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Previewing the NATO Summit in Ankara · FDD Events Podcast

• 0:10
  [SPEAKER_04]: Good afternoon and thank you for joining us for today's media call as FDD Experts Preview next week's NATO Summit and Anchorl.
• 0:18
  [SPEAKER_04]: My name is Joe Dockerdy.
• 0:20
  [SPEAKER_04]: I'm Senior Director of Communications here at the Foundation for Defense of democracies.
• 0:26
  [SPEAKER_04]: We've got a lot to go over today, so we're going to get right to it.
• 0:29
  [SPEAKER_04]: We've got three tremendous experts today to preview the upcoming summit.
• 0:35
  [SPEAKER_04]: We have Bradley Bowman, a senior director of FDD Center on Military and Political Power.
• 0:41
  [SPEAKER_04]: Specializing in U.S. foreign and defense policy and strategy, Bradley served as a national security adviser to members of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, as well as an active duty U.S. Army officer, Blackhawk pilots, and assistant professor at West Point.
• 0:59
  [SPEAKER_04]: Sinan CD is director of FDD's Turkey program and is an FDD senior fellow focusing on Turkish domestic policies in politics, Turkey's foreign policy, and regional security issues.
• 1:13
  [SPEAKER_04]: Sinan is an associate professor of national security studies at Marine Corps University and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service.
• 1:23
  [SPEAKER_04]: And Kevin Malin is senior research analyst with FDD's Center on Military and Political Power, where he focuses on U.S. military readiness, posture, operations, defense, production, and security operation as well as Middle Eastern and European security.
• 1:40
  [SPEAKER_04]: Cameron served as a U.S. Army Field Officer in the Massachusetts National Guard, deploying to Iraq in 2021 as a C-RAM counter rocket artillery and mortar battle captain.
• 1:52
  [SPEAKER_04]: Today's conversation is on the record.
• 1:55
  [SPEAKER_04]: We will have time for Q&A after each panelists opening remarks.
• 2:00
  [SPEAKER_04]: And we will provide a transcript and a recording audio end video after the call is completed.
• 2:07
  [SPEAKER_04]: Let's get right to it.
• 2:08
  [SPEAKER_04]: Brad, over to you, and thank you for getting us started.
• 2:11
  [SPEAKER_03]: Great Joe.
• 2:12
  [SPEAKER_03]: Thank you very much and thanks to my impressive colleagues and on in Camus.
• 2:16
  [SPEAKER_03]: We'll honor to be here with them and thanks for those of you tuning in.
• 2:19
  [SPEAKER_03]: We know you're busy.
• 2:20
  [SPEAKER_03]: We want to make this worth your while.
• 2:22
  [SPEAKER_03]: So let me kind of set the scene if I can make a few comments specific to the geostrategic environment, the summit and what might transpire and then turn over my colleagues so they can dive into their part.
• 2:35
  [SPEAKER_03]: So
• 2:37
  [SPEAKER_03]: I think anyone who kind of looks at the U.S. military experience in the Red Sea, a couple years back, with the Houthis and the military operations with Ron, against Ron early this year.
• 2:48
  [SPEAKER_03]: And if you look at it objectively and seriously, I think you kind of come away with two conclusions.
• 2:53
  [SPEAKER_03]: One is that the United States has the most impressive combat power or military in the world.
• 2:58
  [SPEAKER_03]: one and two, there are serious limits to American military power and what we can accomplish with the military.
• 3:03
  [SPEAKER_03]: And I think you have to hold both of those ideas in your head at the same time and that and that our arsenals were not quite as robust as we thought and as many of us have been saying is for a while including in our arsenal of democracy, monograph, our defense production capacity is severely lacking.
• 3:18
  [SPEAKER_03]: So
• 3:19
  [SPEAKER_03]: I think that review of US military operations in the Red Sea and also against Iran more recently should impress us with the bravery, competence, and professionals of our service members, but also maybe suggest a little bit of humility.
• 3:34
  [SPEAKER_03]: When I look at what our adversaries are doing,
• 3:38
  [SPEAKER_03]: And I've been leading here at FDD at two year research project on how China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are cooperating, and I've been teaming up with my great partners, Admiral Montgomery and Elaine Desinsky, and we're looking at that in the economic, financial, cyber technology, military domains.
• 3:53
  [SPEAKER_03]: It really confirms what the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said about a year ago now that we're seeing unprecedented cooperation against among our acts of the aggressors adversary, China, Russia, and North Korea.
• 4:05
  [SPEAKER_03]: They clearly understand the value of partners and their cooperation is making each of them stronger than they would be otherwise in their ongoing or prospective spheres of aggression.
• 4:16
  [SPEAKER_03]: So if you accept the truth of what I just said, they are kind of the geostrategic framing, it would be a great paradox.
• 4:22
  [SPEAKER_03]: I would say it would be very unfortunate downright unwise for at this moment when our adversaries are working together in unprecedented ways for us to take our allies for granted.
• 4:33
  [SPEAKER_03]: And I would say we are blessed with our allies.
• 4:35
  [SPEAKER_03]: We have arguably one of the best alliances in human history that has been fundamentally successful since its creation in 1949 on Constitution Avenue here in Washington.
• 4:47
  [SPEAKER_03]: In a chief in its core mission, that has deterrent aggression, conventional military aggression against alliance members.
• 4:55
  [SPEAKER_03]: And so we have this summit coming up, and it's important to promote unity and solidify the strength that I have Alliance because we need NATO to be very effective at its core responsibility and that is deterring aggression and the transatlantic region, particularly in Eastern Europe, primarily against the Russians.
• 5:16
  [SPEAKER_03]: And so it is not charity, it is a wise investment to empower them, the alliance, which were a core part of, so that we don't confront additional aggression like in the Baltics in the next few years.
• 5:27
  [SPEAKER_03]: I cried me a style of invasion, for example, in the Baltics.
• 5:30
  [SPEAKER_03]: And I would make that same argument with our other allies and partners who are on the frontiers of freedom around the edges of the Eurasian land, mass, namely Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan and South Korea.
• 5:40
  [SPEAKER_03]: So helping to make them strong and secure, helping them to be able to carry more of the burden is not a nice to have.
• 5:47
  [SPEAKER_03]: It's not a charity thing.
• 5:48
  [SPEAKER_03]: It's a wise investment that makes Americans more secure.
• 5:52
  [SPEAKER_03]: So that's how I approach this.
• 5:54
  [SPEAKER_03]: And just a little bit of, um,
• 5:56
  [SPEAKER_03]: Quick context for those who are old enough, remember, let's remember that on 9-11 Americans were attacked, not Europeans, yet they invoked Article 5, many of them deployed to Afghanistan, more than a thousand of our out-nado allies, were killed there and never returned home to their families.
• 6:12
  [SPEAKER_03]: And some of them stayed with us to the very last days.
• 6:15
  [SPEAKER_03]: And so,
• 6:17
  [SPEAKER_03]: where I come from that's called a friend that's called a very good friend and where I come from you don't disrespect or friend like that you show them gratitude and you treat them with respect and you don't do things like we did with Greenland.
• 6:27
  [SPEAKER_03]: So let me talk quickly about U.S. force posture in Europe and my colleague Cam here in a minute is going to dig into more detail.
• 6:34
  [SPEAKER_03]: But one of the big grand strategic debates right now is what we do or don't do with U.S. military posture on European continent.
• 6:41
  [SPEAKER_03]: The administration's argument is that we need to do less in Europe so we can do more in the Pacific.
• 6:45
  [SPEAKER_03]: There's a fundamental strategic insight to that.
• 6:48
  [SPEAKER_03]: If a strategy is the coordination ends of means, you can't do everything.
• 6:50
  [SPEAKER_03]: You have to make tough choices.
• 6:52
  [SPEAKER_03]: But there's a paradox here or something we have to balance.
• 6:56
  [SPEAKER_03]: We have to make sure that we don't reduce US military posture on the European continent.
• 7:02
  [SPEAKER_03]: So quickly, our prematurely or excessively that our European partners are not prepared to stand up, so that we avoid a deterrence gap that invites aggression, understanding that we need to do more in the Pacific.
• 7:13
  [SPEAKER_03]: Patriotic America is going to disagree about how to get that balance right, but that's absolutely the balance.
• 7:18
  [SPEAKER_03]: That's why it's so important that our
• 7:21
  [SPEAKER_03]: our NATO allies step up.
• 7:23
  [SPEAKER_03]: And as the Secretary General has been saying, including at his speech at the Atlantic Council and a speech a while back at the Reagan Institute, this is about burden sharing a defense spending.
• 7:34
  [SPEAKER_03]: A few quick comments on burden sharing defense spending, a couple of things, and I'll move to conclude.
