Latest / Marine Operations in Korea The Chosin Reservoir Campaign / 022 - Chapter 11 Part 1 - Task Force Drysdale

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022 - Chapter 11 Part 1 - Task Force Drysdale · Marine Operations in Korea The Chosin Reservoir Campaign

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Speaker 1: Chapter eleven, Part one of US Marine Operations in Korea
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Speaker 1: nineteen fifty to nineteen fifty three, Volume three, The Chosen
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Speaker 1: Reservoir Campaign by Lynn Montross and Nicholas Canzona. This LibriVox
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Speaker 1: recording is in the public domain. Task Force Drysdale. Before
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Speaker 1: the Chinese struck at Udam Knee, they had penetrated thirty
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Speaker 1: five miles farther south along the MSR at Chinhung Knee.
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Speaker 1: On the night of twenty six November, the marines of
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Speaker 1: the first Battalion rct IE exchanged shots in the darkness
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Speaker 1: with several elusive enemy groups making light probing attacks. Lieutenant
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Speaker 1: Colonel Donald M. Schmuck, a new battalion commander, had set
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Speaker 1: up a defensive perimeter upon arrival with his three rifle companies,
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Speaker 1: reinforced by four point two inch mortar and seventy five
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Speaker 1: millimeters recoilists rifle platoons. The identity of the enemy on
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Speaker 1: the night of the twenty sixth was not suspected, and
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Speaker 1: patrols the next day made no contacts. At nineteen hundred
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Speaker 1: on the twenty seventh, however, another light attack on the
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Speaker 1: perimeter was repulsed. During the next two days, patrol actions
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Speaker 1: definitely established that Chinese and estimated battalion strength were in
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Speaker 1: a mountain valley to the west, hiding in houses by
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Speaker 1: day and probing by night, apparently in preparation for a
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Speaker 1: determined attack. Schmuck decided to strike first. On the twenty ninth,
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Speaker 1: a Baker company of reconnaissance patrol searched out the enemy positions,
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Speaker 1: and the next day the battalion commander led an attacking
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Speaker 1: force composed of Captain Barrow's Able Company and part of
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Speaker 1: Captain Norrin's Baker Company, reinforced by eighty one millimeter and
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Speaker 1: four point two inch mortars under the direction of Major
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Speaker 1: William L. Bates Junior, commanding the weapons company, while First
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Speaker 1: Lieutenant Howard A. Blancheri's Fox Battery of two eleven laid
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Speaker 1: down supporting fires. The infantry ran the Chinese right out
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Speaker 1: of the country. According to Major Bates's account, we burned
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Speaker 1: all the houses they had been living in and brought
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Speaker 1: the civilians back with us. We had no more difficulty
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Speaker 1: with the Chinese from that valley. The Communists were found
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Speaker 1: to be warmly clothed in new padded cotton uniforms and
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Speaker 1: armed with American weapons, presumably captured from the nationalists. An
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Speaker 1: estimated fifty six were killed by the ground forces before
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Speaker 1: the coursairs of VMF three to twelve took up a
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Speaker 1: relentless pursuit which lasted until the enemy remnants scattered into hiding.
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Speaker 1: Some of the Chinese were mounted on shaggy Mongolian ponies.
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Speaker 1: CCF attacks on two to one at Koto Ree. During
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Speaker 1: this same period, Lieutenant Colonel Sutter, second Battalion of rct
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Speaker 1: I had several hard fought encounters with the new enemy.
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Speaker 1: After arriving at Cooto Ree on the twenty fourth, he
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Speaker 1: set up a perimeter defense facing west, north and east,
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Speaker 1: which included did a four point two inch mortar platoon
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Speaker 1: as well as easy Battery of two eleven, commanded by
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Speaker 1: Captain John C. McClellan, Junior. Some commanding ground was left unoccupied,
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Speaker 1: but Sutter believed that a tight perimeter offered advantages over
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Speaker 1: widely separated blocking positions. In addition to two one, the
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Speaker 1: Regimental CP and H and S Company, the AT Company
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Speaker 1: minus the four point two inch Mortar Company minus Company
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Speaker 1: D of the first Medical Battalion, and the Second Battalion
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Speaker 1: of the eleventh Marines less batteries dn F were at
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Speaker 1: coto Ree, the perimeter second in importance only to Hagaroo
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Speaker 1: as a base was to be jammed during the next
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Speaker 1: few days, with hundreds of marine and army troops held
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Speaker 1: up by CCF roadblocks to the north. On twenty seven November,
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Speaker 1: the enemy made his presence known. A motorized patrol of
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Speaker 1: platoon strength from Captain Jack A Smith's Easy Company supported
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Speaker 1: by a section of ten engaged in a firefight with
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Speaker 1: about twenty five Chinese and the hills west of coto Re.
