Latest / Deep Tech Germany – AI, Robotics & Frontier Innovation by Startuprad.io™ / Financing Capital-Intensive Deep Tech — Partech's Simone Riva
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker1: If capital is supposed to make companies stronger, why do some of the most efficient
- 0:05Speaker1: companies emerge when they can't raise any venture capital?
- 0:21Speaker1: What actually determines whether venture capital creates value or destroys discipline?
- 0:27Speaker1: Today's guest sits at the intersection of venture capital strategy and long term capital thinking.
- 0:34Speaker1: He is a partner at ParTech VC and previously worked at H14, the family office
- 0:42Speaker1: associated with the Bilosconi family as well as the consultancy Bain.
- 0:47Speaker1: We connect that perspective with real founder outcomes, including companies
- 0:52Speaker1: like Flix, which scaled with significant capital, and Emma,
- 0:58Speaker1: which reached over 400 million euros in revenue with minimal funding and strong discipline.
- 1:05Speaker1: A little disclaimer, the most recent numbers are not available to me,
- 1:09Speaker1: but since they sold half of the company to conglomerate, they are close to getting
- 1:16Speaker1: to 1 billion euros revenue.
- 1:19Speaker1: Hello and welcome, everybody. Simona, great to have you here.
- 1:23Speaker0: Hi, Joe. Great to meet you and thanks for having me.
- 1:28Speaker1: Totally my pleasure. You had quite an illustrious career so far.
- 1:33Speaker1: When you look back at your own career, what shaped your philosophy on capital and risk?
- 1:44Speaker0: Absolutely. Let's take it from here. So let's say that basically I always wanted
- 1:50Speaker0: to be an investor even before I started the Bain & Company.
- 1:55Speaker0: So when I joined Bain, I proactively decided to,
- 2:03Speaker0: invest most of my time and spend 50% of my time on the project on due diligence,
- 2:12Speaker0: for private equity funds, strategic planning projects,
- 2:16Speaker0: cost-cutting projects across multiple industries from luxury,
- 2:19Speaker0: med tech, pharma, oil and gas, diversified industrial, B2C.
- 2:25Speaker0: That helped me basically learning two things,
- 2:30Speaker0: how different industries work and especially how a P&L looked like,
- 2:39Speaker0: especially a top-notch P&L looked like in each industry.
- 2:44Speaker0: Um then i basically when i moved
- 2:49Speaker0: to age 14 i learned how to invest in the growth stage and so i really,
- 2:56Speaker0: uh understood how to apply what i learned at ben and company more on the tech
- 2:59Speaker0: side especially because i was investing already uh at the later stage and so,
- 3:05Speaker0: i had the opportunity to help also some entrepreneurs in scaling.
- 3:11Speaker0: Their businesses. Now at Partec, basically, I'm investing at Series A and B,
- 3:18Speaker0: so much earlier on compared to what I was doing at age 14.
- 3:23Speaker0: And basically, I'm using what I learned in the first 10 years of my career to,
- 3:31Speaker0: A, to understand which are ideally the companies and the business models that
- 3:36Speaker0: work better than others.
- 3:37Speaker0: And B, when my portfolio companies reach already a certain scale,
- 3:44Speaker0: I can help them in identifying early on the issues that they have and,
- 3:51Speaker0: you know, solving them and scaling them.
- 3:55Speaker0: Uh scanning basically the the business uh ideally becoming uh you know large
- 4:01Speaker0: businesses and also profitable.
- 4:05Speaker1: I was wondering you you talk about learning what did you believe early on for
- 4:10Speaker1: example when you started at main um that you now think is wrong
- 4:17Speaker0: In terms of uh you mean for venture capital or in general?
- 4:23Speaker1: In general investing, but especially, of course, 91 percent of our audience
- 4:28Speaker1: listens for professional reasons. By the way, there's always audience feedback link.
- 4:33Speaker1: You can take it every time, wherever you're watching this or listening to this.
- 4:38Speaker1: So especially in venture capital investing.
- 4:43Speaker0: So listen, I think that is, you know, consulting. I think it is good when you
- 4:51Speaker0: start working because you learn a lot.
- 4:54Speaker0: Maybe what the output that you generate is not super useful,
- 4:59Speaker0: but for sure you learn a lot.
- 5:02Speaker0: So what I would say is that I wouldn't use or I wouldn't hire consultants for
- 5:09Speaker0: any kind of need and assessment.
