians since February 28, and schools, Those have been exceptional strikes, but they're still ⁓ far too So yeah, I think they're the ones who are caught up in it. And I think that whatever the administration uses as to how Amir Golshani: Right. Aaron David Miller: prosecuting this war against regime could free up the Iranian people, I frankly. Had Trump found his Iranian Delci Rodriguez amidst some the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps elites, had he found a pragmatic ideologue to do business with, he would have cut a deal and he would have left the ⁓ Amir Golshani: Right. Aaron David Miller: their forces of repression as he's done in Venezuela intact. Amir Golshani: Yeah, it reminds me, you know, a quote from your colleague, Karim Sadjadpour. did the having another Kim Jong-un own is more probable than. Aaron David Miller: Right. He looked for an Iranian, Delci Rodriguez, and Karim said that he has found an Iranian Kim Jong-un. And you know, it's interesting because when you talk to Karim about where Iran is going of all the various models, China, Pakistan, Russia, Karim thinks Iran is going toward North Korea. Heavily ideological, militarized regime. What it's missing why the North Korean model isn't exactly accurate is with the killing of Ali Khamenei on February 28th, replacement by his son, Mostaba, who would have needed under any circumstances several years to find his footing and gain legitimacy. The fact that he was ⁓ badly wounded, ⁓ reports, he hasn't yet found that. So Iran does not have an Ali Khamenei. which is one of the reasons I think you have decision-making. And again, I'm here, I apologize in advance. I'm not an expert on Iran. I don't play one on TV. I learned from those who follow Iran on a day-to-day basis. But Iranian experts believe in eliminating Ali Khamenei, they have removed the balancer who was capable of... figuring out a way to harmonize the respective divisions and factions that exist in any polity and certainly exists in revolutionary Iranian policies. another constraint ⁓ you are looking for the regime to make decisions. Amir Golshani: So that disconnect that you mentioned between Washington's interests and the people's reality brings us to the current strategy, the mindset behind the decisions. You understand the Washington mindset better than anyone. In your view, what is the US getting fundamentally right about current crisis? And what is the one critical blind spot that them from seeing the long-term solution? Aaron David Miller: I ⁓ would have argued to you Trump I was relatively astute at reading the mindsets of the Republican and Democratic administrations that I worked for, Jimmy Carter to Bush 43, and even the ones that I didn't. But represents a ⁓ unique persona on domestic ⁓ where I think the damage is really being done to the American Republic. The kind unkindness, the cruelty, the way in which Trump is undermining effective constitutional governance in is unprecedented in American history. It's an of presidential power. We've never witnessed You know what I say to people? The word I, the pronoun I, is only used once in the U.S. Constitution. And I thought to myself, when someone asked me the question, why did the founders, the drafters of the document, use the pronoun I? I couldn't figure it out. I should have. It's there because the founders embedded the inaugural oath that the president takes Article 2. that deals with powers and the office of the presidency. And they did it to remind the holder of the office that they are subordinate to the principles of the document and to the popular sovereignty that gave rise to it. Trump has sense of moral self-governance. He cannot control or sublimate his personal ambitions, his ego, his vanities, his financial and political interests to concept of public virtue. So it's hard to describe his mindset analytically, I think, and it follows along with his, I think, view of reality, which doesn't go ⁓ beyond his own self and his prejudices. think he looked at Venezuela, He looked at the power of the US military and I think he became convinced that an overwhelming show of force with the Israelis would have to cause the regime either to fracture or to become compliant. So I think he underestimated the coherence ⁓ resilience of the regime and he overestimated. Amir Golshani: Right. Aaron David Miller: as it wouldn't be the first time. I'd give you Hamas' Hezbollah as examples of the degradation by the Israeli military of Hamas' and Hezbollah's military capacities have still, maybe much to their surprise, not to mine, left Hamas as the preeminent Palestinian actor in the 47 % of Gaza they control. and Hezbollah, although hollowed out and much weakened, no longer Iran's billion-dollar proxy. Nonetheless, Hezbollah retains capacity to intimidate and certainly the Lebanese government from moving against it. And it remains a significant challenge for Israeli residents northern