• 7:38
  [SPEAKER_03]: Let's be honest, for too long, a lot of our NATO allies were not carrying their fair share of the security burden.
• 7:44
  [SPEAKER_03]: They were not meeting their defense spending commitments.
• 7:47
  [SPEAKER_03]: But the bottom lines, we're seeing massive progress on that front.
• 7:51
  [SPEAKER_03]: Look at some of those statistics that the Secretary General's signing, we're talking roughly a $200 billion increase in the last year or two.
• 7:58
  [SPEAKER_03]: We have all allies at 2% and let's remember at the Hague Summit last year.
• 8:03
  [SPEAKER_03]: In June of 2025,
• 8:05
  [SPEAKER_03]: All NATO member countries agreed to reach this 5% that, remember, that's the 3.5% of GDP on core defense spending and 1.5% on defense related elements.
• 8:16
  [SPEAKER_03]: So you the critical infrastructure networks, civilian prepared resilience.
• 8:20
  [SPEAKER_03]: I would just say sorry Spain that doesn't include expenditures on soccer juries or football as you call them, but you know, so 5% there, and I would say this summit that we have next week here in Ankara, it's going to be show me the money time.
• 8:35
  [SPEAKER_03]: It's going to be, hey, you committed in the Hague summit to quote submit plans showing credible incremental path to this goal, namely the 3.5% of GDP goal.
• 8:47
  [SPEAKER_03]: that this is where you know we're going to see if people are putting their money where their mouth is or whether they're putting their budgets and their allocations where the political commitments are.
• 8:56
  [SPEAKER_03]: Now this isn't like gotcha or sniping and allies that I don't I don't do that that's not my nature.
• 9:01
  [SPEAKER_03]: This matters here's why it matters.
• 9:04
  [SPEAKER_03]: Because if NATO allies don't spend the necessary amounts on defense, they will not have the military capability and capacity required to defend themselves to fulfill their responsibilities within the alliance, to carry more of the burden on the European continent, so we can focus more or find it resources elsewhere and to turn aggression both in Europe and the Pacific.
• 9:23
  [SPEAKER_03]: So holy cow, that's really important.
• 9:24
  [SPEAKER_03]: And that's why it's going to be important for them to show us that they're stepping up a few last comments here.
• 9:31
  [SPEAKER_03]: at the upcoming summer in addition to burden sharing and defense spending and in making sure people holding people accountable to their commitments, allies is defense and industry cooperation.
• 9:41
  [SPEAKER_03]: I afflicted this earlier, Putin's February 24th, 2022 invasion and then again the war against Iran.
• 9:49
  [SPEAKER_03]: revealed once again that America's arsenal is not as deep as we'd like and our defense production capacity is not what it was for example in the 1940s and so the way we're going to get after this is some of the measures that the Trump administration is taking which are lovable but Congress needs to follow up and make sure they're implemented effectively and quickly but it's also cooperating with allies so we want as much defense production capacity in Europe as possible
• 10:18
  [SPEAKER_03]: But there's something more than that important than the economic cooperation.
• 10:22
  [SPEAKER_03]: We are so deficient on our numbers of humanitians, so deficient on capacity, and air defense interceptors, and almost everywhere you look.
• 10:30
  [SPEAKER_03]: We need all the defense production we can get, and we're going to do that more effectively and avoid unhelpful redundancy if we're cooperating.
• 10:37
  [SPEAKER_03]: So I think that's really important.
• 10:38
  [SPEAKER_03]: One of the main reason and the Iran Ukraine that I'm done.
• 10:42
  [SPEAKER_03]: One of the reasons why the Trump administration is upset with these days generally speaking is that there's a frustration that many of your European allies did not do more in the war against Iran.
• 10:54
  [SPEAKER_03]: Let me just say that as good of a thing it is for American interests to have severely degraded Iran in military power defense and industrial base,
• 11:03
  [SPEAKER_03]: I would respectfully say this administration didn't make the case the way it should have to the American people to Congress and to our European allies before the conflict started.
• 11:12
  [SPEAKER_03]: And so when it happened, they felt like, well, you know, you didn't even give us a heads up, you didn't talk to us, so there were some hurt feelings there.
• 11:18
  [SPEAKER_03]: But the anomalies where we had a few instances where we couldn't use US military bases to do what we wanted to do, those were a few in far between and fleeting, and if you see what the Secretary General said in the last few days, we had four to five thousand US military aircraft taking off from American bases in Europe to support Epic Fury.
• 11:40
  [SPEAKER_03]: Okay, so this reinforces the point that American military posture in Europe is not charity to ungrateful free writing Europeans.
• 11:48
  [SPEAKER_03]: It serves American interests, it tears aggression, and it facilitates power projection to the Mediterranean, Africa, the Middle East, and the Arctic.
• 11:57
  [SPEAKER_03]: Lastly, Ukraine and Kim's going to hit this hard.
• 12:00
  [SPEAKER_03]: One of the big things here from the summit is going to be a focus on Ukraine, and here again we see the European stepping up, contributing more to Ukraine security than we are, which is positive and good, but let's remember America has a core interest in the outcome of Ukraine.
• 12:17
  [SPEAKER_03]: If we're not willing to support Ukraine with modest help and modest investments,
• 12:22
  [SPEAKER_03]: Then why would the Chinese Communist Party think that we're going to send thousands of Americans to fight and some of them die not return home to deter aggression against Taiwan so what we do or don't do with respect to Ukraine is going to affect perceptions and Beijing and potentially effect where they launch what could be the worst war of the 21st century.
• 12:41
  [SPEAKER_03]: I'll stop there and turn over to see not if that's right.
• 12:43
  [SPEAKER_03]: Thanks.
• 12:51
  [SPEAKER_01]: The way I would sort of jump into this based on your comment and your framing of it, which is pretty holistic and pretty comprehensive, I would say one of the things to watch out for I'm sure many of you are sort of following news items on this is to suggest that in addition to the problems that NATO has.
• 13:07
  [SPEAKER_01]: In projecting itself in terms of its defense capabilities is defense industrial based, particularly on the side of U.S. allies, but also in the U.S. zone reduction sort of capabilities is an additional potential problem that we've tried to highlight for some time, which is from the perspective of a one-member state, the host this time.
• 13:26
  [SPEAKER_01]: This is the first time that Turkey's hosted the native summits its 2004, and the way to probably think about that is, is do we have a
• 13:35
  [SPEAKER_01]: And whilst Turkey has projected itself consistently on the last few years under Erdogan as a country which has increased its spending limits in NATO, that it does highly significant defense industrial base, it is a major contributor of arms, weapons, and defense articles.
• 13:55
  [SPEAKER_01]: two members of the organization, the Turks have just built and delivered their first first warship to the Romanian Navy, but in addition, the Turks have right now 50 other warships being built in their shipyards, which as I think, if I'm not mistaken, more than the combined ability of shipbuilding in all of the European Union.
• 14:14
  [SPEAKER_01]: In addition to that, we also have heard extensive reporting about how capable Turkey's drone industry is that it is supplied key weapons in the Ukraine conflict to Ukraine in terms of drones.
• 14:25
  [SPEAKER_01]: Those those those weapons were tested in theaters like the Nagorno Karabakh war, but they were also deployed inside of Libya and Turkey's message to the upcoming summit is.
• 14:33
  [SPEAKER_01]: Hey guys, look, Turkey's the most formidable, most capable NATO power which puts its money where its mouth is in quite a stark contrast to all of its other members.
• 14:46
  [SPEAKER_01]: And the reason why we are essentially, I think, questioning in a Turkey's bona fide is as a stalwart and model NATO member.
• 14:55
  [SPEAKER_01]: is because Turkey does have problematic relationships in other theatres, which potentially in our estimation really do significant damage to the collective security interests of the transatlantic alliance.
• 15:12
  [SPEAKER_01]: Sure, it's spending this money.
• 15:13
  [SPEAKER_01]: It has all these capabilities, but the question essentially is, to what extent is Turkey interested in
• 15:23
  [SPEAKER_01]: deploying these capabilities towards NATO's collective defense.
• 15:26
  [SPEAKER_01]: In my estimation and some of the research that we've done, I would say it's not.
• 15:30
  [SPEAKER_01]: Turkey's actual pursuit is strategic autonomy to acquire enough capabilities and defense capabilities in terms of technological transfer from the United States primarily, but also perhaps additionally from the European Union, so that it can become completely independent of Western sources to continue building its defense capabilities.
• 15:53
  [SPEAKER_01]: Turkey, as we know, is in line to develop its own fifth generation fighter aircraft, the Khan.