- 5:13Speaker0: That I have to perform on my portfolio companies because by the way, I can do it by myself.
- 5:20Speaker0: But very often, you know, CEOs were hiring consultants just because they were,
- 5:25Speaker0: they wanted to put the finger to the consultant and blame them just because
- 5:30Speaker0: they said what the CEOs wanted,
- 5:34Speaker0: to tell to their managers. Okay.
- 5:36Speaker0: So this is a little bit how it worked. But consulting is a good school,
- 5:41Speaker0: as it is also investment banking.
- 5:44Speaker0: Pros and cons of the two experiences. Of course, you learn different skills.
- 5:51Speaker1: Little disclaimer for my laughter here. It was not about Simone.
- 5:54Speaker1: It was not about the consultants.
- 5:56Speaker1: It was about my memory starting out in consulting.
- 6:01Speaker1: Simone, what was the most common misconceptions founders have about venture capital.
- 6:08Speaker1: Usually I would assume the most misconceptions are cleared out after seed.
- 6:17Speaker1: But there should be some misconceptions at the very start.
- 6:20Speaker1: For example, what I see with most early stage founders, it's venture capital.
- 6:25Speaker1: So I pitch it. They don't understand that it requires different expertise,
- 6:30Speaker1: different stages, different industries.
- 6:34Speaker0: Yeah. So let me say that today in the venture capital industry,
- 6:39Speaker0: both on the investor side and on the founder side, there is a big ego topic.
- 6:45Speaker0: And a lot of decisions are made also driven by ego sometimes.
- 6:52Speaker0: I'm not saying always, but sometimes.
- 6:54Speaker0: And not rationally. Okay. And I can understand, you know, young founders with
- 7:00Speaker0: a lot of ambition that they see their peers raising massive round,
- 7:06Speaker0: you know, hundreds of millions at super high valuations.
- 7:11Speaker0: And they probably just look at the positive side of that and they do not understand the implications,
- 7:19Speaker0: that those rounds have in terms of, you know, the liquidation preference stack
- 7:24Speaker0: that you might have on top of your head,
- 7:27Speaker0: especially if things are not going well.
- 7:31Speaker0: So I think, you know, it is very much important to understand early on if you
- 7:36Speaker0: want to embark in a journey with
- 7:37Speaker0: a venture capital Because the moment you race around, this is not just.
- 7:45Speaker0: A first milestone of success, but basically you are automatically raising the
- 7:50Speaker0: bar and you are embarking on a journey where the speed has to be much faster
- 7:58Speaker0: compared to what you did before.
- 8:01Speaker0: And, you know, capital is accelerating things, is accelerating growth,
- 8:06Speaker0: technically, but it is also accelerating issues.
- 8:10Speaker0: So if you don't have the right machine, the right people in place,
- 8:13Speaker0: you might risk to hit the wall.
- 8:17Speaker1: A very smart friend of mine told me, basically, all venture capitalists are
- 8:22Speaker1: sharks that will hunt you if you're not fast enough.
- 8:26Speaker1: Would you agree to that?
- 8:29Speaker1: He didn't instantly say no
- 8:35Speaker0: Let me tell you something. Private equity funds can be considered as sharks. Okay.
- 8:44Speaker0: For venture capital fund, I wouldn't define myself a shark when I pay very hefty valuations,
- 8:56Speaker0: okay, at enterprise on a very limited traction just because a company wants
- 9:03Speaker0: to raise a certain amount of money that is typically quite big.
- 9:09Speaker0: And of course, there is a rule of, you know, 20% or even less of dilution.
- 9:15Speaker0: The thing is, our job on paper is to make money, to deliver our clients,
- 9:25Speaker0: are both the entrepreneurs, but also our investors, the LPs.
- 9:30Speaker0: So at some point we need to generate money.
- 9:34Speaker0: If of course we see that things are not going well, we need to take actions
- 9:42Speaker0: and to explain to the entrepreneurs that things are not going as expected and
- 9:47Speaker0: he has to change something.
- 9:49Speaker0: Then of course it is market standard to have the 1x liquidation preference on each round.
- 9:59Speaker0: And then, of course, okay, you might blame and you might say that that is not fair.
- 10:06Speaker0: How can I say?
- 10:07Speaker1: Welcome to life. Life is not fair.
