Latest / Escape The Clock: How to Become Financially Free and Have the Option Not to Work / The Insider's Edge: How Wall Street Actually Trades and What Retail Investors Can Learn from It with Scott Curry
Transcript
- 0:00Today, on Escape the Clock, we're aiming to answer
- 0:02the question, if you and a Wall Street insider
- 0:05make the exact same trade, why does Wall Street
- 0:08almost always win? Most of us learn the rules.
- 0:11We know to buy low, sell high, diversify, and
- 0:15to try to avoid panic selling. And once you know
- 0:17the rules, you can play the game. In a good year,
- 0:20you might even match the market. But there is
- 0:22one thing most investors never stop to consider.
- 0:25On the other side of every trade you make, there's
- 0:27someone else. A lot of that time, that someone
- 0:30is a professional with tools you don't have,
- 0:33a playbook you've never seen. Researchers at
- 0:36MIT and Stanford studied more than a decade of
- 0:38everyday investors trading options around company
- 0:41earnings. They found that regular investors lost
- 0:44money on those bets. And a big share of the loss
- 0:47was the spread, the hidden cost of the trade
- 0:50itself. About 9 % to 10 % of their money was
- 0:53gone. So who is on the other side of your trade?
- 0:56What do they see that you don't? Today's guest
- 0:59spent years finding out. He learned to trade
- 1:02in college from his roommate, mostly by guesswork,
- 1:04watching strange moves in the market that he
- 1:06couldn't understand. Then a seat at Merrill Lynch
- 1:09put him on the inside, the clear view of what
- 1:11the big institutions were really doing, but the
- 1:14rest of us were doing wrong. Now he teaches an
- 1:16audience of more than 80 ,000 investors how to
- 1:19trade with professional discipline. So today,
- 1:21get into what insiders actually know, how the
- 1:24pros decide when to buy and when to sell, and
- 1:27why so many retail traders read the market's
- 1:30biggest signals exactly backwards. Stay tuned
- 1:33to learn how the insiders trade and how to stop
- 1:35being the easy money on the other side. Welcome
- 1:58back to Escape the Clock, the show where we highlight
- 2:00strategies and approaches for achieving financial
- 2:02freedom and having the option not to work. I'm
- 2:05your host, Daniel C. Rodgers. Most of us come
- 2:07to the stock market in the same way. Our employer
- 2:10opens an account on our behalf or someone mentioned
- 2:13a stock, like the market might've had a great
- 2:15year and we don't want to miss out on the next
- 2:17one. We learned by doing. We made some money.
- 2:20We lost some money. We developed opinions and
- 2:22instincts in a general sense that we're figuring
- 2:25things out. But here is something most retail
- 2:27investors never stop to consider. On every side
- 2:30of every trade you make, there's someone else.
- 2:33And in many cases, that someone else is an institutional
- 2:35trader who does it professionally, who has access
- 2:38to tools that you don't, is operating from a
- 2:40playbook that you've never seen. 80 % of day
- 2:43traders quit within two years, not because the
- 2:46market ran out of opportunity, but because they
- 2:48were consistently on the wrong side of that equation.
- 2:50The institutional edge is real. The gap between
- 2:53how professionals trade and how retail investors
- 2:56trade is measurable and be significant. And it's
- 2:59rarely talked about honestly. Today's guest traded
- 3:02professionally at Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley
- 3:04before walking away to teach retail investors
- 3:06what he saw from the inside. Scott Curry is a
- 3:09former investment banker with over 25 years of
- 3:11professional trading experience. Known as Stock
- 3:14Curry, he has built a YouTube community of over
- 3:1680 ,000 investors and generated more than 6 million
- 3:19views. teaching retail investors to trade with
- 3:22professional discipline. Scott, welcome to Escape
- 3:24the Clock. Thank you so much for having me. It's
- 3:27a pleasure to be on and I can't wait to share
- 3:29some of the insights that I experienced working
- 3:32at Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and other investment
- 3:34banks and some of the differences in how retail
- 3:38traders trade, as well as a lot of the advantages
- 3:41that institutions have. Good news is a lot has
- 3:44changed over the last five years or so. Retail
- 3:46traders have access to a lot more tools these
- 3:48days, and we can get into a little bit on that
- 3:51so that we can help you, the listener, to become
- 3:55a better trader and make a lot more money. I'm
- 3:58really excited to learn from you here because
- 4:00I know you spent decades really learning and
- 4:02mastering this and teaching. So what did you
- 4:06see that retail investors might be getting wrong
- 4:09that you feel that you had something worth starting
- 4:11to share out with everybody? For me, it all started
- 4:15back in 2000 when I was training on my own. I
- 4:18was learning how to trade from my roommate in
- 4:21college. And at the time, it just felt like a
- 4:24lot of guesswork. And I was seeing these weird
- 4:27things in the market where I would do something.
- 4:29And then since large trade would come in and
- 4:31kind of mess everything up, I couldn't quite
- 4:32figure it out. In 2008, I had the opportunity
- 4:36to go work for Merrill Lynch. And that is when
- 4:39my eyes were opened because suddenly I could
- 4:42see everything that was going on. And the real
- 4:45benefit for me is I was actually working in the
- 4:47back end. So I had full access to the DTCC and
- 4:52all of the dark pool trades. And I could see
- 4:55what every single institution was buying and
- 4:56selling. I could also see what the retail traders
- 5:00are buying and selling through Apex Clearing.
- 5:02And I had access to see what our firm was actually
- 5:07pushing. out to the individual investors on the
- 5:11financial advisory side of the business as well.