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Speaker 1: Two wounded CCF soldiers were left behind by the dispersed enemy.
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Speaker 1: At this point the patrol proceeded on foot until it
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Speaker 1: was stopped by the fire of an estimated two hundred
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Speaker 1: communists dug in along ridge lines. At sixteen hundred, the
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Speaker 1: Marines returned to the perimeter with two men wounded. Enemy
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Speaker 1: losses were reported as eight killed and fifteen wounded, in
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Speaker 1: addition to the two prisoners. Upon being questioned, these Chinese
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Speaker 1: asserted that they belonged to a Chinese division assembling to
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Speaker 1: the west of coto Rie with a headquarters and a
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Speaker 1: mine shaft. There could be no doubt the next day
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Speaker 1: that the enemy had swarmed into the area in fairly
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Speaker 1: large numbers. A marine outpost on a hill northeast of
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Speaker 1: the perimeter received heavy small arms fire at zero eight
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Speaker 1: forty five and was reinforced by a platoon from Easy Company. Finally,
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Speaker 1: these troops had to be withdrawn and an air strike
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Speaker 1: called on the hill to a vict the enemy. At
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Speaker 1: ten fifty eight, General Smith ordered Colonel Poeller to push
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Speaker 1: a force up the MSR to make contact with the
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Speaker 1: tank patrol being sent south from Hagaroo and to clear
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Speaker 1: the MSR. Groups of Chinese sighted during the day to
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Speaker 1: the north west and east were taken under artillery fire
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Speaker 1: by Captain McClellan's battery. Reconnaissance planes landing at the Coto
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Speaker 1: re O Y Strip reported CCF roadblocks on the way
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Speaker 1: to Hagaroo, and at thirteen thirty Captain GUILDO. S. Kataspati
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Speaker 1: the S three dispatched Captain well B. W. Cronk's Dog
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Speaker 1: Company in vehicles with orders to open up the route.
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Speaker 1: Following in Dog Company's way came the last serial of
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Speaker 1: Division Headquarters troops on its way to Hagaroo. Less than
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Speaker 1: a mile north of the perimeter. The convoy ran into
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Speaker 1: a storm of rifle and automatic weapons fire from Chinese
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Speaker 1: entrenched along the high ground on both sides of the road.
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Speaker 1: The Marines of Dog Company piled out of their vehicles
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Speaker 1: into ploy for a hot firefight, supported from Coto Ree
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Speaker 1: by eighty one millimeter mortars of Captain William A. Kerr's
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Speaker 1: Weapons Company. Two platoons swung around to clear the enemy
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Speaker 1: from the ridge. The other platoon and the headquarters troops
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Speaker 1: advanced along the road. At sixteen fifteen, a platoon from
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Speaker 1: Captain Goodwin C. Groff's Fox Company was ordered out to
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Speaker 1: assist in evacuating casualties, but as the afternoon war on,
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Speaker 1: it grew apparent that the Chinese were in greater strength
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Speaker 1: than had been anticipated, and all troops were directed to
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Speaker 1: return to Cotore at seventeen thirty five. They did so
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Speaker 1: under cover of strikes by the course airs of VMF
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Speaker 1: three twelve marine losses numbered four KA or DOW and
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Speaker 1: thirty four WIA. Enemy casualties were estimated at one hundred
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Speaker 1: fifty four killed and eighty three wounded, in addition to
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Speaker 1: three prisoners taken from a unit identified as the one
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Speaker 1: hundred seventy ninth Regiment of the sixtieth CCF Division captured
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Speaker 1: Chinese weapons included one hundred thirty rifles, twenty five machine guns,
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Speaker 1: and two cases of grenades. That evening, George Company three
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Speaker 1: to one, forty first Commando Royal Marines and Baker Company
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Speaker 1: of the thirty first Infantry, seventh Infantry Division arrived at
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Speaker 1: Codoree on their way to Hagarou. Colonel Poller and his
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Speaker 1: s III Major Loregan organized the newcomers into a task
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Speaker 1: force under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale, COO of
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Speaker 1: the British unit, with orders to fight its way to
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Speaker 1: Hagaroo the following day. Luckily, the enemy did not elect
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Speaker 1: to attack the overcrowded perimeter. On the night of the
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Speaker 1: twenty eighth, every warming tent was packed to capacity and
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Speaker 1: a CCF mortar round could hardly have landed anywhere without
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Speaker 1: doing a good deal of damage. After a quiet night,
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Speaker 1: the Chinese began the new day by digging in placements
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Speaker 1: in the hills to the west under harassing fire from
