Latest / ACLED Audio / WEBINAR: How Islamic State Mozambique funds its operations

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WEBINAR: How Islamic State Mozambique funds its operations · ACLED Audio

• 0:06
  SPEAKER_01: Okay, uh so welcome to the webinar.
• 0:09
  SPEAKER_01: My name is Tumash Kefasir.
• 0:11
  SPEAKER_01: I'm a research consultant with the Mozambique Conflict Monitor, uh, formerly known as uh Kabuli Gardu, an observator by Accolade, the Armed Conflict Location in Vindata, and uh Zitama News to monitor political violence, particularly in now in Mozambique's Kabo Delgado province.
• 0:31
  SPEAKER_01: I'll be moderating today's session to where we will be discussing Accolade and the Mozambique conflict uh monitors latest report, ransom, gold, and spoils of war, Islamic State Mozambique new uh cash flow.
• 0:46
  SPEAKER_01: Using the latest data, this uh report explores how Islamic State Mozambique or ISM has uh shifted its focus to develop new revenue sources, including uh uh ransom, uh exorction, weapons saviors and activity around uh mining sites.
• 1:05
  SPEAKER_01: Northern Mozambique, as you all might know, uh particularly the province of uh Cap Delgado has been facing a violent insurgent since 2017, a kill by armed groups linked to Islamic extremism.
• 1:20
  SPEAKER_01: The conflict has involved attacks on civilians, villages, and infrastructure, resulting in widespread uh uh displacement and a major humanitarian crisis.
• 1:31
  SPEAKER_01: In response, Mazamican forces uh supported at various times by regional and international partners have carried out counter-insurgence operations to address the insecurity in the region.
• 1:45
  SPEAKER_01: Welcome through the report today.
• 1:47
  SPEAKER_01: We are joined by the report's author, Peter Boffin.
• 1:51
  SPEAKER_01: Peter is a claimed Southeast Africa senior analyst focusing on the Mozambique conflict monitor.
• 1:57
  SPEAKER_01: In his capacity, he is responsible for managing the production of the 49 uh updates, leading collaboration with partners, engaging key stakeholders in Mozambique and elsewhere.
• 2:11
  SPEAKER_01: Since 2017, he has led research projects and written and presented extensively on conflict in East Africa.
• 2:20
  SPEAKER_01: He's has also worked on the petroleum sector, governance, civil society space, political economy, informed planning, and natural resource management, civil society support and investment.
• 2:34
  SPEAKER_01: So thank you, Peter, for taking the time to be with us.
• 2:38
  SPEAKER_01: We are also joined by Emil Zeka.
• 2:41
  SPEAKER_01: Emilio has a PhD in international strategic studies, he's a research in the Department of Peace and Security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at the Yugi Shissan University.
• 2:56
  SPEAKER_01: He's a professor of security studies at the School of International Relations, again at the University at the Yuki Shasan or Youngishan University, um, and uh visiting professor at the School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy, and Politics at Queen's University of Belfast.
• 3:15
  SPEAKER_01: His current research focuses on documents produced within Al-Shabab, operating in the Capitol Garden and foreign relations of the group.
• 3:24
  SPEAKER_01: Uh, we're very lucky to have you joining this discussion.
• 3:28
  SPEAKER_01: Thank you, Emilio.
• 3:30
  SPEAKER_01: After Peter and maybe a commentary, we will move to the QA portion of the event.
• 3:36
  SPEAKER_01: Please feel free to pop your questions into the chat uh at any point during the event, and we will pick them in the second half of the session.
• 3:45
  SPEAKER_01: And uh with that, I will pass it to Peter to start it off last year.
• 3:52
  SPEAKER_04: Uh thank you, Tomash, and uh good day, everybody.
• 3:55
  SPEAKER_04: Um, first want to acknowledge um the situation in Mozambique currently, the floods, um, and almost certainly many people on the on the call.
• 4:03
  SPEAKER_04: Um, their friends or family have been affected by this.
• 4:07
  SPEAKER_04: And um, yeah, I'd just like to acknowledge that situation.
• 4:10
  SPEAKER_04: Um also secondly like to thank Tomash uh and his colleagues in Zittimar, just to note that though I'm down as the author of the report and sort of led them led the writing of it, it's built on the foundation of our work with Zitomar News and Mozambique, uh, without which this uh this would not be uh this would not be possible.
• 4:28
  SPEAKER_04: And um, and of course the support of colleagues in in ACLED.
• 4:34
  SPEAKER_04: So um two two of the most common questions that um are asked about the conflict are what do the insurgents want and how do they support themselves?
• 4:44
  SPEAKER_04: How do they get by?
• 4:46
  SPEAKER_04: And over the past few months we've been trying to help answer the second question: how do they support themselves?
• 4:52
  SPEAKER_04: Now, there for some time there's been hard evidence of external funding from Islamic State in Somaliland, the Al-Qadar um office.
• 5:00
  SPEAKER_04: That's been uh sort of sort of uh presented by both the Bridgeway Foundation and uh Security Council experts.
• 5:08
  SPEAKER_04: But there's there's a little evidence of what domestic sources are being used to uh to to support Islamic State Mozambique.
• 5:15
  SPEAKER_04: There's been a lot of speculation around connections to gemstone and mining, um, even to hardwood timber, but not not not often hard evidence.
• 5:25
  SPEAKER_04: Um I get some later in the call of Mamelias.
• 5:28
  SPEAKER_04: Um at the end of uh 2024, in in um the Cabaligado, the Mozambique conflict monitor, we we we began to notice an uptick, uh, an increase in demands for ransom and some increase in activity related to mining by Islamic State Mozambique.
