Latest / Vietnam- The Advisory Years to 1965 / 009 - The Taylor Mission
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- 0:00Speaker 1: Chapter eight of Vietnam The Advisory Years to nineteen sixty
- 0:05Speaker 1: five by Robert Hugh Trell and Martin Blumensen. This is
- 0:09Speaker 1: a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
- 0:14Speaker 1: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
- 0:18Speaker 1: Chapter eight the Tailor Mission. Several hours after announcing on
- 0:24Speaker 1: October eleventh, nineteen sixty one, the dispatch of farm Gate
- 0:28Speaker 1: to Vietnam, President Kennedy disclosed that he was sending his
- 0:32Speaker 1: military adviser, General Taylor to Saigon. Taylor was to make
- 0:36Speaker 1: an educated military guests of the situation in the country
- 0:40Speaker 1: and to find ways in which we can perhaps better
- 0:43Speaker 1: assist the government of Vietnam and meeting this threat to
- 0:47Speaker 1: its independence. In his letter of instructions to the General,
- 0:51Speaker 1: Kennedy said, the initial responsibility for the effective maintenance of
- 0:55Speaker 1: the independence of South Vietnam rests with the people and
- 0:59Speaker 1: government of that country, concerned with political, social, and economic
- 1:04Speaker 1: matters in addition to military problems. The President appointed Walt W.
- 1:09Speaker 1: Rostro as Taylor's deputy. Actually, Taylor was to advise the
- 1:14Speaker 1: President whether to deploy US combat forces for a direct
- 1:18Speaker 1: role in Vietnam or to continue US training and support functions.
- 1:22Speaker 1: Only public knowledge of Taylor's mission produced an immediate reaction
- 1:27Speaker 1: from the Communists. On October twelfth, Premier Chau and Lai
- 1:31Speaker 1: warned that China could scarcely be indifferent to the increasingly
- 1:34Speaker 1: grave situation caused by United States imperialism in South Vietnam.
- 1:39Speaker 1: Ho Chi Minh went to Peking for discussions. The Soviet
- 1:44Speaker 1: Union lent the Tailor Mission with flagging diplomatic discussions at
- 1:48Speaker 1: Geneva in charge the United States with planning to send
- 1:51Speaker 1: troops to Vietnam to bring pressure to bear on the situation.
- 1:55Speaker 1: Allows On October fourteenth, North Vietnam protested to the International
- 2:01Speaker 1: Control Commission that the Tailor Mission was meant to intensify
- 2:05Speaker 1: United States intervention in South Vietnam and prepare the way
- 2:09Speaker 1: for introducing United States troops. What was the exact state
- 2:14Speaker 1: of affairs in South Vietnam? Increases in viet Cong numbers, aggressiveness,
- 2:19Speaker 1: and incidents constantly surprised the Vietnamese National Intelligence Agency. United
- 2:25Speaker 1: States intelligence estimates placed the strength of viet Cong main
- 2:29Speaker 1: forces a seventeen thousand men, eighty to ninety percent of
- 2:33Speaker 1: whom were recruited locally. President d M was complaining to
- 2:37Speaker 1: the International Control Commission of the international threat to his government,
- 2:42Speaker 1: Annoy's determination to liberate the South, the massive infiltration of
- 2:47Speaker 1: Communist agents, the ruthless strategy of terror waged against the
- 2:51Speaker 1: South Vietnamese people, and the endeavors to establish liberated territory
- 2:56Speaker 1: in the central reaches of the republicble of gaining recognition
- 3:01Speaker 1: and support from the communist powers. Sink Pack intelligence assessments
- 3:06Speaker 1: identified enemy goals as consolidating control over the richer agricultural
- 3:11Speaker 1: areas of the country, isolating Saigon and the d M
- 3:15Speaker 1: government from the people, in keeping the infiltration approaches into
- 3:19Speaker 1: South Vietnam open. What military assistance did the South Vietnamese want?