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Speaker 1: F Company. The howitzers of Easy Battery and the mortars
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Speaker 1: of two to one provided supporting fires for Task Force
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Speaker 1: Drysdale when it moved out at zero nine forty five
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Speaker 1: followed by a convoy of Division Headquarters troops. A platoon
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Speaker 1: of Easy Company two to one went along with corman
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Speaker 1: and ambulances to assist in evacuating any early wounded back
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Speaker 1: to Coto Ree. Stubborn CCF resistance resulted in casualties from
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Speaker 1: the outset, and it was sixteen hundred before the Easy
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Speaker 1: Company escort platoon got back to the perimeter. The Chinese,
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Speaker 1: keeping the perimeter under observation all day, evidently concluded that
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Speaker 1: the northern rim, defended by Easy Company, offered the best
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Speaker 1: opportunity for a penetration. Marine air strikes were called in
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Speaker 1: on the Chinese swarming over the nearby high ground during
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Speaker 1: the last minutes of daylight, but enemy mortar rounds hit
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Speaker 1: Easy Company at seventeen forty five. They were followed by
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Speaker 1: bugle calls and whistle signals as the CCF infantry attacked
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Speaker 1: from the high ground to the northeast. The assault force
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Speaker 1: was estimated at company strength, with the remainder of a
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Speaker 1: battalion in reserve. Unfortunately for the Chinese, they had made
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Speaker 1: their intentions clear all day with unusual activity in the
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Speaker 1: surrounding hills. An Easy Company was not surprised. Major Clarence J. Maybrey,
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Speaker 1: the two one executive officer, could be heard above the
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Speaker 1: machine guns as he shouted encouragement to marines, who poured
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Speaker 1: it into the advancing communists. They came on with such
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Speaker 1: persistence that seventeen managed to penetrate within the lines, apparently
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Speaker 1: to attack the warming tents. All were killed. In addition,
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Speaker 1: about one hundred and fifty CCF bodies lay in front
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Speaker 1: of the sector when the enemy withdrew at eighteen fifty
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Speaker 1: five after suffering a complete repulse. It was conjectured that
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Speaker 1: the Chinese had interpreted the return of the Easy Company
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Speaker 1: platoon late that afternoon as an indication that a gap
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Speaker 1: in the line needed to be hastily plugged, but the
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Speaker 1: supposed weeks did not materialize, and at nineteen thirty five
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Speaker 1: the enemy signed off for the night after pumping four
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Speaker 1: final mortar rounds in the vicinity of the Battalion CP
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Speaker 1: without doing any harm. Losses of two to one for
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Speaker 1: the day were six KIA and eighteen wia, total CCF
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Speaker 1: casualties being estimated at one hundred seventy five killed and
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Speaker 1: two hundred wounded. Ten heavy machine guns seven lmgs, twelve
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Speaker 1: Thompson submachine guns, seventy six rifles, four pistols, and five
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Speaker 1: hundred grenades were captured. That was all at Codo Ree,
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Speaker 1: where recon Company arrived during the day to add its
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Speaker 1: weight to the defense. But during intervals of silence, the
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Speaker 1: sound of heavy and continuous firing to the north gave
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Speaker 1: proof that Task Force Drysdale was in trouble. Convoy reinforced
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Speaker 1: by marine tanks. Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale's plan of attack had
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Speaker 1: called for his British Marines to lead out at zero
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Speaker 1: nineth and seized the first hill mass to the east
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Speaker 1: of the road. Captain Sitters George Company of three to
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Speaker 1: one was to follow and pass through to attack Hill
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Speaker 1: twelve thirty six with Baker Company of the thirty first
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Speaker 1: Infantry in Reserve. Lieutenant Colonel Sutter, assisted by his staff,
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Speaker 1: had the responsibility for planning and coordinating preparatory artillery and
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Speaker 1: mortar fires from Coto Ree, and attaching an air liaison
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Speaker 1: officer to the task force. The first hill was taken
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Speaker 1: without meeting serious resistance, but Sitter came up against well
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Speaker 1: entrenched CCF troops when he attacked Hill twelve thirty six,
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Speaker 1: about a mile and a half north of Koto Ree.
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Speaker 1: It was nipin tuck until Master Sergeant Roko a Zulu
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Speaker 1: fired his three point five rocket launcher at a range
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Speaker 1: of two hundred yards. Several rounds brought the Chinese out
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Speaker 1: of their holes, and the Marines took possession of the hill.
