Latest / Behind the Bastards / How The Winklevoss Twins Lost A Billion Dollars
Transcript
- 0:02Speaker 1: All Zone Media.
- 0:05Speaker 2: Hello and welcome to Better Offline. I'm your host ed Zetron.
- 0:09Speaker 2: This is a weekly tech show where I walk you
- 0:11Speaker 2: through the good, the bad, and the stupid of a
- 0:14Speaker 2: multi trillion dollar industry that's changed and monetized almost every
- 0:18Speaker 2: part of our lives. So you're likely aware of the
- 0:32Speaker 2: tale of Sam Bankman Free, the curly haired fraudster who
- 0:35Speaker 2: conned millions of people out of billions of dollars, crushing
- 0:38Speaker 2: the cryptocurrency markets in the process. He did so by
- 0:41Speaker 2: creating a cryptocurrency exchange called ftx, where people could buy
- 0:45Speaker 2: things like bitcoin and ethereum, except it had one little catch.
- 0:49Speaker 2: He was stealing the customer funds, keeping only a little
- 0:52Speaker 2: around at any given time for people to withdraw. This
- 0:55Speaker 2: meant that when hundreds of thousands of people went to
- 0:58Speaker 2: withdraw their funds at once, the entire scheme fell apart
- 1:01Speaker 2: and FTX collapsed. Bankman Fried currently sits in prison awaiting
- 1:05Speaker 2: sentencing after being convicted and several counts of fraud, including
- 1:09Speaker 2: wirefraud and wirefraud conspiracy, which is appropriate as him and
- 1:12Speaker 2: his co conspirators at one point genuinely used their group
- 1:16Speaker 2: called wirefraud Chat and I am not kidding yet. This
- 1:20Speaker 2: isn't about SBF. There are actually two other villains in
- 1:24Speaker 2: this story, two villains of the recent crypto crash that
- 1:28Speaker 2: you might have missed, despite the fact that they're both
- 1:30Speaker 2: six foot five and lost their customers over a billion dollars.
- 1:36Speaker 2: I'm talking about Cameron and Tyler Winklevoss, two brothers, both
- 1:40Speaker 2: alike in dignity and appearance, the gay notoriety by suing
- 1:44Speaker 2: Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook now known as Metta in the
- 1:47Speaker 2: early days of the social network back in two thousand
- 1:49Speaker 2: and four. In the Winklevi's defense, Zuckerberg dig screw them
- 1:54Speaker 2: as a student at Harvard, where he pretended to work
- 1:57Speaker 2: on the Winklevoss's social network, Harvard Connect while actually working
- 2:00Speaker 2: on the earliest version of Facebook, effectively sabotaging the competition
- 2:04Speaker 2: from within. When Facebook finally launched the identical Moist, Riverboat
- 2:09Speaker 2: Giants alleged that Zuckerberg had stolen their idea for a
- 2:12Speaker 2: social network and used their code, resulting in a year's
- 2:15Speaker 2: long back and forth and a sixty five million dollar
- 2:18Speaker 2: settlement that the Winklevosses were forced by a court to accept.
- 2:21Speaker 2: In twenty eleven, I think the had Zuckerberg kept his
- 2:24Speaker 2: filthy little hands to himself, we'd likely never have heard
- 2:27Speaker 2: of Tyler and Cameron Winkelvoss, and I believe the world
- 2:31Speaker 2: would have been a better place if they weren't already.
- 2:34Speaker 2: The Winklevoss twins were now millionaires. In twenty ten, Aaron
- 2:38Speaker 2: Sorkin's Oscar nominated retelling of the Facebook origin story the
- 2:42Speaker 2: social network would raise their profiles even further, portraying them
- 2:45Speaker 2: as victims of a calculated, misanthropic opportunist, Mark Zuckerberg. Of course,
- 2:51Speaker 2: you could almost feel sorry for them, even if they
- 2:53Speaker 2: were portrayed by Armie Hammer, the famous cannibalism fan and
- 2:58Speaker 2: potentially perverted in enjoyer of other things too. But you
- 3:03Speaker 2: really shouldn't feel sorry for Army Hammer. But you definitely
- 3:06Speaker 2: shouldn't for the Winklevosses either. In the years following their
- 3:10Speaker 2: legal dust up with Mark Zuckerberg, the Winklevoss twins remained
- 3:13Speaker 2: active in the tech scene, launching an investment fund in
- 3:16Speaker 2: twenty twelve that focused on early stage, consumer centric startups.
- 3:20Speaker 2: A year later, they acquired eleven million dollars of bitcoin,
- 3:23Speaker 2: and while it's unclear exactly how much they bought. A
- 3:25Speaker 2: New York Times article about their acquisition, which of course
- 3:28Speaker 2: featured no verification of that actual purchase, ran on April eleventh,
- 3:32Speaker 2: twenty thirteen, when bitcoin was around one hundred and fourteen
- 3:35Speaker 2: dollars apiece, meaning that the Winklevoss brothers likely bought somewhere
- 3:39Speaker 2: in the region of ninety thousand bitcoin. Based on today's valuation,
- 3:43Speaker 2: those holdings would be worth an excess of three point
- 3:46Speaker 2: eight billion dollars. It was a big, stupid bet, and
- 3:51Speaker 2: it absolutely paid off. In the same year, they'd pursue
- 3:54Speaker 2: creating a bitcoin exchange traded fund also known as an ETF,
- 3:59Speaker 2: a thing that allows you to invest in something, in
- 4:01Speaker 2: this case bitcoin, much like you would trading a stock,
- 4:04Speaker 2: without all of the complexity and risk associated with actually
- 4:07Speaker 2: owning the thing in question, in this case bitcoin. While
- 4:11Speaker 2: this never materialized, the winklevoss Is cozied up with New
- 4:14Speaker 2: York's Department of Financial Services and realized they could found
- 4:17Speaker 2: their own cryptocurrency exchange to rival the other American rival, Coinbased,
- 4:22Speaker 2: which had launched two years earlier. A cryptocurrency exchange, as
- 4:26Speaker 2: I've discussed, is a place where you can buy and
- 4:28Speaker 2: sell your crypto using generally a credit card or a
- 4:31Speaker 2: debit card. At the time very focused on debit cards,
- 4:34Speaker 2: though in twenty fifteen they launched Gemini, what would eventually
- 4:38Speaker 2: become a major and highly respected cryptocurrency exchange that from
- 4:42Speaker 2: the very beginning tried to swaddle its ugly and often
- 4:45Speaker 2: fraudulent industry in a blanket of legitimacy, winning approval from
- 4:48Speaker 2: New York state regulators to provide certain financial services. Gemini
- 4:53Speaker 2: now sits as one of the top ten largest cryptocurrency
- 4:56Speaker 2: exchanges in the world and one of the few remaining
- 4:59Speaker 2: American exchange. One might be forgiven for thinking they were trustworthy,
- 5:04Speaker 2: and they'd be wrong. Toward the end of twenty twenty,
- 5:07Speaker 2: the price of cryptocurrencies began to climb rapidly, with bitcoin
- 5:11Speaker 2: climbing from nineteen thousand dollars in December to over forty
- 5:14Speaker 2: thousand dollars in January, cresting over fifty thousand dollars a
- 5:17Speaker 2: bitcoin by March twenty twenty one. The cryptocurrency industry would
- 5:21Speaker 2: see more venture investment in the first quarter of twenty
- 5:24Speaker 2: twenty one than it had in the entirety of twenty twenty,
- 5:28Speaker 2: with one hundred and twenty nine crypto and blockchain startups
- 5:30Speaker 2: receiving two point six billion dollars in the space of
- 5:33Speaker 2: three months, compared to three hundred and forty one cryptocurrencies
- 5:37Speaker 2: receiving two point three billion in the entirety of twenty twenty.