- 3:25Speaker 1: As the Vietnamese Defense Minister told Ambassador Nolting on October thirteen,
- 3:31Speaker 1: DM wished American combat units or combat training units to
- 3:35Speaker 1: be stationed near the seventeenth Parallel to make a show
- 3:38Speaker 1: of force and also to free Vietnamese units for anti
- 3:42Speaker 1: guerrilla action. En route to Saigon, Taylor and Rostau stopped
- 3:46Speaker 1: off in Hawaii for a briefing by Admiral Felt. The
- 3:50Speaker 1: Admiral stress that the Vietnamese required prompt us assistance. He
- 3:55Speaker 1: pinpointed two serious Vietnamese weaknesses, the tendency of province chiefs
- 4:00Speaker 1: to metal and military matters in the penchant of military
- 4:03Speaker 1: commanders to stay in static defensive positions. Felt endorsed the
- 4:08Speaker 1: farm Gate commitment, but saw no present need for other
- 4:11Speaker 1: American combat forces to take a direct part in the war.
- 4:15Speaker 1: He recommended continuing U. S. Air Force reconnaissance flights, accelerating
- 4:20Speaker 1: the delivery of T twenty eighth, and refining military communications.
- 4:25Speaker 1: He wanted the primitive airstrip at Plais Coup enlarged in
- 4:29Speaker 1: stores of ammunition, equipment, and wore consumables positioned at basis
- 4:33Speaker 1: for a possible introduction of SITO forces. The Taylor Rostau
- 4:39Speaker 1: mission arrived at Tan San Nut on October eighteenth, spent
- 4:43Speaker 1: six days in Vietnam, and departed for Baguio in the Philippines,
- 4:47Speaker 1: where the group sent President Kennedy an interim report. By
- 4:51Speaker 1: November third, the members drew up a lengthy final report.
- 4:55Speaker 1: General Taylor defined the situation in South Vietnam as an
- 4:59Speaker 1: acute crisis of confidence at every social level, doubt of
- 5:03Speaker 1: the seriousness of the U. S. Commitment, concern over Viet
- 5:06Speaker 1: Cong's successes and discouragement over recent floods that burdened in
- 5:11Speaker 1: already strained state. The military crisis mirrored political weakness. D
- 5:16Speaker 1: M was an old fashion Asian ruler, seeking to maintain
- 5:20Speaker 1: all the strings of power in his own hands while
- 5:23Speaker 1: fragmenting power beneath him. The military suffered from skimpy intelligence,
- 5:28Speaker 1: scant command control, and sparse mobility. A lack of target
- 5:32Speaker 1: intelligence and a frustrating structure hampered the small but capable
- 5:37Speaker 1: Vietnamese Air Force. It had made no significant contribution to
- 5:42Speaker 1: the struggle because there had been little photo reconnaissance before
- 5:45Speaker 1: the United States Air Force able Mabel missions. While the
- 5:50Speaker 1: very nature of guerrilla war makes good targets hard to find,
- 5:53Speaker 1: tailor noted sophisticated aerial photography should find such good targets
- 5:58Speaker 1: as there are. Finally, the general saw none of the
- 6:01Speaker 1: controlling structure necessary for effective tactical operations. There were less
- 6:07Speaker 1: than eight hundred American military personnel and even fewer civilians
- 6:11Speaker 1: in the country. None worked inside Vietnamese ministries, and few
- 6:15Speaker 1: were in the field. For d M preferred Americans to
- 6:18Speaker 1: remain in Saigon. Some U S officials apparently thought it
- 6:22Speaker 1: improper to report anything critical of the d M government.
- 6:26Speaker 1: As a result, it was not easy to secure a
- 6:29Speaker 1: thorough estimate of the situation. Still, the unsettled Laotian situation
- 6:35Speaker 1: had probably lessened Vietnamese confidence in the United States, and
- 6:39Speaker 1: more visible U. S. Military presence might restore Vietnamese morale.
