Latest / ACLED Audio / REPORT: Economic warfare escalates as militants expand beyond the Sahel.

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REPORT: Economic warfare escalates as militants expand beyond the Sahel. · ACLED Audio

• 0:06
  SPEAKER_00: Economic warfare escalates as militants expand beyond a Sahel.
• 0:11
  SPEAKER_00: By the numbers, from January first to November 28, 2025.
• 0:17
  SPEAKER_00: Political violence resulted in the deaths of over 10,000 people in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.
• 0:25
  SPEAKER_00: Militants kidnapped 34 nationals in Mali and Niger, 22 and 8 respectively.
• 0:33
  SPEAKER_00: ACLED records nearly 70% more fatalities in Benin compared to the first 11 months of 2024.
• 0:41
  SPEAKER_00: In 2025, jihadist militant groups escalated their campaigns in the central Sahel, threatening the stability and security of military-led regimes in the region.
• 0:51
  SPEAKER_00: Jumahat Nusrat al-Islam, Wal Muslimin, Jainim, and the Islamic State Sahel Province consolidated their influence across much of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, while extending operations into the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands.
• 1:11
  SPEAKER_00: As a deliberate strategy employed by militant groups to disrupt economic functions and pressure states in the region, economic warfare became a defining feature.
• 1:21
  SPEAKER_00: In Mali, J.
• 1:22
  SPEAKER_00: Nim imposed a sweeping fuel and transport embargo on the cities of Key and Nioro do Sahel as part of coordinated offensives spanning Kei, Sakasso, Kulakoro, Segu, and Mopti.
• 1:35
  SPEAKER_00: The blockade disrupted trade and transport routes linking Bamako and the surrounding regions, resulting in fuel shortages and nationwide price hikes.
• 1:45
  SPEAKER_00: It was part of a deliberate effort to paralyze the economy, undermine government authority, and destabilize the military regime.
• 1:53
  SPEAKER_00: As a result of J Nim's operations and counteroffensives by the military, violence in Kei, Sakaso, and Segu surged to the highest monthly levels since Accled began recording data in 1997.
• 2:08
  SPEAKER_00: In Burkina Faso, J Nim sustained its offensives against the military and the volunteers for the defense of the homeland, VDP.
• 2:17
  SPEAKER_00: In May, the group briefly seized the provincial capitals of Jibo and Diapaga in rapid succession, demonstrating a step change in its military capacity.
• 2:27
  SPEAKER_00: In September, the group launched a devastating ambush on a military convoy near Kubel Alpha in Sum province, killing about 90 soldiers in one of the deadliest attacks on the country's military forces to date.
• 2:41
  SPEAKER_00: The offensives in both Mali and Burkina Faso further demonstrate J Nim's growing military capabilities and its clear intent to destabilize these military regimes by undermining state authority and territorial control and disrupting economies and key transit routes.
• 3:00
  SPEAKER_00: Niger has not experienced the same scale of violence as its neighbors, but it is becoming increasingly vulnerable to militant activities.
• 3:08
  SPEAKER_00: Militancy has spread well beyond traditional hotspots into the southern Doso and northern Agadez regions.
• 3:16
  SPEAKER_00: Similar to J.
• 3:17
  SPEAKER_00: Nim, ISSP has carried out its own form of economic warfare and intensified its attacks on the Benin-Niger oil pipeline in the Doso and Tahua regions along the border with Nigeria.
• 3:31
  SPEAKER_00: The kidnapping of a United States citizen in Niame on October 21st illustrates the country's growing fragility and further demonstrates that militant reach now extends into urban centers once considered secure and less affected by militancy.
• 3:49
  SPEAKER_00: Both JNEM and ISSP launched kidnapping campaigns targeting foreigners, which drove record-high instances of kidnapping in Mali and Niger.
• 3:59
  SPEAKER_00: Refer to the graph in the report for details.
• 4:01
  SPEAKER_00: JNEM primarily targeted foreign workers as part of its economic warfare strategy.
• 4:07
  SPEAKER_00: It focused on industrial production facilities, mining sites, and transit routes.
• 4:13
  SPEAKER_00: ISSP adopted a different approach by targeting both Western nationals and foreign laborers.
• 4:20
  SPEAKER_00: Most abductions occurred in Niger.
• 4:22
  SPEAKER_00: ACLED records additional incidents in the nearby border areas of Burkina Faso and Algeria.
• 4:29
  SPEAKER_00: The ISSP-sponsored operations mark a shift toward taking high-value Western nationals hostage and outsourcing abductions to criminal networks.
• 4:39
  SPEAKER_00: Spreading conflict into coastal West Africa will challenge regional cooperation in 2026.
• 4:46
  SPEAKER_00: One of the key developments shaping the outlook for 2026 is the consolidation of a new front line in the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands, which is now strategically important for both Sahelian and Nigerian militant groups.
• 5:03
  SPEAKER_00: Throughout 2025, Jim and ISSP further entrenched their presence in this tri-border area, transforming it into a conflict hotspot with implications for both the Sahel and coastal West Africa.
• 5:17
  SPEAKER_00: Refer to the map in the report for details.
• 5:20
  SPEAKER_00: Northern Benin experienced its deadliest year on record, as JNIM intensified cross-border operations from eastern Burkina Faso in April, culminating in the killing of over 50 soldiers in Park W.
