Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / One browser extension can take over the AI assistant built into your browser
Transcript
- 0:03This is Decrypted. Saturday, the nineteenth of September.
- 0:07One browser extension can take over the AI assistant built into your browser.
- 0:12Researchers have shown that one browser extension, asking for two everyday permissions, can take over the AI
- 0:19assistants built into five browsers.
- 0:22Chrome, Edge, Perplexity's Comet, Opera Neon and Claude in Chrome.
- 0:28BleepingComputer reported the technique, named BragJack, today.
- 0:33There's no public evidence of it being used in the wild.
- 0:37But it's a tidy demonstration of what goes wrong when an AI assistant is handed the keys to the machine.
- 0:43Next. So, what does BragJack do?
- 0:47.
- 0:53The "body" runs inside your browser and can see the screen.
- 0:57In some products it can also read files, or use the camera and microphone.
- 1:02The "brain" sits on the vendor's servers and issues the commands.
- 1:07The body only takes orders from one trusted web page, such as gemini.
- 1:12google dot com for Chrome.
- 1:14Think of a valet who only follows instructions from the hotel reception desk.
- 1:19BragJack doesn't argue with the valet.
- 1:21It slips a note onto the reception desk's notepad, and the valet obeys.
- 1:26The malicious extension injects its own code into the trusted page, and talks to the assistant as though it w
- 1:32ere the vendor. It needs only a permission that changes web pages, which is common in ad blockers, and declara
- 1:39tiveNetRequest, which alters browser network traffic.
- 1:43This isn't classic prompt injection, where hidden text tricks a model.
- 1:47The attacker hands the agent a complete instruction, and the agent carries it out with the user's own privile
- 1:54ges.
- 1:58.
- 2:02Comet was the worst case. The extension could read any file, list visited sites, take screenshots and act as
- 2:10the user. The researchers got in through testing.
- 2:14perplexity dot com, which lacked the lockdown of the main site.
- 2:17Opera Neon was the easiest target, because opera dot com had no extension restrictions.
- 2:23Edge was harder. Microsoft's defences forced the researchers to chain two weaknesses.
- 2:29It's tracked as C V E twenty twenty-six, five five nine four five, rated 4.
- 2:362, and fixed in version 150.
- 2:390.4078.48. Chrome's flaw is C V E twenty twenty-six, zero six two eight, rated 8.
- 2:508, fixed in 143.0.7499.192 in January.
- 2:58Claude in Chrome was the mildest.
- 3:00That's one extension abusing another, which Anthropic rated medium.
- 3:05The five vendors paid around $20,000 in bounties in total.
- 3:09The attack assumes the victim has already installed the extension.
- 3:13That's the starting point for many browser attacks.
- 3:16And finally. The Secure by Design lesson.
- 3:20Three design choices made this possible.
- 3:22Trust was anchored to a web address, so a forgotten test site or marketing page became a command channel.
- 3:29The assistants held broader privileges than any single task needs.
- 3:33And the extension model treats "read and change data on websites" as a routine request.
- 3:39For UK organisations, my opinion is that an AI browser is privileged software, not a productivity toy.
- 3:47Allow extensions by exception, rather than by default.
- 3:51Keep browsers patched. And ask vendors plainly what an assistant can reach by default, and whether you can sw
- 3:58itch that off. Opinion, not advice.
- 4:01That was Decrypted. The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 4:06Thanks for listening.