• 5:46
  SPEAKER_04: And this was very clear in the first quarter of 2025.
• 5:50
  SPEAKER_04: Um and soon after that, we thought it might be possible to uh dig into accolade data for references um and um to these these these sort of activities and see if what we thought was happening was being captured in the data.
• 6:06
  SPEAKER_04: Um so could you give us that?
• 6:07
  SPEAKER_04: Yes, thank you.
• 6:08
  SPEAKER_04: Thank you, Gina.
• 6:10
  SPEAKER_04: And that certainly does seem to be the case.
• 6:13
  SPEAKER_04: Um in 2025, Islamic State Muslim B clearly did develop new income sources through kidnapping for ransom, uh, some extortion, and by extinct and also by exerting some control over artisanal and small-scale mining.
• 6:28
  SPEAKER_04: These gave the group significant new income.
• 6:31
  SPEAKER_04: Um, but whether this is in addition to external financing from um Islamic States al-Karab and Somaliland, um, or replacing it is not yet clear.
• 6:41
  SPEAKER_04: We don't really know that this the shift has been dramatic.
• 6:44
  SPEAKER_04: Uh, ransom and extortion uh sort of multiplied by four in 2025 compared to 2024, and in 2025 made up sort of 10% of all of the group's activity in Mozambique.
• 6:56
  SPEAKER_04: Um, activity around mining sites, as you can see, increased even more, which while the rise in ISM activity in general, uh it's it's a violent activity, uh, was behind an increase in what is their steadiest source of resources, which is seizing weapons from uh FADAM the Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique in clashes.
• 7:18
  SPEAKER_04: I should I should point out to users of ACLED data that these are not based on tracking events or sub-events they see in our data, but but but through identifying keywords related to kidnapping, ransom, uh kidnapping ransom uh mining activity and seizure of weapons.
• 7:34
  SPEAKER_04: Uh we had initially thought that this approach might help us estimate income raised, uh, but though we got indications of income, which are which are very useful, we don't we don't quite have enough, particularly for mining, to come to a solid estimate of what the what the group might be might be raising domestically.
• 7:54
  SPEAKER_04: Um nevertheless, it has given us some unexpected insights into the into in into the insurgency and different facets of it, and so some significant implications that need to be looked at.
• 8:06
  SPEAKER_04: Uh next slide, please, Jason.
• 8:10
  SPEAKER_04: So let's look uh first at um kidnapping, kidnapping for ransom.
• 8:15
  SPEAKER_04: Uh kidnapping is usually for quite short periods, often less than a day, uh, and extortion.
• 8:20
  SPEAKER_04: The focus is on high-level high-value targets, which is not a euphemism for foreigners.
• 8:27
  SPEAKER_04: Um, we're talking about passenger buses, commercial traffic, um, private vehicles, mostly on the N380 road, which you can see snaking up north, north, north, south, south, north, um, on the map, um, as well as small boats um plying between towns and villages along the coast and their crews.
• 8:47
  SPEAKER_04: And the N380 road is the center of it.
• 8:50
  SPEAKER_04: Uh, one-third of these sort of ransom extortion events in 2025 took place on that road, mostly between um Makumiatan and Owasi, further than on the road to Musumba.
• 9:04
  SPEAKER_04: This uh on the roads, you this uh typically involves a roadblock to stop traffic, demands for money for the release of vehicle, vehicles and passengers, and at times people have been taken into the bush and held for some hours while payment is arranged.
• 9:19
  SPEAKER_04: Uh, payments can be into the thousands of dollars for commercial vehicles and up to into hundreds of dollars for for individuals.
• 9:26
  SPEAKER_04: So it's lucrative.
• 9:28
  SPEAKER_04: Um in one week in March 2025, we estimated that ISM may have raised about uh$3,000 um dollars from kidnapping extortion at a series of roadblocks that they had they had put in place.
• 9:42
  SPEAKER_04: Now these amounts are very high, and I was actually initially quite skeptical about them.
• 9:46
  SPEAKER_04: But however, reports from victims, um, even like within within less than an hour of being released, um, as well as uh local sources in the area and mainstream media reports are consistent.
• 10:00
  SPEAKER_04: These are other types of payments that are being demanded and paid.
• 10:04
  SPEAKER_04: Um, but these types of payments are not uh they're not a predictable source of income, and they're typically raised in in short campaigns after which um travelers may change their habits, uh small boards may be strengthened, etc.
• 10:23
  SPEAKER_04: Um are usually paid through one of the mobile money apps.
• 10:27
  SPEAKER_04: Um, the mobile money services operated by mobile networks such as MPESA, EMOLA, MKesh.
• 10:34
  SPEAKER_04: Um, insurgents ask victims to transfer money themselves or to get others to do so, and to transfer to mobile money accounts that are that are controlled by ISM collaborators, probably or certainly in rural areas.
• 10:47
  SPEAKER_04: At the other end of the transaction, these collaborators need to withdraw the payments promptly before victims can share the recipient number with authorities.
• 10:56
  SPEAKER_04: And withdrawal can be either in cash, but probably more likely in transfers to other mobile money accounts or interbank accounts over than likely.
• 11:04
  SPEAKER_04: Um for such a system to work, um, ISM Dynamic Study Mozambique collaborators must be able to register new SIM cards, open mobile money accounts attached to them, and to do that frequently enough to allow transfers to take place without being traced.
• 11:22
  SPEAKER_04: The process likely involves either fake identities or misused identities, and suggests quite strongly that security protocols and practices around SIM card and mobile money account registration have pretty much broken down use.
