Latest / CLEs You Actually Want to Hear / Unmasking Judicial Bias: Rhetoric, Neutral Reasoning, and Disparate Impact in the Courtroom
Transcript
- 0:03Hello, everyone. Welcome to today's program,
- 0:07Unmasking Judicial Bias, Rhetoric, Neutral Reasoning,
- 0:10and Disparate Impact in the Courtroom. I'm Alla
- 0:13Policastro, Director of Education and Professional
- 0:16Development at Beverly Hills Bar Association.
- 0:19And today, I'm delighted to introduce our speaker,
- 0:21Dr. Susan Tanner. Professor Tanner is an associate
- 0:26professor of law at the University of Louisville
- 0:28Brandeis School of Law, where she teaches AI
- 0:31and the law and lawyering skills. Her scholarship
- 0:34brings together law, rhetoric, legal writing,
- 0:37corpus linguistics, computational linguistics,
- 0:41privacy, and professional responsibility. She
- 0:43holds a PhD in rhetoric from Carnegie Mellon
- 0:46University, where her dissertation examined the
- 0:49language, genre, and structure of legal opinions.
- 0:52Her work studies how legal meaning is made through
- 0:55language, argument, genre, narrative, institutional
- 0:59practice, and technology. She routinely writes
- 1:02and speaks about law and rhetoric amongst other
- 1:04topics. We're so excited to hear what she has
- 1:07to share with us today, so I'm going to turn
- 1:08it over to her. Thank you so much. Let me go
- 1:12ahead and share my screen. Hopefully this is
- 1:16looking good for everyone. Let me know in the
- 1:19Q &A if you can't see my slides. But I'm so pleased
- 1:23to join you all on something that, a topic that
- 1:26is sort of near and dear to my heart. I'm often
- 1:29tasked with doing things like CLEs for other
- 1:33topics, but this is really sort of a really important
- 1:38topic for me. And hopefully you'll see it, hopefully
- 1:42I don't get too terribly enthusiastic as we're
- 1:44going through and looking at some of the language
- 1:46that court opinions use and sort of unpacking
- 1:49those. So. everything in this next hour will
- 1:54rest on one claim. The most contestable step
- 1:58in a judicial opinion is usually the step that
- 2:00never gets written down. And so I want to sort
- 2:03of pause there because we're really going to
- 2:06be looking at language, not only the language
- 2:09that's in some of the opinions that we're going
- 2:11to be examining today, but also the language
- 2:13that gets left out. And that's actually a really
- 2:16important thing to look for. I also want to say
- 2:22that my background is in law and rhetoric. I've
- 2:26been fortunate enough to teach several classes
- 2:28on law and rhetoric. We can think that sometimes
- 2:33law and rhetoric is a class on politics or what
- 2:40do we think about the justice of a particular
- 2:43outcome, but that's not what this particular
- 2:47hour is about. It's an elimination of bias hour,
- 2:50but there's no implicit association test and
- 2:53no speculation about what any judge privately
- 2:56believes. What we're going to do here instead
- 2:58is just examine a method for reading opinions.
- 3:02In modern opinions, bias often shows up as a
- 3:06structure, not necessarily as political animus.
- 3:11Just so you know, I'm going to be talking about
- 3:14some very contentious opinions. That's by design.
- 3:18Some of these are really interesting to unpack
- 3:20rhetorically, but I'm not really going to be
- 3:22talking about any of the merits of any of these
- 3:25cases. This is going to be at times a little
- 3:30bit wonky. At some points, you might want more
- 3:34explanation. I went ahead and I shared links
- 3:37you can capture through your smartphones if you
- 3:40want. You don't have to. But if you want any
- 3:43of my writings about these topics, the one on
- 3:48the left is an article and the one on the right
- 3:49will take you to a chapter in a Cambridge book
- 3:53about law and rhetoric. The entire book is fascinating.
- 3:57including chapters that were not written by me.
- 3:59I really highly encourage everyone to look at
- 4:00that one. It's free to download. So what we're
- 4:04really going to be thinking about is sort of
- 4:07comparing what we're taught. So the ideal on
- 4:11the left of this picture is what every first
- 4:13year student is taught. The reality on the right
- 4:16is what every practicing lawyer already knows.
- 4:19So we tend to pretend like judicial decisions
- 4:23are the product of objective deductive analysis.
- 4:27Judges are free of ideology. They're just sort
- 4:29of applying neutral principles. But we know that
- 4:36really, anyone who's practiced law doesn't believe
- 4:40that's how the law actually operates. Jared Laffer
- 4:45famously said that the law is rhetoric, but it's
- 4:49also the law is rhetoric that tends to obscure
- 4:53its rhetoricality through a scientific -looking
- 4:56reasoning. And I just want to focus on the thesis
- 5:04of this hour, which is that bias enters modern
- 5:07opinions not as open animus, but as unstated
- 5:11background assumptions presented as common sense.
- 5:14And so we're really going to be looking at unstated
- 5:18assumptions and the impact that they can make
- 5:21on a particular outcome. Before I go further,
- 5:28I wanted to sort of defend a word, right? Because
- 5:32if I don't, we're all going to be thinking about
- 5:34rhetoric a little bit differently, right? So
- 5:36rhetoric is often used pejoratively. When people
- 5:40learn that I study rhetoric, you know, they often
- 5:43think that I study sort of ways to manipulate,
- 5:47for example. But in reality, I study three related
- 5:54fields, pragma dialectics, sociolinguistics,
- 5:57and rhetorical scholarship. And so I talk about
- 6:00these three particular fields because they're
- 6:03going to undergird some of the conversations
- 6:05we're going to be having today. And I really
- 6:09want to start off by saying I'm not defending
- 6:12rhetoric as a term. The question is never whether
- 6:15an argument is rhetorical. All legal arguments
- 6:17are. The question is what the rhetoric is doing.
- 6:21So some of what we're going to be looking at
- 6:24today is pulled from a field called pragma dialectics.
