Latest / Vietnam- The Advisory Years to 1965 / 010 - US Command Arrangements 2d ADVON and MACV
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- 0:00Speaker 1: Chapter nine Vietnam The Advisory Years to nineteen sixty five
- 0:04Speaker 1: by Robert Futrell and Martin Blumensen. This is the LibriVox recording.
- 0:08Speaker 1: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
- 0:10Speaker 1: information or a volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. Recording
- 0:14Speaker 1: by Graham mc millan, San Diego, California. Chapter nine US
- 0:18Speaker 1: Command Arrangements two D A, d V, O N and
- 0:21Speaker 1: M A c V. Acceptance of the Taylor Rostau recommendations
- 0:26Speaker 1: of November third, nineteen sixty one marked a shift in
- 0:29Speaker 1: American policy from advice to limited partnership and working collaboration
- 0:33Speaker 1: with the Vietnamese. More material assistance would a company increased
- 0:37Speaker 1: participation in the war. American advisers, as friends and partners,
- 0:41Speaker 1: were to show the Vietnamese how the job might be done,
- 0:44Speaker 1: not tell them or do it for them. By November thirteenth,
- 0:49Speaker 1: using such expressions as proceed urgently and with all possible speed,
- 0:54Speaker 1: Defense Secretary McNamara had issued a host of measures. Among
- 0:58Speaker 1: them were increased airlift include dding sixteen C one T
- 1:01Speaker 1: three S for the Vietnamese Armed Forces, help with aerial reconnaissance, photography,
- 1:06Speaker 1: air ground support, and installing a tactical air control system,
- 1:11Speaker 1: small naval craft with advisers and crews to cut enemy
- 1:14Speaker 1: water borne infiltration and resupply. Training and equipment for the
- 1:18Speaker 1: Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps to free Vietnamese Army
- 1:21Speaker 1: units for offensive operations. Personnel and equipment to enhance military
- 1:26Speaker 1: political intelligence at all levels. More economic support to afford
- 1:30Speaker 1: better military pay, food and medicine, relief and rehabilitation in
- 1:35Speaker 1: the flooded areas. Individual administers and advisers for insertion into
- 1:41Speaker 1: the governmental machinery of South Vietnam in types and numbers
- 1:45Speaker 1: to be agreed upon by the two governments, And surveys
- 1:48Speaker 1: in all provinces to discover how best to deal with
- 1:51Speaker 1: the insurgency, assuming that DM would formally agree later, the
- 1:55Speaker 1: Defense Secretary instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to proceed.
- 1:59Speaker 1: McNamara personally monitored the aid program, requiring a progress report
- 2:04Speaker 1: every Monday. He wanted man and material for a tactical
- 2:07Speaker 1: air control system to go to Vietnam as soon as possible.
- 2:11Speaker 1: He wanted thirty T twenty eights rushed out to give
- 2:14Speaker 1: the Vietnamese a second fighter squadron, and he wanted more
- 2:17Speaker 1: US advisors in place. By June thirtieth, nineteen sixty two,
- 2:21Speaker 1: there would be six thousand, four hundred nineteen Americans in
- 2:24Speaker 1: South Vietnam. As McNamara informed Admiral Felt and General Magar,
- 2:30Speaker 1: political uncertainty of DM's position and doubt as to his
- 2:33Speaker 1: willingness to take steps to make his government more effective
- 2:36Speaker 1: must not prevent us from going ahead full blast without
- 2:39Speaker 1: publicity until political discussions are completed on all possible actions
- 2:43Speaker 1: short of large scale introduction of US combat forces. Fundamentally,
- 2:48Speaker 1: we must adjust ourselves to a perennially unclear political framework
- 2:52Speaker 1: and to a policy that, for overall national reasons, sets
- 2:55Speaker 1: limits on military actions. Early in Decent Member, President DM
- 3:01Speaker 1: made an affirmative but hedged response to the Kennedy program.
