Latest / ACLED Audio / WEBINAR: Are China’s oceanic tensions entering a new phase?

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WEBINAR: Are China’s oceanic tensions entering a new phase? · ACLED Audio

• 0:06
  SPEAKER_00: Welcome everyone and thank you for joining us on this webinar where we'll be exploring whether we are entering a new phase of oceanic tensions in Asia, specifically around Taiwan.
• 0:20
  SPEAKER_00: I'm the moderator for today's webinar and Daniel Herrera Kelly, Associate Analysis Manager at Accled.
• 0:26
  SPEAKER_00: Accolid is the armed conflict location and event data, and we are the leading source of data and analysis on global conflict.
• 0:36
  SPEAKER_00: And I'm glad to say it's quite a timely webinar on two accounts for us, one a bit more internal, because today Accolid is launching a new data set of maritime events that improves our coverage precisely of tensions in and around Taiwan Strait and a new dashboard to visualize this data.
• 0:55
  SPEAKER_00: I'll come a little bit to that in a moment.
• 0:59
  SPEAKER_00: The second reason why it's quite timely, of course, is because Taiwan, its status, the potential for escalation, is uh is again, you know, as it has been on and off for many years, uh a subject of quite important public and policy debate, um especially in light of the the Xi Trump summit, which is unfolding as we speak in Washington.
• 1:22
  SPEAKER_00: Um and on the table of that, you know, aside from trade, AI, war in Iran, of course, will be Taiwan, its status, and particularly ongoing sales of arms from the US.
• 1:35
  SPEAKER_00: So um, while, as many of you will know, and maybe are sort of also venturing, it's quite unlikely that this summit will necessarily change the status quo very much.
• 1:45
  SPEAKER_00: But um, in recent years, as uh many of you followers of of Taiwan and the regional politics will know, political events and sort of symbolic gestures do have then uh a consequence and can trigger escalation on the ground and can translate into on the ground, or at sea rather, can translate into sort of a tangible increase in intentions.
• 2:08
  SPEAKER_00: So um you'll recall the visit by Nancy Pelosi, then US House Speaker in 2022, um, which was followed by large-scale military exercises by the PRC, uh, which then began routinely crossing the median line of the straits and eroding that tacit boundary.
• 2:28
  SPEAKER_00: Um also after the sort of inauguration of Lai Jing Te in May 2024, Meijing stepped up again its drills, um, including a 2025 exercise that reached into Taiwan's contiguous zone, simulating a blockade.
• 2:43
  SPEAKER_00: Um, and all this is happening happening amid sort of repeated uh statements uh by by particularly Xi Jinping but broader leadership, China, that um reunification is not just a goal, but rather something that's that's inevitable.
• 2:58
  SPEAKER_00: Um, you know overall, in this sort of continued pursuit of reunification, sort of combined with an increasingly sort of sustained operational presence and expansion around Taiwan, and the sort of uncertainty or at least some some question marks over whether the US will maintain its support without formal recognition and supply of arms, we we really come here to discuss and address two broader strategic questions, right?
• 3:26
  SPEAKER_00: Which is um, are we entering a new phase of tensions?
• 3:30
  SPEAKER_00: Um and within that, sort of, is Taiwan building the capacity to isolate or quarantine Taiwan?
• 3:36
  SPEAKER_00: Um and are Japan and the Philippines becoming part of this sort of operational geography of the crisis, right?
• 3:45
  SPEAKER_00: And and if they are, then um does that also raise the stakes?
• 3:49
  SPEAKER_00: Does it mean that the risk of Taiwan, uh Taiwan crisis turning into a regional conflict is quite real?
• 3:55
  SPEAKER_00: So answering those questions is no easy feat, but it's easier done when you've got in-depth expertise and of course good evidence.
• 4:04
  SPEAKER_00: And today, luckily, uh, we've got quite a bit of both.
• 4:07
  SPEAKER_00: So on the evidence side, as I mentioned, I'm quite pleased to share that Accled has launched uh an invaluable new resource really, a data set that will help users and policymakers track developments and escalation in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding waters.
• 4:25
  SPEAKER_00: And this is invaluable because it's a very complex phenomenon to track.
• 4:29
  SPEAKER_00: Much of it sits in the gray zone, it comes in the form of coastguard patrols, survey vessels, um, and sort of military exercises that do not constitute open conflict, that are not overt violence, but that certainly have a coercive element and an element of asserting jurisdiction.
• 4:46
  SPEAKER_00: Um and Accolid's new dataset tracks uh maritime and some land-based events.
• 4:52
  SPEAKER_00: Um, it builds on our existing work, which some of you may know around the South China Sea.
• 4:58
  SPEAKER_00: Uh, but now this newly released um data set going back to uh January 2025 focuses on the on cross-strait maritime tensions, um, but going also into coverage on East China Sea and the Philippine Sea.
• 5:14
  SPEAKER_00: So, as you'll you'll see there, um with the data itself, we've also released a new a new platform, a new tool that expands our East Asia Maritime Monitor and provides users a tool to make sense of this data, right?
• 5:31
  SPEAKER_00: So that um can access and get a clearer picture of what is happening, when, where, and particularly important, who are the actors involved.
• 5:41
  SPEAKER_00: So, from this broader data set that we've released, the tool shows for key event types, uh, movements of forces, military exercises, harassments at sea, and and collisions.
• 5:51
  SPEAKER_00: And any user can filter by by date, actors involved, and location.
• 5:55
  SPEAKER_00: So I invite you all to um to browse at your at your leisure and make use of that um that new resource.
• 6:03
  SPEAKER_00: And of course, aside from the data, we um we have with us to to make sense of the context and the broader sort of political dimensions of the crisis, we have um two great speakers and experts on on Taiwan who bring quite complementary expertise on the issues, the regional political environment, so the shape that escalation is taking.
• 6:28
  SPEAKER_00: And I'm really excited that they could both join us.
• 6:31
  SPEAKER_00: So, um first we have with us uh our very own Laura Surika, who is a research manager at Acclit.
• 6:38
  SPEAKER_00: She is in the East Asia Pacific Desk.
• 6:41
  SPEAKER_00: Um, she's been with us at the organization since 2019, and she's led the expansion into East Asia.
• 6:48
  SPEAKER_00: Uh, and I must say she's been pivotal, absolutely crucial to the expansion of the data to cover uh maritime tensions and development of the methodology and then the tool that uh that now we're launching.