- 5:14And so it gave me a lot of insight that most
- 5:16people never get to see. Even the traders themselves
- 5:19don't get access to all this information. And
- 5:22through that. I learned some really big differences
- 5:26between what institutions were doing and what
- 5:29retail was doing. But I think the biggest difference
- 5:31of all for me at that time was seeing how the
- 5:36firm would take their research and their analysis
- 5:39that Merrill Lynch got from BlackRock and other
- 5:42investment firms, whether it's Vanguard, Jefferies,
- 5:44we all do our own research. And the firm itself
- 5:48would use that research to place their trades.
- 5:53Then they would give that out to the financial
- 5:55advisors. The financial advisors would then push
- 5:58those stocks to their clients. And then the firm
- 6:00would turn around, sell and take profit. You
- 6:02know, you can call it unethical, whatever. That's
- 6:05just one of the many ways that it works. And
- 6:07there's all of these little inside things that
- 6:09I learned about. And it made me very quickly
- 6:12realize that if I was going to make money, I
- 6:14had to be able to do my own research and find
- 6:17these things before the institutions jumped on
- 6:20them. Yeah, this works. There was this management
- 6:23science article that came out, published that
- 6:26in the same market, with the same conditions,
- 6:28an average retail investor loses an equivalent
- 6:31of approximately $18 ,500, while institutional
- 6:35investors gain approximately $375 ,000. This
- 6:40is over the same period. So they're making great
- 6:42money, while the average person is actually losing
- 6:44money. So same time period, opposite results.
- 6:48So I think people might be really curious. I
- 6:50know I am. What are those professional traders
- 6:52seeing? You mentioned that they have tools, they're
- 6:55able to see some things and then they pass it
- 6:57off. What kinds of like signals are they looking
- 6:59for? What are these triggers that's helping them
- 7:01make all that money? What's really interesting
- 7:04is that the investment bankers actually have
- 7:07access to a lot of the same tools that you and
- 7:09I do. And that is especially true over the past
- 7:13five years. Over the past five years, the amount
- 7:16of tools that have been made available to retail
- 7:18traders, at this point, it's almost on par with
- 7:22what the institutions are seeing. So much so
- 7:24that the institutions aren't even using their
- 7:28unique tools that they once had access to that
- 7:31nobody else did, such as the Bloomberg terminals.
- 7:34Things have changed now where everybody has access
- 7:37to the same information. The major difference,
- 7:39though, is not so much in what information we
- 7:43have access to or what we're buying and selling.
- 7:45The big, big difference is when we buy and sell.
- 7:50And that makes all the difference in the world.
- 7:52The most basic summary form I can give you, institutions
- 7:56buy. When stocks are beat down and sold off and
- 8:01nobody's interested in them, it's what's called
- 8:03an accumulation period in a stock. And that accumulation
- 8:07period can last for years where retail has no
- 8:11interest in it whatsoever. Then once the stock
- 8:14starts to run up, it starts to rally. That's
- 8:16when retail starts to take notice and retail
- 8:19traders start to buy it because they get FOMO,
- 8:22this fear of missing out. They see the stock
- 8:24going up. It's already up 50, 100 percent. They
- 8:27get fear that they're going to miss out on future
- 8:28returns. So they jump in. And more often than
- 8:32not, they're jumping in near the top. And once
- 8:35that stock starts to sell off, institutions get
- 8:38out. They're taking their 50, 100, 200 percent
- 8:41profits. And retail has now bought at the top.
- 8:45and the stock is starting to go down, rather
- 8:47than jumping ship and cutting their losses early,
- 8:50retail tends to hold on. They don't want to take
- 8:53that loss. Even though they have the paper loss,
- 8:55they don't want to realize the loss. And so,
- 8:58so many times, traders, they're just going to
- 9:01hold on that stock, waiting months or years for
- 9:03it to turn around, to even break even. And they
- 9:06end up losing money on the exact same stock that
- 9:09the institution actually made money on, because
- 9:11the institution bought it when it was beat down.
- 9:13Nobody wanted it. touch it and then sold it when
- 9:16it was rallying and everybody wanted to buy it.
- 9:18And retail did the exact opposite. They bought
- 9:20when it was rallying and everybody wanted to
- 9:22buy it. And then they end up selling after it's
- 9:24already fallen 50, 80, 90 percent. And so that's
- 9:27why very often retail traders will lose money
- 9:29when the institutions will make money. It's not
- 9:32so much about what they're buying and what research
- 9:33they did. It's about when they buy. So they have
- 9:37the lateral and the leverage to be able to buy
- 9:39in. They're doing it when it's cheapest. They
- 9:42know they have the deep pockets to wait. They
- 9:44allow those retail investors to create that momentum
- 9:46that they can ride up and then eventually profit
- 9:49from. And they understand the psychology that
- 9:52might be hurting others and able to kind of mitigate
- 9:55that. That's amazing. You mentioned Bloomberg
- 9:57terminals. A Bloomberg terminal costs $25 ,000
- 10:01per year per user. They're super expensive, sophisticated
- 10:04things. And institutional firms will deploy these
- 10:07across entire trading floors. And then they have
- 10:09like proprietary algorithms and dark pool access
- 10:12and pre -market execution capabilities and things
- 10:15like that. It's really interesting. I was wondering,
- 10:17is that giving them an extra edge more than the
- 10:22timing piece? Maybe help explain what the Bloomberg
- 10:25terminal is and why they're investing in them
- 10:27since they're so expensive. So the Bloomberg
- 10:29terminal. is and always has been a tool with
- 10:32a lot of research tools and analytical tools
- 10:35built into it. But more importantly, it's also
- 10:39been a trading platform where the different brokers
- 10:42can actually talk to each other with their Bloomberg
- 10:44terminal chat. And that terminal chat is where
- 10:47the real value is. You know the old saying, it's
- 10:50not about what you know, it's about who you know.