• 11:41
  SPEAKER_04: Thank you.
• 11:44
  SPEAKER_04: Um mining activity.
• 11:46
  SPEAKER_04: This is less clear-cut, but there's there's a very, very interesting um uh indications in our data as to what's been going on.
• 11:56
  SPEAKER_04: Um, firstly, we need to think about the context.
• 11:59
  SPEAKER_04: Um, in recent years, we've seen a surge in the level of global gold price that we're all aware of.
• 12:04
  SPEAKER_04: And this has likely driven the great expansion in teslop gold mining that to see in most of the particularly in San Posum, but you can see in Manika and Sofala, but also in Mampula and even in Yassa.
• 12:18
  SPEAKER_04: And the possibility of in Capitol Gado itself has probably been limited by by the conflict itself.
• 12:27
  SPEAKER_04: And I mentioned that just to indicate that this is not that there's a whole set of issues around um around gold mining, but any intervention is that we'll have to control it needs to take a hand on.
• 12:37
  SPEAKER_04: It's not just certain issues almost a big and the group, the the graph um, sorry, not certain issues in capital guard.
• 12:44
  SPEAKER_04: And the graph shows a clear correlation between ISM's activities around mine sites and the price of gold.
• 12:49
  SPEAKER_04: That's kind of interesting with all those work graphics.
• 12:52
  SPEAKER_04: Um now the mining and trade of gemstones and gold have long been assumed to be a source of funding for ISM.
• 13:00
  SPEAKER_04: The first in-depth study of the insurgency, uh written by um uh Sheikh Habibi, uh published in 2019, uh, published by YesI, detailed links between insurgency leaders and figures involved in gemstone trading and mining from both Mozambique and the Great Lakes region.
• 13:21
  SPEAKER_04: More recently, Mozambique authorities have claimed that they've captured insurgents with golden gemstones in their in their possession.
• 13:28
  SPEAKER_04: And they've also claimed that the group has raised approximately$30 million from ruby mining alone.
• 13:34
  SPEAKER_04: I'd say that figure is is almost certainly significantly exaggerated.
• 13:39
  SPEAKER_04: Um, nevertheless, increased activity in mining areas indicates that it's becoming a more significant source of mining.
• 13:52
  SPEAKER_04: Um reflected in the map is restricted to events in our data set that have mentions of known mine sites, those ones that we know.
• 14:04
  SPEAKER_04: Um, interactions between the Islamic State, Mozambique, and miners, mentions of gold and mentions of the principal gem stands of Ruby and Tamil.
• 14:15
  SPEAKER_04: Such events have been primarily in Meluco and Montepuez districts, as well as in Kwak and Nkwabi, but less so there.
• 14:24
  SPEAKER_04: Data indicate that the group's presence in mining areas is becoming more noticeably pronounced and it's and its importance to the group is growing.
• 14:32
  SPEAKER_04: Isolated mines in southern southern Capital Gado operate some on the margins of state control, yet they're connected to international markets through informal supply chains that feed formal and informal gold and gemstone markets elsewhere in most of the big things.
• 14:50
  SPEAKER_04: In Maluco district, over half of uh mining-related activity by ISM in 2025 was concentrated around two villages, Minania and Ravia.
• 15:02
  SPEAKER_04: Now, Mignania lies approximately 25 kilometers north of Maluco, and it's been a center for artisanal mining, um, gemstones, mostly turmeling, as well as gold since around 2011 at least.
• 15:16
  SPEAKER_04: Um, Ravia village, on the other hand, is is to the southwest towards Montepuej.
• 15:22
  SPEAKER_04: Like in Binanya, there's a mixture of uh gold and turmaling mines in the area.
• 15:28
  SPEAKER_04: Um ISM was not active in this area prior to 2024.
• 15:33
  SPEAKER_04: So certainly in terms of what I think is pretty clear compared to the movements and activities.
• 15:41
  SPEAKER_04: And yet, despite their increased sort of concentrated activity around Minania and Ravia, um, in 2025 the group directly attacked mines there on only three occasions.
• 15:52
  SPEAKER_04: So we we feel we think that a sustained presence around mine sites suggests efforts to control the sector rather than to destroy it.
• 16:00
  SPEAKER_04: There's there's stronger evidence from Montepuège.
• 16:03
  SPEAKER_04: Um the Bulbic of ISM's remaining mining-related activities in Mont has been in Montepuège in 2025.
• 16:10
  SPEAKER_04: Well, most of it actually happening in October, which which followed the movement to Montepuège of about a hundred fighters.
• 16:16
  SPEAKER_04: Uh that came from Witumbi.
• 16:18
  SPEAKER_04: Um and they spent about a month in the in the in the district, which is a very long time for uh these one of these sorties out of their heartland.
• 16:28
  SPEAKER_04: Um here, the group's intention to raise funds by exerting control over mining operations was was was made explicit in one instance at a gold mine that was on the 7th of October.
• 16:43
  SPEAKER_04: Um ISM visited, called a meeting of miners, and according to a source in the small scale participant mining industry, statements that they can't stay, but that they required daily contributions, which we presume means cash, uh and and access to gold.
• 17:00
  SPEAKER_04: And they also threatened to burn property if their demands were not met.
• 17:05
  SPEAKER_04: Um week later, they launched an attack, one of their rare attacks on a gold mine on another gold mine in that same area, not the October property and prompting the police, the rapid intervention unit to flee.
• 17:22
  SPEAKER_04: How all of this translates into income for the group is not clear.
• 17:26
  SPEAKER_04: Um there's some evidence of forced payments from miners, no evidence, but no evidence to suggest that they control or want to control uh specific mining operations.