• 7:00
  SPEAKER_00: Um and Laura also brings additional experience from academia in the private sector.
• 7:05
  SPEAKER_00: So I'm very excited that she can join us and help us make sense of some of what's going on in and around Taiwan.
• 7:13
  SPEAKER_00: And with Laura, we also have Dr.
• 7:16
  SPEAKER_00: Rati Kabinawa, who is an adjunct research fellow at the University of Western Australia.
• 7:21
  SPEAKER_00: Her work focuses on East Asia's political and security dynamics, especially in the Taiwan Strait.
• 7:27
  SPEAKER_00: So it's very, very pertinent, and we're very excited that she could join us.
• 7:30
  SPEAKER_00: Um, Rati is currently based at the Japan Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo, and she's conducting research on precisely cooperation between Japan and Southeast Asian states to address Taiwan-related contingencies.
• 7:45
  SPEAKER_00: So very excited to have them both.
• 7:47
  SPEAKER_00: I will be giving the floor to them for uh roughly 10 to 12 minutes to answer a few framing questions, and then we'll jump into a Q ⁇ A that will be open to all of you who are who are listening.
• 8:01
  SPEAKER_00: So let's start with uh with Laura.
• 8:03
  SPEAKER_00: Laura, um so going back to the title that that brings us together.
• 8:08
  SPEAKER_00: Are we entering indeed a new phase in oceanic tensions in in Asia?
• 8:12
  SPEAKER_00: What does the evidence tell us?
• 8:14
  SPEAKER_00: What are we seeing in that?
• 8:17
  SPEAKER_02: Thank you for the introduction, Daniel, and thank you everyone for joining us today.
• 8:21
  SPEAKER_02: Um well, the main main trend we we are seeing in the data, um, which actually goes back to 2025, is the increasingly persistent and diversified nature of Chinese maritime pressure around Taiwan.
• 8:36
  SPEAKER_02: Importantly, we are seeing an evolution uh in how this pressure has been applied since 2025 onward.
• 8:44
  SPEAKER_02: As we can see in this visual, in 2025, Chinese maritime activity was primarily concentrated on the western side of Taiwan, particularly around the Taiwan Strait, Pratas Island, and also Taiwan's western outlying islands, including Pengu, Kinmen, and Matsu.
• 9:01
  SPEAKER_02: The activity involved the military, so the People's Liberation Army or the PLA and China Coast Guard, and included military exercises, naval deployments, and patrols.
• 9:14
  SPEAKER_02: The overall pattern was one of sustained pressure around Taiwan's western side.
• 9:19
  SPEAKER_02: And one of the most significant developments that came towards the end of 2025 was Justice Mission, a major Chinese military exercise that explicitly included scenarios related to the blockade of Taiwan.
• 9:36
  SPEAKER_02: Importantly, the exercise also involved the China Coast Guard operating alongside the military.
• 9:43
  SPEAKER_02: This demonstrated how Beijing could potentially combine military and law enforcement assets in a crisis, including using Coast Guard vessels and the language of law enforcement to particular to support maritime restrictions.
• 9:58
  SPEAKER_02: And I believe this is particularly relevant for what we are seeing now in 2026.
• 10:04
  SPEAKER_02: Next slide, please.
• 10:08
  SPEAKER_02: The main shift this year has been the increasingly diversification of maritime activity.
• 10:14
  SPEAKER_02: While the Chinese military has continued its operations, these have become less prominent.
• 10:20
  SPEAKER_02: At the same time, we are seeing a growing number of activities involving a combination of Coast Guard and research and survey vessels.
• 10:30
  SPEAKER_02: As you can see in this visual, while the share of events involving exclusively the Coast Guard activity, which is shown in red, has remained relatively consistent, we are seeing a great diversification in types of activities being recorded this year.
• 10:47
  SPEAKER_02: The proportion of events involving only military forces, which is shown in green, has declined.
• 10:54
  SPEAKER_02: And meanwhile, there have been a significant increase in the proportion of events involving research vessels, which is shown in blue, as well as events in which the Coast Guard operates alongside research vessels, which is shown in orange.
• 11:11
  SPEAKER_02: And this matters because these different types of activities can serve different purposes.
• 11:16
  SPEAKER_02: We have the naval vessels demonstrating military capabilities, the Coast Guard vessels, which can operate under the guise of law enforcement, while research and survey vessels can gather information about the maritime environment.
• 11:31
  SPEAKER_02: And together these activities create a persistent presence without every individual action appearing to be a direct military escalation.
• 11:41
  SPEAKER_02: This is why I think it is useful to think about all these activities as part of a broader spectrum, from routine maritime presence to gray zone coercion and potentially towards more direct forms of military control or blockade.
• 11:59
  SPEAKER_02: The other major development is the geographic expansion of activity.
• 12:06
  SPEAKER_02: Next slide, please.
• 12:10
  SPEAKER_02: As we can see in 2025, most of the activity we tracked was concentrated west of Taiwan.
• 12:19
  SPEAKER_02: And in 2026, we are seeing more activity on Taiwan's eastern side, particularly involving the Coast Guard and also Chinese research and survey vessels.
• 12:29
  SPEAKER_02: This matters because Taiwan has traditionally viewed its eastern maritime side as providing greater strategic depth.
• 12:38
  SPEAKER_02: In August, for example, we've seen China conducting a seabed survey east of Taiwan, accompanied by Coast Guard activity.
• 12:46
  SPEAKER_02: And we've also seen Chinese naval activity further into the Philippine Sea, including a military exercise with the Indonesian Navy, also in August.
• 12:56
  SPEAKER_02: China, of course, presented the exercise as relevant to its claimed rights and jurisdiction in the area, while Indonesia described it as routine.
• 13:05
  SPEAKER_02: The different interpretations are important, but the location itself is also quite notable, since Chinese naval forces are now operating further into the maritime space of east of Taiwan.
• 13:18
  SPEAKER_02: And these activities can serve several purposes.
• 13:21
  SPEAKER_02: They can provide experience operating on Taiwan's eastern flank, they can allow Chinese vessels to collect information about the maritime environment, and also potentially testing the ground for any kind of other similar activities, while also reinforcing China's broader maritime claims.
• 13:44
  SPEAKER_02: So, what does this diversification in activity tell us?
• 13:48
  SPEAKER_02: Well, the key point here is that we are seeing multiple maritime tools being used around Taiwan.
