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Kurt Campbell on China, Allies, and US Power | China Considered | Hoover Institution · China Considered

• 0:08
  - Welcome to China
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  Considered a podcast that brings fresh insight
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  and informed discussion to one
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  of the most consequential issues of our time,
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  how China's changing and changing the world.
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  I'm Liz Economy, Hargrove senior fellow
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  and co-director of the program on the us, China
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  and the world at the Hoover Institution at
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  Stanford University.
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  Today I'm delighted to welcome a very special guest,
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  a close friend and colleague, Dr.
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  Kurt Campbell. Kurt has served in a number
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  of important positions in the Pentagon,
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  in the State Department, and in the White House most
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  recently as Deputy Secretary
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  of State in the Biden administration.
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  Today, we're gonna talk about his experience as one
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  of the most important architects of US Indo-Pacific policy
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  and what's happening right this very moment in Beijing
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  between US President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping.
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  So Kurt, you began your career in
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  government at the Pentagon.
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  What were some of the operating assumptions about the US
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  relationship with China in the 1990s?
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  How different was it then from today?
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  - First of all, Liz, it's just great to be with you
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  and it's wonderful to be here at Stanford
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  and I've been looking forward to this conversation.
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  My, actually, my first time in government was
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  as a naval officer, not as a Dsdi at the Pentagon.
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  And so I was beginning to teach up at Harvard
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  and at that moment, the United States and the Soviet Union.
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  Then when the Soviet Union was still around,
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  they were beginning mill to mill dialogues
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  between our two countries
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  and having exchanges between naval ships and the like
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  and port visits.
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  And I had been in the naval, I was a naval officer
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  and my Russian was quite strong.
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  And so I was recruited to join the staff
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  of then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
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  a man named William Crow, and he was the last chairman
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  before Goldwater Nichols.
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  And Goldwater Nichols,
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  the defense reform gave the chairman just
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  extraordinary powers.
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  And that next chairman was Colin Powell.
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  So I worked for about a year with Admiral Crow,
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  and then about a year with Colin Powell. And
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  - So which year was this exactly?
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  - It's kind of 19 88, 19 89. Okay.
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  So and and so
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  - Early years of Gorbachev at the time.
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  - Yeah, exactly. And, and,
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  and a lot of confusion in the United States about
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  whether this was all a faint
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  or the Soviet Union was really changing.
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  And so during that time, we had a lot of diplomacy with,
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  with our counterparts at the time.
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  It was a, a guy named OV that is kind
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  of a famous ov Yes.
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  Yeah. Soviet theoretician on military power.
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  He coined the term revolution in military affairs,
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  which we still use today.
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  So I really learned in that capacity, which was I was lowly
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  and junior, even though I had in my, kind of my secret life,
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  I was going to be,
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  and I was a professor at Harvard in my low, my lowly life,
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  I was a lieutenant, so pretty much good enough to get a cup
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  of coffee and like, you know, kind of make sure
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  that doors were opened and closed.
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  But it was a great education
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  and I got to, I worked closely with Powell
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  who was incredibly effective and tough,
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  and through that process met Rich Armitage
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  who kinda took an interest in me
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  and helped support me in my career.
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  So that was really my first experience,
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  and it was humbling to be, you know, at the very bottom.
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  You're not, I wasn't even on the totem pole.
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  I was kind of beneath the ground of the totem pole.
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  But it was, it was an incredible experience. It was
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  - A safe space to learn. Right.
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  - Very much. Yeah. And also, you know,
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  there was a tremendous sense of American power.
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  We had basically just won the Cold War
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  and, you know, there was a sense
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  that anything was possible at that moment.
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  The idea of a unilateral power
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  and kind of globalization, tremendous optimism
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  and potential as far as the eye could see.
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  - And it was exciting too. I was actually the CIA at the CIA
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  in charge of Gorbachev.
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  Yeah. He was my sort of, yeah, my responsibility from 1985
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  to 1987.
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  And I remember that being a time of potential, right?
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  As you said, was it a faint or was it something real? Yeah.
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  And it turned out to be something real.
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  And I think by the time you were working there,
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  there was momentum, I think, between the two countries
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  and an understanding
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  that Gorbachev maybe was gonna do
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  something a little bit different.
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  - Very much so. And it took Reagan's leadership
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  of the Republican party to basically say, look,
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  we're gonna give this guy a chance.
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  And really, the person, more than anyone else
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  behind the scenes that helped maneuver this doesn't get
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  enough credit, was actually Margaret Thatcher
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  who did initial diplomacy with Gorbachev.
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  And then basically communicated to Reagan
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  that this is a person we can do business with.
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  And I remember we talked about this, 'cause both you
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  and I come from this training as Sovietologists,
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  and it was, we, you, one
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  of our first conversations many years ago,
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  you might not remember,
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  Gorbachev gave a speech about Soviet power in the Pacific in
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  1986 when he was in blood of aoc.
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  And so there was a lot of speculation about what
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  that meant was the Soviet Union reordering more towards the
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  Pacific and away from Europe.
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  And that was one of our first conversations.
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  But that process, that education actually served me well
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  because, you know, I got
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  to see like some really effective leaders up close,
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  the tools they used to motivate
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  and you know, how they tried to lead
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  and like, you know, people like Armitage
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  and General Powell are rare.
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  And it was an honor,
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  - And I wanna come back to sort of
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  what you took from them in your own leadership,
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  because I think people would say
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  that you've been very effective in your ability
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  to shape US policy,
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  to lead US policy in the Indo-Pacific.
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  But let, let's stay with the fact that you started off like
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  as a naval officer focused on the Soviet Union,
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  brought in some Japan.
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  - Yeah. - So when did China first enter your space
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  and what was your thinking about China coming at it from
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  two other countries
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  and expertise in two other countries? Really,
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  - You know, a little bit Liz, by happenstance, I, you know,
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  a few years later I had started teaching at Harvard
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  and you know, was on my way to an academic career.
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  But the truth is that as
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  what happens is there is a thing called Potomac Fever,
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  in which once you actually serve in policy, it's exciting
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  and you want to do it again.
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  And so I applied for White House Fellowship, I got one,
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  and I ended up spending a year or a year
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  and a half at the Treasury Department.
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  So I worked for Lloyd Benson at the beginning
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  of the Clinton administration.
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  I was a special assistant to then Larry Summers, I worked
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  with Rahm Emanuel on nafta.
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  So I did that for at the White House.
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  So I did that for about 18 months,
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  and then I was literally heading back to Harvard
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  to resume my teaching position, ambivalent about it.
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  But, you know, that was what I was gonna do.
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  And I got a call from Joe Nye,
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  who had just landed at the Pentagon,
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  and he said, why don't you come on over
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  and, you know, we can explore whether you'd be the dity for
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  what we called East Station the Pacific.
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  At the time I had had a little ship duty in Japan,
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  a little bit of experience,
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  but really not very much in the Indo-Pacific,
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  what we call now the Indo-Pacific, then East Asia.