- 10:51Well, in today's day and age, especially over
- 10:54the past five years, all of that proprietary
- 10:56information that was on the Bloomberg terminal
- 10:58is now available to retail traders. It's no longer
- 11:01proprietary. It's no longer something that institutions
- 11:04have access to that retail doesn't. And so really,
- 11:07especially over the last five years, retail's
- 11:09really caught up in that manner. But where the
- 11:12Bloomberg terminal still shines, and this is
- 11:14really what it's used for today, is terminal
- 11:16chat. It's used to talk to other brokers and
- 11:21other traders at institutions to decide what
- 11:25trades they want to make, to actually find people
- 11:28that have stocks that they can buy. Because as
- 11:31a retail trader, you want to buy a stock, you
- 11:33just go and you buy it. You don't know what's
- 11:35really happening in the back end. Generally speaking,
- 11:37if there's enough sellers out there, you're going
- 11:39to buy from them. If there's not, you're going
- 11:41to buy from a market maker. But when you are
- 11:45an institution and you're buying millions, and
- 11:47sometimes billions of shares at a time, you can't
- 11:50just go out to the open market and find those
- 11:52for two reasons. One, there's just not enough
- 11:55shares available. And two, if you were to buy
- 11:58that many shares at one time, you would artificially
- 12:00inflate the price of that stock significantly.
- 12:03And same when you get ready to sell, you would
- 12:05end up crashing the stock. And so you can't do
- 12:08that. And as a result. They use the Bloomberg
- 12:11terminals and terminal chat to find other institutions
- 12:14that they want to trade with. And then they place
- 12:17those trades on what's known as the dark pool.
- 12:19And it's processed on the back end through DTCC.
- 12:22And that is something that the retail traders
- 12:25still to this day do not have immediate access
- 12:28to. Obviously, we have no access to the Bloomberg
- 12:32terminal chat. And even the dark pool data, even
- 12:35though it does now get released, it's released
- 12:37two to four weeks after the trade. are placed,
- 12:40which isn't real helpful. Yeah, that's interesting
- 12:43because the dark pool data, at least when they're
- 12:47doing some of these trades, it's still the order
- 12:48size prices are hidden from the public market,
- 12:51like you said, for at least a while. How much
- 12:53is like the pre -market and aftermarket windows
- 12:56matter here? Because those are windows that retail
- 12:59investors are rarely using effectively, at least.
- 13:01Are institutions really taking advantage of that
- 13:03timing? Some are, some aren't. It really depends
- 13:06upon the strategy of the firm. Certainly, when
- 13:09it comes to earnings, you bet. They are absolutely
- 13:12taking advantage of the pre -market and aftermarket.
- 13:15Because a lot of times you might wake up in the
- 13:18morning and it's 930 and you go to check your
- 13:22stocks and somehow magically they fell 5 % overnight.
- 13:25They rallied 15 % overnight. And what's ultimately
- 13:28happening there is some news came out, whether
- 13:30it's earnings or some other news. And the institutions
- 13:33have immediately jumped on that and they've bought
- 13:36or sold that stock. And by the time most retail
- 13:39gets around to checking, the move has already
- 13:41happened. And this is something. that retail
- 13:45traders have access to, but they just don't really
- 13:48take advantage of, nor are they really able to
- 13:51since your entire pre -market after hour trading
- 13:55hours are from about 4 a .m. all the way up to
- 14:00around 8 p .m. And you just can't physically
- 14:04sit in front of your computer from 4 a .m. to
- 14:058 p .m. and trade where the institutions have
- 14:08an advantage is they can hire multiple traders.
- 14:11They can hire one for the morning, one during
- 14:13the day and one in the evening. And when you
- 14:15have multiple people all handling a portfolio,
- 14:17it becomes a lot more feasible. So when you were
- 14:20at Merrill Lynch or you were seeing some of these
- 14:23things, what were you seeing that you were like,
- 14:26OK, I can help people here? What were some of
- 14:29the big first lessons? I kind of used my time
- 14:32at Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley to learn.
- 14:34And I didn't really figure out like how I could
- 14:37help people until really that that light bulb
- 14:40went off on me during that GameStop fiasco. Actually,
- 14:43it started earlier during Tilray and seeing what
- 14:45people were doing at Wall Street Bets. That's
- 14:47when my mind started shifting from, all right,
- 14:50I'm just going to go trade for myself versus,
- 14:52oh, I need to start helping people. Let's talk
- 14:55about the GameStop because that was a huge event.
- 14:57I think a lot of us were fascinated during that
- 15:00watching really kind of an outlier like we had
- 15:03never really seen before. So you had the rare
- 15:06experience of kind of watching this retail revolt.
- 15:09You were on the inside during that time. Is that
- 15:11right? Not during GameStop now. So I was on the
- 15:14inside for the Volkswagen finish squeeze and
- 15:17then the flash crash, which was caused by retail
- 15:20trader. Funny enough, 2008 financial crisis.
