Latest / Dissidentpodden / The necessity for eternal enemies
Transcript
- 0:00[music]
- 0:09SPEAKER_00: Welcome to another episode of the Dissident Podcast.
- 0:15SPEAKER_00: I'm now very honored to have us joined by Professor David Gibbs from the University of Arizona.
- 0:27SPEAKER_00: I think I best just leave it up to you,
- 0:29SPEAKER_00: Professor Gibbs,
- 0:30SPEAKER_00: to give us a short,
- 0:32SPEAKER_00: our Swedish listeners, a short introduction to yourself and your fields of research.
- 0:38SPEAKER_01: Okay.
- 0:39SPEAKER_01: I'm a history professor, though I have my degrees in political science.
- 0:42SPEAKER_01: I sort of do both.
- 0:44SPEAKER_01: And I've worked on a lot of different areas.
- 0:45SPEAKER_01: I'm writing a book right now that's going to be called Guns, Butter,
- 0:50SPEAKER_01: and America's Permanent Search for Enemies,
- 0:53SPEAKER_01: which is about the United States after the Cold War.
- 0:56SPEAKER_01: And so I'm working on that right now.
- 1:03SPEAKER_00: That's good.
- 1:04SPEAKER_00: It's always good to have different approaches to these questions.
- 1:10SPEAKER_00: Today I will be asking a few questions to you,
- 1:17SPEAKER_00: Professor Gibbs,
- 1:18SPEAKER_00: mainly concerning how NATO foreign policy,
- 1:24SPEAKER_00: since the end of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union,
- 1:30SPEAKER_00: It's
- 1:33SPEAKER_00: systematically
- 1:36SPEAKER_00: created new threats to justify its own existence and make
- 1:43SPEAKER_00: a perpetual case for keeping an American global hegemony.
- 1:51SPEAKER_00: So...
- 1:53SPEAKER_00: There is one general that you have cited, and that's General Powell, I believe.
- 1:59SPEAKER_00: You have said that the US military machine was not running on empty,
- 2:07SPEAKER_00: but running out of villains.
- 2:09SPEAKER_00: That's the quote I think you used.
- 2:12SPEAKER_00: And basically there is a group that try and provide
- 2:21SPEAKER_00: New villains to the NATO system after the Cold War.
- 2:29SPEAKER_00: So I was just wondering for a first question.
- 2:34SPEAKER_00: How do you distinguish between,
- 2:38SPEAKER_00: let's say,
- 2:39SPEAKER_00: a strategic need to create enemies driven by these institutional interests
- 2:47SPEAKER_00: in comparison to the Obvious diplomatic failure to integrate potential protagonists
- 2:58SPEAKER_00: or potential friends like Russia into a new European security architecture.
- 3:05SPEAKER_00: Were both operating simultaneously within the American system or was
- 3:12SPEAKER_00: the State Department kind of Because I know there were American interests trying
- 3:19SPEAKER_00: to get Russia into the Western sphere,
- 3:22SPEAKER_00: but were they maneuvered out at an early stage?
- 3:25SPEAKER_00: Or what happened in the 90s, in the beginning, concerning these different interests?
- 3:32SPEAKER_00: Do you know?
- 3:34SPEAKER_01: Yes, I do.
- 3:36SPEAKER_01: The key topic we'll be discussing,
- 3:37SPEAKER_01: I assume, is Russia in the context of the current war in Ukraine.
- 3:42SPEAKER_01: Obviously one of the questions is how do things deteriorate to the point that
- 3:45SPEAKER_01: the United States and Europe are effectively at war with Russia operating
- 3:49SPEAKER_01: through Ukraine?
- 3:49SPEAKER_01: How did that happen?
- 3:51SPEAKER_01: And it's surprising at a lot of levels to the extent
- 3:53SPEAKER_01: that Russia seemed like not just a friendly country,
- 3:57SPEAKER_01: but at times almost a vassal state of the United States in the 90s,
- 4:00SPEAKER_01: came pretty close at times.
- 4:03SPEAKER_01: You know,
- 4:03SPEAKER_01: the United States boasted that it played a key role in re-electing Boris Yeltsin
- 4:08SPEAKER_01: as president in 1996.
- 4:11SPEAKER_01: And there was a very high level of positive feeling among the Russian people towards
- 4:16SPEAKER_01: the United States immediately following the end of the Cold War.
- 4:21SPEAKER_01: And something happened to cause that deteriorate.
- 4:23SPEAKER_01: And even later,
- 4:25SPEAKER_01: under Putin,
- 4:26SPEAKER_01: when Putin came to power in 2000,
- 4:28SPEAKER_01: one of the things he tried to do was improve relations with the United States.
- 4:31SPEAKER_01: He offered, unsuccessfully, to become a member of NATO.
- 4:35SPEAKER_01: He wanted to become a member of NATO, and that was rejected.
- 4:39SPEAKER_01: And one does get the impression the United States and Europe
- 4:42SPEAKER_01: to some degree has done everything they could to alienate Russia and to make it
- 4:46SPEAKER_01: an enemy state.
- 4:48SPEAKER_01: And why is that?
- 4:50SPEAKER_01: How did that happen?
- 4:52SPEAKER_01: And I think that to a large extent,
- 4:54SPEAKER_01: it's a kind of a model of the United States of looking for enemies after
- 4:57SPEAKER_01: the Cold War.
- 4:59SPEAKER_01: At the time the Cold War ended in 1989 through 1991, one generally thinks of the
- 5:06SPEAKER_01: Official ending the Cold War as the breach of the Berlin Wall in 89.
- 5:10SPEAKER_01: And the Soviet Union itself dissolved in 91.
- 5:13SPEAKER_01: And during that period, I think there was a sense of astonishment among American officials.
- 5:18SPEAKER_01: They've run out of enemies.
- 5:19SPEAKER_01: The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time was the famed general, Colin Powell.
- 5:24SPEAKER_01: And he said in an interview in 1990, you quoted this, I'll say it again.
- 5:28SPEAKER_01: He said, think hard about it.
- 5:29SPEAKER_01: I'm running out of demons.
- 5:31SPEAKER_01: I'm running out of villains.
- 5:32SPEAKER_01: And you could see that was a Dilemma for him,
- 5:35SPEAKER_01: because after all, as a general, you need enemies.
- 5:37SPEAKER_01: The United States had this enormous military budget,
- 5:40SPEAKER_01: at the time by far the largest in the world,
- 5:43SPEAKER_01: and how do you justify that kind of a budget to the public
- 5:47SPEAKER_01: if you don't have any enemies?
- 5:49SPEAKER_01: How do you justify hundreds of overseas bases,
- 5:52SPEAKER_01: alliances all over the world, not just NATO, but elsewhere?
- 5:55SPEAKER_01: How do you justify the Central Intelligence Agency,
- 5:59SPEAKER_01: which was set up,
- 6:00SPEAKER_01: to some extent,
- 6:02SPEAKER_01: In opposition to traditional American norms against having
- 6:06SPEAKER_01: a peacetime intelligence service, how do you justify all of those things?
- 6:09SPEAKER_01: And the answer is nobody really knew.
- 6:11SPEAKER_01: And so I think there was a conscious effort to find new enemies.
- 6:14SPEAKER_01: And there were many American officials who said publicly they missed the Cold War.
- 6:19SPEAKER_01: They said it half jokingly, but I don't think they were joking.
- 6:22SPEAKER_01: I think it was serious.
- 6:22SPEAKER_01: They did miss the Cold War.
- 6:24SPEAKER_01: And they wanted to recreate the Cold War by finding new enemies.
- 6:28SPEAKER_01: And, you know, there were a variety of enemies that were found.
- 6:31SPEAKER_01: Obviously, there was a war with Iraq in 1991, Operation Desert Storm.
- 6:38SPEAKER_01: There's a lot of evidence,
- 6:39SPEAKER_01: I would say,
- 6:40SPEAKER_01: that the United States played a role in sort of almost maybe tricking Iraq into
- 6:46SPEAKER_01: that war.
- 6:46SPEAKER_01: There was a meeting between the U.S.
- 6:48SPEAKER_01: ambassador to Iraq,
- 6:49SPEAKER_01: April Glaspie,
- 6:51SPEAKER_01: in which Saddam Hussein said,
- 6:52SPEAKER_01: you know, I'm thinking basically of Making moves against Kuwait.
- 6:57SPEAKER_01: What do you think of that?
- 6:58SPEAKER_01: And the U.S. ambassador said, America has no position on these inter-Arab rivalries.