- 6:45Speaker 1: General Taylor's recommendations included continuing U. S. Air Force reconnaissance
- 6:50Speaker 1: flights in Vietnam, setting up a U S. Tactical Air
- 6:54Speaker 1: Ground system run partially as a training program, giving farm
- 6:58Speaker 1: Gate a liberal rather than a restrictive mission, and improving
- 7:01Speaker 1: Vietnamese air facilities. He saw no reason to commit US
- 7:05Speaker 1: combat forces in a direct role for the moment envisioned successes,
- 7:10Speaker 1: hinging on DM's willingness to undertake political and social reforms.
- 7:16Speaker 1: With a clear impression that a U. S. Military presence
- 7:19Speaker 1: of some kind was greatly desired, General Taylor reported that
- 7:23Speaker 1: he leaned toward bolstering American military aid and advisory support
- 7:28Speaker 1: for a broadly conceived counter guerrilla campaign. Central to his
- 7:32Speaker 1: concept was making MAAG in operational headquarters for a theater
- 7:38Speaker 1: of war with eight thousand military advisors to quicken Vietnamese
- 7:42Speaker 1: training upgrade intelligence and communications, enrich research and development, and
- 7:49Speaker 1: give quick military and economic support to Vietnamese offensive operations.
- 7:54Speaker 1: An alternative was to deploy perhaps ten thousand U S
- 7:57Speaker 1: ground troops for defense to release the Vietnamese army for
- 8:01Speaker 1: active counterinsurgency. Though Taylor and his colleagues believed American support
- 8:06Speaker 1: for counterinsurgency inside Vietnam to be basic, they warned against
- 8:11Speaker 1: sending more US reinforcements until the nature of any final
- 8:14Speaker 1: settlement in Laos and the way in which Hanoi adjusted
- 8:18Speaker 1: to it were clear. If Hanoi persisted in its guerrilla infiltration,
- 8:23Speaker 1: the United States would be forced to attack the source
- 8:26Speaker 1: of guerrilla aggression in North Vietnam and impose on the
- 8:29Speaker 1: Hanoi government a price for participating in the current war,
- 8:33Speaker 1: which is commensurate would be damage inflicted on its neighbors
- 8:37Speaker 1: to the south. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not
- 8:40Speaker 1: care for the intim in final tailor rostyle reports. They
- 8:44Speaker 1: wanted a positive American commitment to the clear objective of
- 8:47Speaker 1: preventing the fall of South Vietnam, even if that meant
- 8:51Speaker 1: US military forces must fight. The loss of South Vietnam
- 8:55Speaker 1: would lead to Communist control over neighboring nations, and the
- 8:59Speaker 1: Chiefs favored in an immediate deployment of strong American combat
- 9:02Speaker 1: forces instead of a gradual entry of combat support units.
- 9:07Speaker 1: They proposed to warn Hanoi a punitive action unless Vietcong
- 9:11Speaker 1: aggression ceased, there was little chance of staving off the
- 9:15Speaker 1: fall of South Vietnam without U S forces on a
- 9:18Speaker 1: substantial scale. The United States could persuade North Vietnam of
- 9:23Speaker 1: its serious intent solely by a clear commitment to keep
- 9:26Speaker 1: South Vietnam out of the Communist camp, plus a diplomatic
- 9:30Speaker 1: warning to Hanoi that its continued support of the viet
- 9:33Speaker 1: Cong would bring American retaliation, a long war, and perhaps
- 9:37Speaker 1: the intervention of the People's Republic of China might ensue.
- 9:41Speaker 1: If it did, the United States would have to put
- 9:44Speaker 1: at least two hundred and five thousand military men into
- 9:47Speaker 1: the field. Secretary macnamara discussed the matter with the Joint
- 9:52Speaker 1: Chiefs on November eighth. He informed President Kennedy of his
- 9:55Speaker 1: and their support of the Taylor Rostow recommendations as first
- 10:00Speaker 1: apeps toward realizing the American aim averting the fall of
- 10:03Speaker 1: South Vietnam. Defending Southeast Asia would take no more than
- 10:07Speaker 1: six U S divisions about two hundred and five thousand men.