- 6:31underlying theory behind pragma dialectis is
- 6:34that argumentation is a rule -governed critical
- 6:37discussion aimed at resolving disagreement on
- 6:40the merits. So this is probably the closest to
- 6:42what law typically thinks that it does. And so
- 6:46under pragma dialectics, rhetorical effectiveness
- 6:49matters, but it must stay tied to the dialectical
- 6:52reasonableness. So we can judge an opinion not
- 6:55just on whether it's right or wrong, but whether
- 6:58it is dialectically reasonable. But sociolinguistics,
- 7:01which I'm going to sort of layer on top of that,
- 7:03says that we can't sort of understand meaning
- 7:06outside of the discourse. Things like genre,
- 7:09audience, identity, registered, and shared assumptions
- 7:12shape what words do. And that inference, the
- 7:17inference that we bring to language is social
- 7:19as well as semantic, right? And so these two
- 7:22in some ways are at odds with each other. And
- 7:24I actually, I take both up in turn. And also
- 7:29generally, rhetorical scholarship just studies
- 7:32more generally how arguments create adherence,
- 7:34frame issues, and make some reason sound available
- 7:36while others disappear. And so under this theory,
- 7:40persuasion is constitutive, not sort of just
- 7:42merely style or decor. And so that persuasion
- 7:46is constitutive actually comes from James Boyd
- 7:49White, an important law and rhetoric scholar.
- 7:53So what we're going to be looking at is how does
- 7:56the wording or the sort of choices that they
- 7:58make about the language and the law make particular
- 8:02things appear reasonable, inevitable, neutral,
- 8:05or outside the frame? And so I also want to take
- 8:09a moment and say that I'm going to be talking
- 8:12about quasi -logical arguments. And when I use
- 8:14the term quasi -logical, again, that often sounds
- 8:17like a pejorative. Like I'm saying these are
- 8:19somehow less than logical. It's not that they're
- 8:22less than, it's that they're different from.
- 8:25And this is, again, a little bit wonky, but I...
- 8:30take up often the claim that's often repeated
- 8:34that law is a syllogism. We're going to get into
- 8:37sort of unpacking that. But part of the reason
- 8:42that we're going to sort of get away from calling
- 8:45the law syllogistic is because a syllogism belongs
- 8:48to formal logic. Under formal logic, We know
- 8:54that we've done a good job with our syllogism
- 8:56when we've sort of stated all the premises. The
- 9:00conclusion must follow from the premises as they're
- 9:03stated, and it's forced as deductive, truth preserving,
- 9:07not audience depending. And so one of the things
- 9:10that, for example, Karl Popper and Stephen Toulmin
- 9:13both respectively argue is that under this sort
- 9:17of formal logic, we can't actually develop new
- 9:20truths. And so any time that we're creating sort
- 9:24of a new understanding of the world, we are necessarily
- 9:28outside of the realm of purely formal logic.
- 9:31Now it could be something that looks like logic,
- 9:33which is what we call quasi logic. And so these
- 9:37quasi logical argumentation schemes, they're
- 9:40called quasi logical because they look kind of
- 9:42like formal logic, but they're doing something
- 9:44extra. Some of the common things that you're
- 9:47going to be, you know, you're going to interact
- 9:52with on a daily basis. And the law are things
- 9:54like arguments of definition, classification,
- 9:58equivalence, analogy, part to whole, incompatibility.
- 10:01So you can see that these are very sort of logic
- 10:03adjacent argument structures. They're not illogical.
- 10:08The term quasi -logical doesn't mean illogical,
- 10:10but it does mean that it's somehow separate from
- 10:13a purely formal logic. But the effect that this
- 10:17has by mapping a quasi -logical argument, making
- 10:23it look like it follows formalogical reasoning
- 10:26is that a contestable choice can sound necessary,
- 10:29value judgments can appear neutral and scientific.
- 10:33Then we're going to talk about how one of the
- 10:35important things that operates within enthememes
- 10:37is that the audience applies some missing premise
- 10:39and helps complete the inference. We're going
- 10:42to look later at some language that we can point
- 10:45to that might indicate that we're within this
- 10:49quasi -logical argument. argumentation space.
- 10:53So as I mentioned, this sort of rests on my content,
- 10:58my sort of claim that the law operates and thematically
- 11:03rather than syllogistically. And I'm going to,
- 11:06I'm going to sort of explain what the difference
- 11:08is in another step. But I just want to sort of
- 11:11say that in generally, right, we know that syllogism
- 11:16operates generally A implies B, B implies C,
- 11:18therefore A implies C, and these are sort of
- 11:22truth -preserving and deductive. They derive
- 11:26the conclusion strictly from what is stated and
- 11:29they cannot generate new facts about the world.
- 11:32The anthem meme, on the other hand, is what Aristotle
- 11:35called the rhetorical syllogism. And it's rhetorical
- 11:39because this is what we use in the realm where
- 11:42truth is uncertain or we're trying to sort of
- 11:45produce some sort of new knowledge. And so it
- 11:49derives its persuasive power when used effectively
- 11:52precisely from what remains unstead. But of course,
- 11:58because they are rhetorical, there's also rhetorical
- 12:01danger, which is that enthmemes can allow the
- 12:03court to present controversial, value -laden
- 12:06conjectures as natural or self -evident. So this
- 12:13is just a little bit more of a breakdown of what
- 12:16the difference is, right? So we have... two different
- 12:21domains, just demonstrative proof versus rhetorical
- 12:25proof, and the main difference. So an enthememe
- 12:30generally can be thought of as a syllogism with
- 12:34one or more premises left unstated. Sometimes
- 12:39the reason that the premises are left unstated
- 12:41is because we all understand them to be true.
- 12:44So this is sort of a universally held belief.
- 12:48Or Sometimes the reason that we might leave them
- 12:54unstated under that sort of how it fails is because
- 12:56it's actually the heart of the contention and
- 12:59we don't want to name it. And so this question
- 13:03about what do we do with these missing premises
- 13:06goes back to some really groundbreaking work
- 13:09from a couple of linguists, McCogna and de Mele,
- 13:12who argued that missing premises do have a lot
- 13:16of rhetorical force because the The audience
- 13:18must first supply them and then if they choose
- 13:21to, then refute them. And this is really easy
- 13:24to sort of, it's easy to shield yourself from
- 13:28too much criticism because you haven't actually
- 13:30said the most sort of problematic parts out loud.
- 13:37So here's what a typical syllogism looks like.
- 13:41So I'm gonna start with the sort of classic syllogism
- 13:43is all men are mortal. I've put in people there
- 13:46because I had a lot of back and forth with one
- 13:48of my editors about making, changing it from
- 13:52all men are mortal to all people are mortal to
- 13:55be more inclusive. But one of the things that
- 13:57we're gonna look at is what... sort of the choice
- 14:02of the word man does in this sentence. So when
- 14:05we say man, do we mean all people? That's debatable.