- 7:04SPEAKER_01: No one has ever really explained that statement.
- 7:07SPEAKER_01: And she would not have been saying that unless she had authorization from Washington to say it.
- 7:11SPEAKER_01: One could view that as an effort to trick Iraq into invading Kuwait and giving
- 7:16SPEAKER_01: the U.S. a pretext for war.
- 7:18SPEAKER_01: The advantage of that war was it helped to give a justification for American power.
- 7:21SPEAKER_01: We won.
- 7:22SPEAKER_01: There's nothing like victory to justify a military budget.
- 7:26SPEAKER_01: And it had that effect.
- 7:28SPEAKER_01: It killed any talk of really major downsizing of the US military, I would say.
- 7:34SPEAKER_01: And there was a series of other interventions.
- 7:36SPEAKER_01: There was humanitarian intervention in the Balkans, about which I've written a book.
- 7:40SPEAKER_01: We can discuss that in detail if you'd like,
- 7:43SPEAKER_01: where the United States deliberately blocked peace negotiations
- 7:48SPEAKER_01: that could have settled the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo
- 7:51SPEAKER_01: through peace negotiations and blocked these negotiations.
- 7:54SPEAKER_01: Because they wanted a war to justify American power,
- 7:59SPEAKER_01: particularly in Europe and NATO, which needed a new justification.
- 8:03SPEAKER_01: There was the war on terror, the invasion of Iraq.
- 8:07SPEAKER_01: They were thrown in Afghanistan in 2001.
- 8:11SPEAKER_01: There's a whole series of actions.
- 8:13SPEAKER_01: I think that mostly were a response to the fact that America did not have a proper enemy.
- 8:18SPEAKER_01: But I think there was a feeling America needed a really big enemy, a large power.
- 8:23SPEAKER_01: It wasn't enough to focus on Iraq or on terrorism or on, you know, Serbia.
- 8:28SPEAKER_01: You need something big.
- 8:30SPEAKER_01: And Russia was big.
- 8:32SPEAKER_01: And so I think there was actually an effort to alienate Russia.
- 8:35SPEAKER_01: The expansion of NATO was,
- 8:38SPEAKER_01: American officials have been warned for 30 years that this is going
- 8:41SPEAKER_01: to cause major problems with Russia.
- 8:43SPEAKER_01: The old-style diplomats from the Cold War,
- 8:46SPEAKER_01: dozens of them,
- 8:47SPEAKER_01: had warned American officials, beginning with Clinton, not to expand NATO.
- 8:52SPEAKER_01: Because that would have a devastating effect in America's relations with Russia,
- 8:55SPEAKER_01: particularly key.
- 8:56SPEAKER_01: Well, let me stop for a moment.
- 8:57SPEAKER_01: I don't want to keep talking forever.
- 8:59SPEAKER_01: I would like to interject anything here, Notts.
- 9:03SPEAKER_00: Yes, I would just like to go back to your book.
- 9:06SPEAKER_00: I don't know.
- 9:07SPEAKER_00: It was one of your early books, First Do No Harm.
- 9:12SPEAKER_00: Yes.
- 9:13SPEAKER_00: And I read that, not recently, but I have memory of it.
- 9:20SPEAKER_00: And the thing was that...
- 9:24SPEAKER_00: You very much challenged the humanitarian kind of narrative on the reason for
- 9:31SPEAKER_00: the interventions in both Bosnia and Kosovo.
- 9:34SPEAKER_00: And this was a momentum,
- 9:39SPEAKER_00: one of the starting engines
- 9:40SPEAKER_00: to create these staged so-called humanitarian interventions.
- 9:47SPEAKER_00: And also a way of clearly starting to Present a situation of good and bad,
- 9:56SPEAKER_00: of the mechanisms of manufacturing evils, the Serbians and the evils.
- 10:04SPEAKER_00: The Serbians were genocidal, they were barbaric basically.
- 10:10SPEAKER_00: And I guess in the Ukraine context, we see a similar humanitarian framing.
- 10:19SPEAKER_00: Does this connect to the post-1991 intervention in Yugoslavia?
- 10:25SPEAKER_00: Is it basically the same humanitarian narrative,
- 10:28SPEAKER_00: would you say, as the one you described in First Do No Harm?
- 10:32SPEAKER_01: The language of justification is very similar.
- 10:36SPEAKER_01: And the language of demonization is very similar.
- 10:38SPEAKER_01: In the case of the Serbs,
- 10:39SPEAKER_01: you had a demonic people led by demonic leaders,
- 10:43SPEAKER_01: particularly Slobodan Milosevic and others.
- 10:45SPEAKER_01: You know, there's Radovan Karadic.
- 10:49SPEAKER_01: There were a whole series of evil figures.
- 10:51SPEAKER_01: These were not nice people, by the way, but I guess they were one of many, is what I would say.
- 10:56SPEAKER_01: And the sides we were backing weren't necessarily that much better in principle.
- 11:01SPEAKER_01: But I think the sort of...
- 11:03SPEAKER_01: The bottom line,
- 11:04SPEAKER_01: I think,
- 11:04SPEAKER_01: in Yugoslavia is what you had is you had a justification for war
- 11:08SPEAKER_01: that was humanitarian in nature.
- 11:10SPEAKER_01: The claim was the United States is acting pretty much out of the goodness
- 11:13SPEAKER_01: of its heart in intervening.
- 11:16SPEAKER_01: And many people said that when the U.S.
- 11:18SPEAKER_01: was reluctant to intervene,
- 11:19SPEAKER_01: when we delayed intervention, that showed cynical realpolitik.
- 11:26SPEAKER_01: It was motivated by humanitarian purposes.
- 11:29SPEAKER_01: And it's remarkable, the naivete of this is extraordinary.
- 11:32SPEAKER_01: But nevertheless, people did insist that the US had no ulterior motives.
- 11:37SPEAKER_01: I think if you look at public statements by officials,
- 11:39SPEAKER_01: if you read their memoirs,
- 11:40SPEAKER_01: as I've done,
- 11:42SPEAKER_01: there was a clear motive here, which was to give a new justification for NATO.
- 11:47SPEAKER_01: NATO had no justification, right?
- 11:51SPEAKER_01: Europe, people forget this, but in the 90s, Europe was acting very independently of NATO.
- 11:55SPEAKER_01: They were seriously considering an independent foreign policy.
- 11:58SPEAKER_01: This was an initiative led by France and Germany to set up Europe as
- 12:03SPEAKER_01: a possibly new pole of power to check American unilateralism.
- 12:09SPEAKER_01: And the United States was very eager to block this,
- 12:11SPEAKER_01: particularly the neoconservative element in US foreign policy establishment.
- 12:15SPEAKER_01: We're looking for some way to undermine European independence.
- 12:20SPEAKER_01: And I think the Balkans became the arena in which this played out,
- 12:25SPEAKER_01: that Europe was trying,
- 12:27SPEAKER_01: to their credit in my view,
- 12:29SPEAKER_01: mostly trying to achieve a negotiated settlement in the Bosnia war.
- 12:34SPEAKER_01: And they almost achieved a settlement a number of times,
- 12:37SPEAKER_01: and the US kept blocking the settlement.
- 12:40SPEAKER_01: And the same thing happened in Kosovo,
- 12:43SPEAKER_01: that the United States kept on blocking European efforts to settle.
- 12:49SPEAKER_01: The war through negotiations.
- 12:50SPEAKER_01: And I think what you had here is two competing agendas.
- 12:52SPEAKER_01: The Europeans wanted to demonstrate their credibility as a new pole of power
- 12:58SPEAKER_01: through settling these wars,
- 13:00SPEAKER_01: through diplomacy,
- 13:01SPEAKER_01: showing that Europe had the ability to achieve that without the Americans.
- 13:04SPEAKER_01: The United States was eager to block this from happening and instead wanted to show
- 13:10SPEAKER_01: that not the European Union,
- 13:12SPEAKER_01: but NATO would be the dominant force, institutional force in Europe.
- 13:16SPEAKER_01: And so it was necessary to settle it through NATO bombing campaigns,
- 13:19SPEAKER_01: which was done first in Bosnia, then in Kosovo.
- 13:23SPEAKER_01: And, you know,
- 13:25SPEAKER_01: I think what they did also is they changed the tone and they gave,
- 13:28SPEAKER_01: this is particularly true on the political left.
- 13:30SPEAKER_01: They began to convert the political left from anti-interventionism,
- 13:34SPEAKER_01: which is where the left had traditionally been.