- 3:05Speaker 1: His memorandum distinguished between domestic and military matters and clearly
- 3:09Speaker 1: defined the latter. For example, American helicopters and naval units
- 3:14Speaker 1: were to be under exclusive US command. DM's government would
- 3:17Speaker 1: take no decisions or actions entailing combined operations quote without
- 3:21Speaker 1: full prior consultation with the qualified US agencies quote. Although
- 3:26Speaker 1: doubting that DM's reply would be fully acceptable, Ambassador Nolting
- 3:30Speaker 1: radioed the State Department I nevertheless think memorandum represents US
- 3:34Speaker 1: moving confidently ahead. The new Kennedy program dictated that the
- 3:38Speaker 1: ma AAG in Saigon be reorganized and augmented. Then it
- 3:42Speaker 1: could better help subdue the subversion and insurgency and as
- 3:46Speaker 1: en quote an advanced party unquote, command forces sent to
- 3:50Speaker 1: Vietnam to oppose aggression in Seido terms. In the latter case,
- 3:55Speaker 1: Task Force one sixteen was the ready force. Admiral Felt
- 3:58Speaker 1: had said in May nineteen six sixty one that of
- 4:01Speaker 1: large scale U S combat forces entered Vietnam, he would
- 4:04Speaker 1: name the m A A Chief as the commander United
- 4:07Speaker 1: States Forces Vietnam. This commander would function under sink pack control. Now,
- 4:14Speaker 1: there was talk of appointing a four star general to
- 4:16Speaker 1: command U S forces in Vietnam as early as November first,
- 4:20Speaker 1: the State Department was skeptical about the necessity. Secretary Rusk said, quote,
- 4:26Speaker 1: while attaching greatest possible importance to security in Southeast Asia,
- 4:30Speaker 1: I would be reluctant to see the United States to
- 4:32Speaker 1: further commit American prestige to a losing horse. Quote. Ambassador
- 4:37Speaker 1: John K. Galbraith in India pointed to d M as
- 4:40Speaker 1: quote a wasting asset unquote, who was losing not gaining
- 4:44Speaker 1: popularity the United States, he thought should refrain from putting
- 4:48Speaker 1: American ground troops into Vietnam and from over committing. On
- 4:52Speaker 1: November twenty second, the Joint Chiefs recommended to the Secretary
- 4:56Speaker 1: of Defense a new subordinate unified command under sink Pack.
- 5:00Speaker 1: It would be designated as United States Forces Vietnam and
- 5:03Speaker 1: organized in Saigon with Army, Navy, and Air Force component commands.
- 5:08Speaker 1: The commander in Vietnam was to have four stars and
- 5:11Speaker 1: be co equal with the Ambassador. He would draw together
- 5:14Speaker 1: all American military activities in the country related to counter insurgency,
- 5:18Speaker 1: including intelligence MAAG, and whatever economic assistance had military implications.
- 5:25Speaker 1: A four star commander would signal a considerable commitment of
- 5:28Speaker 1: American prestige and a major endorsement of DM's government. Consequently,
- 5:34Speaker 1: the Joint Chiefs wished, before altering the command structure, to
- 5:38Speaker 1: have the United States clearly spell out its objectives in
- 5:40Speaker 1: Vietnam and to extract a pledge for a suitable military
- 5:43Speaker 1: program from DM McNamara. Approved on November twenty seventh, the
- 5:49Speaker 1: proposed command ran counter to sink Pack contingency planning for
- 5:52Speaker 1: a possible deployment of j t F one one six.
- 5:56Speaker 1: Admiral Felt nonetheless admitted that it was justified in light
- 5:59Speaker 1: of an enlarged MAAG PACAF units deployed into Vietnam and
- 6:05Speaker 1: the arrival of Army helicopter companies. Drawing up a detailed
- 6:09Speaker 1: table of distribution, Felt suggested an Army general as the
- 6:12Speaker 1: commander and a small joint staff with USAF officers as
- 6:16Speaker 1: chief of staff, J two Intelligence and J five plans.
- 6:20Speaker 1: The new command, the sink Pack thought might well give
- 6:23Speaker 1: DM the assurance of American support that he appeared to
- 6:26Speaker 1: need before carrying out his own program. United States Army
- 6:31Speaker 1: Pacific in Hawaii favored a separate theater of operations for Vietnam,
- 6:35Speaker 1: removed from sinc Pack control, but acquiesced in quote double
- 6:39Speaker 1: hatting end quote the mag chief as commander of U
- 6:42Speaker 1: S Forces. On that basis, General Magar took operational control
- 6:46Speaker 1: of Farm Gate. Admiral Felt accepted this for Farmgate's training mission,
- 6:50Speaker 1: but PACAF pointed out that the detachment had a second
- 6:54Speaker 1: mission of combat operations. By law, maags could not command
- 6:59Speaker 1: operational force. Foreseeing widespread air activities in Vietnam and other
- 7:03Speaker 1: parts of Southeast Asia. PACAF wanted to establish an Advanced
- 7:08Speaker 1: Echelon of Thirteenth Air Force in Saigon to command USAF
- 7:12Speaker 1: units in sea. Admiral Felt agreed the MAG Chief, working
- 7:17Speaker 1: with his Air Force Section Chief, would handle farmgates training missions,
- 7:21Speaker 1: while sink Pack, through PACAF and an Advanced Echelon of
- 7:24Speaker 1: thirteenth Air Force, would take care of any combat operations.