- 5:41Speaker 2: As an explanation for those listeners that don't know, venture
- 5:45Speaker 2: capital investments are generally investing inequacy in the companies. They
- 5:49Speaker 2: buy a piece of the company for a certain amount
- 5:51Speaker 2: of money, venture capitalists, of course, taking the risk that
- 5:54Speaker 2: the company will fall apart. What differs with a lot
- 5:57Speaker 2: of these companies is that they will sometimes sell you
- 5:59Speaker 2: a token. This isn't necessarily relevant for this story. I
- 6:03Speaker 2: just want you to know the fact that this industry
- 6:05Speaker 2: at its core is based on the idea of basically
- 6:09Speaker 2: selling securities, you know, like stocks, but hiding from the
- 6:14Speaker 2: law and conning people. That's not how the Winklevosses fucked
- 6:18Speaker 2: people over, though, no. So another thing to realize about
- 6:23Speaker 2: these crypto companies is that they didn't really do anything.
- 6:26Speaker 2: They'd sell tokens. They would claim that they would build
- 6:28Speaker 2: something in the future on something called a roadmap. They
- 6:31Speaker 2: would sometimes have a white paper which would describe some
- 6:34Speaker 2: underlying technological stuff. But there are really none of them
- 6:37Speaker 2: that had a feature or a function. They were mostly
- 6:41Speaker 2: just nonentities that promise things. But because you could trade
- 6:46Speaker 2: their tokens, which much like a stock, should have been
- 6:50Speaker 2: regulated by the government, but were not because they were
- 6:53Speaker 2: such new financial devices and objects. Well, this whole market
- 6:58Speaker 2: was growing and growing and growing, and along with it,
- 7:02Speaker 2: the Winklevosses were getting even richer. Then they got greedy.
- 7:07Speaker 2: To understand how the Winklevosses bungled a billion dollars, I
- 7:10Speaker 2: have to give you a little bit of background on
- 7:12Speaker 2: the last few years of hell in the cryptocurrency industry.
- 7:16Speaker 2: In February twenty twenty one, Gemini, that's their cryptocurrency exchange
- 7:19Speaker 2: where you could buy and sell different cryptocurrency began something
- 7:23Speaker 2: called Earn, their Earn program. It was an interest earning
- 7:27Speaker 2: program where users could feed their cryptocurrency like Bitcoin, for example,
- 7:32Speaker 2: into Gemini through a few clicks and earn interest. And
- 7:36Speaker 2: you should put quotation marks around those so you would
- 7:38Speaker 2: get a percentage return on the crypto that you put
- 7:42Speaker 2: into Gemini Earn. One might be forgiven for believing that
- 7:46Speaker 2: as a result, they were putting money into some sort
- 7:48Speaker 2: of secure protected account like a certificate of deposit. They
- 7:51Speaker 2: really were not, I must be clear, how not like
- 7:55Speaker 2: a bank. This was Gemini, a New York based trust
- 7:58Speaker 2: company that promised to security protocols on par with those
- 8:02Speaker 2: offered by top financial institutions. Claimed to generate this interest
- 8:06Speaker 2: by working with and I quote institutional borrowers who were
- 8:10Speaker 2: partners who had been vetted through Gemini's and I quote
- 8:13Speaker 2: again risk management framework. What's also important to know is
- 8:17Speaker 2: that none of what you're about to hear was the
- 8:19Speaker 2: security issue. It was entirely the result of two greedy
- 8:23Speaker 2: riverboat giants pissing away money because they were greedy little pigs.
- 8:28Speaker 2: And as a result of trusting this company that was
- 8:31Speaker 2: a trust company, a New York based trust company, a
- 8:34Speaker 2: regulated one allegedly, but not regulated for the thing that
- 8:37Speaker 2: I'm about to tell you, people trusted them, and as
- 8:40Speaker 2: a result, customers deposited somewhere between seven hundred million and
- 8:45Speaker 2: a billion dollars of funds into Gemini Earn, believing that
- 8:48Speaker 2: Gemini was offering something akin to an interest generating savings account.
- 8:52Speaker 2: After all, Gemini had institutional partners, and that is plural.
- 8:56Speaker 2: That's what they said and they had vetted said partners
- 8:59Speaker 2: through their collateralization management process, which means, in the case
- 9:03Speaker 2: of a loan, you collateralize the loan, you give them something.
- 9:06Speaker 2: For example, you would collateralize the loan for a house
- 9:09Speaker 2: by giving them a down payment of twenty percent. In
- 9:11Speaker 2: the case of a loan, you might borrow a certain
- 9:14Speaker 2: amount of money, but put some money down so they
- 9:16Speaker 2: have something in the event that you default on the loan.
- 9:20Speaker 2: In plain English, they were claiming to work with institutional
- 9:23Speaker 2: investors like banks and hedge funds that would pull Gemini
- 9:27Speaker 2: earn customers, so people giving them their Bitcoin ethereum and
- 9:30Speaker 2: all that they would pull those resources to allow them
- 9:33Speaker 2: to get involved in big trades with better returns than
- 9:36Speaker 2: users will be able to get on their own. Indeed,
- 9:39Speaker 2: classical financial markets have larger loans that have preferential rates
- 9:43Speaker 2: and get involved in deals that the regular customer would
- 9:46Speaker 2: not be able to. That's what people thought they were getting.
- 9:50Speaker 2: The other suggestion was that Gemini had diversified its risk
- 9:53Speaker 2: and there's actually an archived version of the Gemini earned
- 9:56Speaker 2: Patron twenty twenty one that said that Gemini worked with
- 9:58Speaker 2: multiple accredited party borrowers to do so. As a result,
- 10:03Speaker 2: as a customer, you may believe, well, if one fails,
- 10:06Speaker 2: that won't be the end of the world. Right. It's
- 10:11Speaker 2: also important explaining that the way that a lot of
- 10:13Speaker 2: these companies in crypto made their money was by loaning
- 10:16Speaker 2: it to others in the form of margin trading, where investors,
- 10:20Speaker 2: both retail and institutional, borrowed a massive amount of cryptocurrency
- 10:24Speaker 2: in returned for collateral which was usually less than the
- 10:27Speaker 2: amount they were borrowing. As I mentioned, kind of like
- 10:29Speaker 2: putting a damn payment for a house, except the asset
- 10:32Speaker 2: is a token on a blockchain like bitcoin. In fact,
- 10:37Speaker 2: as you'll find out, most of the cryptocurrency industry was
- 10:41Speaker 2: held up by these loans. Now, all of this supposedly
- 10:46Speaker 2: legal and cool and normal stuff. All this sounded very trustworthy.
- 10:51Speaker 2: This was, of course not the case. Neither was it
- 10:54Speaker 2: the case that Gemini had diversified their investments at all,
- 10:58Speaker 2: or actually really any risk management of any kind. Although
- 11:02Speaker 2: Gemini had the outward appearance of being a highly diversified,
- 11:05Speaker 2: sophisticated and well run financial services business, it actually wasn't.
- 11:10Speaker 2: They placed the vast majority of their eggs in one
- 11:13Speaker 2: single basket, and that was a cryptocurrency brokerage called Genesis.