- 15:24I saw all of that. But during GameStop and Toray,
- 15:28I was actually on my own. I was working for another
- 15:31company called Genesis Financial. We helped retail
- 15:34traders do algo trading at that time. What was
- 15:37the. institutional response like since you were
- 15:39kind of seeing it from that side was people responding
- 15:42in a large way to it there is this really interesting
- 15:46thing that happened so a lot of people have heard
- 15:49about GameStop and they know the GameStop story
- 15:51there's been documentaries made about that what
- 15:54a lot of people don't realize is that actually
- 15:56happened before years prior with a company called
- 15:59Tilray. And this was actually the first time
- 16:02that the institutions had to wake up and realize
- 16:06that market dynamics were changing because for
- 16:09the longest time, the institutions basically
- 16:13controlled the market and retail was pretty much
- 16:16just along for the ride. That all changed when
- 16:20the Tilray rally happened. And at that time,
- 16:23it occurred on Wall Street Bets. Today, Wall
- 16:26Street Bets has millions of people watching it.
- 16:28But at the time, it was only about 200 ,000 people.
- 16:30And those 200 ,000 retail traders all collectively.
- 16:35not on purpose, just happened to decide that
- 16:37they all wanted to buy Tilray. Because at that
- 16:39time, there was some belief that with Colorado
- 16:42decriminalizing marijuana and Washington State
- 16:46getting ready to decriminalize it, that these
- 16:49Canadian companies were going to be able to come
- 16:51in and start selling their marijuana products
- 16:52here in the U .S. And that was going to cause
- 16:54massive outsized returns for these companies.
- 16:57And so a lot of people in Wall Street Bets did
- 16:59that analysis. They decided to buy Tilray and
- 17:01the stock rallied 200 percent in a very short
- 17:03period of time. And this got picked up on CNBC.
- 17:06And it was the first time ever that CNBC started
- 17:10to talk about retail traders controlling the
- 17:13market. And then that story kind of died down.
- 17:16And then a few years later, when GameStop blew
- 17:18up, that's when institutions finally said, OK,
- 17:21we can no longer ignore retail traders. We now
- 17:25have to look at what retail traders are doing,
- 17:27because in certain stocks, they're actually controlling
- 17:30the markets. And I actually heard from one. insider,
- 17:34he told me that it had become such an important
- 17:37issue that Wall Street Bets was now in the training
- 17:41for the institutional traders on the Bloomberg
- 17:44terminals. That's how important it had become
- 17:47to the institutions. So we went from this place
- 17:49where retail was ignored and along for the ride
- 17:53to now today, retail traders are actually controlling
- 17:56the market on a lot of stocks and the institutions
- 17:59looking to retail and the institutions are along
- 18:01for the ride. And that's been the most stark
- 18:04difference over the past couple of years. It's
- 18:06been absolutely amazing to watch. I mean, I've
- 18:09definitely seen some meme stocks grab momentum.
- 18:12That's really fascinating. Really wanting to
- 18:14ask you about options. Let's use GameStop to
- 18:17transition because that's where the story started.
- 18:20That's how everybody got into options. Yeah,
- 18:22exactly. So maybe maybe we should take a step
- 18:25back, actually, though, and talk about GameStop
- 18:27a little bit more for those who aren't super
- 18:28aware of what happened. And then I'd love to
- 18:31transition to options because institutional investors
- 18:34definitely trade options a very specific way
- 18:36and they leverage it very well, typically on
- 18:40the selling side. But I don't want to jump ahead.
- 18:41So talk a little bit more about GameStop because
- 18:44you did experience that as well. At that point,
- 18:46you had a lot of experience behind your belt.
- 18:47What were you kind of taken away from that? I
- 18:50think the biggest stark contrast for me when
- 18:52it came to GameStop was the naked shorting. The
- 18:55whole reason GameStop blew up is because retail
- 18:58was looking at short interest. And that was one
- 19:01of those data tools that I told you was only
- 19:03available to institutional investors, was now
- 19:05available to retail for the first time ever.
- 19:07And retail traders looked at that and they said,
- 19:10wait a second, how is it possible for one stock
- 19:13to be shorted 124 % of float? How can it possibly
- 19:17be possible that 124 % of the total shares are
- 19:20being shorted? It doesn't even make sense. And
- 19:23retail looked at that. And I want to go back,
- 19:26kind of explain like how that occurs, because
- 19:29I actually had the benefit of working on the
- 19:31short selling side when I was working at Merrill
- 19:33Lynch. And what? essentially happened is prior
- 19:37to 2009, a lot of companies were doing naked
- 19:40shorting. And that's essentially where if you
- 19:43wanted to short a stock, you have to go out and
- 19:46essentially borrow that stock from somebody else
- 19:49who already owns it so that you can then sell
- 19:52it. And if you don't know what short selling
- 19:54is, basically you've heard that you want to buy
- 19:56low and sell high. Well, short selling is just
- 19:59the opposite of that. You start by selling high
- 20:02and then later down the road you buy low. And
- 20:04so in order to do that, what you're doing is
- 20:07you're borrowing the stock from somebody who
- 20:09already owns it. You give them a percentage interest
- 20:12in order to borrow the stock from them, maybe
- 20:151 % or 2 % or 4 % per year. And then you go out,
- 20:19you short the stock. Later, when you're ready
- 20:20to buy it, you buy it, and then you return the
- 20:23stock to the person that you borrowed it from.
- 20:25And that's kind of how short selling works. Well,
- 20:27what happened in 2008 is a lot of people were
- 20:31naked shorting, meaning they would try to find
- 20:33a stock that they wanted to borrow and there
- 20:35weren't any shares available to borrow. And so
- 20:38they would just short the stock anyway. They'd
- 20:40just sell it even though they didn't own it.