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Speaker 1: The commandos and George Company moved up about a mile
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Speaker 1: astride of the road toward the third objective Hill eleven
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Speaker 1: eighty two. There the enemy resisted strenuously with well placed
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Speaker 1: mortar as well as machine gun fire from strong positions
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Speaker 1: on the high ground. The impetus of the attack had
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Speaker 1: been stopped when Sitter received orders from the task force
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Speaker 1: commander to break off action, withdraw to the road and
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Speaker 1: await new instructions. Drysdale had received a message from RCT
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Speaker 1: IE at eleven thirty advising him that the armour of
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Speaker 1: Company D less second Platoon, First Tank Battalion would be
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Speaker 1: available to him at thirteen hundred. He decided to wait
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Speaker 1: therefore and reform the column before continuing the advance. The
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Speaker 1: two platoons of Company D tanks, reinforced by the Tank
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Speaker 1: Platoon of the at Company RCT five, reached Coto Re
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Speaker 1: at noon After moving out that morning from majan Dong,
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Speaker 1: Company B, first Tank Battalion departed Tong john Nie, just
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Speaker 1: south of Majong Dong, but did not arrive at Kodo
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Speaker 1: Ree until fifteen hundred, the second platoon being attached to
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Speaker 1: Sutter's battalion. The remainder of the company was directed to
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Speaker 1: bring up the rear of the Task Force Drysdale, which
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Speaker 1: by that time had renewed its attack. Thus, the convoy
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Speaker 1: was made up of the following components, including the elements
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Speaker 1: which joined in the late afternoon of twenty nine November
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Speaker 1: forty one Independent Commando Royal Marines estimated strength two hundred
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Speaker 1: thirty five. Company G three one estimated strength two hundred
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Speaker 1: five Company B thirty First Infantry US Army estimated strength
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Speaker 1: one hundred ninety estimated vehicles twenty two Detachment Division Headquarters
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Speaker 1: Battalion estimated strength sixty two estimated vehicles seventeen. Detachment First
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Speaker 1: Signal Battalion estimated strength eight estimated vehicles. Four. Detachment seventh
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Speaker 1: Motor Transport Battalion estimated strength twelve estimated vehicles, twenty two
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Speaker 1: Detachment Service Company, First Tank Battalion estimated strength eighteen estimated
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Speaker 1: vehicles thirty one Company B minus First Tank Battalion estimated
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Speaker 1: strength eighty six estimated vehicles, twenty three estimated tanks twelve
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Speaker 1: Company D minus First Tank Battalion estimated strength seventy seven
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Speaker 1: estimated vehicles, twenty two estimated tanks twelve tank platoon at
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Speaker 1: Company RCT five estimated strength twenty nine estimated tanks five
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Speaker 1: total estimated strength nine hundred, twenty two estimated vehicles one hundred,
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Speaker 1: forty one estimated tanks twenty nine. At thirteen fifty, the
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Speaker 1: head of the column had resumed the advance, with the
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Speaker 1: order of march being D tanks and eight five seventeen tanks,
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Speaker 1: G one twenty two vehicles, forty one Commando thirty one vehicles,
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Speaker 1: B thirty one twenty two vehicles, Headquarters Battalion sixty six vehicles,
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Speaker 1: B tanks, twelve tanks. Shortly after moving out, sitters men
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Speaker 1: were hit by heavy small arms fire from houses on
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Speaker 1: the right of the road. The company commander went forward
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Speaker 1: and requested the tanks to open up with their ninety
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Speaker 1: millimeters guns, and the Chinese flushed out of the houses
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Speaker 1: were destroyed by machine gun fire. Progress was slow because
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Speaker 1: of the necessity of further halts while the tanks blasted
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Speaker 1: out pockets of CCF resistance. Enemy mortar as well as
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Speaker 1: small arms fire was encountered, and around scored a direct
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Speaker 1: hit on one of the trucks carrying personnel of third
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Speaker 1: Platoon of George Company, wounding every man in the vehicle.
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Speaker 1: Further delays resulted while the tanks made their way over
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Speaker 1: roadblocks or around. For the three infantry companies, the advance
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Speaker 1: consisted of brief periods of movement alternated with interludes in
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Speaker 1: which the troops scrambled out of the trucks to engage
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Speaker 1: in firefights. Finally, about sixteen fifteen, the column ground to
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Speaker 1: a complete halt about four miles north of Codo Ree.
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Speaker 1: At that time, the tanks of Company B were just
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Speaker 1: leaving the two to one perimeter to join the convoy
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Speaker 1: the fight in hell Fire Valley. Drysdale and Sier were
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Speaker 1: informed by the tank officers that they thought the armor
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Speaker 1: could get through, but that further movement for the trucks
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Speaker 1: was inadvisable in view of road conditions and increasing enemy resistance.