- 10:12Speaker0: For sure, there are some funds, you know, the very large fund that are very
- 10:17Speaker0: much power load driven funds.
- 10:21Speaker0: They tend to you know invest in a high number of companies but just to spend
- 10:26Speaker0: time on those that are going very well and they tend to forget a little bit
- 10:32Speaker0: about those that are not going well,
- 10:36Speaker0: the other VC funds that are not focused on power law and that basically they,
- 10:43Speaker0: in a way tend to minimize a little bit the loss ratio,
- 10:47Speaker0: my view is that they are a bit more supportive also in companies that are not
- 10:52Speaker0: performing super well, just because they want to try to have maybe an early
- 10:57Speaker0: exit and to sell the company, I don't know, to a corporate.
- 11:03Speaker0: Yes, of course. I wouldn't define venture capitals as sharks, but my personal view.
- 11:11Speaker1: I still find it funny that you didn't not instantly say no.
- 11:16Speaker1: But we are already talking about scaling companies fast when you invest venture capital.
- 11:24Speaker1: What we say is the first sign you look for that capital, venture capital,
- 11:30Speaker1: your venture capital will actually improve a company?
- 11:35Speaker0: Look, I think that companies are made of people, okay?
- 11:40Speaker0: And, you know, I don't think that companies with more revenues are better than smaller companies.
- 11:50Speaker0: Companies that have a solid tier one top management are better than others.
- 11:58Speaker0: So the sign that I want to see is a willingness and ability,
- 12:04Speaker0: both things together, of the founding team of being surrounded of top talent, top managers.
- 12:12Speaker0: Because, you know, and by the way, it is very difficult and I understand that
- 12:17Speaker0: because typically the company is your own baby.
- 12:21Speaker0: So sometimes it is difficult, you know, to let it go and to delegate.
- 12:25Speaker0: But it is important long-term to have someone that has more experience than
- 12:29Speaker0: you and that can do things much better than you.
- 12:33Speaker0: So the ability of selecting people and then, you know, also the willingness
- 12:39Speaker0: of hiring those people is a key point for me.
- 12:48Speaker1: What would you say is a signal that capital won't improve this company?
- 12:56Speaker1: We've been talking about the human factor here.
- 12:59Speaker1: Would you say that's also the most decisive one?
- 13:03Speaker0: Probably, yes. Absolutely. Absolutely. Because it is when you have the right
- 13:07Speaker0: people in place, it is when the magic happens, right?
- 13:14Speaker0: If you don't have the right people in place, and of course, not everyone is
- 13:18Speaker0: the right person for the right company,
- 13:22Speaker0: but when you have the right mix of people in place and the right culture is
- 13:28Speaker0: created, it is when you have the magic happening.
- 13:33Speaker1: We've seen companies here at Startup Radio, for example, like Emma Sleep,
- 13:37Speaker1: they scale to the last available public numbers on 950 million in revenue,
- 13:44Speaker1: million euros, with very little funding.
- 13:48Speaker1: What did they get fundamentally right?
- 13:53Speaker0: So let me say first that I never had the chance to look deeply at Emma, okay?
- 14:01Speaker0: But I know quite well that space.
- 14:06Speaker0: So Emma basically was playing in a vertical where the consumer have a very low.
- 14:17Speaker0: Repeat rate, repurchase rate.
- 14:19Speaker0: Okay, so if you buy a mattress basically this year, probably you won't buy another
- 14:26Speaker0: one in the next two or three months.
- 14:28Speaker0: That means automatically that you need to have a customer acquisition cost that
- 14:35Speaker0: is lower than your contribution margin post cost of production,
- 14:41Speaker0: post cost of goods sold and post,
- 14:44Speaker0: logistic cost. Okay.
- 14:47Speaker0: And so I guess that, A, since day one, they set up the operations in a very
- 14:54Speaker0: asset-like way because basically they didn't have their own logistics.
- 14:59Speaker0: They didn't have their own production.
- 15:02Speaker0: They just had a sourcing team in Southeast Asia.
- 15:07Speaker0: And then they basically relied on third-party provider.
- 15:11Speaker0: And then more on the customer acquisition side, again, I'm not sure,
- 15:16Speaker0: but I think that they did what my portfolio company, Coro, did also.
