Latest / The Plato Library / Theaetetus Section V
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: Part five of Thettus by Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett.
- 0:07Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by
- 0:12Speaker 1: Geoffrey Edwards. Socrates, then, once more, what shall we say
- 0:19Speaker 1: that knowledge is? For we are not going to lose
- 0:22Speaker 1: heart as yet Thetetus. Certainly, I shall not lose heart
- 0:27Speaker 1: if you do not, Socrates, What definition will be most
- 0:32Speaker 1: consistent with our former views? Thetetus. I cannot think of
- 0:37Speaker 1: any but our old one, Socrates. Socrates, what was it? Thettus?
- 0:44Speaker 1: Knowledge was said by us to be true opinion, and
- 0:47Speaker 1: true opinion is surely unerring, and the results which follow
- 0:52Speaker 1: from it are all noble and good. Socrates, he who
- 0:57Speaker 1: led the way into the river Thettus said, the experiment
- 1:01Speaker 1: will show, and perhaps if we go forward in the search,
- 1:05Speaker 1: we may stumble upon the thing which we are looking for.
- 1:08Speaker 1: But if we stay where we are, nothing will come
- 1:11Speaker 1: to light. Thettus very true. Let us go forward and try, Socrates.
- 1:18Speaker 1: The trail soon comes to an end, for a whole
- 1:21Speaker 1: profession is against us Thettus. How is that? And what
- 1:27Speaker 1: profession do you mean, Socrates? The profession of the great
- 1:31Speaker 1: wise ones who are called orators and lawyers. For these
- 1:35Speaker 1: persuade men by their art and make them think whatever
- 1:38Speaker 1: they like, but they do not teach them. Do you
- 1:42Speaker 1: imagine that there are any teachers in the world so
- 1:45Speaker 1: clever as to be able to convince others of the
- 1:47Speaker 1: truth about acts of robbery or violence of which they
- 1:51Speaker 1: were not eye witnesses. While a little water is flowing
- 1:54Speaker 1: in the klepsydra, thetitis certainly not. They can only persuade them, Socrates.
- 2:01Speaker 1: And would you not say that persuading them is making
- 2:04Speaker 1: them have an opinion thettus, to be sure, Socrates, When therefore,
- 2:11Speaker 1: judges are justly persuaded about manners which you can know
- 2:15Speaker 1: only by seeing them, and not in any other way,
- 2:19Speaker 1: And when thus judging of them from report, they attain
- 2:22Speaker 1: a true opinion about them. They judge without knowledge, and
- 2:26Speaker 1: yet are rightly persuaded if they have judged well thettus, certainly, Socrates.
- 2:34Speaker 1: And yet, oh, my friend, if true opinion in law,
- 2:37Speaker 1: courts and knowledge are the same, the perfect judge could
- 2:40Speaker 1: not have judged greatly without knowledge, And therefore I must
- 2:44Speaker 1: infer that they are not the same thettus. That is
- 2:49Speaker 1: a distinction, Socrates, which I have heard made by some
- 2:52Speaker 1: one else, but I had forgotten it. He said, the
- 2:56Speaker 1: true opinion, combined with reason, was knowledge, but that the appearinion,
- 3:00Speaker 1: which had no reason, was out of the sphere of knowledge.
- 3:03Speaker 1: And that things of which there is no rational account
- 3:07Speaker 1: are not knowable. Such was the singular expression which he used,
- 3:11Speaker 1: and that things which have a reason or explanation are knowable.
- 3:16Speaker 1: Socrates excellent, But then how did he distinguish between things
- 3:21Speaker 1: which are and are not knowable? I wish that you
- 3:25Speaker 1: would repeat to me what he said, and then I
- 3:27Speaker 1: shall know whether you and I have heard the same
- 3:30Speaker 1: tale theatatus. I do not know whether I can recall it,
- 3:34Speaker 1: but if another person would tell me, I think that
- 3:37Speaker 1: I could follow him. Socrates, let me give you then
- 3:41Speaker 1: a dream in return for a dream. Methought that I
- 3:44Speaker 1: too had a dream, and I heard in my dream
- 3:47Speaker 1: that the prime evil letters or elements out of which
- 3:51Speaker 1: you and I and all other things are compounded, have
- 3:54Speaker 1: no reason or explanation. You can only name them, but
- 3:58Speaker 1: no predicate can be either affirmed or denied of them,
- 4:02Speaker 1: for in the one case, existence, in the other non
- 4:05Speaker 1: existence is already implied, neither of which must be added.