• 13:54
  SPEAKER_02: We have the military exercises, the coast guard patrols and inspections, and also the research and survey activity.
• 14:02
  SPEAKER_02: Individually, these activities may have different explanations, but taken together they give China greater experience operating different types of vessels in different types of scenarios around Taiwan.
• 14:17
  SPEAKER_02: And this is particularly relevant when we are considering a potential blockade or quarantine scenario.
• 14:23
  SPEAKER_02: A future crisis may not necessarily involve only the PLA Navy, the Coast Guard, and also other maritime actors could potentially play different roles, including inspection, monitoring, and also maritime traffic control.
• 14:38
  SPEAKER_02: But of course, this does not mean that every individual or every activity or every action is a preparation for a potential future blockade.
• 14:48
  SPEAKER_02: The important point here would be that China appears to be developing a broader range of tools that could be used to exert maritime pressure while also remaining below the threshold of an open conflict.
• 15:02
  SPEAKER_02: So, how did Taiwan respond to all these developments?
• 15:05
  SPEAKER_02: Well, Taiwan has responded by strengthening its maritime and coastal defense capabilities, including surveillance and coast guard capabilities as well.
• 15:16
  SPEAKER_02: Taiwan's 2026 Hangwan exercise, which was held in August, expanded the focus of its defense preparations.
• 15:25
  SPEAKER_02: We've seen for the first time Taiwan conducting a joint Navy and Coast Guard exercise simulating an anti-blockade operation.
• 15:35
  SPEAKER_02: And we've also seen Taiwan testing responses to internet disruptions and also using enhanced counter drone capabilities.
• 15:45
  SPEAKER_02: So what are the risks?
• 15:47
  SPEAKER_02: Well, the increasing number of Chinese vessels and operations creates more opportunities for encounters between Chinese and Taiwanese vessels.
• 15:57
  SPEAKER_02: This makes miscalculation and also accidental escalation an important risk to monitor.
• 16:05
  SPEAKER_02: As we can see in this visual showing the current trends this year, China is increasingly surrounding Taiwan for its maritime presence.
• 16:14
  SPEAKER_02: There is also a potential normalization effect as Chinese vessels operate around Taiwan more frequently.
• 16:21
  SPEAKER_02: Their presence can become increasingly routine, making it harder to distinguish between normal activity and potentially the early stages of a more serious operation.
• 16:35
  SPEAKER_02: Looking ahead, I believe there are five indicators that are very important to monitor.
• 16:40
  SPEAKER_02: First, we have the China Coast Guard activity around Taiwan outlying islands, including Ginmen Matsu, Penguin, Pratas.
• 16:48
  SPEAKER_02: Second, we have the operations east of Taiwan, especially whether the Coast Guard and Research Vessels activity becomes even more sustained.
• 16:59
  SPEAKER_02: Third, we have the coordination between the Coast Guard and the PLA Navy, including outside any kind of major military exercises.
• 17:10
  SPEAKER_02: Fourth, we have the research and seabed survey activity, particularly in strategically sensitive areas.
• 17:18
  SPEAKER_02: And finally, we have the exercises and operations that explicitly rehearse blockade, inspection, maritime traffic control, or even port access.
• 17:29
  SPEAKER_02: Overall, China is increasingly combining military, Coast Guard, government, and also research vessels to build operational familiarity and also greater maritime control around Taiwan, while also making sure that all these different activities remain below the threshold of an open conflict.
• 17:52
  SPEAKER_02: And I believe these are the key trends that we need to be watching very closely going forward.
• 17:58
  SPEAKER_02: Thank you.
• 18:01
  SPEAKER_00: Great.
• 18:02
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you very much, Laura, for that presentation and particularly for laying out what we need to be watching, which is which is particularly important.
• 18:11
  SPEAKER_00: Now I would like to invite uh Rati, which who, given her expertise on Taiwan and Asia's cooperation, foreign policy and formal diplomacy, can can provide a quick good overview and response in terms of where the China-Taiwan relation um or tension is at right now.
• 18:28
  SPEAKER_00: So Rati, over to you.
• 18:30
  SPEAKER_00: And basically, how would you characterize this sort of relation right now?
• 18:36
  SPEAKER_00: China-Taiwan, but also particularly in the period with um with Lai Qing Te, you know, how's that relationship with Xi Jinping?
• 18:44
  SPEAKER_00: How's Taiwan pursuing informal diplomacy amid this pressure, sort of changes in the relationship?
• 18:50
  SPEAKER_00: Um, and how do domestic political divisions in Taiwan shape uh public perceptions of that cross-trade relationship?
• 18:59
  SPEAKER_00: And I think particularly important given your research and where things are headed, um, how are Japan, Philippines, and other Southeast Asian states um coordinating for a potential Taiwan's trade contingency?
• 19:12
  SPEAKER_00: How does this balance, right?
• 19:14
  SPEAKER_00: Um Taiwan's own contingency planning with broader Chinese maritime coercion and in the seas around.
• 19:23
  SPEAKER_03: Okay.
• 19:24
  SPEAKER_03: Um Thanks, Daniel, for the very nice introduction.
• 19:28
  SPEAKER_03: And of course, once again, congratulations to ACLET for the newly created and published dashboard on Taiwan.
• 19:34
  SPEAKER_03: I believe that the new data will contribute to much further discussion among relevant stakeholders working on Taiwan issues in the future.
• 19:42
  SPEAKER_03: And yeah, I got lots of questions from Daniel, and I'll try to um address them one by one through my presentation.
• 19:52
  SPEAKER_03: So um, next slides, next slide, please.
• 19:56
  SPEAKER_03: So now we'll begin by reviewing the cross-trait uh relations from several years back.
• 20:02
  SPEAKER_03: It's just an overview.
• 20:04
  SPEAKER_03: So as soon as Tsai Ingwen took power in 2016, there has been a sift in how China views and treats cross-trait issues.
• 20:14
  SPEAKER_03: Um, Beijing um aggressively step up its efforts to isolate Taiwan using political and military pressures.
• 20:24
  SPEAKER_03: So, under Tsai Nguyen, we saw several of Taiwan's diplomatic partners switch recognition from the ROC to the PRC and leaving only 12 remaining allies until today, uh, mostly countries, small countries in the Pacific, Latin America, and the Caribbean.
• 20:44
  SPEAKER_03: Beijing also suspended direct communication between the two sides.
• 20:48
  SPEAKER_03: So before that, there has been a direct contact between a regular direct contact between Taiwan and China.
