Latest / ACLED Audio / WEBINAR: The view from Mekelle: Inside Ethiopia's escalating conflict

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WEBINAR: The view from Mekelle: Inside Ethiopia's escalating conflict · ACLED Audio

• 0:06
  SPEAKER_00: I'd like to welcome everybody to our webinar on the view from Mikele, Inside Tik Rai's Escalating Conflict.
• 0:13
  SPEAKER_00: Of course, when we decided to do this webinar, it was it was quite a few weeks before this most recent development.
• 0:21
  SPEAKER_00: So with that in mind, of course, we've changed the subject matter a little bit.
• 0:26
  SPEAKER_00: But I did want to make sure that everybody knows that we have been keeping up on and abreast of the changes within Ethiopia, well, since Accolid started, of course.
• 0:37
  SPEAKER_00: But we have a particular interest in making sure that we document well and of course discuss and analyze thoroughly what's been happening both this last week but also in the past few years.
• 0:50
  SPEAKER_00: So with that in mind, uh we will be having a presentation by Dr.
• 0:56
  SPEAKER_00: Jolale Gitachi Biru, who is ACLED's senior analyst for East Africa with, of course, a particular interest and specialization in Ethiopia.
• 1:06
  SPEAKER_00: I am Clina Raleigh.
• 1:08
  SPEAKER_00: I am the founder and CEO of Accled.
• 1:10
  SPEAKER_00: I have also a particular interest in Ethiopia, having lived there briefly, and also having a background in African conflict patterns.
• 1:22
  SPEAKER_00: And we hope to make sure we have about 30 minutes for questions at the end of Jalale's presentation.
• 1:31
  SPEAKER_00: And with that in mind, I think we will get started.
• 1:36
  SPEAKER_00: There's a note here that there's no sound.
• 1:38
  SPEAKER_00: Is that all is everybody else hearing?
• 1:41
  SPEAKER_00: Jalale?
• 1:42
  SPEAKER_00: Do you hear?
• 1:44
  SPEAKER_00: All right.
• 1:44
  SPEAKER_00: I think we're all right.
• 1:45
  unknown: Okay, great.
• 1:46
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you very much.
• 1:47
  SPEAKER_00: I this is the most enthusiastic webinar I think I've ever seen.
• 1:51
  SPEAKER_00: So I'm uh delighted that everybody can join us.
• 1:56
  SPEAKER_00: And please um make sure to send questions our way.
• 2:01
  SPEAKER_00: We would love to spend the last half of the webinar addressing any issues or questions you may have.
• 2:08
  SPEAKER_00: And with that in mind, I'm going to turn it over to Julale to give at first an insight into what has happened very recently and where we think the situation is going and how it has built on the situation from the last five years or so.
• 2:25
  SPEAKER_00: And with that, welcome Julale.
• 2:27
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you for your time and insights.
• 2:29
  SPEAKER_01: Thank you very much for the lovely introduction and uh um welcome.
• 2:35
  SPEAKER_01: Salam salam for those who are who joined.
• 2:39
  SPEAKER_01: I will try my best to finish in certain minutes, but as you know, things are a bit complicated uh to explain, so I will try my best.
• 2:47
  SPEAKER_01: Um, so this webinar, next slide please, this webinar um will talk about what's happening at this moment, um, the endaves capability, and also what's IMDO, uh, who did how did it start, and the Ethiopian People's Uh Forces Alliances for Survival.
• 3:08
  SPEAKER_01: You might know it for Alliances Survival, who is the member uh and their capabilities, and at the end uh we will share with you a few scenarios uh based on our data and the information we have.
• 3:22
  SPEAKER_01: So, for what's happening uh in Ethiopia, uh or at this moment, next slide please, two slides.
• 3:29
  SPEAKER_01: Um all actors, um, all actors began mobilizing in February 2024, not recently.
• 3:38
  SPEAKER_01: CLIDE data shows that mobilization by the TDF, the Tigray Defense Forces, by ENDF, the Ethiopian National Defense Forces, and also by the AirTrain Defense Forces that started in February 2024.
• 3:54
  SPEAKER_01: And on May 5th, as you may already know, the Tigray People's Liberation Front, TPA Lev, um reinstated the 2020 elected regional government in Tegray and started to uh consolidate power, for example, by removing some officials and replacing them with pro-TPALF officials and also uh having a discussion with the public, holding different um uh multiple uh public meetings so that they can regain the support within the region as well.