- 14:10But we have a major premise. All men are mortal.
- 14:14Socrates is a man. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
- 14:18Again, not groundbreaking, not terribly exciting
- 14:22or controversial. If the major premise all men
- 14:26are mortal is true and the minor premise Socrates
- 14:29is a man is also true, the conclusion just follows
- 14:32from those premises. However, in something like
- 14:40a court opinion, we're often going to leave some
- 14:45of the premises unstated. Um. So we have, for
- 14:50example, in Dobbs, which we'll look at, a major
- 14:54premise is an unenumerated right is protected
- 14:57only if it is, quote, deeply rooted in this nation's
- 15:00history and tradition, right? That comes from
- 15:02Glucksburg. That's the Glucksburg test. A minor
- 15:05premise in that opinion is the inescapable conclusion
- 15:08is that a right to abortion is not deeply rooted
- 15:10in the nation's history and traditions. Therefore,
- 15:13the conclusion is there's no constitutional right
- 15:15to abortion. This seems fairly clear and uncontroversial.
- 15:18if we go through it as stated. But we're going
- 15:23to actually unpack that a little bit more and
- 15:26talk about what happens when we do things like
- 15:29call something inescapable, right? And ask whether
- 15:34it really truly is inescapable or whether there's
- 15:38actually a hidden premise in there that we need
- 15:40to defend. As I mentioned, one of the sort of
- 15:47rhetorical, one of the ways that the enthememe
- 15:51gets its rhetorical force is because sometimes
- 15:54the most controversial part of a particular argument
- 15:58is left unstated. And so this means not only
- 16:02does the reader have to supply that unstated
- 16:06premise, but then they also have to sort of argue
- 16:10against it if they want to, if they find an issue
- 16:13with an unstated premise. And so there are three
- 16:19things rhetorically that omitting a premise does.
- 16:27First, it A premise that is never stated is never
- 16:32argued, right? So there's the sort of self -evidence,
- 16:34right? The omission is what makes a contested
- 16:37value judgment read as common sense rather than
- 16:40a choice the court made, right? So we know that
- 16:43we often omit premises that everyone would readily
- 16:48agree to, right? We could, for example, on a
- 16:50syllogism say, all men are mortal, therefore
- 16:53Socrates is mortal. say, because those admitted
- 16:58premises are not controversial, we can sort of
- 17:01follow along. When we do that for a controversial
- 17:04premise, it might still make it feel self -evident,
- 17:08right? Like we were able to eliminate that without
- 17:11having to explain it. Second, there's a term,
- 17:22a rhetorical term about sort of ethos building
- 17:24called identification. And so identification
- 17:27as Kenneth Burke has defined it is when a reader
- 17:31starts to identify something with the speaker.
- 17:35And so the reader who fills the blank has in
- 17:38a way co -authored the conclusion, right? So
- 17:41people are actually more likely, we know this,
- 17:44that people are more likely to defend what they
- 17:46help to build, which is part of why an anthamine
- 17:49persuades more durably than a stated premise
- 17:52would. And then also flexibility, as I mentioned,
- 17:55a premise that is too weak to survive open defense
- 17:57can still be relied on silently. And so it can
- 18:01shift quietly from case to case without anyone
- 18:03having to reconcile the versions. And we're going
- 18:05to look at that. We're going to look at what
- 18:07happens when some of the unstated premises gain
- 18:11more force in a series of cases. So Toolman,
- 18:17Stephen Toolman calls this a warrant, right?
- 18:20So these unstated premises are a warrant. the
- 18:26unstated warrant can hide the inferential license
- 18:29of the court. And so the court looks like it's
- 18:33offering you deductive proof, something that
- 18:35looks like a syllogism. But again, when all of
- 18:38the controversial part is left unstated, we have
- 18:43to do extra work to both identify the unstated
- 18:45premises and then refute them. Again, this is
- 18:49where I return to this claim that often when
- 18:53we're talking about bias, we're not talking about
- 18:55open animus, but as some unstated background
- 18:58assumptions presented as common sense. We might,
- 19:03because of our own particular life experiences,
- 19:07have some assumptions built in, some implicit
- 19:10biases that we don't necessarily examine, but
- 19:16that nonetheless operate as warrants as we're
- 19:22making claims. Because of Cecilia, I wanted to
- 19:27share some ways that we can look for. these premises
- 19:31that are missing. So some single language you
- 19:34might find is something like the inescapable
- 19:36conclusion is, or of course, plainly, surely.
- 19:40It follows that. No one contends that, right?
- 19:43So that's one that I would always look for. When
- 19:47my students say, everyone agrees with me on this
- 19:49one, I know that this is probably a pretty controversial
- 19:51claim that's going to be made. We have long recognized
- 19:55X, Y, or Z. Sometimes that's a true statement
- 19:58of how the law has developed. often it is actually
- 20:00hiding some deeper work. Common sense tells us
- 20:04X, Y, or Z, that tells us that the law doesn't
- 20:07tell us that. Those are some of the signal language
- 20:11that you might look for, but there are also structural
- 20:15signals. Again, often what we're looking for
- 20:17is what's not there versus what is there. Some
- 20:21things that we might be looking for are things
- 20:23like a test imported across doctrines with no
- 20:26explanation. Under Dobbs, They bring in Gluxburg
- 20:32and bring it in as though it's uncontroversial,
- 20:35right? Gluxburg is a test which has been used
- 20:40occasionally to decide whether to recognize a
- 20:43new right, but it was used in DOBS to retract
- 20:47one that had already been established, and so
- 20:49that's an interesting use of that. A definition
- 20:52announced in passing that decides the case, right?
- 20:55So we're going to look at a case Feeney that
- 20:57sort of gives a definition of because of, not
- 20:59merely in spite of, as though it's self -explanatory.
- 21:05Looking at prior cases and citing it for more
- 21:08than it actually did hold. These are the sorts
- 21:11of things that I will drill my students on, but
- 21:15justices sometimes can get away with it. Also,
- 21:19a comparison class chosen, but never defended.
- 21:22So we might compare different types of classes
- 21:26to each other to make the reasoning work out,
- 21:31even if, for example, even if the sort of logic
- 21:37wouldn't apply similarly to different groups.