- 11:21Speaker 2: Genesis provided a variety of cryptocurrency related services for large
- 11:25Speaker 2: institutional investors and high net worth individuals. Their money was
- 11:29Speaker 2: made by offering these institutions and individuals loans leveraged by
- 11:33Speaker 2: their cryptocurrency, which Genesis would in turn invest, theoretically profiting
- 11:38Speaker 2: in the process through their access to large deals. As
- 11:41Speaker 2: I previously mentioned, when I say leverage, I mean the
- 11:45Speaker 2: very simple thing of I give you some money and
- 11:48Speaker 2: then you lend me money in return, and there is
- 11:52Speaker 2: usually some sort of interest deal, or there is some
- 11:54Speaker 2: way where both parties benefit. Sometimes it will be that
- 11:57Speaker 2: they are borrowing an asset like bitcoin. The price can change,
- 12:01Speaker 2: then the collateral they give maybe an excess of the
- 12:04Speaker 2: amount they're borrowing in dollars, but the price of bitcoin
- 12:07Speaker 2: may go down. Thus, as a result, if I loaned
- 12:09Speaker 2: somebody a billion dollars a bitcoin, but the price of
- 12:12Speaker 2: bitcoin went down and they gave me, I don't know,
- 12:14Speaker 2: one point something billion in return, They're gambling the idea
- 12:18Speaker 2: that bitcoin will go up from there, and I'm gambling
- 12:21Speaker 2: that it will go down, and I would have made
- 12:22Speaker 2: money on that loan. This is a messy stupid assholes
- 12:25Speaker 2: industry one built on sand and you're about to find
- 12:29Speaker 2: out how badly it can go. So Genesis was also
- 12:34Speaker 2: part of a huge empire called the Digital Currency Group,
- 12:37Speaker 2: a holding company for multiple different parts of the cryptocurrency ecosystem,
- 12:41Speaker 2: including cryptocurrency news outlet coin Desk, which ironically was a
- 12:46Speaker 2: large part of the reason that Sam Bankman Freed has
- 12:49Speaker 2: gone to prison. I could do an entire episode on
- 12:52Speaker 2: this company, but all you really need to know is
- 12:54Speaker 2: that they own Genesis, and while Genesis was meant to
- 12:57Speaker 2: be independent, it absolutely was not. And what's really important
- 13:01Speaker 2: to know is how stupidly Genesis was run. They weren't
- 13:04Speaker 2: simply bad at investing. They were so bad at investing
- 13:08Speaker 2: that they somehow managed to invest in not one, but
- 13:11Speaker 2: two of the entities that brought down the entire cryptocurrency
- 13:15Speaker 2: industry in twenty twenty two. Their first mistake was investing
- 13:19Speaker 2: two point four billion dollars in Three Arrows Capital, a
- 13:23Speaker 2: major cryptocurrency hedge fund that ended up being a significant
- 13:26Speaker 2: scam that also led to the collapse of FTX, the
- 13:29Speaker 2: other entity that Genesis had trusted with its capital, and
- 13:33Speaker 2: again that's the subject of another episode. Three Arrows Capital
- 13:37Speaker 2: was a Singapore based cryptocurrency hedge fund with over a
- 13:40Speaker 2: decade worth of history. Run by two guys. It started
- 13:44Speaker 2: life in arbitrage, essentially making money on the differences in
- 13:47Speaker 2: prices of products in two separate locations, with a niche
- 13:50Speaker 2: in smaller traditional currencies like the ty bart and the
- 13:53Speaker 2: Indonesian Rupia. This business model often relied on a healthy
- 13:57Speaker 2: relationship with legacy banks. We had some success on that front.
- 14:01Speaker 2: It's relationship soured in twenty seventeen, forcing the company to
- 14:04Speaker 2: pivot to the wild West of cryptocurrency. It started investing
- 14:07Speaker 2: its client's money in early stage crypto projects, hoping for
- 14:10Speaker 2: a big return when their values went up. One of
- 14:13Speaker 2: these projects was terror Lunar, an algorithmic stable coin which,
- 14:17Speaker 2: in plain English is meant to be a cocoon on
- 14:20Speaker 2: the Ethereum blockchain that is always related to the price
- 14:23Speaker 2: of a dollar, except in this case. You may have
- 14:26Speaker 2: heard that word algorithmic. You know what The problem with
- 14:30Speaker 2: algorithms is they need to be perfect in they almost
- 14:33Speaker 2: never are. But this bit kind of requires some explanation,
- 14:39Speaker 2: so bear with me. Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum, they're
- 14:43Speaker 2: wildly volatile, which is bad if you want to actually
- 14:46Speaker 2: transact with them. If a currency could be twenty five
- 14:48Speaker 2: percent more or less the next day, how do you
- 14:52Speaker 2: actually know what to charge for something? And that's where
- 14:54Speaker 2: stable coins come in. These are cryptocurrencies that aim to
- 14:58Speaker 2: fix their value to that of a traditional fiat currency
- 15:02Speaker 2: like the US dollar or the Euro. Most stable coins have,
- 15:06Speaker 2: or say they have, at least a cash reserve equivalent
- 15:10Speaker 2: to the amount of tokens in circulation. Terror Lunar differed
- 15:13Speaker 2: using an algorithm to maintain price parity rather than any reserves.
- 15:18Speaker 2: The algorithm worked until it suddenly and violently did not.
- 15:22Speaker 2: On May third, twenty twenty two, a Terror stable coin
- 15:26Speaker 2: was worth one dollar. A few days later, it was
- 15:29Speaker 2: worth a fraction of a penny. The Bearre offline theme
- 15:43Speaker 2: song by Mattasowski will be dropping this Friday, March first,
- 15:46Speaker 2: on all streaming platforms. You can find the Spotify presab
- 15:50Speaker 2: link in the episode notes. Terr Luna collapsed in May
- 16:11Speaker 2: twenty twenty two with the loss of forty five billion
- 16:14Speaker 2: dollars in market capitalization, meaning the total value of all
- 16:19Speaker 2: of the tokens on the blockchain. Three arrows capital's entire
- 16:23Speaker 2: five hundred million dollar position in Lunar was now effectively worthless.
- 16:29Speaker 2: This collapse also shaved off and estimated one trillion dollar
- 16:33Speaker 2: value from the wider crypto market. Three Arrows Capital, the
- 16:37Speaker 2: so called hedge fund to quote research firm fs insight,
- 16:42Speaker 2: was an old fashioned, made off style Ponzi scheme where
- 16:45Speaker 2: founders Suzo and Carl Davis would use client funds to
- 16:48Speaker 2: borrow from basically anywhere that would let them in the
- 16:51Speaker 2: entire crypto ecosystem. And because Three Arrows didn't bother collateralizing
- 16:55Speaker 2: these loans sufficiently or managing the risk behind them, there
- 16:58Speaker 2: was very little money to turn to customers. The failure
- 17:03Speaker 2: of Three Arrows Capital left a multi billion dollar hole
- 17:06Speaker 2: in Genesis balance sheet that if paypered over with a
- 17:10Speaker 2: one point one billion dollar promissory note from its holding company,
- 17:13Speaker 2: Digital Currency Group that was due in twenty thirty two.
- 17:18Speaker 2: This sounds like it would be helpful, right. The problem
- 17:22Speaker 2: is this maneuver never appeared to involve the conveyance of
- 17:25Speaker 2: any actual money. It pretty much existed only to pretend
- 17:28Speaker 2: that Genesis had another one point one billion dollars on
- 17:31Speaker 2: the books. To be abundantly clear, no money actually ever
- 17:35Speaker 2: got sent to anybody. This promissory note only existed to
- 17:39Speaker 2: mislead creditors about the financial health of Genesis. As you
- 17:42Speaker 2: can understand, those creditors would probably want to know, well, okay,
- 17:46Speaker 2: do you have enough money in case we need our
- 17:49Speaker 2: money back? Little bit of a spoiler for you, they didn't.