• 4:31
  SPEAKER_01: And starting from May, uh the Tegrad Defense Forces, TDF, uh uh accelerated its uh force conscription uh across the region by forcibly taking every able-bodied uh specially they use to join TDF.
• 4:51
  SPEAKER_01: Uh, another development I want to focus on is that um an association uh named the Tegray Council for Peace and change was established on 17th May this year in Addis Ababa.
• 5:05
  SPEAKER_01: The main objective of this council is to create an enabling peace environment through an organized approach to remove the TPLA faction and once it's removed, bring sustainable peace uh and security in the region.
• 5:19
  SPEAKER_01: The founding assembly or the founding meeting of the council was attended by uh different actors, for example, those who represented uh at that time uh TPL during the Pretoria Agreement at that time, including Generals Adkan Gabres uh Gavretan Sai, um Gitacho Redda, and others as well.
• 5:42
  SPEAKER_01: Uh different political parties based in Tegrai also joined this founding uh conference in Antisawa, among other actors.
• 5:53
  SPEAKER_01: Uh so these are the major developments.
• 5:56
  SPEAKER_01: Next slide.
• 5:57
  SPEAKER_01: Um When did the new round of violence began?
• 6:01
  SPEAKER_01: Actually, it started on the 1st of August when the TDF led by TP Lev clashed with ENDF and Takazab.
• 6:11
  SPEAKER_01: It's a uh it's a kind of militia based in Welqait, the disputed Wolkite or Western Takrai uh area, and the Hammer Regional Anterior police near the Ethiopian Sudan border in Shararina.
• 6:27
  SPEAKER_01: And throughout August, Acclaid data have recorded violence, polit uh different uh political violence uh clustered primarily around two distinct areas of engagement.
• 6:40
  SPEAKER_01: The first one is border clashes, and the second one is targeted aerial um bombardments or drone stroke drone strikes.
• 6:51
  SPEAKER_01: However, the August violent conflict lacked the widespread daily intensity of the previous war or what we are currently witnessing since last week.
• 7:04
  SPEAKER_01: Next slide please.
• 7:06
  SPEAKER_01: And on as you all know, on 23 September, the TTF uh finally um controlled the remaining airstrikes.
• 7:16
  SPEAKER_01: Uh it has controlled the region since May 2026, but finally that was the last stretch.
• 7:22
  SPEAKER_01: And then at the same time, uh battles across various areas followed this uh development.
• 7:30
  SPEAKER_01: Our data shows that currently there are two major fronts.
• 7:35
  SPEAKER_01: The first front uh is in the zone two in AFRA.
• 7:40
  SPEAKER_01: Uh you can see it on the visual.
• 7:43
  SPEAKER_01: Uh, and the first um at this uh front, the first front, the TDF and Ugogumo, uh, an actor um is clashing with government forces and the Tigray Peace Forces.
• 7:58
  SPEAKER_01: Um the second front consists of uh Southern Tigray zone in Tigray, the Wagamra uh zone and North Warlo zones uh in Amhara region.
• 8:09
  SPEAKER_01: At this front, the Tigray Defense Forces and the Amara Afano National Movement, IFNM, are fighting with the government forces.
• 8:19
  SPEAKER_01: And um recently, uh this week, the AFAR regional president also claimed that the AirTrain Defense Forces, the EDF, have crossed the border and controlled areas in northern uh AFAR.
• 8:34
  SPEAKER_01: Various heavy weapons, uh uh likely uh drones and other heavy weapons have been used.
• 8:42
  SPEAKER_01: And by the beginning of this week, uh government across um government forces regained control of Sakota and the surrounding areas in Wadamra, as well as Alamata and the surrounding area in Southern Tegrai zone.
• 8:58
  SPEAKER_01: And recent informations indicate that the government and allied forces are advancing northward, and reports are also emerging uh detailing the violent impact on civilians.
• 9:12
  SPEAKER_01: Next slide, please.
• 9:13
  SPEAKER_01: Um, before we jump to the uh sumdo movement and the current alliances, uh let's talk about the capabilities of the Ethiopian military.
• 9:23
  SPEAKER_01: Uh next slide.