Israel. Amir Golshani: Right. Aaron David Miller: So the overestimation of military power somehow is a means to create political outcomes. I think that is the one takeaway on the geostrategic level policy that the administration I think into wrongly or the president himself. Amir Golshani: Right. I hear what you say, 100%, but looking from Iranian people perspective. So as you mentioned, President Trump is the first and only US president that publicly and openly mentioned that ⁓ help on the way. And Iranian people saw that as ⁓ the time that US interests in the region is aligned with what they ⁓ ask and they protested for, to have a normal life. And they still believe that, job is not done until, President Trump, US mainly, finishes what he has started by replacing this regime, by helping the process, by facilitating, you know, still that they are really hopeful in that regard. And they always ask, finish the job. That's what they see and that they don't like to be left alone So what happens, know, economically they were in trouble before this war. Right now it's hundred times worse we can say. what is the end game? This is how they see that. Aaron David Miller: Yeah. You know, I can't imagine a, if the war stopped today, I think it would be quite clear that the regime, successors that are left in the wake of the ⁓ Israeli strategy, I think you're going to have to deal with an embittered, angry regime that's going to want to repress ⁓ even harder. because they will be perceived to be somehow weaker, they're going to preside over a destroyed economy, assuming this does not end in a negotiated settlement, which frees up billions of dollars of frozen assets and sanctions relief. I think if you're going to see divisions in the ⁓ Iranian elite, the time that they're going to appear. Now, what could those divisions actually lead to? I have a very hard time understanding this because without a coherent political opposition that is very well organized and funded and capable of pressuring the regime to the point where elements within the security establishment begin to question whether or not the repression is in their interests. I don't see how you produce a regime or elements would somehow be more pragmatic and liberal and open up the system. I don't see how that actually works. And we've seen what in authoritarian societies when in fact they do crack. I mean, you ⁓ saw undergo a transition under reformers, Yeltsin and Gorbachev, and yet the consolidation of the state reasserted itself under Vladimir Putin. you saw Russia a under reformers, Yeltsin and Gorbachev, and yet the consolidation of the state reasserted itself Vladimir Putin. And Russia is hardly democratic. It's different than it was under the Soviet Union. So I don't know. And aren't that many examples of authoritarian Orban, Hungary is not Iran. It's in a democracy. Orban was corrupt. had elections that were ⁓ actually even if they were tainted, they were largely fair and free. So you saw a transition there. I don't know how you'd move from 47 years ⁓ Islamic clerical and IRGC rule to something else. ⁓ beat something with nothing. ⁓ outside pressures, certainly an air campaign, Amir Golshani: So that's a group. That's it. Aaron David Miller: which is what we've been conducting, not a, I mean, ⁓ history on this is pretty clear. You can't fundamentally change a regime from the air. You have to get down to the... ⁓ Amir Golshani: So how about this maximum economic pressure? What do you think of this one? Aaron David Miller: I I think that if the blockade were sustained for six months. You could probably break the Iranian economy. 90 % of Iran's imports are seaborne. You'd cut Iran off from its, what, almost $2 million of revenue, two million barrels of oil a day. You'd cut it off from paying imports. You'd end up with hyperinflation. even that, you'd have to question how you get from that ⁓ a political ⁓ constellation of forces that would put the country in a more liberal democratic path. I don't see how it actually works and there are not that many examples. Amir Golshani: That's a critical question, yeah, absolutely. You mentioned a great point, transition. So history shows that cruelty and suppression have an expiration date, but the quality of that transition matters. So based on the patterns of history you have studied, what does a successful transition look like for Iran that doesn't result in another 40 years of chaos? history shows that cruelty and suppression have an expiration date, Aaron David Miller: You see, that's what I mean. I wish I could offer you a clear pathway out of this. You have in the Middle East, in the Arab world, and Iran is not an Arab country, but it is still part of that region, interacting with that region. You had something called the Arab Spring. the Arab Spring, without exception, and remember the Arab Spring, really was in many respects a demonstration of what I'm talking about because in the