- 17:53Speaker 2: The Terror Lunar and Three Arrows capital fiasco trash the
- 17:56Speaker 2: value of cryptocurrencies, with Bitcoin dropping from around thirty thousand
- 18:00Speaker 2: in mad twenty twenty two to less than twenty grand
- 18:02Speaker 2: in October. And in November twenty twenty two, ftx collapsed
- 18:06Speaker 2: as a result of the coin Desk article, again owned
- 18:09Speaker 2: by DCG, that revealed that most of ftx's assets were
- 18:12Speaker 2: held in FTT, a token that they owned the majority
- 18:15Speaker 2: of and could never sell because doing so would crash
- 18:17Speaker 2: the FTT market, making said asset worthless. Indeed, in cryptocurrency,
- 18:22Speaker 2: this is a big problem. If you have a big
- 18:25Speaker 2: market and say there's twenty billion dollars of a token
- 18:28Speaker 2: out there, but one person owns a billion of it,
- 18:30Speaker 2: they actually can't sell it because in doing so, the
- 18:34Speaker 2: market would suddenly think, oh, this is worthless because someone
- 18:36Speaker 2: wants to dump him. The results of this revelation that
- 18:40Speaker 2: FTX was holding most of the world's FTT and thus
- 18:44Speaker 2: could never sell it, and indeed that in the process
- 18:46Speaker 2: made their company pretty much insolvent. This left both retail
- 18:50Speaker 2: investors and institutional investors out to dry. Now eager ide
- 18:56Speaker 2: and eager eared listeners may have probably guessed by this
- 18:58Speaker 2: point that Genesis was inexhoribly entangled in this disaster, quickly
- 19:04Speaker 2: going from saying that they had no material exposure to
- 19:07Speaker 2: FDx on November eight, twenty twenty two, to then saying
- 19:10Speaker 2: they had seven million dollars of exposure on November tenth,
- 19:13Speaker 2: to saying that they had one hundred and seventy five
- 19:15Speaker 2: million dollars in exposure a day later, to saying that
- 19:18Speaker 2: they needed to freeze all customer withdrawals and new loans
- 19:21Speaker 2: entirely and that they would likely be going bankrupt, which
- 19:24Speaker 2: they said on November eighteenth, twenty twenty two. They entered
- 19:28Speaker 2: Chapter eleven bankruptcy. In the early twenty twenty three. The
- 19:31Speaker 2: Digital Currency Group, which of course owns Genesis, had also
- 19:34Speaker 2: borrowed five hundred and seventy five million dollars from them,
- 19:37Speaker 2: which has since led to the hilarious situation of Genesis,
- 19:40Speaker 2: suing the company that owns it as part of its
- 19:42Speaker 2: own bankruptcy proceedings. This is the company that the Wingovoss
- 19:47Speaker 2: twins and Gemini their cryptocurrency exchange, had allegedly run through
- 19:51Speaker 2: their risk management framework and despite allegedly reviewing the collateralization
- 19:56Speaker 2: management process that Genesis underwent, which means how they lateralized
- 20:00Speaker 2: the loans, what money they took in to make sure
- 20:02Speaker 2: that the loans did not just fall apart if something
- 20:04Speaker 2: bad happened. Well, Gemini hadn't diversified their investments at all.
- 20:10Speaker 2: They put over a billion dollars of customer funds into Genesis,
- 20:13Speaker 2: money which is most likely gone now. In many respects,
- 20:18Speaker 2: Gemini was the cryptocurrency equivalent of Green Seal Capital, a
- 20:22Speaker 2: company that at one point was the highest profile lender
- 20:24Speaker 2: in the supply chain financing space, touting former British Prime
- 20:28Speaker 2: Minister David Cameron as one of its advisors. Like Gemini,
- 20:31Speaker 2: green Seal Capital pretended to be a diversified business, when
- 20:34Speaker 2: in reality it borrowed money from large institutional investors to
- 20:37Speaker 2: lend to a handful of companies. The circumstances behind its
- 20:41Speaker 2: collapse are slightly more complicated than those of Genesis, but
- 20:43Speaker 2: not by much. Green Sill's implosion in twenty twenty one
- 20:46Speaker 2: rippled throughout the industry, contributing to the demise of the
- 20:49Speaker 2: already troubled credit sueese which were acquired really they were
- 20:53Speaker 2: rescued by UBS in early twenty twenty three for the
- 20:56Speaker 2: bargain price of just three point twenty five million dollars.
- 21:00Speaker 2: Since November twenty twenty two, when Gemini froze, withdrawals from
- 21:03Speaker 2: Gemini earned the interest bearing account, the Winklevosses and Barry Silbert,
- 21:08Speaker 2: CEO of Digital Currency Group, who, as I've mentioned, are
- 21:10Speaker 2: technical owners of Genesis, have engaged in an embarrassing back
- 21:15Speaker 2: and forth publicly on Twitter, where the Winklevosses have attempted
- 21:18Speaker 2: to frame themselves as victims of a scam rather than
- 21:21Speaker 2: bad actors acting badly. If they were remotely competent, they
- 21:26Speaker 2: could have yanked their customers' funds the ones loaned to
- 21:29Speaker 2: Genesis from the Gemini ern program. When it was revealed
- 21:32Speaker 2: that Genesis loaned two point four billion dollars for three
- 21:35Speaker 2: hourrows capital in July of twenty twenty two, call it
- 21:39Speaker 2: what you want. Prudent's diligence or just risk management, but
- 21:42Speaker 2: it would have been the sensible thing to do, unless,
- 21:45Speaker 2: of course, they didn't believe they'd be able to get
- 21:47Speaker 2: the money out. On October nineteenth, twenty twenty three, New
- 21:52Speaker 2: York Attorney General Letitia James filed a massive fraud suit
- 21:55Speaker 2: against Gemini, Genesis Global Capital, and Digital Currency Group, ring
- 22:00Speaker 2: a conspiracy to mislead customers and cover up of rebillion
- 22:04Speaker 2: dollars of losses. The Attorney General's office found that the
- 22:07Speaker 2: twin brothers named Cameron and Tyler Winklevoss had misled investors
- 22:11Speaker 2: about the risks associated with Genesis, and that Genesis not
- 22:15Speaker 2: only failed to disclose its losses, but took steps to
- 22:19Speaker 2: actively hide them from their clients and the public. The
- 22:23Speaker 2: New York Attorney General's suit is damning and shows that
- 22:26Speaker 2: Gemini was well aware of the rotten condition of Genesis
- 22:29Speaker 2: from the launch of the program in twenty twenty one.
- 22:32Speaker 2: With Gemini and I quote the Attorney General suit here
- 22:37Speaker 2: their internal risk analysis showing that Genesis Capital's loan book
- 22:41Speaker 2: was undercollateralized, which means that they did not have enough
- 22:45Speaker 2: money to give back the money that they owed to
- 22:48Speaker 2: their customers and that only a year into the program,
- 22:52Speaker 2: Gemini revised its estimate of Genesis Capital's credit rating, which
- 22:56Speaker 2: is the way in which you measure whether a creditor
- 22:58Speaker 2: or someone who is borrowed or loaning money whether they're
- 23:02Speaker 2: worthy of doing so. They provised its testiment of their
- 23:05Speaker 2: credit rating from an investment grade of BBB to a
- 23:08Speaker 2: non investment or junk grade of CCC. Don't need to
- 23:11Speaker 2: get too technical here, just know that's pretty bad. Genesis
- 23:15Speaker 2: also routinely reported to Gemini from May twenty twenty two
- 23:18Speaker 2: through November twenty twenty two that he had failed its
- 23:21Speaker 2: own internal loan book risk assessments, to the point that
- 23:24Speaker 2: in July twenty twenty two, a Gemini board member compared
- 23:28Speaker 2: Genesis Capital to Layman Brothers prior to the financial collapse
- 23:31Speaker 2: of two thousand and seven and two thousand and eight.