• 17:38
  SPEAKER_04: Um though that and and that though they have been found with uh gemstones and gold uh in their possession, that may suggest that they may be looking to enter regional uh regional illicit markets.
• 17:53
  SPEAKER_04: Um, that this is likely to be occurring through um local and regional markets, um, exploiting existing trade networks either southwards into Nampula or or into Tanzania.
• 18:06
  SPEAKER_04: Um, a stronger chip by Jerry with Genzi and Zhang Fue Zhou into the operations of these markets, which was published um uh the first half of last year, I think.
• 18:17
  SPEAKER_04: Um no one really has a number that has a decent figure on what's been been uh raised by this.
• 18:24
  SPEAKER_04: The United Nations Afurity Council Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Um uh reported, but um as as always, these reports don't give a clear source that they were able to raise up to$3,000 um dollars in one week in the loop of in the first half of 2025.
• 18:44
  SPEAKER_04: But um that that that just is what it is.
• 18:48
  SPEAKER_04: Um accurately estimating income from this source is very challenging.
• 18:52
  SPEAKER_04: Payments in cash, they may be regular or they may be seized in occasional attacks, it may be payment in kind for later sale on, but it in all cases these this seizure or exchange occurs in in isolated areas and in intimate transactions.
• 19:09
  SPEAKER_04: And of course, gold and gemstones are are a very low bulk, high value uh models that are easily smuggled, very difficult to uh to sort of to monitor.
• 19:20
  SPEAKER_04: Um weapon seizures.
• 19:27
  SPEAKER_04: This is um a little bit easier to get a handle on.
• 19:30
  SPEAKER_04: We've got some of the best evidence for it because every time they see some some weapons from Phantom, they publish publish pictures of it.
• 19:38
  SPEAKER_04: Um it's always been a feature of ISM activities, and it's and though its actions increase, uh and and as it's um as is now explained, Wilson Peaks, overall activity increased in 2025, we saw more an increase in the seizure of weapons, which we would have would have been expected, though the share um increased as well.
• 19:56
  SPEAKER_04: In 2024, about 2% of ISM's operations involved seizure of weapons.
• 20:02
  SPEAKER_04: And by the end by in 2025, that that uh that share had doubled by the the consistency of weapon seizures over the years does raise questions about the ease, the ease with which they are taken.
• 20:17
  SPEAKER_04: Um in the first half of last year, when um swearing in the chief of defense forces, President Chapeau, complained of some members of the security forces being willing to quote, um, sell out their homeland and leak, end quote, and leak details of operations.
• 20:33
  SPEAKER_04: So information that leads ISN to arms captures would likely command a high price for anyone willing to sell it.
• 20:40
  SPEAKER_04: Um becomes useful.
• 20:44
  SPEAKER_04: Maintaining weaponry requires uh systems to control the supply, the storage, and the distribution of weapons.
• 20:52
  SPEAKER_04: Um, virus too need to be trained in their use.
• 20:55
  SPEAKER_04: And and seven years into the insurgency, there's some evidence that the group has developed some internal training capacity.
• 21:02
  SPEAKER_04: The the lack of leakage of weapons out of ISM into uh the criminal community um does suggest some effective control mechanisms.
• 21:13
  SPEAKER_04: Um, such a um continuing continuing seizure seizures also um give access to ammunition, and that that can be pretty easily supplemented.
• 21:24
  SPEAKER_04: Um in a country that went through what 15 years of civil war that followed an armed liberation struggle.
• 21:30
  SPEAKER_04: So access to ammunition is not especially difficult.
• 21:34
  SPEAKER_04: One thing we haven't uh seen is evidence of rewards for seizure, which is um um seemingly uh standard sort of Islamic State.
• 21:44
  SPEAKER_04: It wasn't a big practice of Islamic state practice elsewhere, uh where either where um that the where where it isn't truly by by an affiliate, but soldiers are paid um uh commission if it was nothing.
• 22:02
  SPEAKER_04: Um final slide, please.
• 22:06
  SPEAKER_04: So, in terms of there's um there's some obvious implications um around this, um the most obvious are in the security sector.
• 22:14
  SPEAKER_04: There's that the need to secure the N380 and make it a more reliable route for for for commercial and civilian commercial and private traffic.
• 22:24
  SPEAKER_04: Um the need to um possibly address issues of corruption, if that's what's the what's uh underlying the the ability of RSM to see seize weaponry.
• 22:37
  SPEAKER_04: Um in terms of the finance sector, there's this there's obviously issues in terms of how the the mobile money uh how the mobile money systems are regulated and the the relationship between uh probably between the relationship between um mobile money accounts and um mainstream bank accounts.
• 22:56
  SPEAKER_04: Um so that's something that clearly does clearly I think with some agency does need to be looked at.
• 23:02
  SPEAKER_04: Um more broadly, the the the the certainly for me the the the research has helped help helped us understand better um Islamic State Mozambique.
• 23:13
  SPEAKER_04: We all in terms of numbers, we're we often we're often asked how many there are, and it's something we often consider ourselves.
• 23:19
  SPEAKER_04: Um and really that you know the numbers in the field are are only one aspect of it, that and it's quite clear that um the group depends on a much wider support network.
• 23:29
  SPEAKER_04: Um so so the the the figures we read of of up to 300 or less than 500 um only tell part of the story.
• 23:38
  SPEAKER_04: Um it's clear also that they have resilient command and control systems that that allow for the management of um um extensive networks managing uh um large amounts of cash and also the the the the um control of of weaponry.
