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Charmides - Plato Πλατων · Around the Clock in Europe : A Travel Sequence

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  Speaker 1: Part one of Karmides. This is a LibriVox recording. All
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  Speaker 1: LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information
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  Speaker 1: or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. Recording by
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  Speaker 1: Geoffrey Edwards. Charmides or Temperance by Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett.
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  Speaker 1: Persons of the Dialog Socrates, who is the narrator, Charmides, Charaphon, Quidias,
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  Speaker 1: scene the Palestra of Tarius, which is near the porch
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  Speaker 1: of the King Arkon. Yesterday evening, I returned from the
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  Speaker 1: army at Potidea, and having been a good while away,
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  Speaker 1: I thought that I would go and look at my
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  Speaker 1: old haunts. So I went into the Palestra of Tarreas,
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  Speaker 1: which is over against the temple, adjoining the porch of
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  Speaker 1: the King Arkan, And there I found a number of personsans,
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  Speaker 1: most of whom I knew, but not all. My visit
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  Speaker 1: was unexpected, and no sooner did they see me entering
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  Speaker 1: than they saluted me from afar on all sides, and Charaphon,
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  Speaker 1: who is a kind of madman, started up and ran
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  Speaker 1: to me, seizing my hand and saying, how did you escape? Socrates?
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  Speaker 1: I should explain that an engagement had taken place at
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  Speaker 1: Potidia not long before we came away, the news of
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  Speaker 1: which had only just reached Athens. You see, I replied
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  Speaker 1: that here I am, there was a report. He said
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  Speaker 1: that the engagement was very severe, and that many of
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  Speaker 1: our acquaintance had fallen. That, I replied, was not far
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  Speaker 1: from the truth. I suppose he said that you were present.
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  Speaker 1: I was then sit down and tell us the whole story,
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  Speaker 1: which as yet we have only heard imperfectly. I took
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  Speaker 1: the place which he assigned to me by the side
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  Speaker 1: of Critias, the son of Calais Gross, And when I
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  Speaker 1: had saluted him and the rest of the company, I
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  Speaker 1: told them the news from the army and answered their
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  Speaker 1: several inquiries. Then, when there had been enough of this, I,
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  Speaker 1: in my turn, began to make inquiries about matters at home,
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  Speaker 1: about the present state of philosophy, and about the youth.
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  Speaker 1: I asked whether any of them were remarkable for beauty
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  Speaker 1: or sense, or both. Qriteus, glancing at the door, invited
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  Speaker 1: my attention to some youths who were coming in and
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  Speaker 1: talking noisily to one another, followed by a crowd of
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  Speaker 1: the beauties. Socrates he said, I fancy that you will
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  Speaker 1: soon be able to form a judgment, for those who
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  Speaker 1: are just entering are the advanced guard of the great
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  Speaker 1: beauty of the day, and he is likely to be
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  Speaker 1: not far off himself. Who is he, I said, and
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  Speaker 1: who is his father? Charmides, he replied, is his name?
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  Speaker 1: He is my cousin and the son of my uncle.
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  Speaker 1: I rather think that you know him, although he was
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  Speaker 1: not grown up at the time of your departure. Certainly
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  Speaker 1: I know him, I said, for he was remarkable even
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  Speaker 1: then when he was still a child, and now I
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  Speaker 1: should imagine that he must be almost a young man.
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  Speaker 1: You will see, he said, in a moment, what progress
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  Speaker 1: he has made, and what he is like. He had
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  Speaker 1: scarcely said the word when Carmodes entered. Now you know,
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  Speaker 1: my friend, that I cannot measure anything, and of the
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  Speaker 1: beautiful I am simply such a measure as a white
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  Speaker 1: line is of chalk. For almost all young persons are
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  Speaker 1: alike beautiful in my eyes. But at that moment, when
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  Speaker 1: I saw him coming in, I must admit that I
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  Speaker 1: was quite astonished at his beauty and stature. All the
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  Speaker 1: world seemed to be enamored of him. Amazement and confusion
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  Speaker 1: reined when he entered, and a troop of lovers followed him.
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  Speaker 1: That grown up men like ourselves should have been affected
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  Speaker 1: in the way was not surprising. But I observed that
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  Speaker 1: there was the same feeling among the boys, all of them,
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  Speaker 1: down to the very least child turned and looked at
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  Speaker 1: him as if he had been a statue. Charophon called
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  Speaker 1: me and said, what do you think of him? Socrates?
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  Speaker 1: Has he not a beautiful face that he has? Indeed?
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  Speaker 1: I said, but you would think nothing of his face.
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  Speaker 1: He replied, if you could see his naked form, he
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  Speaker 1: is absolutely perfect. And to this they all agreed. By Heracles,
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  Speaker 1: I said, there never was such a paragon. If he
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  Speaker 1: has only one other slight addition, what is that, said Quitteus?
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  Speaker 1: If he has a noble soul, and being of your house, Quitteus,
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  Speaker 1: he may be expected to have this. He is as
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  Speaker 1: fair and good within as he is without, replied Qriteus.
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  Speaker 1: Shall we ask him, then, I said, to show us
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  Speaker 1: not his body, but his soul, naked and undisguised. He
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  Speaker 1: is just of an at which he will like to talk.
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  Speaker 1: That he will, said Critius. And I can tell you
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  Speaker 1: that he is a philosopher already and also a considerable poet,
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  Speaker 1: not in his own opinion only, but in that of others. That,
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  Speaker 1: my dear Critius, I replied, is a distinction which has
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  Speaker 1: long been in your family, and is inherited by you
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  Speaker 1: from Solon. But why don't you call him and show
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  Speaker 1: him to us, For even if he were younger than
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  Speaker 1: he is, there could be no impropriety in his talking
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  Speaker 1: to us in the presence of you, who are his
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  Speaker 1: guardian and cousin. Very well, he said that I will
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  Speaker 1: call him, and turning to the attendant, he said, call
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  Speaker 1: Charmides and tell him that I want him to come
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  Speaker 1: and see a physician about the illness of which he
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  Speaker 1: spoke to me the day before yesterday. Then, again addressing me,
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  Speaker 1: he added, he has been complaining lately of having a
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  Speaker 1: headache when he rises in the morning. Now, why should
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  Speaker 1: you not make believe to him that you know a
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  Speaker 1: cure for the headache? There will be no difficulty about that,
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  Speaker 1: I said, If he comes, he will be sure to come,
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  Speaker 1: he replied, He came as he was bidden, and sat
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  Speaker 1: down between Quittius and me. Great amusement was occasioned by
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  Speaker 1: every one, pushing with might and mean at his neighbor
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  Speaker 1: in order to make a place for him next to them,
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  Speaker 1: until at the two ends of the row, one had
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  Speaker 1: to get up and the other was rolled over sideways.
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  Speaker 1: Now I, my friend, was beginning to feel awkward. My
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  Speaker 1: former bold belief in my powers of conversing with him
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  Speaker 1: had vanished. And when Quittius told him that I was
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  Speaker 1: the person who had the cure, he looked at me
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  Speaker 1: in such an indescribable manner and was about to ask
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  Speaker 1: a question. And then all the people in the palestra
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  Speaker 1: crowded about us, and oh Rare, I caught a sight
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  Speaker 1: of the inwards of his garment and took the flame.
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  Speaker 1: Then I could no longer contain myself. I thought how
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  Speaker 1: well Kedius understood the nature of love, And in speaking
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  Speaker 1: of a fair youth, he warned some one not to
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  Speaker 1: bring the fawn in the sight of the lion, lest
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  Speaker 1: he devour him. For I felt that I had been
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  Speaker 1: overcome by a sort of wild beast appetite. But I
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  Speaker 1: controlled myself, and when he asked me if I knew
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  Speaker 1: the cure of the headache, I answered, but with an effort,
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  Speaker 1: that I did know. And what is it? He said,
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  Speaker 1: I replied that it was a kind of leaf which
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  Speaker 1: required to be accompanied by a charm, and if a
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  Speaker 1: person would repeat the charm at the same time that
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  Speaker 1: he used the cure, he would be made whole, but
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  Speaker 1: that without the charm, the leaf would be of no avail.
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  Speaker 1: Then I will write out the charm from your dictation,
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  Speaker 1: he said, With my good will, I said, or without
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  Speaker 1: my good will. With your goodwill, Socrates, he said, laughing
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  Speaker 1: very good, I said, And are you quite sure that
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  Speaker 1: you know my name? I ought to know you, he replied,
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  Speaker 1: for there is a great deal said about you among
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  Speaker 1: my companions, and I remember when I was a child
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  Speaker 1: seeing you in company with my cousin Quidius. That is
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  Speaker 1: very good of you, I said, and will make me
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  Speaker 1: more at home with you. In explaining the nature of
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  Speaker 1: the charm, I was thinking that I might have a
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  Speaker 1: difficulty about this, for the charm will do more carmodies
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  Speaker 1: than only cure the headache. I dare say that you
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  Speaker 1: may have heard eminent physicians say to a patient who
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  Speaker 1: comes to them with bad eyes, that they cannot cure
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  Speaker 1: his eyes by themselves, but that if his eyes are
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  Speaker 1: to be cured, his head must be treated, and then again,
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  Speaker 1: they say that to think of curing the head alone
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  Speaker 1: and not the rest of the body also is the
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  Speaker 1: height of folly, And arguing in this way, they apply
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  Speaker 1: their methods to the whole body and try to treat
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  Speaker 1: and heal the whole in the part together. Did you
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  Speaker 1: ever observe that this is what they say? Yes, he said,
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  Speaker 1: and they are right, and you would agree with them, Yes,
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  Speaker 1: he said, certainly I should. His approving answer reassured me,
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  Speaker 1: and I began by degrees to regain confidence, and the
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  Speaker 1: vital heat returned. Such charmides, I said, is the nature
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  Speaker 1: of the charm? Now? I learned it when serving with
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  Speaker 1: the army of one of the physicians of the Thracian
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  Speaker 1: king Samulxes. He was one of those who are said
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  Speaker 1: to give immortality. This Thracian told me that the Greek
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  Speaker 1: physicians are quite right in these notions of theirs which
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  Speaker 1: I was mentioning, as far as they go. But Samulxes,
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  Speaker 1: he added, our king, who is also a god, says
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  Speaker 1: further that as you ought not to attempt to cure
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  Speaker 1: the eyes without the hand, or the hand without the eyes,
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  Speaker 1: so neither ought you to attempt to cure the body
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  Speaker 1: without the soul. And this, he said, is the reason
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  Speaker 1: why the cure of many diseases is unknown to the
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  Speaker 1: physicians of hellas, because they are ignorant of the whole
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  Speaker 1: which ought to be studied. Also, for the part can
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  Speaker 1: never be well unless the whole is well. For all
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  Speaker 1: good and evil, whither in the body or in human nature, originates,
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  Speaker 1: as he declared, in the soul, and overflows from thence
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  Speaker 1: as from the head into the eyes. And therefore, if
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  Speaker 1: the head and the body are to be well, you
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  Speaker 1: must begin by curing the soul. That is the first thing.