- 23:34Speaker 2: At this point, you're probably thinking, so all the money's
- 23:37Speaker 2: gone and your raim. Gemini and the Winklevosses decided they
- 23:42Speaker 2: would terminate the EARN program on September second, twenty twenty two,
- 23:46Speaker 2: but only decided to inform Genesis that it would do
- 23:49Speaker 2: so on October thirteenth, twenty twenty two. It continued to
- 23:53Speaker 2: send customer funds to Genesis throughout this period until an
- 23:57Speaker 2: indeterminate time, with all of this information coming from the
- 24:00Speaker 2: Attorney General's suit, and they failed to let customers know
- 24:04Speaker 2: that the program was fully terminated until January twenty twenty three,
- 24:08Speaker 2: though I should add that they froze with drawals in
- 24:10Speaker 2: November twenty twenty two. All of these dates are very confusing,
- 24:14Speaker 2: but the important facts to know is that Gemini knew
- 24:18Speaker 2: from twenty twenty one that they were sending customer funds
- 24:22Speaker 2: into an unreliable, unstable, undercollateralized lender for years, and indeed,
- 24:28Speaker 2: even when they froze their own program when they decided
- 24:32Speaker 2: that the party had to stop in September twenty twenty two,
- 24:35Speaker 2: they were still taking customer funds and putting it in
- 24:38Speaker 2: Genesis's hands. They didn't freeze the withdrawal process, the way
- 24:43Speaker 2: in which customers have withdrawn their funds, until November twenty
- 24:46Speaker 2: twenty two, So that's months of throwing customer money into
- 24:52Speaker 2: the toilet and aggressively flushing it like you're trying to
- 24:55Speaker 2: get rid of a basketball. They knew. Cameron and Tyler
- 25:02Speaker 2: Winklevos knew. They knew what they were doing. They knew
- 25:07Speaker 2: they were losing customers money, and they didn't care. Two
- 25:12Speaker 2: American billionaires put a billion dollars of customer funds into
- 25:17Speaker 2: deeply questionable lenders' hands, then proceeded to obfuscate the risks involved.
- 25:22Speaker 2: They claimed that Genesis had appropriate risk ratios and healthy
- 25:26Speaker 2: financial condition as recently as November fourteenth, twenty twenty two,
- 25:31Speaker 2: a full month after it had formerly terminated their agreement
- 25:35Speaker 2: with Genesis, who was the company that they were lending
- 25:38Speaker 2: this too. This wasn't a casual fling with a risky
- 25:42Speaker 2: asset class. It was a near billion dollar swindle of
- 25:47Speaker 2: and I quote Cameron Winklevoss in his abominable letter to
- 25:51Speaker 2: Barry Silbert, a swindle of a single mother who lent
- 25:55Speaker 2: her son's education money to them, a father who lent
- 25:59Speaker 2: his sons by me for money to Gemini earn, a
- 26:02Speaker 2: husband and a wife who lent their life savings. A
- 26:05Speaker 2: school teacher who lent his children's college funds. Cameron and
- 26:11Speaker 2: Tyler Winklevoss, as well as Barry Silbert, who runs Digital
- 26:15Speaker 2: Currency Group and by proxy, Genesis, have defrauded investors at
- 26:19Speaker 2: a similar scale to Sam Bankman freed. As I mentioned
- 26:23Speaker 2: the disgraced and now incarcerated CEO of FTX, They convinced
- 26:28Speaker 2: customers that they were putting money into an interest generating account,
- 26:31Speaker 2: tricking them into believing that this was a stable, risk
- 26:34Speaker 2: managed investment, one that was continually liquid, and they indeed
- 26:38Speaker 2: advertised that you could withdraw your assets instantly, as opposed
- 26:41Speaker 2: to the reality that Cameron and Tyler Winklevoss knowingly funneled
- 26:45Speaker 2: customer funds into an unstable undercollateralized lender. They intentionally and
- 26:51Speaker 2: repeatedly misled customers, claiming to an Earn investor on June
- 26:55Speaker 2: twenty seven, twenty twenty two, that they periodically would conduct
- 26:58Speaker 2: an analysis of their partner's cash flow, balance sheet, and
- 27:02Speaker 2: financial statements to ensure that appropriate risk ratios and healthy
- 27:06Speaker 2: financial condition of their partners happened, and that they said
- 27:10Speaker 2: their partners were vetted through a risk management process, heavily
- 27:13Speaker 2: implying that said process would protect their customers. And on
- 27:17Speaker 2: October twentieth, twenty twenty two, less than a month before,
- 27:20Speaker 2: the winklevoss Is frozen withdrawals from Gemini Earn, leaving their
- 27:24Speaker 2: customers unable to access their funds or their interest digital
- 27:27Speaker 2: currency groups. CEO Barry Silbert, also the owners of Genesis,
- 27:32Speaker 2: met with Cameron Winklevoss and told him that Gemini was
- 27:35Speaker 2: Genesis Capital's largest and most important source of capital, and
- 27:38Speaker 2: that they couldn't withdraw Gemini earned customers funds without bankrupting
- 27:42Speaker 2: the firm. Cameron and Tyler Winklevoss not only deceived customers,
- 27:47Speaker 2: but turned their assets into a load bearing part of
- 27:50Speaker 2: Genesis's balance sheet so that they could funnel them into
- 27:53Speaker 2: billions of dollars of loans, which would then go into
- 27:56Speaker 2: places like Three Arrows Capital and FDx. And the Winklevosses
- 28:01Speaker 2: have spent the best part of a year playing the
- 28:03Speaker 2: victim with pathetic open letters that they post on Twitter
- 28:06Speaker 2: to Barry Silbert, demanding the returns of funds that they
- 28:10Speaker 2: knew were gone, claiming that Silbert hid in his ivory
- 28:13Speaker 2: tower and he should take responsibility and do the right thing,
- 28:18Speaker 2: as Cameron and his brother continued to mislead the world
- 28:21Speaker 2: about what actually happened. While I'd never refer to the
- 28:25Speaker 2: Winklevosses as victims, one cannot ignore how thoroughly fraudulent Barry
- 28:31Speaker 2: Silbert's empire had become. On January twenty fourth, twenty twenty two,
- 28:36Speaker 2: Genesis Capital loaned one hundred million dollars to DCG, the
- 28:40Speaker 2: company that owned it, due on July twenty fourth, twenty
- 28:43Speaker 2: twenty two, only for Digital Currency Group to tell them
- 28:47Speaker 2: that they and I quote the suit literally did not
- 28:49Speaker 2: have the money. Barry Silbert's solution was to and I
- 28:53Speaker 2: quote repaper the loan, delaying its due date by ten
- 28:57Speaker 2: months to May twenty twenty three, and you'll be surprised
- 29:01Speaker 2: to hear that they never actually paid it back, along
- 29:03Speaker 2: with several other loans that were either unpaid or paid
- 29:06Speaker 2: back in shares of another part of Digital Currency Group
- 29:09Speaker 2: called Greyscale Bitcoin Trust, another enterprise involved in crypto. According
- 29:15Speaker 2: to Sam Bankman Freed's testimony during his own criminal fraud
- 29:19Speaker 2: and conspiracy trial, Barry Silbert begged him for help, which
- 29:23Speaker 2: he declined to provide, despite Genesis Capital having loaned FDx
- 29:27Speaker 2: billions of dollars in the past, which trustees agreed to
- 29:30Speaker 2: settle for a puzzling one hundred and seventy five million dollars.