• 16:00
  [SPEAKER_01]: It is
• 16:01
  [SPEAKER_01]: It has several prototypes in operation.
• 16:03
  [SPEAKER_01]: It has made some test flights.
• 16:04
  [SPEAKER_01]: We don't quite know the capabilities of this craft where they can be called stealth, but what we do know is that it's desperately in need of engines for these planes.
• 16:13
  [SPEAKER_01]: It's trying to produce its own domestic engines for them, but until they can affect that technology, they're going after and wanting to purchase US engines, the general electric F-110 engines.
• 16:23
  [SPEAKER_01]: And the Trump administration recently signaled last week that it was willing to make $700 million
• 16:31
  [SPEAKER_01]: against existing objections and legislation in Congress which prevents the transfer of these engines to Turkey.
• 16:39
  [SPEAKER_01]: That's one.
• 16:40
  [SPEAKER_01]: Turkey also would like to purchase the F-35 or be brought back into the F-35 program from which it was removed back in 2019 specifically because it acquired and still maintains
• 16:51
  [SPEAKER_01]: Russian defensive equipment in the form of S400 missile defense system, which saw the first Trump administration kicking Turkey out of NATO and out of NATO out of out of the F-35 program and imposing sanctions on Turkey's defense industries from being able to procure this.
• 17:09
  [SPEAKER_01]: Um, so in stark contrast to its message is, um, of like, we're a model defense, uh, partner and ally of NATO, uh, so you should bring this back into the F-35, cellar engines so we can provide more capable equipment to NATO countries.
• 17:25
  [SPEAKER_01]: I think there are several compelling arguments that we are trying to make.
• 17:28
  [SPEAKER_01]: And in a recent piece that Brad, I can put together and just publish and breaking defense.
• 17:33
  [SPEAKER_01]: I believe yesterday, but also we've had previous pieces on this before.
• 17:38
  [SPEAKER_01]: there are problematic relationships there.
• 17:41
  [SPEAKER_01]: First of all, Turkey is the only member in NATO country that openly supports provides material support for and champions a terrorist entity in the form of Hamas inside of NATO.
• 17:52
  [SPEAKER_01]: We know many countries inside of NATO don't get on well with
• 17:57
  [SPEAKER_01]: Israel, our US ally, different countries have different approaches and different problems that they underline, but no country inside of NATO explicitly provides open support for Hamas as an entity in champions them as a resistance movement or what I don't want sometimes calls as a liberation movement.
• 18:13
  [SPEAKER_01]: Turkey is the only country inside of NATO that is applied for membership of entities such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS.
• 18:22
  [SPEAKER_01]: Turkey is the only member country inside of NATO, which openly threatens other NATO members, specifically Greece, in contested spaces in the eastern Mediterranean and
• 18:34
  [SPEAKER_01]: We had just seen legislation tabled in a Turkish parliament that suggests that Turkey is interested in potentially claiming as many as 152 islands and islands which would then give the Turkish military a pretext to military advance on these islands and try to uphold sovereign claims which don't actually exist.
• 18:54
  [SPEAKER_01]: But Turkey's escalatory and military belligerent towards Israel is also being documented, not since just October 7 or the Iran War, but Erdogan's relationship to breaking, or taking a very negative disposition towards Israel goes back all the way that I've traced at least as early as 2008.
• 19:12
  [SPEAKER_01]: And in addition to that, if you do pick up our piece in breaking
• 19:20
  [SPEAKER_01]: You will see that there's additional cause that we should highlight and we sort of put forth US lawmakers and the administration that, in addition to all of those sort of threatening behaviors, there is also a concern that Turkey's telecommunications infrastructure, particularly in the 5G space,
• 19:38
  [SPEAKER_01]: It may start to become too compromised by Chinese partnerships, Chinese ownership and Chinese penetration, with companies such as Huawei, but just not limited to that, having a significant stake, which presents a risk to the F-35 stealth capabilities being tracked and compromised.
• 19:55
  [SPEAKER_01]: So, in any case.
• 19:58
  [SPEAKER_01]: what we will see at the summit and what the total try to do is use this opportunity as of the summit to really exact the F-35s and the F-110s out of the administration and the only thing that really stands in the way of against add-on wishes is essentially the United States Congress.
• 20:16
  [SPEAKER_01]: I gave a testimony yesterday before the Tom Lanzo's commission in the House of Representatives.
• 20:24
  [SPEAKER_01]: existing cats' sanctions should prevent Turkey by law acquiring will be in brought back into the F-35 program as well as provisioned 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act which prevents Turkey being able to acquire sensitive U.S. defense articles as long as they continue to maintain the Russian missile as 400 system on their soil.
• 20:43
  [SPEAKER_01]: They've made no commitment to remove that in any shape or form so be watching for that.
• 20:47
  [SPEAKER_01]: Anyway, Brad, if there are anything that you would like to add to my
• 20:54
  [SPEAKER_03]: No, it was great synonym.
• 20:55
  [SPEAKER_03]: I think mine was longer.
• 20:57
  [SPEAKER_03]: So I could host to you.
• 20:58
  [SPEAKER_03]: And I think you covered it quite well.
• 21:00
  [SPEAKER_03]: I would just, you know, my bottom line summary would be the F 35 is America is arguably most advanced fighter jet.
• 21:07
  [SPEAKER_03]: We and our key allies and partners, including in Europe are going to be flying it for decades to come their sensitive technologies associated with the F 35.
• 21:16
  [SPEAKER_03]: If any one of our Axis aggressors' adversaries get their hands on that, we can expect them in light of the research we've done in the last two years to share it with the other three, thereby in dayduring American security, American pilots, and the pilots of our allies and partners.
• 21:29
  [SPEAKER_03]: Anyone who knows anything about the co-location and regular operation of S-400s and X-RNF-35 understands that is not a fanciful concern.
• 21:38
  [SPEAKER_03]: And just take a moment and pause and consider what Sennon said, do we want a leader or to one who prays to most after the worst single day slaughter of juice since the Holocaust thinks that's just fine and praises the most to have America's best fighter jet.
• 21:54
  [SPEAKER_03]: Is it too much to ask to not acquire an air defense system from the leading threat to the NATO alliance?
• 22:00
  [SPEAKER_03]: and not be led by a leader who thinks Hamas is just wonderful and who's not in a bear hug with China on bringing more of the better 5G systems, which have repeatedly been a tool for espionage and cyber concerns.
• 22:13
  [SPEAKER_03]: So that would be my summary of the great points you make unless you have anything else
• 22:20
  [SPEAKER_05]: Thanks Brad, good to be with you and C9 and Joe as well.
• 22:23
  [SPEAKER_05]: So I'll try to hit three points as briefly as I can.
• 22:27
  [SPEAKER_05]: Starting with US force posture cuts that have happened in the months preceding the summit, kind of what I think's driving those and why I think they're a mistake and then finally an update on Ukraine.
• 22:38
  [SPEAKER_05]: So start with the force posture cuts, excuse me, the bottom line is basically the Trump administration as a road in American combat power in Europe in the preceding months through a series.
• 22:49
  [SPEAKER_05]: of steps and I fear that it could get worse with Secretary Heggsess announcement about and further review of US military posture on the continent and how this relates to the summit directly, I think that it will probably give the president actually less leverage as he hits into the summit with the basic principle that the less skin you have in the game, the less people are going to listen to you.
• 23:13
  [SPEAKER_05]: Right, so looking at where we are kind of militarily, I think it might be helpful to kind of define terms, so the U.S. Army is these things called brigade combat teams, which I'm sure many of you are familiar with BCTs, and they're basically the primary combined arms formation with which the U.S. Army fights large scale ground combat operations.
• 23:34
  [SPEAKER_05]: So the U.S. has generally maintained at least four in Europe since the 2022 invasion.
• 23:41
  [SPEAKER_05]: We have Second Cavalry Regiment, which is a striker brigade combat team, SBCT.
• 23:46
  [SPEAKER_05]: We have an armor brigade combat team, rotational deployment.
• 23:50
  [SPEAKER_05]: Through Poland, we had an infantry brigade combat team, IBCT, rotational deployment through Romania.
• 23:58
  [SPEAKER_05]: And then we had the 173rd airborne brigade,
• 24:03
  [SPEAKER_05]: So we had started with four.
• 24:05
  [SPEAKER_05]: The Trump administration ended the Romania Brigade deployment last fall.
• 24:11
  [SPEAKER_05]: So we came down to three.