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  Speaker 1: And the cure, my dear youth, has to be affected
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  Speaker 1: by the use of certain charms. And these charms are
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  Speaker 1: fair words, and by them temperance is implanted in the soul.
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  Speaker 1: And where temperances there health is speedily imparted, not only
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  Speaker 1: to the head, but to the whole body. And he
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  Speaker 1: who taught me the cure and the charm added a
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  Speaker 1: special direction. Let no one, he said, persuade you to
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  Speaker 1: cure the head until he has first given you his
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  Speaker 1: soul to be cured by the charm. For this, he said,
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  Speaker 1: is the great error of our day in the treatment
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  Speaker 1: of the human body. That physicians separate the soul from
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  Speaker 1: the body, and he added with emphasis at the same time,
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  Speaker 1: making me swear to his words, Let no one, however
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  Speaker 1: rich or noble or fair, persuade you to give him
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  Speaker 1: the cure without the charm. Now I have sworn, and
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  Speaker 1: I must keep my oath. And therefore, if you will
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  Speaker 1: allow me to apply the Thracian charm first to your soul,
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  Speaker 1: as the stranger directed, I will afterwards proceed to apply
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  Speaker 1: the cure to your head. But if not, I do
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  Speaker 1: not know what I am to do with you. My
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  Speaker 1: dear Charmides Qriteus, when he heard this, said, the headache
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  Speaker 1: will be an unexpected benefit to my young relation if
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  Speaker 1: the pain in his head compels him to improve his mind.
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  Speaker 1: And I can tell you, Socrates, that Charmides is not
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  Speaker 1: only pre eminent in beauty among his equals, but also
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  Speaker 1: in that quality which is given by the charm. And this,
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  Speaker 1: as you say, is temperance, is it not, Yes? I said,
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  Speaker 1: Then let me tell you that he is the most
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  Speaker 1: temperate of human beings, and for his aim inferior to
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  Speaker 1: none in inequality. Yes, I said, Charmides. And indeed I
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  Speaker 1: think that you ought to excel others in all good qualities.
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  Speaker 1: For if I am not mistaken, there is no one
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  Speaker 1: present who could easily point out two Athenian houses, the
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  Speaker 1: alliance of which was likely to produce a better or
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  Speaker 1: nobler son than the two from which you are sprung.
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  Speaker 1: There is your father's house, which is descended from Critius,
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  Speaker 1: the son of Dropidus, whose family has been commemorated in
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  Speaker 1: the panegyrical verses of Anaquian Solon and many other poets,
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  Speaker 1: as famous for beauty and virtue and all other high fortune.
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  Speaker 1: And your mother's house is equally distinguished. For your maternal uncle,
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  Speaker 1: Pyrilampi's never met with his equal in Persia, at the
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  Speaker 1: court of the Great King, or on the whole continent,
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  Speaker 1: in all the places to which he went as ambassador
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  Speaker 1: for stature and beauty. That whole family is not a
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  Speaker 1: whit inferior to the other. Having such ancestors, you ought
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  Speaker 1: to be first in all things. And as far as
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  Speaker 1: I can see, sweet son of Glaucon, your outward form
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  Speaker 1: is no dishonor to them. And if you have temperance
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  Speaker 1: as well as beauty, as quitteous declares, then blessed art thou,
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  Speaker 1: dear Carmides in being the son of thy mother. And
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  Speaker 1: this is the question. If this gift of temperance is
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  Speaker 1: already yours, as Quitteous declares, and you are temperate enough,
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  Speaker 1: in that case you have no need of any charms,
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  Speaker 1: whether of Zamulxy's or of Aberrez the Hyperborean. And I
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  Speaker 1: may as well give you the cure of the head
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  Speaker 1: at once, But if you are wanting in these qualities,
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  Speaker 1: I must use the charm before I give you the medicine. Please, therefore,
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  Speaker 1: to inform me whether you admit the truth of what
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  Speaker 1: Quitius has been saying about your gift of temperance, or
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  Speaker 1: are you wanting in this particular Carmides blushed, and the
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  Speaker 1: blush heightened his beauty, for modesty is becoming in youth.
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  Speaker 1: He then said very ingenuously that he really could not
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  Speaker 1: say at once either yes or no in answer to
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  Speaker 1: the question which I had asked for. Said he, If
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  Speaker 1: I affirm that I am not temperate, that would be
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  Speaker 1: a strange thing to say of myself, and also I
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  Speaker 1: should have to give the lie to Quideus and many
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  Speaker 1: others who think that I am temperate, as he tells you.
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  Speaker 1: But on the other hand, if I say that I am,
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  Speaker 1: I shall have to praise myself, which would be ill manners,
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  Speaker 1: and therefore I have no answer to make to you.
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  Speaker 1: I said to him, that is a natural reply, Charmides,
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  Speaker 1: And I think that you and I may as well
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  Speaker 1: inquire together whether you have this quality about which I
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  Speaker 1: am asking or not, And then you will not be
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  Speaker 1: compelled to see what you do not like. Neither shall
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  Speaker 1: I be a rash practitioner of medicine. Therefore, if you please,
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  Speaker 1: I will join with you in the inquiry, but I
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  Speaker 1: will not prays you if you would rather not. There
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  Speaker 1: is nothing which I should like better, he said, And
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  Speaker 1: as far as I am concerned, you may proceed in
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  Speaker 1: the way which you think best. I think, I said
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  Speaker 1: that I had better begin by asking you what is temperance,
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  Speaker 1: for you must have an opinion about this. If temperance
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  Speaker 1: abides in you, she must give some intimation of her
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  Speaker 1: nature and qualities which may enable you to form some
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  Speaker 1: notion of her. Is not that true? Yes? He said,
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  Speaker 1: that I think is true. And as you speak Greek,
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  Speaker 1: I said, you can surely describe what this appears to
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  Speaker 1: be which you have within you. Certainly, he said, In
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  Speaker 1: order then that I may form a conjecture, whether you
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  Speaker 1: have temperance abiding in you or not? Tell me, I said,
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  Speaker 1: what in your opinion is temperance? At first he hesitated
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  Speaker 1: and was very unwilling to answer. Then he said that
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  Speaker 1: he thought temperance was doing things orderly and quietly, such things,
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  Speaker 1: for example, as walking in the streets and talking, or
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  Speaker 1: anything else of that nature. In a word, he said,
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  Speaker 1: I should answer that, in my opinion, temperance is quietness.
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  Speaker 1: Are you right, Carmodes, I said, no doubt. The opinion
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  Speaker 1: is held that the quiet are the temperate. But let
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  Speaker 1: us see whether they are right who say this, And
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  Speaker 1: first tell me whether you would not acknowledge temperance to
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  Speaker 1: be of the class of the honorable and good. Yes,
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  Speaker 1: But which is best when you are at the writing
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  Speaker 1: masters to write the same letters quickly or quietly quickly,
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  Speaker 1: and to read quickly or slowly quickly again, And in
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  Speaker 1: playing the lyre or wrestling, quickness or cleverness are far
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  Speaker 1: better than quietness and slowness. Yes. In the same holds
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  Speaker 1: in boxing and the pancratium, certainly, and in leaping and
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  Speaker 1: running and bodily exercises generally, quickness and agility are good
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  Speaker 1: slowness and inactivity and quietness are bad. That is evident, then,
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  Speaker 1: I said, in all bodily actions, not quietness, but the
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  Speaker 1: greatest agility and quickness is noblest and best. Yes, certainly.
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  Speaker 1: And is temperance a good? Yes? Then in reference to
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  Speaker 1: the body, not quietness, but quickness will be the higher
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  Speaker 1: degree of temperance, if temperance is a good, true, he said,
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  Speaker 1: And which I said, is better facility in learning or
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  Speaker 1: difficulty in learning? Facility, yes, I said. And facility in
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  Speaker 1: learning is learning quickly, and difficulty in learning? Is learning
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  Speaker 1: quietly and slowly? True? And is it not better to
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  Speaker 1: teach one another quickly and energetically rather than quietly and slowly. Yes?
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  Speaker 1: And to call to mind and to remember quickly and
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  Speaker 1: readily that is also better than to remember quietly and slowly. Yes.