• 9:26
  SPEAKER_01: So, as you can see here um in 2023, this this is the view from Arat Kilo uh before the end of uh 2023, and as you can see, uh there um the government was uh faced with different actors, and you can see where most of the violences were were focused on.
• 9:49
  SPEAKER_01: Uh in 2023, it was the time when Fando Militia started uh their movement against the government.
• 9:57
  SPEAKER_01: Uh so you can uh you can see a high level of uh violence uh increasing in Amhar region as well as in Oromer region.
• 10:06
  SPEAKER_01: Uh OLA was very active, and at the same time, uh the OLA also the OLA is the Oromo Liberation Army.
• 10:16
  SPEAKER_01: Uh it also tried to negotiate with the government two times, which failed.
• 10:21
  SPEAKER_01: So this was the view from Aratkilo at that time and uh how many actors it was uh dealing with.
• 10:28
  SPEAKER_01: For example, there was an incident involving Al-Shabaab in the Somali region as well.
• 10:33
  SPEAKER_01: So this was the case at that time.
• 10:36
  SPEAKER_01: But since then, the government has uh increased its capacity when it comes to drones and also increased its um manpower.
• 10:45
  SPEAKER_01: And even though the regional special forces have been dismantled officially, they have been integrated under the police, the regional police forces, and they function as a different actor under different names in each in each region.
• 11:02
  SPEAKER_01: For example, in uh in Amhara region, they are part of the uh the Amhara Regional Anti-Riot Force.
• 11:12
  SPEAKER_01: In Oromia region, they they are part of the GEDA command, which is also under the regional police force.
• 11:20
  SPEAKER_01: So this was the view at that time.
• 11:23
  SPEAKER_01: Next slide, please.
• 11:26
  SPEAKER_01: But when we see currently, uh as I said, the uh accolade data shows that drones have become a key military strategy for the ENDF.
• 11:37
  SPEAKER_01: For example, during the 2020-2022 Northern Ethiopia conflict, ENDF's drone strike played a major role in um in 2021 and 2022, uh forcing the TPLF late TDF to retreat to Tugray region, as I said, in late uh 2021.
• 11:58
  SPEAKER_01: And from our data also shows that the majority of drone strikes are recorded in Amara region.
• 12:06
  SPEAKER_01: This is because of two things.
• 12:08
  SPEAKER_01: Uh the first one is the previous and also the current ongoing northern Ethiopia conflict is happening within this region, and the conflict involving Fando militias also uh includes drone strikes as well.
• 12:24
  SPEAKER_01: So as the tension between TPA Lev and the government escalated in 2026, the government began using drone strikes in Tegray, and the first such strike since the signing of the Praetoria Peace Agreement uh were recorded on 31st of January this year in central Tigray zone in Tegray.
• 12:48
  SPEAKER_01: Uh however the frequency of the drone strikes escalated since 10 August 2026, with most of the tar with most of these drone strikes targeting TDF positions and weapons.
• 13:02
  SPEAKER_01: And in total, from the beginning of January 2026 until 18 of September before the start of this conflict, Accled recorded around 19 drone strikes in Tokyo.
• 13:16
  SPEAKER_01: As because of there is a information uh blackout and so on, uh, informations regarding the recent round of uh escalation since last week is coming slowly, so those will be added uh throughout um uh in the future whenever the information comes.
• 13:33
  SPEAKER_01: Next slide, please.
• 13:35
  SPEAKER_01: Now we can jump to what is sumdo and how it uh started when we planned uh this um webinar.
• 13:45
  SPEAKER_01: Uh this was our focus at at that time, and we were going to predict uh who will be part of this emdo movement, and um most of our prediction was correct, but now we have we have a confirmation, so we will start uh with uh the the the phases.
• 14:04
  SPEAKER_01: So um during the first phase, um the during the first the first pay phase started um in let's say it started as a people-to-people movement initiative involving activist uh religious figures and local communities in Tugroy and uh at the Croy and Ertian border villages, and the first of such uh movement or such meeting was recorded in June 2025 in Zalambesa.
• 14:41
  SPEAKER_01: And uh the the second major development was that by the last quarter of 2025, the stemdo uh movement shifted to a political alignment between the TPLF and the Airtrian government.
• 14:55
  SPEAKER_01: And um the the force or the third phase is the May 2026 SEMDO conference in Port Sudan, Sudan, uh where uh a lot of actors who now announce themselves uh as being aligned with TDF uh joining those comp those conferences.