- 21:41We can also do, you'll also see things like a
- 21:43conceded proof set aside as background, right?
- 21:45So we could, we might concede something and say,
- 21:47oh yes, but that's not important for this case.
- 21:50Or an empirical claim made without evidence.
- 21:54that seems like an empirical claim, but we know
- 21:56it doesn't have the sort of data to back it up.
- 22:00Things like our country has changed with no causal
- 22:03analysis behind it. So anytime you see it like
- 22:07this, it's a place to stop and, you know, sort
- 22:10of think through what the unstated premises are,
- 22:13right? So I have my students do something similar
- 22:16to this. This step requires the unstated premise
- 22:19that X. The opinion never states it and can't
- 22:21be determined when stated, right? So I wanted
- 22:26to do a little bit of a deep dive into one of
- 22:29the cases that I wrote about. which was Dobbs.
- 22:37And so what I found most interesting about Dobbs,
- 22:41and I've done this from, I've looked at enthememes
- 22:43in other cases, Dobbs was a particularly interesting
- 22:47case to look at exactly what was not stated in
- 22:50that. So in this, in the article that I wrote,
- 22:55I looked at four unstated enthememes that masked
- 22:57the erasure of women's reproductive autonomy
- 23:00behind the sort of facade of historical and formal
- 23:03neutrality. And so I'm guessing most people are
- 23:10familiar with the basic facts and law of Dobbs.
- 23:17But one of the things that sort of, we're gonna
- 23:21look into some of the wording in a moment, but
- 23:26this really rested, the entire case rested on
- 23:29whether or not there was sort of a constitutionally
- 23:33protected right to an abortion. And I'm going
- 23:36to say I'm taking that that particular framing
- 23:40up because that's how Alito presented it. We're
- 23:44going to question whether that's actually what
- 23:46Dobbs was looking at. And especially in sort
- 23:50of the aftermath of Dobbs, it's being applied.
- 23:53It's sort of folks are looking to apply sort
- 23:57of similar reasoning, right? So this case that
- 23:59was specifically narrowed to just talk about
- 24:02abortion is now being sort of revisited for other
- 24:06types of privacy rights, seeing if we have other
- 24:10types of privacy rights. And so one of the things
- 24:17that, you know, that really is important to look
- 24:25at is this sentence. The constitution makes no
- 24:30reference to abortion and no such right is implicitly
- 24:33protected by any constitutional provision. This
- 24:35seems really logical on its sense and the whole
- 24:39opinion is built to make that sentence look like
- 24:42a finding rather than a premise. Part of what
- 24:45I want to do is unpack that to show why it's
- 24:47actually a series of premises. that are actually
- 24:53individually contestable. All right. So first
- 24:59of all, and this is something that a lot of folks
- 25:01have, when they came and offered some critique
- 25:04of Dobbs, this is one of the first things that
- 25:06a lot of people sort of pointed out, right? That
- 25:10it has this sort of selective history that not
- 25:14only. erases a half a century of modern reliance,
- 25:17right? So it's sort of a racism, I can't believe
- 25:19it's a half a century between 1973 and 2022.
- 25:24But, you know, so there was there was sort of
- 25:26a lot of, you know, a lot of precedent, establishing
- 25:32some sort of a right to an abortion. But In the
- 25:38way that Alito brings out the Glaxburg test rate,
- 25:43and the Glaxburg test again is that a right is
- 25:45deeply rooted only if legally recognized. we
- 25:50only recognize a new right if it's deeply rooted
- 25:53in our nation's history. And so there's this
- 25:56sort of unstated premise behind that, which that
- 26:00deeply rooted means sort of legally recognized
- 26:04continuously in all circumstances. That's a really
- 26:07high bar for any test to pass. And the way that
- 26:14Alito sort of takes that apart is by showing
- 26:18that there have been times when there were limits
- 26:22on abortion, right? But that's not usually what
- 26:25we do when we want to look for a sort of deeply
- 26:28rooted historical right, right? We haven't done
- 26:31that, for example, with the Second Amendment.
- 26:33And I know there's a little bit of a difference
- 26:35between rights that are formally recognized and
- 26:38the constitutional rights that aren't. But typically,
- 26:42we sort of think of deeply rooted meaning something
- 26:45something less than continuous recognition in
- 26:49all circumstances. There's also another unstated
- 26:52premise, which is that legal practices forged
- 26:54during periods of explicit gender discrimination,
- 26:56women lacked voting and property rights, are
- 26:59legitimate neutral guides for modern constitutional
- 27:00rights. And so that's another one that some of
- 27:03the other critics of the case took up. And that's
- 27:08an easy one to pull apart and look at the history.
- 27:11and see who's sort of the winner and the loser
- 27:14based on this premise. And then there's a couple
- 27:20more anthamines. I'm putting these together because
- 27:25they sort of work together. One of the anthamines
- 27:29that I identified is a public controversy anthamine
- 27:32and actually Alita starts off talking about how
- 27:34this was sort of an unsettled dispute. And so
- 27:38he says, abortion presents a profound moral issue,
- 27:42so it must be left to the democratic process
- 27:45of the states. So the unstated premise there
- 27:48is that moral disagreement diminishes constitutional
- 27:50protection, which actually inverts Barnett that
- 27:55shields fundamental rights precisely from the
- 27:56viciditudes of political controversy, right?
- 28:00And then there's also a categorical choice, and
- 28:03this is one of the ones that I spent the most
- 28:06time on in my paper. So he says that abortion
- 28:09is uniquely about potential life and must be
- 28:12analyzed independently. So an unstated premise
- 28:15here is that a medical right exercised only by
- 28:18women can be categorically severed from all other
- 28:21bodily autonomy rights without triggering equal
- 28:24protection scrutiny. So that's really doing a
- 28:27lot. And you can see then that sort of unstated
- 28:31promise is putting a lot of the argument in the
- 28:35part that does not get written in the opinion.