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  Speaker 1: And is not shrewdness a quickness or cleverness of the
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  Speaker 1: soul and not a quietness true? And is it not
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  Speaker 1: best to understand what is said, whether at the writing
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  Speaker 1: masters or the music masters, or anywhere else, not as
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  Speaker 1: quietly as possible, but as quickly as possible. Yes. And
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  Speaker 1: when the soul inquires, and in deliberations, not the quietest
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  Speaker 1: as I imagine, and he who with difficulty deliberates and
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  Speaker 1: discovers is thought worthy of praise. But he who does
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  Speaker 1: this most easily and quickly, that is true, he said.
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  Speaker 1: And in all that concerns either body or soul, swiftness
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  Speaker 1: and activity are clearly better than slowness, and quietness that
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  Speaker 1: he said is the inference. Then temperance is not quietness,
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  Speaker 1: nor is the temperate life quiet upon this view, for
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  Speaker 1: the life which is temperate is supposed to be the good.
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  Speaker 1: And of two things one is true. Either never or
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  Speaker 1: very seldom do the quiet actions in life appear to
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  Speaker 1: be better than the quick and energetic ones, or granting
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  Speaker 1: ever so much that of the nobler sort of actions,
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  Speaker 1: there are as many quiet as quick and vehement ones. Still,
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  Speaker 1: even if we admit this, temperance, will not be acting
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  Speaker 1: quietly any more than acting quickly and vehemently, either in walking, talking,
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  Speaker 1: or anything else. Nor will the quiet life be more
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  Speaker 1: temperate than the unquiet, Seeing that temperance is reckoned by
• 19:38
  Speaker 1: us in the class of good and honorable, and the
• 19:42
  Speaker 1: quick have been shown to be as good as the quiet.
• 19:46
  Speaker 1: I think, he said, Socrates, that you are right in
• 19:50
  Speaker 1: saying that. Then once more, Carmidies, I said, fix your
• 19:55
  Speaker 1: attention and look within. Consider the effect which temperance has
• 19:59
  Speaker 1: upon your sel, and the nature of that which has
• 20:02
  Speaker 1: the effect. Think over that, and like a brave youth,
• 20:06
  Speaker 1: tell me what is temperance. After a moment's pause, in
• 20:11
  Speaker 1: which he made a real manly effort to think, he said,
• 20:14
  Speaker 1: my opinion is, Socrates, that temperance makes a man ashamed
• 20:19
  Speaker 1: or modest, and that temperance is the same as modesty
• 20:24
  Speaker 1: very good, I said. And did you not admit just
• 20:27
  Speaker 1: now the temperance is honorable, Yes, certainly, he said, and
• 20:32
  Speaker 1: the temperate are also good? Yes? And can that be
• 20:36
  Speaker 1: good which does not make men good? Certainly not? And
• 20:41
  Speaker 1: you would infer that temperance is not only honorable but
• 20:44
  Speaker 1: also good. That is my opinion, well, I said, And
• 20:49
  Speaker 1: surely you would agree with Homer when he says modesty
• 20:53
  Speaker 1: is not good for a needy man? Yes, he said,
• 20:57
  Speaker 1: I agree to that. Then I suppose that modesty is
• 21:01
  Speaker 1: and is not good, that is plain. But temperance, whose
• 21:05
  Speaker 1: presence makes men only good and not bad, is always good.
• 21:10
  Speaker 1: That appears to me to be as you say. Then
• 21:13
  Speaker 1: the inference is that temperance cannot be modesty. If temperance
• 21:17
  Speaker 1: is a good, and if modesty is as much an
• 21:20
  Speaker 1: evil as a good, All that Socrates appears to me
• 21:25
  Speaker 1: to be true. But I should like to know what
• 21:28
  Speaker 1: you think about another definition of temperance, which I just
• 21:31
  Speaker 1: now remember to have heard from some one who said
• 21:34
  Speaker 1: that temperance is doing our own business? Was he right
• 21:38
  Speaker 1: to affirm that, you, young monster? I said, this is
• 21:41
  Speaker 1: what Critius or some philosopher has told you. Some one else, then,
• 21:46
  Speaker 1: said Qritius, For certainly I have not. But what matter?
• 21:50
  Speaker 1: Said Carmodes, from whom I heard this? No matter at all,
• 21:54
  Speaker 1: I replied, For the point is not who said the words,
• 21:57
  Speaker 1: but whether they are true or not. There you are
• 22:01
  Speaker 1: in the right, Socrates, he replied, to be sure, I said,
• 22:05
  Speaker 1: Yet I don't whether we shall ever be able to
• 22:07
  Speaker 1: discover their truth or falsehood, For they are a riddle.
• 22:12
  Speaker 1: What makes you think that? He said, because I said,
• 22:16
  Speaker 1: he who uttered them seems to me to have meant
• 22:19
  Speaker 1: one thing, and said another. Is the scribe, for example,
• 22:23
  Speaker 1: to be regarded as doing nothing when he reads or writes?
• 22:27
  Speaker 1: I should rather think that he was doing something. And
• 22:31
  Speaker 1: does the scribe write or read or teach? You boys?
• 22:34
  Speaker 1: To write or read your own names only, or did
• 22:37
  Speaker 1: you write your enemy's names as well as your own,
• 22:40
  Speaker 1: and your friends as much one as the other. And
• 22:45
  Speaker 1: was there anything meddling or intemperate in this? Certainly not.
• 22:51
  Speaker 1: And yet if reading and writing are the same as doing,
• 22:54
  Speaker 1: you were doing what was not your own business. But
• 22:58
  Speaker 1: they are the same as doing, and the healing art,
• 23:02
  Speaker 1: my friend, and building, and weaving, and doing anything whatever
• 23:06
  Speaker 1: which is done by art all come under the head
• 23:09
  Speaker 1: of doing. Certainly. And do you think that a state
• 23:13
  Speaker 1: would be well ordered by a law which compelled every
• 23:16
  Speaker 1: man to weave and wash his own coat, and make
• 23:19
  Speaker 1: his own shoes, and his own flask and strigil and
• 23:23
  Speaker 1: other implements on this principle of everyone doing and performing
• 23:27
  Speaker 1: his own and abstaining from what is not his own,
• 23:31
  Speaker 1: I think not, he said, But I said, a temperance
• 23:34
  Speaker 1: staint will be a well ordered staint. Of course, he replied.
• 23:39
  Speaker 1: Then temperance, I said, will not be doing one's own business,
• 23:43
  Speaker 1: at least not in this way, or not doing these
• 23:46
  Speaker 1: sort of things. Clearly not, then, as I was just
• 23:51
  Speaker 1: now saying, he who declared that temperance is a man
• 23:54
  Speaker 1: doing his own business had another and a hidden meaning,
• 23:58
  Speaker 1: for I don't think that he could have been such
• 24:00
  Speaker 1: a fool as to mean this. Was he a fool
• 24:03
  Speaker 1: who told you Charmides? Nay, he replied, I certainly thought
• 24:08
  Speaker 1: him a very wise man. Then I am quite certain
• 24:12
  Speaker 1: that he put forth this as a riddle. He meant
• 24:14
  Speaker 1: to say that there was a difficulty in a man
• 24:17
  Speaker 1: knowing what is his own business? I dare say, he replied,
• 24:21
  Speaker 1: And what then is the meaning of a man doing
• 24:24
  Speaker 1: his own business? Can you tell me? Indeed I cannot,
• 24:29
  Speaker 1: he said, And I shouldn't wonder if he who said
• 24:32
  Speaker 1: this had no notion of his own meaning. And in
• 24:35
  Speaker 1: saying this, he laughed slyly and looked at Quitius. Quittius
• 24:41
  Speaker 1: had long been showing uneasiness, for he felt that he
• 24:44
  Speaker 1: had a reputation to maintain with Carmodes and the rest
• 24:47
  Speaker 1: of the company. He had, however, hitherto managed to restrain himself,
• 24:52
  Speaker 1: but now he could no longer forbear, and his eagerness
• 24:56
  Speaker 1: satisfied me of the truth of my suspicion that Karl
• 25:00
  Speaker 1: Medes had heard this answer about temperance from Critius and Charmides,
• 25:05
  Speaker 1: who did not want to answer himself, but to make
• 25:08
  Speaker 1: Critius answer tried to stir him up. He went on,
• 25:11
  Speaker 1: pointing out that he had been refuted, And at this
• 25:15
  Speaker 1: Quittius got angry, and, as I thought, was rather inclined
• 25:19
  Speaker 1: to quarrel with him, just as a poet might quarrel
• 25:22
  Speaker 1: with an actor who spoiled his poems in repeating them.
• 25:25
  Speaker 1: So he looked hard at him and said, do you imagine, Charmides,
• 25:30
  Speaker 1: that the author of the definition of temperance did not
• 25:32
  Speaker 1: understand the meaning of his own words because you don't
• 25:35
  Speaker 1: understand them? Why? At his age, I said, most excellent, Critius,
• 25:40
  Speaker 1: he can hardly be expected to understand. But to you,
• 25:43
  Speaker 1: who are older and have studied, may well be assumed
• 25:46
  Speaker 1: to know the meaning of them. And therefore, if you
• 25:49
  Speaker 1: agree with him and accept his definition of temperance, I
• 25:52
  Speaker 1: would much rather argue with you than with him about
• 25:56
  Speaker 1: the truth or falsehood of the definition. I entirely agree,
• 26:00
  Speaker 1: he said, quideas, and accept the definition. Very good, I said,
• 26:04
  Speaker 1: And now let me repeat my question. Do you admit,
• 26:08
  Speaker 1: as I was just now saying, that all craftsmen make
• 26:11
  Speaker 1: or do something I do, And do they make or
• 26:16
  Speaker 1: do their own business only or that of others? Also?