- 4:10Speaker 1: If you mean to speak of this or that thing
- 4:12Speaker 1: by itself alone. It should not be called itself or that,
- 4:16Speaker 1: or each or alone, or this or the like, For
- 4:20Speaker 1: these go about everywhere and are applied to all things,
- 4:24Speaker 1: but are distinct from them. Whereas, if the first elements
- 4:28Speaker 1: could be described and had a definition of their own,
- 4:31Speaker 1: they would be spoken of apart from all else. But
- 4:34Speaker 1: none of these primeval elements can be defined. They can
- 4:38Speaker 1: only be named, for they have nothing but a name,
- 4:41Speaker 1: And the things which are compounded of them, as they
- 4:44Speaker 1: are complex, are expressed by a combination of names. For
- 4:48Speaker 1: the combination of names is the essence of a definition. Thus,
- 4:52Speaker 1: then the elements or letters are only objects of perception
- 4:56Speaker 1: and cannot be defined or known. But the syllables or
- 5:00Speaker 1: combinations of them are known and expressed, and are apprehended
- 5:04Speaker 1: by true opinion. When therefore, anyone forms the true opinion
- 5:08Speaker 1: of anything without rational explanation, you may say that his
- 5:12Speaker 1: mind is truly exercised, but has no knowledge. For he
- 5:16Speaker 1: who cannot give and receive a reason for a thing
- 5:19Speaker 1: has no knowledge of that thing. But when he adds
- 5:23Speaker 1: rational explanation, then he is perfected in knowledge, and may
- 5:27Speaker 1: be all that I have been denying of him. Was
- 5:30Speaker 1: that the form in which the dream appeared to you
- 5:33Speaker 1: thettus precisely, Socrates? And you allow and maintain that true
- 5:40Speaker 1: opinion combined with definition or rational explanation, is knowledge thettus exactly, Socrates.
- 5:49Speaker 1: Then may we assume thettus that to day, and in
- 5:53Speaker 1: this casual manner, we have found a truth which in
- 5:56Speaker 1: former times many wise men have grown old and have
- 6:00Speaker 1: not found thetitus at any rate, Socrates. I am satisfied
- 6:05Speaker 1: with the present statement, Socrates, which is probably correct, for
- 6:10Speaker 1: how can there be knowledge apart from definition and true opinion?
- 6:14Speaker 1: And yet there is one point in what has been
- 6:17Speaker 1: said which does not quite satisfy me. Thettus? What was it, Socrates?
- 6:24Speaker 1: What might seem to be the most ingenious notion of all,
- 6:27Speaker 1: that the elements or letters are unknown, but the combination
- 6:31Speaker 1: or syllables known thettus? And was that wrong? Socrates? We
- 6:38Speaker 1: shall soon know, for we have as hostages the instances
- 6:42Speaker 1: which the author of the argument himself used thettus? What hostages, Socrates?
- 6:49Speaker 1: The letters which are the elements, and the syllables which
- 6:52Speaker 1: are the combinations? He reasoned, did he not from the
- 6:56Speaker 1: letters of the alphabet Thetitus. Yes he did, Socrates. Let
- 7:02Speaker 1: us take them and put them to the test, or
- 7:05Speaker 1: rather test ourselves. What was the way in which we
- 7:09Speaker 1: learned letters? And? First of all, are we right in
- 7:12Speaker 1: saying that syllables have a definition, but that letters have
- 7:15Speaker 1: no definition? Thetitis? I think so, Socrates. I think so too.
- 7:23Speaker 1: For suppose that someone asks you to spell the first
- 7:25Speaker 1: syllable of my name, thettus. He says, what is saw thetitis?
- 7:32Speaker 1: I should reply s And Oh, Socrates, that is the
- 7:38Speaker 1: definition which you would give of the syllable thetitis, I should, Socrates.