- 7:29Speaker 1: The MAG Air Force Section Chief Commander and the commander
- 7:32Speaker 1: of the Advanced Echelon could be the same officer assigned
- 7:35Speaker 1: to MAG. He would have dual responsibilities to MAG and
- 7:38Speaker 1: to PACAF. Above all, there was to be no appearance
- 7:42Speaker 1: of a new American command moving into Vietnam to fill
- 7:46Speaker 1: the two hats. General O'Donnell of PACAF nominated Brigadier General
- 7:51Speaker 1: Rolin H. Anthis, an outstanding officer serving as Thirteenth Air
- 7:56Speaker 1: Force Vice Commander. Admiral Felt. Sink Pack approved to General
- 8:01Speaker 1: Anthis assumed command of Second Advanced Echelon ADVN and needing
- 8:06Speaker 1: personnel for the organization, took control of the four small
- 8:09Speaker 1: contemporary duty detachments seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth. Detachment seven
- 8:14Speaker 1: at Saigon became an effect second ADVON Staff On November twentieth.
- 8:19Speaker 1: Anthus settled Second Advon at the Brink Hotel in downtown Saigon,
- 8:24Speaker 1: sharing space with the mag Air Force Section. The new
- 8:27Speaker 1: commander realized after a few days that he was too
- 8:30Speaker 1: far from his operating units, whereupon he moved Second Advon
- 8:33Speaker 1: to Tan San Nut and into a building near Vietnamese
- 8:35Speaker 1: Air Force headquarters. His Vietnamese neighbors were puzzled by anthus presence.
- 8:41Speaker 1: When Ambassador Nolting first found out about Second Advon on
- 8:44Speaker 1: the twenty fourth, he was not only puzzled but surprised.
- 8:47Speaker 1: General Anthis told him that Second Advon controlled USAF operating
- 8:51Speaker 1: units in Vietnam, but not the training units. Nolting found
- 8:55Speaker 1: it incomprehensible for American authorities to form a new U
- 8:58Speaker 1: S military headquarters without consulting him and the Vietnamese government.
- 9:03Speaker 1: The Ambassador instructed the Second Advon commander to delay further
- 9:06Speaker 1: organizational activities until Nolting received clarification of the relationship of
- 9:11Speaker 1: the headquarters to the embassy. He solicited from Anthos a
- 9:15Speaker 1: precise understanding that any combat operation in Vietnam carried out
- 9:19Speaker 1: by elements of this command will be cleared in advance
- 9:22Speaker 1: with me Nolting apprized of the ambassador's reaction. Admiral Felt
- 9:27Speaker 1: advised Anthos to avoid creating a new headquarters. He was
- 9:30Speaker 1: to locate in General Magar's mag headquarters and to conduct
- 9:33Speaker 1: his advanced echelon business through Detachment seven in Saigon. After
- 9:39Speaker 1: fresh study, Felt termed Second adv o N neither a
- 9:42Speaker 1: command nor a headquarters, since its purpose was to administer
- 9:46Speaker 1: control and support units. It was simply a facility for coordination.
- 9:51Speaker 1: Nolting might have thought this a distinction without a difference,
- 9:54Speaker 1: but he learned that the DM government had no objection.
- 9:57Speaker 1: He accepted Second ad v O N as needed to
- 10:00Speaker 1: administer and control PACAF elements that might be deployed to
- 10:03Speaker 1: Southeast Asia in coordination with mag thirteenth Air Force specified
- 10:08Speaker 1: that Second ADVON execute with the Vietnamese Air Force sustained offensive, defense,
- 10:13Speaker 1: and reconnaissance air operations aimed at the destruction or neutralization
- 10:17Speaker 1: of viet Cong forces resources and communications within the borders
- 10:20Speaker 1: of South Vietnam. General anthus was to set the pattern
- 10:24Speaker 1: for Vietnamese Air Force operations. In short, he was to
- 10:28Speaker 1: act as the commander of a tactical air force. But
- 10:31Speaker 1: the peculiarly ad hoc nature of the organization led to problems.
- 10:35Speaker 1: For example, what control did unit commanders have over their
- 10:38Speaker 1: logistics support? In the standard USAF command, such questions had
- 10:42Speaker 1: been carefully worked out through the years, but for Second
- 10:46Speaker 1: Advon they needed to be rethought. Furthermore, General Anthests faced
- 10:50Speaker 1: a somewhat more complex chain of command. He reported to
- 10:53Speaker 1: sync PACK through PACAF on operational matters, but he went
- 10:57Speaker 1: direct to thirteenth Air Force on strictly USAF up operational,
- 11:00Speaker 1: logistic and administrative issues. Colonel King, the farm Gate commander,
- 11:05Speaker 1: was also confused when Second Advon's Detachment nine at Pienha
- 11:10Speaker 1: tried to make operational controls of his unit. King protested
- 11:14Speaker 1: this as inconsistent with General lee May's instructions. He understood
- 11:18Speaker 1: the Detachment nine was limited to furnishing based logistic support.