• 26:19
  Speaker 1: They make that of others also, and are they temperate,
• 26:23
  Speaker 1: seeing that they make not for themselves or their own
• 26:26
  Speaker 1: business only? Why not? He said, No objection on my part,
• 26:31
  Speaker 1: I said, But there may be a difficulty on his.
• 26:34
  Speaker 1: Who proposes as a definition of temperance doing one's own
• 26:38
  Speaker 1: business and then says that there is no reason why
• 26:41
  Speaker 1: those who do the business of others should not be temperate,
• 26:45
  Speaker 1: Ni said, he did I ever acknowledge that those who
• 26:48
  Speaker 1: do the business of others are temperate? I said, those
• 26:51
  Speaker 1: who make, not those who do what I asked, do
• 26:55
  Speaker 1: you mean to say that doing and making are not
• 26:57
  Speaker 1: the same? No more, he replied, than making or working
• 27:01
  Speaker 1: are the same. That I have learned from Hesiod, who
• 27:04
  Speaker 1: says that work is no disgrace. Now do you imagine
• 27:09
  Speaker 1: that if he had meant by working such things as
• 27:12
  Speaker 1: you were describing, he would have said that there was
• 27:15
  Speaker 1: no disgrace in them, in making shoes, for example, or
• 27:18
  Speaker 1: in selling pickles, or sitting for hire in a house
• 27:22
  Speaker 1: of ill fame. That Socrates is not to be supposed,
• 27:26
  Speaker 1: But as I imagine, he distinguished making from action and work,
• 27:31
  Speaker 1: and while admitting that the making anything might sometimes become
• 27:35
  Speaker 1: a disgrace, when the employment was not honorable, thought that
• 27:39
  Speaker 1: work was never any disgrace at all. For things nobly
• 27:43
  Speaker 1: and usefully made he called works, and such makings he
• 27:48
  Speaker 1: called workings and doings. And he must be supposed to
• 27:53
  Speaker 1: have called such things only man's proper business, and what
• 27:58
  Speaker 1: is hurtful not his business. And in that sense, he seid,
• 28:02
  Speaker 1: and any otherwise man may be reasonably supposed to call
• 28:06
  Speaker 1: him wise who does his own work? O Qritius, I said, no.
• 28:11
  Speaker 1: Sooner had you opened your mouth than I pretty well
• 28:13
  Speaker 1: knew that you would call that which is proper to
• 28:16
  Speaker 1: a man and that which is his own good, and
• 28:20
  Speaker 1: that the making of the good you would call doings.
• 28:23
  Speaker 1: For I have heard particos, strong, endless distinctions about names.
• 28:28
  Speaker 1: Now I have no objection to your giving names any
• 28:31
  Speaker 1: sense that you please, If you will only tell me
• 28:33
  Speaker 1: what you mean by them. Please then to begin again
• 28:37
  Speaker 1: and be a little plainer. Do you not mean that
• 28:40
  Speaker 1: this doing, or making, or whatever is the word which
• 28:43
  Speaker 1: you would use of good actions? Is temperance? I do,
• 28:47
  Speaker 1: he said, Then, not he who does evil, but he
• 28:51
  Speaker 1: who does good is temperate. Yes, he said, and you
• 28:55
  Speaker 1: would agree to that, Never mind whether I agree or not,
• 29:00
  Speaker 1: As yet we are only concerned with your meaning. Well,
• 29:03
  Speaker 1: he answered, I mean to say that he who does
• 29:06
  Speaker 1: evil and not good is not temperate, and that he
• 29:10
  Speaker 1: is temperate who does good and not evil. For temperance
• 29:13
  Speaker 1: I define in plain words, to be the doing of
• 29:16
  Speaker 1: good actions. And you may be very likely right in that,
• 29:20
  Speaker 1: I said, But I am curious to know whether you
• 29:23
  Speaker 1: imagine that temperate men are ignorant of their own temperance.
• 29:27
  Speaker 1: I do not imagine that, he said. And yet were
• 29:30
  Speaker 1: you not saying, not so very long ago, that craftsmen
• 29:34
  Speaker 1: might be temperate in doing another's work as well as
• 29:36
  Speaker 1: their own? Yes? I was, he replied. But why do
• 29:40
  Speaker 1: you refer to that? I have no particular reason. But
• 29:44
  Speaker 1: I wish you would tell me whether a physician who
• 29:47
  Speaker 1: cures a patient may do good to himself and good
• 29:50
  Speaker 1: to another. Also, I think that he may. And he
• 29:54
  Speaker 1: who does this does his duty, and does not he
• 29:57
  Speaker 1: who does his duty act temperately or wisely? Yes, he
• 30:01
  Speaker 1: acts wisely. But must a physician necessarily know when his
• 30:05
  Speaker 1: treatment is likely to prove beneficial and when not, Or
• 30:09
  Speaker 1: must the craftsman necessarily know when he is likely to
• 30:12
  Speaker 1: be benefited and when not to be benefited by the
• 30:16
  Speaker 1: work which he is doing. I suppose not, then, I said,
• 30:21
  Speaker 1: he may sometimes do good or harm and not know
• 30:24
  Speaker 1: what he is himself doing. And yet in doing good,
• 30:27
  Speaker 1: as you say, he has done temperately or wisely. Was
• 30:31
  Speaker 1: not that your statement? Yes, then, as would seem in
• 30:37
  Speaker 1: doing good, he may act wisely or temperately, and be
• 30:40
  Speaker 1: wise or temperate, but not know his own wisdom or temperance.
• 30:45
  Speaker 1: But that, Socrates, he said, is impossible. And therefore, if
• 30:49
  Speaker 1: that is, as you imply, the necessary consequence of any
• 30:53
  Speaker 1: of my previous admissions, I would rather withdraw them and
• 30:57
  Speaker 1: not be ashamed to confess that I was mistaken. Than
• 30:59
  Speaker 1: it meant that a man can be temperate or wise
• 31:02
  Speaker 1: who does not know himself for self knowledge would certainly
• 31:06
  Speaker 1: be maintained by me to be the very essence of knowledge.
• 31:09
  Speaker 1: And in this I agree with him who dedicated the
• 31:12
  Speaker 1: inscription know thyself. At Delphi. That word, if I am
• 31:17
  Speaker 1: not mistaken, is put there as a sort of salutation
• 31:20
  Speaker 1: which the God addresses to those who enter the temple.
• 31:23
  Speaker 1: As much as to see that the ordinary salutation of
• 31:27
  Speaker 1: hail is not right, and that the exhortation be temperate,
• 31:32
  Speaker 1: would be a far better way of saluting one another.
• 31:35
  Speaker 1: The notion of him who dedicated the inscription was, as
• 31:38
  Speaker 1: I believe that the God speaks to those who enter
• 31:40
  Speaker 1: his temple, not as men speak. But when a worshiper enters,
• 31:45
  Speaker 1: the first word which he hears is be temperate. This, however,
• 31:50
  Speaker 1: like a prophet, he expresses in a sort of riddle.
• 31:52
  Speaker 1: For know thyself and be temperate are the same as
• 31:57
  Speaker 1: I maintain, and as the writing. And and yet they
• 32:01
  Speaker 1: may be easily misunderstood. And succeeding sages who added, never
• 32:07
  Speaker 1: too much, or give a pledge, and evil is nigh
• 32:11
  Speaker 1: at hand, would appear to have misunderstood them. For they
• 32:15
  Speaker 1: imagined that nor thyself was a piece of advice which
• 32:19
  Speaker 1: the God gave, and not his salutation of the worshippers
• 32:22
  Speaker 1: at their first coming in. And they wrote their inscription
• 32:26
  Speaker 1: under the idea that they would give equally useful pieces
• 32:29
  Speaker 1: of advice. Shall I tell you, Socrates, why I say
• 32:32
  Speaker 1: all this. My object is to leave the previous discussion,
• 32:36
  Speaker 1: in which I know not whether you or I are
• 32:39
  Speaker 1: more right, but at any rate, no clear result was attained,
• 32:43
  Speaker 1: and to raise a new one, in which I will
• 32:46
  Speaker 1: attempt to prove if you deny that temperance is self knowledge. Yes,
• 32:51
  Speaker 1: I said, quideus. But you come to me as though
• 32:55
  Speaker 1: I profess to know about the questions which I ask,
• 32:58
  Speaker 1: and as though I could, if only I would agree
• 33:01
  Speaker 1: with you. Whereas the fact is that I am, as
• 33:04
  Speaker 1: you are, an inquirer into the truth of your proposition,
• 33:08
  Speaker 1: And when I have inquired, I will say whether I
• 33:11
  Speaker 1: agree with you or not. Please then to allow me
• 33:14
  Speaker 1: time to reflect. Reflect, he said, I am reflecting, I replied,
• 33:20
  Speaker 1: in discover that temperance or wisdom, if implying a knowledge
• 33:24
  Speaker 1: of anything, must be a science, and a science of something. Yes,
• 33:30
  Speaker 1: he said, the science of itself, and is not medicine,
• 33:34
  Speaker 1: I said, the science of health. True. In suppose I
• 33:38
  Speaker 1: said that I were asked by you what is the
• 33:40
  Speaker 1: use or effect of medicine? Which is this science of health?
• 33:45
  Speaker 1: I should answer that medicine is a very great use
• 33:48
  Speaker 1: in producing health, which, as you will admit, is an
• 33:51
  Speaker 1: excellent effect, granted. And if you were to ask me
• 33:56
  Speaker 1: what is the result or effect of architecture, which is
• 33:59
  Speaker 1: the science of building, I should say houses, and so
• 34:03
  Speaker 1: of other arts, which all have their different results. Now
• 34:07
  Speaker 1: I want you Qritius to answer a similar question about
• 34:11
  Speaker 1: temperance or wisdom, to which you ought to know the answer, if,
• 34:15
  Speaker 1: as you say, wisdom or temperance is the science of itself.