- 15:22Speaker0: So meaning using the microbloggers on Instagram because that can give you a lot of variability,
- 15:34Speaker0: because, you know, they give a lot of discount codes and basically you pay only on performance.
- 15:43Speaker0: And I think basically they were in the right vertical at the right moment because then COVID started.
- 15:52Speaker0: So probably there was also a pickup of the revenues and, you know,
- 15:55Speaker0: multiple e-commerce companies were pretty high back then. Post-COVID-19.
- 16:02Speaker0: Who knows what would have happened? But, you know, they sold the company at the right moment.
- 16:08Speaker0: And I think that, you know, it was a massive journey. So congrats with them.
- 16:13Speaker0: Chapeau, as they say in Paris.
- 16:15Speaker1: By the way, we interviewed the founder. Basically, he said they were too honest
- 16:20Speaker1: in their pitch decks. They had realistic numbers, but everybody inflates them apparently.
- 16:27Speaker1: And so everybody thought, oh, the real numbers are the inflated numbers and
- 16:30Speaker1: nobody invested. So that was the bottom line of the interview.
- 16:34Speaker1: Let's get back to that. If that company had raised significantly more capital
- 16:39Speaker1: early on, what would likely have broken first, like culture, product or economics?
- 16:49Speaker0: I see three potential mistakes they could have made.
- 16:55Speaker0: A, setting up their own operations, warehouses, logistics, that is very difficult
- 17:04Speaker0: to operate and is very expensive, so from a CapEx perspective.
- 17:08Speaker0: B, they might have been tempted to increase, to push up the customer acquisition
- 17:16Speaker0: costs to increase the revenues,
- 17:21Speaker0: basically reducing their margins and overall unit economics.
- 17:25Speaker0: And C, they might have been tempted also to hire a lot of an army of developers
- 17:32Speaker0: that for this specific business, I'm not sure they are so necessary.
- 17:41Speaker0: Just because they might have been tempted to say, hey, I'm a tech company.
- 17:48Speaker1: I think I know what you mean. Like now everything can be tech.
- 17:53Speaker1: We've also seen spectacularly that co-working is not necessarily tech.
- 18:01Speaker1: I was wondering because I also see that here privately in my company, you're tempted by
- 18:12Speaker1: more available funds that you ask outsiders to do more.
- 18:18Speaker1: You just try to do more. So does sometimes capital make companies worse because
- 18:26Speaker1: it removes their financial discipline?
- 18:30Speaker0: Well, the reality is that for sure, so let's start from one very common thing.
- 18:41Speaker0: When a company raises a round, there is,
- 18:45Speaker0: a moment in which the founders and the rest of the team, they are so tired at
- 18:53Speaker0: the end of the process, so exhausted because the team basically pushed art,
- 18:58Speaker0: for really for a month to deliver results and not to disappoint the investors
- 19:02Speaker0: that are about to invest.
- 19:04Speaker0: That they tend to, of course, not always, but they tend sometimes to relax a little bit.
- 19:10Speaker0: And the abundance of capital might trigger what they call the champagne mode,
- 19:18Speaker0: meaning that, you know, you have abundance of capital.
- 19:23Speaker0: So you are not really caring too much whether your employees are taking on subscriptions,
- 19:30Speaker0: they are taking consulting services, headhunters, any kind of expenses.
- 19:36Speaker0: And if you don't check, you don't have processes in place, you know,
- 19:42Speaker0: you might have bad surprises.
- 19:44Speaker0: Also, more on the people hiring side.
- 19:48Speaker0: Again, if you do not establish and design a target organization and understand
- 19:55Speaker0: which are the right roles that you need to go from point A to point B.
- 20:02Speaker0: You might end up basically overhiring. Mm-hmm.
- 20:07Speaker0: A number of people that is too high and the wrong type of people.
- 20:13Speaker0: And in that sense, this is not adding value at all. This is destroying value.
- 20:18Speaker0: Because by the way, founders and existing investors got diluted with this round.
- 20:25Speaker0: And you're not creating value. So this is an issue. So this is typically what
- 20:30Speaker0: is happening when you are raising money. Not always, but when you raise too much money.
- 20:38Speaker1: What will stick to my mind for the next few years is champagne mode. I like that.
- 20:48Speaker1: You've described that pretty nicely with an outside view.
- 20:53Speaker1: What would you say breaks internally first in those companies?