- 7:44Speaker 1: I wish that you would give me a similar definition
- 7:47Speaker 1: of the s thetitus. But how can anyone, Socrates, tell
- 7:51Speaker 1: the elements of an element? I can only reply that
- 7:55Speaker 1: s is a consonant, a mere noise, as of the
- 7:58Speaker 1: tongue hissing, be, And most other letters again, are neither
- 8:03Speaker 1: vowel sounds nor noises. Thus letters may be most truly
- 8:07Speaker 1: said to be undefined, for even the most distinct of them,
- 8:11Speaker 1: which are the seven vowels, have a sound only, but
- 8:14Speaker 1: no definition at all. Socrates. Then I suppose, my friend,
- 8:19Speaker 1: that we have been so far right in our idea
- 8:21Speaker 1: about knowledge Thetitas. Yes, I think that we have Socrates well.
- 8:29Speaker 1: But have we been right in maintaining that the syllables
- 8:32Speaker 1: can be known but not the letters Thetitas? I think so, Socrates.
- 8:38Speaker 1: And do we mean by a syllable two letters, or
- 8:42Speaker 1: if there are more, all of them, or a single
- 8:45Speaker 1: idea which arises out of the combination of them Thettus,
- 8:49Speaker 1: I should say that we mean all the letters, Socrates.
- 8:54Speaker 1: Take the case of the two letters A, S and O,
- 8:57Speaker 1: which form the first syllable of my own name. Must
- 9:01Speaker 1: not he who knows the syllable know both of them? Thetitus? Certainly, Socrates.
- 9:08Speaker 1: He knows that is the S and O. Thetitus, Yes, Socrates.
- 9:15Speaker 1: But can he be ignorant of either singly and yet
- 9:18Speaker 1: know both together? Thetitus. Such a supposition, Socrates is monstrous
- 9:23Speaker 1: and unmeaning Socrates. But if he cannot know both without
- 9:28Speaker 1: knowing each, then if he is ever to know the syllable,
- 9:32Speaker 1: he must know the letters first. And thus the fine
- 9:35Speaker 1: theory has again taken wings and departed Thetitus. Yes, with
- 9:40Speaker 1: wonderful celerity, Socrates. Yes, we did not keep watch properly.
- 9:46Speaker 1: Perhaps we ought to have maintained that a syllable is
- 9:49Speaker 1: not the letters, but rather one single idea framed out
- 9:52Speaker 1: of them, having a separate form distinct from them. Thetitus
- 9:57Speaker 1: very true, and a more likely notion then the other, Socrates.
- 10:02Speaker 1: Take care. Let us not be cowards and betray a
- 10:05Speaker 1: great and imposing theory. Thetitas no, indeed, Socrates. Let us assume, then,
- 10:13Speaker 1: as we now say, that the syllable is a simple form,
- 10:16Speaker 1: arising out of the several combinations of harmonious elements, of
- 10:20Speaker 1: letters or of any other elements. Thetitas very good, Socrates.
- 10:27Speaker 1: And it must have no parts. Thetitas why, Socrates, because
- 10:33Speaker 1: that which has parts must be a whole of all
- 10:36Speaker 1: the parts. Or would you see that a whole, although
- 10:40Speaker 1: formed out of the parts, is a single notion different
- 10:43Speaker 1: from all the parts thetitas I should, Socrates. And would
- 10:49Speaker 1: you say that all in the whole are the same?
- 10:52Speaker 1: Are different thetitas? I am not certain, But as you
- 10:57Speaker 1: like me to answer at once, I shall hazard the
- 10:59Speaker 1: reply that they are different. Socrates. I approve of your
- 11:04Speaker 1: readiness the aetitis, but I must take time to think
- 11:07Speaker 1: whether I equally approve of your answer thettus. Yes, the
- 11:12Speaker 1: answer is the point, Socrates, According to this new view,
- 11:17Speaker 1: the whole is supposed to differ from all thettus yes, Socrates. Well,
- 11:25Speaker 1: but is there any difference between all in the plural
- 11:29Speaker 1: and the all in the singular. Take the case of number.
- 11:33Speaker 1: When we say one, two, three, four, five, six, or
- 11:40Speaker 1: when we say twice three or three times two, or
- 11:46Speaker 1: four and two or three in two and one, are
- 11:50Speaker 1: we speaking of the same or of different numbers? Thetitis
- 11:55Speaker 1: of the same Socrates, that is, of six, thetitas yes, Socrates.