• 34:19
  Speaker 1: Admitting this, I ask what good work worthy of the
• 34:24
  Speaker 1: name does wisdom effect? Answer me that that is not
• 34:28
  Speaker 1: the true way of pursuing the inquiry, Socrates, he said,
• 34:31
  Speaker 1: for wisdom is not like the other sciences any more
• 34:35
  Speaker 1: than they are like one another. But you proceed as
• 34:38
  Speaker 1: if they were alike. For tell me, he said, what
• 34:41
  Speaker 1: result is there of computation or geometry, in the same
• 34:45
  Speaker 1: sense as a house is the result of building, or
• 34:48
  Speaker 1: a garment of weaving, or any other work of any
• 34:51
  Speaker 1: other art. Can you show me any such result of them?
• 34:54
  Speaker 1: You cannot, that is true, I said. But still each
• 34:58
  Speaker 1: of these sciences has a sub which is different from
• 35:01
  Speaker 1: the science. I can show you that the art of
• 35:04
  Speaker 1: computation has to do with odd and even numbers in
• 35:07
  Speaker 1: their numerical relations to themselves and to each other. Is
• 35:11
  Speaker 1: not that true, yes, he said, And the odd and
• 35:16
  Speaker 1: even numbers are not the same with the art of computation.
• 35:19
  Speaker 1: They are not. The art of wing, again, has to
• 35:23
  Speaker 1: do with lighter and heavier but the art of wing
• 35:26
  Speaker 1: is one thing, and the heavy and the light another.
• 35:29
  Speaker 1: Do you admit that? Yes? Now I want to know
• 35:34
  Speaker 1: what is that which is not wisdom, and of which
• 35:37
  Speaker 1: wisdom is the science? That is precisely the old error Socrates.
• 35:42
  Speaker 1: He said, you come asking in what wisdom differs from
• 35:46
  Speaker 1: the other sciences, and then you carry on the inquiry
• 35:49
  Speaker 1: as if they were alike. But that is not the case.
• 35:52
  Speaker 1: For all the other sciences are of something else, and
• 35:55
  Speaker 1: not of themselves. But that alone is a science of
• 35:59
  Speaker 1: other sciences and of itself, and of this as I
• 36:03
  Speaker 1: believe you are very well aware, and that you are
• 36:06
  Speaker 1: only doing which you denied that you were doing, just now,
• 36:09
  Speaker 1: leaving the argument and trying to refute me. And what
• 36:13
  Speaker 1: if I am refuting you? How can you think that
• 36:16
  Speaker 1: I have any other motive in this? But what I
• 36:18
  Speaker 1: should have in examining into myself, which motive would be
• 36:23
  Speaker 1: just a fear of my unconsciously fancying that I knew
• 36:26
  Speaker 1: something of which I was ignorant. And at this moment
• 36:30
  Speaker 1: I pursue the inquiry chiefly for my own sake, and
• 36:34
  Speaker 1: perhaps in some degree also for the sake of my
• 36:37
  Speaker 1: other friends. For is not the discovery of things as
• 36:40
  Speaker 1: they truly are, a common good to all mankind. Yes, certainly, Socrates,
• 36:46
  Speaker 1: he said. Then I said, be of good cheer, sweet sir,
• 36:51
  Speaker 1: and give your opinion in answer to the question which
• 36:53
  Speaker 1: I asked, without minding whether Quitteous or Socrates is the
• 36:57
  Speaker 1: person refuted. Attend only to the argument, and see what
• 37:01
  Speaker 1: will come of the refutation. I think that you are right,
• 37:05
  Speaker 1: he replied, and I will do as you say. Tell me. Then,
• 37:09
  Speaker 1: I said, what you mean to affirm about wisdom? I mean,
• 37:13
  Speaker 1: he said, that wisdom is the only science, which is
• 37:16
  Speaker 1: the science of itself, and of the other sciences as well.
• 37:21
  Speaker 1: But the science of science, I said, will also be
• 37:24
  Speaker 1: the science of the absence of science. Very true, he said, then,
• 37:29
  Speaker 1: the wise or tempered man, and he only will know
• 37:32
  Speaker 1: himself and be able to examine what he knows or
• 37:35
  Speaker 1: does not know, and see what others know and think
• 37:39
  Speaker 1: that they know and do really know, and what they
• 37:42
  Speaker 1: do not know, and fancy that they know when they
• 37:45
  Speaker 1: do not. No other person will be able to do this.
• 37:49
  Speaker 1: And this is the state in virtue of wisdom or
• 37:52
  Speaker 1: temperance and self knowledge, which is just knowing what a
• 37:56
  Speaker 1: man knows and what he does not know. That is
• 37:59
  Speaker 1: your you. Yes, he said, And of part one of
• 38:05
  Speaker 1: Carmodes recording in memory of Mitchell Edwards, Part two of
• 38:22
  Speaker 1: Krmodes by Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowittt. This LibriVox recording
• 38:28
  Speaker 1: is in the public domain recording by Jeffrey Edwards. Now, then,
• 38:35
  Speaker 1: I said, making an offering of the third or last
• 38:38
  Speaker 1: argument to Zeus the Savior, let us once more begin
• 38:42
  Speaker 1: and ask, in the first place, whether this knowledge that
• 38:45
  Speaker 1: you know and do not know what you know and
• 38:48
  Speaker 1: do not know is possible, And in the second place, whether,
• 38:53
  Speaker 1: even if quite possible, such knowledge is of any use.
• 38:58
  Speaker 1: That is what we must consider, he said. And here Critius,
• 39:02
  Speaker 1: I said, I hope that you will find a way
• 39:05
  Speaker 1: out of a difficulty into which I have got myself.
• 39:08
  Speaker 1: Shall I tell you the difficulty by all means? He replied,
• 39:14
  Speaker 1: does not what you have been seeing, if true, amount
• 39:17
  Speaker 1: to this, that there must be a science which is
• 39:20
  Speaker 1: wholly a science of itself and also of other sciences,
• 39:24
  Speaker 1: And that the same is also the science of the
• 39:27
  Speaker 1: absence of science. True, But consider how monstrous this is,
• 39:32
  Speaker 1: my friend. In any parallel case, the impossibility will be
• 39:36
  Speaker 1: transparent to you how is that? And in what cases
• 39:40
  Speaker 1: do you mean? In such cases as this, suppose that
• 39:45
  Speaker 1: there is a kind of vision which is not like
• 39:47
  Speaker 1: ordinary vision, but a vision of itself and of other
• 39:51
  Speaker 1: sorts of vision, and of the defect of them, which
• 39:55
  Speaker 1: in seeing sees no color, but only itself and other
• 39:59
  Speaker 1: sorts of vision. Do you think that there is such
• 40:02
  Speaker 1: a kind of vision? Certainly not? Or is there a
• 40:06
  Speaker 1: kind of hearing which hears no sound at all, but
• 40:09
  Speaker 1: only itself and other sorts of hearing, or the defects
• 40:12
  Speaker 1: of them? There is not? Or take all the senses.
• 40:18
  Speaker 1: Can you imagine that there is any sense of itself
• 40:21
  Speaker 1: and of other senses, but which is incapable of perceiving
• 40:25
  Speaker 1: the objects of the senses? I think not. Could there
• 40:29
  Speaker 1: be any desire which is not the desire of any pleasure,
• 40:33
  Speaker 1: but of itself and of all other desires, certainly not.
• 40:38
  Speaker 1: Or can you imagine a wish which wishes for no good,
• 40:42
  Speaker 1: but only for itself and all other wishes? I should
• 40:46
  Speaker 1: answer no. Or what do you see that there is
• 40:50
  Speaker 1: a love which is not the love of beauty, but
• 40:53
  Speaker 1: of itself and of other loves? I should not? Or
• 40:58
  Speaker 1: did you ever know of a fear which fears itself
• 41:02
  Speaker 1: or other fears, but has no object of fear. I
• 41:06
  Speaker 1: never did, he said, Or of an opinion which is
• 41:10
  Speaker 1: an opinion of itself and of other opinions, and which
• 41:14
  Speaker 1: has no opinion on the subjects of opinion in general.
• 41:18
  Speaker 1: Certainly not. But surely we are assuming a science of
• 41:23
  Speaker 1: this kind, which, having no subject matter, is a science
• 41:26
  Speaker 1: of itself and of the other sciences. For that is
• 41:30
  Speaker 1: what is affirmed. Now. This is strange. If true. However,
• 41:35
  Speaker 1: we must not as yet absolutely deny the possibility of
• 41:39
  Speaker 1: such a science. Let us rather consider the matter. You
• 41:43
  Speaker 1: are quite right, well, then this science of which we
• 41:46
  Speaker 1: are speaking is a science of something, and is of
• 41:50
  Speaker 1: a nature to be a science of something. Yes, just
• 41:55
  Speaker 1: as thought which is greater is of a nature to
• 41:57
  Speaker 1: be greater than something, yes, which is less, if the
• 42:02
  Speaker 1: other is to be conceived as greater, to be sure.