- 13:36SPEAKER_01: That's the tradition I came up in, I came of age in, was after the Vietnam War.
- 13:41SPEAKER_01: The left was staunchly anti-interventionist.
- 13:44SPEAKER_01: And remained that way until Yugoslavia.
- 13:46SPEAKER_01: In Yugoslavia,
- 13:47SPEAKER_01: I think much of the left,
- 13:49SPEAKER_01: in Europe and the United States,
- 13:50SPEAKER_01: came to see American military power as a force for good.
- 13:54SPEAKER_01: And this was also a period of the culture wars,
- 13:57SPEAKER_01: when things like gender, race, and sexuality came to the fore.
- 14:00SPEAKER_01: And the claim was that America and Yugoslavia is doing things like protecting women
- 14:05SPEAKER_01: from persecution.
- 14:07SPEAKER_01: It's, you know, protecting multiculturalism.
- 14:10SPEAKER_01: That was the language that was being used.
- 14:12SPEAKER_01: It was very effective, I think.
- 14:14SPEAKER_01: And converting people.
- 14:16SPEAKER_01: This is especially true in Germany,
- 14:19SPEAKER_01: where you had the Green Party,
- 14:21SPEAKER_01: and people forget this,
- 14:22SPEAKER_01: but the Green Party emerged in the 80s, partly out of a certain pacifism.
- 14:26SPEAKER_01: They were anti-militarist.
- 14:29SPEAKER_01: Their environmentalism was closely connected with this.
- 14:31SPEAKER_01: They were against nuclear power because that reminded people,
- 14:34SPEAKER_01: it was connected in their minds with nuclear weapons.
- 14:38SPEAKER_01: And in the Kosovo case, you had for the first time The Greens had a big part in the government.
- 14:46SPEAKER_01: The foreign minister was Yoshka Fischer.
- 14:48SPEAKER_01: He was the head of the Green Party.
- 14:50SPEAKER_01: He had a very radical background.
- 14:52SPEAKER_01: He had a background in radical politics in Frankfurt.
- 14:58SPEAKER_01: He became a big arguer that Germany should set aside its pacifist tradition
- 15:03SPEAKER_01: and support a bombing campaign against the Serbs to prevent a new Auschwitz
- 15:06SPEAKER_01: from occurring.
- 15:07SPEAKER_01: He kept on invoking Germany's historic mission to prevent a new Auschwitz from occurring.
- 15:12SPEAKER_01: And this was very effective on the German left.
- 15:14SPEAKER_01: It transformed the Green Party and much of the German left generally
- 15:18SPEAKER_01: from being anti-militarist to pro-militarist,
- 15:20SPEAKER_01: because after all,
- 15:22SPEAKER_01: Militarism does wonderful things like,
- 15:24SPEAKER_01: you know, protecting people from persecution, from genocide.
- 15:27SPEAKER_01: That was the language being used.
- 15:28SPEAKER_01: What he left out was that this could have all been settled at the negotiating table,
- 15:32SPEAKER_01: but the U.S. had blocked that.
- 15:34SPEAKER_01: The whole purpose here was to not negotiate, but to settle it through a bombing campaign.
- 15:39SPEAKER_01: He left out that detail.
- 15:43SPEAKER_00: Yes, it was very interesting what you said now and especially it's the same in Sweden.
- 15:50SPEAKER_00: The Green Party has gone from coming out of the environmental peace movement
- 15:55SPEAKER_00: to having moved to a more centrist position and now are Even though they voted no
- 16:01SPEAKER_00: to NATO, they're now saying that we accept NATO.
- 16:04SPEAKER_00: And they've changed from just within one year from going to no to NATO
- 16:09SPEAKER_00: to now saying we should not leave NATO.
- 16:12SPEAKER_00: So I think Jorska Fischer,
- 16:15SPEAKER_00: he was definitely one of the first common queens to take this position.
- 16:21SPEAKER_00: Just returning to what you said about Yugoslavia,
- 16:25SPEAKER_00: you said that Europe wanted to settle things diplomatically.
- 16:30SPEAKER_00: But I think we can
- 16:35SPEAKER_00: now kind of agree upon that these tables have sort of,
- 16:41SPEAKER_00: not totally,
- 16:42SPEAKER_00: but sort of turned in the sense that today I would say that the Europeans are
- 16:49SPEAKER_00: the ones who want to keep the cauldron of war boiling in the eastern part
- 16:55SPEAKER_00: of Ukraine,
- 16:56SPEAKER_00: while America under Trump is somehow Although not wholeheartedly,
- 17:02SPEAKER_00: but sometimes on certain days of the year, looking for a diplomatic solution.
- 17:10SPEAKER_00: What is behind this,
- 17:12SPEAKER_00: not shift,
- 17:12SPEAKER_00: but what is behind this muddling of the old European diplomacy,
- 17:20SPEAKER_00: American war narrative right now?
- 17:24SPEAKER_00: Do you know?
- 17:24SPEAKER_00: Do you have any ideas?
- 17:26SPEAKER_01: Well, I'll just note factually what has happened and then give you an explanation
- 17:30SPEAKER_01: as best I can.
- 17:30SPEAKER_00: Thank you.
- 17:31SPEAKER_01: Factually,
- 17:32SPEAKER_01: what you have seen since about 2000 was a dramatic shift,
- 17:37SPEAKER_01: not just in European policy,
- 17:38SPEAKER_01: but in the whole European elite structure,
- 17:42SPEAKER_01: which is they've given up completely on European independence from the United States
- 17:46SPEAKER_01: and now basically want to insist upon NATO being the only game in town and that
- 17:52SPEAKER_01: the essence basically of The European Union is to be basically closely linked
- 17:56SPEAKER_01: to NATO.
- 17:57SPEAKER_01: This is a dramatic change from the 90s,
- 17:58SPEAKER_01: because again,
- 17:59SPEAKER_01: in the 90s, you were seeing a very different idea being presented by Europe.
- 18:05SPEAKER_01: Amazingly, that included Great Britain, by the way.
- 18:08SPEAKER_01: Even Great Britain,
- 18:09SPEAKER_01: America's most loyal ally,
- 18:11SPEAKER_01: was beginning to show significant signs of independence from the United States,
- 18:15SPEAKER_01: which is very worrying to the United States, I should add.
- 18:18SPEAKER_01: And the issue presented itself in terms of Yugoslavia,
- 18:22SPEAKER_01: I think the idea was that the Europeans were concerned that with the sudden ending
- 18:26SPEAKER_01: of the Soviet Union, there'd be no check in American power.
- 18:29SPEAKER_01: And they saw that as an unhealthy state of affairs,
- 18:32SPEAKER_01: which is a reasonable conclusion,
- 18:33SPEAKER_01: one might say, and felt that Europe could check that American power.
- 18:37SPEAKER_01: This lasted about a decade,
- 18:38SPEAKER_01: and when they gave up on the idea of European independence,
- 18:41SPEAKER_01: they really and totally gave up on it.
- 18:43SPEAKER_01: And it even included France,
- 18:45SPEAKER_01: which of course had a long history of independence in the United States
- 18:48SPEAKER_01: under De Gaulle.
- 18:49SPEAKER_01: De Gaulle,
- 18:49SPEAKER_01: it should be recalled,
- 18:50SPEAKER_01: withdrew France from the integrated military structure of NATO in 1966.
- 18:55SPEAKER_01: It's rejoined since more recently.
- 18:58SPEAKER_01: But for a long time, France was the most important pole of independence.
- 19:01SPEAKER_01: Sweden, of course, had been neutral for centuries, really.
- 19:06SPEAKER_01: And all of that began to change after about 2000, right around then.
- 19:12SPEAKER_01: And the question of why did it change?
- 19:14SPEAKER_01: And I think the idea is that Europe really tried very hard to play
- 19:19SPEAKER_01: an independent role and to demonstrate its capacity for independence in Yugoslavia.
- 19:24SPEAKER_01: And the Americans outmaneuvered them.
- 19:27SPEAKER_01: They simply undermined European efforts to show their capability
- 19:32SPEAKER_01: through settling this diplomatically.
- 19:35SPEAKER_01: And in a forced situation of a bombing campaign, which Europe reluctantly participated.
- 19:41SPEAKER_01: I think after the Kosovo bombing campaign,
- 19:43SPEAKER_01: many Europeans said to each other and themselves, That this is simply impossible.
- 19:48SPEAKER_01: The Americans are too powerful.
- 19:50SPEAKER_01: We simply cannot establish Europe as an independent center.
- 19:54SPEAKER_01: And there's the phrase, if you can't beat them, join them.