- 11:22Speaker 1: King prevailed in this matter, but proved less successful in
- 11:25Speaker 1: clarifying his own operational mission. He visited Sigon and was
- 11:29Speaker 1: unable to see General Anthus, but the Second Advon operations
- 11:33Speaker 1: officer speculated that it was highly unlikely for farm Gate
- 11:37Speaker 1: even to be cleared for daylight combat. King's officers then
- 11:40Speaker 1: borrought several aerial flares from the Vietnamese pressed a SC
- 11:43Speaker 1: forty seven into service for unimprovised flare drops, and under
- 11:47Speaker 1: the illumination made strike passes with their T twenty eighths.
- 11:51Speaker 1: Colonel King went back to Saigon and reported that his
- 11:54Speaker 1: unit could make night attacks. As King later recalled, Second
- 11:59Speaker 1: Advon despatched wach to C forty seven and some T
- 12:01Speaker 1: twenty eights on at least two night attacks later in
- 12:04Speaker 1: November against an enemy position in the jungle south of Delatt.
- 12:08Speaker 1: The T twenty eight pilots never saw an exact target
- 12:10Speaker 1: under the flarelight and merely placed their ordinance into the trees.
- 12:15Speaker 1: Flying to the aid of a fort in the Delta
- 12:16Speaker 1: under attack, The T twenty eight crews found the airstrike
- 12:19Speaker 1: request to be several days old. When they arrived on
- 12:22Speaker 1: the scene, there were no targets. Another mission in late
- 12:25Speaker 1: November responded to a report of Viet Cong intentioned to
- 12:29Speaker 1: cut the railroad between Bianhoi and Natrang. Bearing flares in
- 12:34Speaker 1: addition to their guns, four T twenty eighths reconnoitered the
- 12:38Speaker 1: rail line. They illuminated and inspected possible ambush sites, but
- 12:42Speaker 1: saw no sign of the enemy. While the departments of
- 12:45Speaker 1: State and Defense discussed organizing the American Command in Vietnam.
- 12:49Speaker 1: MAG was quote over its head in operations and intelligence
- 12:53Speaker 1: planning to the neglect of its primary duty. The training
- 12:56Speaker 1: and advisory effort authorized a strength of six hundred and
- 13:00Speaker 1: eighty five persons in May nineteen sixty one. MAG at
- 13:03Speaker 1: the end of the year had two thousand, three hundred
- 13:05Speaker 1: ninety four military assistance program spaces and five thousand, four
- 13:09Speaker 1: hundred and thirty five others. A compromise worked at by
- 13:13Speaker 1: Secretaries McNamara and Rusk in December envisioned a Military Assistants
- 13:17Speaker 1: Command Vietnam ma ACV under SINC pack roughly modeled on
- 13:22Speaker 1: the United States Taiwan Defense Command. To highlight the positive
- 13:26Speaker 1: impact of change in American policy, McNamara desired the MACV
- 13:30Speaker 1: commander to be a four star Army general. He suggested
- 13:33Speaker 1: General Paul D. Harkins to the President as quote an
- 13:37Speaker 1: imaginative officer fully qualified to fill what I considered to
- 13:41Speaker 1: be the most difficult job in the U. S. Army
- 13:46Speaker 1: Commander of the United States Army Pacific and a protege
- 13:48Speaker 1: of Generals George S. Patton Junior and Maxwell D. Taylor
- 13:52Speaker 1: Harkins was summoned to Florida in nineteen sixty two. There,
- 13:56Speaker 1: in a brief interview, President Kennedy said he was pleased
- 13:58Speaker 1: at the general's book. French told him to assist DM
- 14:02Speaker 1: and the South Vietnamese people and wished them well. With
- 14:05Speaker 1: DM's blessing, sink Pack created the new command in Zagon
- 14:09Speaker 1: on February eighth, nineteen sixty two. Harkins became commander with
- 14:13Speaker 1: a promotion to full general on the tenth PACAF designated
- 14:17Speaker 1: General anthus second Advon Commander, to be the Air Component
- 14:21Speaker 1: Commander and to further serve as thirteenth Air Force and
- 14:24Speaker 1: PACAF Air Commander for all USAF matters in Southeast Asia.