• 42:06
  Speaker 1: And if we could find something which is at once
• 42:08
  Speaker 1: greater than self and greater than other great things, but
• 42:13
  Speaker 1: not greater than those things in comparison of which the
• 42:16
  Speaker 1: others are greater, then that thing would have the property
• 42:19
  Speaker 1: of being greater and also less than itself. That Socrates,
• 42:24
  Speaker 1: he said, is the inevitable inference. Or if there be
• 42:28
  Speaker 1: a double which is double of other doubles and of itself,
• 42:32
  Speaker 1: they will be halves, for the half is relative to
• 42:35
  Speaker 1: the double. That is true, And that which is greater
• 42:39
  Speaker 1: than itself will also be less, And that which is
• 42:42
  Speaker 1: heavier will also be lighter, and that which is older
• 42:47
  Speaker 1: will also be younger, and the same of other things.
• 42:51
  Speaker 1: That which has a nature relative to self will retain
• 42:54
  Speaker 1: also the nature of its object. I mean to say,
• 42:57
  Speaker 1: for example, that hearing is as we say of sound
• 43:01
  Speaker 1: or voice. Is that true? Yes, then if hearing hears itself,
• 43:07
  Speaker 1: it must hear a voice, for there is no other
• 43:10
  Speaker 1: way of hearing, certainly. And sight also, my excellent friend,
• 43:15
  Speaker 1: if it sees itself, must see a color, for sight
• 43:18
  Speaker 1: cannot see that which has no color. No, then do
• 43:23
  Speaker 1: you see Qridius that in several of the examples which
• 43:26
  Speaker 1: have been recited, the notion of a relation to self
• 43:29
  Speaker 1: is altogether inadmissible, and in other cases hardly credible. Inadmissible,
• 43:35
  Speaker 1: for example, in the case of magnitudes, numbers and the like,
• 43:40
  Speaker 1: very true. But in the case of hearing and the
• 43:44
  Speaker 1: power of self motion and the power of heat to burn,
• 43:48
  Speaker 1: this relation to self will be regarded as incredible by some,
• 43:52
  Speaker 1: but perhaps not by others. And some great man, my friend,
• 43:56
  Speaker 1: is wanted, who will satisfactorily determine for us whether there
• 44:00
  Speaker 1: is nothing which has an inherent property of relation to
• 44:03
  Speaker 1: self or some things only, and not others, and whether
• 44:08
  Speaker 1: in this latter class, if there be such a class,
• 44:11
  Speaker 1: that science, which is called wisdom or temperance is included.
• 44:15
  Speaker 1: I altogether distrust my own power of determining this. I
• 44:19
  Speaker 1: am not certain whether there is such a science of
• 44:21
  Speaker 1: science at all, and even if there be, I should
• 44:25
  Speaker 1: not acknowledge this to be wisdom or temperance until I
• 44:28
  Speaker 1: can also see whether such a knowledge would or would
• 44:32
  Speaker 1: not do us any good. For I have an impression
• 44:35
  Speaker 1: that temperance is a benefit and a good, and therefore O,
• 44:39
  Speaker 1: son of calais gross. As you maintain that temperance or
• 44:43
  Speaker 1: wisdom is a science of science, and also of the
• 44:46
  Speaker 1: absence of science, I will request you to show, in
• 44:49
  Speaker 1: the first place, as I was saying before, the possibility,
• 44:53
  Speaker 1: and in the second place, the advantage of such a science,
• 44:56
  Speaker 1: And then perhaps you may satisfy me that you are
• 45:00
  Speaker 1: right in your view of temperance. Quitteus heard me say this,
• 45:04
  Speaker 1: and saw that I was in a difficulty. And as
• 45:07
  Speaker 1: one person when another yawns in his presence, catches the
• 45:11
  Speaker 1: infection of yawning from him, so did he seem to
• 45:14
  Speaker 1: be driven into a difficulty by my difficulty. But as
• 45:18
  Speaker 1: he had a reputation to maintain, he was ashamed to
• 45:21
  Speaker 1: admit before the company that he could not answer my
• 45:24
  Speaker 1: challenge or decide the question I'd issue, And he made
• 45:28
  Speaker 1: an unintelligible attempt to hide his perplexity in order that
• 45:32
  Speaker 1: the argument might proceed. I said to him, well, then quitius,
• 45:36
  Speaker 1: if you like, let us assume that there may be
• 45:39
  Speaker 1: this science of science, whether the assumption is right or wrong,
• 45:43
  Speaker 1: may be hereafter investigated, but fully admitting this, will you
• 45:47
  Speaker 1: tell me how such a science enables us to distinguish
• 45:50
  Speaker 1: what we know or do not know, which, as we
• 45:54
  Speaker 1: were saying, is self knowledge or wisdom. That is what
• 45:57
  Speaker 1: we were saying, Yes, Socrates, he said, and that I
• 46:01
  Speaker 1: think is certainly true. For he who has that science
• 46:05
  Speaker 1: or knowledge which knows itself will become like that knowledge
• 46:08
  Speaker 1: which he has, in the same way that he who
• 46:11
  Speaker 1: has swiftness will be swift, and he who has beauty
• 46:14
  Speaker 1: will be beautiful, And he who has knowledge will know
• 46:18
  Speaker 1: in the same way, he who has that knowledge, which
• 46:20
  Speaker 1: is the knowledge of itself, will know himself. I do
• 46:24
  Speaker 1: not doubt. I said that a man will know himself
• 46:26
  Speaker 1: when he possesses that which has self knowledge. But what
• 46:30
  Speaker 1: necessity is there that having this he should know what
• 46:34
  Speaker 1: he knows and what he does not know? Because Socrates,
• 46:38
  Speaker 1: they are the same. Very likely, I said, But I
• 46:41
  Speaker 1: remain as stupid as ever, For still I fail to
• 46:44
  Speaker 1: comprehend how this knowing what you know and do not
• 46:48
  Speaker 1: know is the same as the knowledge of self. What
• 46:51
  Speaker 1: do you mean, he said, This is what I mean?
• 46:54
  Speaker 1: I replied, I will admit that there is a science
• 46:57
  Speaker 1: of science. But can this do more than determined that
• 47:01
  Speaker 1: of two things, one is and the other is not
• 47:04
  Speaker 1: science or knowledge? No? Just that, then, is knowledge or
• 47:10
  Speaker 1: want of knowledge of health the same as knowledge or
• 47:13
  Speaker 1: want of knowledge of justice? Certainly not. The one is
• 47:17
  Speaker 1: medicine and the other is politics. But that of which
• 47:20
  Speaker 1: we are speaking is knowledge, pure and simple, very true.
• 47:25
  Speaker 1: And if a man knows only and has only knowledge
• 47:28
  Speaker 1: of knowledge, and has no further knowledge of health and justice,
• 47:32
  Speaker 1: the probability is that he will only know that he
• 47:35
  Speaker 1: knows something and has a certain knowledge, whether concerning himself
• 47:40
  Speaker 1: or other men. True, But how will this knowledge or
• 47:44
  Speaker 1: science teach him to know what he knows? Say that
• 47:47
  Speaker 1: he knows health, not wisdom or temperance. But the art
• 47:51
  Speaker 1: of medicine has taught him that, and he has learned
• 47:54
  Speaker 1: harmony from the art of music, and building from the
• 47:57
  Speaker 1: art of building, neither from wisdom or temperance, and the
• 48:01
  Speaker 1: same of other things. That is evident. But how will wisdom,
• 48:06
  Speaker 1: regarded only as a knowledge of knowledge or science of science,
• 48:10
  Speaker 1: ever teach him that he knows health or that he
• 48:13
  Speaker 1: knows building. That is impossible. Then he who is ignorant
• 48:18
  Speaker 1: of this will only know that he knows, but not
• 48:21
  Speaker 1: what he knows. True, Then wisdom or being wise appears
• 48:27
  Speaker 1: to be not the knowledge of the things which we
• 48:29
  Speaker 1: do or do not know, but only the knowledge that
• 48:32
  Speaker 1: we know and do not know. That is the inference.
• 48:37
  Speaker 1: Then he who has this knowledge will not be able
• 48:40
  Speaker 1: to examine whether a pretender knows or does not know
• 48:44
  Speaker 1: that which he says that he knows. He will only
• 48:47
  Speaker 1: know that he has a knowledge of some kind, But
• 48:50
  Speaker 1: wisdom will not show him of what the knowledge is
• 48:53
  Speaker 1: plainly not neither will he be able to distinguish the
• 48:57
  Speaker 1: pretender in medicine from the truth, is nor between any
• 49:01
  Speaker 1: other true and false possessor of knowledge. Let us consider
• 49:05
  Speaker 1: the matter in this way. If the wise man or
• 49:08
  Speaker 1: any other man wants to distinguish the true physician from
• 49:12
  Speaker 1: the false, what is he to do? He will not
• 49:15
  Speaker 1: talk to him about medicine. And that, as we are saying,
• 49:19
  Speaker 1: is the only thing which the physician understands true. And
• 49:24
  Speaker 1: he certainly knows nothing of science, for this has been
• 49:27
  Speaker 1: assumed to be the province of wisdom. True. But then again,
• 49:33
  Speaker 1: if medicine is a science, neither will the physician know
• 49:36
  Speaker 1: anything of medicine exactly. The wise man will indeed know
• 49:42
  Speaker 1: that the physician has some kind of science or knowledge.
• 49:45
  Speaker 1: But when he wants to discover the nature of this,
• 49:47
  Speaker 1: he will ask what is the subject matter? For each
• 49:51
  Speaker 1: science is distinguished not as science, but by the nature
• 49:54
  Speaker 1: of the subject. Is not that true? Yes, that is
• 49:58
  Speaker 1: quite true. And medicine is distinguished from other sciences as
• 50:03
  Speaker 1: having the subject matter of health and disease. Yes, And
• 50:07
  Speaker 1: he who would inquire into the nature of medicine must
• 50:10
  Speaker 1: pursue the inquiry into health and disease, and not into
• 50:14
  Speaker 1: what is extraneous true. And he who judges rightly will
• 50:19
  Speaker 1: judge of the physician as a physician in what relates
• 50:22
  Speaker 1: to these he will. He will consider whether what he
• 50:26
  Speaker 1: says is true, and whether what he does is right.