- 29:33Speaker 2: And just to be clear, the bankruptcy trustee just was
- 29:37Speaker 2: just like, I'll take one hundred and seventy five million.
- 29:39Speaker 2: I don't need the billion back, and one can really
- 29:41Speaker 2: see where they misled Gemini and the Winklevoss brothers. The
- 29:45Speaker 2: one point one billion dollar promisory note from Digital Currency
- 29:49Speaker 2: Group to Genesis, the one that was completely fake and
- 29:52Speaker 2: was literally just words on paper, was marked in genesis
- 29:55Speaker 2: balance sheet, which Gemini was occasionally shown as one point
- 29:59Speaker 2: one b billion dollars in receivables from related parties, with
- 30:02Speaker 2: no designation of what it was or how it was amortized.
- 30:06Speaker 2: In plain English, that just means to any financial analysis
- 30:10Speaker 2: that would appear as just money in the bank. We
- 30:12Speaker 2: are receiving cash from someone one point one billion dollars actually,
- 30:17Speaker 2: and that's good. That would make you a little bit calmer. However,
- 30:21Speaker 2: one cannot ignore the fact that Gemini knew that something
- 30:25Speaker 2: was up. In a March fifth, twenty twenty one email
- 30:28Speaker 2: to an earn investor, Gemini claimed that Genesis was and
- 30:31Speaker 2: I quote only lending assets to posited it inter earned
- 30:34Speaker 2: to institutional borrowers in an overcollateralized way. Overcollateralization meaning that
- 30:41Speaker 2: they were loaning more money than they were borrowing. How
- 30:45Speaker 2: does that work? It doesn't. Gemini never sought to correct
- 30:49Speaker 2: a coin Desk article from February twenty twenty one that claimed,
- 30:53Speaker 2: and I quote that the Genesis loans are overcollateralized, the
- 30:57Speaker 2: loans in question being the ones where Gemini earned funds.
- 31:02Speaker 2: The funds that people put into Gemini earned to earn
- 31:04Speaker 2: interest were going It's all just a big pile of
- 31:08Speaker 2: dog shit. In May twenty twenty one, Gemini's risk management
- 31:28Speaker 2: team determined that Genesis Capital was and I quote highly leveraged,
- 31:32Speaker 2: with an over ninety five percent debt to asset ratio,
- 31:36Speaker 2: meaning that most of their money was in debt rather
- 31:39Speaker 2: than things they actually had, and that Genesis has low
- 31:42Speaker 2: liquidity and that the business is just able to cover
- 31:45Speaker 2: its short term obligations. Think of it like living paycheck
- 31:49Speaker 2: to paycheck to the tune of billions. By August twenty
- 31:52Speaker 2: twenty one, Gemini Earn had placed three billion dollars of
- 31:57Speaker 2: customer assets in Genesis's hands, and this whole situation enrages me.
- 32:03Speaker 2: This is one of the largest and most gratuitous acts
- 32:06Speaker 2: of negligence in the history of finance, a craven and
- 32:10Speaker 2: deliberate swindle that flowed through every vein of the organization.
- 32:15Speaker 2: Gemini intentionally and repeatedly misled customers into investing in an
- 32:21Speaker 2: undercollateralized and risky lender by dressing their fraud in the
- 32:25Speaker 2: trappings of conventional retail banking. Gemini was well aware and
- 32:30Speaker 2: continually reminded of how unstable and disorganized Genesis was and
- 32:35Speaker 2: how risky its customer's assets were held, and yet it
- 32:38Speaker 2: continued to hype the scheme in the hopes that nothing
- 32:41Speaker 2: would ever change. They put billions of dollars into an
- 32:44Speaker 2: entity that from the very beginning they knew was rotten.
- 32:48Speaker 2: They knew could barely cover their bills. They could have
- 32:52Speaker 2: predicted this, and indeed they tried to. They just wanted
- 32:56Speaker 2: to keep the party going. Cameron and Tyler Winklevos are villains,
- 33:02Speaker 2: and while they didn't outright steal customer funds, they intentionally
- 33:06Speaker 2: and willfully misled customers into investing in Genesis Capital, an
- 33:11Speaker 2: unstable and recklessly managed lender. They were fully aware of
- 33:15Speaker 2: these dangers, yet they chose to launch a program that
- 33:19Speaker 2: their own risk management team believed was riskier than other
- 33:22Speaker 2: partners that Gemini had considered loaning that money to, saying
- 33:26Speaker 2: in February twenty twenty two, the Genesis Finances were weaker,
- 33:31Speaker 2: with a higher leverage ratio and low liquidity ratio, meaning
- 33:35Speaker 2: that they were more risky and they had less money
- 33:38Speaker 2: to give back to customers when they need it. And indeed,
- 33:40Speaker 2: they worried that a market downturn would mean that a
- 33:43Speaker 2: fifty to sixty percent default rate for Genesis was an
- 33:46Speaker 2: appropriate assumption, meaning that more than half of their loans
- 33:50Speaker 2: would go under, and that a market downturn would mean
- 33:53Speaker 2: that a fifty to sixty percent default rate for Genesis
- 33:56Speaker 2: loans was an appropriate assumption, meaning that more than half
- 33:59Speaker 2: of their loans default in the event that there was
- 34:01Speaker 2: a change in the cryptocurrency market. The risk management team
- 34:05Speaker 2: repeated this language several times, and it took until May
- 34:08Speaker 2: twenty twenty two for Cameron Winklevoss to personally ask for
- 34:11Speaker 2: a one pager on the risk profile of Gemini Earn
- 34:14Speaker 2: and Genesis, the company that they had lent at that
- 34:16Speaker 2: time of rebillion dollars two and indeed whether Ern adequately
- 34:21Speaker 2: compensated Gemini for the risk. In plain English, they were saying,
- 34:25Speaker 2: in a war, is it really worth it for us
- 34:28Speaker 2: to risk all of this customer money? And when they
- 34:31Speaker 2: said worth it, they mean is it making us enough
- 34:33Speaker 2: money for the pain in the ass we're creating. I
- 34:36Speaker 2: hope it wasn't. I hope they burned for this one.
- 34:40Speaker 2: Having read the entire New York Attorney General suit, I
- 34:44Speaker 2: cannot find a single instance of concern for the hundreds
- 34:48Speaker 2: of thousands of people the Gemini and Cameron and Tyler
- 34:51Speaker 2: Winklevoss failed despite Gemini's pledge to uphold and I quote,
- 34:56Speaker 2: the highest level of fiduciary obligations. The Winklevosses represent their
- 35:02Speaker 2: position as the trusted stewards of the digital currency industry,
- 35:06Speaker 2: claiming to live by a policy of asking for permission
- 35:08Speaker 2: rather than forgiveness, as they brazenly funneled billions of dollars
- 35:12Speaker 2: of customer funds into a lender that they clearly didn't trust.