- 19:57SPEAKER_01: And they decided that's what they would do.
- 19:59SPEAKER_01: They would join the United States.
- 20:00SPEAKER_01: The term in, of course, international relations is bandwagoning.
- 20:03SPEAKER_01: You bandwagon with the dominant power and see if they can give you a few crumbs of advantage.
- 20:09SPEAKER_01: Britain had done this through the Cold War.
- 20:10SPEAKER_01: And I guess now everyone in Europe decided this is the way to go.
- 20:13SPEAKER_01: And even Sweden.
- 20:15SPEAKER_01: Began gradually to set aside its tradition of independence,
- 20:19SPEAKER_01: even before the Ukraine war,
- 20:20SPEAKER_01: and we could see this, during the overthrow of the Libyan government, for example.
- 20:25SPEAKER_01: Sweden, if I recall correctly, was showing some coordination with NATO during that campaign.
- 20:31SPEAKER_01: I think I remember that correctly,
- 20:34SPEAKER_01: that Sweden was giving some support to the NATO forces that were going to war
- 20:38SPEAKER_01: with Muammar Gaddafi.
- 20:41SPEAKER_01: And so you began getting a grud.
- 20:43SPEAKER_00: That's correct.
- 20:44SPEAKER_00: The social democratic leader at the time actually had to step down for voicing
- 20:52SPEAKER_00: an opinion to go against letting the Sweden Gripen plane do it.
- 20:59SPEAKER_00: The Gripen's were not allowed to bomb, but they were allowed to do surveillance.
- 21:06SPEAKER_00: In order to let American and British American planes at least do the bombing.
- 21:12SPEAKER_00: So Libya was definitely,
- 21:16SPEAKER_00: like you said, a breaking point or a very distinct shift in Swedish policy.
- 21:22SPEAKER_00: That's correct.
- 21:24SPEAKER_01: And also I do recall,
- 21:26SPEAKER_01: if I'm not mistaken,
- 21:27SPEAKER_01: the Swedes were using that as an opportunity to try and advertise and sell
- 21:31SPEAKER_01: the Gripen fighter plane internationally.
- 21:33SPEAKER_00: Oh yes, it wasn't even a secret.
- 21:38SPEAKER_00: I think it was opened by the then minister Göran Persson, who said that this was an opportunity.
- 21:48SPEAKER_00: He's also famed of having said that If this is a quick war it will be good for business.
- 21:55SPEAKER_00: So the Swedes have always been dualistic in the sense
- 22:00SPEAKER_00: that we have been very outwardly peaceful and the diplomacy and the tradition
- 22:06SPEAKER_00: of Olof Palme that lived with us for many many years.
- 22:09SPEAKER_00: But at the same time we have been fiercely Aggressive when it's come to try
- 22:17SPEAKER_00: and push our military industrial innovations out throughout the world.
- 22:23SPEAKER_00: As always, there is an official side and there's a non-official side.
- 22:30SPEAKER_00: Sweden is very Janus-faced when it comes to humanitarian issues, I have to say, sadly.
- 22:39SPEAKER_00: So you're quite right.
- 22:41SPEAKER_01: Yeah, overall though, what it has to note is that the Libyan case was a catastrophe.
- 22:47SPEAKER_01: Overthrowing Addafi made things much worse.
- 22:49SPEAKER_01: It destabilized Libya.
- 22:51SPEAKER_01: Perhaps for the long term,
- 22:52SPEAKER_01: it helped to destabilize North Africa,
- 22:55SPEAKER_01: transmitted violence into neighboring Mali and Niger.
- 23:00SPEAKER_01: I should add, I served in the Peace Corps in Niger, so I take that very negatively.
- 23:07SPEAKER_01: And...
- 23:08SPEAKER_01: Yeah, the interventions also in Bosnia and Kosovo had a very negative effect.
- 23:12SPEAKER_01: These are remembered as successful interventions.
- 23:14SPEAKER_01: They were anything but successful.
- 23:16SPEAKER_01: In the case of Bosnia,
- 23:17SPEAKER_01: the whole Bosnian war probably could have been prevented because the EU was about
- 23:21SPEAKER_01: to broker a peace agreement in Lisbon that was going to have promise of preventing
- 23:25SPEAKER_01: the war in the first place.
- 23:26SPEAKER_01: It was blocked by the United States.
- 23:28SPEAKER_01: Repeated efforts to revive that,
- 23:31SPEAKER_01: to achieve a solution that's remarkably similar to the one the Americans achieved
- 23:35SPEAKER_01: after the bombing campaign.
- 23:37SPEAKER_01: They were blocked by the United States,
- 23:39SPEAKER_01: and as a result, 100,000 people died that didn't have to die.
- 23:42SPEAKER_01: In Kosovo, the same thing.
- 23:43SPEAKER_01: This could have been settled at the negotiating table without a bombing campaign.
- 23:47SPEAKER_01: The bombing campaign in Kosovo massively increased the number of deaths
- 23:50SPEAKER_01: when it occurred before, and the ethnic cleansing.
- 23:54SPEAKER_01: It worsened the humanitarian situation.
- 23:56SPEAKER_01: In both cases, countries now are not really fully independent countries.
- 24:00SPEAKER_01: They're basically wards of the EU and the UN.
- 24:02SPEAKER_01: There's still peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Kosovo.
- 24:07SPEAKER_00: And what are then the forces that at so many different junctures in time in
- 24:13SPEAKER_00: the beginning of conflicts like in Lisbon and like Kosovo and like Libya and like
- 24:20SPEAKER_00: for example Iran where you had negotiations going and of course in Ukraine
- 24:26SPEAKER_00: where you had the February agreement on the table back in in February of 2014
- 24:34SPEAKER_00: and later in 2022 you had the Istanbul negotiations at each and every turn
- 24:42SPEAKER_00: where you have the peace negotiations they fail now what are the forces
- 24:49SPEAKER_00: that intervene Are they different forces at different time?
- 24:54SPEAKER_00: Or is it that force looking to gain a kind of a profit from the next conflict?
- 25:03SPEAKER_00: I can't give a clear answer myself,
- 25:05SPEAKER_00: but what are your thoughts on why it seems that diplomacy always fails before
- 25:11SPEAKER_00: the war?
- 25:12SPEAKER_00: That is almost you need a bloodletting before you can settle a war in the post-Cold War era.
- 25:22SPEAKER_01: This goes back to the ideology of neoconservatism,
- 25:24SPEAKER_01: which became the dominant ideology in American foreign policy,
- 25:29SPEAKER_01: and increasingly seems to have a lot of influence in Europe as well.
- 25:32SPEAKER_01: The origins go in the 70s,
- 25:34SPEAKER_01: after America's debacle in Vietnam, after America's defeat in Vietnam.
- 25:37SPEAKER_01: These were a group of intellectuals who had a very hardline militarist attitude
- 25:42SPEAKER_01: and insisted that America should not show weakness after Vietnam.
- 25:47SPEAKER_01: We should show strength through intervention.
- 25:51SPEAKER_01: And I think one of the things I emphasized is to disparage negotiation as for the weak.
- 25:58SPEAKER_01: Negotiating is for the weak.
- 26:01SPEAKER_01: A great power like the United States uses force and only negotiates
- 26:05SPEAKER_01: when they absolutely have to.
- 26:06SPEAKER_01: And so I think that the ideology that America as
- 26:09SPEAKER_01: a superpower does not negotiate owes much of its idea to the neoconservative
- 26:15SPEAKER_01: A big influence here,
- 26:17SPEAKER_01: I think,
- 26:17SPEAKER_01: was the state of Israel and the Israel Defense Forces and the idea that, well,
- 26:22SPEAKER_01: Israel does negotiate,
- 26:23SPEAKER_01: but it has a strong preference for settling things through force unapologetically
- 26:28SPEAKER_01: and ruthlessly, and it doesn't defend, it attacks.
- 26:32SPEAKER_01: The neoconservatives like that.
- 26:33SPEAKER_01: The neoconservatives felt Israel should teach us,
- 26:36SPEAKER_01: should teach the United States how it should cope with the Vietnam debacle.
- 26:41SPEAKER_01: And I think that the increasing integration of the United States with Israel was not
- 26:46SPEAKER_01: an accident here.
- 26:47SPEAKER_01: It flowed very much from this ideology and from the set of interests they represented.
- 26:51SPEAKER_01: Needless to say,
- 26:52SPEAKER_01: by the way,
- 26:53SPEAKER_01: the neoconservatives were heavily backed by the military-industrial complex
- 26:57SPEAKER_01: and were heavily intertwined with the military-industrial complex.