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  And I, I remember when I first started, he had a really,
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  a group of incredibly accomplished Asian people that were,
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  or Asian specialists working with him, like Ezra Vogel.
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  And I, I could tell they were all like, who's this guy?
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  This is, this is not a good idea. This guy knows nothing.
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  But, you know, I think it's probably true to say this,
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  this happens to everyone, Liz,
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  but sometimes someone sees something in you
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  that you don't see in yourself.
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  And I think Joe saw a, you know, kind of a determination
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  and so I I maybe some
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  - Talent too.
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  - Yeah. But so I I, I, I was in that job for five years,
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  even though Joe left after one, he went back to Harvard.
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  But to be honest, you know, we had a small office
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  of about 20, 25 people.
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  It is now an assistant secretary's office,
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  but at the time it had like, enormous sway.
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  - And this is not the Clinton administration's,
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  - It is the Clinton administration's.
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  Yeah, yeah. I'm sorry. It should be, it's like 1995 to 2000,
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  and I am still with those people.
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  It was a life transforming experience.
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  It was just incredible.
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  And I'm close to almost every person I
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  worked with in that office.
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  You know, Carl Iken very well. He was my China officer.
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  He's fantastic. Taught me an enormous amount.
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  Randy Schreiber, I could, yep.
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  A lot of people I worked with closely for years.
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  But it was a great experience.
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  And, and I think at that time I ended up seeing
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  China through a number of lenses.
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  We remember it was
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  after the Taiwan Street crisis, of which I was involved
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  with, with Bill Perry, the decision
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  to send aircraft carriers to the Western Pacific.
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  But after that, there was really a, a, a
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  concerted decision to try
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  to build stronger US-China relations.
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  And at the core of that, at
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  that time was the mill to mill dimension.
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  So I was involved in hundreds of visits that we would have
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  to manage between Chinese
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  and American components as they tried to, this was
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  - Perry, this - Was during
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  - Perry's term.
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  He was a very effective, in some respects,
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  a very effective ambassador for the US
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  with the Chinese. I think,
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  - I think, you know, the truth is there are a lot of people
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  that are underrated.
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  I, I think Bill Perry is one
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  of the finest public servants
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  and also a person
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  that you could really deeply emulate his sort of careful
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  and gentle leadership style underneath it.
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  A very sort of tough and purposeful approach.
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  But, so I worked with him on refashioning,
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  our strategy towards Japan with Jon, I,
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  the so-called NA initiative.
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  I worked, we rebuilt, we had no relationship with Vietnam,
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  so we started mill to mill talks.
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  I did that quietly behind the scenes.
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  We did our first scenario in war games about North Korea
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  collapse with the South Koreans, saw Indonesia
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  through its revolution and the, the fall of Sacho,
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  and did a lot of diplomacy with, with the Chinese
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  and quiet diplomacy with the Taiwans.
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  And so the experience was incredible.
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  And I saw the hope of the relationship.
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  It even then I remember, I, I was
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  so deeply involved in this military diplomacy,
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  I could see the challenges, the distrust, the
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  attempt to kind of size up.
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  And there was really always a sense on the Chinese side
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  that they were anticipating a different kind
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  of relationship in the future where I don't think many
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  of my American counterparts thought that way.
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  I think they thought that, look, this is a, this is a,
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  you know, a rising country, but has decades to go
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  before they're able to do anything.
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  And, you know,
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  - Yeah, not only that, but this was the really sort of a,
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  a ushering in the peak period of engagement, right?
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  Yes. Because this led into China's accession
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  to the W tt O Yeah.
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  In the sense that China was going
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  to join the international system, it was gonna become,
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  you know, what Bob Zel later termed the responsible
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  stakeholder.
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  And, you know, along with that would come the rise
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  of the middle class and,
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  and opening of China's, you know, political
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  and economic system, right.
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  Sort of modernization theory wrapped under the guise
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  of engagement.
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  - Yeah. I, I, I think all of that was in play, but at,
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  but I, I think we tend to forget some of the ebbs and flows
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  after this period of really intense military diplomacy.
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  There was substantial pushback
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  from conservatives on the hill
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  that thought this was the wrong direction.
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  And so they put many restrictions on a variety of things.
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  So, you know, things that you could do with respect
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  to information sharing or any kind of cooperation in space
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  or the, like, you know, one
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  of the reasons why we never were able
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  to do very much in our space programs,
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  even though we had done so much, was the Soviets
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  with the Soviets was because of legislation
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  that was introduced at that time.
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  And then I, you know, what,
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  what I think happened more than anything else, president
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  Bush came to power with the initial idea
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  that they were going to center their foreign policy on the
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  idea of China as a strategic threat to the United States.
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  We tend to forget that,
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  but that was an animating perspective.
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  And then nine 11 changed all of
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  that fundamentally complete reorientation
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  refocused towards the Middle East.
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  And, and frankly, I, I would say
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  our foreign policy got substantially out
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  of balance at that moment.
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  And it's frankly, in many ways continued since then.
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  And so for those of us who have been very focused
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  on the Indo-Pacific
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  and Asia, it's been a constant struggle to try to
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  make the argument that the lion's share of the history
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  of the 21st century's gonna play out in the Indo-Pacific
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  and not in some
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  of these really hard places in the Middle East.
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  - It would seem that that's a function of the fact
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  that there are the crises right in the Middle East.
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  I mean, then you have, you know, we had the Afghanistan,
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  we have obviously what we're seeing right now, we had Iraq,
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  you know, we, there, the Middle East is a constant,
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  you know, source of immediacy for us.
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  Whereas the Indo-Pacific tends
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  to be the longer term strategic play, right?
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  The rise of China. There was the rise of Japan.
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  It doesn't have the same degree of, you know, sort
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  of heightened conflict and urgency. Exactly.
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  - The only thing I would say to that, Liz, I think
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  that is a misreading of the kinds of challenges
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  that we are facing.
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  I we, and we would, I think both of us agree some
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  of the challenges may be subtle in technology and the like,
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  but they're very much urgent
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  and they require immediate attention.
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  And so, I mean, one of the surprising things
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  about what's happened in the last couple of months, I,
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  I think President Trump made a powerful argument about
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  avoiding political quicksand in the Middle East.
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  And, and, and remember, the most brutal critiques
• 15:01
  of the Iraq war do not come from Democrats.
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  They came, they come from President Trump.
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  But in many respects, what he has undertaken
• 15:11
  here is likely to have longer
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  and more important implications in some ways than
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  what we've seen in Afghanistan and Iraq.
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  Those were both countries that were largely irrelevant
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  to the global economy.
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  But Iran is so important with respect to the provision
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  of, you know, fuels
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  and a variety of associated capacities like, you know,
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  fertilizer and the like.
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  And I think the changes in the Persian Gulf Strait of Horus
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  that flow from this are going to make the region much
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  different than it was before.
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  And, and I think the hard thing
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  for the Trump administration is that they face very,
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  you know, difficult challenges.