• 20:54
  SPEAKER_03: And as you can see from the picture, uh under the leadership of Ma Injo, there was a historic, what we call it, meeting between Ma and Si in uh nearing the end of the Ma Injo period.
• 21:08
  SPEAKER_03: But this thing was uh was was shifted during the Si Yingwan period.
• 21:14
  SPEAKER_03: And also we saw that for the first time since the third Taiwan strike crisis in the 1995 to 1996, a major military escalation by the PLA in response to the Nancy policy visit to Taiwan in August 2022.
• 21:32
  SPEAKER_03: And this political and military pressure continues under the current lighting to administration.
• 21:39
  SPEAKER_03: And if I may characterize the relationship uh nowadays between China and Taiwan, then I would say there are much of the sustained coercion coming from China and also the normalization of the use of force to intimidate Taiwan, bullying Taiwan at uh regional and international levels.
• 22:02
  SPEAKER_03: Next slides, please.
• 22:06
  SPEAKER_03: And here's the summary of major military escalations since 2022.
• 22:12
  SPEAKER_03: And there have been some increases in trends and patterns aimed at isolating and preserving Taiwan.
• 22:19
  SPEAKER_03: I wouldn't go into details on these slides as it has been covered by a colleague from ACLET by Laura before, so we can uh jump into the uh next slides, please, which is more important about how the Taiwan's domestic politics plays out under the current uh sustained coercion from China.
• 22:43
  SPEAKER_03: So under Lai Chingta, Taiwan faces not only military provocations from Beijing, but also political challenge at home, especially from the major opposition party, the KMT.
• 22:57
  SPEAKER_03: So if you follow the 2024 uh presidential election, uh yes, Lai Chingteo um won the election, but only with a very slight margin, 40%.
• 23:11
  SPEAKER_03: And the majority uh and the legislative UN was actually under the uh uh was under the uh major occupation of the KMT, the TPP, which both form coalitions or less um and provides only a small margin uh of seats for the DPP.
• 23:31
  SPEAKER_03: So it becomes a political friction between the KMT and the DPP or the Pan Blue, we always call it as a Pan Blue and the Pan-Green um um coalition in the in the in the legislative UN on how they were you know like fighting each other, uh constraining each other and challenging each other's political views in regard to many issues in Taiwan.
• 23:54
  SPEAKER_03: And uh the most recent development was that the visit of the uh Ki Mt chairwoman, Chiang Li Wun to the uh to China and met with the president with Xi Jinping in April 2026.
• 24:09
  SPEAKER_03: Um, of course, it is it shows the strong domestic political contestation or division in in Taiwan and show who Beijing favors to govern the island.
• 24:20
  SPEAKER_03: The KMT framed the visit as if the party were promoting peace rather than war, as contrary to the DPP, but we should feel the meeting very carefully because um China's goals towards Taiwan is never change.
• 24:36
  SPEAKER_03: Unification with or without military force.
• 24:39
  SPEAKER_03: So just you know, with the key MT, the goal is the same, unification, but maybe without military force, but with the DPP, then use of military force.
• 24:49
  SPEAKER_03: The political diffusion also occurs in the parliament, as I mentioned before, and also it causing deadlocks and delays in major political decisions, primarily on the government's budget.
• 25:01
  SPEAKER_03: And what will be interesting to observe in the coming months is the local elections to fill public offices at the city, county, and municipal levels in Taiwan.
• 25:12
  SPEAKER_03: Um, as for local elections, contrary to the national elections in Taiwan, the main issue will usually be around people's welfare rather than Taiwanese position on the future of cross-trade relations.
• 25:26
  SPEAKER_03: And this is actually the actual challenge.
• 25:30
  SPEAKER_03: Uh, the local election is actually the actual challenge for the DPP, like having having lost many seats during the 2022 local election, how should the party and its candidates sift their campaign strategy from agonizing Beijing to promoting more on to promoting the welfare of the people, especially housing and employment opportunities for the youth?
• 25:54
  SPEAKER_03: But it does have a consequence for the future cross-regulation in a way that who is going to be the nomination for the presidential candidates for both parties, for the DPP and the KMT, whether Cheng Li Wun would be able to be nominated by the party for the presidential elections.
• 26:16
  SPEAKER_03: Because if the KMT made a good performance during the local election, most likely the Cheng Li Wun will gain support inside her parties in order to seek for nomination for the presidential election.
• 26:30
  SPEAKER_03: And at this uh at the same time, uh for the for Leichingta, he might seek for a nomination for the for the 2020, it means would be 2028 presidential election.
• 26:41
  SPEAKER_03: If Leichingter or the DPP uh perform poorly during this local election, there might be some um uh efforts to um replace him for a nomination or even ask him to step down as the chairman of the DPP that was happened during Tsai Ingwen when he lost when the DPP lost the local election.
• 27:02
  SPEAKER_03: So then it might uh give us a quite a prediction on who is going to be nominated for the uh presidential elections in the coming two years from now.
• 27:13
  SPEAKER_03: Okay, so next uh slides, please.
• 27:17
  SPEAKER_03: Uh when it comes to the future of Taiwan, I would view it through a self-determination perspective, meaning that the Taiwanese looking at the Taiwanese position on cross-trade relations um than anything else.
• 27:32
  SPEAKER_03: And to understand the stance of Taiwanese people, I draw on the um NCCU annual survey on Taiwanese attitudes towards cross-trade relations.
• 27:43
  SPEAKER_03: As you can see from the graphic, especially in the blue lines, the number of Taiwanese who prefer the status quo is increasing and has reached a record high of 35%.
• 27:56
  SPEAKER_03: Well, yes, status quo.
• 27:58
  SPEAKER_03: However, we also need to be very careful when understanding the status quo, especially regarding what kind of status quo we look forward to.
• 28:09
  SPEAKER_03: Because this status quo, the status quo we experience today differs from what we had a few years back in terms of military escalation.
• 28:18
  SPEAKER_03: Today's status quo is in fact characterized by increased military escalation around the Taiwan street.
• 28:26
  SPEAKER_03: And this might then question to the world and also to the Taiwanese itself, is this is this this kind of status quo that we want?
• 28:35
  SPEAKER_03: You know, seeing many military uh escalation, provocation, and of course there should be efforts by countries in the region to de-escalate the tension.
• 28:45
  SPEAKER_03: So, what kind of status quo that we are searching now?