• 24:12
  [SPEAKER_05]: And then last month, as I'm sure many of you saw, there was a flurry of reporting about potential cuts to either second calf,
• 24:20
  [SPEAKER_05]: in Germany or the rotational brigade in Poland and we actually saw the Pentagon halted the deployment of what was basically the replacement book brigade the next up in that armor brigade rotation in Poland and it appears that that's not fully resolved in serious concerns for me and I know some of my colleagues as well about gaps in that armor brigade combat team in Poland currently in a pretty uncertain path forward.
• 24:48
  [SPEAKER_05]: Fire defense reporter, that's probably what I'd be asking the Pentagon about.
• 24:52
  [SPEAKER_05]: You guys made an announcement after these flurry of reports.
• 24:54
  [SPEAKER_05]: You guys being the administration, the Pentagon, saying that we have decided to go down from four to three brigade combat teams in Europe.
• 25:02
  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, we already did that last fall.
• 25:05
  [SPEAKER_05]: So what is it with this flurry of reports?
• 25:08
  [SPEAKER_05]: And what is the status of the Polyn Darwin Brigade combat team?
• 25:12
  [SPEAKER_05]: And I know Congress is also trying to get answers to those questions as well.
• 25:16
  [SPEAKER_05]: The next big cut that we saw came outside of these BCTs and something called the Long Range Fires Battalion, or an LRFB.
• 25:25
  [SPEAKER_05]: That was attached to the second multi-domain task force NDTF, which is basically these multi-domain units that the army has stood up in different theaters in the second MDTF as for Europe.
• 25:36
  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, this long range fires battalion has long been planned to be deployed to join the rest of the second MDTF in Germany.
• 25:44
  [SPEAKER_05]: and it provides really essential long-range strike capabilities that frankly the NATO alliance is overwhelmingly dependent on the United States for.
• 25:55
  [SPEAKER_05]: So the administration also canceled that deployment.
• 25:58
  [SPEAKER_05]: Amid the feud between the president and other heads of states in Europe over Iran.
• 26:03
  [SPEAKER_05]: So the bottom line there is a significant reduction mostly pointed at U.S. Army.
• 26:08
  [SPEAKER_05]: Europe, but there's been reporting in the past weeks, I believe, from New York Times, about potential air and naval cuts as well.
• 26:14
  [SPEAKER_05]: And what I think driving these cuts is to be frank, I don't think they're surprising if you read the administration's National Defense Strategy.
• 26:21
  [SPEAKER_05]: And the key line for me is that they said, or they're kind of consistent message, is that Europe needs to take primary responsibility for conventional defense in Europe with
• 26:38
  [SPEAKER_05]: And I see kind of two issues with that logic with some of these cuts.
• 26:43
  [SPEAKER_05]: So the first being, if we asked why, Brad touched on that really well.
• 26:47
  [SPEAKER_05]: Why is a stark strategic reality if we can, we have to re focus more resources to the Pacific?
• 26:55
  [SPEAKER_05]: That's obvious.
• 26:55
  [SPEAKER_05]: That's a kind of general consensus, frankly, among that many policymakers and a bipartisan consensus.
• 27:03
  [SPEAKER_05]: But those critical elements, while some of these cuts impact those critical elements, the long-range fires battalion is one, if that New York Times reporting turns out to be true that things like air refueling takers will be pulled out of Europe.
• 27:17
  [SPEAKER_05]: That's a really big critical requirement.
• 27:19
  [SPEAKER_05]: These are capabilities or enablers that the European's really depend on the United States for.
• 27:23
  [SPEAKER_05]: I don't have difficulty replicating in the near-to-medium term.
• 27:28
  [SPEAKER_05]: And the second side of this is like Brad said, we got to put more stuff to the Pacific.
• 27:33
  [SPEAKER_05]: But if we look at some of these Army units specifically,
• 27:36
  [SPEAKER_05]: They have very outside of Korea, which I doubt they're going there.
• 27:40
  [SPEAKER_05]: They have very limited value in Pacific scenarios involving China.
• 27:45
  [SPEAKER_05]: I mean, if you think of an armored brigade combat team, this is a combat formation that is literally designed, basically, to fight the Russian army in Europe.
• 27:54
  [SPEAKER_05]: And to deter the Russians from making the move on the Baltics or Poland or making a move towards Kalininggrad.
• 28:01
  [SPEAKER_05]: So unless we plan on having a bunch of Abrams tanks swim to Taiwan in a Taiwan contingency, it has much more value in Europe.
• 28:11
  [SPEAKER_05]: And so we kind of hit the critical in the Pacific and why I think there's some flaws in that logic to touch on Ukraine briefly.
• 28:18
  [SPEAKER_05]: I think the bottom line is I share the bottom line analysis of many my colleges that Ukraine's not losing.
• 28:24
  [SPEAKER_05]: And I expect that to change anytime soon.
• 28:26
  [SPEAKER_05]: In fact, I think they've regained the initiative in some areas, especially with their long range strike campaign against Russian energy, which will continue I expect to do damage to Russia's warmaking abilities and the ability to sustain its economy.
• 28:39
  [SPEAKER_05]: But also their mid-range strike campaign against Russian logistics networks, not just things like ammo dumps, or supply depos, but really important ground lines of communication, things like rail bridges,
• 28:52
  [SPEAKER_05]: and increasingly, command and control in drone command and control specifically.
• 28:57
  [SPEAKER_05]: Meanwhile, we see from Putin and the Kremlin what I think we've basically been seeing for years now, which is Putin remains committed to his maximalist demands.
• 29:07
  [SPEAKER_05]: And, frankly, in terms of what can we expect out of the administration at the NATO summit, I do not believe that we can expect much until there is a fundamental shift in how the administration views the war in Ukraine.
• 29:24
  [SPEAKER_05]: If the administration believes
• 29:27
  [SPEAKER_05]: falsely that Putin is interested in peace, we're going nowhere, and I think we'll continue to go nowhere, because he is not interested in peace, he is interested in war, and so far we have had fruitless negotiation, after fruitless negotiation, applying pressure on Kiev, and not applying pressure on the Kremlin.
• 29:45
  [SPEAKER_05]: So in my opinion, Putin understands American steel in the hands of Ukrainian fighters, and if the administration can finally accept that fundamental reality,
• 29:57
  [SPEAKER_05]: My hope would be that they would resume resume direct military aid at the very least increase pearl orders, work with European ally to increase pearl orders to get Ukraine the weapon that needs.
• 30:08
  [SPEAKER_05]: And basically say to the Kremlin, hey, if you guys want to talk, we're here, but we're done playing this game.
• 30:14
  [SPEAKER_05]: So, I think the administration is going to enter the NATO summit with a lot of demands out of the Europeans.
• 30:20
  [SPEAKER_05]: I don't think that's new from the president, but I think a lot of their reductions, both in support for Ukraine and US military force posture on the continent really kind of probably counterlogically to the administration actually weakened their leverage and what they can expect to get out of the Europeans and their goals for the summit.
• 30:40
  [SPEAKER_05]: And that's it for me.
• 30:44
  [SPEAKER_04]: Dan Sinan and Brad, thank you for the excellent analysis.
• 30:48
  [SPEAKER_04]: We're going to open it up to a Q&A now.
• 30:50
  [SPEAKER_04]: We've got Missy already in the queue.
• 30:53
  [SPEAKER_04]: Missy Ryan at the Atlantic.
• 30:54
  [SPEAKER_04]: We're going to get to you in a moment.
• 30:55
  [SPEAKER_04]: To ask your question, you can use the chat feature, or you can use the Q&A feature, and we will call on you to ask your question, or you can type it in, and I will ask it for you.
• 31:07
  [SPEAKER_04]: Missy Ryan, over to you.
• 31:08
  [SPEAKER_04]: Thanks for joining us today.
• 31:10
  [SPEAKER_02]: Hi, thank you guys, so I just wanted to follow up on, um, I think what Cam was talking about it.
• 31:16
  [SPEAKER_02]: I think
• 31:17
  [SPEAKER_02]: Maybe you too, Brad, but what do you guys know about the NATO 3.0 review or the it seems like there's several components that's like a force posture review but also review of allies.
• 31:32
  [SPEAKER_02]: What do you guys hear is the is the process and where that is where that stance and then related what are you hearing from allies about that like how nervous are they what are they trying to do to deal that.
• 31:46
  [SPEAKER_03]: I can start and then Cam, you can fill in whatever you want.
• 31:49
  [SPEAKER_03]: I don't miss yet, like you, I'm looking for details.
• 31:53
  [SPEAKER_03]: I was talking with that, I was at the embassy of a key European LA yesterday, and you may have seen that the Secretary General talked about this 3.0 at length and his Atlanta Council interview a little bit.
• 32:08
  [SPEAKER_03]: But it was all a little bit vague, right?
• 32:09
  [SPEAKER_03]: It's about Europe stepping up.