- 28:38And so again, some other scholars have actually
- 28:41taken this up that one of the problems with this
- 28:45line of reasoning, and so it does it for women,
- 28:48but we can do this with a lot of other marginalized
- 28:50groups, right? So if we take this legal premise
- 28:53that equality means treating men and women identically,
- 28:58then we have a few unstated warrants that we
- 29:00can sort of unpack there too, right? where men
- 29:04neither have nor need a specific right, like
- 29:06abortion access, that absence becomes the normative
- 29:08baseline for equal treatment. And so then the
- 29:11result there would be that denying abortion is
- 29:14rhetorically framed as equal neutral treatment,
- 29:16rendering women's distinct reproductive reality
- 29:18and physical burdens legally invisible. And so
- 29:21one of the things that Dobbs never does is undertake
- 29:25a more rigorous discussion of whether or not
- 29:29we have rights to make medical decisions because
- 29:33he hasn't placed general decisions about bodily
- 29:37autonomy together with other types of decisions
- 29:40about bodily autonomy. This is one of those things
- 29:46that we can do when we're talking about the categoricals,
- 29:51this is a real place that a lot of sort of bias
- 29:55can be, can sort of seep in. Sometimes it makes
- 30:01sense to treat people equally, sometimes it makes
- 30:03sense to treat people differently, but at the
- 30:05very least we should be sort of going through
- 30:08the reasoning in each instance. So, And I'm not
- 30:17going to go through these really too much one
- 30:19more time, but these are sort of the four and
- 30:22the memes that I examined in in in Dobbs and
- 30:28similar things can happen in other types of cases,
- 30:32right? And so we're going to look at. Oh, I also
- 30:40I'm not going to get into it too much right here.
- 30:44but the sort of starry decisive enthememe, which
- 30:47actually doesn't get used very often. I thought
- 30:52was interesting because they used the Glexburg
- 30:55test, a test to decide whether or not to grant
- 30:58new rights in order to revoke a right that had
- 31:01previously been recognized. And so they sort
- 31:05of turn stare decisis on its head. Again, I would
- 31:09normally say this doesn't happen that often,
- 31:13but I do think part of the reason that some folks
- 31:16are really excited by Glexburg is because it
- 31:19is being used. to sort of re -examine what rights
- 31:25we recognize and who has sort of a right, whose
- 31:31history counts. I also wanted to look at a series
- 31:39of cases that show what happens when the unstated
- 31:45premises are really important to understanding
- 31:47how the case turns out and how they can compound
- 31:51one after another. This is really going to be
- 31:56looking at facial neutral laws and racial disparity.
- 32:01I picked some of these cases because I just wrote
- 32:04a new textbook on AI and the law. And some of
- 32:08these are really important to understanding algorithmic
- 32:11bias. And so these were sort of at top of mind
- 32:15as I was doing this presentation. So we've got
- 32:21a series of cases that each one makes a new claim,
- 32:28right? Something that's left a little bit unhidden
- 32:30in the enthememes. And each one builds on what
- 32:34was unstated the last case, right? So we have
- 32:37Washington v. Davis, which was a 1976 case looking
- 32:41at disparate impact. Personnel v. Femi, which
- 32:47was a 1979 case just a few years later. And you
- 32:51can see these first two cases were actually a
- 32:54seven to two vote, right? So that's actually
- 32:57a lot of support. We'll look at them a little
- 33:00bit deeper next couple of slides. But then it
- 33:03gets a little bit closer. So we have McCleskey
- 33:05v. Kemp and Shelby County v. Holder, which are
- 33:10fair majorities. And then, of course, SFFA, Students
- 33:16for Fair Admissions versus Harvard and UNC. All
- 33:22right. So what we start off with in the first
- 33:25couple of cases, and I'm going to try and just
- 33:29for purposes of time to sort of big level analysis,
- 33:36was looking at what disparate, how do we sort
- 33:40of understand disparate impact? Do we require
- 33:44some sort of discriminatory purpose or intent?
- 33:48So in Washington v Davis, the 1976 case, the
- 33:52stated premise was disparate impact alone does
- 33:55not trigger strict scrutiny. Plainness must trace
- 33:58effects to discriminatory purpose. But there
- 34:00is an unstated premise there, which is that constitutional
- 34:03equality concerns only a decision -maker's subjective
- 34:06conscious animus, completely ignoring real -world
- 34:09systemic effects. And again, I keep bringing
- 34:12this up, this idea that intent and animus are
- 34:17key to understanding bias. And we can see how
- 34:20this gets built. Then we have Feeney, where they
- 34:25stated in the opinion, purpose implies acting
- 34:27because of, not merely in spite of, adverse effects
- 34:31on an identifiable group. The unstated premise
- 34:34here is foreseeing the entrenchment of hierarchy.
- 34:39For example, the near total exclusion of women
- 34:42is constitutionally absolved if the state classifies
- 34:45classifies it as a background accident, right?
- 34:48So in other words, purpose implies acting because
- 34:52of, not merely in spite of, right? So that we
- 34:54must have some sort of animus in our intent.
- 35:00So as I mentioned, Washington v. Davis was actually
- 35:04a 7 to 2 opinion involving two black applicants
- 35:12and one police examine. and this test 21, which
- 35:19was a civil service exam that purportedly measured
- 35:24verbal skill, vocabulary, and reading comprehension.
- 35:26Just like we're going to be able to preview this,
- 35:30this was a facially neutral exam. The objection
- 35:37to it was brought under the fact that it had
- 35:39disparate impacts. And so what's interesting
- 35:43here is not necessarily how the case turned out,
- 35:48but that the case actually did have a lot of
- 35:52precedent that could have just as easily had
- 35:56a reverse opinion, right? So going back. more
- 36:00than 100 years before this case, there had been
- 36:04laws that hold that a law that is fair on its
- 36:07face and impartial appearance still offends equal
- 36:09protection when administered with an evil eye
- 36:12and an unequal hand. So here it's read with an
- 36:17evil eye and unequal hand. We could have easily
- 36:21read that as evil eye or unequal hand to have
- 36:24a little bit more of a disparate impact. analysis,
- 36:29or at least engage with it a little bit more.
- 36:33So again, What we're seeing here is the unstated
- 36:40premises of the warrants that's really focusing
- 36:45on constitutional equality being a limit on the
- 36:48state of mind of decision makers, not on the
- 36:51distribution of burdens that the government produces.
- 36:54This is going to be important as we see this
- 36:57same assumption get picked up in Feeney. In Feeney,
- 37:09who brought this action was not losing at the
- 37:13margins. She was hitting a ceiling that no score
- 37:16could clear, right? So this was even more, right?
- 37:23there was more intent seen here. Under this Massachusetts
- 37:27law that gave veterans an absolute lifetime preference,
- 37:31any veteran who passed a civil service exam was
- 37:33ranked above every non -veteran who took it,
- 37:34regardless of score, for every covered position
- 37:37for life. This was a preference stated plainly,
- 37:44but the statute was gender neutral on its face.