- 14:29Speaker 1: The Joint chiefs of Staff had recommended status for General
- 14:32Speaker 1: Harkins co equal with Ambassador Nolting, but the term was
- 14:36Speaker 1: absent from the MAACV mission statement. Harkins, none the less
- 14:40Speaker 1: owned broader than normal authority. He was to assist and
- 14:43Speaker 1: support the government of Vietnam in its quest for security
- 14:47Speaker 1: through defeating communist insurgency and resisting overt aggression. He was
- 14:51Speaker 1: charged with all American military policy operations and aid in
- 14:55Speaker 1: South Vietnam. On US and Vietnamese military operations, he could
- 15:00Speaker 1: go straight to President d M and other governmental leaders.
- 15:03Speaker 1: He had direct access to sink Pack and threw him
- 15:06Speaker 1: to the j c S and the Secretary of Defense.
- 15:10Speaker 1: He was to consult with the Ambassador on political affairs
- 15:12Speaker 1: and to keep him abreast of military matters. As sink
- 15:16Speaker 1: Pack's single spokesman in South Vietnam, Harkins exercised operational command
- 15:20Speaker 1: of all U S forces and military agencies assigned or
- 15:23Speaker 1: attached to m ac V, including the Military Assistants Advisory Group.
- 15:29Speaker 1: For m a c v's Joint staff, Admiral Felt had
- 15:31Speaker 1: recommended U SAF officers as chief of staff J two
- 15:35Speaker 1: Intelligence and J five plans. Even so, General Harkins picked
- 15:39Speaker 1: a Marine officer, Major General Richard G. Wead to be
- 15:42Speaker 1: his chief of staff and advocated Air Force officers for
- 15:45Speaker 1: J three operations, J two and J five. Secretary Mcnamaraw
- 15:50Speaker 1: wanted the army to have the J three billet, but
- 15:52Speaker 1: Felt believed this would unbalance the staff. He proposed upgrading
- 15:56Speaker 1: J five to a brigadier general slot and allocating it
- 15:59Speaker 1: to the Air Force, while the deputy J three would
- 16:01Speaker 1: be a USAF Colonel, General LeMay tried in vain to
- 16:05Speaker 1: persuade McNamara to change his mind on the Chief of
- 16:08Speaker 1: Staff and J three positions. The MAACV manning Authority was
- 16:12Speaker 1: approved by the Defense Secretary on March second. It gave
- 16:16Speaker 1: the Air Force none of the key operational spots and
- 16:19Speaker 1: only one of the five general officer billets J five,
- 16:22Speaker 1: filled by Brigadier General John A. Dunning. Of the one
- 16:25Speaker 1: hundred and five officers spaces, the Army got fifty four,
- 16:28Speaker 1: compared to twenty nine for the Navy and Marines and
- 16:31Speaker 1: twenty two for the Air Force. General Harkins shifted mag's
- 16:35Speaker 1: operations and intelligence functions to MAACV. He appointed Major General
- 16:40Speaker 1: Charles J. Timms USA to be MAG Chief tims Haben
- 16:43Speaker 1: mcguar's deputy. The MAG was split into Army, Navy, and
- 16:46Speaker 1: Air Force sections. Each handled military assistants, plans and programs,
- 16:51Speaker 1: training in logistic advice to the Vietnamese, and administration of
- 16:55Speaker 1: American field advisory detachments. Yet the separation of functions between
- 17:00Speaker 1: in MAACV and MAG remained fuzzy. General Harkins opposed anthusis
- 17:05Speaker 1: serving as both the MACV Air Component Commander and Chief
- 17:08Speaker 1: of the MAG Air Force Section. He suggested an Admiral
- 17:12Speaker 1: Felt directed on May twelfth, nineteen sixty two, the General
- 17:15Speaker 1: Anthes be relieved as mag Chief of Air Force Section
- 17:18Speaker 1: and replaced by the USAF colonel who was the deputy General.