- 12:04Speaker 1: And in each form of expression we spoke of all
- 12:06Speaker 1: the six, thetitas true Socrates. Again, in speaking of all
- 12:13Speaker 1: in the plural, is there not one thing which we
- 12:15Speaker 1: express thetitas? Of course, there is Socrates, and that is six,
- 12:23Speaker 1: thetitas yes, Socrates. Then, in predicating the word all of
- 12:29Speaker 1: things measured by number, we predicate at the same time
- 12:32Speaker 1: a singular and a plural thetitas. Clearly we do Socrates. Again,
- 12:39Speaker 1: the number of the acre and the acre are the same,
- 12:43Speaker 1: are they not? Thetitas yes, Socrates. And the number of
- 12:49Speaker 1: the stadium, in like manner is the stadium thetitas yes, Socrates.
- 12:55Speaker 1: And the army is the number of the army. And
- 12:58Speaker 1: in all similar cases, the entire number of anything is
- 13:01Speaker 1: the entire thing, thetitis true, Socrates, And the number of
- 13:07Speaker 1: each is the parts of each thettus exactly, Socrates. Then
- 13:14Speaker 1: as many things as half parts are made up of
- 13:16Speaker 1: parts thetitas, clearly, Socrates. But all the parts are admitted
- 13:22Speaker 1: to be the all. If the entire number is the all,
- 13:25Speaker 1: thetitis true, Socrates, then the whole is not made up
- 13:31Speaker 1: of parts, for it would be the all if consisting
- 13:34Speaker 1: of all the parts thetitis. That is the inference, Socrates.
- 13:40Speaker 1: But is a part a part of anything, but the
- 13:42Speaker 1: whole thetitis, Yes, of the all, Socrates. You make a
- 13:48Speaker 1: valiant defense thetitis. And yet is not the all that
- 13:52Speaker 1: of which nothing is wanting? Thetitis certainly, Socrates, and is
- 13:59Speaker 1: not a whole. Likewise, that from which nothing is absent,
- 14:02Speaker 1: But that from which anything is absent, is neither a
- 14:06Speaker 1: whole nor all, if wanting in anything, both equally lose
- 14:10Speaker 1: their entirety of nature thetitus. I now think that there
- 14:15Speaker 1: is no difference between a whole and all, Socrates. But
- 14:20Speaker 1: were we not saying that when a thing has parts,
- 14:23Speaker 1: all the parts will be a whole, and all thetitas certainly, Socrates. Then,
- 14:30Speaker 1: as I was saying before, must not the alternative be
- 14:33Speaker 1: that either the syllable is not the letters, and then
- 14:36Speaker 1: the letters are not parts of the syllable, or that
- 14:39Speaker 1: the syllable will be the same with the letters, and
- 14:42Speaker 1: will therefore be equally known with them. Thetitas. You are right, Socrates,
- 14:49Speaker 1: and in order to avoid this we suppose it to
- 14:52Speaker 1: be different from them. Thetitas, yes, Socrates. But if letters
- 14:58Speaker 1: are not parts of syllables, can you tell me of
- 15:01Speaker 1: any other parts of syllables which are not letters? Thettus No, indeed, Socrates,
- 15:07Speaker 1: For if I admit the existence of parts in a syllable,
- 15:10Speaker 1: it would be ridiculous in me to give up letters
- 15:12Speaker 1: and seek for other parts. Socrates. Quite true, thetetus, And therefore,
- 15:18Speaker 1: according to our present view, a syllable must surely be
- 15:21Speaker 1: some indivisible form thetitus. True, Socrates. But do you remember,
- 15:29Speaker 1: my friend, that only a little while ago we admitted
- 15:32Speaker 1: and approved the statement that of the first elements, out
- 15:35Speaker 1: of which all other things are compounded, there could be
- 15:38Speaker 1: no definition, because each of them, when taken by itself,
- 15:42Speaker 1: is uncompounded. Nor can one rightly attribute to them the
- 15:46Speaker 1: words being or this because they are alien and inappropriate words,
- 15:52Speaker 1: and for this reason the letters or elements were indefinable
- 15:57Speaker 1: and unknown. Thettus, remember, Socrates, and is not this also
- 16:03Speaker 1: the reason why they are simple and indivisible? I can
- 16:07Speaker 1: see no other thetitas. No other reason can be given, Socrates. Then,
- 16:14Speaker 1: is not the syllable in the same case as the
- 16:16Speaker 1: elements or letters, if it has no parts and is
- 16:20Speaker 1: one form? Thetitas to be sure, Socrates. If then a
- 16:27Speaker 1: syllable is a whole and as many parts or letters,
- 16:31Speaker 1: the letters as well as the syllable must be intelligible
- 16:34Speaker 1: and expressible, since all the parts are acknowledged to be
- 16:38Speaker 1: the same as the whole, thetitas true, Socrates. But if
- 16:43Speaker 1: it be one and indivisible, then the syllables in the
- 16:46Speaker 1: letters are alike undefined and unknown, and for the same
- 16:50Speaker 1: reason thetitas I cannot deny that, Socrates. We cannot therefore
- 16:57Speaker 1: agree in the opinion of him who says that the
- 17:00Speaker 1: syllable can be known and expressed, but not the letters.