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  They either continue on in some way, which will be expensive
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  and difficult and will take us away from the drama
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  of the Indo-Pacific,
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  or they acknowledge that maybe this,
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  we made some mistakes here and cut a not very good deal.
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  - But don't you think, looking at the discussion right now
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  that's underway in Beijing between President Trump
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  and President Xi, that that linkage really
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  between the Middle East, especially Iran
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  and the Indo-Pacific and China, I mean, has been made right?
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  Quite explicitly. Yeah.
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  So there's, there's no separating the two.
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  I mean, China is Iran's most important patron,
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  economically security, they're deeply invested.
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  So these two have now come together, I think in
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  - An - Important way.
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  And I'm just gonna remind you, you, you may
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  or may not remember, you said to me
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  when you became Deputy Secretary of State, you said,
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  you know, Liz, you said, we think dealing with Asia is hard.
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  Let me tell you what's really hard is the Middle East.
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  - Yeah, - Right. So you said you think
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  that this Iran conflict is,
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  is gonna be transformative over the long term.
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  Maybe play that out a little bit.
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  - It will, - Yeah. Maybe just
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  - So, so look, I think you are right.
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  The, the linkage has now been made,
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  but I think the reasons are manifest first.
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  You know, the, the closure
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  of the strait have had,
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  it's had impacts on the United States that, you know,
• 17:23
  we can feel it in the gas pump
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  and we're starting to feel it in certain areas,
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  secondary and tertiary areas.
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  But it's had profound impacts across Asia so much deeper,
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  much more impactful than most
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  people in the United States know.
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  There are a variety of countries that are teetering
• 17:40
  with respect to shortages of fuel, of diesel, of jet fuel.
• 17:45
  Some airlines literally have a week or two left of supply.
• 17:49
  So there are going to be major consequences there.
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  China is among all the Asian powers the most insulated,
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  but they too are starting to feel it.
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  I, I think if, if I could say China has had the ability
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  to watch us as a great power for 20 or 30 years,
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  and you know, these, they are very attentive students
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  of global politics.
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  If we have taught them anything, it is to be wary
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  of the Middle East and it,
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  and the challenges that it can present.
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  And so I fully expect as we sit here
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  that President Trump is asking
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  for more from President Xi with respect to, you know, trying
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  to help in that, in the conflict.
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  And to date,
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  the Chinese have been very general in
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  the things that they said.
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  You know, they, they have asked people to go
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  to the negotiating table.
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  They've played a little bit of a role behind the scenes,
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  but not much more.
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  Now the question is, if President Xi decides
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  that he is going to consider, you know, doing more,
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  what is he asked for in return?
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  And I think what we're all waiting for
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  and uncertain about is what's taken place
• 19:02
  behind closed doors on Taiwan.
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  And we'll get to that in a bit.
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  But, but I would say, Liz, generally speaking, you're right,
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  the, the connections between the Gulf
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  and Asia now are profound and deep.
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  And there is an expectation that we do what we can
• 19:20
  to close this, you know, this basically festering
• 19:26
  economic and energy related stoppage
• 19:29
  that is having massive global implications, much more
• 19:32
  so than we realize in, you know,
• 19:35
  here in the United States more generally.
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  And I, I, I think what's hard is that much
• 19:41
  as the Trump administration tries
• 19:43
  to explain why this made sense,
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  and it was a good strategic move, I think
• 19:50
  to most strategists, they would view this as a,
• 19:54
  as a very challenging detour,
• 19:56
  which will have substantial short, short-term con you know,
• 20:00
  consequences for our economy for inflation.
• 20:03
  But not just that, like one of the things that both you
• 20:05
  and I have been involved with is the patient accumulation
• 20:10
  of military capabilities
• 20:12
  to support deterrents in the Indo-Pacific.
• 20:15
  And that means the provision of, you know,
• 20:19
  ballistic missile defense to Japan
• 20:21
  and South Korea, substantial marine expeditionary
• 20:25
  capabilities, two
• 20:27
  and a half aircraft carriers basically on station.
• 20:30
  You can go on and on more fighter aircraft at Cadena.
• 20:34
  What what people don't understand is
• 20:37
  that this new capacity in the Middle East that is being used
• 20:41
  to stand watch and to inspect
• 20:44
  and to most of that from Asia.
• 20:49
  And, and so the quality
• 20:51
  of our deterrence has definitely been affected
• 20:55
  in a downward way.
• 20:56
  And so as President Trump goes to Beijing,
• 21:01
  I think first of all, it is understood
• 21:03
  that this has not played out.
• 21:04
  This has not been Venezuela, you know, the,
• 21:07
  for whatever reason, the
• 21:12
  Iran has not sort of modeled themselves
• 21:16
  after the Maduro regime, right?
• 21:17
  And so that's very clear, and I think it becomes clear
• 21:22
  and clear that the president took this decision,
• 21:27
  impetuously
• 21:28
  and you know, just, he's an improvisational player.
• 21:32
  And this bet
• 21:34
  after talking with a couple of foreign leaders,
• 21:37
  not really consulting the experts inside our government,
• 21:41
  is gonna turn out to be a dangerous one.
• 21:43
  And the Chinese know that.
• 21:44
  And so they're hosting him at a moment
• 21:47
  that I think they appreciate that the correlation
• 21:50
  of power in many respects has shifted
• 21:53
  against President Trump.
• 21:55
  - Yeah, I mean, I think it's, it's interesting, certainly
• 21:57
  Admiral Papapa, you know, our head at Indo Paycom has tried
• 22:01
  to make the case.
• 22:02
  I think that our deterrent capability has not been affected
• 22:07
  by Iran, but I don't think
• 22:08
  that's probably the view of many people.
• 22:11
  - You, you have to make that argument if
• 22:12
  you're the commander.
• 22:13
  I mean, I mean, what, what is he gonna say?
• 22:15
  Like, no, I, I'm, I'm in dire need,
• 22:18
  but all you've gotta look at, right?
• 22:20
  The, the, the, the mu in Japan ha has vacated.
• 22:25
  I mean, we don't really have an aircraft carrier
• 22:28
  and station you can go through, right.
• 22:30
  A variety of things. Yes.
• 22:31
  And the perception is shared not just in a couple of places,
• 22:36
  but across most of our allies and partners.
• 22:38
  There is a worry about this.
• 22:39
  - I know, I think, I think maybe the one thing
• 22:41
  that we can be grateful for ironically is that
• 22:46
  the head of the KMT, the chair of the party was recently,
• 22:49
  you know, Taiwan's opposition
• 22:51
  - Party - Was recently in Beijing
• 22:53
  and seemed to, you know, smooth some waters
• 22:56
  and grant perhaps Taiwan a little bit of space,
• 22:59
  oddly enough, where Xi Jinping, you know,
• 23:02
  can maybe make the case
• 23:03
  that peaceful reunification is on the horizon so
• 23:07
  that our sort of sort
• 23:09
  of weaker deterrent capability doesn't then signal
• 23:14
  to President Xi Jinping that this might be a moment
• 23:16
  to take some action.
