Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / No zero-day needed: the FortiBleed credentials now for sale
Transcript
- 0:03This is Decrypted. Monday, the thirteenth of July.
- 0:06No zero-day needed: the FortiBleed credentials now for sale.
- 0:11Login details for the Foreign Office, several N H S trusts, energy suppliers and at least two local councils
- 0:20are up for sale on dark web forums this week.
- 0:22The asking price is as much as $60,000, that's £44,000.
- 0:28They come from FortiBleed.
- 0:30It's a months-old campaign against internet-facing Fortinet firewalls and V P N gateways, and the N C S C fir
- 0:39st warned about it on 18 June.
- 0:41What's changed since then isn't the attack.
- 0:44It's the aftermath. The harvested logins are now a commercial product, and buyers are reportedly window-shopp
- 0:51ing for follow-on ransomware access.
- 0:54And here's the uncomfortable detail, confirmed by Fortinet itself.
- 0:59None of this required a new vulnerability at all.
- 1:02Next. No zero-day needed.
- 1:10But Fortinet has been clear.
- 1:13The campaign is built on brute-force, dictionary and credential-stuffing attempts against devices with weak o
- 1:20r reused passwords and no multi-factor authentication.
- 1:24A Russian-speaking criminal group appears to be behind it.
- 1:28It seems to have combined credentials leaked in older, unrelated breaches with automated guessing against int
- 1:34ernet-facing FortiGate devices.
- 1:36It verified a database of 86,644 working credentials, drawn from more than 74,000 devices across 194 countrie
- 1:48s.
- 1:52Attackers use passwords stolen from one service to try their luck on another.
- 1:57Think of it as the digital equivalent of a lost bunch of house keys turning up at a locksmith, who quietly t
- 2:03ries each one on every door in the street.
- 2:05No lock was picked. Enough doors just used the same key.
- 2:10And finally. The Secure by Design lesson.
- 2:14The organisations named this week did not fail to patch anything.
- 2:18They failed to make reuse and single-factor logins impossible in the first place.
- 2:23That is precisely the gap Secure by Design is meant to close.
- 2:27Security that depends on every administrator choosing a strong, unique password and remembering to enable M F
- 2:34A will eventually fail, because someone won't.
- 2:38The N C S C's own remediation advice this week amounts to a design checklist, not a patching one.
- 2:45Enforce M F A on every V P N and management login.
- 2:50Remove management interfaces from the internet where they don't need to be there.
- 2:54And treat any password that has ever been reused elsewhere as already compromised.
- 2:59So UK boards reviewing supplier and internal access this month should ask a sharper question than "are we pa
- 3:07tched". Can our administrative interfaces be reached from the open internet at all?
- 3:12And would a stolen password from an unrelated breach actually get an attacker anywhere on our network?
- 3:18If the answer to that second question is yes, that's a design decision waiting to be made, not a training re
- 3:25minder waiting to be repeated.
- 3:27That was Decrypted. The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 3:32Thanks for listening.