• 50:29
  Speaker 1: In relation to these he will. But can anyone appreciate
• 50:33
  Speaker 1: either without having a knowledge of medicine. He cannot, nor
• 50:38
  Speaker 1: anyone but the physician, not even the wise man, as appears,
• 50:42
  Speaker 1: for that would require him to be a physician as
• 50:45
  Speaker 1: well as a wise man. Very true, then, assuredly, wisdom
• 50:50
  Speaker 1: or temperance, if only a science of science, and of
• 50:54
  Speaker 1: the absence of science or knowledge, will not be able
• 50:57
  Speaker 1: to distinguish the physician who knows from one who does
• 51:00
  Speaker 1: not know, but pretends or thinks that he knows, or
• 51:04
  Speaker 1: any other professor of anything at all. Like any other artist,
• 51:08
  Speaker 1: he will only know his fellow in art or wisdom,
• 51:10
  Speaker 1: and no one else. That is evident, he said, But then,
• 51:15
  Speaker 1: what profit Critius I said, Is there any longer in
• 51:18
  Speaker 1: wisdom or temperance which yet remains? If this is wisdom,
• 51:22
  Speaker 1: If indeed, as we were supposing at first, the wise
• 51:26
  Speaker 1: man had been able to distinguish what he knew and
• 51:29
  Speaker 1: did not know, and that he knew the one and
• 51:32
  Speaker 1: did not know the other. And to recognize a similar
• 51:35
  Speaker 1: faculty of discernment in others. There would certainly have been
• 51:38
  Speaker 1: a great advantage in being wise, For then we should
• 51:42
  Speaker 1: never have made a mistake, but have passed through life
• 51:45
  Speaker 1: the unerring guides of ourselves and of those who were
• 51:48
  Speaker 1: under us. And we should not have attempted to do
• 51:51
  Speaker 1: what we did not know, but we should have found
• 51:54
  Speaker 1: out those who knew and confided in them. Nor should
• 51:57
  Speaker 1: we have allowed those who were under us to do
• 52:00
  Speaker 1: anything which they were not likely to do well. And
• 52:03
  Speaker 1: they would be likely to do well just that of
• 52:06
  Speaker 1: which they had knowledge. And the house or state which
• 52:10
  Speaker 1: was ordered or administered under the guidance of wisdom would
• 52:13
  Speaker 1: have been well ordered, and everything else of which wisdom
• 52:17
  Speaker 1: was the lord for truth, guiding, and error having been
• 52:21
  Speaker 1: expelled in all their doings, man would have done well
• 52:25
  Speaker 1: and would have been happy. Was not this qriteous what
• 52:29
  Speaker 1: we spoke of as the great advantage of wisdom to
• 52:32
  Speaker 1: know what is known and what is unknown to us?
• 52:37
  Speaker 1: Very true? He said, And now you perceive I said
• 52:41
  Speaker 1: that no such science is to be found anywhere I perceive,
• 52:45
  Speaker 1: he said, May we assume? Then, I said, that wisdom,
• 52:49
  Speaker 1: viewed in this new light merely as a knowledge of
• 52:52
  Speaker 1: knowledge and ignorance, has this advantage that he who possesses
• 52:56
  Speaker 1: such knowledge will more easily learn anything that he learnedes,
• 53:00
  Speaker 1: and that everything will be clearer to him, because, in
• 53:04
  Speaker 1: addition to the knowledge of individuals, he sees the science,
• 53:07
  Speaker 1: and this also will better enable him to test the
• 53:10
  Speaker 1: knowledge which others have of what he knows himself, whereas
• 53:14
  Speaker 1: the inquirer who is without this knowledge may be supposed
• 53:17
  Speaker 1: to have a feebler and weaker insight. Are not these,
• 53:21
  Speaker 1: my friend, the real advantages which are to be gained
• 53:23
  Speaker 1: from wisdom, And are not we looking and seeking after
• 53:27
  Speaker 1: something more than is to be found in her? That
• 53:31
  Speaker 1: is very likely, he said. That is very likely, I said,
• 53:35
  Speaker 1: And very likely too we have been inquiring to no purpose.
• 53:39
  Speaker 1: I am led to infer this because I observe that
• 53:43
  Speaker 1: if this is wisdom, some strange consequences would follow. Let
• 53:47
  Speaker 1: us if you please assume the possibility of this science
• 53:50
  Speaker 1: of sciences, and further admit and allow, as was originally suggested,
• 53:55
  Speaker 1: that wisdom is the knowledge of what we know and
• 53:58
  Speaker 1: do not know. Assuming all this still, upon further consideration,
• 54:03
  Speaker 1: I am doubtful preteus whether wisdom, if such as this,
• 54:07
  Speaker 1: would do us any good. For I think we were
• 54:10
  Speaker 1: wrong in supposing, as we were saying just now, that
• 54:14
  Speaker 1: such wisdom ordering the government of house or state would
• 54:17
  Speaker 1: be a great benefit. How is that? He said? Why?
• 54:22
  Speaker 1: I said, we were far too ready to admit the
• 54:24
  Speaker 1: great benefits which mankind would obtain from their severely doing
• 54:28
  Speaker 1: the things which they knew, and committing to others who
• 54:31
  Speaker 1: knew the things of which they are ignorant. Were we
• 54:35
  Speaker 1: not right, he said, in making that admission, I think not.
• 54:39
  Speaker 1: I said, that is certainly strange. Socrates, by the dog
• 54:44
  Speaker 1: of Egypt, I said, I am of your opinion about that,
• 54:47
  Speaker 1: And that was in my mind when I said that
• 54:50
  Speaker 1: strange consequences would follow, and that I was afraid we
• 54:54
  Speaker 1: were on the wrong track. For however ready we may
• 54:57
  Speaker 1: be to admit that this is wisdom, I certainly cannot
• 55:00
  Speaker 1: make out what good this sort of thing does to us.
• 55:04
  Speaker 1: What do you mean, he said? I wish that you
• 55:06
  Speaker 1: could make me understand what you mean. I dare say
• 55:10
  Speaker 1: that what I am saying is nonsense, I replied, And
• 55:13
  Speaker 1: yet if a man has any feeling of what is
• 55:15
  Speaker 1: due to himself, he cannot let the thought which comes
• 55:18
  Speaker 1: into his mind pass away unheeded and unexamined. I like that,
• 55:23
  Speaker 1: he said here, Then I said my own dream, Whether
• 55:27
  Speaker 1: coming through the horn or the Ivory gate, I cannot tell.
• 55:31
  Speaker 1: The dream is this. Let us suppose that Wisdom is
• 55:34
  Speaker 1: such as we are now defining, and that she has
• 55:38
  Speaker 1: absolute sway over us. Then each action will be done
• 55:42
  Speaker 1: according to the arts or sciences, and no one professing
• 55:46
  Speaker 1: to be a pilot when he is not, or any
• 55:49
  Speaker 1: physician or general, or anyone else pretending to know matters
• 55:53
  Speaker 1: of which he is ignorant, will deceive or elude us.
• 55:56
  Speaker 1: Our heals will be improved, our safety at sea, and
• 55:59
  Speaker 1: also u when battle will be assured. Our coats and
• 56:02
  Speaker 1: shoes and all other instruments and implements will be well made,
• 56:07
  Speaker 1: because the workmen will be good and true. I and
• 56:10
  Speaker 1: if you please, you may suppose that prophecy, which is
• 56:14
  Speaker 1: the knowledge of the future, will be under the control
• 56:16
  Speaker 1: of Wisdom, and that she will deter deceivers and set
• 56:20
  Speaker 1: up the true profit in their place as the revealer
• 56:23
  Speaker 1: of the future. Now I quite agree that mankind thus
• 56:27
  Speaker 1: provided would live and act according to knowledge, for wisdom
• 56:31
  Speaker 1: would watch and prevent ignorance from intruding on us. But
• 56:35
  Speaker 1: we have not as yet discovered why. Because we act
• 56:37
  Speaker 1: according to knowledge, we act well and are happy, my
• 56:41
  Speaker 1: dear critias. Yet I think, he replied, that you will
• 56:45
  Speaker 1: hardly find any other end of right action if you
• 56:48
  Speaker 1: reject knowledge. And of what is this knowledge? I said,
• 56:52
  Speaker 1: Just answer me that small question. Do you mean a
• 56:55
  Speaker 1: knowledge of shoemaking God forbid? Or of working in brady
• 57:01
  Speaker 1: certainly not, or in wall or wood or anything of
• 57:04
  Speaker 1: that sort. No, I do not. Then, I said, we
• 57:09
  Speaker 1: are giving up the doctrine that he who lives according
• 57:11
  Speaker 1: to knowledge is happy. For these live according to knowledge,
• 57:15
  Speaker 1: and yet they are not allowed by you to be happy.
• 57:18
  Speaker 1: But I think that you mean to confine happiness to
• 57:21
  Speaker 1: particular individuals who live according to knowledge, such for example,
• 57:25
  Speaker 1: as the prophet, who, as I was seeing, knows the future. Yes,
• 57:30
  Speaker 1: I mean him, But there are others as well, Yes,
• 57:34
  Speaker 1: I said, some one who knows the past and present
• 57:37
  Speaker 1: as well as the future, and is ignorant of nothing.