• 23:18
  So maybe the, the constellation of of forces political
• 23:21
  and military are maybe not going to sort
• 23:25
  of trigger something that they might otherwise have. Y
• 23:28
  - You know, I, my own sense is Liz, I I I,
• 23:32
  I do believe we overestimate how much
• 23:36
  that China is thinking about taking near term
• 23:40
  immediate military action.
• 23:42
  I, I actually think,
• 23:43
  and I read the, the visit of the KMT in a different way.
• 23:47
  I, I think this is a pincer strategy designed to profoundly,
• 23:51
  you know, kind of erode the confidence
• 23:55
  of politically, of the current administration
• 24:00
  and basically place them in a deeply vulnerable position.
• 24:03
  So the first is, you, you welcome her, you,
• 24:06
  you roll out the red carpet that creates political anxiety.
• 24:11
  And now I think the hope will be the Chinese intend
• 24:15
  to play this meeting in Beijing.
• 24:18
  And I, I know we're gonna disagree on this, we are gonna
• 24:21
  - Disagree - Because I, I think they're gonna play
• 24:23
  this as a G two.
• 24:24
  Yeah. And that look, two great powers standing a stride,
• 24:27
  and it's gonna create a lot of anxiety in Asia,
• 24:31
  And particularly in Taiwan.
• 24:33
  So I think that's the pencer movement.
• 24:35
  There's, they're dis they are intent on weakening the
• 24:38
  confidence in Taiwan.
• 24:40
  And I don't think we tend to underestimate, you know,
• 24:44
  Taiwan is a remarkable achievement in every possible way,
• 24:48
  you know, democratically, technologically, culturally,
• 24:53
  but much of it is grounded on the assumption
• 24:56
  of an ironclad American commitment that is bipartisan.
• 25:00
  And I, I think there are now probably in the next couple
• 25:03
  of weeks gonna be questions about that.
• 25:06
  Now, it is possible that we'll see a kind of backlash
• 25:10
  among a still pretty timid Republican group on the
• 25:15
  hill that we'll say, no, no, we've gotta continue to stand
• 25:18
  by Taiwan much more to come.
• 25:20
  But I think what I'm trying to argue here is
• 25:23
  that the Chinese strategy really right now is
• 25:27
  to use other forces to try to constrain
• 25:31
  and to undermine t taiwan's, you know, sense
• 25:35
  of confidence. And, and I worry about that.
• 25:38
  - Yeah. I mean, I don't, I don't disagree that
• 25:39
  that's their strategy.
• 25:41
  Perhaps we disagree on whether it's actually that effective,
• 25:44
  because I do think, you know, the polling in Taiwan,
• 25:46
  and we had a little bit of this discussion last week in
• 25:48
  Washington, a little, the polling in Taiwan suggests
• 25:53
  that actually the visit of the chairwoman to Beijing
• 25:56
  was a negative for the KMT for the upcoming elections.
• 26:01
  That a majority, a, a vast majority
• 26:04
  of the population in Taiwan has no interest in
• 26:07
  reunification with the mainland.
• 26:08
  So I, I think that that visit didn't actually accomplish
• 26:12
  what Beijing would've wanted it to accomplish,
• 26:14
  but I think it does enable Xi Jinping to create a fiction
• 26:19
  that the time is moving forward in the
• 26:21
  way that he would like.
• 26:23
  I think in terms of the current Trump
• 26:25
  and XI summit, I would say so far, so good now,
• 26:29
  so we still have the possibility
• 26:31
  that things will go sideways in terms of
• 26:34
  what the president might say or do around Taiwan.
• 26:37
  But I think initial indications are,
• 26:40
  the Chinese came out very hot at the beginning, sort
• 26:43
  of giving this warning
• 26:44
  that Taiwan is the most important issue.
• 26:47
  It's central, don't do anything stupid
• 26:49
  or we're gonna end up in conflict.
• 26:52
  The response from the US side has been nothing.
• 26:55
  There hasn't been an acknowledgement of, even the statement
• 26:59
  Secretary Rubio said
• 27:01
  after the first day
• 27:02
  that our policy has not changed on Taiwan.
• 27:04
  It's been one administration after another.
• 27:07
  Now you're right, there's, there's still time for things to,
• 27:10
  to change on the, the next day of the discussions.
• 27:13
  But, but I think that, you know, members of congress,
• 27:17
  senior members of the Republican party in the lead up
• 27:21
  to this summit have come out pretty clearly
• 27:24
  and said they don't want
• 27:25
  to see any shift in US policy on Taiwan.
• 27:29
  And don't forget, Taiwan just passed huge arms purchases.
• 27:33
  That's KMT and DPP aligned
• 27:36
  in the legislature in Taiwan, huge arms purchases agreement.
• 27:42
  - I agree that that is what Rubio said,
• 27:44
  but I think as significant is what Bessant said
• 27:48
  in an interview in which he indicated a couple
• 27:51
  of different things that President Trump acknowledged,
• 27:54
  understood, felt some of the Chinese issues
• 27:58
  with respect to Taiwan
• 28:00
  and would have more to stay in the next few days.
• 28:03
  So my sense is
• 28:04
  that signals perhaps some subtle
• 28:09
  adjustment in our policy.
• 28:11
  And I think what's important to keep in mind is
• 28:14
  that the dominant player in the formulation
• 28:18
  and execution strategy on, on China
• 28:22
  and the Indo-Pacific is not Rubio Secretary Rubio is,
• 28:25
  is barely involved.
• 28:26
  He's much more involved in the Middle East
• 28:28
  and in Latin America it is Beston
• 28:31
  who is the dominant player in all issues
• 28:35
  associated with China.
• 28:36
  And so, let's see,
• 28:38
  but I also would say, Liz, there, there are already plenty
• 28:42
  of indicators that would at least cause some anxiety.
• 28:46
  We know that President Trump
• 28:48
  and President Xi have talked about managing
• 28:52
  or discussing issues associated with, with, with arm sales
• 28:56
  to Taiwan, that
• 28:57
  that has been made clear in their last conversation.
• 29:01
  And when, you know, president Xi called President Trump
• 29:05
  to complain about
• 29:09
  the Japanese position on Taiwan,
• 29:11
  president Trump immediately called her
• 29:14
  and warned her as opposed to speaking out,
• 29:17
  supporting the Japanese position, which we've tried
• 29:19
  to get them to do substantially.
• 29:21
  And so I would just say, and I understand
• 29:24
  and I, I hope what you're saying is true,
• 29:26
  but I would say at best the record is ambiguous
• 29:29
  and there are lots of indicators
• 29:31
  that suggest perhaps a different approach.
• 29:34
  And we do know from a history of things
• 29:38
  that the president has said
• 29:40
  and done that he feels like big
• 29:43
  countries should have maybe a little bit more say over their
• 29:48
  immediate neighborhoods.