- 20:41And what happened is it caused a lot of stocks
- 20:45to end up having a short interest where there
- 20:49were more short sellers and there were actually
- 20:51shares in the overall market. Now, theoretically,
- 20:54that became illegal in 2008. 2009. However, it
- 20:58still occurs. And we realized that with GameStop.
- 21:00And what happened with GameStop wasn't necessarily
- 21:03naked shorting entirely. It was actually more
- 21:07of a recycling of shares. So the short sellers
- 21:11would sell those shares on the open market. Retail
- 21:15would buy them. Retail then have more shares
- 21:18available to short. And then the institutions
- 21:21would then borrow those shares. They would sell
- 21:23them. And then those shares would then become
- 21:26available. to short, they'd get borrowed again.
- 21:28And it was the cycle where the exact same shares
- 21:31were getting borrowed over and over and over
- 21:34again until we eventually got to one hundred
- 21:36and twenty four percent of the total number of
- 21:38shares available being borrowed and shorted.
- 21:41And retail said, this is stupid and we're going
- 21:45to punish these people for this. And they collectively
- 21:48all got together and decided to buy GameStop.
- 21:51And what ended up happening when everybody got
- 21:54together to buy GameStop. is that the entire
- 21:58value of that share started to go up and up and
- 22:00up because when you have more buyers than selling,
- 22:02price goes up. And as the price went higher and
- 22:05higher, as more retail was buying, the short
- 22:07sellers were starting to lose more and more money.
- 22:09And short sellers panicked and they said, we
- 22:12need to go out and buy shares on the open market
- 22:16in order to close our short positions. And so
- 22:20they would go out and buy and that caused the
- 22:22price to go higher and then retail would buy
- 22:24and that caused price to go higher. then more
- 22:25short sellers would close and that caused the
- 22:27price to go higher. And it's called a short squeeze
- 22:30when you end up with this loop where there's
- 22:34just massive amounts of buying in a very rapid
- 22:37period of time. And people at that time thought
- 22:39they were going to have the quote unquote MOAS
- 22:41or mother of all short squeezes. So they just
- 22:44kept buying the stock. But where things really,
- 22:47really took a turn and made all the difference
- 22:50in the world for retail, and this is what really
- 22:52made the headlines, is retail traders. weren't
- 22:54just buying GameStop stock. They were actually
- 22:58buying call options on it and they were seeing
- 23:02incredible returns, 9 ,000, 10 ,000, 20 ,000
- 23:08% returns. People were literally putting $100
- 23:11,000 into these call options and making millions
- 23:14of dollars off of the stock. At least they could
- 23:18have. if they had sold. And that's where retail
- 23:22kind of screwed up. But it doesn't matter. We
- 23:24still took the win because the large institutions
- 23:27took massive, massive losses. Marvin Capital
- 23:30actually had to shut down because of it. And
- 23:34it was just one of those incredible stories that
- 23:37made headlines. Documentaries have been made
- 23:39about it. And it completely changed the entire
- 23:43trading game for everybody. Absolutely. I mean,
- 23:46people still look for high IV. hope to profit
- 23:49massively on these things. I mean, see it all
- 23:52the time. So this hasn't stopped at all. I think
- 23:55people are looking for their GameStop moment
- 23:57for sure. But I wanted to ask you, because I
- 24:02was reading this paper about how institutions
- 24:05typically do multi -leg options. Like you mentioned
- 24:09Squeeze, a lot of retail investors still do simple
- 24:12options, one -sided positions, just a call or
- 24:15a put. institutional investors typically are
- 24:17selling options rather than buying them. And
- 24:20they're really profiting well from it. I know
- 24:22retail investors are waking up to options and
- 24:24getting more sophisticated, doing better. So
- 24:27I was curious, how do you look at options today
- 24:30for retail investors? I think it's multifaceted.
- 24:34So when you would talk about selling options,
- 24:37generally, when we're using multi -leg options,
- 24:39we're selling options. We're just using multi
- 24:42-leg options to do it. So to give a real brief
- 24:44overview on what options are, in case you as
- 24:46a listener aren't really sure, you may have heard
- 24:48about it, don't really know what they are. Essentially,
- 24:50they're designed to provide leverage on a stock.
- 24:53So with a call option, if the stock goes up a
- 24:56certain percent, the option should go up much
- 24:59larger percent. And a put option is the opposite
- 25:02of that. If a stock goes down a certain percent,
- 25:05the put option should make significantly more
- 25:07money. And so a lot of retail traders have that
- 25:11basic understanding, and they try to find a stock
- 25:15that they think is going to go up massively.
- 25:16And rather than buying the stock, they buy call
- 25:18options on it because they think, well, if the
- 25:21stock goes up 50%, I might make 500 % on my option.
- 25:24And they're right if it were to occur. And on
- 25:27the downside, they might look for a stock that
- 25:29they expect to fall significantly. And they will
- 25:32buy a put option on that, hoping to make a massive
- 25:35profit if the stock doesn't back to fall. Where
- 25:38a lot of retail traders get confused is they
- 25:41don't entirely understand applied volatility.