- 10:11Speaker 1: The United States, however, should introduce major US units into
- 10:15Speaker 1: Vietnam only if it was willing to make an unalterable
- 10:19Speaker 1: espousal of that goal. Macnamara and the Joint Chiefs were
- 10:24Speaker 1: candid in saying that success would turn upon many factors
- 10:27Speaker 1: not within our control, notably the conduct of d M
- 10:31Speaker 1: himself and other leaders in the area. They were uneasy
- 10:35Speaker 1: about American domestic political problems, but expected Congress to respond
- 10:40Speaker 1: better to affirm initial position than to courses of action
- 10:43Speaker 1: that lead US in only gradually, and that, in the
- 10:46Speaker 1: meantime are sure to involve casualties. The key, of course,
- 10:51Speaker 1: was the firmness of American intent. Without that, there was
- 10:54Speaker 1: no point to deploy sizeable units. As chairmen of the
- 10:58Speaker 1: State Department Pulace see Planning Council, Will Rostau argued for
- 11:03Speaker 1: a contingency policy of retaliation against North Vietnam, a program
- 11:09Speaker 1: graduated to match the intensity of Hanoi's support of the
- 11:12Speaker 1: Viet Cong. Upon his request, P. A. C. A. F.
- 11:17Speaker 1: Furnished Rostau with two lists of aerial targets in North Vietnam.
- 11:22Speaker 1: Admiral felt clung to his earlier opinion the United States
- 11:25Speaker 1: should not send large combat forces until the lesser measures
- 11:29Speaker 1: suggested by him and substantially approved by General Taylor were implemented.
- 11:35Speaker 1: President Kennedy was loth to approve an extensive, open ended commitment.
- 11:40Speaker 1: They want a force of American troops, he told an aid,
- 11:43Speaker 1: and he likened that force to the unit sent to
- 11:45Speaker 1: Germany earlier in the year. They say it's necessary in
- 11:49Speaker 1: order to restore confidence and maintain morale. But it will
- 11:53Speaker 1: be just like Berlin. The troops will march in, the
- 11:56Speaker 1: bands will play, the crowds will cheer, and in four
- 11:58Speaker 1: days everyone will have Then we will be told we
- 12:02Speaker 1: have to send in more troops. Its like taking a drink.
- 12:05Speaker 1: The effect wears off and you have to take another.
- 12:08Speaker 1: According to Kennedy, the war could be won only so
- 12:11Speaker 1: long as it remained Vietnam's war, otherwise the Americans would
- 12:15Speaker 1: lose like the French. On November eighth, Secretary of Defense McNamara,
- 12:20Speaker 1: together with the Joint Chiefs, had been inclined to recommend
- 12:23Speaker 1: a firm commitment to preclude the takeover of South Vietnam,
- 12:27Speaker 1: even if it meant direct military action. Three days later,
- 12:32Speaker 1: McNamara joined with Secretary of State Rusk in proposing a
- 12:36Speaker 1: more moderate stance in line with President Kennedy's thinking. The
- 12:40Speaker 1: Defense Secretary urged the instant dispatch of modest support units
- 12:44Speaker 1: and further study before resolving to send large organized units
- 12:48Speaker 1: for actual or potential combat. The National Security Council and
- 12:53Speaker 1: State and Defense representatives weight on November eleven American military
- 12:59Speaker 1: options in Vietnam. On the thirteenth, a State Defense memorandum
- 13:04Speaker 1: generally followed the Rusk macnamara view there was to be
- 13:08Speaker 1: no swift overt commitment of US combat troops to Vietnam.