case of Egypt, had the factions when the military basically conclude they could not repress oppress public demonstrations. So Mubarak had to go. But when Mubarak went, since there was no third way between other than the military or the Islamists, which then Mohammed Morsi and the ekhvan the Brotherhood, there was no third way opposition that offered a more inclusive, pluralistic, I'll say liberal or democratic pathway forward. And in Tunisia, the same thing happened. Ben Ali was removed. And yet you had a greater consolidation of presidential power at the expense of any sort of democratic In Yemen, Abdullah Saleh was removed and you have a fractious failed state. In Iraq, Saddam was removed and that was done as a consequence of the two longest wars in American history. Now, Iraq well be of all, and don't know what's going to happen in Syria. You have Ahmad Shahra, who appears to be quite pragmatic. I'm sure Syrians prefer to the Assasins, but Shahra no Democrat. But maybe Syria will prove to be the one exception to ⁓ the transition you're talking about. I mean, Iraq is not a failed state. It's a state with enormous challenges, sectarian tensions, large parts of the country not under the control of the central government. But it's better than it was under Saddam. So, I mean, in the Middle East, that's about the best. Amir Golshani: D- We can argue, Aaron, that there are many aspects of Iran that makes it different from those countries that you mentioned. Geography, history, culture, know, so demographics. So. Aaron David Miller: Yes, ⁓ many, many, absolutely. Iran doesn't have the cohe- the sectarian divisions either. I mean, there are, there are different minority groups to be sure. but what I can't figure is how, if you're not talking about an Iranian Delci Rodriguez, that is to say a pragmatic ideologue who ⁓ cuts a deal with the U.S. but Iran is still an authoritarian, very repressive society. Right, exactly. They want to have freedom. They want to be able to choose. And I don't know how to give them. Amir Golshani: People don't want that. 100%. You know, the complication here comes from the fact that you often said that US cannot fix these problems. And Middle East, you know, this is your sentence. I really like that. Middle East eats up all the ideas about transformation. So, and the locals must lead. But when the locals are being suppressed mainly by militias brought in from Iraq and Afghanistan, how does a population move from? when the locals are being suppressed mainly by militias brought in from Iraq and Afghanistan, how does a population move from? seeking change to achieving it seeking change to achieving it without becoming a casualty of geopolitical proxy war. This is Aaron David Miller: I mean, I don't think I have a clear pathway for you here. Cuba is another example. I don't, know, Raul Castro is 94 years old. It's a very coherent set of elites that's governing the country. Trump is going to be looking for a Cuban, Delci Rodriguez and Havana. Maybe he'll find it with one of the younger Castro's, the grand nephews or the grandkids the sons of Raul. Freedom House will tell you since 1950, there only 22 countries in the world that have maintained their democratic character continuously. And Turkey is not on the list and neither is India. The creation of a democratic polity and the maintenance of that polity. Iran has politics. It constitutional politics. It has society. And yet, the word I use in terms of changing of the regime sclerotic. stuffed ⁓ and constrained. And I just don't see how you break that pattern. Amir Golshani: So economic pressure at this point, you mentioned President Trump announced today that he's planning to hold the blockade for another couple of months. At the same time, this maximum pressure campaign, think economically they are collapsing Islamic regime. President Trump announced that ⁓ he's planning to hold the blockade for another of months. I see it is collapsing, but the transition low cost, that's something I cannot imagine, as you mentioned, how it's going to happen. This ⁓ is serious real question. And if China and Russia do not provide financial and diplomatic floor for Iran, do you think Iranian regime can sustain this much pressure? Aaron David Miller: I mean, I think it'll come first at the expense of the public, right? I think if the pressure got that intense, to borrow a phrase from the late Ayatollah Khomeini, that ⁓ this regime would drink the poison, would actually come to the negotiating table. Because Trump, wants, I mean, he may say all that he's got all the time in the world, he wants a way out of this. And if the economic pressure became so intense, that the regime felt it had to restore its revenue by opening up by getting rid of the blockade, I think they'd come to the table at but they would negotiate issue. don't on the nuclear issue. They'd come to some agreement, a moratorium, some constraint on enrichment, but