• 57:41
  Speaker 1: Let us suppose that there is such a person, And
• 57:44
  Speaker 1: if there is, you will allow that he is the
• 57:46
  Speaker 1: most knowing of all living men. Certainly he is. Yet
• 57:50
  Speaker 1: I should like to know one thing more, Which of
• 57:53
  Speaker 1: the different kinds of knowledge makes him happy? Or do
• 57:56
  Speaker 1: all equally make him happy? Not all equally, he replied,
• 58:00
  Speaker 1: But which most tends to make him happy? The knowledge
• 58:03
  Speaker 1: of what, past, present, or future thing? May I infer
• 58:07
  Speaker 1: this to be the knowledge of the game of drafts?
• 58:11
  Speaker 1: Nonsense about the game of drafts, or of computation, no,
• 58:17
  Speaker 1: or of health? That is nearer the truth, he said,
• 58:20
  Speaker 1: And that knowledge which is nearest of all, I said,
• 58:23
  Speaker 1: is the knowledge of what, the knowledge with which he
• 58:27
  Speaker 1: discerns good and evil. Monster, I said, you have been
• 58:31
  Speaker 1: carrying me round in a circle, and all this time
• 58:35
  Speaker 1: hiding from me the fact that the life according to
• 58:37
  Speaker 1: knowledge is not that which makes men act rightly and
• 58:41
  Speaker 1: be happy, not even if all the sciences be included,
• 58:45
  Speaker 1: but that this has to do with one science, only,
• 58:48
  Speaker 1: that of good and evil. For let me ask you, quitteus,
• 58:53
  Speaker 1: whether if you take away this science from all the rest,
• 58:56
  Speaker 1: medicine will not equally give health and shee making equally
• 59:00
  Speaker 1: produce shoes in the art of the weaver clothes. Whether
• 59:04
  Speaker 1: the art of the pilot will not equally save our
• 59:06
  Speaker 1: lives at sea in the art of the general in war.
• 59:10
  Speaker 1: Quite so. And yet, my dear critias, none of these
• 59:13
  Speaker 1: things will be well or beneficially done if the science
• 59:17
  Speaker 1: of the good be wanting. That is true. But that
• 59:21
  Speaker 1: science is not wisdom or temperance, but a science of
• 59:24
  Speaker 1: human advantage, not a science of other sciences or of ignorance,
• 59:29
  Speaker 1: but of good and evil. And if this be of use,
• 59:32
  Speaker 1: then wisdom or temperance will not be of use. And why,
• 59:36
  Speaker 1: he replied, will not wisdom be of use? For if
• 59:39
  Speaker 1: we really assume that wisdom is a science of sciences
• 59:43
  Speaker 1: and has a sway over other sciences, surely she will
• 59:46
  Speaker 1: have this particular science of the good under her control,
• 59:50
  Speaker 1: and in this way will benefit us. And will wisdom
• 59:53
  Speaker 1: give health? I said? Is not this rather the effect
• 59:56
  Speaker 1: of medicine? Or does wisdom do the work of any
• 1:00:00
  Speaker 1: of the other arts? And do not they do each
• 1:00:03
  Speaker 1: of them their own work? Have we not long ago
• 1:00:06
  Speaker 1: severated that knowledge is only the knowledge of knowledge and
• 1:00:09
  Speaker 1: of ignorance, and of nothing else. That is clear? Another
• 1:00:14
  Speaker 1: art is concerned with health. Another the art of health
• 1:00:19
  Speaker 1: is different, yes different. Nor does wisdom give advantage my
• 1:00:24
  Speaker 1: good friend, For that again we have just now been
• 1:00:27
  Speaker 1: attributing to another art very true, How then can wisdom
• 1:00:32
  Speaker 1: be advantageous, giving no advantage that Socrates is certainly inconceivable.
• 1:00:38
  Speaker 1: You see, then, quitdeus that I was not far wrong
• 1:00:41
  Speaker 1: in fearing that I could have no sound notion about wisdom.
• 1:00:45
  Speaker 1: I was quite right in depreciating myself, for that which
• 1:00:48
  Speaker 1: is admitted to be the best of all things would
• 1:00:51
  Speaker 1: never have seemed to us useless if I had been
• 1:00:54
  Speaker 1: good for anything at an inquiry. But now I have
• 1:00:58
  Speaker 1: been utterly defeated, and have failed to discover what that
• 1:01:02
  Speaker 1: is to which the imposer of names gave this name
• 1:01:05
  Speaker 1: of temperance or wisdom. And yet many more admissions were
• 1:01:09
  Speaker 1: made by us than could be really granted. For we
• 1:01:12
  Speaker 1: admitted that there was a science of science, although the
• 1:01:15
  Speaker 1: argument said no and protested against this. And we admitted
• 1:01:19
  Speaker 1: further that this science knew the works of the other sciences,
• 1:01:23
  Speaker 1: although this too was denied by the argument. Because we
• 1:01:26
  Speaker 1: wanted to show that the wise man had knowledge of
• 1:01:29
  Speaker 1: what he knew and did not know. Also, we nobly
• 1:01:33
  Speaker 1: disregarded and never even considered the impossibility of a man
• 1:01:37
  Speaker 1: knowing in a sort of way that which he does
• 1:01:40
  Speaker 1: not know at all. For our assumption was that he
• 1:01:43
  Speaker 1: knows that which he does not know, than which nothing,
• 1:01:47
  Speaker 1: as I think, can be more irrational. And yet after
• 1:01:50
  Speaker 1: finding us so easy and good natured, the inquiry is
• 1:01:54
  Speaker 1: still unable to discover the truth, but mocks us to
• 1:01:57
  Speaker 1: a degree, and has gone out of its ways to
• 1:02:00
  Speaker 1: prove the inutility of that which we admitted only by
• 1:02:03
  Speaker 1: a sort of supposition in fiction to be the true
• 1:02:06
  Speaker 1: definition of temperance or wisdom, which result, as far as
• 1:02:10
  Speaker 1: I am concerned, is not so much to be lamented,
• 1:02:13
  Speaker 1: I said, but for your sake, Carmodes, I am very
• 1:02:17
  Speaker 1: sorry that you, having such beauty in such wisdom and
• 1:02:21
  Speaker 1: temperance of soul, should have no profit or good in
• 1:02:24
  Speaker 1: life from your wisdom and temperance. And still more am
• 1:02:28
  Speaker 1: I grieved about the charm which I learned with so
• 1:02:31
  Speaker 1: much pain, and to so little profit from the Thracian
• 1:02:35
  Speaker 1: for the sake of a thing which is nothing worth.
• 1:02:38
  Speaker 1: I think, indeed that there is a mistake, and that
• 1:02:41
  Speaker 1: I must be a bad inquirer, for I am persuaded
• 1:02:44
  Speaker 1: that wisdom or temperance is really a great good. And
• 1:02:47
  Speaker 1: happy are you if you possess that good, and therefore
• 1:02:51
  Speaker 1: examine yourself and see whether you have this gift and
• 1:02:55
  Speaker 1: can do without the charm For if you can, I
• 1:02:58
  Speaker 1: would rather advise you to regard me simply as a
• 1:03:00
  Speaker 1: fool who is never able to reason out anything, and
• 1:03:03
  Speaker 1: to rest assured that the more wise and temperate you are,
• 1:03:07
  Speaker 1: the happier you will be. Charmides said, I am sure
• 1:03:11
  Speaker 1: that I do not know, Socrates, whether I have or
• 1:03:14
  Speaker 1: have not this gift of wisdom and temperance. For how
• 1:03:17
  Speaker 1: can I know whether I have that the very nature
• 1:03:20
  Speaker 1: of which even you and Quideus, as you say, are
• 1:03:23
  Speaker 1: unable to discover. Not that I believe you. And further,
• 1:03:28
  Speaker 1: I am sure, Socrates, that I do need the charm,
• 1:03:31
  Speaker 1: And as far as I am concerned, I shall be
• 1:03:33
  Speaker 1: willing to be charmed by you daily until you say
• 1:03:36
  Speaker 1: that I have had enough very good charmody, said Quitteus.
• 1:03:41
  Speaker 1: If you do this, I shall have a proof of
• 1:03:43
  Speaker 1: your temperance. That is, if you allow yourself to be
• 1:03:46
  Speaker 1: charmed by Socrates and never desert him at all, you
• 1:03:50
  Speaker 1: may depend on my following in not deserting him, said Charmides.
• 1:03:54
  Speaker 1: If you who are my guardian command, me. I should
• 1:03:57
  Speaker 1: be very wrong not to obey you, and I do
• 1:04:01
  Speaker 1: command you. He said. Then I will do as you
• 1:04:04
  Speaker 1: say and begin this very day you sirs, I said,
• 1:04:08
  Speaker 1: what are you conspiring about. We are not conspiring, said Carmodes.
• 1:04:12
  Speaker 1: We have conspired already, And are you about to use
• 1:04:16
  Speaker 1: violence without even going through the forms of justice? Yes,
• 1:04:20
  Speaker 1: I shall use violence, he replied, since he orders me,
• 1:04:23
  Speaker 1: and therefore you had better consider well. But the time
• 1:04:27
  Speaker 1: for considerations passed. I said, when violence is employed, and you,
• 1:04:32
  Speaker 1: when you are determined on anything and in the mood
• 1:04:34
  Speaker 1: of violence, are irresistible, do not you resist me? Then,
• 1:04:38
  Speaker 1: he said, I will not resist you, I replied, And
• 1:04:44
  Speaker 1: of Carmodies by Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett, read by
• 1:04:49
  Speaker 1: Geoffrey Edwards, metic ordinated and proof listened by Anne Boulay.
• 1:04:55
  Speaker 1: Recording in memory of Mitchell Edwards