• 32:11
  [SPEAKER_03]: It's about America, burden shifting, but retaining as Camus saying consistent with the National Defense Strategy key capabilities there that are particularly hard for the Europeans to replace in the short-term.
• 32:23
  [SPEAKER_03]: It's interesting that evidently it kind of started with
• 32:27
  [SPEAKER_03]: Bridge Colby's formulation and then was picked up by NATO and kind of echoed and this is all kind of happening in the context of this six-month review, this posture review that Cam touched on and that we touch on on a forthcoming piece where it does seem like some of the decisions are already baked in and already made and they're just going through the process to kind of give it an air of credibility to it.
• 32:49
  [SPEAKER_03]: So
• 32:50
  [SPEAKER_03]: I think the main concern, and I'm not the first to say this, is that any additional U.S. military posture reductions will go faster than the ability of the Europeans to step up and carry that burden themselves because as we know, as we know, it takes a long time to go from increased
• 33:17
  [SPEAKER_03]: flip a switch and while we've seen these 20% increases in European defense spending very impressive.
• 33:22
  [SPEAKER_03]: We see large economies like Germany stepping out.
• 33:25
  [SPEAKER_03]: We see the British trying to do better.
• 33:27
  [SPEAKER_03]: Although some of their immediate year numbers are a little bit disappointing.
• 33:30
  [SPEAKER_03]: But it's going to take time and the rebuttal of that from the bridge Colby camp is well time is what we don't have in the Pacific potentially.
• 33:38
  [SPEAKER_03]: And so this is where we have to be serious and we have to understand that the essence of
• 33:45
  [SPEAKER_03]: And you really have to scrutinize anyone who would say you need to pull an armored brigade combat team out of Europe and send it to the Pacific.
• 33:52
  [SPEAKER_03]: He says campsite just doesn't make sense.
• 33:54
  [SPEAKER_03]: So in short, it's about European stepping up holding them accountable to carrying more of the burden with increased defense spending, but that will take time.
• 34:03
  [SPEAKER_03]: But it really is, you know, if you see the Secretary General's formulation he talked one point now, that's kind of the early years of NATO, 2.0 was really him saying the Europeans weren't carrying by and large their fair share, even though we did have Afghanistan there, and as I made a pitch, they did carry a lot of the burden there, and really this new paradigm where
• 34:21
  [SPEAKER_03]: Primarily because of Vladimir Putin's invasion of Crimea in 2014, and then the massive naked aggression reinvasion in 2022, we see the massive increase in defense spending, and also let's be honest, President Trump has scared the heck out of our European allies, and that's probably had some role in increased defense spending.
• 34:38
  [SPEAKER_03]: Nonetheless, we're in a better place now.
• 34:40
  [SPEAKER_03]: But we need to make sure the checks not in the mail in terms of future defense spending and we're seeing really intense guns versus butter domestic debates among a lot of our political allies that are really, really quite tough, including in Britain and elsewhere.
• 34:54
  [SPEAKER_03]: And we're seeing some that here at home, right?
• 34:56
  [SPEAKER_03]: You know, we saw the defense budget quest of 1.5 trillion.
• 35:00
  [SPEAKER_03]: It's unclear on the reconciliation, right?
• 35:02
  [SPEAKER_03]: So, you know, I'm going to say if we're going to preach and brow beat people about meeting 3.5% of GDP spending, then maybe we should do that ourselves.
• 35:10
  [SPEAKER_03]: Kind of, you know, walk your talk and by the way, we need to.
• 35:12
  [SPEAKER_03]: So I'll take a breath there, Cam, what do you want to add to that?
• 35:15
  [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, I just say I agree with Brad and probably a lot of your colleagues Missy of trying to kind of figure out the specifics of it.
• 35:25
  [SPEAKER_05]: I think it is intentionally vague.
• 35:27
  [SPEAKER_05]: That's my opinion and I think elements of it are baked in.
• 35:30
  [SPEAKER_05]: I do think they will be looking at how individual and the donations are doing basically with defense spending or field and combat capabilities of forward stationed units.
• 35:41
  [SPEAKER_05]: Like if you take Germany for example, they've got forward station units now in the Baltics.
• 35:45
  [SPEAKER_05]: I should say rotational.
• 35:48
  [SPEAKER_05]: And I think that they will likely be matched with any force posture decisions, which is counterintuitive, right?
• 35:58
  [SPEAKER_05]: I mean, like what should dictate our force posture positions are a military realities and b the American interests.
• 36:05
  [SPEAKER_05]: So Poland, which rightly gets pointed to, is a very positive example of stepping up on defense.
• 36:12
  [SPEAKER_05]: That armor brigade combat team there is really valuable and really important.
• 36:17
  [SPEAKER_05]: But I mean, Estonia, Lafayette, the Baltics, right?
• 36:20
  [SPEAKER_05]: There's been a lot per GDP.
• 36:21
  [SPEAKER_05]: But throughout is a really small country.
• 36:23
  [SPEAKER_05]: So they need help, right?
• 36:24
  [SPEAKER_05]: And if they were not meeting, which they completely are, those targets, for example, if you put Spain where Lafayette is, I'm not going to say, don't put troops there because we're upset with their domestic political decisions.
• 36:38
  [SPEAKER_05]: And then the only thing that I'd say on wherever this thing falls out is,
• 36:43
  [SPEAKER_05]: I don't know where it will, but I know the one thing that I don't want to come out of it and it's that armor brigade combat team at Poland to come out of there.
• 36:50
  [SPEAKER_05]: And these are not, these are really important for all the strategic reasons that Brad said of signals to the Kremlin in just deterrence, but there is also just cold, hard, military reality on the continent, right?
• 37:02
  [SPEAKER_05]: We've seen the kind of troop numbers are usually things there in the headline
• 37:12
  [SPEAKER_05]: But to be honest, I mean numbers of troops.
• 37:16
  [SPEAKER_05]: is important, but what's really important is combat capabilities.
• 37:19
  [SPEAKER_05]: And if you look at that BCT imponents specifically, and we think about most dangerous courses of action in the Baltics or ones that Kalining grab, that is the American combat power, because the Polish army is gonna be pretty busy in that scenario.
• 37:34
  [SPEAKER_05]: That would bust up into the Baltics and reopen ground lines of communication.
• 37:39
  [SPEAKER_05]: So why is that important?
• 37:40
  [SPEAKER_05]: Because then the Russians don't do it.
• 37:42
  [SPEAKER_05]: Because then they say, if I make a shot and I take the big gamble and I go for cleaning grad and I see if I can break up NATO or if I go into the Baltics, they know they're going to meet American Abrams in Bradley's and it's going to be a bad day and that at the end of the day, they're not going to be able to do it.
• 37:59
  [SPEAKER_05]: So that to me is really important in what comes out of this cannot be those key capabilities, like the enablers and stuff that Brad was talking about the Europeans with a difficulty replicating, but it also cannot be things that, yes, our larger combat formations, but our relatively modest, when you look at American true presences,
• 38:19
  [SPEAKER_05]: in history in Europe when we used to have like whole divisions and course I mean three BCTs is honestly not that much and even if you compare it to the Korean Peninsula we've got two BCTs there and that's a single peninsula right so it's a lot of ground to cover um so all that to say is that I am frankly worried of what's gonna come out of it and I hope that the Poland BCT specifically is protective.
• 38:42
  [SPEAKER_03]: Joe 30 seconds just if I may very quickly, if you look at the NDA legislation, it's focused on numbers of troops in Europe.
• 38:50
  [SPEAKER_03]: I think the camps had all that beautifully.
• 38:51
  [SPEAKER_03]: It's focused on not going below a specific number.
• 38:54
  [SPEAKER_03]: What is a camp?
• 38:54
  [SPEAKER_03]: I think 76,000 or so roughly.
• 38:56
  [SPEAKER_03]: But that's not the main point.
• 38:58
  [SPEAKER_03]: You could say, well, it's 72,000, really going to be so dangerous.
• 39:01
  [SPEAKER_03]: The point that Caminar trying to emphasize, it's what kind of troops they are and what kind of units they are matters.
• 39:08
  [SPEAKER_03]: And what we see the administration reducing is the combat power, and that's what matters most to deterrence.
• 39:14
  [SPEAKER_03]: And I would take Cam's point agree with it and build on it.
• 39:17
  [SPEAKER_03]: It's not just about cold steel and hard power that hard power is also a symbol of political commitment.