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Speaker 1: The task force commander requested a decision from Division headquarters
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Speaker 1: as to whether he should resume an advance, which threatened
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Speaker 1: to prove costly. It was a difficult choice for General
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Speaker 1: Smith to make, but in view of the urgent necessity
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Speaker 1: for reinforcements at Hagarou, he directed Drysdale to continue. The
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Speaker 1: tanks had to refuel so that more time was lost
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Speaker 1: cecif fire was only moderate during this delay, thanks to
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Speaker 1: the air strikes of vm F three twenty one planes
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Speaker 1: directed by Captain Norman Vining. When the column stopped, the
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Speaker 1: vehicles had pulled off into a dry stream bed. Upon
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Speaker 1: resuming the advance, unit integrity was lost and infantry elements
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Speaker 1: mingled with headquarters troops not far south of the half
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Speaker 1: way point to Hagaroo. Increased enemy fire caused an abrupt
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Speaker 1: halt in a long valley. The high ground rose sharply
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Speaker 1: on the right of the road, while on the left
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Speaker 1: a frozen creek wound through a plain several hundred yards wide,
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Speaker 1: bordered by the Changjin River and wooded hills. This was
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Speaker 1: hell Fire Valley, a name applied by Drysdale, and it
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Speaker 1: was to be the scene of an all night fight
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Speaker 1: by half the men of the convoy. Such a possibility
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Speaker 1: was far from their thoughts when they piled out of
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Speaker 1: the trucks once more, as they had done repeatedly all
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Speaker 1: day to return the enemy's fire. It did not even
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Speaker 1: seem significant when an enemy mortar shell set one of
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Speaker 1: the trucks in flames at the far end of the valley,
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Speaker 1: thus creating a roadblock and splitting the column. The enemy
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Speaker 1: took advantage of the opportunity to pour in small arms
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Speaker 1: and mortar fire, which pinned down the troops taking cover
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Speaker 1: behind vehicles or in the roadside ditches, and prevent a
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Speaker 1: removal of the damaged truck. During this interlude, the head
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Speaker 1: of the column, consisting of dog tanks George Company, nearly
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Speaker 1: three fourths of the forty first Commando and a few
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Speaker 1: Army infantrymen, continued the advance with Drysdale in command, in
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Speaker 1: obedience to orders to proceed to Hagaroo at all costs.
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Speaker 1: Left behind in hell Fire Valley were sixty one Commandos,
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Speaker 1: most of Company B thirty first Infantry, and practically all
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Speaker 1: the division headquarters and service troops. Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. Chydister,
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Speaker 1: Assistant Division G four ter and senior officer, caught south
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Speaker 1: of the roadblock, ordered the barred vehicles to turn around
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Speaker 1: and attempt to return to Coto Ree. Before his orders
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Speaker 1: could be carried out, a Chinese attack severed the convoy
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Speaker 1: about two hundred yards to the north of him. Other
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Speaker 1: enemy attacks cut the road south of the stalled convoy.
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Speaker 1: Both Chitaster and Major James K. Egan being wounded and captured.
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Speaker 1: Shallow ditches on either side of the road and the
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Speaker 1: unused narrow gage railway were utilized by the isolated troops
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Speaker 1: as protection from the fire of the Chinese occupying the
19:34
Speaker 1: high ground rising abruptly at the right. The valley was
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Speaker 1: about a mile long, covered with a frozen crust of snow,
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Speaker 1: and far from affording much cover, it offered the enemy
19:45
Speaker 1: a convenient approach to the rear by way of the
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Speaker 1: wide plain and frozen river. The Chinese fire was not
19:52
Speaker 1: heavy at first, but when darkness put an end to
19:55
Speaker 1: the marine air strikes, the enemy became increasingly bolder. Even so,
20:00
Speaker 1: there was no attempt for several hours to close within
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Speaker 1: grenade throwing distance. During this interlude, the defenders had time
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Speaker 1: to recover from their confusion and take defensive positions. As
20:12
Speaker 1: nearly as the scene can be reconstructed from confused and
20:15
Speaker 1: contradictory accounts. One large and three small perimeters were strung
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Speaker 1: out over a distance of perhaps twelve hundred yards from
20:23
Speaker 1: north to south. Toward the north, near the outskirts of
20:27
Speaker 1: the village of Pousong Knee was the largest perimeter. It
20:32
Speaker 1: contained the troops caught north of the second fracture of
20:34
Speaker 1: the column, and was led by Major John N. McLoughlin.
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Speaker 1: His hodgepodge of one hundred thirty to one hundred forty
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Speaker 1: men included Captain Charles Peckham and part of his B Company,
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Speaker 1: thirty first Infantry Warrant Officer Lloyd V. Durst, and a
20:50
Speaker 1: group of Marine MPs, some commandos, associated press photographer Frank Knowle,
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Speaker 1: and assorted Marine Service and headquarters troops. The three perimeters
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Speaker 1: appeared to have been resulted from the splintering of a
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Speaker 1: larger group originally containing nearly all the men caught south
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Speaker 1: of the second cut in the convoy. Major Henry J. Seely,
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Speaker 1: Division Motor Transport Officer attempted to form a perimeter with
21:16
Speaker 1: these men, but was frustrated by Chinese attacks, which forced
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Speaker 1: the men to fall back in small groups. About three
21:23
Speaker 1: hundred yards south of McLoughlin's perimeter, the remnants of two
21:26
Speaker 1: Army platoons crouched in a drainage ditch. Apparently several marines,
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Speaker 1: including Chief Warrant Officer D. R. Yancey, were with them.