- 37:51if you remember this was in 1979, there weren't
- 37:53a lot of female, there weren't the number of
- 37:56female veterans at that time that there were
- 37:58male veterans, but because it distinguished,
- 38:02it did not sort of use any the terms male or
- 38:07female, it was not found to have had a discriminatory
- 38:12purpose, right? And so They said that discriminatory
- 38:16purpose implies more than intent is volition
- 38:18or intent is awareness of consequences. It implies
- 38:21that the decision maker selected or reaffirmed
- 38:23a particular course of action, at least in part
- 38:25because of not merely in spite of the adverse
- 38:28effects upon an identifiable group. And so you
- 38:31can see that this language is saying is is. they're
- 38:36using language to say we're holding because of
- 38:39this, but they don't actually explain the warrant
- 38:42about why we care so much more about the intent
- 38:47rather than the impact. There are three ways
- 38:57to attack the definition that comes from Vini.
- 39:04In practice, you'll probably use all three and
- 39:06usually in this particular order, right? So first,
- 39:10you might attack the warrant. So a consequence
- 39:13that is certain, foreseen, or permanent is not
- 39:15purpose, so long as it was not the actor's motives.
- 39:21So this can be attacked because of doctrinal
- 39:25inconsistency. Tort, criminal, and contract law
- 39:27all treat consequences known to be certain as
- 39:29intended. That's oblique intent. Feeney adopts
- 39:33for constitutional equality alone a standard
- 39:35stricter than the criminal laws. And so I would
- 39:38make the court to find that exception. Two, the
- 39:42neutrality is constructed. Federal law capped
- 39:44women's share of the armed forces at 2 percent
- 39:45until 1967, just before FENI was decided. The
- 39:51Commonwealth borrowed a classification of federal
- 39:53government had already made gendered, then called
- 39:55the borrowing neutral. If you keep only one attack,
- 39:59that's a probably important one to keep. Then
- 40:02three, as I mentioned, the comparison class.
- 40:04This is something that really shows up a lot
- 40:06in these bias cases. Burdened male non -veterans
- 40:12makes an absolute bar look symmetrical. Counting
- 40:14the ceiling women hit makes it look total. The
- 40:17court chose the first frame without defending
- 40:20it. And so something like Feeney is so old, we're
- 40:25not going to necessarily go back and attack it.
- 40:28But what we can do is see the implied premises
- 40:31that rest underneath Feeney and use those potentially
- 40:36for new bias cases. So in my next two cases,
- 40:41we can see that statistical proof of systemic
- 40:44bias, which should be enough to challenge some
- 40:48of these cases, can be rendered constitutionally
- 40:52invisible through these implicit premises. So
- 40:57the first is McCloskey v. Kemp, which is a 1987
- 40:59case, and then Shelby County v. Holder, which
- 41:02is a more recent case, that starts striking down
- 41:06the Voting Rights Act preclearance. So in McCleskey,
- 41:14there was massive statistical proof of racial
- 41:17disparity and capital sentencing. And we're gonna
- 41:22sort of, we'll go through and sort of unpack
- 41:25that one a little bit. And so this was brought
- 41:30by, on behalf of Warren McCleskey, who was a
- 41:32black man and who was convicted of armed robbery
- 41:35and murder. And they found that there was a very
- 41:50statistically significant difference in death
- 41:53sentences, which were imposed only on 11 % of
- 41:57white victim cases and 1 % of Black victim cases.
- 42:05where the prosecutor sought death in 70 percent
- 42:09of black defendant white victim cases and 32
- 42:12percent of white white and 19 percent of white
- 42:15defendant black defendant victim and 15 percent
- 42:18of black black. So we can see that not in raw
- 42:23numbers but in percentages that there was a real
- 42:25statistical difference in who was facing the
- 42:28death penalty. But the court said So that the
- 42:36apparent disparities and sentences are an inevitable
- 42:39part of our criminal justice system. And that
- 42:41accepting the claim about disparate impact would
- 42:45invite similar claims as to other types of penalty
- 42:48throwing into serious question of principles
- 42:49that underlie our entire criminal justice system.
- 42:52And so one of the things that the court is resting
- 42:58on, one of the assumptions is that because of
- 43:04McCluskey, because McCluskey had to show that
- 43:08the decision makers in his own case acted with
- 43:10discriminatory purpose, right? So we're sort
- 43:12of further narrowing. what, whose discriminatory
- 43:17purpose we're looking at. And it's almost, it's
- 43:20a near impossible bar to cross, right? That we've
- 43:24sort of narrowed down to discriminatory purpose,
- 43:26not just discriminatory effect. And so, and here
- 43:30we're furthering narrowing it to his particular
- 43:32case, even though he'd really shown that there
- 43:35was a discriminatory effect of death penalty
- 43:40cases. So. With McClaskey, it wasn't the proof
- 43:50that was the problem. He had proof, but the framing
- 43:53was really important. So the court stated apparent
- 43:58disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part
- 44:01of our criminal justice system. But the unstated
- 44:03premise that that hides is a disparity that recurs
- 44:07across the whole system is a background condition
- 44:10rather than an injury. right? Because remitting
- 44:13it would require redesigning discretion itself.
- 44:16So what it's saying is because this is so far
- 44:20reaching, it's just part of the criminal justice
- 44:24system rather than an injury to a particular
- 44:26person. Let's look at another premise versus
- 44:30implied premise, right? So they wrote, accepting
- 44:34the claim would mean we can soon be faced with
- 44:36similar claims as to other types of penalty,
- 44:38throwing into serious question the principle
- 44:39bound by our entire criminal justice system.
- 44:42And so the scale of a constitutional violation
- 44:44is a reason not to find one. Now, interesting.
- 44:50Brennan dissenting gave us a name, a fear of
- 44:52too much justice. We're going to look a little
- 44:54bit about the importance of dissent to sort of
- 44:58understanding the framing as well. So what's
- 45:02really interesting about this one, right? Is
- 45:05that McCluskey had all the evidence that he could
- 45:09have had absent particularized finding about
- 45:14particularized bias in his one case, right? So
- 45:19the fact that this bias is so widespread became
- 45:23a reason not to remedy it. And then we have Shelby
- 45:31County versus Holder, which I think has an interesting
- 45:34new frame, which is that our country has changed.