• 29:50
  And, and that has been how he thinks about the United States
• 29:53
  and Latin America, how he sees Russia in Ukraine.
• 29:56
  And we'll see. But I, I do think there are clear indications
• 30:01
  that strains of that thinking have affected
• 30:05
  how he thinks about China and Taiwan.
• 30:07
  - Okay. So we'll, we'll, we'll call that, you know,
• 30:09
  we'll see in the next 24 hours.
• 30:11
  Yeah, I mean,
• 30:12
  I might just add it's gonna plan longer than that.
• 30:15
  I mean, I do think, I do think that, you know,
• 30:17
  there was this understanding at the outset
• 30:19
  of this administration
• 30:21
  or that, you know, president Trump was consumed
• 30:23
  with this notion of spheres of influence.
• 30:25
  But I think if you look at the national security strategy,
• 30:28
  if you look at what we've been doing since that time,
• 30:31
  it is clear that we are still deeply
• 30:33
  engaged in the Indo-Pacific.
• 30:35
  - Right. Do do you think, do you think he read
• 30:37
  or had anything to do with the national security
• 30:39
  - Side?
• 30:40
  See, I, I think, I think what's surprising about this
• 30:41
  administration to some extent is, is
• 30:43
  that they are actually doing a little bit of
• 30:46
  what the first Trump administration did.
• 30:48
  Even though I think they're much weaker in terms
• 30:51
  of experience and capabilities and,
• 30:53
  and knowledge certainly
• 30:55
  of Asia than the first Trump administration.
• 30:57
  They're doing a little bit of what that administration did,
• 31:00
  which is to run their own play in Asia, kind of irrespective
• 31:04
  of whatever the president is saying or doing.
• 31:07
  That's interesting. I think they have a much more aggressive
• 31:11
  policy, one that's much more in line
• 31:14
  with Biden administration.
• 31:16
  Yes. Strengthening, strengthening relations
• 31:19
  with our Indo-Pacific partners.
• 31:21
  I mean, restarting mill, Tom Mill with Cambodia
• 31:25
  and new exercises with
• 31:27
  - Cambodia.
• 31:28
  Yeah. That that'll really, ah,
• 31:29
  - Okay.
• 31:30
  Well anyway, let's, let's go back.
• 31:31
  I wanna go back I to do one more. No, no, wanna go back.
• 31:33
  I have to say one thing. Alright, last,
• 31:34
  I'll give you the last word on this.
• 31:35
  I the last word and then I wanna go back.
• 31:37
  I wanna go back a little's, it's my podcast.
• 31:39
  But you want my guess be a good guess.
• 31:40
  - Sorry. So look, I I don't think you can argue
• 31:44
  that the allies
• 31:46
  and partners are being nurtured and supported.
• 31:49
  Our most important partner.
• 31:51
  Japan is quite anxious right now.
• 31:55
  I think it is also the case that a country
• 31:57
  that we had really worked to pull into the fabric
• 32:01
  of our engagement India, that has fallen on very hard times.
• 32:04
  So I don't think you can argue
• 32:06
  that this has been woven together effectively as a strategy.
• 32:11
  The the second thing I will say
• 32:13
  that I've seen now in the Middle East, in Europe
• 32:16
  and now in Asia, is a general lack of interest in
• 32:21
  what experts have to say.
• 32:22
  They really are not interested in that.
• 32:24
  And I remember asking a very senior person about like,
• 32:27
  who do you listen to on the Iran stuff?
• 32:29
  Like, who do you? And he said, well, you know, you know,
• 32:32
  the, the, the people that really are on the ground, Mr.
• 32:36
  Woff and the, the president's
• 32:40
  Jared are the ones now, look, they have a lot
• 32:42
  of experience in real estate and stuff,
• 32:43
  but they don't probably, they're not imbued in some
• 32:47
  of the history and the like.
• 32:48
  And so I I I actually think we are both falling into a
• 32:53
  trap that I always warn Asians about,
• 32:56
  which is the constant search
• 32:58
  for an overriding strategy
• 33:01
  or logic when a lot
• 33:04
  of these things are really guided by personal impetuousness,
• 33:09
  lack of coordination, long held biases and beliefs.
• 33:13
  And that there isn't a kind
• 33:15
  of a convening overarching principle.
• 33:17
  And I, I try to remind myself of that
• 33:20
  'cause my, my instinct is to constantly look for
• 33:25
  what's the, you know, kind of the larger strategy in place.
• 33:29
  - Okay. I'm gonna say I agree with you.
• 33:30
  I don't think that there's a coherent strategy.
• 33:33
  What I do think is
• 33:34
  that this administration is intensely competitive
• 33:38
  with China in technology, economy and national security.
• 33:43
  - Yeah. - So I, and,
• 33:44
  and I think those are the things that are driving the type
• 33:47
  of actions that I'm talking about.
• 33:49
  I see. So you're right, it's not an overarching strategy,
• 33:53
  but it nonetheless can get us to a place
• 33:57
  that I think is better than the one
• 33:58
  that you are envisioning. But we will
• 34:00
  - See, I just want all of our Liz's good listeners
• 34:03
  and watchers, she has the last word on this.
• 34:06
  I'm gonna be very gracious and just, we'll move on now.
• 34:08
  - Okay. Okay. So let's, let's backtrack just a little bit
• 34:12
  because one of the things that you have, I think really
• 34:18
  architected is not a word.
• 34:19
  So let us just say that you have created over the past
• 34:22
  couple of decades is this approach to the region
• 34:26
  of focusing on our allies
• 34:28
  and partners as opposed to the G two notion.
• 34:32
  And just thinking that the, the country that we need to deal
• 34:35
  with first and foremost is China, right?
• 34:37
  You have been very much about working
• 34:39
  with our allies and partners first.
• 34:41
  That's most important. So did that come out
• 34:43
  of your first Pentagon experience as you were describing it?
• 34:47
  You know, you were looking
• 34:48
  and working with Indonesia, you were seeing all the Vietnam,
• 34:51
  all these other countries in addition to China,
• 34:54
  or how did you come to that sort of thought about working
• 34:58
  with allies and partners creating this kind of network,
• 35:01
  not even just hug hub
• 35:03
  and spoke beyond that, I think in,
• 35:05
  certainly in the Biden administration,
• 35:08
  but encouraging our allies
• 35:10
  and partners then to form their own sort of a lattice
• 35:14
  as somebody, I think maybe it was rom rom right
• 35:17
  lattice sort of effect.
• 35:19
  How did you come to that?
• 35:20
  Where, where did that come from, that idea?
• 35:23
  - Well, look, a a lot of it evolved over time.
• 35:26
  The, if you work at the Pentagon on Asia,
• 35:31
  then you spend most of your time nurturing allies
• 35:35
  and partners and is hard work.
• 35:39
  It's often very narrow work on like
• 35:42
  what altitude do helicopters fly.
• 35:45
  And so it's very practical and very operational
• 35:48
  and you develop deep ties with your counterparts.