- 17:04Speaker 1: Thetitus certainly not, if we may trust the argument Socrates. Well,
- 17:11Speaker 1: but will you not be equally inclined to disagree with
- 17:14Speaker 1: him when you remember your own experience in learning to
- 17:16Speaker 1: read thetitas? What experience, Socrates? Why that in learning you
- 17:23Speaker 1: were kept trying to distinguish the separate letters, both by
- 17:26Speaker 1: the eye and by the ear, in order that when
- 17:30Speaker 1: you heard them spoken or saw them written, you might
- 17:33Speaker 1: not be confused by their position. Thetitus very true, Socrates,
- 17:39Speaker 1: And is the education of the harp player complete unless
- 17:42Speaker 1: he can tell what string answers to a particular note.
- 17:46Speaker 1: The notes, as every one would allow, are the elements
- 17:49Speaker 1: or letters of music, thetitas exactly, Socrates. Then if we
- 17:55Speaker 1: argue from the letters and syllables which we know to
- 17:58Speaker 1: other simples and compounds, we shall say that the letters
- 18:02Speaker 1: or simple elements as a class are much more certainly
- 18:05Speaker 1: known than the syllables, and much more indispensable to a
- 18:09Speaker 1: perfect knowledge of any subject. And if someone says that
- 18:13Speaker 1: the syllable is known and the letter unknown, we shall
- 18:16Speaker 1: consider that, either intentionally or unintentionally, he is talking nonsense.
- 18:22Speaker 1: Thettus exactly, Socrates. And there might be given other proofs
- 18:28Speaker 1: of this belief if I am not mistaken, But do
- 18:31Speaker 1: not let us, in looking for them, lose sight of
- 18:34Speaker 1: the question before us, which is the meaning of the
- 18:36Speaker 1: statement that right opinion, with rational definition or explanation is
- 18:41Speaker 1: the most perfect form of knowledge. Thettus, We must not, Socrates, well,
- 18:49Speaker 1: and what is the meaning of the term explanation? I
- 18:52Speaker 1: think that we have a choice of three meanings Thetatus.
- 18:56Speaker 1: What are they? Socrates. In the first place, the meaning
- 19:00Speaker 1: may be manifesting one's thought by the voice with verbs
- 19:04Speaker 1: and nouns, imaging an opinion in the stream which flows
- 19:08Speaker 1: from the limps, as in a mirror or water. Does
- 19:11Speaker 1: not explanation appear to be of this nature Thetitus. Certainly,
- 19:17Speaker 1: he who so manifests his thought is said to explain himself, Socrates.
- 19:22Speaker 1: And every one who is not born deaf or dumb,
- 19:25Speaker 1: is able sooner or later to manifest what he thinks
- 19:27Speaker 1: of anything. And if so, all those who have a
- 19:31Speaker 1: right opinion about anything will also have right explanation. Nor
- 19:35Speaker 1: will right opinion be anywhere found to exist apart from
- 19:39Speaker 1: knowledge Thetitus true Socrates. Let us not therefore hastily charge
- 19:46Speaker 1: him who gives us account of knowledge with uttering an
- 19:49Speaker 1: unmeaning word. For perhaps he only intended to say that
- 19:53Speaker 1: when a person was asked what was the nature of anything,
- 19:56Speaker 1: he should be able to answer his questioner by giving
- 19:59Speaker 1: the elements of thing, thetitas, as for example, Socrates, Socrates.