- 45:36So we've seen before trying to hold to values
- 45:40and Shelby does an interesting sort of flip of
- 45:44that saying, no, things are different now than
- 45:47they used to be. And so therefore we're going
- 45:49to sort of rethink our precedent here. Under
- 45:59Section 5 of the Voting Acts, it required a preclearance.
- 46:05And it required jurisdiction to obtain federal
- 46:08preclearance before changing any voting practice.
- 46:12And Section 4B supplied the coverage formula
- 46:14to determine who was covered, jurisdiction that
- 46:16had used a test or device as a precondition to
- 46:18voting, had registration or turnout below 50
- 46:21% in the relevant benchmark years. And so The
- 46:27posture was, Shelby County, Alabama sued the
- 46:30attorney general seeking a declaration that section
- 46:344B and 5 were unconstitutional. Congress had
- 46:38reauthorized the act in 2006 and this is in 2013,
- 46:42this case is decided. for 25 years on a legislative
- 46:47record of roughly 15 ,000 pages. Northwest Austin
- 46:51in 2009 had already signaled the court stouts
- 46:54while avoiding the question. And Roberts held
- 46:57that Section 4B was unconstitutional. He said,
- 47:00current burdens must be justified by current
- 47:03needs. The formula rested on decades -old data
- 47:06and departed from the equal sovereignty of the
- 47:08states. Section 5 was left standing but inoperative
- 47:10since nothing determined who it covers. In this
- 47:15one, one of the promises is interesting is our
- 47:17country has changed, right? And so the opinion
- 47:22treats improved registration and turnout numbers
- 47:25as proof that the condition that the statute
- 47:27addressed has passed and never asked whether
- 47:30the statute produced this improvement, never
- 47:31asked whether there's more that needs to be done.
- 47:35And then Texas announced within hours that it's
- 47:38previously blocked voter identification law would
- 47:40take immediate effect. And so what's interesting
- 47:49here is the warrant that's not stated. And we're
- 47:53going to see this again in the next case. So
- 47:56one of the warrants, this implied premise, is
- 47:59that improved outcome metrics show that the underlying
- 48:01problem has been solved, and therefore that the
- 48:04remedy which produced those metrics is no longer
- 48:07needed. So if they had directly stated that warrant,
- 48:10we can decide whether we want to agree or disagree
- 48:14with that. But by leaving that unstated, we're
- 48:19just left with the claim that times have changed,
- 48:24which is, you know, it's hard to argue with the
- 48:26fact that times have changed. But times have
- 48:32changed often is not enough of a reason to overturn
- 48:35a law, but it seems to be in this particular
- 48:38case. So now we have the sort of colorblind rules,
- 48:44which are now applied to segregated realities,
- 48:47which reliably reproduce hierarchy. And so we've
- 48:57got sort of the anti -classification, right?
- 48:59The court's view from students in fair admissions,
- 49:04where they say eliminating racial discrimination.
- 49:06discrimination means eliminating all of it. And
- 49:09I love, I actually love this term to phrase,
- 49:12right? Eliminating racial discrimination means
- 49:14eliminating all of it. It makes sense on its
- 49:18face, right? It's almost a tautology. Well, it
- 49:20is a tautology. But there's an unstated warrant
- 49:24there, which is that race conscious remediation
- 49:26and race based subordination are morally and
- 49:29constitutionally equivalent wrongs, right? And
- 49:32so this is one of the ones that a lot of scholars
- 49:35have taken up, but we have to first name it before
- 49:39we can attack that unstated warrant. Then we've
- 49:43got the anti -subordination, which is the dissent
- 49:46view, where Justice Jackson says, deeming race
- 49:50irrelevant in law does not make it so in life.
- 49:55Justice Jackson really takes up the warrant,
- 49:59the unstated premise, in the majority's opinion.
- 50:05So as you're probably aware, students prefer
- 50:09admission. Maybe this isn't impacting your life
- 50:14in the everyday way that it impacts those of
- 50:16us in higher education, but it was the one that
- 50:20challenged race -conscious admissions at Harvard
- 50:22and North Carolina. And so Roberts held that
- 50:27both programs were unlawful. and said that the
- 50:32stated defects, the asserted diversity interests,
- 50:34are not sufficiently coherent or measurable to
- 50:36survive strict scrutiny. So race is used as a
- 50:40negative and as a stereotype, and the programs
- 50:41have no logical endpoint. Gruders don't formally
- 50:44overrule that it's treated as having expired.
- 50:48So same thing, right? So times have changed is
- 50:51pretty much the reasoning for SFFA. And then
- 50:56they sort of carve out some potential race consciousness,
- 51:02considering an applicant's discussion of how
- 51:04race affected his or her life, be it through
- 51:06discrimination, inspiration, or otherwise. And
- 51:10they expressly reserved the question in military
- 51:12service academies. But again, I love the phrase,
- 51:19eliminating racial discrimination means eliminating
- 51:21all of it, implying that the court can't perpetuate
- 51:29racial discrimination and the schools can't perpetuate
- 51:32it by having race -conscious admissions. The
- 51:41two are, it's a six to three to six to two just
- 51:43because of Justice Jackson recusing herself from
- 51:46the Harvard case. But what we have though is
- 51:54the sort of question about, and I'm not the first
- 51:58to say this, right, to sort of framing colorblindness
- 52:02as the sort of end goal without questioning some
- 52:07of the underlying premises is one of those things
- 52:09where it sounds really reasonable. It sounds
- 52:11really, and in some ways it might be reasonable
- 52:14to say let's stop discriminating without necessarily
- 52:18looking at whether or not the practices are so
- 52:24systemic that we still need to be looking at
- 52:27racial discrimination. Oh, I'm going to sort
- 52:31of skip this one for this potentially a little
- 52:35bit crazy looking graphic. But what we see here
- 52:41is that not only do we have these disparate impact
- 52:47cases, right? Gender jurisprudence in DOBS and
- 52:52racial jurisprudence in the latter five cases.