• 35:53
  I I was able to see, I think in the nineties,
• 35:55
  a very different quality of interaction between our allies
• 36:00
  and partners and the kinds of interactions I had
• 36:03
  with my Chinese friends.
• 36:05
  And I, I I have always been struck that even
• 36:08
  during periods when we were working more closely together,
• 36:13
  we had almost no habits of cooperation.
• 36:15
  And at the very core of almost all
• 36:18
  of my Chinese interlocutors approaches was just a deep
• 36:23
  abiding, profound suspicion of the United States.
• 36:27
  And it was hard to break through with that.
• 36:29
  And I think part of that was ideological
• 36:33
  and part of it was systemic.
• 36:35
  But I think I realized pretty early on, certainly
• 36:39
  after what happened in the time of the Straits crisis,
• 36:41
  when China launched this massive
• 36:44
  military modernization program, which has reached heights
• 36:47
  that no one imagined in the early to mid 1990s.
• 36:51
  But I would say I believed
• 36:54
  that we would be facing a country
• 36:57
  that did not share our values and our interests,
• 37:01
  and that would be more competitive with us.
• 37:03
  And I think I probably like many underestimated how quickly
• 37:07
  and how rapid and how sustained that effort would be.
• 37:12
  But the, the truth, it really coalesced
• 37:15
  around the leadership of Xi Jinping in which most
• 37:18
  of those approaches were no
• 37:20
  longer shadowed.
• 37:23
  They were very much out in the open.
• 37:27
  I I also observed in both
• 37:29
  of our administrations an approach
• 37:32
  to policymaking Asia in Asia that I think undermined
• 37:36
  or did not pay heed to the interests
• 37:39
  of other nations in the region.
• 37:41
  And, and some of that was almost on the verge
• 37:44
  of disrespectful.
• 37:45
  And the idea was the only thing
• 37:47
  that really mattered was sitting in the stuffed chairs next
• 37:51
  to the Chinese and talking about the French revolution.
• 37:54
  And that other diplomacy and engagement was secondary
• 37:59
  and not in our interest perhaps.
• 38:01
  And so I I thought it was, you know, both a misreading
• 38:05
  of China's interests,
• 38:06
  but also misunderstanding of the import
• 38:10
  of working more closely with allies and partners.
• 38:13
  And I would say the people that originally formed
• 38:16
  that school, it was a very small school of, you know, kind
• 38:20
  of strategic thinkers
• 38:22
  and many of them were more operational than
• 38:25
  they were strategic.
• 38:26
  Rich Armitage is, is often thought of as one
• 38:29
  of the fathers of this school.
• 38:31
  But at the same time,
• 38:32
  I will just say we were in a very small minority
• 38:36
  and looked down upon by those that would say, look,
• 38:40
  you know, what's important is, you know, functioning
• 38:43
  and getting things right between Washington and Beijing.
• 38:47
  I, I tried not to diminish that
• 38:50
  'cause I think it's very important
• 38:52
  and I did a lot of Chinese diplomacy,
• 38:54
  but I wanted it in a larger context.
• 38:57
  I also think it became increasingly clear, Liz,
• 39:01
  unlike previous challenges
• 39:02
  that we have faced in the second World war
• 39:05
  and first world war Vietnam, we had the wherewithal
• 39:09
  technologically in military to stand up
• 39:12
  to any potential challenger.
• 39:14
  We were the giant on the sidelines that, you know,
• 39:17
  would enter the fight that is no longer the case.
• 39:20
  And, and I would argue that over the course
• 39:23
  of the last 10 years, it becomes increasingly clear
• 39:26
  that if we want to have an effective global strategy,
• 39:30
  we have to do with allies and partners.
• 39:32
  And that means with respect to technology, procurement,
• 39:36
  you know, planning and the like.
• 39:37
  And here I would say that every administration,
• 39:41
  including the one I served in,
• 39:44
  has not gone nearly far enough in terms of the kinds
• 39:48
  of relationships that we will need.
• 39:50
  There is still a substantial amount of paternalism
• 39:54
  and, you know, kind of imbalance in roles
• 39:59
  and responsibilities, dialogue, consultation, even
• 40:02
  with our closest allies and partners.
• 40:04
  It, it will, it will take a sea change
• 40:07
  of sustained bipartisan effort
• 40:09
  to really build the kind
• 40:12
  of integrated coalition of allies
• 40:15
  and partners, all of whom also should be seeking
• 40:18
  to build ties and engagements with Beijing.
• 40:22
  My own view,
• 40:24
  and I realize that this is controversial, is
• 40:26
  that the best way to have a good relationship with China is
• 40:30
  to engage them from a perspective of strength.
• 40:33
  Now, I, the reason why I'm probably more wary
• 40:37
  of this summit than you are is I think the Chinese have
• 40:42
  sized this up right now.
• 40:44
  They see that when we made the clarion call
• 40:47
  for support from our allies
• 40:49
  and partners in Iran, in the Persian Gulf, just, just,
• 40:54
  you know, kind of echoing silence.
• 40:56
  They know that we're largely alone and have alienated
• 40:59
  and many of those countries are trying
• 41:02
  to carefully rebuild relations with Beijing.
• 41:05
  And so it is for me, inescapable
• 41:09
  that the Chinese read that.
• 41:11
  And so that concerns me.
• 41:14
  And my hope will be that over time we will realize that some
• 41:18
  of these partnerships like India, like Vietnam,
• 41:22
  that are really struggling right now, again,
• 41:25
  are reintegrated into a international global strategy
• 41:30
  that is multifaceted.
• 41:31
  But I will say it will not be easy.
• 41:34
  It will require a major shift in our own perspectives
• 41:39
  and it will take a bipartisan com commitment that, you know,
• 41:43
  to date we've shown some evidence of.
• 41:46
  But it turns out that under just a little bit of pressure,
• 41:49
  it can evaporate pretty quickly.
• 41:51
  - Yeah, I mean, I I don't disagree
• 41:54
  with you on the importance of working with allies
• 41:57
  and partners and that we're gonna need to rebuild
• 42:01
  the very fabric of our relations, certainly
• 42:05
  with our European partners and allies
• 42:06
  and even with our Asian partners
• 42:08
  and allies who I think are, have greater forbearance
• 42:12
  for the Trump administration than Yeah, I agree.
• 42:14
  Our European partners and allies do.
• 42:16
  I I I'll just offer again,
• 42:18
  maybe I'm the glass half full in this sense
• 42:20
  and you're the glass half empty that I,
• 42:22
  I think it's one thing to say
• 42:24
  that Washington is losing credibility
• 42:26
  or has lost some credibility.
• 42:28
  It's another thing to say that China can effectively
• 42:30
  capitalize on that.
• 42:31
  And I'm not yet convinced that China has managed
• 42:36
  to step into the vacuum that's been left by some
• 42:40
  of the retreat that we've seen from the,
• 42:42
  this administration in terms
• 42:44
  of leadership on the global stage.