- 17:24Speaker 1: LeMay saw the change as a complication for the USAF
- 17:27Speaker 1: Liaison Officers with Vietnamese Army divisions who should have been
- 17:30Speaker 1: under Anthesis command were instead assigned to the mag LeMay
- 17:34Speaker 1: also protested the proposed reduction in rank of the mag
- 17:37Speaker 1: Chief of Air Force Section. General Anthis held his two
- 17:41Speaker 1: jobs for a while longer. Felton Harkins agreed in October
- 17:44Speaker 1: to accept Brigadier General Robert R. Rowland as mag Chief
- 17:48Speaker 1: of Air Force Section. On December one, nineteen sixty two,
- 17:52Speaker 1: Roland relieved Anthus of its mag duty. Although Anthis and
- 17:56Speaker 1: Roland worked well together, some mag Air officers wondered how
- 18:00Speaker 1: how far they might go on advising and training before
- 18:02Speaker 1: entering into operational activities. Believing that he was quote responsible
- 18:07Speaker 1: for all that US military du or failed to do
- 18:10Speaker 1: it South Vietnam, General Harkins argued for full operational command
- 18:15Speaker 1: over all American military resources in the country, to include
- 18:18Speaker 1: projected covert operations. Admiral felt thought otherwise. On April twentieth,
- 18:24Speaker 1: nineteen sixty two, he placed under MACV operational command those
- 18:28Speaker 1: units having the primary mission of advising and assisting the
- 18:32Speaker 1: training of Vietnamese military and paramilitary forces. Other units were
- 18:36Speaker 1: to remain under sink Pack component commanders. General anthus deemed
- 18:40Speaker 1: this interpretation important because the Air Force was meagerly represented
- 18:44Speaker 1: on the MACV staff. The United States Army Pacific, unlike
- 18:49Speaker 1: the Air Force, elected to give MACV operational command over
- 18:53Speaker 1: the Army helicopter companies in Vietnam. Created as the MACV
- 18:57Speaker 1: Component Army Command, United States Army Support Group Vietnam furnished
- 19:03Speaker 1: administrative and logistics support to Army units in the country.
- 19:07Speaker 1: General Harkins exercised direct operational command over US Army helicopter
- 19:11Speaker 1: companies through the MAGS, senior Army adviser at each Vietnamese
- 19:15Speaker 1: court headquarters. This arrangement appeared contrary to the principle restraining
- 19:21Speaker 1: a unified commander from personally commanding a component force. Moreover,
- 19:26Speaker 1: the MAACV joint staff had to handle peculiarly army matters
- 19:30Speaker 1: that might have been more properly the work of an
- 19:32Speaker 1: Army Component Command staff. The extra workload was often cited
- 19:37Speaker 1: as a compelling reason for so many Army personnel on
- 19:39Speaker 1: the MAACV staff. Since macv's birth on February eighth, nineteen
- 19:44Speaker 1: sixty two had been publicized. Lieutenant General Thomas S. Moorman,
- 19:49Speaker 1: vice Commander in chief of PACAF, saw no reason why
- 19:52Speaker 1: the Second Advent should stay a paper organization. On February twentieth,
- 19:58Speaker 1: General Mormon asked for Federal Fault to accept a reorganization
- 20:02Speaker 1: of Second ADVON to make it a standard USAF air division.
- 20:07Speaker 1: This meaningful designation would clear up the airports organization in
- 20:10Speaker 1: Southeast Asia. Timing of the proposal was in opportune. The
- 20:15Speaker 1: International Control Commission was examining m ACV to see if
- 20:19Speaker 1: its presence in the country violated the Geneva Agreements. Under
- 20:23Speaker 1: Secretary of State George W. Ball urged the United States
- 20:26Speaker 1: to go along with the Commission and quote play the
- 20:29Speaker 1: game partly their way. In response to questions from the press,
- 20:33Speaker 1: President Kennedy insisted that no US combat forces were in Vietnam.
- 20:38Speaker 1: He did admit that training units were authorized to fire
- 20:40Speaker 1: in self protection if fired upon. Consequently, Felton Harkins considered
- 20:46Speaker 1: it impolitic to reorganize Second ADVON into an air division
- 20:50Speaker 1: at this time, doing so could be misconstrued as the
- 20:53Speaker 1: introduction of a large operational command. Visiting Vietnam in April
- 20:58Speaker 1: nineteen sixty two, May decided that something had to be
- 21:01Speaker 1: done about Second ADVON and its nondescript detachments. On some basis,
- 21:07Speaker 1: there were as many as nine separate air detachments and
- 21:10Speaker 1: no one person or organization was in charge. The Chief
- 21:14Speaker 1: of Staff called for an air division to replace Second
- 21:16Speaker 1: ADVON and for an air base structure at each major
- 21:19Speaker 1: operating location. Air Force Headquarters prepared to replace Second ADVON
- 21:24Speaker 1: with a regularly constituted unit to which other units and
- 21:27Speaker 1: personnel could be legitimately assigned. Two events hastened acceptance of
- 21:33Speaker 1: this action. When American forces were deployed to Thailand on
- 21:36Speaker 1: May fifteenth, General Harkins was additionally designated commander of the
- 21:40Speaker 1: United States Military Assistance Command Thailand, and on June second,
- 21:45Speaker 1: the International Control Commission labeled North Vietnamese activities as aggression
- 21:49Speaker 1: in the establishment of MACV as a violation. Meanwhile, the
- 21:54Speaker 1: decision had been made to reveal the USAF role in
- 21:57Speaker 1: Vietnam Speaking in Los Angeles on April twenty seventh, General
- 22:01Speaker 1: LeMay announced that the farm Gate Air Commandos had the
- 22:04Speaker 1: code name of Jungle Gym and were instructing Allied crews
- 22:08Speaker 1: in all phases of air operations. This is a realistic
- 22:11Speaker 1: training program, the Chief of Staff concluded. These people, the Vietnamese,
- 22:16Speaker 1: are at war. Our instructors occasionally accompany them on combat missions.