- 13:13Speaker 1: A unilateral employment independent of SITO action might trigger a
- 13:17Speaker 1: military escalation, provoked apathy and perhaps hostility among South Vietnamese,
- 13:23Speaker 1: jeopardize the chances for a political settlement and LLOWS, and
- 13:28Speaker 1: promote domestic political repercussions in the United States. Also on
- 13:32Speaker 1: November thirteen, Kennedy approved the lesser measures more airlift, helicopters,
- 13:38Speaker 1: light planes, and transports for the d M forces, along
- 13:42Speaker 1: with the United States Air Force personnel in planes for
- 13:45Speaker 1: a reconnaissance in defoliation. Nine days later, the President advised
- 13:50Speaker 1: DM of American willingness to expand aid men and equipment
- 13:55Speaker 1: for a combined undertaking to speed Vietnamese training and to
- 13:59Speaker 1: help fashion better communications and intelligence. In return, DM would
- 14:04Speaker 1: have to put South Vietnam on a firm war footing,
- 14:07Speaker 1: mobilize his resources, give his government adequate authority, and overhaul
- 14:12Speaker 1: the military establishment and command structure. Meanwhile, uniform US military
- 14:18Speaker 1: personnel in the country would furnish airlift for Vietnamese forces,
- 14:23Speaker 1: air reconnaissance, photography, instruction in and execution of air ground
- 14:28Speaker 1: support techniques, and special intelligence. There was neither a statement
- 14:32Speaker 1: of American national objectives nor a provision for stronger US
- 14:37Speaker 1: military actions should these first phase measures prove insufficient. The
- 14:42Speaker 1: Air Staff regarded this as a much watered down policy.
- 14:46Speaker 1: It differed mainly from the Joint Chief's position by adding
- 14:48Speaker 1: the quid pro quo approach to the Republic of Vietnam
- 14:53Speaker 1: that his American commitments would grow solely in response to
- 14:56Speaker 1: positive Vietnamese actions. At a meeting of the Joint Chiefs
- 15:00Speaker 1: of Staff on December five, General LeMay expressed his grave concern.
- 15:05Speaker 1: He labeled what Rusk and McNamara had proposed, what the
- 15:09Speaker 1: President had approved as inadequate. The greater U S assistance
- 15:14Speaker 1: was still insufficient to defeat the Vietcom. Southeast Asia was
- 15:18Speaker 1: the best place for a showdown between the United States
- 15:21Speaker 1: and the Communists. This was not because of the local
- 15:24Speaker 1: terrain or political situation. It was because US military intervention
- 15:29Speaker 1: in Southeast Asia, including the use of nuclear weapons, could
- 15:33Speaker 1: be followed by many layers of escalation before the ultimate
- 15:37Speaker 1: confrontation would occur. In contrast, the Secretaries of State and
- 15:41Speaker 1: Defense had apparently tried to obscure, play down or delay
- 15:45Speaker 1: the determined and decisive action required to effectively combat the
- 15:50Speaker 1: communist threat. LeMay urged the Joint chiefs to suggest that
- 15:55Speaker 1: President Kennedy deploy sizeable American forces to Vietnam, them to
- 16:00Speaker 1: press for high level accord on a clear statement of
- 16:03Speaker 1: US objectives in the area, and to tell macnamara that
- 16:07Speaker 1: timely positive military actions are essential. He desired at least
- 16:12Speaker 1: a definite contingency commitment to insert US forces into Vietnam
- 16:16Speaker 1: for open operations when required. What the Air Force chief
- 16:20Speaker 1: thought were suitable forces for the commitment would be an
- 16:24Speaker 1: Army brigade task force, a marine division and its complementary
- 16:28Speaker 1: air wing, plus a tactical fighter squadron, a tactical bomber
- 16:33Speaker 1: squadron and a tactical reconnaissance task force. These units would
- 16:38Speaker 1: free the bulk of DM's forces to root out the
- 16:40Speaker 1: guerrillas and to secure South Vietnam's borders. They would also
- 16:45Speaker 1: bolster DM's political position and insure his regime and tenure
- 16:50Speaker 1: in office. LeMay envisioned no open engagement with the enemy,