- 25:44And basically what that means is when you're
- 25:46leading up to a major event, I see this a lot
- 25:48with earnings. price of the option starts to
- 25:52get very very expensive because people expect
- 25:55that stocks are going to move massively after
- 25:57earnings and as a result of that the price of
- 25:59the options start to price in this implied move
- 26:03in the stock price and so the options themselves
- 26:06get very very expensive and more often than not
- 26:09the price of the option is so expensive that
- 26:13even when the stock does move in the direction
- 26:15you think it does it doesn't move enough to actually
- 26:18make money on the And as a result, even when
- 26:22the retail traders get the direction right with
- 26:26their option, they still lose money because of
- 26:29that implied volatility, because of theta decay
- 26:31and a lot of other things that go into the pricing
- 26:34of options. So the question that I started to
- 26:37ask was, if 70 to 80 percent of retail traders
- 26:40lose money on options, who's making money? And
- 26:43I very quickly began to realize that if retail
- 26:47traders who are buying these options losing money,
- 26:49the people making money are the ones selling
- 26:52the options to them. And I realized that if I
- 26:56flip the script and I start selling options to
- 26:58people, then I would actually make a lot more
- 27:01money. And that made all the difference in the
- 27:03world. And then from there, I said, OK, well,
- 27:06if I'm going to sell options to people and make
- 27:09money 70 percent of the time when they lose money
- 27:1170 percent of the time, why don't we take it
- 27:13up a step? And I realized that with multi -leg
- 27:15options, there are certain strategies that you
- 27:18can implement in order to reduce risk. And you
- 27:21can literally get to the point where if you think
- 27:24about a stock, it could do five things, right?
- 27:26It could go up significantly. It could go up
- 27:29a little. It could go flat. It could go down
- 27:31a little or could go down a lot. You do one of
- 27:34those five things. And if you're just buying
- 27:36a call option, you only make money if the stock
- 27:38goes up a lot. You lose money if it goes up a
- 27:41little flat, down a little or down a lot. Put
- 27:44options the opposite. You make money if the stock
- 27:46goes down a lot. You lose money if it goes down
- 27:48a little, flat up a little or up a lot. And so
- 27:51with a call option or put option buying, you're
- 27:54only making money on 20 % of the time. But if
- 27:57you then sell that option, guess what? You make
- 27:59money 80 % of the time. However, there's a little
- 28:01bit of risk in that because if I sell you a call
- 28:04option and the stock does, in fact, go up a lot,
- 28:07my losses could be substantial. It could wipe
- 28:10me out. And in fact, some institutions have been
- 28:12wiped out. And so multi -leg options, they reduce
- 28:17your risk and they put a limit to the amount
- 28:20of money that you can make. It also limits the
- 28:22amount of money you can lose. And so if I'm going
- 28:25to sell a call option to you. And I say, I don't
- 28:27think the stock is going to go up massively.
- 28:29It might go up a little bit. It's not going to
- 28:31go up massively. I want to hedge that and protect
- 28:34myself just in case the stock does go up massively.
- 28:37I don't want to get wiped out. So what I'll do
- 28:39is when I sell that call option to you, I'm also
- 28:42going to buy another call option at a much higher
- 28:44price. It's a lot cheaper. And then my goal is
- 28:47basically to pocket the difference between the
- 28:50expensive call option I sold to you and the cheap
- 28:54call option that I bought. And that difference
- 28:56between those two is my profit if, in fact, the
- 29:01trade does not go up a lot. And if the trade
- 29:04does go up a lot and I lose money, my losses
- 29:07are now maximized. I'm not going to get wiped
- 29:10out. So on the institution side, are there things
- 29:15that institutions are doing then? Because I know
- 29:18they're profiting a lot from being on the right
- 29:19side of options and on a lot of these trades.
- 29:23Are there things that they're also doing to kind
- 29:25of protect themselves from the implied volatility
- 29:29and large swings? Are they hedging positions
- 29:32the way retail investors do? What other things
- 29:35did you notice that they do that we can learn
- 29:37from on that side? The biggest thing that I noticed
- 29:40is that retail traders don't really hedge their
- 29:42positions at all. And very oftentimes when stocks
- 29:47start to go down massively, they end up losing
- 29:49a lot of money. Now, I think the reason for this
- 29:52is because as a retail investor, a lot of times
- 29:55we're buying a stock and we know that the most
- 29:57amount of money we can lose is 100%. But when
- 30:00you're shorting a stock. It's very different.
- 30:02When you're shorting stock, the most amount of
- 30:04money you can make is 100%. But the most amount
- 30:08of money you can lose is infinite. If you think
- 30:10about it, let's say you short a stock that's
- 30:12trading at $100 and the stock goes to zero. Well,
- 30:16you sold it at 100. You bought it at zero. You
- 30:20made 100 % profit. But let's say the trade goes
- 30:23against you and you short that stock at $100
- 30:26and then it runs up to $1 ,000. Well, you now
- 30:30sold the stock at $100. You bought at $1 ,000.
- 30:33You have a $900 loss on a $100 investment. And
- 30:36so when you're shorting stocks, your losses can
- 30:39be infinite. And as a result, you have to hedge.
- 30:42You just have to. And one of the ways that a
- 30:46lot of the institutions will hedge when they're
- 30:49shorting is to buy call options and retail. now
- 30:53has access to see these large outsized options
- 30:57trades. And they mistakenly think that, OK, this
- 31:01institution just went out and bought a ton of
- 31:03call options. They must know something I don't.
- 31:05Let me go buy call options, too. And they don't
- 31:07realize that it's actually a hedge against a
- 31:09short position. And the institution's expecting
- 31:12the stock to go down, not up. And so what I think
- 31:16a lot of retail misses is that a lot of times
- 31:19they see these massive trades being made in options.
- 31:22And they think it's a belief a stock is going
- 31:25to go in a certain direction when it's actually
- 31:28a hedge against the belief it's going to go in
- 31:29the opposite direction. Sleight of hand. Yeah.
- 31:33So a lot of times when we're looking at these
- 31:36large outside options trades, I ignore the single
- 31:40leg because I don't know what they're actually
- 31:42doing. What I'm looking for is the multi leg.