- 52:58are both serving to place disparate effects beyond
- 53:02constitutional reach, but through two different
- 53:05mechanisms, right? So under Dobbs, Dobbs isolates
- 53:10a specific medical right and then establishes
- 53:16male biology as a baseline and then sort of ignores
- 53:21modern societal reliance, ignores 50 years of
- 53:24precedent to sort of come to a formally neutral
- 53:27rule. And then the race jurisprudence cases isolate
- 53:32specific conscious intent and establish color
- 53:35blindness as the baseline and then ignore statistical
- 53:37reality. So both of these sort of build on each
- 53:42other to produce a an enthememe, looking like
- 53:49a syllogism, which has a formally neutral rule,
- 53:53but it's applied to potentially an unequal rule,
- 53:56which might reproduce hierarchy. But the disparate
- 54:00effect part is always placed out of bounds. So
- 54:05if you're looking at a case with some implicit
- 54:09bias at it, The first step is just to expose
- 54:15the unstated premise. And this is actually harder
- 54:17than it might seem. It really takes a close reading.
- 54:21But restate what you think the court would have
- 54:25to have as its implicit premises for the syllogism
- 54:30to work. And then step two, center affected communities.
- 54:34Think about how do those unstated premises potentially
- 54:43shape, how are they shaped in lived experiences,
- 54:48right? Matsuda would say look to the bottom and
- 54:52then prioritize the voices of those most impacted.
- 54:56Third step, reframe the issue, shift from abstract
- 54:59frames, history and tradition to concrete intersectional
- 55:01stakes like economy and bodily autonomy and move
- 55:04beyond abstract legal tests. Four, employ interdisciplinary
- 55:09proof when the courts will hear it and force
- 55:12courts to confront effects using sociology, public
- 55:14health, and economics. I'm working on a new article
- 55:17about the Brandeis brief. I'm really hoping that
- 55:19we'll bring that back. And make sure that you
- 55:21introduce non -legal evidence where possible.
- 55:25And then number five, develop alternative narratives.
- 55:28Engage in popular constitutionalism. and then
- 55:33coordinate with public education to build a broader
- 55:36public understanding of what's going on. So in
- 55:43general, if you're really trying to reclaim the
- 55:47authority of proof, do not take the court's framing
- 55:52or your opposing counsel's framing at face value.
- 56:00Really understand what's what's not being said,
- 56:04hunt those warrants. And then make sure that
- 56:08you're on the record talking about not only what
- 56:11is in the brief or in the record, but what has
- 56:15been ignored as well. So in general, right, we're
- 56:22just going to sort of... look at the opinion's
- 56:27argument, the state of premise, and the state
- 56:28of conclusion, and then try and find that hidden
- 56:32warrant. What must be true for the conclusion
- 56:33to follow? Name it, demand backing, and order
- 56:36a better frame. So as I mentioned, reconstructing
- 56:45the hidden premise is actually a little bit more
- 56:47difficult than you might think. It requires a
- 56:50close reading to find the rule you know, ask
- 56:54yourself what's the assumed rule, and then state
- 56:57the missing parts in plain language. And then
- 57:01also test it. What would the premise hold in
- 57:03a neighboring doctor in our case? And then, you
- 57:06know, give an answer to that, right? Offer a
- 57:08counter warrant and build a record support. What
- 57:11I have my students do is sort of this sort of
- 57:14template -driven way of identifying implicit
- 57:19premises, right? Because these grounds, the court
- 57:23concludes this is the claim. The conclusion depends
- 57:26on the warrant and then state that warrant. The
- 57:29warrant is contestable if it is because of law,
- 57:31record history, empirical proof, name why the
- 57:35warrant is contestable. And so again, some of
- 57:41the cases we've seen have formal frames that
- 57:46could be challenge, right? Sort of what is the
- 57:50neutral rule? Have conditions changed? Have they
- 57:53changed in ways that are salient for the ruling?
- 57:57And sort of what is the purpose, right? Why is
- 58:03the effect and not just the intent what we need
- 58:07to be looking at? I also want to say this is
- 58:12all about critiquing the argument. As I've mentioned,
- 58:18I don't really want to look too much into intent.
- 58:22Same thing, I don't want to look at the intent
- 58:25of the judges or justices. Thinking about what
- 58:31is stated on the paper rather than inferring
- 58:35ill intent by the judges is important. So, practically,
- 58:46any time you're sort of trying to unpack a rule
- 58:49that you don't think really makes sense and sort
- 58:52of. reality. So I would start by reading the
- 58:55opinion twice, first for doctrine and then the
- 58:57second one for inference. And so what we make
- 59:02a mistake is by conceding the inevitability of
- 59:06a line of reasoning. We can let the effects become
- 59:09the background. We stop arguing over those, which
- 59:13also, for example, in these bias cases, we treat
- 59:16formal sameness as neutrality. So I have One
- 59:22minute for questions, but I'm also happy to stay
- 59:25after, to answer any questions, be they clarifying,
- 59:31challenging, whatever sort of questions you might
- 59:33have for me. And I know that you don't have a
- 59:35formal mechanism to raise your hand, but I do
- 59:39encourage you to post questions in the Q &A,
- 59:42and I will stay around as long as you would like
- 59:44me to. Thank you. All right, Dr. Tanner, it does
- 59:49look like someone did reach out a little bit
- 59:52earlier in the program. Could you happen to put
- 59:54up that QR code for that resource that you mentioned
- 59:57earlier in the presentation today? Absolutely.
- 1:00:02I know this is the worst way to go back to slide
- 1:00:05one, but it was the only way I know. It looks
- 1:00:20like we haven't received any additional questions.
- 1:00:24Do you have any other closing statements that
- 1:00:27you'd like to make today, Dr. Tech? So, no, I
- 1:00:30think, first of all, again, I want to thank you
- 1:00:33so much for allowing me to be here. This is,
- 1:00:35I think, some of the most important work that
- 1:00:38a law professor can undertake, right? We have
- 1:00:40the luxury. to look not only at what the court
- 1:00:43says but what the court doesn't say. And I know
- 1:00:45that's an absolute luxury. So I really appreciate
- 1:00:48being able to come and talk about this. But if
- 1:00:51anyone does have any questions that were not
- 1:00:53answered, if I went over anything too quickly,
- 1:00:56if you have any clarifying questions, go ahead
- 1:00:59and email me. My email address is just susan
- 1:01:03.tanner at global .edu. And I'm happy to answer
- 1:01:09individual questions as well. Alrighty, this
- 1:01:14concludes today's presentation. Thank you so
- 1:01:17much, Dr. Tanner, for an excellent presentation
- 1:01:19today, and thank you so much to our audience.
- 1:01:21Have a great day, everybody. Thank you.