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Speaker 1: Some thirty yards farther down the ditch were Captain Michael J. Koprero,
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Speaker 1: the Division PIO, First Lieutenant John A. Buck, General craig'saide,
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Speaker 1: and about fifteen headquarters troops. A few other marines clustered
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Speaker 1: around Major Seely, perhaps one hundred yards south of Corprero's group.
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Speaker 1: There was some hope at first that the tanks of
21:58
Speaker 1: Baker Company for Tank Battalion would come to the rescue,
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Speaker 1: but the marine armor ran into heavy opposition near Hill's
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Speaker 1: twelve thirty six and eleven eighty two, along the road
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Speaker 1: cleared only a few hours before by Task Force Drysdale.
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Speaker 1: When attacking a convoy, the Chinese usually strove to split
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Speaker 1: the motorized column into segments suitable for tactical mastication. That
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Speaker 1: is what happened to Baker Company. The tanks and trucks
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Speaker 1: nearest to Coto Ree got back without much trouble at
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Speaker 1: twenty one ten. After the enemy cut the column into
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Speaker 1: three groups, the middle group comprising most of the service
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Speaker 1: trucks was hit hardest. Lieutenant Colonel Harvey S. Walsith, the
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Speaker 1: Division G one, was wounded as this group finally fought
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Speaker 1: back to Coto Ree at zero two thirty after heavy
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Speaker 1: losses and trucks. This left the tank platoon, which had
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Speaker 1: proceeded farthest, and it formed a tight perimeter for the
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Speaker 1: night about a half a mile south of Sealy's position,
22:58
Speaker 1: boxed in by friendly archill fires from Codo Ree. At dawn,
23:03
Speaker 1: the tanks returned to Codo Ree without further enemy interference.
23:07
Speaker 1: No knowledge of these events reached the beleaguered troops in
23:10
Speaker 1: hell Fire Valley. They continued to hope that the tanks
23:14
Speaker 1: might arrive to the aid of men who had no
23:16
Speaker 1: weapons larger than a single seventy five millimeters recoilists. In
23:20
Speaker 1: addition to rifles, car beings, and grenades, there were also
23:24
Speaker 1: a few sixty millimeter mortars, but no ammunition for them. Fortunately,
23:30
Speaker 1: no determined Chinese attacks were received up to midnight. Looting
23:34
Speaker 1: the trucks proved more alluring than fighting to the Asiatics,
23:38
Speaker 1: and their officers contented themselves with keeping the perimeters pinned
23:41
Speaker 1: down and enveloped on three sides, not until the early
23:46
Speaker 1: hours of thirty November did the Communists resort to probing
23:49
Speaker 1: attacks by small groups armed with grenades. The headquarters and
23:53
Speaker 1: service troops gave a good account of themselves in the
23:56
Speaker 1: firefight signalmen, clerks, cooks, truck drivers, military policemen. The Marines
24:03
Speaker 1: of hell Fire Valley included a good many veterans of
24:05
Speaker 1: World War Two, and they proved as steady as the
24:08
Speaker 1: tough combat trained commandos. Once again, the value of the
24:12
Speaker 1: Marine corps insistence on good basic training showed itself. Major
24:17
Speaker 1: McLoughlin sent reconnaissance parties south in an unsuccessful attempt to
24:21
Speaker 1: link up with the other perimeters. He decided, therefore to
24:25
Speaker 1: remain in his position and fight off the Chinese until
24:28
Speaker 1: Eric could come on station at dawn. The wounded were
24:32
Speaker 1: placed in the deepest of the three ditches, and Army
24:34
Speaker 1: medics gave first aid. As the night wore on, McLoughlin's
24:39
Speaker 1: situation became increasingly grave. By zero two hundred, his men
24:44
Speaker 1: were out of grenades, and Army crew performed valiantly with
24:48
Speaker 1: the seventy five millimeters recoilists firing at enemy mortar flashes
24:52
Speaker 1: until all soldiers were killed or wounded and the gun
24:55
Speaker 1: put out of action. Twice, McLoughlin's men drove the Chinese
24:59
Speaker 1: from their mortars, only to have them return. Some of
25:02
Speaker 1: the commandos managed to slip out of the perimeter in
25:05
Speaker 1: an effort to reach Codo Ree and summon assistance, but
25:09
Speaker 1: an attempt by Nol and two men to run the
25:11
Speaker 1: gauntlet in a jeep between zero two hundred and zero
25:14
Speaker 1: three hundred ended in their capture before they proceeded one
25:17
Speaker 1: hundred yards. At about zero four point thirty, the Chinese
25:21
Speaker 1: sent their prisoners to the perimeter with a surrendered demand. McLoughlin,
25:26
Speaker 1: accompanied by a commando, went out to parley through an interpreter,
25:30
Speaker 1: in the hope of stalling until help arrived, or at
25:33
Speaker 1: least until some of the men escaped. Initially, I demanded
25:37
Speaker 1: a CCF surrender, he recalls, but it made little impression.