• 23:55
  SPEAKER_04: And finally the um the yeah the the uh underlying that that the the the group if it is able to um continue raising raising finances domestically and then if it is sort of increasingly autonomous and then probably less reliant on external transfers and therefore um a more worrying problem.
• 24:17
  SPEAKER_04: Um I'll stop there and I will um I'm very delighted to hand over to uh Professor Zekka, who um I know has uh yeah uh very interesting complimentary um um information and insights to share.
• 24:37
  SPEAKER_02: Thank you very much.
• 24:47
  SPEAKER_02: Thank you very much, Peter.
• 24:48
  SPEAKER_02: Uh over to you, Emilio.
• 24:54
  SPEAKER_00: So thank thank you, Peter, and uh thank you, I claimed, for uh invitation.
• 25:02
  SPEAKER_00: I will discuss a little bit about the report that was written by Peter, and um this report reminds me the um the test or the article that was written by the Saida Bibo for Killian Jean Pereira in 2019 about the the Islamic radicalization in the north of Mozambique.
• 25:31
  SPEAKER_00: And um, I think that these two tests have some complementarity.
• 25:38
  SPEAKER_00: Uh Saida Bibo, Jean Pereira, and uh Forquilia present the first uh field research where we can find the traditional income of a national income of the group and the cash flow.
• 25:54
  SPEAKER_00: And Peter now, like seven, six or seven years after, present us this wonderful and seminal test that show and share with us the new way of the groups in terms of defining the financial and the cash, the the cash flow.
• 26:23
  SPEAKER_00: The test of the PETA have three important pillars: the raison, the artisanal mining, and the spoil of the war.
• 26:35
  SPEAKER_00: And we when we see eight eight years after the first attack, there are there are some aspects that are uh still continuing to be a support to in terms of financing and the cash flow of the group.
• 27:00
  SPEAKER_00: For example, in 2017, when the group started, when the group started the activity, it was not clear uh the the agenda, the the structure, the intention, the connective internal internal and external connection of the group.
• 27:23
  SPEAKER_00: But uh after five years, we start to see how the group or how the group was set up in terms of Musimba da Praia and Palma and another district, the the internal connection with the community and the social support that the group received from the community, and we start to see the connection with the with the foreign actors uh from Tanzania, Uganda, Somalia, and after 2019, the connection with the Islamic State.
• 28:05
  SPEAKER_00: It's not clear the real role that the Islamic State play in the group, but uh we are trying to discuss a little bit about it.
• 28:16
  SPEAKER_00: Um I schedule the evolution of the group.
• 28:19
  SPEAKER_00: I will I will focus on three three aspects that I'm I'm sure here in my my first slide.
• 28:28
  SPEAKER_00: Between 2017 and 2019, after the first attack, we see some eclectic growth the group, and uh the group received a lot of support that comes from the the community, the local community.
• 28:47
  SPEAKER_00: The local donations, the economic illicity, the illegal mining, and the illegal traffic, the different traffic related by the minerals, forests, and the marine resource.
• 29:08
  SPEAKER_00: When we see the gap in terms of the time, PETA brought also this part of this uh this uh find or the resource that the group was used to support the activity or the operations.
• 29:24
  SPEAKER_00: In 20 in 2020 and 2021, there is some transformation or some shift.
• 29:34
  SPEAKER_00: After the Rwanda intervention and the SAMIM intervention, the group changed their strategy and their TVTO and also their oppressions.
• 29:46
  SPEAKER_00: They disperse, but uh also the group tried to adapt the new strategy that the contrainsurgents face to them.
• 29:57
  SPEAKER_00: And also we see the transformation in terms of uh the source to support their their um their their activity.
• 30:08
  SPEAKER_00: We rem I don't know if we we um we can also remind or remember the bishop of uh Pemba, Bishop uh Lisboa Lisboa.
• 30:23
  SPEAKER_00: There are two sisters that was kidnapping in Musimbada prayer, and the process of release of this sister was involved with uh reason and also the payments.
• 30:38
  SPEAKER_00: And uh all these operations are described in this book that I'm I'm sharing that was written by by the bishop, uh Bishop Lishboa.
• 30:50
  SPEAKER_00: Also, the Peter brought also the kidnapping, and the reason uh the Rason has uh a new a new way of the group that founds to to support their uh their activity.
• 31:07
  SPEAKER_00: How how Mpeza, Emola, and Mkesh are using to pay all the money that are requested to release the people that are kidnapping and uh and uh and all the all the reason.
• 31:24
  SPEAKER_00: But in 20 in 20 in 2024, there is a document that um there is a document that um uh circulate in in Nangade and also perhaps in Balama.
• 31:47
  SPEAKER_00: Also, where the group introducing the jizya.
• 31:51
  SPEAKER_00: Jizya is uh Islamic tax that is applicated for all the people that are not Muslim, but they live in the territory that they are caliphate or the territory where where the Islamic State are uh are in charge or in the power.
• 32:12
  SPEAKER_00: So in February 2024, first uh first letter or advertised that circulate in the community, the group introducing introducing the jizya.
• 32:26
  SPEAKER_00: Uh Peter mentioned also the new cash flow of the of the group and the relation with the support that comes from Islamic State.
• 32:42
  SPEAKER_00: I think that this is important point to the future research and analyze, also the future discussion, because some documents show the relationship between, for example, Somalia, Somalia, the Al-Kharar store, and the Islamic State, or the Al-Shabab in Muslim in Cab Delgado.
• 33:08
  SPEAKER_00: Al-Qharar function has a financial hub where all the money that the sympathizer of the group and the donor uh want to give to the group, the Al-Kharar collects this money or those money and then share or send to Ghana, Congo, and Mozambique.