• 28:48
  SPEAKER_03: What we are looking forward to?
• 28:50
  SPEAKER_03: Uh the current status quo with military escalation or before the status quo before the military escalation has increased.
• 28:59
  SPEAKER_03: So that's a question for with that we need to think about the concept of status quo nowadays.
• 29:05
  SPEAKER_03: Next slides, please.
• 29:09
  SPEAKER_03: Um even under the current status quo, countries in the region face major political and security implications for the past year.
• 29:18
  SPEAKER_03: We have seen how many countries in East Asia particularly responded directly or indirectly to the increasing military activity across the Taiwan Strait.
• 29:29
  SPEAKER_03: Um, the current Prime Minister of Japan, for example, views the escalation as a survival-threatening situation to Japan and sparks ongoing debate over whether Japan's strategic ambiguity on the Taiwan issues has shifted.
• 29:46
  SPEAKER_03: While Malaysia has been indicating its indirect support for the use of force to resolve Taiwan issues, Indonesia's recent passeks with Beijing paved the way for the normalization of foreign navies' participation in exercises in the contested areas or waters surrounding Taiwan.
• 30:07
  SPEAKER_03: If there set up a precedent for whether other countries will follow the same practice like Indonesia did.
• 31:40
  SPEAKER_03: Yeah, it's actually at around 10 minutes presentation.
• 31:44
  SPEAKER_03: Thank you.
• 31:46
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you very much, Razi.
• 31:48
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you both actually for that impeccable time management.
• 31:51
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you very much.
• 31:51
  SPEAKER_00: It leaves a lot of time for questions.
• 31:54
  SPEAKER_00: Um I'm going to start with with one that uh sort of merges something has come up here in the chat from from Philip and something that I've been wanting to ask.
• 32:04
  SPEAKER_00: Uh particularly for Laura.
• 32:06
  SPEAKER_00: So you've mentioned sort of as indicators to watch, right?
• 32:08
  SPEAKER_00: The role of the Coast Guards, the role also sort of coordination, Coast Guard PLA.
• 32:13
  SPEAKER_00: Um it'd be quite interesting to hear your thoughts around how important is that distinction between military, civilian, law enforcement vessels when assessing sort of the escalation potential of Chinese activity, right?
• 32:29
  SPEAKER_00: How how important is that?
• 32:30
  SPEAKER_00: And particularly in light of things like something that Philip mentions, which is sort of the um the the use of fishing fleets that are sort of forming in a coordinated line, like more recently in the East China Sea near Taiwan, Japan.
• 32:45
  SPEAKER_00: Um and Philip asks, is this part of sort of military-civil fusion?
• 32:51
  SPEAKER_00: Is Beijing preparing to use sort of civilian fishing vessels uh more concernedly in a potential blockade or invasion?
• 32:59
  SPEAKER_00: How do you read those events and in that in that framework of distinction between military and civilian vessels?
• 33:05
  SPEAKER_02: Yeah, thank you, Daniel.
• 33:06
  SPEAKER_02: And also thank you, Philip, for the the great question.
• 33:08
  SPEAKER_02: I will get into more details about the fishing vessels specifically a bit later on, but let me just start with uh the distinction between different types of vessels that we are seeing um operating around Taiwan.
• 33:21
  SPEAKER_02: And I do believe that the distinction is quite important because the military, the coast guard, and also other types of vessels, including research vessels that are affiliated with the government and also the fishing vessels, um, you know, their presence um serves different purposes, and also most importantly, they carry different escalations risk, right?
• 33:46
  SPEAKER_02: So it's um slightly different if we are seeing the uh the military operating in certain areas, but then you know, if we are seeing um fishing vessels um forming a coordinated line, as Philip mentioned, it um it carries a uh a different escalation risk, right?
• 34:06
  SPEAKER_02: Um I believe that what matters here is the broader pattern that we are seeing.
• 34:11
  SPEAKER_02: Um so where and how frequent these vessels um are um operating.
• 34:18
  SPEAKER_02: Um also importantly, what is the level of coordination um and how different taxers are also being used to gradually um increase presence and pressure around Taiwan.
• 34:31
  SPEAKER_02: Um as for the the fishing vessels, um I recall of at least a few instances where this uh has happened in recent years, so since 2000, um also since 2025.
• 34:44
  SPEAKER_02: Um so it's it's not unique, but it's definitely part of the broader strategy, uh, I believe.
• 34:51
  SPEAKER_02: Um we've also seen fishing vessels and also cargo ships operating um uh in the same area where Taiwan has the telecommunication cables, which is quite concerning.
• 35:04
  SPEAKER_02: And there have been accusations by Taiwan that those have been damaged.
• 35:09
  SPEAKER_02: So I do believe that watching closely um how the operations um of the fishing vessels it's it's really important, and also but looking at the broader picture um and potentially also seeing if there is any kind of coordination involving fishing vessels, the coast guard, the military, and also the research vessel.
• 35:35
  SPEAKER_02: And I think uh this is definitely something that we need to be watching very closely going forward.
• 35:44
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you, Laura, thank you, Philip, for the for the question as well.
• 35:46
  SPEAKER_00: Um for going on to the next one.
• 35:48
  SPEAKER_00: I'm going to remind everyone to uh to please type your questions and send them through.
• 35:55
  SPEAKER_00: Um it's in the QA tool that you'll see at the bottom of your screens.
• 35:59
  SPEAKER_00: If it's not appearing already, there's a circle with three dots that says more on Zoom, and there you'll see that function.
• 36:06
  SPEAKER_00: So if you if you couldn't find it earlier, that's where that is, usually, depending on your configuration of Zoom and what device you're using.
• 36:13
  SPEAKER_00: Um yeah, please do do send your questions through as and when you think of them.
• 36:17
  SPEAKER_00: We'll do our very best, I promise, to get to as many as we can.
• 36:22
  SPEAKER_00: Um and this next one is for Rati.
• 36:26
  SPEAKER_00: And it's a bit of a reaction to your to your talk and that question of the status quo, right?
• 36:31
  SPEAKER_00: And if the status quo is escalation, then well where does that leave us, right?
• 36:37
  SPEAKER_00: And particularly wanted to think again of that domestic angle.
• 36:41
  SPEAKER_00: That is where if the status quo is escalation, um I mean how how do you assess Taiwan's resilience like currently, you know, if if that's going to be something that that increases and continues, right?
• 36:54
  SPEAKER_00: It's resilience defense posture against intensifying maritime pressure.