• 39:24
  [SPEAKER_03]: And unfortunately, unfortunately, some of the comments emanating from the White House that of Cushions didn't spend extra wine to fence we were working on our Article 5 was really unfortunate misguided because it cast doubt on the American political commitment and the only thing more important than the amount of
• 39:42
  [SPEAKER_03]: deterrent steel in eastern Europe is the perception of Vladimir Putin, of the one that national security wives of adviser walks into the Ovalas and Mr. President.
• 39:51
  [SPEAKER_03]: We got a Crimea style invasion of the Baltics.
• 39:54
  [SPEAKER_03]: What do we do?
• 39:54
  [SPEAKER_03]: If Vladimir Putin says that the president at the at the desk says it's not our fight, then we're more likely to see it.
• 40:02
  [SPEAKER_03]: So that's why every statement from the President's mouth and these hard-parallel tangible things are so important because it
• 40:09
  [SPEAKER_03]: It sends perceptions related to political commitment, which is at least half of deterrence.
• 40:15
  [SPEAKER_03]: Thanks, Baxter Joe.
• 40:17
  [SPEAKER_04]: Thanks, Brad.
• 40:18
  [SPEAKER_04]: Thanks, Cam.
• 40:19
  [SPEAKER_04]: Missy, great question.
• 40:20
  [SPEAKER_04]: And Brad, your comments there kind of make for a nice transition into George Condon's question, George, National Journal.
• 40:27
  [SPEAKER_04]: Summits this question.
• 40:28
  [SPEAKER_04]: Given the president's angry remarks about allied response on Iran and statements that we don't need or benefit from the alliance.
• 40:47
  [SPEAKER_03]: I'll try to be succinct.
• 40:49
  [SPEAKER_03]: I think we have this weird paradox where on some level European defense spending and growing combat capability is as good as we've seen it in a long time and yet the attention within the Alliance is also elevated and
• 41:08
  [SPEAKER_03]: I don't take any joy and say this is a patriotic American, but a major reason for that is some of the the rhetoric emanating from the White House and things like with which Greenland, what was associated with Greenland, which was a completely self-inflicted wound and unforced error.
• 41:23
  [SPEAKER_03]: So Europe is going to defend itself as best they can no matter what.
• 41:31
  [SPEAKER_03]: But that is not a tangential to the American interest.
• 41:34
  [SPEAKER_03]: Students of Hissier will remember we had two World War start in 30 years and sooner or later despite efforts to stay out of those wars we were pulled in and more than 500,000 Americans paid the ultimate price in those wars.
• 41:46
  [SPEAKER_03]: So, is it easier to have, you know, a few tens of thousands of troops in Europe and to support our European allies to prevent the war or to deal with the war that we could have prevented?
• 41:57
  [SPEAKER_03]: I think that's an easy question to answer.
• 41:59
  [SPEAKER_03]: So, yes, there's tension.
• 42:02
  [SPEAKER_03]: We had real problems of the Orban being squishy on Moscow.
• 42:04
  [SPEAKER_03]: We have real problematic statements emanating out of the leadership of Spain.
• 42:09
  [SPEAKER_03]: I can give you an hour on all the issues with Erdogan.
• 42:12
  [SPEAKER_03]: So, this is not me saying
• 42:14
  [SPEAKER_03]: But NATO is a grand strategic asset and treasure for the United States.
• 42:19
  [SPEAKER_03]: We're near powerful, and we need friends and our NATO allies are among our best friends.
• 42:27
  [SPEAKER_04]: Thanks, Brad.
• 42:28
  [SPEAKER_04]: Georgia is a great question there.
• 42:30
  [SPEAKER_04]: Let's transition quickly over to back to Turkey.
• 42:34
  [SPEAKER_04]: Sonan, you just testified again on Turkey and in particular on its human rights.
• 42:39
  [SPEAKER_04]: You've got some concerns there.
• 42:41
  [SPEAKER_04]: Can you flush out a little bit more
• 42:46
  [SPEAKER_01]: Sure.
• 42:47
  [SPEAKER_01]: I could possibly give it from the angle of some of the members who attended that in machine hearing.
• 42:53
  [SPEAKER_01]: Specifically, we had Congresswoman Dina Titus from Nevada.
• 42:58
  [SPEAKER_01]: I'll ask a couple of interesting questions and just a piggyback from on what Brad just outlined.
• 43:06
  [SPEAKER_01]: Put aside what I think is a misperception of NATO, you know, suggesting that it's a less than useful alliance, you know what's a really problematic ally, I would say with friends like with with allies like this, who need enemies, I mean, you know, you have you have a country such as Turkey.
• 43:25
  [SPEAKER_01]: not just rhetorically, but physically threatening NATO allies in European partners.
• 43:33
  [SPEAKER_01]: Turkey just positioned F-16 fighter jets, or generation fighters, not even fifth gen that it has acquired yet, but fourth generation fighters, onto Cyprus, the occupied part of North Cyprus, which Turkey's occupied since 1974.
• 43:48
  [SPEAKER_01]: And this is in direct violation of end user agreements pertaining to U.S. military articles under ITAR restrictions.
• 43:55
  [SPEAKER_01]: As in, there are certain obligations that come with operating U.S. platforms once a country acquires them through foreign military sales.
• 44:03
  [SPEAKER_01]: And you're not supposed to do certain things with them.
• 44:04
  [SPEAKER_01]: Now putting them to contest a territory like an occupied part of Cyprus, that should have immediately triggered a congressional oversight or
• 44:13
  [SPEAKER_01]: or at least some sort of concern being voiced from the administration saying, why is Turkey putting its fighter jets into direct contested space, which could result in arms conflict breaking out between Cyprus and Turkey, if not Greece and other European powers?
• 44:27
  [SPEAKER_01]: And there's been no sort of questioning whatsoever.
• 44:30
  [SPEAKER_01]: And Dina Titus's question to me was basically very simple and she asked,
• 44:36
  [SPEAKER_01]: is the administration ever going to sort of question or come to terms with all the litany of concerning behaviors this native ally presents rather than try to whitewash them to which my answer was I hope so and then when she asks you know this is freely available on YouTube you're welcome to watch it so quite a short exchange I have with her to your questions
• 44:59
  [SPEAKER_01]: Um, you know, which has why, why does Trump not essentially, you know, holtocardocount as opposed to just trying to keep platitudes on him.
• 45:08
  [SPEAKER_01]: My answer is quite simple.
• 45:09
  [SPEAKER_01]: A, um, well, not a, I just think that the president is not hearing.
• 45:15
  [SPEAKER_01]: Um, all the advice that he should be hearing from his, members of his administration in national secular roles that really sort of position Turkey in a very problematic, uh, uh, uh, a white for them.
• 45:28
  [SPEAKER_01]: And the other potential outside of Cyprus is concerning the air naval buildup and escalatory naval buildup by the Turks inside of the island chains of the Cymeteranian and EGNCs where there are significant deposits of natural gas.
• 45:43
  [SPEAKER_01]: as well as potentially oil, and unless this is essentially brought to, you know, to essentially a negotiated settlement in terms of who's maritime rights, who's exclusive economic zones belong to whom, although that appears that that is actually settled under existing international law Turkey contested, but it contested
• 46:06
  [SPEAKER_01]: And there is essentially no adults in the room, I would argue, that essentially stand up the turkey's increasingly belligerent behavior, and the more platitudes the administration keeps upon people like Erdogan, the higher the likelihood of conflict, I'm fearful of breaking their seeing breakout in these Mediterranean, but that concern also carries forward for me in the case of Israel versus Turkey.
• 46:30
  [SPEAKER_01]: in the Middle East, and again, there has been not much by words of rhetoric or by constraining behavior to whole-circuit or count over it's increasing in negative predisposition towards Israel.
• 46:41
  [SPEAKER_03]: Hey, Joe, a 30 second addendum, you know, I sent on those more in his pinky than I do my entire body about Turkey and Erdogan, but just building on something that we wrote together in our op-ed.
• 46:52
  [SPEAKER_03]: You know, it's clear that Erdogan has spent a lot of time and effort into building a personal relationship with President Trump, right?
• 47:01
  [SPEAKER_03]: Erdogan, and that's clearly paying off.
• 47:05
  [SPEAKER_03]: And if you look at the press conferences, we highlight in our piece a week ago today.
• 47:10
  [SPEAKER_03]: Trump called Erdogan a respected man a respected leader, you know, I mean, I'm sorry, but that's not exactly I think the assessment as we wrote in the piece that I think most Americans would use for someone as fully embraced Hamas, a designated foreign terrorist organization.
• 47:25
  [SPEAKER_03]: If you if you think October 7th is just fine and you brace murderous Hamas,
• 47:31
  [SPEAKER_03]: That's not the activity of a respectable gentleman.
• 47:34
  [SPEAKER_03]: And so I think, unfortunately, a lot of leaders have decided if I can just flatter President Trump, then I can get policies that I want.