- 21:02Speaker0: Again, I think that the most tricky thing is going back to the hiring of the wrong people, because,
- 21:10Speaker0: when you hire, typically you
- 21:12Speaker0: realize that a person is not right for that role after six, nine months.
- 21:18Speaker0: And after six, nine months, you have already spent a substantial amount of time
- 21:24Speaker0: on onboarding and training that person for that role.
- 21:28Speaker0: And therefore, if after nine months you need to get rid of that person and restart
- 21:33Speaker0: from scratch, re-spend money on hiring, well, I think that you might start to create a lot of friction,
- 21:43Speaker0: on daily operations.
- 21:45Speaker0: So having a core group of people that are there with an average tenure that
- 21:52Speaker0: is much longer than the average
- 21:56Speaker0: is really important because you have one third or more of your employees that change every year,
- 22:02Speaker0: still to be tough, in my opinion.
- 22:05Speaker1: Yes, like in consulting, when on average every year 20% change,
- 22:12Speaker1: it's completely common to have an I'm leaving the company in your mailbox like almost every week.
- 22:22Speaker1: If I would ask you to choose what creates more long-term value,
- 22:27Speaker1: is it capital efficiency or aggressive scaling?
- 22:34Speaker1: By the way, that's also very interesting given the current scaling race in artificial intelligence.
- 22:41Speaker0: Absolutely. So let's say that,
- 22:46Speaker0: when you are small, let's say sub 10 million in revenues or even five,
- 22:53Speaker0: I think you have no choice, but just scaling aggressively, okay?
- 22:59Speaker0: Because you are too small to become profitable.
- 23:03Speaker0: If you start reaching 15, 20 million, I think you can have a choice.
- 23:11Speaker0: Let's start from what, by defining what aggressive scaling means to me.
- 23:17Speaker0: I think I see three categories.
- 23:20Speaker0: A, one is price dumping.
- 23:25Speaker0: That is basically the art of using the VC money to subsidize the price of your product.
- 23:31Speaker0: Two, conquer market share.
- 23:35Speaker0: Okay uh and this is basically very good because later on,
- 23:41Speaker0: once you have a dominant position in the market you can always increase the prices uh b,
- 23:48Speaker0: you can flood your local market with sales and marketing in a super aggressive
- 23:55Speaker0: way and it is basically the other side of the coin uh,
- 23:59Speaker0: of price dumping, because on the unit economics, they have more or less the same impact.
- 24:04Speaker0: But basically, if you flood the market with your sales team and marketing, again, same stuff.
- 24:13Speaker0: And then basically, you can go international and open multiple markets at the
- 24:19Speaker0: same time. This is really assuming you have a business model that is really exportable.
- 24:25Speaker0: These are the three measures of aggressive scaling that I think are good and okay.
- 24:34Speaker0: But the moment you see that basically to add one euro of additional revenue, you need to spend an,
- 24:45Speaker0: always higher amount in sales and marketing, I think you need to stop.
- 24:52Speaker0: If we go back to.
- 24:55Speaker0: Basically to capital efficiency, I think that if you are already at 15, 20 million,
- 25:03Speaker0: you can afford, if you want, to say, okay, I still have, I don't know,
- 25:08Speaker0: 10 million on the balance sheet or five, I don't know, something like this.
- 25:15Speaker0: I'm very close to profitability. I can decide to grow 40% every year,
- 25:23Speaker0: making selected investments.
- 25:26Speaker0: And when selected means I make a proper assessment of what is the input and what is the output.
- 25:36Speaker0: If you grow 40% every year for seven years, basically you reach,
- 25:42Speaker0: this is the amazing effect of compounding, you reach 200 million.
- 25:47Speaker0: That is overall a nice outcome and probably you would have generated a decent amount of cash flow.
- 25:53Speaker0: And in that case, by the way, in the middle, you can always change your mind
- 25:58Speaker0: and decide to raise capital if there are the right opportunities out there.
- 26:03Speaker0: But it is a nice outcome. And the overall dilution in some cases,
- 26:07Speaker0: of course, is way lower than if you raise $150 million to get to $200 million in revenues.
- 26:17Speaker0: It's a matter of personal choices. This is how I see it.
- 26:25Speaker1: Which one would you say fails more often?
- 26:31Speaker0: Of course, it isn't an easy one. Well, aggressive failing, because you need
- 26:38Speaker0: always to be in control at each point in time.