- 27:00SPEAKER_01: And I think, though,
- 27:01SPEAKER_01: the idea here that the United States should not rely on negotiations,
- 27:05SPEAKER_01: the United States should rely on force, that's been
- 27:09SPEAKER_01: More and more influential in the United States.
- 27:11SPEAKER_01: It was influential during the Cold War, and after the Cold War, it became even more influential.
- 27:17SPEAKER_01: And one could see that very clearly in Yugoslav cases.
- 27:21SPEAKER_01: One could see that in Libya,
- 27:24SPEAKER_01: where the United States refused to negotiate with Gaddafi, Europe too, actually.
- 27:28SPEAKER_01: And I think most dramatically, perhaps, one could see it in Ukraine.
- 27:32SPEAKER_01: There was a very...
- 27:33SPEAKER_01: This could easily have been settled through diplomacy, the Ukraine War.
- 27:35SPEAKER_01: I mean,
- 27:36SPEAKER_01: if the United States had not expanded NATO and agreed to stop trying to expand NATO
- 27:41SPEAKER_01: into Ukraine, there probably would be no war now.
- 27:44SPEAKER_01: But the U.S. was refusing to negotiate on those key issues.
- 27:48SPEAKER_01: I should add,
- 27:48SPEAKER_01: by the way,
- 27:49SPEAKER_01: you know,
- 27:49SPEAKER_01: I was recently in the,
- 27:51SPEAKER_01: I did some research for my book in the papers of George F.
- 27:53SPEAKER_01: Kennan, one of the architects of the Cold War.
- 27:56SPEAKER_01: His papers are Princeton University.
- 27:58SPEAKER_01: I looked at them there.
- 27:59SPEAKER_01: And he was in the 90s.
- 28:00SPEAKER_01: He was a very old man.
- 28:02SPEAKER_01: He was close to 100, but he was still very mentally active.
- 28:06SPEAKER_01: And he was doing interviews, very intelligent interviews, and writing letters.
- 28:10SPEAKER_01: And I found letters to the State Department in the late 90s in
- 28:14SPEAKER_01: which he basically said he's astounded to see that NATO expansion is taking place,
- 28:20SPEAKER_01: that doesn't everyone realize that Russia is no threat right now,
- 28:24SPEAKER_01: but they will become a threat.
- 28:26SPEAKER_01: If you start expanding NATO like this,
- 28:28SPEAKER_01: and he expressed a special concern about NATO involvement in Ukraine and
- 28:33SPEAKER_01: the Black Sea,
- 28:34SPEAKER_01: and was noting increasing NATO engagement with Ukraine,
- 28:37SPEAKER_01: already in the 90s this was happening,
- 28:40SPEAKER_01: in Ukraine and in the Black Sea region,
- 28:41SPEAKER_01: and he said to the State Department officials, to the,
- 28:44SPEAKER_01: I think it was the undersecretary,
- 28:45SPEAKER_01: Strobe Talbot,
- 28:47SPEAKER_01: he said, don't you realize what this is going to do to US relations with Russia?
- 28:51SPEAKER_01: I mean, you really want to open up that can of worms And
- 28:55SPEAKER_01: the State Department was just dismissive of him.
- 28:57SPEAKER_01: They were polite, but insisted they were going to go ahead with this.
- 29:02SPEAKER_01: And so there was a certain recklessness that the United States,
- 29:05SPEAKER_01: after the Cold War, could do whatever it wanted.
- 29:07SPEAKER_01: I think that William Perry,
- 29:10SPEAKER_01: who was the Defense Secretary,
- 29:12SPEAKER_01: later said in an interview that the attitude in the 90s in the Clinton presidency,
- 29:16SPEAKER_01: in the Clinton White House,
- 29:18SPEAKER_01: was that the Russians are a bunch of losers and the United States does not have
- 29:21SPEAKER_01: to deal with losers.
- 29:23SPEAKER_01: And the United States could just humiliate Russia as much as they wanted to.
- 29:27SPEAKER_01: And there was nothing that the United States could do about it.
- 29:29SPEAKER_01: Yeah, that's very good.
- 29:30SPEAKER_01: Very good.
- 29:30SPEAKER_01: Yes.
- 29:31SPEAKER_01: The United States intervened brazenly in Russian politics.
- 29:36SPEAKER_01: Yeltsin was president at the time.
- 29:37SPEAKER_01: And Yeltsin was clearly failing mentally.
- 29:41SPEAKER_01: And he was failing physically and mentally.
- 29:44SPEAKER_01: And he was up for reelection in 1996.
- 29:47SPEAKER_01: The economy was a disastrous state.
- 29:50SPEAKER_01: I think it was maybe equivalent to what the United States and Europe went through
- 29:53SPEAKER_01: the 1930s with the Great Depression.
- 29:55SPEAKER_01: Russia was experiencing its Great Depression in the 90s.
- 29:58SPEAKER_01: And Yelchin was president, and he was going to be defeated.
- 30:01SPEAKER_01: And so the United States massively intervened in the elections and boasted about it.
- 30:05SPEAKER_01: There you have a Time magazine, Yanks to the Rescue.
- 30:08SPEAKER_01: It says the secret story of how American advisors help Yelchin win.
- 30:14SPEAKER_01: So this wasn't a secret.
- 30:15SPEAKER_01: This was an open fact.
- 30:16SPEAKER_01: That the U.S. was massively intervening in Russian elections.
- 30:20SPEAKER_01: And naturally the Russian people did not appreciate this.
- 30:24SPEAKER_01: And that's very well remembered by the Russians.
- 30:27SPEAKER_01: And there was a certain arrogance of power to this, that the U.S. could do whatever it wanted.
- 30:31SPEAKER_01: This, by the way, is illegal.
- 30:32SPEAKER_01: The United States is a signatory to the charter of the Organization of American States.
- 30:38SPEAKER_01: I think it came into operation in 1951.
- 30:41SPEAKER_01: And the OAS Charter requires all signatories,
- 30:44SPEAKER_01: including the United States,
- 30:46SPEAKER_01: to refrain from any form of meddling in the domestic affairs of any country in
- 30:50SPEAKER_01: the world.
- 30:51SPEAKER_01: All right?
- 30:52SPEAKER_01: This, by the way,
- 30:53SPEAKER_01: also is standing in American domestic politics,
- 30:55SPEAKER_01: because if you actually read the U.S.
- 30:56SPEAKER_01: Constitution, it says that treaties are part of the supreme law of the land.
- 31:02SPEAKER_01: Okay?
- 31:02SPEAKER_01: So it's standing in American domestic law.
- 31:04SPEAKER_01: The courts have ignored this,
- 31:05SPEAKER_01: and pretty much everybody's ignored this,
- 31:06SPEAKER_01: but it's worth mentioning that that kind of- Sorry,
- 31:11SPEAKER_00: it's just a lawyer in me awakening.
- 31:14SPEAKER_00: When you say the courts have ignored,
- 31:17SPEAKER_00: in Sweden it would be impossible for the courts to ignore something
- 31:22SPEAKER_00: that was written down or legally sent into writing.
- 31:29SPEAKER_00: But in America, the courts can ignore the law?
- 31:35SPEAKER_01: I think that they've taken implicitly,
- 31:38SPEAKER_01: not explicitly,
- 31:39SPEAKER_01: that foreign policy and national security are a constitution-free zone, basically.
- 31:45SPEAKER_01: That's the view they've taken.
- 31:46SPEAKER_01: Again, they've never said this out loud, at least not to my knowledge.
- 31:50SPEAKER_01: But I'm not aware of any court case that has ever cited any of these documents,
- 31:55SPEAKER_01: including the document,
- 31:56SPEAKER_01: the U.S. Constitution, which establishes treaties of the supreme law of the land.
- 32:00SPEAKER_01: It says that clear as day in the Constitution.
- 32:04SPEAKER_01: But again, nobody seems to have any interest in enforcing these things.
- 32:10SPEAKER_01: So the U.S. feels free to intervene worldwide and boast about it.
- 32:13SPEAKER_01: The U.S. proudly does these things.
- 32:16SPEAKER_01: In any case, I'm sorry, do you want to say something?
- 32:19SPEAKER_00: I was just going to tie back to what you talked about,
- 32:23SPEAKER_00: your current project, the Guns, Butter and Permanent War that you're working on.