- 31:44I'm looking for the ones where somebody bought
- 31:46a ton of call options at one price and sold a
- 31:50ton of call options at another price. I'm saying,
- 31:52OK, that gives me direction. Now I know what
- 31:55they're actually thinking. And so the hedging
- 31:57a lot of times is done with options, especially
- 32:00when you're shorting the stock. Now, on the upside,
- 32:03there's not usually a lot of hedging that's taking
- 32:06place. If they're itch hedging, it's done with
- 32:09another stock with a different company in the
- 32:12same industry. So, for example, somebody might
- 32:16buy Verizon stock and short AT &T stock and they
- 32:20can do hedging that way. strategy called a long
- 32:24short strategy is something that isn't super
- 32:27effective, but a lot of people do it just to
- 32:30hedge in case they end up losing a lot of money
- 32:33on the stock. At least they're going to make
- 32:34a little bit back on the short position. And
- 32:36that's something the institutions do. Retail
- 32:39doesn't really have to worry too much about that,
- 32:41especially if you're only buying stocks. I think
- 32:43what would actually help retail out more is closing
- 32:47out those losing trades quickly rather than bag
- 32:50holding. just hoping and praying the stock turns
- 32:52around because a lot of times it doesn't. Scott,
- 32:56I'm sure there are people listening who are like,
- 32:59this is great, but what do I start doing today?
- 33:01I'm not a professional. I'd love to have more
- 33:03professional discipline into how I'm trading
- 33:05options or how I'm trading my stocks. But how
- 33:08do you generally help people get started with
- 33:11some of these things? Where would you start to
- 33:13guide folks? I would tell people to start with
- 33:17my YouTube channel at Stock Curry. And from there,
- 33:21if you don't want to learn video by video, maybe
- 33:24you just want to dive in and just get all this
- 33:26information right away. I put together an entire
- 33:28course with everything that I learned at Merrill
- 33:30Lynch and Morgan Stanley, as well as full options
- 33:33trading. And people that go in there, they find
- 33:37that they're learning information they didn't
- 33:39even know they didn't know. There's just so much
- 33:41information out there. And that is available
- 33:44at weprofit .io. Now, if you're a little bit
- 33:48more experienced trader, you already know options
- 33:50and you just want to learn what professional
- 33:52traders are doing and how they're making money.
- 33:55I also have another community called Stock Dads,
- 33:57where I show you from over 20 full -time professional
- 34:01multimillionaire traders exactly what they're
- 34:03buying and selling as they buy and sell so that
- 34:06you can copy their trades and learn from them.
- 34:07Again, that's all available at weprofit .io.
- 34:11Thank you so much for coming on the show. I really
- 34:13appreciate you sharing your insider wisdom and
- 34:16answering all those questions and best of luck
- 34:18continuing with all your trades. My pleasure.
- 34:21I really appreciate it. I sincerely hope that
- 34:23you as a listener will jump on board and learn
- 34:27so that you can make those kinds of returns as
- 34:29well. I stumbled my way through trading. I bought
- 34:43high. I sold low. I bought calls and lost money.
- 34:47I've even had my covered calls get crushed by
- 34:50Ivy and had my shares assigned less than what
- 34:54I could have made just by sitting and waiting.
- 34:56It just hadn't occurred to me that it could be
- 34:59that complicated. You know, it's a transaction.
- 35:01You're buying something that shows value, and
- 35:04then you cash it in to realize that value. Yet,
- 35:06like Scott said, there are two sides to every
- 35:09transaction. meaning someone is always coming
- 35:11out on top. Take options trading, for example.
- 35:15I had bought calls hoping to profit on what looked
- 35:18like undervalued companies. It seemed really
- 35:21straightforward. Someone sold me those options,
- 35:24meaning that there was a person or a professional
- 35:26institution betting the other way. And when the
- 35:30stock didn't rise, I ended up being the loser.
- 35:32And that left me scratching my head to where
- 35:35it all went wrong. What information did they
- 35:38have that I didn't? Were they just more lucky?
- 35:41Now, Scott explained institutions have access
- 35:44to information earlier and throughout the day,
- 35:46and that makes it hard for retail investors like
- 35:49me to compete. A single Bloomberg terminal costs
- 35:53$25 ,000 a year. It gives those professionals
- 35:56access to research data and, most importantly,
- 35:59other professional traders. They can trade information
- 36:02on the inside, making moves before it's priced
- 36:05into the stock. With deeper pockets, they can
- 36:07create real momentum. pushing a stock up, short
- 36:11selling one down. This causes retail investors
- 36:14to jump on because let's be honest, the fear
- 36:17of missing out can be too powerful to ignore.
- 36:20Sometimes those trades aren't even what they
- 36:23appear to be. Take put options, for example.
- 36:26So people buy put options because they're certain
- 36:29a stock is about to fall. On the other side,
- 36:32though, is someone gladly selling them that put
- 36:35and that someone has already priced in that exact.
- 36:38fear that made the bet feel obvious. So the cost
- 36:42of betting on the crash gets baked so high that
- 36:45the stock can genuinely drop. And you can be
- 36:48right about that. You could be in the right direction
- 36:50and you could profit from it. But like Scott
- 36:52said, a stock can move in five directions. So
- 36:55when you're betting on a single direction, in
- 36:57this case to fall far below market price, the
- 37:00odds can really be against your purchase. And
- 37:03it can even be more confusing the other way around.