• 36:58
  SPEAKER_00: Like, can can it sustain that status quo?
• 37:01
  SPEAKER_00: Is it well prepared to do so?
• 37:03
  SPEAKER_00: What are some of the pain points there?
• 37:07
  SPEAKER_03: Okay, um, thanks, Daniel, for the questions.
• 37:11
  SPEAKER_03: Um, yeah, um regarding Taiwan's defense resilience system, I think there has been some sift or so, or there has been some changes as well on the defense resilience system.
• 37:26
  SPEAKER_03: Um, for example, the first one scaling up the Han Kwan exercises.
• 37:31
  SPEAKER_03: Of course, the Han Kwang exercises is not a new exercise, it has been going on for several years in Taiwan.
• 37:38
  SPEAKER_03: But then how then the exercises um was um level uh the Taiwanese government level it level it level up the Han Kwang exercises to include, for example, the current one, the blockade scenarios in order to dealing with the blockade scenarios, evacuation of the president, for example, um simulated internal disruption, and the use of enhanced counter drone capabilities, for example.
• 38:04
  SPEAKER_03: So that's that's another another way of Taiwan's um uh in Taiwan, there's another way of Taiwan's dealing with the current um tension.
• 38:16
  SPEAKER_03: And also there's um uh institutional, at the institutional level, there is a there's a whole of society resilience committee set up under the president to increase public awareness and prepare the society for any potential escalation, such as the mar such as maritime block, and also um increased budget uh on defense um on the defense sectors on the resilience system as well.
• 38:41
  SPEAKER_03: And if I might refer to my professional or um personal experience living in Taiwan before the current escalation, I would say that I I experienced Han Quang exercises when I was in Taiwan in 2024, but then when I studied there back in 2020 or 2013, there was no such a thing involving of a publics to be part of the Han Kuang exercises.
• 39:09
  SPEAKER_03: So there's a there's a that that that you can see how the status quo, the sifting of status quo, then impact Taiwan defense resilience system.
• 39:17
  SPEAKER_03: And also in regards to the conscription for the Taiwanese, it has been changing from one government to another government as well.
• 39:25
  SPEAKER_03: But then again, the main challenge, as I mentioned before, is the domestic frictions among political parties.
• 39:31
  SPEAKER_03: Um that would potentially further divide the society uh between, you know, like the the one who supports KMT and the one who supports DPP, and particularly giving a delay, uh um budget approval of large procurement package, might also experience delays as with these domestic frictions, and also how Beijing um gained benefits from these domestic political frictions by its uh propaganda, you know, like uh this distortion of information inside Taiwan.
• 40:04
  SPEAKER_03: So that's the main challenge that Taiwan needs to address is the domestic friction between the two political parties, uh major parties.
• 40:14
  SPEAKER_03: Yeah.
• 40:16
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you very much, Rati.
• 40:18
  SPEAKER_00: Um another question for Volaura, and perhaps if you want to jump in as well, uh again, coming back to this sort of question of the status quo being in escalation, right?
• 40:28
  SPEAKER_00: So, Laura, what at what point would you say gray zone coercion and the sort of normalization of this activity really should be understood as something else, right?
• 40:40
  SPEAKER_00: As a preparation for an actual maritime uh blockade or sort of more coercive or or or overt um control of the waters.
• 40:50
  SPEAKER_00: Um and then Radhia, if you want to jump in on that as well, and and maybe jump in from the perspective of sort of Taiwanese society, right?
• 40:56
  SPEAKER_00: What could be something that becomes a bit of a watershed in that perception that the status quo is acceptable?
• 41:02
  SPEAKER_00: Yeah, so Flora first, if you will.
• 41:04
  SPEAKER_02: Yeah, I think it's this is a great question, and I think it's on everybody's mind given the trends that we have been seeing in the past uh several months.
• 41:15
  SPEAKER_02: Um, and I think here the key is when we are seeing a shift for presence to control.
• 41:21
  SPEAKER_02: Um so, for example, the increased patrols alone may still be grazed on coercion, but repeat it and also coordinated activities involving the Coast Guard, uh the PLA Navy, particularly alongside inspections, traffic restrictions, maritime traffic restrictions, um, and also any type of exercises that are focused on controlling maritime access, uh, would be more concerning.
• 41:50
  SPEAKER_02: And I think we have a few examples of those um uh during the past months.
• 41:57
  SPEAKER_02: Um so basically at that point, we are not longer just seeing a normalization of Chinese presence, but we are potentially seeing um China rehearsing the mechanisms uh needed to control or restrict maritime access to Taiwan.
• 42:14
  SPEAKER_02: Um and yeah, the the trends that we've been seeing during the past months are really concerning, and I think um Taiwan during um the recent military exercise that Raki was also mentioning, they've been preparing for exactly for this type of scenario.
• 42:35
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you, Laura.
• 42:36
  SPEAKER_00: Um if you want to comment on that, and I'll also sort of flag a question that's coming from Jung Min, which you might want to touch on in your answer related to that.
• 42:43
  SPEAKER_00: So um it's it's about the the effect that PRC escalation in the region could have on forthcoming elections.
• 42:52
  SPEAKER_00: Like you see this as sort of increasing tensions leading to DPP um winning ground or losing ground.
• 42:59
  SPEAKER_00: Uh perhaps you want to touch on that in your in your answer as well and kept sort of two two birds in one stone.
• 43:08
  SPEAKER_03: Sorry, I was muted.
• 43:10
  SPEAKER_03: So um I was in Taiwan during the local elections in 2022.
• 43:17
  SPEAKER_03: Um and I can and in 2022, and it was just right after Nancy Pelosi visits.
• 43:24
  SPEAKER_03: Nancy Pelosi visit was in August, and the elections in 2022 was in November.
• 43:30
  SPEAKER_03: And it does not give any difference today uh to the results of the elections.
• 43:36
  SPEAKER_03: The DPP kept using the narrative or agonizing Beijing towards Taiwan, and it doesn't it doesn't solve, it doesn't sell well, it didn't sell well into the into the voters because when it comes into local elections, the welfare of the Taiwanese people is at the utmost important.
• 43:56
  SPEAKER_03: So then compared to the narrative of uh or agonizing Beijing into the campaign elections, the DP the DPP suffered major losses.
• 44:06
  SPEAKER_03: In 2022, local elections.