25:42
Speaker 1: The marine officer stalled until the Chinese threatened to overrun
25:45
Speaker 1: the perimeter with an all out attack. They gave him
25:48
Speaker 1: ten minutes to discuss the capitulation with his officers. McLoughlin
25:53
Speaker 1: went from one to another of the approximately forty able
25:56
Speaker 1: bodied men he had left. Some had no rifle ammunition
26:01
Speaker 1: at all and none had more than eight rounds. For
26:04
Speaker 1: the sake of his wounded, he consented to surrender on
26:07
Speaker 1: condition that the serious cases be evacuated. The Chinese agreed,
26:12
Speaker 1: and the fight in hell Fire Valley ended. McLoughlin succeeded
26:16
Speaker 1: in killing enough time so that more men were given
26:19
Speaker 1: the opportunity to slip away while the enemy relaxed his
26:22
Speaker 1: vigilance during the prolonged negotiations. Largest of these groups was
26:27
Speaker 1: composed of the survivors of the three small perimeters. Caprero
26:32
Speaker 1: and Buck, both of whom were slightly wounded, managed to
26:35
Speaker 1: unite with the army infantrymen just north of them, and
26:38
Speaker 1: nine commandos who joined them at about zero two hundred.
26:43
Speaker 1: An hour and a half later, they linked up with
26:45
Speaker 1: the Marines under Seely, who led the combined group in
26:48
Speaker 1: a withdraw to the high ground across the river, out
26:52
Speaker 1: distancing their CCF pursuers. After shooting down several they made
26:56
Speaker 1: it safely to Coto Ree. Other groups in including three
27:00
Speaker 1: more commandos and seventy one Army infantrymen, also contrived to
27:04
Speaker 1: straggle back to the two to one perimeter, although the
27:08
Speaker 1: Chinese did not keep their word as to evacuation of
27:11
Speaker 1: the wounded. They did not interfere with the removal of
27:14
Speaker 1: the more critical cases to a Korean house. When the
27:18
Speaker 1: enemy retired to the hills for the day, an opportunity
27:21
Speaker 1: was found to evacuate these casualties to Coto Ree. An
27:25
Speaker 1: accurate breakdown of the Task Force Drysdale casualties will probably
27:29
Speaker 1: never be made, but the following estimate is not far
27:33
Speaker 1: from the mark. Total KIA one hundred sixty two WIA
27:39
Speaker 1: one hundred fifty nine, total battle casualties three hundred twenty
27:43
Speaker 1: one lost vehicles seventy five. The casualties of Task Force
27:49
Speaker 1: Drysdale were heavy, commented General Smith, But by its partial success,
27:54
Speaker 1: the task Force made a significant contribution to the holding
27:57
Speaker 1: of Hagarou, which was vital to the division. To the
28:01
Speaker 1: slender infantry garrison of Hagaroo were added a tank company
28:04
Speaker 1: of about one hundred men and some three hundred seasoned infantrymen.
28:09
Speaker 1: The approximately three hundred troops which returned to Codo Ree
28:12
Speaker 1: participated thereafter in the defense of that perimeter. The head
28:16
Speaker 1: of the Task Force Drysdale Column with the Company D
28:19
Speaker 1: Tanks leading George Company and the commandos, was not aware
28:23
Speaker 1: at dusk on the twenty ninth that the convoy had
28:25
Speaker 1: been cut behind them. There had been previous gaps during
28:29
Speaker 1: the stops and starts caused by enemy fire, and it
28:33
Speaker 1: was supposed at first that the thin skinned vehicles would
28:35
Speaker 1: catch up with the vanguard. Progress was fairly good, despite
28:40
Speaker 1: intermittent fire from the high ground on the right of
28:42
Speaker 1: the road, until the tanks reached a point about twenty
28:45
Speaker 1: two hundred yards from Hagaroo. There the column was stopped
28:49
Speaker 1: by concentrated CCF mortar and small arms fire. One of
28:53
Speaker 1: the tanks was so damaged by a satchel charge that
28:56
Speaker 1: it had to be abandoned, and several vehicles were set afire.