• 33:32
  SPEAKER_00: And for our case in Mozambique, South Africa plays an important role because we know that there are ATM, the Bitcoin ATM in in South Africa where we can withdraw money converting by Bitcoin.
• 33:52
  SPEAKER_00: And these money normally are sending to Mozambique or to Tanzania, and then the member of the group exchanges it to Chile, and then share or sent by the mobile uh money service.
• 34:12
  SPEAKER_00: So I think that it's uh there is an important window that Peter opened for us in terms of um the deeper and the and relevant research that we can care to see and to see, analyze, and discuss the the role and the the relationship that uh that Islam's the Islamic State with through Al-Kharari and the other and other arms play to financial to financial in Capdel Gado.
• 34:50
  SPEAKER_00: I think that when after reading the the the paper of the that Peter shared with us, there are multidimensional and some regenerative capacity that the group have in terms of uh adaptation to find the to find the resource to conduct the activity and the operations.
• 35:22
  SPEAKER_00: Um in the beginning, uh minerations or not, sorry, mining, illegal mining, um uh traffic of uh timber, charcoal was some important source to support the the activity of the group.
• 35:45
  SPEAKER_00: Uh Tanzania, it's a place where the timber are sailing.
• 35:53
  SPEAKER_00: Comoros and the island states in the in the India Ocean buy a lot of charcoal to to prepare their meals and uh to carry their TV at home.
• 36:09
  SPEAKER_00: And also, this is some some bridge that's uh that create also uh important pillar to developing our our research.
• 36:25
  SPEAKER_00: Um there are also marine source, oleoturia, uh horse sears and fish that uh are using to support and to financial the the activity of the group.
• 36:46
  SPEAKER_00: Um in the second phase between 2020 and 2021, after after Palma attack, yeah, the group stole a lot of money in the bank.
• 37:06
  SPEAKER_00: This is the front office of the bank of Musimba da Praya, millennium beam in Musimba da Praia.
• 37:11
  SPEAKER_00: And all the money that uh that were in the bank was uh was stored by the group, and the the group uh used those money to support the activity.
• 37:24
  SPEAKER_00: Also in Palma, after the attack in 21 match, also the group uh stole a lot of a lot of money.
• 37:34
  SPEAKER_00: Uh there are another source that uh Peter uh didn't touch in the in his in his report.
• 37:44
  SPEAKER_00: Um the group developed a strong network with the community that give the social or the a strong social base in terms of support, base support, but also the local trader, the local people that care the transport activity, the people that uh that are uh involved or related with the mobile uh money service, and uh the sale of the components, the vehicle components, uh, motorcycles, cars, and boats are also an important phone um an important source in terms of financial financial of the group.
• 38:44
  SPEAKER_00: Uh there are a lot of evidence of the cars, uh motorcycles and both that were stored in the in the different places, and um all the components was was selling in Pemba, was selling in Palma, also in Musimba da Praia, and the rest of uh the rest of the rest part of Kapdel Garde.
• 39:13
  SPEAKER_00: We know well, and the the researcher of from Asipol and the Military Academy wrote an important uh important uh article that show the the roles, the role of empiers, all the all the all the money, all the mobile money service in terms of support the the financial issues of the group.
• 39:45
  SPEAKER_00: Asipol published article of also Academia Military Military Academy in Ampula also published uh also published article, uh important article related by by um by by these issues.
• 39:59
  SPEAKER_00: So again, the the report that Peter shared with us, it's uh for me comparing with the the the article that was written by uh Saida Bibu, Forquilla, and John Pereira are the similar seems is a similar test to to discuss and to understand how the group, according to the context, to the situation and the evolution of the conflicts, they adapt to find money, resource, and cash flow to carry on their activity.
• 40:43
  SPEAKER_00: So to conclude, I think that when uh when we when we see all the phase all the phases uh related by the evolution of the group, we can see from each phase there are there are correspondent strategies or way to find the resource to support the the activity of the group.
• 41:12
  SPEAKER_00: So the group is very, very ecletical and clever to to see the the local or the internal or external way to find the to find the resource.
• 41:29
  SPEAKER_00: They adopt a multidimensional uh way to find those resources.
• 41:37
  SPEAKER_00: And the the capacity to regenerate and to adapt according to to the pressure that the group uh to the group receives, it's very, very, very, very impressive.
• 41:52
  SPEAKER_00: So again, I will congratulate Peter Peter again with the test that uh that share with us.
• 42:03
  SPEAKER_00: Uh Reson, mineral mining, and spoil of the war are presenting in all the phases where the group uh the group uh all the phases related by the evolution of the group and the group normal try to find the best way to adapt, adapting uh and to face the constraint and the challenge to carry on the activity.
• 42:34
  SPEAKER_00: So thank you again.
• 42:36
  SPEAKER_00: I will give back the floor to the Thomas.
• 42:49
  SPEAKER_01: I will really appreciate your additional insights and uh feedback on the reports.
• 42:54
  SPEAKER_01: Uh Peter, thank you for the brilliant presentation.
• 42:57
  SPEAKER_01: It was really engaging, and you have highlighted many of the key points covered in the report.
• 43:03
  SPEAKER_01: At this stage, we will move to the QA section.
• 43:06
  SPEAKER_01: I'd like to allow both Peter and Emilio to respond to the questions we received.
• 43:13
  SPEAKER_01: I will read them uh out one by one, and uh each of you can jump in and uh uh hang on.
• 43:19
  SPEAKER_01: So if the question uh isn't within your area, please feel free to defer it to the other speaker.