- 16:54Speaker 1: but could not rule it out. Enemy military actions, he said,
- 16:58Speaker 1: would not alter the political objective, but such actions may
- 17:01Speaker 1: compel military responses which would not necessarily be confined to
- 17:05Speaker 1: South Vietnam. But there was no feasible military alternative of
- 17:10Speaker 1: lesser magnitude that would prevent the loss of South Vietnam
- 17:14Speaker 1: and ultimately of Southeast Asia. The Joint Chiefs referred LeMay's
- 17:18Speaker 1: proposal to the Joint Strategic Survey Council, a group of
- 17:22Speaker 1: senior officers freed from day to day matters so they
- 17:26Speaker 1: could take a detached view of broad military and political
- 17:29Speaker 1: questions as to examine the rationale for deploying U S
- 17:33Speaker 1: troops to South Vietnam. They replied on December seventh, the
- 17:38Speaker 1: recently authorized measures, even when implemented, they said, will prove
- 17:43Speaker 1: to be inadequate. The Council called attention to the deteriorating
- 17:47Speaker 1: military situation and the tenuous character of the South Vietnam government,
- 17:52Speaker 1: which made it imperative that the United States government take
- 17:56Speaker 1: the initiative to reassure President DM that the United State
- 18:00Speaker 1: States will support his government and will discourage and oppose
- 18:03Speaker 1: any internal factions which seek to overthrow him. US combat
- 18:08Speaker 1: forces and those of its Asian allies should go to
- 18:11Speaker 1: South Vietnam strong enough to assure the South Vietnamese of
- 18:15Speaker 1: our determination to support their government and to defeat communist digression.
- 18:20Speaker 1: There should be a military command in modus operandi in
- 18:24Speaker 1: South Vietnam which will assure loyalty and maximum combat effectiveness
- 18:29Speaker 1: in the campaign against the communists. Secretary Macnamara was not convinced,
- 18:34Speaker 1: as he afterwards told the President, I am not prepared
- 18:37Speaker 1: to endorse the views of the chiefs until we have
- 18:40Speaker 1: had more experience with our present program in South Vietnam.
- 18:44Speaker 1: Kennedy agreed. General LeMay clearly doubted if the administration actually
- 18:49Speaker 1: had a firm and definite Vietnam policy. In his opinion,
- 18:53Speaker 1: He later observed, none of the American military chiefs really
- 18:57Speaker 1: believed that the United States was undertaking anything except having
- 19:01Speaker 1: some diplomatic fiddling around with a little more aid program.
- 19:05Speaker 1: Part of this feeling might have flowed from le Maay's
- 19:07Speaker 1: frustration over major constraints hindering the Air Force's influence in Sia,
- 19:12Speaker 1: too few and two junior United States Air Force officers
- 19:16Speaker 1: in the MAAGS, PACAF's restricted voice in Vietnamese affairs, the
- 19:24Speaker 1: inability of the indigenous air forces to cope with the insurgency,
- 19:28Speaker 1: an inadequate ground environment for employment of United States Air
- 19:32Speaker 1: Force airpower on a large scale. Moreover, Secretary McNamara kept
- 19:37Speaker 1: a tight rein on the military services. In mid November,
- 19:41Speaker 1: for example, the movement of three single engine Liaison aircraft
- 19:45Speaker 1: to Vietnam required his permission. Little wondered that the United
- 19:50Speaker 1: States Air Force leadership felt cramped and uncomfortable. Maybe it
- 19:54Speaker 1: was no coincidence that on December five, the de General
- 19:57Speaker 1: LeMay voiced his concern to the Joint Chief of Staff.
- 20:01Speaker 1: Admiral Felt dispatched a warning to the Joint chiefs. He
- 20:04Speaker 1: reported that General mcgar maag Chief and Saigon, and Sir
- 20:10Speaker 1: Robert G. K. Thompson, head of a British advisory mission
- 20:14Speaker 1: to Saigon, were both uneasy because the situation in South
- 20:18Speaker 1: Vietnam was more than serious. It is critical, with the
- 20:21Speaker 1: peak of the crisis possible at any moment. End of
- 20:26Speaker 1: Chapter eight