- 22:20Speaker 1: Our pilots are armed. They will protect themselves if fired upon.
- 22:25Speaker 1: The New York Times remarked that the Air Force, besides
- 22:28Speaker 1: stressing massive retaliation with nuclear weapons, was as much involved
- 22:32Speaker 1: in the guerrilla warfare, training and in counter insurgency as
- 22:36Speaker 1: the other armed services. Radio Hanoi broadcast that US officers
- 22:41Speaker 1: served in combat while instructing Vietnamese, adding American pilots are
- 22:46Speaker 1: often at the controls in air strikes. Radio Peking depicted
- 22:50Speaker 1: farm Gate doings with considerable precision. The reaction of the
- 22:54Speaker 1: farm Gate personnel on air Commandos as they might now
- 22:57Speaker 1: be styled, was that le May's speech legitimate their existence.
- 23:02Speaker 1: Under Secretary of State George W. Ball spoke in Detroit
- 23:05Speaker 1: on May first, stressing that no American combat forces were
- 23:09Speaker 1: in Vietnam and that the United States was neither fighting
- 23:12Speaker 1: nor running the war. The press reported farm Gates activities
- 23:15Speaker 1: as follows quote. None of these men are designated combat
- 23:19Speaker 1: troops per se, but some will be fighting just as
- 23:22Speaker 1: their counterparts are today. Sometimes an American instructor pilot has
- 23:26Speaker 1: been at the controls in a strafing pass at jungle
- 23:29Speaker 1: targets are on a bomb run. Again, Americans are also
- 23:34Speaker 1: flying on bombing and strafing missions. U S Air Force
- 23:37Speaker 1: pilots fled B twenty six bombers and T twenty eight
- 23:40Speaker 1: fighter bombers in air strikes against the Viet Cong and
- 23:43Speaker 1: in support of ground troops. Still, the Air Force was
- 23:46Speaker 1: generally hidden behind the name farm Gate, even though newspapers
- 23:49Speaker 1: covered Army and marine helicopter operations and the work of
- 23:52Speaker 1: the special forces. If the air commandos and the USAF
- 23:57Speaker 1: echelons above them were denied the recognition they win, there
- 24:01Speaker 1: was nonetheless a movement towards the conventional. On May twentieth,
- 24:05Speaker 1: PACAF suggested and Air Force Headquarters later approved, redesignating the
- 24:10Speaker 1: supporting detachments in South Vietnam. The sixty two, twentieth, sixty two,
- 24:15Speaker 1: twenty first, sixty two, twenty second, and sixty two twenty
- 24:18Speaker 1: third Air Base squadrons were formed respectively at Tan salm Nut, Bienhoi, Danang,
- 24:24Speaker 1: and Natrang. All four units were assigned to Second ADVON
- 24:28Speaker 1: on June seventh. Detachment seven became Headquarters Second Advanced echelon
- 24:33Speaker 1: thirteenth Air Force and Detachment ten became Headquarters six oh
- 24:38Speaker 1: one zero. Tactical Group. Converting Second ADVON to an Air
- 24:41Speaker 1: Division was eased on July nineteenth when Ambassador Nolton no
- 24:45Speaker 1: longer opposed the redesignation if it could be done without publicity.
- 24:49Speaker 1: With the discontinuance of Headquarters Second ADVON on October eighth,
- 24:53Speaker 1: the Second Air Division was organized at Tanson Nut under
- 24:56Speaker 1: General Anthus and assigned to thirteenth Air Force. This regularization
- 25:02Speaker 1: of U S a F unit organization indicated a movement
- 25:05Speaker 1: away from counterinsurgency concepts and toward the conventional General Anthis
- 25:11Speaker 1: served as the Air component commander both in South Vietnam
- 25:13Speaker 1: and Thailand under General Harkins. As commander of m A
- 25:16Speaker 1: C V and of Military Assistance Command Thailand. Anthos was
- 25:22Speaker 1: also responsible for U S Air insurgency in Vietnam. P
- 25:26Speaker 1: A C a F saw that Second Air Division a
- 25:28Speaker 1: forward edgelon of Thirteenth Air Force and a operating headquarters
- 25:32Speaker 1: in a forward area could not do air planning for
- 25:35Speaker 1: Southeast Asia as a whole. Since Thirteenth Air Force and
- 25:39Speaker 1: p A c A F afforded administrative and logistic support
- 25:42Speaker 1: for air activities and plans, the m A c V staff,
- 25:46Speaker 1: though composed chiefly of army officers, became the air planning agency.