• 43:25
  SPEAKER_01: So, with that, uh let's start with the first question.
• 43:30
  SPEAKER_01: Um so I think this question is more for Peter beyond the initial extraction and collection point.
• 43:39
  SPEAKER_01: Uh uh, what does the wider revenue chain look like?
• 43:43
  SPEAKER_01: Who are the key intermediaries?
• 43:46
  SPEAKER_01: Where is the product sold next, and how does it yield middle enter formal or mainstream commercial markets?
• 43:59
  SPEAKER_04: I presume we're talking about gold gemstones there, and um it's a very good question to which I don't.
• 44:06
  SPEAKER_04: Know the answer.
• 44:08
  SPEAKER_04: And I do, unfortunately, I cannot remember the title of it.
• 44:11
  SPEAKER_04: I do uh send the reader to Jean Fajot and Jerry Mackenzie's report on um the uh small-scale and informal um small scale and artisanal mining sector in in Capital Guerra and how sort of relates to the wider political economy.
• 44:30
  SPEAKER_04: Um it it touches on uh relationships with uh with with the terrorists, but more importantly describes um uh how right down to pricing at mine sites to and and on to um uh the the yeah higher up the value chain as as as as the as the product gets closer to um to to uh as the product gets closer to market.
• 44:56
  SPEAKER_04: Then it can get very messy.
• 44:57
  SPEAKER_04: I mean that's uh got a bit uh I mean about 10 or 15 years ago you used to have um um illegal gold smelters in Dar Salam who would smelt gold from across the region, mostly from Tanzania.
• 45:12
  SPEAKER_04: So it you you're getting into you have very, very messy and obscure networks um that can process and then put the put the product into the international market.
• 45:24
  SPEAKER_04: So I think I think it's a long way of saying I don't know.
• 45:28
  SPEAKER_04: Sorry that yeah.
• 45:31
  SPEAKER_01: No indeed.
• 45:32
  SPEAKER_01: Thank you very much, Peter.
• 45:34
  SPEAKER_01: Um well this this the next question is is for both of you.
• 45:39
  SPEAKER_01: Um it's about the Qatar officer.
• 45:42
  SPEAKER_01: There is a view that uh the operational role of the Al-Kharar officer has shifted towards or been absorbed by Islamic State Mozambica.
• 45:53
  SPEAKER_01: So in your session, how plausible is this and what evidence supports or challenges that claim?
• 46:03
  SPEAKER_04: Um media's laughing, so I'll pass over to him in a second.
• 46:09
  SPEAKER_04: Um I just don't know, just don't know whatsoever.
• 46:13
  SPEAKER_04: Um I'd imagine it's possibly unlikely.
• 46:16
  SPEAKER_04: Uh if if if if I was on the run from Sunariland, I think I'd probably more likely go to DRC than somewhere that is more heavily policed, like like Northern Mozambique.
• 46:27
  SPEAKER_04: Um interestingly, the spikes in uh ransom in particular uh came in the wake of the um Somaliland UAE and United States operations against uh Islamic State in Somalia.
• 46:45
  SPEAKER_00: Um just a correlation, no idea if it's got any any any relationship to find yeah there are there are a lot of evidence related by the the Al-Kharar roles and the the connection of the Al-Kharar with the with the Islamic State in Congo, Uganda and the Mozambique.
• 47:22
  SPEAKER_00: Um I I can about Mozambique.
• 47:29
  SPEAKER_00: The connection is South Africa play important roles in this in this uh avenue or in this in this connection.
• 47:41
  SPEAKER_00: Because uh it's possible use bitcoin in in South Africa and here in the Southern Africa, uh South Africa is only country that have a HTM where we can withdraw money, uh, exchange or convert from the Bitcoin.
• 47:58
  SPEAKER_00: And uh we know many countries or all the countries here in Southern Africa, we don't know well how the Bitcoin function and the and the oppression related by this kind of currents.
• 48:16
  SPEAKER_00: So the group are using a lot this uh this tool or this opportunity to send the money, and the money come from come from South Africa through through Tanzania or here through Mopoto, and then the money are um are put it in the mobile mobile money service, and then the money arrives to to the members of the group.
• 48:48
  SPEAKER_00: So there are the expertise of the there right there is a report of Security Council where I present some aspects related by Al-Charar.
• 48:59
  SPEAKER_00: Uh there are also another documents that uh that's uh share and uh and uh show how how it's functioned.
• 49:16
  SPEAKER_01: Right, that's very uh interesting insight, uh Emilio.
• 49:19
  SPEAKER_01: Uh there is another particular and interesting question is about uh mobile transfers.
• 49:26
  SPEAKER_01: Uh since we know that uh insurgents have been charging ransom special around the N380 road as presented by Peter, um mobile transfer beneficiaries in Mozambique are identified to um the government can know their names and identities, but the question is why why don't we see arrests or detentions of uh Islamic State militants or collaborators involved in the withdrawal of the money?
• 50:02
  SPEAKER_02: That's the question, isn't it?
• 50:05
  SPEAKER_04: Yeah, yeah, I wouldn't wouldn't want to speculate.
• 50:11
  SPEAKER_04: Um yeah, I wouldn't want to speculate, but I do think it's it's definitely something that sort of personally I'd like to follow up on much more closely as to what are the control mechanisms within the companies and then the control mechanisms for the regulator.
• 50:27
  SPEAKER_04: It'd be very interesting to know more about that.
• 50:36
  SPEAKER_00: Thomas, I uh Thomas, I think that uh the really problem is related by the the law.