- 20:06Speaker 1: As for example, when Hesiod says that a wagon is
- 20:10Speaker 1: made up of a hundred planks. Now neither you nor
- 20:13Speaker 1: I could describe all of them individually. But if anyone
- 20:17Speaker 1: asked what is a wagon, we should be content to
- 20:20Speaker 1: answer that a wagon consists of wheels, axel, body, rims, yoke, thetitas. Certainly, Socrates,
- 20:31Speaker 1: and our opponent will probably laugh at us, just as
- 20:34Speaker 1: he would if we profess to be grammarians and to
- 20:37Speaker 1: give a grammatical account of the name of thetitas, and
- 20:41Speaker 1: yet could only tell the syllables and not the letters
- 20:43Speaker 1: of your name, that would be true opinion and not knowledge.
- 20:48Speaker 1: For knowledge, as has been already remarked, is not attained
- 20:51Speaker 1: until combined with true opinion. There is an enumeration of
- 20:55Speaker 1: the elements out of which anything is composed, thetitas, Yes, Socrates.
- 21:03Speaker 1: In the same general way, we might also have true
- 21:05Speaker 1: opinion about a wagon. But he who can describe its
- 21:09Speaker 1: essence by an enumeration of the hundred planks adds rational
- 21:13Speaker 1: explanation to true opinion, and instead of opinion, has art
- 21:17Speaker 1: and knowledge of the nature of a wagon in that
- 21:20Speaker 1: he attends to the whole through the elements Thetitas. And
- 21:25Speaker 1: do you not agree in that for you Socrates? Socrates,
- 21:29Speaker 1: if you do, my friend, but I want to know
- 21:31Speaker 1: first whether you admit the resolution of all things into
- 21:35Speaker 1: their elements to be irrational, explanation of them, and the
- 21:39Speaker 1: consideration of them in syllables or larger combinations of them
- 21:43Speaker 1: to be irrational. Is this your view Thettus precisely, Socrates. Well,
- 21:50Speaker 1: and do you conceive that a man has knowledge of
- 21:53Speaker 1: any element who at one time affirms and at another
- 21:57Speaker 1: time denies that element of something, or thinks that the
- 22:01Speaker 1: same thing is composed of different elements at different times
- 22:05Speaker 1: the Titus, assuredly not, Socrates. And do you not remember
- 22:10Speaker 1: that in your case and in that of others, this
- 22:13Speaker 1: often occurred in the process of learning to read the Titus.
- 22:18Speaker 1: You mean that I mistook the letters and misspelled the syllables, Socrates, Yes,
- 22:24Speaker 1: the Titus. To be sure, I perfectly remember. And I
- 22:28Speaker 1: am very far from supposing that they who are in
- 22:31Speaker 1: this condition have knowledge, Socrates. When a person at the
- 22:36Speaker 1: time of learning writes the name of Thetitas and thinks
- 22:39Speaker 1: that he ought to write, and does write thh and E,
- 22:44Speaker 1: but again, meaning to write the name of Theodorus, thinks
- 22:47Speaker 1: that he ought to write, and does write T and E.
- 22:52Speaker 1: Can we suppose that he knows the first syllables of
- 22:55Speaker 1: your two names, the Titus. We have already admitted that
- 22:59Speaker 1: such a one has not yet atteened knowledge, Socrates, And
- 23:04Speaker 1: in like manner he may enumerate without knowing them the
- 23:07Speaker 1: second and third and fourth syllables of your name, Thetitus,
- 23:12Speaker 1: he may, Socrates. And in that case, when he knows
- 23:16Speaker 1: the order of the letters and can write them out correctly,
- 23:19Speaker 1: he has right opinion Thetitus clearly, Socrates. But although we
- 23:26Speaker 1: admit that he has right opinion, he will still be
- 23:29Speaker 1: without knowledge. Thetitus, yes, Socrates. And yet he will have
- 23:36Speaker 1: explanation as well as right opinion, for he knew the
- 23:39Speaker 1: order of the letters when he wrote, and this we
- 23:42Speaker 1: admit to be explanation Thetitus true Socrates. Then, my friend,
- 23:49Speaker 1: there is such a thing as right opinion united with
- 23:52Speaker 1: definition or explanation, which does not, as yet attain to
- 23:56Speaker 1: the exactness of knowledge. Thetitus would seem so, Socrates. And
- 24:03Speaker 1: what we fancied to be a perfect definition of knowledge
- 24:06Speaker 1: is a dream only. But perhaps we had better not
- 24:09Speaker 1: say so as yet, For were there not three explanations
- 24:12Speaker 1: of knowledge, one of which must, as we said, be
- 24:16Speaker 1: adopted by him who maintains knowledge to be true opinion
- 24:19Speaker 1: combined with rational explanation, And very likely there may be
- 24:24Speaker 1: found some one who will not prefer this. But the third, Thetitis,
- 24:29Speaker 1: you are quite right, there is still one remaining. The
- 24:32Speaker 1: first was the image or expression of the mind in speech.