the regime itself is not going to change. What you need is a period of quiet where the regime had to fundamentally manage all expectations of the public. amidst a wrecked economy, tremendous destruction, physical destruction in the country, the memories of what happened in January thousands of Iranians who were killed, imprisoned and tortured. Then you might be able to see cracks beginning to appear. Whether or not ⁓ political opposition in Iran could take advantage of that. is beyond my capacity to know. Amir Golshani: Right. So this brings us to the ultimate question of sustainability. No one can hold a pressure cooker shot forever without exploding it or leaking. So Washington seems to be operating on a strategy of improvisation right now. Given your 25 years of experience, how sustainable is a U.S. naval blockade? Because we see the global economic impact has already started. Aaron David Miller: It's not. Not if we're talking oil at $150 a barrel. Not if we're talking... See, at some point, the oil markets and the financial markets will begin to realize that a diplomatic solution is not around the corner. Then you're going to end up with a lot of pain. And while the U.S. can insulate itself better than most countries in the world, it can't hermetically seal itself from a global recession. So I think a blockade is sustainable for another couple months. I wonder though, or not the Iranians in an effort to break out of it, wouldn't consider escalating against one area in the Gulf that they have not yet. I think a blockade is sustainable for another couple months. I wonder though, whether or not the Iranians in an effort to break of it, wouldn't consider escalating against the one area in the Gulf that they have not attack comprehensively. attack comprehensively. And that's oil export facilities, ⁓ facilities and export facilities. Amir Golshani: They already warned that today that ⁓ so our patients has a limit. Okay. Aaron David Miller: Right. So it may be, but I just don't want to raise expectations. You could get a move back to the negotiating table, but what it won't produce, at least not now, are sorts of political reforms that are required to free an entire people, or at least to give them choices, which they do not have now. Amir Golshani: Is there anything that you think is critical at this moment, especially for policymakers at Washington to hear? And if they were listening to you, what would you tell them? Aaron David Miller: I mean, I would remove the block. Well, this is running against if you have if you Amir Golshani have an interest in keeping the blockade on so that the pressure on Iran would increase, the regime might fracture or end up with a situation on which some I can't imagine a new regime. Then what I'm about to say ⁓ won't be music to your ears. I think that war needs to and the straits need to be reopened. The blockade needs to be removed and the Iranians and Americans not on the cell phone, not through intermediaries, not on the back of a cocktail napkin need to sit down and begin to talk through the issues that would allow a diplomatic off-ramp to take root. Because my own sense is, if there's any promise of regime collapse, will not occur in middle of a war. It will occur when the folks are running the country, who control the oil, the money, and the guns, ⁓ begin to as they've if there's ⁓ any promise regime collapse, it will not occur in the middle of a It will when the folks who are the country, who control oil, the money, and the guns, begin to confront as confronted in the past all of the challenges that the Iranian public, a fractured economy, an angry, resentful public, a regime that has lost probably for the vast majority of the Iranian people has lost its legitimacy. confronted in the past all of the challenges that the Iranian public, a fractured economy, an angry, resentful public, a regime that has lost probably for the vast majority of the Iranian people has lost its legitimacy. It is under those circumstances, maybe with additional focus by the international community in the United States on what Washington can actually do to support. an opposition movement. So under those circumstances that maybe you could begin to see tough choices and ⁓ occur. But even under those circumstances, I'm not sure how you move from an authoritarian repressive regime to one that is significantly less so. And use the word transition, so did I. Because that's what you need. not going to get, you're not going to get, it's not like a light switch that's going to be turned on and off. You're going to get a transition. If you're lucky, you got to, you'll get a Yeltsin or a Gorbachev. Amir Golshani: Let's not talk about uranium nuclear program and many other missile program, many other things that are unresolved. But that's for another discussion. Aaron, thank you so much for being with us today. Aaron David Miller: Sure. Amir, great questions. It was a pleasure.