- 32:32SPEAKER_00: I'm just wondering,
- 32:34SPEAKER_00: because when you say they ignored or they ignore good advice and They,
- 32:41SPEAKER_00: the ones ignoring it,
- 32:42SPEAKER_00: are they ignoring it due to the fact that they are intertwined
- 32:47SPEAKER_00: with economic interests that might be gained from a conflict?
- 32:52SPEAKER_00: Or are they ignoring sound advice because they're ideologically committed to conflict?
- 33:02SPEAKER_00: Not letting America be perceived as weak, or is it a combination of both?
- 33:11SPEAKER_01: It's the latter.
- 33:12SPEAKER_01: They both mutually reinforce each other.
- 33:14SPEAKER_01: It must be said,
- 33:15SPEAKER_01: at the end of the Cold War,
- 33:16SPEAKER_01: you had a set of vested interests,
- 33:18SPEAKER_01: including,
- 33:18SPEAKER_01: of course, the military-industrial complex, but it was much broader than that.
- 33:22SPEAKER_01: I'm an academic, and I remember academia got lots of money from the Cold War.
- 33:27SPEAKER_01: It poured money into academia, into professors' pockets.
- 33:30SPEAKER_01: In 1990,
- 33:31SPEAKER_01: as the Soviet Union was breaking up,
- 33:32SPEAKER_01: there was an amusing article in the Washington Post by
- 33:34SPEAKER_01: an academic called Gorbachev Ruined My Career, okay?
- 33:38SPEAKER_01: He was an academic who studied Soviet intervention in the Southern Hemisphere,
- 33:44SPEAKER_01: and he said,
- 33:45SPEAKER_01: there is no Soviet intervention in the Southern Hemisphere anymore,
- 33:48SPEAKER_01: so I have almost ruined my research agenda.
- 33:51SPEAKER_01: All the money that flowed into my career is gone now,
- 33:55SPEAKER_01: and he said,
- 33:56SPEAKER_01: and And he jokingly said,
- 33:58SPEAKER_01: what we really need to have here is a hardline communist coup in Moscow because
- 34:02SPEAKER_01: that would reignite the Cold War and my career would be back on track.
- 34:06SPEAKER_01: And he said, he closed by saying, I know the objection.
- 34:10SPEAKER_01: Some people would say, why should the Soviet people have to suffer just to advance my career?
- 34:14SPEAKER_01: Well, my answer is simple.
- 34:16SPEAKER_01: The Soviet people are used to suffering and I am not.
- 34:20SPEAKER_01: Anyway, and so you have here There was a whole range of interests in academia,
- 34:27SPEAKER_01: in journalism,
- 34:28SPEAKER_01: in think tanks,
- 34:30SPEAKER_01: and of course,
- 34:31SPEAKER_01: in the military companies, which was a large part of the U.S. economy and still is.
- 34:35SPEAKER_01: A lot of money was being made at every level, okay?
- 34:39SPEAKER_01: As you know, the whole policymaking elite was integrated into the Cold War.
- 34:43SPEAKER_01: And so I think there was a certain sense that their careers were at stake here.
- 34:48SPEAKER_01: The profit margins were at stake here,
- 34:50SPEAKER_01: and it should not surprise anybody they developed an ideology
- 34:54SPEAKER_01: of relentless militarism and unilateralism.
- 34:56SPEAKER_01: This was formalized in a document in 1992 called
- 35:00SPEAKER_01: the Defense Planning Guidance Document,
- 35:02SPEAKER_01: which was either drafted or supervised by Paul Wolfowitz,
- 35:05SPEAKER_01: one of the key neoconservative intellectuals then at the Pentagon,
- 35:09SPEAKER_01: and this document Established at the end of the Cold War offered the United States
- 35:14SPEAKER_01: a unique opportunity never had by any superpower in history,
- 35:18SPEAKER_01: which is global dominance without a rival.
- 35:21SPEAKER_01: And the basic objective of U.S.
- 35:23SPEAKER_01: foreign policy is to perpetuate that state of affairs as far into the future
- 35:27SPEAKER_01: as possible and to intimidate any country that even considers challenging America
- 35:33SPEAKER_01: for that status.
- 35:35SPEAKER_01: And it talked about the European Union and very European community in those days
- 35:39SPEAKER_01: in very sort of adversarial terms.
- 35:43SPEAKER_01: And it had things that in retrospect sound outlandish.
- 35:49SPEAKER_01: It even talked about the possibility of future conflicts with Germany and Japan.
- 35:53SPEAKER_01: It sounded like they were looking for enemies.
- 35:55SPEAKER_01: And it talked about all the possible enemies we could conjure up.
- 35:59SPEAKER_01: It talked about Russia and China.
- 36:01SPEAKER_01: It even talked about Germany and Japan, as I said.
- 36:05SPEAKER_01: And it insisted that one of the key objectives should be to preserve
- 36:09SPEAKER_01: the US alliance system as an instrument of US power Of which NATO is
- 36:14SPEAKER_01: the most important.
- 36:15SPEAKER_01: And it insisted NATO should not only be preserved and a new purpose should be found
- 36:19SPEAKER_01: for it, but it should be expanded into the former communist states.
- 36:22SPEAKER_01: Even though the US had already promised, essentially agreed with Gorbachev never to do this.
- 36:29SPEAKER_01: There was an agreement,
- 36:30SPEAKER_01: you know,
- 36:31SPEAKER_01: in exchange for Soviet use of its position on the Security Council not
- 36:36SPEAKER_01: to block reunification of Germany.
- 36:40SPEAKER_01: United States had agreed not to expand NATO into the former communist states of Eastern Europe.
- 36:45SPEAKER_01: Well, they violated that again and again, as we know.
- 36:48SPEAKER_01: But what's interesting is that in 1992,
- 36:50SPEAKER_01: already,
- 36:51SPEAKER_01: there was a strategy document in the Pentagon,
- 36:54SPEAKER_01: which I think became the dominant policy.
- 36:56SPEAKER_01: This became really the framing document for the post-Cold War period, was this document.
- 37:03SPEAKER_01: They did not have to find Germany and Japan as an enemy, thankfully.
- 37:06SPEAKER_01: But they did find Russia and China as enemies.
- 37:09SPEAKER_01: And it's very interesting because Russia and China weren't enemies at that time.
- 37:13SPEAKER_01: Russia was very much dependent on the United States.
- 37:17SPEAKER_01: And to the point that the president of Russia allowed the United States
- 37:21SPEAKER_01: to engineer his reelection.
- 37:24SPEAKER_01: And yet we were setting up Russia as a potential enemy and doing everything we could
- 37:30SPEAKER_01: to make that possible,
- 37:31SPEAKER_01: which is the expansion of NATO, which we had been warned about again and again.
- 37:35SPEAKER_01: It would destroy the credibility of U.S. relations with Russia.
- 37:38SPEAKER_01: You know, Canada warned about this in the 90s.
- 37:43SPEAKER_01: But it was functional from the standpoint of finding a new enemy.
- 37:45SPEAKER_01: I think finding an enemy here,
- 37:48SPEAKER_01: making up for the failure to find an enemy initially after the Cold War,
- 37:53SPEAKER_01: addressing the worry that Colin Powell expressed in 1990 that I'm running out
- 37:57SPEAKER_01: of enemies by finding a new enemy.
- 38:01SPEAKER_01: Obviously, if you look for an enemy hard enough, you will find one.
- 38:05SPEAKER_01: And we have found multiple enemies.
- 38:08SPEAKER_01: Again, the idea at a certain level,
- 38:11SPEAKER_01: you could say this is a dysfunctional,
- 38:13SPEAKER_01: reckless, and extraordinary thing to do, to look for enemies.
- 38:19SPEAKER_01: Not to protect against enemies, but to look for enemies, to create enemies.
- 38:22SPEAKER_01: But that is in effect what we've done.
- 38:24SPEAKER_01: Because you cannot have a military of that size unless you have enemies.
- 38:28SPEAKER_01: You have to justify it.
- 38:30SPEAKER_01: You cannot have this kind of alliance structure.
- 38:32SPEAKER_01: A military alliance, unless it's aligning against somebody who's an enemy.
- 38:38SPEAKER_01: It's very difficult to justify NATO unless you have an enemy for NATO.
- 38:41SPEAKER_01: Well, now you have an enemy for NATO.
- 38:43SPEAKER_00: Many enemies, I would say.
- 38:45SPEAKER_00: I mean, it's an interesting,
- 38:48SPEAKER_00: this need for enemies or this need to find an enemy and kind of exhaust the enemy.