- 24:36Speaker 1: The second, which has just been mentioned, is a way
- 24:39Speaker 1: of reaching the whole by an enumeration of the elements.
- 24:43Speaker 1: But what is the third definition? Socrates? There is further
- 24:48Speaker 1: the popular notion of telling the mark or sign of difference,
- 24:52Speaker 1: which distinguishes the thing in question from all others Thetetus.
- 24:57Speaker 1: Can you give me any example of such a definition, Socrates?
- 25:01Speaker 1: As for example, in the case of the sun, I
- 25:04Speaker 1: think that you would be contented with the statement that
- 25:07Speaker 1: the sun is the brightest of the heavenly bodies which
- 25:10Speaker 1: revolve about the earth. Thettus certainly, Socrates understand why. The
- 25:17Speaker 1: reason is as I was just now saying that if
- 25:20Speaker 1: you get at the difference and distinguishing characteristic of each thing,
- 25:24Speaker 1: then as many persons affirm, you will get at the
- 25:27Speaker 1: definition or explanation of it. But while you lay hold
- 25:31Speaker 1: only of the common and not of the characteristic notion,
- 25:35Speaker 1: you will only have the definition of those things to
- 25:38Speaker 1: which this common quality belongs. Thettus. I understand you, and
- 25:43Speaker 1: your account of definition is in my judgment, correct Socrates.
- 25:49Speaker 1: But he who having right opinion about anything can find
- 25:53Speaker 1: out the difference which distinguishes it from other things, will
- 25:57Speaker 1: know that of which before he had only an opinion. Thetitus. Yes,
- 26:03Speaker 1: that is what we are maintaining, Socrates. Nevertheless, Thetitus. On
- 26:08Speaker 1: a nearer view, I find myself quite disappointed. The picture,
- 26:13Speaker 1: which at a distance was not so bad, has now
- 26:15Speaker 1: become altogether unintelligible. Thetitus, what do you mean, Socrates? I
- 26:22Speaker 1: will endeavor to explain. I will suppose myself to have
- 26:26Speaker 1: true opinion of you, and if to this I add
- 26:29Speaker 1: your definition, then I have knowledge. But if not opinion
- 26:33Speaker 1: only Thetitus. Yes, Socrates, the definition was assumed to be
- 26:39Speaker 1: the interpretation of your difference. Thetitis. True, Socrates. But when
- 26:46Speaker 1: I had only opinion, I had no conception of your
- 26:49Speaker 1: distinguishing characteristics. Thettus, I suppose not Socrates, then I must
- 26:56Speaker 1: have conceived of some general or common nature which no
- 26:59Speaker 1: more belong to you than to another, Thetitus true. Socrates.
- 27:05Speaker 1: Tell me, now, how in that case could I have
- 27:09Speaker 1: formed a judgment of you any more than of any
- 27:12Speaker 1: one else. Suppose that I imagine Thetitas to be a
- 27:15Speaker 1: man who has nose, eyes, and mouth, and every other
- 27:19Speaker 1: member complete. How would that enable me to distinguish Thetitis
- 27:23Speaker 1: from Theodorus, or from some outer barbarian Thetitus? How could it, Socrates?
- 27:31Speaker 1: Or if I had further conceived of you, not only
- 27:34Speaker 1: as having nose and eyes, but as having a snub
- 27:36Speaker 1: nose and prominent eyes, should I have any more notion
- 27:40Speaker 1: of you than of myself and others who resemble me Thetitus?