- 26:44Speaker0: And if you have your company that is growing that fast, it's going,
- 26:49Speaker0: I don't know, let's say from one to 50 million in revenues. in,
- 26:55Speaker0: I don't know, let's say two years.
- 26:58Speaker0: Well, there are a lot of things that you need to fix. You need to change constantly processes, people.
- 27:05Speaker0: So you need really to have a proper, I think, finance department,
- 27:12Speaker0: in place to make sure that you need to track everything because otherwise you
- 27:19Speaker0: can really risk to go off-road.
- 27:23Speaker1: Talking about tracking everything, do you think venture capital sometimes compensates
- 27:30Speaker1: for weak business models? We work!
- 27:34Speaker0: 100%. So there are two cases. The first one is when there are hypes.
- 27:43Speaker1: Yeah, we've seen this, like ride sharing, fast delivery, whatever is out there, right?
- 27:53Speaker1: There's always a hype in startups, right? There was quick delivery.
- 27:59Speaker1: There was marketplaces. There was social media.
- 28:04Speaker1: What else did I forget? Blockchain.
- 28:08Speaker1: Cloud first.
- 28:12Speaker1: I could go for quite some time.
- 28:14Speaker0: Yeah, yeah, exactly, exactly. Roll-ups more recently.
- 28:22Speaker0: Of course, during a hype.
- 28:26Speaker0: It might happen that the venture capital wants to deploy absolutely into that
- 28:31Speaker0: vertical, into that model.
- 28:33Speaker0: And so if the first company is already gone because it is already too big,
- 28:38Speaker0: I say, okay, let's invest in company B.
- 28:41Speaker0: But maybe company B is not that great. And so, but if that VC ends up investing
- 28:46Speaker0: there, you say, well, it's good for the entrepreneur.
- 28:52Speaker0: The other case is when you invest in a company, the business model doesn't work
- 28:58Speaker0: super well or founding team is not great, not amazing.
- 29:02Speaker0: Overall growth is not really there. Maybe you have burned a bit too much.
- 29:10Speaker0: And existing investors don't want, you know, to cut their investment and to
- 29:16Speaker0: put it at zero for multiple reasons. And they continue injecting some capital into the company.
- 29:23Speaker0: And that company might end up selling to a corporate for $150 to $100 million.
- 29:29Speaker0: And in some cases, the VC will end up having a nice 1x return on their investment.
- 29:38Speaker0: And founder with a little bit of luck might have, I don't know,
- 29:43Speaker0: 20, 30, more or 50 million in return because they have common shares.
- 29:49Speaker0: And so in that case, why not?
- 29:57Speaker1: I was wondering,
- 30:00Speaker1: as we've seen, even weak business models can make tempting acquisition targets
- 30:05Speaker1: for established companies, but what would you say as a VC?
- 30:11Speaker1: What metrics exposes this the faster? Does you cover up a weak business model with venture capital?
- 30:21Speaker1: It may not always be the losses you are incurring.
- 30:26Speaker0: Sorry, can you just repeat the question?
- 30:30Speaker1: What's the metric you think is the number one that would expose a weak business model
- 30:40Speaker1: compensated, hidden by injection of venture capital?
- 30:45Speaker1: It cannot always be losses.
- 30:48Speaker1: Sometimes pretty good long-term companies make losses in the start.
- 30:52Speaker1: But what would you say is the number one metric?
- 31:02Speaker0: Look, I think that at some point, companies,
- 31:08Speaker0: when they raise too much capital, you have the ratio between capital raise and,
- 31:15Speaker0: revenues that they have that start to be a bit too high.
- 31:21Speaker0: And that is not a good this is the first signal that you see,
- 31:27Speaker0: as an indicator of you know issues on that company that's why in some cases
- 31:35Speaker0: when you announce a round,
- 31:38Speaker0: it is also it is always a little bit tricky to announce the true size of the
- 31:44Speaker0: round or to pump it a little to be tempted to pump it a little bit,
- 31:51Speaker0: to show that you are better than competitors and you have more money than compared to yours.
- 32:00Speaker1: I vividly remember the dot-com boom area where traditionally your losses have
- 32:06Speaker1: been larger than your revenue.
- 32:07Speaker1: Let me ask differently, where do you draw the line between necessary investments
- 32:15Speaker1: and really unnecessarily burn.