- 37:05As retail investors, We might see the momentum
- 37:08from a giant block of call options. And it's
- 37:11natural to think that someone knows something
- 37:13and that we need to jump in before the stock
- 37:15skyrockets up. So we pile on. But as Scott explained,
- 37:20a lot of those institutional calls are not a
- 37:23bet that the stock will rise. They're actually
- 37:25insurance. When a big firm shorts a stock, betting
- 37:29it will fall, it will often buy calls to cover
- 37:32itself in case it's wrong. It's basically betting
- 37:35both sides. It limits as far as they could profit,
- 37:39but they're mitigating the risk of a massive
- 37:41loss. But we can read those signals wrong. So
- 37:45the signal that screamed get in, it was actually
- 37:48a hedge on a bet that the stock goes down. So
- 37:51the crowd can read it backwards. But the good
- 37:54news is, is that all that information that institutions
- 37:56have is now more publicly available than ever
- 37:58before. And that gives us retail investors the
- 38:01advantage to act and benefit like professionals.
- 38:03The strategy is pretty simple. The institutions
- 38:06buy when a stock is beaten down, boring, and
- 38:09abandoned. Then they sell it back once it's exciting
- 38:12and the whole world wants to get in. But as retail
- 38:15typically has proven, we will do the reverse
- 38:17and we'll end up holding the bag. We show up
- 38:20late, buy the excitement near the top, and then
- 38:23when it turns, we hold the loss far too long,
- 38:27hoping for a comeback. Behavioral economists
- 38:30have a name for this last part. They call it
- 38:33the disposition effect. It's our deep, almost
- 38:35physical reluctance to sell a loser and admit
- 38:38that we were wrong. Terrence Oden documented
- 38:41it decades ago and has been quietly draining
- 38:44accounts ever since. So for stock trading, flipping
- 38:49the script can make all the difference. Do the
- 38:51research, find those undervalued positions, and
- 38:54get in to benefit from the rise. And most importantly,
- 38:58not sitting on the shares when the drop occurs.
- 39:01Don't want to be one of those temporary overnight
- 39:04multimillionaires like so many of those GameStop
- 39:08investors who sat on the rise. Like Scott, I
- 39:12came to the same conclusion when it comes to
- 39:14options trading. I no longer buy options. I only
- 39:17sell them. Management Science published a landmark
- 39:20study that found that for everyday investors
- 39:22and giant institutions alike, the single most
- 39:25successful strategy was not buying options at
- 39:27all. It is selling them. Selling an option is,
- 39:31in plain terms, selling someone insurance. Collect
- 39:35a premium up front, and most of the time, nothing
- 39:37dramatic happens. You just keep the money you
- 39:39make. It's that simple. The catch is the rare
- 39:43day that the storm actually hits. That big bet
- 39:46pays off for the other side. And that day can
- 39:49be brutal if you haven't protected yourself.
- 39:51This is why the multi -leg options can really
- 39:54make a big difference for a more sophisticated
- 39:56options trader. And it's why the institutions
- 39:58do it. Today, selling options is part of how
- 40:02I generate cash flow in early retirement. And
- 40:04I'll be honest with you, it has been quite good
- 40:06for me. But I have to be careful saying that
- 40:09part to you because it sounds like a cheat code
- 40:11and it's something that might make you think,
- 40:13oh, that's great. I'm just going to jump in there
- 40:16and start doing that myself. And I'll make a
- 40:18bunch of money and I'll shortcut my plan. And
- 40:20look, it can be quite lucrative. And it is one
- 40:23of those things that absolutely should be part
- 40:25of your plan if you're going to put the right
- 40:27effort into it. But if it's done carelessly,
- 40:30it can wipe you out. The same way Scott watched
- 40:33whole institutions get blown up. It took me years
- 40:36to study it and a great deal of patience to learn
- 40:38to do it right, and I made some mistakes along
- 40:40the way. And I'm still learning. But if there's
- 40:43one big takeaway from today, let it be this.
- 40:46You don't have to beat Wall Street to be financially
- 40:48free. Financial freedom was never about out -trading
- 40:51the insiders at their own game. Almost everyone
- 40:54who reaches it gets there the unglamorous way,
- 40:57by being the patient, boring, consistent investor.
- 41:00If you enjoy trading, that's great. The tools
- 41:03are out there, and with the right education,
- 41:05you can chase that higher return. But you don't
- 41:08have to do that to complete your escape the clock
- 41:10program. Just invest smartly, allocate to the
- 41:13right account to minimize things like tax drag,
- 41:16and aligning your positions to your goals is
- 41:19enough. Follow the strategies in the book. Talk
- 41:22to the professionals. Let the growth do its magic.
- 41:25I'd love to hear from you. What are your trading
- 41:27strategies for financial independence? Email
- 41:30me at contact and escapetheclock.com or leave
- 41:33a comment wherever you listen. I'm Daniel C.
- 41:35Rodgers. Thank you for listening and best of luck.
- 41:38I'm being on the right side of your trades and
- 41:40escaping the clock. See you next week. That's
- 41:45a wrap on this episode of escape the clock. Everything
- 41:46you've heard today is for educational purposes
- 41:48only designed to help you think plan and build
- 41:51a stronger financial program. Take what resonates,
- 41:53bring it into your escape the clock plan and
- 41:55review it with a qualified professional before
- 41:57making any major moves. I'm Daniel C. Rodgers,
- 41:59a wealth management certified professional and
- 42:01your host. The book, the free planner, and the
- 42:03one -on -one time with me are all waiting for
- 42:05you at escape the clock.com. If this episode
- 42:07was valuable, please leave a rating, share it
- 42:09with someone who needs to hear it. I'll catch
- 42:10you next week.