• 5:34
  SPEAKER_00: By mid-year, the group had advanced further south into the Borgu department, along the border with Nigeria, marking a southward expansion of its operations beyond the northernmost regions of Atakora and Alabori.
• 5:48
  SPEAKER_00: Jim also claimed its first attack in Nigeria in late October.
• 5:53
  SPEAKER_00: Meanwhile, ISSP reinforced its foothold in southwestern Niger, moving closer to the city of Gaia on the border with Benin, and continued operations in Nigeria's Sokoto and Kebi states.
• 6:07
  SPEAKER_00: In the Niger-Nigeria border areas, the group attacked villages, security posts, and military patrols and sabotaged critical infrastructure.
• 6:16
  SPEAKER_00: Both Sahelian groups have now established themselves in northwestern and western Nigeria.
• 6:22
  SPEAKER_00: The growing convergence between Sahelian and Nigerian militants represents a turning point, as the previously distinct Sahelian and Nigerian theaters gradually merge into a single, interconnected conflict environment stretching from Mali to Western Nigeria.
• 6:40
  SPEAKER_00: In the coming year, this subregion is likely to become a key arena of competition among militant groups.
• 6:48
  SPEAKER_00: J Nim, ISSP, Ansaru, Mahmuda, Islamic State West Africa Province factions, and bandit groups increasingly overlap in these border areas.
• 7:00
  SPEAKER_00: As their areas of operation expand into shared spaces, we may see increased interaction among these groups, with evolving dynamics and new patterns of violence across these borderlands.
• 7:12
  SPEAKER_00: While this tri-border expansion reshapes the southern front line of the Sahelian conflict, the military regimes in the central Sahel face mounting internal and external pressures.
• 7:23
  SPEAKER_00: In Mali and Burkina Faso, J Nim's sustained offensives, blockades, and sieges have weakened state control and exposed deep structural vulnerabilities.
• 7:34
  SPEAKER_00: In Mali, the fuel and transport embargo continues to affect the economy and the movement of goods and people, intensifying hardship for civilians and undermining the regime's legitimacy.
• 7:46
  SPEAKER_00: Prolonged disruption risks deepening existing fractures within the armed forces and triggering unrest that the junta may struggle to contain.
• 7:56
  SPEAKER_00: Burkina Faso faces similar challenges.
• 7:59
  SPEAKER_00: Years of attrition have left the Army and the VDP overstretched.
• 8:04
  SPEAKER_00: J Nim's ability to temporarily seize major towns is not only indicative of the group's strategic and tactical evolution, but also its potential to target regional capitals like Fada and Gorma in the east of the country, given the state's incapacity to effectively defend and secure departmental and provincial capitals.
• 8:25
  SPEAKER_00: Continued heavy military casualties and territorial losses could generate the same internal descent and coup pressures that brought down previous governments.
• 8:36
  SPEAKER_00: Across the central Sahel, state authority is steadily eroding, despite junta promises to restore security.
• 8:43
  SPEAKER_00: J Nim and ISSP now contest sovereignty across vast rural territories, where they enforce their social order, tax the population, and condition access to livelihoods.
• 8:56
  SPEAKER_00: Their influence is increasingly encroaching on major population centers once considered relatively insulated from militant activity.
• 9:05
  SPEAKER_00: ISSP's incursions into Ayoru and Tiliberi, along with operations in Niame, underscore that no population center is beyond militant reach.
• 9:16
  SPEAKER_00: Local self-defense groups, which are central to state counterinsurgency efforts in rural areas, are under unprecedented strain.
• 9:25
  SPEAKER_00: In Mali, many dozo militias have been disarmed or forced into agreements with J Nim, leaving entire communities dependent on militant-enforced arrangements for limited security and economic access.
• 9:38
  SPEAKER_00: In Burkina Faso, the VDP, which was once central to Traore's mobilization strategy, has suffered heavy losses and remains largely defensive, limiting the state's ability to hold or reclaim territory.
• 9:53
  SPEAKER_00: As these groups weaken, militants are likely to expand their authority further.
• 9:58
  SPEAKER_00: Russia's military partnership with the Sahelian countries has achieved limited results.
• 10:03
  SPEAKER_00: The replacement of the Wagner group with Africa Corps effectively left large areas unprotected.
• 10:09
  SPEAKER_00: Africa Corps has a more limited scope and has been unable to prevent military advances.
• 10:14
  SPEAKER_00: However, toward the end of the year, Africa Corps' role increasingly shifted to securing fuel convoys and key supply routes in southern Mali, where JNIM's embargo began to lose momentum.
• 10:27
  SPEAKER_00: The military partnership is likely to remain important in 2026, with Africa Corps providing essential logistical and aerial support to help the junta maintain control over major transit routes and urban centers, even as broader security challenges continue.
• 10:44
  SPEAKER_00: The combination of sustained militant pressure, weakened militias, and declining state capacity and legitimacy heightens the risk of political destabilization in the central Sahel.
• 10:57
  SPEAKER_00: If either the Malian or Burkinabe military regimes succumb to internal divisions or popular unrest, a regional domino effect could occur, placing neighboring regimes in increasingly precarious positions.
• 11:10
  SPEAKER_00: If current trends continue, 2026 may bring deeper political instability and territorial fragmentation in the central Sahel and along its southern borders.
• 11:22
  SPEAKER_00: This report was written by Henny Insaiba, Accled's senior analyst for West Africa.