- 35:16Speaker 2: They ignored the science, they ignored the risk management profiles,
- 35:20Speaker 2: they ignored the worries, and they continually rambled about being
- 35:25Speaker 2: licensed and regulated by the New York Department of Financial Services,
- 35:28Speaker 2: which means absolutely nothing. As Gemini earned deposits were being
- 35:32Speaker 2: loaned to Genesis for the terms of Gemini Earns agreement,
- 35:35Speaker 2: which in turn took them out of the regulation of
- 35:39Speaker 2: the mydfs. The Winklevosses, the so called self regulators of crypto,
- 35:45Speaker 2: according to Paul Vinya of The Wall Street Journal, built
- 35:48Speaker 2: a reputation as the trustworthy party in a lawless industry,
- 35:52Speaker 2: only to use it as a means of making twenty
- 35:55Speaker 2: two million dollars in agent fees and ten million dollars
- 35:58Speaker 2: in commission from risking billions of dollars of customer funds
- 36:03Speaker 2: and in this case Gemini earned customers are likely going
- 36:06Speaker 2: to lose forty to fifty percent of their holdings if
- 36:10Speaker 2: they get anything back at all. A good comparison point
- 36:13Speaker 2: here is the creditors related to Voyager, which was another
- 36:17Speaker 2: cryptoponzi scheme, only got back thirty five percent of their holdings.
- 36:23Speaker 2: Now I have to get into some more annoying financial stuff.
- 36:25Speaker 2: You'll forgive me. I just want you to know how
- 36:28Speaker 2: loathsome these wet river giants are. These boat boys have
- 36:32Speaker 2: really buggered this up. In October twenty twenty three, the
- 36:36Speaker 2: Winklevosses filed something called an adversary proceeding in court against
- 36:40Speaker 2: Genesis in bankruptcy court to be specific, seeking to recover
- 36:43Speaker 2: one point six billion dollars in value for the benefit
- 36:47Speaker 2: of earned users in an attempt to paper over their
- 36:49Speaker 2: financial mismanagement. On August fifteenth, twenty twenty two, Gemini accepted
- 36:54Speaker 2: over thirty point nine million shares of Greyscale Bitcoin Trust,
- 36:58Speaker 2: a STOG tied to the price of bitcoin, with the
- 37:00Speaker 2: minimum investment of fifty thousand dollars and the ticker of GBTC.
- 37:03Speaker 2: They accepted this as collateral for customer funds invested in
- 37:07Speaker 2: Gemini Earn, valued at the time at around fifteen bucks apiece,
- 37:11Speaker 2: somehow taking on what they call an and I quote
- 37:13Speaker 2: initial collateral stake over a year after the program started,
- 37:16Speaker 2: just to be clear, no collateral when they learned the
- 37:19Speaker 2: money out. It was worth around four hundred and sixty
- 37:22Speaker 2: three million dollars at the time, and the Winklevosses for
- 37:25Speaker 2: some reason decided to foreclose upon it on November sixteenth,
- 37:28Speaker 2: twenty twenty two, selling it when its price was around
- 37:32Speaker 2: nine dollars a share. This left them with two hundred
- 37:35Speaker 2: and eighty four million dollars a little bit over that,
- 37:37Speaker 2: or roughly sixty four point one percent of its original value.
- 37:41Speaker 2: They didn't have to sell it, and indeed, one might
- 37:43Speaker 2: argue they legally shouldn't have because it was collateral from alone,
- 37:47Speaker 2: in the same way that the bank can't immediately foreclose
- 37:51Speaker 2: in your home when you're in it and you've missed
- 37:53Speaker 2: a few payments. They probably weren't meant to do so,
- 37:56Speaker 2: But I continue now. The Winklevosses are claiming that they
- 38:00Speaker 2: should be considered oded. The difference between two hundred and
- 38:02Speaker 2: eighty four million dollars and the amount oede to earns creditors.
- 38:06Speaker 2: Genesis argues, I should say, the bankruptcy trustee of Genesis,
- 38:11Speaker 2: which has no interest in anything to do what Genesis
- 38:14Speaker 2: is doing other than getting money back for the creditors,
- 38:16Speaker 2: most of which are institutional customers, come last. That trustee
- 38:20Speaker 2: is arguing that it actually didn't give Gemini two hundred
- 38:24Speaker 2: and eighty four million dollars in credit. They gave them
- 38:28Speaker 2: thirty million, nine hundred and five thousand, seven hundred and
- 38:30Speaker 2: eighty two shares of GPTC, and that the collateral should
- 38:33Speaker 2: be valued at the price of GBTC today, which would
- 38:36Speaker 2: value the stake that they had given them at eight
- 38:39Speaker 2: hundred million. This is confusing, but what you need to
- 38:42Speaker 2: realize is Gemini earned customers have lost somewhere between eight
- 38:45Speaker 2: hundred million and a billion dollars. Had the Winklevosses not
- 38:48Speaker 2: sold their shares, they would have got a lot more back.
- 38:53Speaker 2: In essence, the Winklevosses rushed to sell these shares for
- 38:56Speaker 2: effectively no reason, potentially flaunting very basic foreclosure rule, and
- 39:00Speaker 2: Genesis argument is that they shouldn't have to make up
- 39:03Speaker 2: the difference for their massive fuck up. Interestingly, Gemini was
- 39:07Speaker 2: also meant to receive another thirty one million shares of
- 39:11Speaker 2: GPTC on November tenth, twenty twenty two, and Genesis just
- 39:14Speaker 2: didn't send it. And guess what the bankruptcy court isn't
- 39:17Speaker 2: going to help with that. Let's be clear, both of
- 39:21Speaker 2: these parties are scum, and in a just society, they'd
- 39:24Speaker 2: rotten the depths of the worst jails under the terms
- 39:27Speaker 2: of genesis reorganization plan. Under bankruptcy, Gemini earn customers those people,
- 39:33Speaker 2: regular people, the people's college funds, the bar mits for funds,
- 39:37Speaker 2: the single mothers who had lost their money. They'd be
- 39:40Speaker 2: considered Class four unsecured creditors getting paid out behind Genesis
- 39:44Speaker 2: institutional creditors, secured creditors and priority claims, which is why
- 39:48Speaker 2: Genesis had to pay one hundred and seventy five million
- 39:51Speaker 2: dollars to fdx's bankruptcy. A single mothers waited to retrieve
- 39:54Speaker 2: their son's college funds. Yet there may be hope that
- 40:07Speaker 2: Gemini Earned customers will be made whole. Mere hours after
- 40:11Speaker 2: the original broadcast of this podcast, the New York State
- 40:14Speaker 2: Department of Financial Services announced that Gemini had committed to
- 40:18Speaker 2: return at least one point one billion dollars to EARNS customers,
- 40:22Speaker 2: though only after the resolution of Genesis Global Capital's bankruptcy.
- 40:26Speaker 2: Assuming that the bankruptcy courts approved the settlement, Gemini Earned
- 40:29Speaker 2: customers can, according to Gemini, expect to receive approximately ninety
- 40:33Speaker 2: seven percent of their assets in kind within two months
- 40:37Speaker 2: of February twenty eight, twenty twenty four, and the rest
- 40:39Speaker 2: about ten months after that. Unlike the proposed FTX settlement,
- 40:43Speaker 2: customers will also receive the actual crypto they committed. In
- 40:46Speaker 2: the case of FTX, they're getting the dollar equivalent on
- 40:49Speaker 2: the day that FTX went bankrupt, which means they're getting
- 40:51Speaker 2: much less than they'd make if they were selling their
- 40:53Speaker 2: crypto today. This means that these customers might actually make
- 40:57Speaker 2: money because on the day that Gemini Earned shut down,
- 41:00Speaker 2: bitcoin was somewhere between eleven and fifteen thousand dollars. This
- 41:04Speaker 2: means that they're actually going to make a profit somehow,
- 41:06Speaker 2: which is pretty good. It's rare to find good news here,
- 41:10Speaker 2: and don't get too excited yet, though all of this
- 41:13Speaker 2: is dependent on the tedious pace of bankruptcy courts that
- 41:16Speaker 2: in this case especially, we've kind of considered Gemini Earns
- 41:20Speaker 2: customers second class citizens. This landmark settlement is being spun
- 41:24Speaker 2: by the Winkelvoss brothers as and I quote a successful
- 41:27Speaker 2: resolution of Gemini Earn that was reached and I quote
- 41:31Speaker 2: again with Genesis and other creditors, one in which these
- 41:34Speaker 2: identical River twins are considered. And I can't believe they're
- 41:38Speaker 2: willing to say this responsible stewards of the crypto ecosystem.