29:00
Speaker 1: After Drysdale was wounded, the command passed a sitter, who
29:04
Speaker 1: formed his force into a perimeter until the repulse of
29:07
Speaker 1: the Chinese permitted the march to be resumed. Several pyramidal
29:11
Speaker 1: tents just outside the Hagaroo perimeter were assumed to be
29:15
Speaker 1: occupied by friendly troops until enemy in the vicinity destroyed
29:18
Speaker 1: two George Company trucks and cost several casualties. Later it
29:23
Speaker 1: was learned that the tents had been originally occupied by
29:26
Speaker 1: troops of the tenth Engineer battalion and abandoned when the
29:29
Speaker 1: Chinese attacked on the twenty eighth. At nineteen fifteen, Captain
29:34
Speaker 1: Sitter reported to Lieutenant Colonel Ridge, who directed that George
29:38
Speaker 1: Company and the forty first Commando spend the night in
29:40
Speaker 1: the perimeter reserve. After their all day fight. The men
29:44
Speaker 1: of the column could scarcely believe their eyes when they
29:47
Speaker 1: saw the marine engineers at work on the airstrip under
29:50
Speaker 1: the floodlights. Contrary to expectations, the hours of darkness on
29:55
Speaker 1: twenty nine to thirty November passed in comparative quiet at Hagaroo,
29:59
Speaker 1: except for Sa D harassing fires. It was not a
30:03
Speaker 1: coincidence that the enemy kept his distance. Attacks on the
30:07
Speaker 1: East Hill an item and how company positions of three
30:10
Speaker 1: to one actually had been planned and partly executed by
30:13
Speaker 1: troops of the fifty eight CCF Division. According to Pow testimony,
30:18
Speaker 1: they were broken up by marine air attacks and supporting
30:21
Speaker 1: fires which hit the assembly areas. The effectiveness of these
30:25
Speaker 1: fires owed a good deal to the intelligence brought back
30:28
Speaker 1: by Lieutenant Kerrey the battalion s two by CIC agents
30:32
Speaker 1: who circulated among Chinese troops on twenty seven and twenty
30:36
Speaker 1: eight November, the Battalion S two had a work table
30:39
Speaker 1: at the CP beside Major Simmons, the sack who directed
30:43
Speaker 1: six sorties of the night hecklers of VMFN five forty two.
30:48
Speaker 1: He guided the planes through the darkness to their targets
30:51
Speaker 1: with a fiery arrow as converging machine gun tracer bullets
30:54
Speaker 1: crossed over suspected CCF assembly areas. The eighty one millimeter
30:59
Speaker 1: mortars of Weapons Company three to one fired about eleven
31:02
Speaker 1: hundred rounds during the night, and the corresponding unit of
31:06
Speaker 1: two seven made a noteworthy contribution the following day. According
31:11
Speaker 1: to Kerry, Chinese prisoners reported that most of the units
31:15
Speaker 1: employed around Hagaru were very badly hit. A few white
31:20
Speaker 1: phosphorus mortar rounds fell on the lines of How and
31:22
Speaker 1: Item Companies, and a CCF green flare had caused an
31:26
Speaker 1: alert for an attack which never materialized. In the early
31:30
Speaker 1: morning hours of the thirtieth an enemy concentration appeared to
31:33
Speaker 1: be taking place on the Item Company front, but intensive
31:36
Speaker 1: sixty millimeter mortar fire put an end to that threat.
31:41
Speaker 1: Attack of George Company on East Hill at zero eight hundred,
31:46
Speaker 1: the battalion commander ordered George Company to retake East Hill
31:49
Speaker 1: while the commandos remained in reserve. Sitters plan called for
31:54
Speaker 1: his first and second platoons, commanded by second Lieutenants Frederick W.
31:58
Speaker 1: Hopkins and J. Joon W. Jager, respectively, to pass through
32:03
Speaker 1: Myers group, then make a sharp left turn and attack
32:06
Speaker 1: on either side of the ridge. First Lieutenant Carl E.
32:10
Speaker 1: Dennis's third platoon and two platoons of Able Company engineers
32:14
Speaker 1: were to follow in reserve. Slow progress caused the George
32:18
Speaker 1: Company commander to modify the plan by giving his third
32:21
Speaker 1: platoon and the two engineer platoons the mission of enveloping
32:24
Speaker 1: the CCF right flank. Lieutenant Dennis led the attack, with
32:29
Speaker 1: First Lieutenant Ernest P. Scouts and Lieutenant Canzona's engineer platoons following.
32:35
Speaker 1: Neither of the George Company attacks was successful. The trampling
32:40
Speaker 1: of hundreds of feet over the snow had made the
32:42
Speaker 1: footing more treacherous than ever, and once again the combination
32:46
Speaker 1: of difficult terrain and long range Chinese fire accounted for
32:50
Speaker 1: failure to retake East Hill. Sitter's request to set up
32:54
Speaker 1: defense positions on the ground previously occupied by Myers was granted. Meanwhile,
33:00
Speaker 1: Dennis's platoon and the engineers were directed to withdraw to
33:03
Speaker 1: the foot of the hill so that the corsairs could
33:05
Speaker 1: work the CCF positions over with rockets and bombs. End
33:11
Speaker 1: of Chapter eleven, Part one read by Aaron Bennett,