- 38:54SPEAKER_00: When you spoke about Russia and China, it's for me one of those very...
- 38:59SPEAKER_00: Clear failures.
- 39:02SPEAKER_00: Because Russia and China previously were never bosom buddies.
- 39:10SPEAKER_00: They could get by.
- 39:12SPEAKER_00: They recognized each other and you stay on that side, I'll stay on my side, we'll do our things.
- 39:19SPEAKER_00: But the current situation is that they have been merged by this policy of Need
- 39:29SPEAKER_00: for enemies policies, if I call it for that.
- 39:32SPEAKER_00: And as you have described in your writings,
- 39:39SPEAKER_00: This need for enemies is economically serving kind of elite interests.
- 39:44SPEAKER_00: It's keeping these academics,
- 39:47SPEAKER_00: it's keeping the contractors within the military industry alive and
- 39:51SPEAKER_00: a few journalists as well and commentators have good privileged positions and
- 39:55SPEAKER_00: the politicians have a good way of keeping their money coming even
- 39:59SPEAKER_00: after they get kicked out of Congress.
- 40:03SPEAKER_00: This strategy is kind of backfiring.
- 40:06SPEAKER_00: If we have the example with Russia merging more and more with China,
- 40:12SPEAKER_00: if we have that as an example,
- 40:13SPEAKER_00: and Iran,
- 40:14SPEAKER_00: of course,
- 40:14SPEAKER_00: which is also backfiring,
- 40:17SPEAKER_00: where this policy could suddenly start creating Shall I say a military,
- 40:23SPEAKER_00: not a loss,
- 40:24SPEAKER_00: but a military stalemate,
- 40:26SPEAKER_00: which will cause economic strain and which will cause political polarization at home
- 40:33SPEAKER_00: in the United States.
- 40:35SPEAKER_00: Does it risk Undermining the very hegemony that it's meant to sustain,
- 40:45SPEAKER_00: given its current level of total control.
- 40:51SPEAKER_00: Is the need for enemies becoming a self-defeating prophecy suddenly?
- 40:59SPEAKER_00: One that actually might exhaust the American empire from within even The projects
- 41:05SPEAKER_00: that it's currently driving.
- 41:07SPEAKER_00: I don't know.
- 41:08SPEAKER_00: Have you gone a bridge too far?
- 41:12SPEAKER_01: That's my hope.
- 41:13SPEAKER_01: I put some hope in democracy,
- 41:15SPEAKER_01: in that these are countries,
- 41:16SPEAKER_01: the United States and Europe, that still have elections.
- 41:20SPEAKER_01: Not perfect elections,
- 41:21SPEAKER_01: obviously, and they're very controlled, and discussions are very controlled.
- 41:25SPEAKER_00: But good enough.
- 41:27SPEAKER_01: Yeah, well,
- 41:28SPEAKER_01: we still have these elections,
- 41:29SPEAKER_01: and we still also have people who have the ability to protest in the street.
- 41:33SPEAKER_01: And basically, the fact is, this is very dramatic in Europe.
- 41:37SPEAKER_01: In Europe, the leadership class is hated by their own populations.
- 41:42SPEAKER_01: I mean,
- 41:42SPEAKER_01: Macron and Merz in Germany have some of the lowest approval ratings in the history
- 41:46SPEAKER_01: of polling, okay?
- 41:48SPEAKER_01: Britain has just seen, I think, six or seven prime ministers in less than a decade.
- 41:52SPEAKER_01: That's extraordinary, unprecedented to my knowledge.
- 41:56SPEAKER_01: And so you are getting the leadership class in Europe is on very thin ice.
- 42:00SPEAKER_01: And in America, too, we're having a political crisis.
- 42:02SPEAKER_01: I mean, You know, the establishment lost credibility.
- 42:05SPEAKER_01: That's why we have Trump.
- 42:05SPEAKER_01: And now Trump is losing credibility, too, with all his disasters.
- 42:10SPEAKER_01: And so I think one of the problems you have here is that
- 42:13SPEAKER_01: the public has been very upset by declining living standards.
- 42:18SPEAKER_01: And there are many reasons for that.
- 42:19SPEAKER_01: But one of them quite clearly, especially in the U.S., is excessive spending on the military.
- 42:25SPEAKER_01: And in Europe, now they're talking about raising military spending.
- 42:27SPEAKER_01: This is...
- 42:28SPEAKER_01: The war in Russia,
- 42:29SPEAKER_01: especially,
- 42:30SPEAKER_01: has been disastrous for the European people because you had the cutoff
- 42:33SPEAKER_01: of cheap energy,
- 42:34SPEAKER_01: and now you have increased military spending,
- 42:36SPEAKER_01: and this is openly being discussed in terms of reducing the welfare state in Europe.
- 42:42SPEAKER_01: I'm hopeful that in time,
- 42:45SPEAKER_01: the people of Europe and the United States will simply not tolerate this,
- 42:48SPEAKER_01: especially,
- 42:50SPEAKER_01: this is the key element here,
- 42:52SPEAKER_01: is that Elites in Europe and to a lesser extent
- 42:55SPEAKER_01: the United States are still promising, well, at least we'll give you victory.
- 42:59SPEAKER_01: We'll lower your living standards, but we'll give you victory.
- 43:01SPEAKER_01: I'll have something to show for it.
- 43:02SPEAKER_01: We're going to defeat Russia and defeat Iran.
- 43:06SPEAKER_01: And so that will give us national glory, which will make up for our lowered living standards.
- 43:10SPEAKER_01: But I don't think we're going to get that.
- 43:12SPEAKER_01: I think you're going to get a strategic defeat by the West in Ukraine and
- 43:16SPEAKER_01: a strategic defeat in the Persian Gulf.
- 43:19SPEAKER_01: And it's going to be very difficult to justify the hundreds of billions of dollars
- 43:24SPEAKER_01: that have been wasted on these wars and all the lives that were ruined
- 43:28SPEAKER_01: by these wars.
- 43:29SPEAKER_01: But we're not even going to get victory to show for it.
- 43:32SPEAKER_01: I think when that happens, I'm hopeful.
- 43:34SPEAKER_01: This happened in Vietnam.
- 43:35SPEAKER_01: In Vietnam also,
- 43:36SPEAKER_01: there was,
- 43:37SPEAKER_01: you know,
- 43:37SPEAKER_01: the narrative in the early part of the war in the early 60s was we're winning,
- 43:41SPEAKER_01: we're winning, we're winning.
- 43:42SPEAKER_01: And by 1968, the setbacks were so dramatic.
- 43:46SPEAKER_01: We had a collapse of public support.
- 43:48SPEAKER_01: The credibility gap emerged.
- 43:49SPEAKER_01: And the public turned on the war very dramatically and eventually forced U.S.
- 43:54SPEAKER_01: withdrawal from Vietnam and a rethinking of U.S. policy for at least a decade.
- 43:59SPEAKER_01: I'm hoping that the European
- 44:01SPEAKER_01: and American political system will reach their Vietnam moment when the idea
- 44:07SPEAKER_01: of militarism and intervention is simply rejected by the public as untenable,
- 44:12SPEAKER_01: that the public will put their foot down and say no.
- 44:15SPEAKER_01: That at least is my hope.
- 44:18SPEAKER_00: So that would be,
- 44:22SPEAKER_00: if you look at what would actually a
- 44:27SPEAKER_00: post-enemy U.S. foreign policy look like?
- 44:33SPEAKER_00: Is there any possibility of a post-enemy U.S. foreign policy?
- 44:38SPEAKER_01: Well, it's an open question.
- 44:40SPEAKER_01: I think we could go back,
- 44:41SPEAKER_01: what I'd like to see ideally is go back to the issues that were dealt with right
- 44:45SPEAKER_01: after the Cold War.
- 44:46SPEAKER_01: People forget this.
- 44:47SPEAKER_01: At the time the Cold War ended,
- 44:49SPEAKER_01: the Soviet Union proposed bilateral nuclear disarmament,
- 44:53SPEAKER_01: complete bilateral nuclear disarmament.
- 44:55SPEAKER_01: The US refused to do that, and so it was not done.
- 44:59SPEAKER_01: But I think given the enormous risks that are being posed now, About nuclear weapons.
- 45:04SPEAKER_01: The thing that keeps me up at night more than anything else is the possibility
- 45:07SPEAKER_01: of nuclear war resulting from these wars,
- 45:09SPEAKER_01: which I think is growing greater and greater by the day.
- 45:12SPEAKER_01: I'm hopeful that the idea of some kind of negotiated bilateral disarmament involving
- 45:18SPEAKER_01: the major powers can be discussed.