• 44:09
  SPEAKER_03: So of course that might be some influence, but I would be not seeing as a bigger one because right now the concern is on the housing system, on the how then the government can provide employment opportunities, more employment opportunities for the youth and sort of things.
• 44:28
  SPEAKER_03: So the inside the welfare system of the state compared to the issues on cross-trade relations.
• 44:34
  SPEAKER_03: So in in terms of local election, I I don't think it would uh did much on relate much on the current tension.
• 44:43
  SPEAKER_03: But for the for the national elections, yes, it would influence the uh the campaign strategies of each uh political party.
• 44:51
  SPEAKER_03: So I would say so not so many or minor if I on that.
• 44:56
  SPEAKER_03: And um regarding then, what is your question?
• 44:59
  SPEAKER_03: Can you repeat again your question?
• 45:01
  SPEAKER_03: Because I was a bit distracted when I look at some questions popping up and then was checking on the on the questions.
• 45:06
  SPEAKER_03: Can you repeat your questions again?
• 45:08
  SPEAKER_00: No worries, of course, of course.
• 45:09
  SPEAKER_00: One of them was you've you've addressed quite nicely, which is uh on the upcoming elections.
• 45:14
  SPEAKER_00: And and then the other one is sort of coming back to what Laura was discussing about, let's say, the uh the breaking point, right?
• 45:22
  SPEAKER_00: At what point does sort of escalation remain gray zone activity, and at what point it becomes something that is a is a shift in the status quo, right?
• 45:32
  SPEAKER_00: In in in sort of Taiwanese domestic perception?
• 45:35
  SPEAKER_00: What would be something that is too big to say we are still in the status quo?
• 45:40
  SPEAKER_03: Yeah, that that it is hard to define actually when it comes into the gray zone and the and the SIF, because um I still believe we are in status quo, but with different escalation, you know, with with different military escalation.
• 45:59
  SPEAKER_03: I still believe we are in status quo.
• 46:01
  SPEAKER_03: I mean, in a way, status quo, status quo is that Taiwan is still sits at at its point as a Republic of China in Taiwan, and there's still PRC, and then not and there is no uh unification, there is no inflation, there is no um uh blockade at the moment.
• 46:19
  SPEAKER_03: So there's still status quo in in which the both sides still standing with each other.
• 46:24
  SPEAKER_03: But then um in terms of when is the breaking point, I think um Beijing uh we can we can see from the uh Beijing's perspective is that as long as no declaration of Taiwan's independence, then that is not a breaking point uh for Beijing.
• 46:44
  SPEAKER_03: But then we also need to understand on how other countries may play out with this, especially the US.
• 46:50
  SPEAKER_03: Um, if there is any sort of a formal recognition to Taiwan or uh other countries uh um give a formal declaration for Taiwan, then that would be another problem.
• 47:03
  SPEAKER_03: That would be another breaking point that we particularly don't want to see.
• 47:08
  SPEAKER_03: It might level up into a blockade or even um major inflation.
• 47:12
  SPEAKER_03: So there are that that two factors, either about Taiwan independence or Taiwan declaring independence, or other countries give that kind of independence, particularly from major countries like the US.
• 47:25
  SPEAKER_03: Um, and also um we can also observe it from the speech of the president, like Leichington, for example.
• 47:34
  SPEAKER_03: Um, he always mentioned about uh the willingness to uh solve the Taiwan issues via dialogue and communication, but treating us as an equal partner.
• 47:45
  SPEAKER_03: But then again, Beijing refused to do that because uh because uh because Leichington, particularly the DDPP, refused to adopt the 1992 consensus because there's no place for Taiwan for the 1992 consensus, so sort of things, you know, like uh it has been going on since uh since on and off about the 1992 consensus and sort of thing.
• 48:05
  SPEAKER_03: So um, but then uh if we look at the most of the statements of Leichington nowadays, there's no such thing of indication of uh declaring independence.
• 48:16
  SPEAKER_03: And because Taiwan is a democratic country, declaring independence needs approval from the legislative UN, process check and balances legislative and executive, and legislative UN is now under the KMT, so there's no such thing of uh would happen.
• 48:30
  SPEAKER_03: So the status quo will remain, but then we need to pay attention on military escalation and what and whether we are satisfied or happy with this current status quo uh uh alongside the military escalation.
• 48:48
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you very much, Grathi.
• 48:50
  SPEAKER_00: Um thank you to all our audiences for sending more questions.
• 48:53
  SPEAKER_00: I'll try and and get through as many as we can, as you mentioned as we've got left.
• 48:58
  SPEAKER_00: One uh perhaps for Laura, thinking a bit more broadly about other players beyond China and Taiwan.
• 49:05
  SPEAKER_00: There's a question about um Russian involvement in uh in combined naval exercises.
• 49:13
  SPEAKER_00: Um the question from it from anonymous from the infrastructure, but uh how realistic is Russian involvement in the Taiwan question?
• 49:20
  SPEAKER_00: And I guess uh sort of further question what what are we seeing from our from our data in terms of sort of Russian involvement?
• 49:26
  SPEAKER_00: Like it's framed the question as a rise in in combined naval exercises.
• 49:31
  SPEAKER_00: What are we seeing?
• 49:33
  SPEAKER_02: Yes, we we have seen um different military exercises involving Russia, especially um for the past weeks or so, if I recall correctly.
• 49:43
  SPEAKER_02: Um but I personally believe that um Russia's appetite for getting involved in another war is quite low.
• 49:50
  SPEAKER_02: Um but of course it it also depends on the dynamics um between China and the US and um what are the the negotiations going to bring.
• 50:04
  SPEAKER_02: Um but although yes we we've seen more more activity from Russia in the uh in the area, I I don't believe they are um you know going they they basically don't have any appetite to to get involved um in the area.
• 50:23
  SPEAKER_02: Um so yeah, it this is actually a very interesting observation.
• 50:27
  SPEAKER_02: So thank you so much for that.
• 50:30
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you, Laura.
• 50:31
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you for the question as well.
• 50:33
  SPEAKER_00: Um one one for for Rati, we've we've spoken a little bit about Japanese um and uh the Philippines posture.
• 50:43
  SPEAKER_00: Um is there a chance that the US-China summit affects sort of you know Japanese, Philippine, even Taiwanese contingency planning or the sort of calculus on the on the crisis?
• 50:55
  SPEAKER_00: But do you anticipate any sort of major outcome from these um three days, is it, in Washington?