- 32:21Speaker0: So, listen, I think that unnecessary burn can be everything related to expenses,
- 32:29Speaker0: due to lack of tracking, reporting, measurement, processes in place,
- 32:34Speaker0: or budgeting choices made without having a proper assessment framework that
- 32:40Speaker0: are not in the end delivering results.
- 32:42Speaker0: OK, so this is what I define unnecessary burn.
- 32:49Speaker0: Necessary investment to me is something that is absolutely required to protect
- 32:56Speaker0: the existence of the company in its core market or to defend the company from external threats.
- 33:04Speaker0: For example, I don't know, cybersecurity. OK, everything is a middle,
- 33:09Speaker0: in my opinion, is up for discussion, you know.
- 33:15Speaker0: So these are the two definitions that I have in my head.
- 33:23Speaker1: Also, picking a little bit on your head, what would you say is the first bad
- 33:28Speaker1: decision companies make when they have too much money?
- 33:34Speaker0: Change office.
- 33:35Speaker1: Sorry?
- 33:36Speaker0: They want to change office.
- 33:38Speaker1: Ah, bigger, more fancy. Okay, okay.
- 33:43Speaker0: They want to move to an insanely fancy office. This is part of the champagne
- 33:50Speaker0: mode that I mentioned before.
- 33:52Speaker0: They want to change office. And if you go to, if you visit the company in person
- 33:59Speaker0: and, well, you say, wow, amazing office, congrats.
- 34:05Speaker0: I mean, still as a startup, I don't think that having an amazing office is a
- 34:11Speaker0: good sign because I don't think, okay, I understand the corporate culture,
- 34:15Speaker0: but I mean, you are not Google, you know?
- 34:17Speaker1: Yes, I understand. We've been going over our guest Emma for some time because
- 34:24Speaker1: they grew with almost no external capital. They did have a little bit of investment.
- 34:30Speaker1: But let's go to companies we also interviewed like Flix.
- 34:34Speaker1: They required significant capital to scale.
- 34:38Speaker1: What made that justified?
- 34:42Speaker0: So maybe let me remind for the audience a little bit how the Flix model works,
- 34:48Speaker0: right? Because I think it is useful.
- 34:51Speaker0: So when they basically decide to open a new market or to launch a specific route from city A to city B,
- 35:01Speaker0: they select a certain number of local bus partners that basically allocate specific
- 35:08Speaker0: buses to work with for Flix.
- 35:12Speaker0: And same is for the driver they have to be,
- 35:16Speaker0: they need to have the Flix branding and basically Flix is sharing the economics,
- 35:23Speaker0: with the bus partner of each trip once you achieve a certain utilization rate
- 35:28Speaker0: on each trip on each line basically,
- 35:32Speaker0: Flix achieves a pretty interesting margin that I cannot disclose because the company is private.
- 35:41Speaker0: So on overall, I think that the company has been pretty disciplined in launching new market,
- 35:52Speaker0: on the customer acquisition side,
- 35:54Speaker0: because I remember when I was supporting them, even on TV advertising,
- 35:59Speaker0: they were really spending a very limited amount of money.
- 36:05Speaker0: They were super, super disciplined on that.
- 36:09Speaker0: Flix basically spent a lot of money in acquiring in asset-like M&A to buy basically local players.
- 36:21Speaker0: Okay, so the big chunk of the money was used to that.
- 36:26Speaker0: They acquired Greyhound in the U.S., the iconic bus operator in the U.S.
- 36:31Speaker0: They opened India, Brazil, Turkey.
- 36:35Speaker0: They acquired the largest, basically, bus operator in Turkey.
- 36:40Speaker0: So that is where the big chunk of the money actually went.
- 36:47Speaker0: But what I really liked back then of Flix, of Flix's model, on top of the three
- 36:54Speaker0: founders that personally I think that were amazing and I still believe that today,
- 37:01Speaker0: is that it is one of the very few business models that has a global potential
- 37:08Speaker0: that is easily exportable in any kind of geography,
- 37:13Speaker0: and where you can have a global repeat because basically people,
- 37:18Speaker0: when they travel, they can use Flix in any kind of geography where Flix is present.
- 37:26Speaker0: So this is basically the nice thing of Flix and it is basically quite difficult to replicate.
- 37:34Speaker0: So it is highly defensible.