- 27:45Speaker 1: Certainly not, Socrates. Surely I can have no conception of
- 27:50Speaker 1: Thetitas until your snub nosedness has left an impression on
- 27:54Speaker 1: my mind different from the snubnosedness of all others whom
- 27:58Speaker 1: I have ever seen, and until your other peculiarities have
- 28:03Speaker 1: a like distinctness. And so when I meet you tomorrow,
- 28:07Speaker 1: the right opinion will be recalled Thettus most true, Socrates,
- 28:13Speaker 1: Then right opinion implies the perception of differences. Thetitus clearly, Socrates,
- 28:21Speaker 1: what then shall we say of adding reason or explanation
- 28:25Speaker 1: to right opinion? If the meaning is that we should
- 28:28Speaker 1: form an opinion of the way in which something differs
- 28:30Speaker 1: from another thing, the proposal is ridiculous Thettus. How so, Socrates,
- 28:38Speaker 1: we are supposed to acquire a right opinion of the
- 28:41Speaker 1: differences which distinguish one thing from another when we have
- 28:45Speaker 1: already a right opinion of them, And so we go
- 28:49Speaker 1: round and round. The revolution of the scittily or pestle,
- 28:53Speaker 1: or any other rotatory machine in the same circles is
- 28:57Speaker 1: as nothing compared with such a requirement. And we may
- 29:01Speaker 1: be truly described as the blind directing the blind. For
- 29:05Speaker 1: to add those things which we already have, in order
- 29:09Speaker 1: that we may learn what we already think is like
- 29:12Speaker 1: a soul utterly benighted. Thetitus. Tell me, what were you
- 29:17Speaker 1: going to say just now when you ask the question, Socrates,
- 29:21Speaker 1: If my boy the argument in speaking of adding the
- 29:24Speaker 1: definition had used the word to know, and not merely
- 29:28Speaker 1: have an opinion of the difference, this, which is the
- 29:32Speaker 1: most promising of all the definitions of knowledge, would have
- 29:35Speaker 1: come to a pretty end, for to know is surely
- 29:38Speaker 1: to acquire knowledge. Thetitus true, Socrates. And so when the
- 29:44Speaker 1: question is asked what is knowledge, this fair argument will answer,
- 29:49Speaker 1: write opinion with knowledge knowledge that is of difference. For this,
- 29:54Speaker 1: as the said argument maintains, is adding the definition Thetitus.
- 30:00Speaker 1: It seems to be true, Socrates. But how utterly foolish
- 30:05Speaker 1: when we are asking what is knowledge that the reply
- 30:08Speaker 1: should only be right opinion with knowledge of difference or
- 30:12Speaker 1: of anything. And so thettus knowledge is neither sensation nor
- 30:17Speaker 1: true opinion, nor yet definition and explanation accompanying and added
- 30:22Speaker 1: too true opinion. Thettus, I suppose not, Socrates. And are
- 30:29Speaker 1: you still in labor and travail, my dear friend, or
- 30:32Speaker 1: have you brought all that you have to say about
- 30:34Speaker 1: knowledge to the birth thettus? I am sure, Socrates, that
- 30:39Speaker 1: you have elicited for me a good deal more than
- 30:42Speaker 1: ever was in me. Socrates, And does not my art
- 30:46Speaker 1: show that you have brought forth wind and that the
- 30:49Speaker 1: offspring of your brain are not worth bringing up? Thetetus?
- 30:54Speaker 1: Very true, Socrates. But if thetetus you should ever conceive afresh,
- 31:00Speaker 1: you will be all the better for the present investigation
- 31:03Speaker 1: and if not, you will be soberer and humbler and
- 31:06Speaker 1: gentler to other men, and will be too modest to
- 31:10Speaker 1: fancy that you know what you do not know. These
- 31:13Speaker 1: are the limits of my art. I can no further go,
- 31:16Speaker 1: nor do I know aught of the things which great
- 31:19Speaker 1: and famous men know or have known in this or
- 31:22Speaker 1: former ages. The office of a midwife, I, like my mother,
- 31:27Speaker 1: have received from God. She delivered women, and I deliver men.
- 31:32Speaker 1: But they must be young and noble and fair. And
- 31:36Speaker 1: now I have to go to the porch of the
- 31:38Speaker 1: King Arkan, where I am to meet Meletos and his
- 31:41Speaker 1: indictment tomorrow morning. Theodoras I shall hope to see you
- 31:45Speaker 1: again at this place. And of Part five and end
- 31:50Speaker 1: of Thetaetus by Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett, read by
- 31:57Speaker 1: Geoffrey Edwards, proofly by Lucretia meticordinated by Joe Recording in
- 32:06Speaker 1: memory of Mitchell Edwards