• 47:42
  [SPEAKER_03]: And but I would say what matters is not the personal relationship between leaders, although that's important.
• 47:48
  [SPEAKER_03]: What matters is Kim said earlier, or what are the interests of the United States?
• 47:52
  [SPEAKER_03]: I would apply that to force posture in Europe.
• 47:55
  [SPEAKER_03]: I'd apply that to the decision to give F, the F 35 to Turkey.
• 47:59
  [SPEAKER_03]: It's not how chummy are they or how much do I like this person.
• 48:03
  [SPEAKER_03]: It's what is in the American interest and if you bring a sober, objective, non-partisan lens of these issues, some of these are not that complicated, so back to you, Joe.
• 48:16
  [SPEAKER_04]: Tom Bowman at NPR asks, given what's President Trump and Secretary Hexeth have said about NATO, do you think it's up to Congress now to put more specific language in about what types of U.S. troops must remain in Europe?
• 48:33
  [SPEAKER_03]: Yes, absolutely, great, great to hear from my names, like Tom, it absolutely.
• 48:38
  [SPEAKER_03]: So like if you look at the, what is it?
• 48:40
  [SPEAKER_03]: Test section 1245 of the fiscal year 2020, National Defense Author's Innovation Act as we link to in our piece that I think is in the chat.
• 48:49
  [SPEAKER_03]: You'll see there that it's focused on end strength numbers of troops as we all know that's important But as Cam and I have argued more important is what type of units and what type of troops and what and we know What Europe most needs and we know what brings us the greatest deterrent value and unfortunately That's the very kind of units that this administration is withdrawing
• 49:12
  [SPEAKER_03]: And so I would be fully supportive.
• 49:14
  [SPEAKER_03]: I would recommend Congress amend that and focus not just on having a floor for end strength, but having as much of a restriction as constitutionally allowable for withdrawal of these key BCTs that Cam laid out so beautifully.
• 49:28
  [SPEAKER_03]: Back to you, Jim.
• 49:33
  [SPEAKER_04]: By the way, if you have a follow up questions and you'd like to talk with any of our experts directly feel free to reach me a press at fd.com and I will be or dot org and I will be happy to schedule that that interview.
• 49:48
  [SPEAKER_04]: It does remind me, Brad, when you were just talking about that, that you and Admiral Montgomery back before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, you warned that the invasion was going to be happening and you also made strong suggestions on how the U.S. can support Ukraine.
• 50:06
  [SPEAKER_04]: What more can the U.S. and the West to support Ukraine against Russia's unprovoked attack?
• 50:13
  [SPEAKER_03]: Thanks, Joe, for the question.
• 50:15
  [SPEAKER_03]: Admiral Montgomery is a national treasure, generally, and particularly on Ukraine issues.
• 50:20
  [SPEAKER_03]: And it's been an honor to write with him a lot through the years on this topic.
• 50:24
  [SPEAKER_03]: I just would remind everyone that the Biden administration committed more than about $66 billion in security assistance to Ukraine.
• 50:33
  [SPEAKER_03]: That sounds like a lot of money, but that's less than 3% of what we spent on, depending on over the same time period.
• 50:39
  [SPEAKER_03]: So the question for us back then was, you know, is helping Ukraine to continue to exist, degrading the second leading conventional threat we confront in Russia and sending a positive deterrent message to Beijing worth 3% of what we send on the Pentagon.
• 50:56
  [SPEAKER_03]: You can tell I think the answer is yes, unfortunately that was not persuasive to the Trump administration and they cut off the vast majority of our Ukraine security initiative assistance initiative funding.
• 51:06
  [SPEAKER_03]: I think that was a mistake.
• 51:08
  [SPEAKER_03]: I, but yes, the European should be paying for most of that.
• 51:10
  [SPEAKER_03]: They are paying for most of that.
• 51:12
  [SPEAKER_03]: But this is not charity and we, the outcome matters to us.
• 51:15
  [SPEAKER_03]: So we should be helping with our massive economy.
• 51:18
  [SPEAKER_03]: One, two, we need to be ramping up production capacity and collaboration with their European partners.
• 51:24
  [SPEAKER_03]: Uh, first for what we need, but also for what you crane needs.
• 51:28
  [SPEAKER_03]: Three, we should be helping Ukraine ramp up their own production capacity.
• 51:32
  [SPEAKER_03]: You know that Ukraine is developed a very impressive production capability.
• 51:35
  [SPEAKER_03]: Even as they're undergoing the worst invasion of Europe since World War II, pretty darn impressive.
• 51:40
  [SPEAKER_03]: And then lastly, both for their benefit and ours, I recommend in our forthcoming book acts of aggressors that we establish a frontiers of freedom for them, where we have Ukraine.
• 51:50
  [SPEAKER_03]: Israel, Taiwan, South Korea, NATO, and Americans at a table, and we're learning every possible thing we can from Ukraine and Israel.
• 51:59
  [SPEAKER_03]: Oops, yeah, I'm saying that America has things to learn from Ukrainian and Israel.
• 52:03
  [SPEAKER_03]: It requires a little humility, a little truth telling.
• 52:05
  [SPEAKER_03]: Ukraine is the best country in the world, the best military in the world and counter-drawn.
• 52:10
  [SPEAKER_03]: We have a lot to learn from them.
• 52:12
  [SPEAKER_03]: The US military doesn't.
• 52:13
  [SPEAKER_03]: If you don't believe me, look at the details of what happened during the 40-day war.
• 52:16
  [SPEAKER_03]: Look what happened in Kuwait.
• 52:18
  [SPEAKER_03]: We, in many ways, we got our world rocked with drone and we had a four-year warning and we still weren't ready.
• 52:23
  [SPEAKER_03]: So we need to focus on learning lessons from these two amazing Belieger-Democratic partners in Ukraine in Israel, proliferate those lessons, tactics, techniques and procedures of the U.S. military, and then share them with South Korea and Taiwan and others as well.
• 52:39
  [SPEAKER_03]: And I'll end with this.
• 52:41
  [SPEAKER_03]: Our research here tells me that the good guys and gals were losing the lesson sharing race.
• 52:48
  [SPEAKER_03]: What do I mean?
• 52:49
  [SPEAKER_03]: We had more than 10,000 North Koreans fighting with Russia against Ukraine.
• 52:53
  [SPEAKER_03]: Those North Koreans went home and I have very good reason to believe that they are proliferating their lessons, learns, and tactics, techniques, and procedures across the North Korean military.
• 53:03
  [SPEAKER_03]: And the North Korean military is going from a barrage warfare, human wave warfare, sobiet-style model.
• 53:09
  [SPEAKER_03]: to a precision strike model with very formidable drone and other capabilities, able to target within 15 to 30 meters anything on the Korean peninsula.
• 53:20
  [SPEAKER_03]: You think our war plans are up ready for that?
• 53:22
  [SPEAKER_03]: Do you think we've learned every lesson in South Korea?
• 53:25
  [SPEAKER_03]: I worry not.
• 53:26
  [SPEAKER_03]: And so I strongly, and the response to that would be, oh, don't worry, we're talking, we're sharing lessons.
• 53:31
  [SPEAKER_03]: OK, OK, the why were we so unprepared in the 40-day war in the Persian Gulf?
• 53:36
  [SPEAKER_03]: So I think we need to institutionalize this less learning process, the sharing of these TTTBs for first for our benefit, but also sharing from these amazing partners we have in Ukraine and Israel to our other Belieger Democratic partners, namely Taiwan and South Korea.
• 53:50
  [SPEAKER_03]: Sorry, Joe, I got excited, but I hope that's all.
• 53:52
  [SPEAKER_04]: That is okay, Brad.
• 53:54
  [SPEAKER_04]: I kind of set you up there.
• 53:55
  [SPEAKER_04]: Brad had mentioned the axis of aggressors book that is forthcoming.
• 54:00
  [SPEAKER_04]: I will have to be come see will make sure that each of you on the call gets that publication, which is coming out soon.
• 54:08
  [SPEAKER_04]: I think it's time now to wrap up the call.
• 54:10
  [SPEAKER_04]: I'm going to ask each of our experts to provide a one-minute summary of the thoughts today, but before doing so, a special thanks to Ellie Buffkin and the FDD comms team for their outstanding job in the background for making sure everything went so smoothly.
• 54:24
  [SPEAKER_04]: A reminder, FDD is a non-partisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.
• 54:31
  [SPEAKER_04]: You find all of our research at FDD.org.
• 54:34
  [SPEAKER_04]: And if you like to chat with Brad, see you now on our cam.