- 37:38Speaker1: What would have happened with Flix without that massive VC investment in capital?
- 37:47Speaker0: Listen, I think that basically,
- 37:53Speaker0: it was one of the very few business models where VC investment were really required to scale or,
- 38:02Speaker0: in case if they had failed in raising additional capital, basically they would have.
- 38:10Speaker0: Stopped acquiring other businesses and so they might have found themselves just
- 38:15Speaker0: on a couple of geographies, let's say Germany, Italy and France,
- 38:18Speaker0: they were the three core geographies. They wouldn't have expanded into the UK, into Turkey.
- 38:25Speaker0: And so they would have gone basically, they would have become profitable way sooner.
- 38:32Speaker0: This is how because basically Germany and Italy they became profitable pretty early on,
- 38:43Speaker0: so the business was you know.
- 38:46Speaker1: Cash generating
- 38:51Speaker1: what would we say if Flix were built today would you find it the same way?
- 38:58Speaker0: So I think yes maybe Maybe they would have required less capital on the tech side.
- 39:10Speaker0: Because, you know, they had a good
- 39:14Speaker0: number of developers in Munich that are expensive, as you can imagine.
- 39:20Speaker0: Today, with the AI that has completely transformed the way developers write
- 39:28Speaker0: code, basically, they might have needed a much lower number of developers.
- 39:35Speaker0: And so, you know, the cost automatically goes down.
- 39:40Speaker0: But on the rest, I think that,
- 39:46Speaker0: it was the right way of doing it.
- 39:51Speaker1: What types of companies do you think truly need venture capital to win?
- 39:58Speaker1: And which should actually avoid it?
- 40:01Speaker0: So I think that the, listen, the companies that absolutely require,
- 40:11Speaker0: venture capital are companies with founders that have global ambitions and where
- 40:17Speaker0: the business model has numbers, you know, unit economics that work and that can be exported,
- 40:26Speaker0: outside of your core market, basically where you can create,
- 40:32Speaker0: a massive outcome. uh,
- 40:37Speaker0: this this is the uh this is the reality on the other side to be a little bit
- 40:43Speaker0: provocative here companies that should absolutely avoid vcs,
- 40:51Speaker0: are roll-ups,
- 40:54Speaker0: because it doesn't work vc doesn't work for roll-ups and i'm and actually.
- 41:02Speaker0: If you want, I can explain you why. But so,
- 41:07Speaker0: keep in mind that every round, for sure, Series A, Series B,
- 41:13Speaker0: has to be done with NVC with 20% or more or less the standard dilution. Okay?
- 41:23Speaker0: You raise the first round, and that one is more or less okay.
- 41:27Speaker0: So seed round is more or less okay.
- 41:30Speaker0: You use the money to acquire companies that are valued, let's say, 3, 4x a bit.
- 41:37Speaker0: And let's say that they have, I don't know, 10 million in revenues.
- 41:44Speaker0: Then, if you want to grow, because you have just acquired companies that are
- 41:48Speaker0: not growing, you need additional capital. So you raise another round.
- 41:55Speaker0: You raise another round, and of course, you don't want to dilute yourself.
- 41:59Speaker0: So you raise the bar, you just ask for a standard 20% dilution,
- 42:05Speaker0: and automatically the valuation, the multiple on revenues goes up.
- 42:12Speaker0: So you just spent, let's say, I don't know, 7, 8 million to acquire 10 million
- 42:18Speaker0: in revenues, and you are automatically valued, let's say, 80 million.
- 42:23Speaker0: Okay. But down the line,
- 42:28Speaker0: if you just end up being basically a package of non-integrated,
- 42:37Speaker0: companies that on the market standalone would be valued at 3, 4, 5x EBITDA.
- 42:47Speaker0: Down the line, you raise to be valued 3, 4x EBITDA.
- 42:53Speaker0: But the problem is that in the meanwhile, you raise tons of venture capital
- 43:00Speaker0: rounds that put on top of your head 1x LickPref.
- 43:07Speaker0: And so if that happens, basically, you are squeezed after some time.
- 43:11Speaker0: So this is for which I would prefer to avoid that.
- 43:21Speaker1: Guys, if capital can both accelerate success and hide structural weakness,
- 43:27Speaker1: what is the decision rule that separates the two?
- 43:31Speaker1: We are already doing 45 minutes. We'll do a second part because we are already running 45 minutes.