Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / Seven forgotten Microsoft 365 accounts, and the default passwords that opened them
Transcript
- 0:03This is Decrypted. Monday, the fifth of October.
- 0:06Seven forgotten Microsoft 365 accounts, and the default passwords that opened them.
- 0:13Most security stories this week are about clever exploits.
- 0:19This one is about a password nobody remembered setting.
- 0:23In research published in late September, Proofpoint described a campaign that tried default passwords against
- 0:325,714 Microsoft 365 accounts across 28 organisations.
- 0:39It got into seven.
- 0:45Each was a service or functional account, created for convenience, never rotated and never protected by multi
- 0:53-factor authentication. The targets were mostly Chilean, but the weakness isn't national.
- 1:00Any UK organisation with a few years of Microsoft 365 behind it probably owns a few accounts like these.
- 1:08Next.
- 1:13Proofpoint tracks the activity as UNK_CondorFiltration.
- 1:19It was built on TeamFiltration, an open penetration testing framework.
- 1:25The operator ran three waves between 21 July and 16 August.
- 1:31That generated 32,825 authentication events from 1,487 Amazon cloud addresses.
- 1:42Each address makes only a few guesses, so lockout rules and simple rate limits never see a pattern.
- 1:50Picture a thief walking along a street of offices, trying the same spare key in every back door.
- 1:57He doesn't need to know anyone's name.
- 2:00He needs one door where someone left the factory lock fitted.
- 2:04Six of the seven successful sign-ins landed within seven minutes.
- 2:10That suggests the accounts shared the same default password.
- 2:14And also.
- 2:18Within about 90 seconds of logging in, the operator switched to a German V P N node.
- 2:25From there they reached Azure Portal, SharePoint Online and the victim's corporate V P N, and tried to obtain
- 2:33Microsoft Graph tokens. The Hacker News, reporting the same research, lists Office, OneDrive and Teams among
- 2:42the services touched.
- 2:45What the defender sees.
- 2:50The sign-in succeeds with the correct password.
- 2:54The account has no owner to notice odd behaviour and no user to complain.
- 2:58Proofpoint noted that none of the seven accounts had any prior legitimate sessions.
- 3:04That's the best detection available.
- 3:06An account that has never signed in, suddenly signing in from a cloud address, is rare enough to alert on.
- 3:14The tool also leaves a fingerprint, a hardcoded Teams user agent string, Teams/1.
- 3:223.00.30866, which modern clients no longer send.
- 3:28And finally.
- 3:33The Hacker News quotes Proofpoint's conclusion: "The forgotten account.
- 3:38Service accounts provisioned for convenience and never revisited are a structurally unprotected attack surfac
- 3:44e."
- 3:49A non-human identity should never authenticate with a human-style password.
- 3:54Where a task needs to log in, use a managed identity or a certificate.
- 4:00Where a password is unavoidable, restrict where it can be used from, and require a second factor or a conditi
- 4:07onal access rule.
- 4:12It's an inventory of every account that has never had a person attached.
- 4:17It's a hunt for whoever owns the old scanner-to-email setup.
- 4:21And it's the nerve to switch off what nobody can explain.
- 4:25This is opinion, not advice, but the control point is clear.
- 4:29You can't govern an account you don't know you own, and attackers are now spending cloud money to find the on
- 4:35es you've forgotten.
- 4:38The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 4:42Thanks for listening.