- 41:42Speaker 2: This couldn't be further from the truth. Superintendent Adrian Harris
- 41:46Speaker 2: of New York State's Department of Financial Services said in
- 41:49Speaker 2: a statement that Gemini had failed to conduct due diligence
- 41:52Speaker 2: on an unregulated third party later accused of massive fraud,
- 41:57Speaker 2: harming EARNED customers who were suddenly unable to access their assets.
- 42:00Speaker 2: The nydfs IS investigation revealed and I quote that Gemini
- 42:05Speaker 2: engaged in unsafe and unsound practices that ultimately threatened the
- 42:09Speaker 2: financial health of the company, and they collected hundreds of
- 42:12Speaker 2: millions of dollars in fees from Gemini customers that could
- 42:15Speaker 2: have gone to Gemini, substantially weakening Gemini's financial condition. The
- 42:20Speaker 2: Winklevosses are not responsible stuarts. They're towering con artists that
- 42:24Speaker 2: got core and they were forced to pay up only
- 42:27Speaker 2: because they ran a foul of one of the few
- 42:29Speaker 2: responsible regulators left in America. While I'm hopeful to earn
- 42:33Speaker 2: customer as a main whole, I also fear that the
- 42:36Speaker 2: bankruptcy courts may drag their feet, and even if they don't,
- 42:40Speaker 2: kind of just want more here. The Winklevosses aren't even
- 42:43Speaker 2: the ones paying the fines. Their company is. Gemini will
- 42:47Speaker 2: pay the thirty seven million dollar fine from the NYDFS,
- 42:51Speaker 2: and I think they're going to pay the one point
- 42:52Speaker 2: one billion dollars in cryptocurrency too. What's weird is I
- 42:56Speaker 2: can find no evidence about where that money is coming from.
- 43:00Speaker 2: I'm also worried that Genesis, as they have multiple times,
- 43:04Speaker 2: will kind of stone wall this deal. They want to
- 43:06Speaker 2: get out of this. They recently settled with the SEC
- 43:08Speaker 2: for twenty one million dollars, so they have a reason
- 43:11Speaker 2: to do well with the US government. But I fear
- 43:15Speaker 2: for this. All of this is condentent on bankruptcy. Courts
- 43:18Speaker 2: don't really care regardless of this landmark settlement. It is great,
- 43:24Speaker 2: it's great that the regulator has got the customer's money back,
- 43:28Speaker 2: but my blood is still boiling. Cameron and Tyler Winklevoss
- 43:32Speaker 2: will continue to run Gemini, which is a multi billion
- 43:35Speaker 2: dollar financial services company, despite the fact that it's very
- 43:39Speaker 2: clear that they really didn't do any due diligence, and
- 43:42Speaker 2: that due diligence which they did they completely ignored. They
- 43:46Speaker 2: knew that this was a bad deal. They sent tens
- 43:50Speaker 2: hundreds over a billion dollars to a company that they
- 43:53Speaker 2: knew as early as twenty twenty one was bordering on insolvent.
- 43:57Speaker 2: Yet they're still allowed to walk around as free men
- 44:01Speaker 2: and stewards of the financial industry. It's kind of taken
- 44:04Speaker 2: the piss and even though the New York Attorney General's
- 44:07Speaker 2: sue is still out there, it's not over yet, and
- 44:10Speaker 2: they're still seeking three billion dollars in restitution. They're doing
- 44:13Speaker 2: so from Gemini and digital currency group, the Winklevosses are
- 44:17Speaker 2: still left unscathed. These are craven fraudsters that continued again
- 44:22Speaker 2: and again to operate without oversight or restrain, and now
- 44:25Speaker 2: they're going to profit handsomely off of an industry built
- 44:28Speaker 2: on the back of manipulating and conning people. And despite
- 44:32Speaker 2: how good this settlement is, these guys are still billionaire
- 44:36Speaker 2: boat boys. They're unscathed. They robbed their own company, they
- 44:40Speaker 2: robbed their customers, They laughed in our faces. And at
- 44:44Speaker 2: this time in society, when tens of thousands of people
- 44:47Speaker 2: are being laid off, when people can't get houses, when
- 44:52Speaker 2: the regular person that cannot seek wealth, people that go
- 44:55Speaker 2: out and fuck over customers again and again and again
- 44:58Speaker 2: in broad daylight, lying to us, lying to you and
- 45:02Speaker 2: me in a way that is so craven, nothing happens
- 45:05Speaker 2: to them. Oh god, they got slightly embarrassed. They can't
- 45:09Speaker 2: be kicked out of Gemini. They own the bloody thing.
- 45:12Speaker 2: The crypto industry isn't attacking them, despite the fact that
- 45:15Speaker 2: two of your so called stewards are fucking con artists.
- 45:20Speaker 2: Anyone who's listening to this, who's a big fan of crypto,
- 45:24Speaker 2: who believes that these guys are good people, or indeed
- 45:27Speaker 2: that really there are any good people in this industry.
- 45:29Speaker 2: Should read the New York Attorney General suit. They should
- 45:33Speaker 2: read everything that the Winklevosses did. They should listen to
- 45:37Speaker 2: this podcast again, perhaps, and recount the many ways, the
- 45:41Speaker 2: manifold ways in which these two giant freaks shat all
- 45:46Speaker 2: over their customers, lied to them, lied to regulators, lied
- 45:49Speaker 2: to their own company, and sat there with their thumbs up,
- 45:53Speaker 2: their asses not digging into their own personal piggybanks, making
- 45:57Speaker 2: the dumbest calls again and again, and nothing has happened
- 46:00Speaker 2: to them. I pray Letitia James and then New York
- 46:05Speaker 2: Attorney General's Office finds a way to exile these two
- 46:08Speaker 2: bastards from this goddamn financial services industry. But I'm gonna
- 46:13Speaker 2: be honest, I'm not holding my breath. Thank you for
- 46:25Speaker 2: listening to Better Offline. It's a weekly tech podcast. You
- 46:29Speaker 2: can find it on iheartradios, app or anywhere else you
- 46:31Speaker 2: find podcasts. The editor and composer of the Better Offline
- 46:34Speaker 2: theme song is Matasowski. You can check out more of
- 46:37Speaker 2: his music and audio projects at matasowski dot com. M
- 46:40Speaker 2: A T T O s o w Ski dot com.
- 46:45Speaker 2: If you want to get in touch with me, email
- 46:47Speaker 2: me at easy at better offline dot com, or visit
- 46:50Speaker 2: me at edzitron on Twitter or zitron dot Besky dot
- 46:53Speaker 2: Social on Blue Sky. Check out my newsletter and more
- 46:56Speaker 2: of my work on better offline dot com. Thank you
- 46:58Speaker 2: for listening.
- 47:06Speaker 1: Better Offline is a production of cool Zone Media. For
- 47:09Speaker 1: more from cool Zone Media, visit our website Coolzonemedia dot com,
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