• 51:03
  SPEAKER_03: Yes, I I do believe this question will pop up about the uh the the current the current summit between um meeting between C and Trump.
• 51:13
  SPEAKER_03: I think the main issue for Taiwan for um today's summit, if if um Trump or if the agenda will appear, I I think the China will push the agenda about Taiwan and will and how Trump will respond to it, it depends on on the on the US.
• 51:32
  SPEAKER_03: But I think the major issue will be the pending 40 billion of military package, the armed sales, to to Taiwan.
• 51:39
  SPEAKER_03: That will be the main agenda that the Xi Jinping will push to discuss and whether Trump will agree to discuss it or not, then it uh will be another question um uh for the for uh for the White House.
• 51:52
  SPEAKER_03: And I think if you look at from the perspective of Japan and the Philippines, um it really depends on how the US responds to such pressure from China, because um armed sales, uh defense, uh, military support is the main um tools that Japan and the Philippines will see uh US commitment in supporting the region, whether the US still committed to uh support their allies or to defend their allies amidst the pressure from Beijing.
• 52:31
  SPEAKER_03: And if then the plan to uh sell 14 billion of military package to Taiwan back down, then it then the Japan and the Philippines, for example, would ask the US credibility in support for them in terms of defense and military spending.
• 52:51
  SPEAKER_03: But then if then the 40 billion military package continues and got approval and then and then it will give more confidence for Japan and the Philippines and for other security alliance, US security alliance in the region, on how that the US is still in the region and still committed to support its allies in the region.
• 53:16
  SPEAKER_03: So we will see on how these things plays out in the next two or three days in Washington.
• 53:23
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you for that, Betsy.
• 53:25
  SPEAKER_00: Um we have a few questions.
• 53:28
  SPEAKER_00: I wanted to end on particularly ask you to be very, very brief, sort of one one minute fly around.
• 53:34
  SPEAKER_00: Um we have a question uh from the from the side of you know, we've uh sort of begin began to delineate this this new phase of escalation, right?
• 53:44
  SPEAKER_00: So uh what could the next phase of escalation, what could uh be the most likely scenario of of further escalation in the in the immediate future?
• 53:54
  SPEAKER_00: And there's a few there's a few sort of options listed here in the question from from Philip again.
• 53:59
  SPEAKER_00: Blockade, full-scale invasion, some type of bigger hybrid attack, maybe on the political arena.
• 54:06
  SPEAKER_00: Um, what would you anticipate?
• 54:07
  SPEAKER_00: Super, super briefly.
• 54:08
  SPEAKER_00: And I know the difficulty of the question.
• 54:10
  SPEAKER_00: Uh so apologies for that, but we do have only a couple of minutes.
• 54:15
  SPEAKER_00: Laura first, maybe.
• 54:18
  SPEAKER_02: Yes.
• 54:18
  SPEAKER_02: Um Yeah, it is indeed a very difficult question, and I I do believe that um today's meeting is also very important um on what we should expect going forward.
• 54:31
  SPEAKER_02: Um we should definitely keep an eye on any kind of um indicators that would tell us that an escalation is kind of imminent.
• 54:42
  SPEAKER_02: So I've talked in my presentation about the the five indicators that we uh need to be monitoring very closely going forward.
• 54:51
  SPEAKER_02: Um so any kind of activity um around also, you know, on the western side in the Taiwan Strait, but also on the eastern side.
• 55:04
  SPEAKER_02: I've I also talked a bit about the coordination between different uh actors, including the military, the Coast Guard, and any other uh types of vessels um affiliated with the government or fishing vessels as well.
• 55:19
  SPEAKER_02: Um then um I also touched upon um the research and seabed uh survey activity um in strategically sensitive areas, um, and also any type of um action that could potentially um uh rehearse blockade inspection, maritime control, or even port access.
• 55:42
  SPEAKER_02: So I think these are the indicators that we should be monitoring and could potentially tell us more about what is the next stage of an escalation would look like.
• 55:55
  SPEAKER_00: Angelora, that's it.
• 55:57
  SPEAKER_03: Yeah, I think um I would pay attention to the involvement of foreign navies, as the case of Indonesia has indicated, even though Indonesia denied that it is uh it's not for the for the war uh purpose, but we need to be more careful on the this the the way the PRC will frame it as a justification of the areas of the contested waters with the involvement of foreign navies, whether other countries will follow suit, and also indirect comments from the political leaders, like the Anwar Ibrahim case, for example, that might escalate the tension rather than de-escalate it.
• 56:38
  SPEAKER_03: And um, of course, as well, depending on the military package, whether it will be approved or not, then we will see um in the future, MART probably continues grazon tactics around Taiwan.
• 56:52
  SPEAKER_03: And um, I don't see blockade in the near future, but it will really depends on the elections two years from now, the national election, or up the for the following the national elections in 2028, then we will see on how this will play out.
• 57:11
  SPEAKER_03: But I well, hopefully no blockade, because um it will escalate in it could be escalate into more uh coercive measures, but I would probably say more um gray zones activities surrounding Taiwan and involving foreign navies that might be uh the next steps that we would see because it's creates precedent pretext for the case in Indonesia.
• 57:40
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you very, very much.
• 57:42
  SPEAKER_00: Uh with that, I'm afraid we're we're at the hour and we have to conclude, but I don't want to do so without first thanking both our speakers, Razi, Laura.
• 57:52
  SPEAKER_00: It's it's been a great pleasure um hearing from you.
• 57:55
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you so much for delineating so clearly the issues, where we are, what's changing, and uh more importantly for for giving us sort of a framework to track this crisis and think about where we're headed and what we need to be to be watching.
• 58:10
  SPEAKER_00: That's particularly interesting.
• 58:12
  SPEAKER_00: Um and I I would remind everyone who's interested in uh following those indicators that they have a new resource now in Accolitz, new data set and enlarged um East Asia Maritime Monitor.
• 58:27
  SPEAKER_00: So please do uh check it out and and reach out if you if you have any questions or um you know need anything in regards to that new resource.
• 58:37
  SPEAKER_00: And um in addition to thanking our our uh amazing speakers, I would like to thank all of you for joining us today.
• 58:44
  SPEAKER_00: I hope you found it as interesting as I have.
• 58:47
  SPEAKER_00: And uh look forward to seeing you at our next uh webinar.
• 58:51
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you very much, everyone.
• 58:52
  SPEAKER_03: Thanks, Daniel.
• 58:54
  SPEAKER_01: Thank you for the video.