• 42:46
  - And Liz, that is one of your most important
• 42:49
  strategic contributions.
• 42:50
  I would completely agree with that.
• 42:52
  And I would go further actually.
• 42:54
  First of all, it's not clear that she, they want
• 42:55
  to step into that vacuum in some areas they,
• 43:00
  they may be more hesitant.
• 43:02
  We'll see how that plays out in the Middle East.
• 43:04
  Secondly, I agree with you, I'm not sure they know how
• 43:07
  to exactly, it's hard for them to appeal to countries
• 43:10
  that have very different systems of government.
• 43:13
  But the third, you know, reason is also important.
• 43:17
  We have both talked at length.
• 43:20
  There's no country we, you know, we have all these beliefs
• 43:24
  and things that we talk about with China,
• 43:26
  long term patience.
• 43:28
  And like the truth is, I've rarely dealt with a country
• 43:32
  that is more impatient
• 43:34
  and takes steps often, you know, that oversteps in a,
• 43:39
  in strategic circumstances
• 43:41
  and I fully expect that they will do
• 43:42
  that in the next couple of years.
• 43:44
  I think it will be hard for them to avoid stepping
• 43:49
  to take advantage of
• 43:50
  what they see are targets of opportunity.
• 43:52
  - Right. But when they do that,
• 43:55
  those steps may be missteps as well.
• 43:57
  - Totally. Right. I think that's that And they
• 43:58
  and they tend to motivate Yeah.
• 44:01
  And, and catalyze engagement between allies
• 44:05
  and partners and Right.
• 44:06
  So my own sense is that this strategy
• 44:09
  that we're talking about that grew in the nineties
• 44:14
  and then really found,
• 44:18
  really became more dominant once Xi Jinping came
• 44:23
  to power and he stated so clearly ambitions and technology
• 44:27
  and pressed his advantages in the South China Sea in a
• 44:30
  variety of other places.
• 44:32
  I think that is when this, you know,
• 44:35
  grouping became more dominant.
• 44:37
  - So let's, let's just sort of wrap up a little bit
• 44:40
  by talking about the next administration
• 44:44
  and what needs to happen.
• 44:45
  You said a little bit about rebuilding relationships
• 44:49
  and changing the dynamic between the United States
• 44:52
  and our partners and allies.
• 44:54
  What does that look like?
• 44:55
  What does a, a, a a different dynamic look like?
• 44:59
  What is the role of US leadership, both with our partners
• 45:03
  and our allies, but I think more just on the global stage,
• 45:06
  who are we,
• 45:09
  - Do - You think?
• 45:10
  - Yeah, well Liz, like you got a lot of questions there
• 45:12
  and it's really hard.
• 45:13
  Look, I I am gonna say that I don't think people fully
• 45:19
  appreciate how difficult it's going to be in,
• 45:22
  you know, three or four years.
• 45:23
  I, if a Democrat would happen to win
• 45:26
  or a more internationalist Republican, the, the,
• 45:30
  the drama
• 45:32
  of rebuilding those partnerships is going to be real.
• 45:36
  And, and I I wouldn't even say rebuilding
• 45:39
  'cause it does suggest a kind
• 45:41
  of going back when in fact we're
• 45:43
  just gonna have to go forward.
• 45:44
  And it's very, it's gonna be very different.
• 45:47
  I think some of the unique leadership roles
• 45:49
  that the United United States plays in certain leadership,
• 45:53
  in certain international organizations won't have
• 45:55
  that same proclivity to give the United States, you know,
• 46:00
  kind of pride of place.
• 46:01
  I think you're gonna see in other areas,
• 46:05
  countries taking initiative without coordinating
• 46:09
  as much with the United States.
• 46:10
  I think those things can be healthy.
• 46:12
  I don't think they're necessarily bad.
• 46:15
  I, I think the harder question is
• 46:19
  what is the global system going
• 46:21
  to look like in three or four years?
• 46:22
  And there are a number of theories.
• 46:25
  One theory is
• 46:26
  that it will be more like spheres of influence.
• 46:30
  Another would be
• 46:32
  that the world will just slink more towards disorder
• 46:37
  and disunity a third.
• 46:39
  It it a world in which China is more dominant.
• 46:44
  But I, I think all of those world worlds carry
• 46:48
  with it some very substantial downsides.
• 46:52
  And the interesting thing about this period is the countries
• 46:55
  that have the most sway, unlike during the Cold War,
• 46:59
  are the medium powers
• 47:01
  and they have the ability to maneuver on the global stage.
• 47:04
  And they do, they create their own connections. There's And
• 47:07
  - Who are you defining as medium power?
• 47:09
  Because I know Japan does not like to be called a medium
• 47:11
  - Power, for example.
• 47:12
  I'm so, I'm sorry. A middle power maybe I, I don't,
• 47:15
  I don't want to get into a leading countries.
• 47:20
  Japan, Germany.
• 47:22
  - Okay. Okay. - Other countries in Europe, Australia,
• 47:25
  - Okay, - Canada.
• 47:27
  These are countries that are kind of swing states.
• 47:30
  I think it's gonna turn out that most
• 47:32
  of those countries are going to look at the world
• 47:35
  and realize that the best option
• 47:38
  among other bad options is try to rebuild a certain kind
• 47:42
  of relationship with the United States.
• 47:45
  But that relationship is going
• 47:46
  to be very different than the kinds of relations
• 47:48
  that we had in the past,
• 47:50
  which were built on a deep reservoir
• 47:53
  of trust and confidence.
• 47:55
  And I don't believe we will be able to resurrect
• 47:57
  that anytime soon.
• 47:58
  And so I hate like, like not very good metaphors,
• 48:02
  but it will be a little bit like a loveless marriage.
• 48:05
  Like we will have a house, we'll figure out
• 48:07
  who mows the lawn, who does.
• 48:08
  No, but, but, but it would be better than
• 48:11
  that than just be thrust out on the street
• 48:13
  with no place to stay.
• 48:15
  We are going to have to start from that Liz.
• 48:17
  And like I am struck you don't live in Washington,
• 48:20
  but this is what it's like, don't when, when you,
• 48:22
  when when visiting leaders come
• 48:26
  or groups, they spend much
• 48:29
  of their time initially figuring out
• 48:31
  what gift they're gonna bring, what, you know,
• 48:33
  like Pacific Islanders with thatched, you know, with,
• 48:37
  with fruit that they lay before the volcano.
• 48:40
  So they consult about that and you know, we talk about that.
• 48:43
  But then after those meetings they come
• 48:46
  and they are very pointed
• 48:48
  and critical about how they feel about the United States
• 48:51
  and that's how they're gonna talk
• 48:53
  to the next administration.
• 48:55
  'cause they're not gonna be as fearful of retribution
• 48:58
  as they are now.
• 49:00
  Like, like if you're chancellor of Germany
• 49:03
  and you say one thing about the Iranians humiliated the
• 49:06
  United States and that causes 5,000 troops to be pulled out.