- 45:21SPEAKER_01: Again, this is hypothetical.
- 45:23SPEAKER_01: I hate to engage in hypotheticals because who knows what will happen.
- 45:27SPEAKER_01: But I'm hopeful that the first step will be,
- 45:30SPEAKER_01: the first step will be Demilitarization and spending more money on butter rather
- 45:36SPEAKER_01: than guns,
- 45:38SPEAKER_01: and not spending money to defeat Russia,
- 45:41SPEAKER_01: which has proven impossible,
- 45:43SPEAKER_01: and to defeat Iran, which has proven equally impossible.
- 45:45SPEAKER_01: And rather than chasing Herman Melville's white whale,
- 45:50SPEAKER_01: Moby Dick,
- 45:51SPEAKER_01: rather than having this obsession with defeating enemies that we can't defeat,
- 45:55SPEAKER_01: perhaps it's better,
- 45:56SPEAKER_01: basically,
- 45:57SPEAKER_01: to give up on the military project and put our energies into something else,
- 46:01SPEAKER_01: something more productive.
- 46:02SPEAKER_01: That's the way I hope the conversation will go once defeat becomes clear
- 46:06SPEAKER_01: as I think it will in coming months.
- 46:09SPEAKER_01: I do want to say that I do take some optimism and things like the dissident club
- 46:16SPEAKER_01: in Stockholm that even though the mainstream media does not cover what you do
- 46:21SPEAKER_01: and sort of freezes you out of discussion,
- 46:23SPEAKER_01: there will still be somewhere Swedes and Scandinavians can go for information
- 46:27SPEAKER_01: on these things.
- 46:28SPEAKER_01: And so when there's a collapse of credibility By the foreign policy elites and
- 46:32SPEAKER_01: the major parties in Sweden.
- 46:34SPEAKER_01: You know, there'll be some voice giving them an alternative.
- 46:38SPEAKER_01: So I'm hopeful that that will eventually gain more and more traction as the disaster
- 46:43SPEAKER_01: of these wars becomes apparent.
- 46:46SPEAKER_00: Yes, I agree with you, obviously.
- 46:51SPEAKER_00: That's the reason for us doing it.
- 46:53SPEAKER_00: But I think there is a heightened awareness of how much
- 46:59SPEAKER_00: the foreign policy actually affects the questions,
- 47:05SPEAKER_00: the interior political questions in Sweden.
- 47:10SPEAKER_00: Because people are asking questions as, why is the prices going up?
- 47:16SPEAKER_00: And then you can start to explain to people,
- 47:18SPEAKER_00: well, it's because we don't have fertilizer like we used to do.
- 47:22SPEAKER_00: It's because the diesel that runs the farm machinery has gone up due to
- 47:28SPEAKER_00: the sanctions and heightened heating costs that drives inflation.
- 47:34SPEAKER_00: People start questioning, but why are we doing that?
- 47:38SPEAKER_00: And why are we sending this amount of money?
- 47:41SPEAKER_00: Why should 5% of our GDP suddenly go to the military,
- 47:45SPEAKER_00: which is not a sustainable area of investment?
- 47:51SPEAKER_00: So the war here in Europe has now gone so far that
- 47:56SPEAKER_00: The economic implications are starting to affect the everyday situations of
- 48:02SPEAKER_00: the citizens.
- 48:04SPEAKER_00: So thereby,
- 48:04SPEAKER_00: like you said,
- 48:05SPEAKER_00: in America,
- 48:06SPEAKER_00: you have to put some trust into the voters and the voters' sense of right and wrong.
- 48:14SPEAKER_00: And they might be purely egotistical.
- 48:17SPEAKER_00: I mean, it's probable that the voters won't put the vote For any great moral reason,
- 48:26SPEAKER_00: they'll put the vote against the current policy due to the fact
- 48:29SPEAKER_00: that it's costing them too much.
- 48:31SPEAKER_01: I agree.
- 48:32SPEAKER_00: But I don't care.
- 48:34SPEAKER_00: I mean, as long as they vote for someone who's going to end the current policy, I'm happy.
- 48:41SPEAKER_00: So thereby I guess we still,
- 48:45SPEAKER_00: both you and me,
- 48:46SPEAKER_00: still somehow trust in the wisdom of the electorate even though some instances
- 48:55SPEAKER_00: of government are doing their best to keep up a narrative that's
- 49:04SPEAKER_00: Dubious at best and downright treacherous at worst.
- 49:10SPEAKER_00: Going back to the fact with these drones in Germany and
- 49:15SPEAKER_00: the Nord Stream explosions trying to blame it on Russia and so on.
- 49:21SPEAKER_00: So there is also a continued media war.
- 49:27SPEAKER_00: But in all this,
- 49:28SPEAKER_00: I'm so very happy to have you clear out a few question marks concerning
- 49:36SPEAKER_00: the true interests of America and this American project power that has been running
- 49:43SPEAKER_00: since the end of the Cold War.
- 49:48SPEAKER_00: Do you have anything else that you wish to add to this conversation?
- 49:52SPEAKER_01: Well, yes.
- 49:53SPEAKER_01: I guess following up on what you said, I mean, I agree.
- 49:55SPEAKER_01: The way in which to approach voters is their pocketbooks,
- 49:59SPEAKER_01: their economics, that,
- 50:01SPEAKER_01: you know,
- 50:01SPEAKER_01: the ordinary man and woman,
- 50:03SPEAKER_01: understandably,
- 50:03SPEAKER_01: in my view,
- 50:04SPEAKER_01: are very concerned with paying the rent, with paying off their credit card.
- 50:07SPEAKER_01: That's their first concern.
- 50:09SPEAKER_01: And we should appeal to that and say this is the key point here,
- 50:12SPEAKER_01: is that these wars are coming out of your living standards.
- 50:16SPEAKER_01: You're paying for them very directly.
- 50:19SPEAKER_01: I should add,
- 50:19SPEAKER_01: by the way,
- 50:20SPEAKER_01: I remember for years I was thinking that the pro-Palestine solidarity groups
- 50:24SPEAKER_01: in America always focused on abstract moral issues and human rights,
- 50:28SPEAKER_01: and I thought that's the wrong approach.
- 50:29SPEAKER_01: The right approach is that the U.S. is subsidizing Israel massively.
- 50:33SPEAKER_01: And when you approach people,
- 50:34SPEAKER_01: you simply say,
- 50:35SPEAKER_01: why spend money on this sort of apartheid state when you could be spending it
- 50:42SPEAKER_01: to improve the lives of people in the United States?
- 50:46SPEAKER_01: We have all sorts of needs in the United States.
- 50:50SPEAKER_01: The American people are nationalistic.
- 50:51SPEAKER_01: Appeal to their nationalism.
- 50:53SPEAKER_01: If that works, use that.
- 50:55SPEAKER_01: It's a perfectly reasonable appeal to nationalism, in my view, in this particular case anyway.
- 51:00SPEAKER_01: And we can do that as well in Sweden, I'm sure.
- 51:05SPEAKER_00: Yes, we can.
- 51:06SPEAKER_00: And we have in just about, I think it's nine days time now, we have our elections.
- 51:14SPEAKER_00: Unfortunately all the current parties within the parliament are in agreement
- 51:21SPEAKER_00: that we should continue to spend money on supporting the war in Ukraine.
- 51:26SPEAKER_00: But there is an opportunity to have a political discussion at least right now
- 51:33SPEAKER_00: in Sweden and we're trying to use it as best we can.
- 51:39SPEAKER_00: But as always,
- 51:42SPEAKER_00: you wake up every morning and you check out what the American president has done in
- 51:47SPEAKER_00: the latest 8 to 12 hours to see if the world is still standing.
- 51:55SPEAKER_00: And it's inevitable that America still has a lot of influence on the rest of the world.
- 52:03SPEAKER_00: I wish you,
- 52:04SPEAKER_00: of course,
- 52:05SPEAKER_00: all the best in your endeavors in creating a good environment of discussion
- 52:10SPEAKER_00: in America as well.
- 52:15SPEAKER_01: Same to you.
- 52:17SPEAKER_01: And thank you very much for having me.
- 52:19SPEAKER_00: Thank you very much for your time.
- 52:21SPEAKER_01: Okay.
- 52:23SPEAKER_00: And by that,
- 52:24SPEAKER_00: tack så mycket för att ni har varit med oss på ytterligare ett avsnitt av
- 52:28SPEAKER_00: dissidentpodden och på återseende.