• 54:37
  [SPEAKER_04]: Separately, please reach me at fdb.org.
• 54:41
  [SPEAKER_04]: Gentlemen, over to you for final thoughts.
• 54:44
  [SPEAKER_04]: Let's start with cam.
• 54:45
  [SPEAKER_04]: Then senon, see you now.
• 54:47
  [SPEAKER_04]: And then we'll wrap it up with Brad.
• 54:49
  [SPEAKER_04]: Cam.
• 54:50
  [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, thanks, Joe.
• 54:51
  [SPEAKER_05]: I'll just I'll close by just kind of reiterating my, my bottom lines and that are one going into this summit.
• 54:58
  [SPEAKER_05]: The administration has already done damage to American combat power in Europe over the past year and as a result American deterrence in Europe.
• 55:07
  [SPEAKER_05]: What would be in my mind from military perspective is successful summit is a reversal of certain drawdown decisions like the long-range fires battalion and ensuring
• 55:20
  [SPEAKER_05]: that the armor brigade combat team in Poland stays there.
• 55:23
  [SPEAKER_05]: So those are kind of like very specific things, but I would hope that those come out of the summit or that the president directs the Pentagon after speaking with European leaders to remedy those.
• 55:35
  [SPEAKER_05]: If he does not, I completely agree with Brad that Congress needs to do everything within its constitutional authority to ensure that America retains absolutely valuable capabilities on the continent.
• 55:48
  [SPEAKER_05]: Second, I think a results both in Ukraine and in NATO more largely, the United States is increasingly losing influence and leverage as a result of our own actions.
• 55:59
  [SPEAKER_05]: Not just being rude, not just making insults, but yes, threatening the sovereign territory of our allies, but also making less of a contribution.
• 56:10
  [SPEAKER_05]: One of the natural consequences of devoting less resources to Europe will
• 56:17
  [SPEAKER_05]: we don't want the Europeans dependent on us, agree.
• 56:21
  [SPEAKER_05]: But one of the byproducts of that is if you're dependent on the United States, we're going to have some influence over you.
• 56:27
  [SPEAKER_05]: So I'm not arguing for that European dependent on the United States.
• 56:30
  [SPEAKER_05]: I certainly think it's good and very necessary that they step up, but the administration needs to recognize that you cannot have it both ways.
• 56:38
  [SPEAKER_05]: You cannot do less and demand more.
• 56:41
  [SPEAKER_05]: So going into the summit,
• 56:43
  [SPEAKER_05]: My expectations are low for those things being fulfilled, but to use Cnon's line, I hope so.
• 56:50
  [SPEAKER_05]: And then on Ukraine, I hope that European leaders can make some progress with the president, hopefully increasing parole orders, and potentially being able to actually start applying pressure on the crime for once.
• 57:03
  [SPEAKER_05]: That's it for me.
• 57:04
  [SPEAKER_01]: Thank you.
• 57:08
  [SPEAKER_01]: Um, a couple of things, I would just say, watch out for the fox in the henhouse, um, if we're serious about collective security and preserving the sanctity and effect in the sort of transit antic Alliance, which is being the boardwork of stability, um, of American and European security since World War II, we shouldn't pander and use the NATO, I will coming NATO summit as a means to just launch the Erdogan's wishlist.
• 57:30
  [SPEAKER_01]: There's an opportunity to hold to account
• 57:35
  [SPEAKER_01]: help allies force and demand better from its allies.
• 57:40
  [SPEAKER_01]: We saw what the problematic nation nature of the Hungarian regime sort of presented to European security and European
• 57:52
  [SPEAKER_01]: add on is a 1.7 trillion dollar economy that presents a much bigger threat to native security.
• 58:00
  [SPEAKER_01]: And for some people when when when I'm asked as to you know whether that should be sort of question or doubted by all means but I would also suggest this.
• 58:11
  [SPEAKER_01]: If you look at any country that has appropriated and operates the F-35 fighter jet, I don't see the long litany of issues that Turkey is facing in being able to acquire this platform.
• 58:22
  [SPEAKER_01]: Why is that?
• 58:23
  [SPEAKER_01]: Are we just facing being sort of a stickler for Turkey in the words of Erdogan and his government?
• 58:29
  [SPEAKER_01]: Are we just trying to prevent Turkey's rise as a great power?
• 58:32
  [SPEAKER_01]: Or is there a simpler explanation as in with denying the sale and which should continue to deny the sale?
• 58:41
  [SPEAKER_01]: there's an danger to the cohesive video in NATO, regional stability in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.
• 58:47
  [SPEAKER_01]: That's where I would argue the truth lies closer to.
• 58:52
  [SPEAKER_01]: And remember, Turkey's had many opportunities to essentially make things right.
• 58:57
  [SPEAKER_01]: It could have divested itself all best 400 systems.
• 59:00
  [SPEAKER_01]: It could have satisfied the legal requirements, but there is a wider trust issue to be met here.
• 59:11
  [SPEAKER_01]: European allies should demand better.
• 59:14
  [SPEAKER_01]: And they should expect more from allies and not just panther to to what add a one would like simply because they are up against the wall in terms of defense procurement.
• 59:29
  [SPEAKER_03]: Joe, I in the clock three quick points of 60 seconds or less.
• 59:34
  [SPEAKER_03]: I think the time for some of our NATO allies to say the check is in the mail on defense spending is over.
• 59:41
  [SPEAKER_03]: It's time for them to show us that they mean what they say by putting their money where their mouths are or more accurately aligning their actual budgets and allocations with political commitments.
• 59:51
  [SPEAKER_03]: This is the show me the money summit for, forget the, forgive the during McGuire reference there.
• 59:58
  [SPEAKER_03]: So that's what I'm watching.
• 1:00:00
  [SPEAKER_03]: Some of our allies are really stepping up.
• 1:00:02
  [SPEAKER_03]: Some of them are not.
• 1:00:03
  [SPEAKER_03]: Don't misunderstand me.
• 1:00:04
  [SPEAKER_03]: I'm not recommending we threaten article five if they don't spend enough.
• 1:00:08
  [SPEAKER_03]: No, no, no.
• 1:00:08
  [SPEAKER_03]: That's a gift of Putin.
• 1:00:10
  [SPEAKER_03]: But I am saying, hold people accountable to their commitments, just like a good parent would, right?
• 1:00:14
  [SPEAKER_03]: So that's first point.
• 1:00:15
  [SPEAKER_03]: Second point is,
• 1:00:17
  [SPEAKER_03]: NATO, as a alliance, and American military posture in Europe makes American safer.
• 1:00:23
  [SPEAKER_03]: Okay, so whatever they're doing or not doing, whatever noise you're doesn't know you, we are safer, we're more secure because of NATO, and because American posture there, it helps us.
• 1:00:33
  [SPEAKER_03]: 4 to 5,000 U.S. planes took off from European bases in support of Epic Fury.
• 1:00:39
  [SPEAKER_03]: If that's not power projection, benefit, what is?
• 1:00:42
  [SPEAKER_03]: Okay, what is?
• 1:00:44
  [SPEAKER_03]: We should have cooler heads per... we should speak respectfully to friends, international friends, just like we do in our personal life if you want them to keep being your friends and be there for you in your moment of need.
• 1:00:54
  [SPEAKER_03]: And let's remember NATO was there for us in our moment of need.
• 1:00:58
  [SPEAKER_03]: They fought, blood and died alongside Americans for two decades in Afghanistan.
• 1:01:04
  [SPEAKER_03]: Let's not forget that.
• 1:01:05
  [SPEAKER_03]: Lastly, if all you care about is China.
• 1:01:09
  [SPEAKER_03]: Or if all you care about it is a wrong, the last thing you want is additional aggression by Moscow and Europe.
• 1:01:17
  [SPEAKER_03]: And the quickest way to get that, that thing that will be a disaster for Eastern Europe, a disaster for the transatlantic community, a disaster for the United States.
• 1:01:26
  [SPEAKER_03]: and the disaster to spend anymore resources focusing on Iran and China will be new aggression in the Baltics, for example.
• 1:01:34
  [SPEAKER_03]: And the quickest way to get that is a suggestion from the White House that we will not honor our Article 5 North of the Land and Treaty commitments that we agree to in 1949 on Constitution Avenue in Washington, D.C.
• 1:01:47
  [SPEAKER_03]: So words matter, respect and tone matter, budgets matter, combat power matters.
• 1:01:53
  [SPEAKER_03]: That's where I stop.
• 1:01:54
  [SPEAKER_03]: Thanks.
• 1:01:56
  [SPEAKER_04]: Gentlemen, thank you for your terrific analysis.
• 1:01:59
  [SPEAKER_04]: This concludes today's call.