- 25:51Speaker 1: Although Thirteenth therefore sent temporary duty officers to augment Second
- 25:54Speaker 1: Air Division planning, the command arrangement was awkward and hindered
- 25:58Speaker 1: air actions. Generals LeMay and O'Donnell wanted the ma A
- 26:03Speaker 1: c V commander to have more and closer day to
- 26:05Speaker 1: day associations with senior U SAF officers. During his visit
- 26:10Speaker 1: to Sigon in April nineteen sixty two, le May had
- 26:12Speaker 1: tried to persuade General Harkins to put more Air Force
- 26:15Speaker 1: officers on them A c V staff. Harkins was unsympathetic,
- 26:19Speaker 1: but agreed to consider it if Anthus or Dunning could
- 26:22Speaker 1: make it a convincing case. Upon returning to Washington, the
- 26:26Speaker 1: Chief of Staff was critical of the ma A c
- 26:28Speaker 1: V commander, believing air activities to be depreciated in South
- 26:32Speaker 1: Vietnam rather than appreciated. At a JCS meeting attended by
- 26:36Speaker 1: Defense Secretary McNamara, General le May charged that air planning
- 26:40Speaker 1: was often omitted from field operations, and that General Anthos
- 26:44Speaker 1: had difficulty seeing General Harkins, and that neither Harkins nor
- 26:47Speaker 1: his chief of staff, General Wead, understood air operations. Asked
- 26:52Speaker 1: to comment, anthus said he had direct access to General
- 26:56Speaker 1: Harkins and had never been reluctant to give his views.
- 26:59Speaker 1: Admiral the Lt. Sink Pack confirmed Anthusi's ability to speak
- 27:03Speaker 1: with the MAACV commander at any time. He further certified
- 27:07Speaker 1: that Harkins and Weed were superior officers and fully experienced
- 27:11Speaker 1: in air ground tactics. Harkins was angered by what he
- 27:14Speaker 1: described as General a Maze preferring charges against him in Washington.
- 27:18Speaker 1: He explained that the Air Force chief seemed to be
- 27:21Speaker 1: thinking of command and control of large numbers of aircraft
- 27:24Speaker 1: as in World War II, whereas there were essentially limited
- 27:27Speaker 1: tactical opportunities for relatively few USAF aircraft in Vietnam throughout
- 27:34Speaker 1: nineteen sixty two. The MAACV staff deficiencies were clear to
- 27:37Speaker 1: Air Force officers who sought to unite air and ground
- 27:40Speaker 1: power in utmost cooperation against the insurgency, But the defects
- 27:45Speaker 1: were scarcely understood by those believed that counterinsurgency was chiefly
- 27:49Speaker 1: an army emission and that USAF contributions could be but secondary.
- 27:53Speaker 1: Secretary McNamara, for one, argued that the army must be
- 27:57Speaker 1: in the driver's seat. If you have two or three
- 27:59Speaker 1: men engaged in an operation, he explained, one has to
- 28:03Speaker 1: be primary. The army has to be primary in land war.
- 28:07Speaker 1: The Air Force is there to serve the army in
- 28:09Speaker 1: the airlift and the close support role in the Air
- 28:11Speaker 1: Force must tailor its activities to the army. As sink
- 28:16Speaker 1: Pack divorced PACAF from operational considerations and confined its authority
- 28:21Speaker 1: to logistic support of Second Advon and of late to
- 28:24Speaker 1: the Second Air Division. General anthus found it hard to
- 28:28Speaker 1: secure a prompt hearing at MAACV for his proposals. He
- 28:32Speaker 1: discovered that several of his written communications were slow to
- 28:35Speaker 1: reach General Harkins. The MACV commander's duties often took him
- 28:39Speaker 1: from Saigon, and its staff carried on much of the
- 28:42Speaker 1: business of command. Harkins followed Army practice in using his
- 28:46Speaker 1: J three operations for daily operational planning, hence his J
- 28:51Speaker 1: five Plans. General Dunning was frequently outside the routine MAACV activity,
- 28:56Speaker 1: especially since the J five Division was situated in another
- 29:00Speaker 1: part of Saigon, away from the major m ACV staff offices.
- 29:05Speaker 1: End of chapter nine recording by Graham McMillan, San Diego, California,