• 49:10
  It's not a lesson that's lost on folks.
• 49:13
  But what will also happen is
• 49:15
  that these very well-meaning folks that really want
• 49:18
  to rebuild relations with Europe are gonna have to sit
• 49:21
  through hours, weeks, months, years
• 49:24
  of reminders about how en reliable and difficult it is.
• 49:28
  And that will be in some ways counterproductive
• 49:31
  and difficult for well-meaning folks trying to rebuild.
• 49:34
  I i I still at the base though,
• 49:37
  I have confidence in the alliance and partnership structures
• 49:41
  and I think there are a variety of reasons why they sustain
• 49:45
  and the momentum goes forward.
• 49:47
  The most important of which are that these mechanisms
• 49:50
  that you described that are taking place
• 49:52
  beneath the surface military engagements in the,
• 49:55
  like continue on, they're not as affected by some
• 49:59
  of the stuff from on high.
• 50:00
  And that gives, that should give us confidence.
• 50:03
  The true deep state is the mill tom mill stuff,
• 50:05
  which, which we have seen.
• 50:07
  And so I'm hopeful of that.
• 50:09
  But I will tell you the task of marshaling
• 50:13
  and building that is going to be unbelievably difficult.
• 50:16
  It will be unlike anything
• 50:19
  that the United States has seen ever.
• 50:21
  Some people will say, well it'll be like at the end
• 50:23
  of the second World War.
• 50:24
  No, no, no. It will, it will be much more difficult
• 50:27
  and the circumstances internationally much more challenging.
• 50:30
  - No, we were the good guys at the end
• 50:32
  of the second World War.
• 50:33
  Now we're not sure what we are,
• 50:35
  but it sounds to me like we're gonna be looking
• 50:37
  for someone like you
• 50:39
  to come back into the next administration to help forge
• 50:44
  - That future.
• 50:45
  But, but can I also say, Liz, one of the things
• 50:46
  that's most important
• 50:47
  and that I I take very seriously is
• 50:51
  that the most important thing that you
• 50:53
  and I have done is help train, recruit,
• 50:56
  and prepare the next generation of people
• 51:00
  to be in foreign policy national security.
• 51:03
  And I grew up in the Democratic party
• 51:05
  and I watched a series of senior people that were reluctant
• 51:09
  to yield and wanted
• 51:11
  to continue on in leadership roles long into
• 51:16
  their successful lives.
• 51:18
  And you have to know when it's time,
• 51:21
  and I will do everything I can to support, you know, if I,
• 51:26
  I do believe we need an internationalist president
• 51:28
  that can recapture elements of what America has stood for.
• 51:33
  And I will do everything to support that.
• 51:35
  But the most important thing for my perspective is to train,
• 51:40
  inspire, identify
• 51:42
  and support a group of people that are prepared
• 51:45
  to serve in the next wave.
• 51:47
  And so for me, one
• 51:50
  of the hardest things about
• 51:52
  how I felt you were asking about my earlier career,
• 51:56
  I don't mind saying there were periods
• 51:57
  where I felt very much alone
• 51:59
  and even in my own administrations, I felt like I had
• 52:02
  to kind of be careful about my real world views.
• 52:05
  I was probably harder headed,
• 52:07
  probably a little bit more skeptical of certain things
• 52:10
  and more focused on this allied stuff.
• 52:13
  And when you engage with your partners, you know,
• 52:15
  in other parts of government that were really focused on
• 52:18
  let's, let's have a good meeting with the Chinese.
• 52:21
  It, it, it could be complicated.
• 52:23
  And so I've always tried to figure out
• 52:25
  and identify who are the people that are up
• 52:28
  and coming that really understand like some
• 52:32
  of the challenges and opportunities and,
• 52:34
  and are well versed in the various things
• 52:38
  that are important for grasping how to think about Asia.
• 52:42
  Just if I just two last things.
• 52:44
  I, so what, I'm a little older than you
• 52:47
  and so most of the people that I worked
• 52:49
  with in foreign policy national security were touched
• 52:53
  by Vietnam and it really affected and it,
• 52:56
  and it drove a wedge through our party and it,
• 52:59
  and it had real consequences for our confidence as Democrats
• 53:04
  and for issues associated with, with use of force.
• 53:07
  And, and, and, and that is challenging.
• 53:11
  I I think a new group of Democrats coming up
• 53:15
  Share fewer of those kind of historical scars.
• 53:20
  And I'm excited by that. I think that's a real possibility.
• 53:25
  I I also would say that what is striking is that a lot
• 53:30
  of the people that now work on the Indo-Pacific Asia are
• 53:35
  recent recruits, right?
• 53:37
  Because they understand like it's the Bonnie
• 53:40
  and Clyde, it, you rob the bank
• 53:42
  'cause that's where the money is.
• 53:44
  So they, they, they've often come to the Indo-Pacific
• 53:49
  mostly with experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.
• 53:52
  And I would just simply say,
• 53:53
  and you know, welcome, you know, it's great
• 53:55
  that we've got more strategic thinkers
• 53:57
  and people who focus, nothing prepares you less well
• 54:02
  for the nuances, the subtlety, the challenges
• 54:05
  of the Indo-Pacific than the brutality
• 54:08
  and the very different set of capacities associated
• 54:13
  with 20 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan.
• 54:17
  - Well, Kurt, I think you've just made my case, which is
• 54:19
  that we still need you at the helm
• 54:24
  because really you have actually trained the next
• 54:27
  generation, but I think we're gonna need some very strong
• 54:30
  leadership at the top, even as we have young people ready
• 54:34
  to, to take on important new roles
• 54:36
  in the next administration.
• 54:37
  But I think we're gonna need somebody with your experience
• 54:41
  and your deaf hand
• 54:43
  and your long relations throughout the Asia Pacific,
• 54:47
  throughout the Indo-Pacific to, to create whatever is going
• 54:51
  to come next because that is what you are
• 54:54
  so great at, right?
• 54:55
  Which is seeing the new vision and seeing the new future
• 54:58
  and, and making it happen.
• 55:00
  So let me thank you for all your service
• 55:04
  to our country
• 55:05
  and let me thank you for taking the time to spend with me
• 55:08
  and, and talk about your views
• 55:10
  and your thoughts about where we are today
• 55:12
  and where we're gonna need to go
• 55:13
  and the future. Really a pleasure.
• 55:15
  - It. No, it's my pleasure, Liz. It's great to be with you.
• 55:18
  And let me just say back at you, we want your role as well.
• 55:22
  It's great to see what you've done here at Stanford,
• 55:26
  the program and the work that you've done.
• 55:27
  I can't tell you how much I appreciate both our friendship
• 55:31
  and your scholarship, all the work that you've done.
• 55:34
  This has been a tremendous, I just got off an airplane,
• 55:37
  but it's been a tremendous morning.
• 55:39
  You'd never know here at Stanford. Thank you very much.
• 55:41
  - Thanks Kurt.