• 50:42
  SPEAKER_00: It's not uh the problem are not uh related by by because it's simple the decision to arrest all the all the members that use this kind of uh of tools to to share the money.
• 50:58
  SPEAKER_00: But our our our legal framework is very, very weak to to face and to deal with this.
• 51:07
  SPEAKER_00: There are problems with the with the company, mobile companies, and uh the group know and use this lack of uh of capacity to carry on the activity.
• 51:19
  SPEAKER_00: From my point of view, the problem is the law.
• 51:22
  SPEAKER_00: The law is very, very uh it's not adequate to to face this kind of uh this this this way that the group used to share and uh to send the money.
• 51:34
  SPEAKER_00: And the companies, the co m sell and mobitel protect their their clients because they know that uh yeah, there are a lot of money that are involved in this operation, on in those operations, and yeah, the the this companies need also the cash flow to to carry on the activities.
• 51:53
  SPEAKER_00: So we have the problem of uh in in terms of the law, and also there are problem with the companies, all the three companies they protect their their clients because they know when they have a lot of money, they can use those money to carry on the activity, to put more tuna.
• 52:16
  SPEAKER_00: Here in Mozambique, we have a tuna.
• 52:17
  SPEAKER_00: Chuna is uh some request that you you can you can ask to the company, the company gives the money and then you pay, we pay back uh you pay back in the in the in the future.
• 52:29
  SPEAKER_00: So from my point of view, there is a problem related by the law.
• 52:33
  SPEAKER_00: The law is very, very weak and disadjusted to face this reality.
• 52:39
  SPEAKER_00: And also we have a problem with the companies.
• 52:41
  SPEAKER_00: The companies protect their their clients because the law protects the data, the information of the clients they can't share without uh without justice authorization.
• 52:55
  SPEAKER_04: The other day, a Kenyan finance journalist uh suggested to me to look more closely at uh controls on mobile money in Kenya, um, because that there's been some sort of positive developments there in terms of as they it was a priority to address it because of Al-Shabaab.
• 53:13
  SPEAKER_04: Um yeah, so that's something um I'm interested following up on to see what happened there.
• 53:23
  SPEAKER_01: Right.
• 53:23
  SPEAKER_01: Uh there is another interesting question.
• 53:25
  SPEAKER_01: Um, it comes from two people.
• 53:27
  SPEAKER_01: Uh one of them is Jean Fijot.
• 53:30
  SPEAKER_01: Um it's asking um if the insurgents managed to attack well-defended places like Palma, uh Musima de Prep town, uh but also Makumiya, uh, but did not attack any uh big multinational or big company like uh um as Jean Fijiot points out, multiple B mining.
• 53:50
  SPEAKER_01: Uh the question is uh is this possible that um these big uh multinational companies are paying protection fees uh to the insurgents or some sort of tax so that they are not uh target that's a very good question.
• 54:11
  SPEAKER_04: It's long been rumored um that that is the case and um though it's the type of thing you can't really get any evidence for.
• 54:21
  SPEAKER_04: Um I I do wonder that they I mean mine sites like that are very well defended.
• 54:28
  SPEAKER_04: Um though it is, yeah, the the the the the question is is if they can take Musimbo and Palma, then why not um Laminong beer?
• 54:39
  SPEAKER_04: Um yeah, it's a it's a difficult question to answer.
• 54:44
  SPEAKER_04: Um yeah, long room route, but but but no no evidence of that.
• 54:49
  SPEAKER_03: I certainly don't think now they'd be in a position to put it that way, uh, at their current sort of uh levels of strength.
• 54:58
  SPEAKER_02: Thank you, Peter.
• 54:59
  SPEAKER_02: Emil, do you want to take that one?
• 55:03
  SPEAKER_00: Oh, I think that's it.
• 55:05
  SPEAKER_00: We have it to we have to to care some some deep research to to find the the really answers, answer related by this question.
• 55:16
  SPEAKER_00: But uh there are case there are different cases in international system where the illegal mining, after mining and find the demons or something, sell to the companies.
• 55:31
  SPEAKER_00: And uh yeah, I don't know if if this situation happened in in Mozambique, in Montebulejo in the other mining company.
• 55:43
  SPEAKER_00: But yeah, this is this is important windows that the window that Jean Fej opened to try to find in the research more uh field research and the care some ethnography studies in close to the to those companies to see if the the the illegal mining people the people that care or practice the illegal mining in the in the end sell or know the the gems or the gold the the core the gold that they find to the companies.
• 56:23
  SPEAKER_00: I think that Jean Fajot, it's important uh we can we can try to see and make some some ethnography studies in in the field.
• 56:34
  SPEAKER_00: But there are there are a lot of uh of similar cases around the international system uh where we're happening in this this kind of uh of deal.
• 56:46
  SPEAKER_01: Oh thank you very much, uh Emilio.
• 56:49
  SPEAKER_01: Well, unfortunately, uh that is all the time we have.
• 56:53
  SPEAKER_01: There have been uh many questions left on the chat.
• 56:56
  SPEAKER_01: We will follow up via email, as uh many of those possible.
• 57:00
  SPEAKER_01: Again, uh thank you so much for joining us, and uh thank you, Peter, uh, for this uh really insightful report and Emily for your invaluable insights.
• 57:10
  SPEAKER_01: I encourage you all to read the full report if you haven't already.
• 57:15
  SPEAKER_01: And you can do that via the link in the chat or the research section on Zoom.
• 57:20
  SPEAKER_01: So we hope you found this uh discussion fruitful and look forward to seeing you again at the future webinar.
• 57:26
  SPEAKER_01: So see you next time.
• 57:33
  SPEAKER_02: Thank you.