• 15:16
  SPEAKER_01: That was the first um over at conference, open conference, unifying different uh fronts um uh at this um uh platform.
• 15:28
  SPEAKER_01: The last phase of this movement is uh what happened on the 20th of September, uh, where the the they announced the formation of the Ethiopian People's Forces Alliances for Survival.
• 15:43
  SPEAKER_01: Uh and after two days, as we all know, um the conflict uh started.
• 15:50
  SPEAKER_01: Um now we will move on to assessing uh who is the member, what what are what what's the next slide please, what what's their capacity and so on.
• 16:04
  SPEAKER_01: Next slide.
• 16:06
  SPEAKER_01: Next again and um the sorry so in the the members are there are seven members as you already know: the IFNM, OLA, uh TPLF, Dogade National Liberation Front, ONLEF, uh the Afar National Unity Revolution Revolutionary Uh Front, which is also known as Ugugumo, and we have the Benishangul People's Liberation Front, BPLF, and the Gums People's Democratic Movement, GPDM.
• 16:45
  SPEAKER_01: So these are the seven uh members of the Alliance for Survival, and we will start with uh IFNM.
• 16:55
  SPEAKER_01: Uh next slide please.
• 16:58
  SPEAKER_01: So for those who already know about uh the situation in the country, uh the IFNM was officially established end of January this year.
• 17:09
  SPEAKER_01: Uh however, members of the AFNM were already active since uh April 2023, and our data shows here um Fando Militias engagement uh in within within within the country.
• 17:27
  SPEAKER_01: They even though their majority movement is within Amhara region, we have seen uh an increase of Fandom Militias activities in Western Oromia, as you can see here.
• 17:40
  SPEAKER_01: And this is also creating tension between uh the communities living there, the Oromo and Amhara ethnic um ethnic uh groups living there, uh, in addition to the armed groups which are active there.
• 17:54
  SPEAKER_01: OLA is also active there, and various the government security forces are also active there.
• 18:00
  SPEAKER_01: However, the formation of the IFNM uh end of January uh led to a lot of prominent uh leaders, former leaders, as well as a lot of um uh uh final militias uh to surrender.
• 18:17
  SPEAKER_01: Next slide, please.
• 18:19
  SPEAKER_01: And our data shows that an increase in January um in January this year, uh the number of uh people reported to surrender increasing in Angara region.
• 18:32
  SPEAKER_01: Uh so not everyone is happy or supports IFNM's decision to work together with uh TPLF and other forces, and this is displayed by the number of surrendering uh and also uh the decrease uh for support.
• 18:51
  SPEAKER_01: Next slide please.
• 18:56
  SPEAKER_01: And when we look at OLA, um the conflict between the OLA OLEF SHANE, it's also called OLEF Shane, uh the the government security forces um they have been engaged um uh in battle since 2019, and OLA leadership and representatives from the Ethiopian government met in Tanzania two times uh between April uh May and also November 2023 for peace talks, but it ended without an agreement, and compared to previous years, as you can see here, uh oil lace engagement in Oromia region began to win uh in 2024.
• 19:43
  SPEAKER_01: Uh this is because uh fighters led by Sunni Nagasa signed a peace deal in the west and south Shawa zones of Oromia on the 1st of uh December 2024.
• 19:58
  SPEAKER_01: So that's why you see a decrease of uh OLA's activity uh since um 2025.
• 20:05
  SPEAKER_01: This is compared to um compared to the previous years, uh and we are not saying, next slide please, but we are not saying that, or our data doesn't show that uh doesn't say that oil is not active.
• 20:22
  SPEAKER_01: OLA is still active in the region with sporadic clashes with security forces as well as violence targeting civilians.
• 20:31
  SPEAKER_01: So um this is what we see uh in the past one year.
• 20:36
  SPEAKER_01: Uh the group is still active.
• 20:38
  SPEAKER_01: Next slide, please.
• 20:40
  SPEAKER_01: When we see ONF, um um they returned to Ethiopia after signing a peace agreement uh in October 2018 with the Ethiopian government uh in Asmer Earth, and between November and December uh 2018 they returned to the Somali region and they disarmed.
• 21:02
  SPEAKER_01: Um and the OEL experienced uh started to experience an internal split in 2025, and at this moment there are two OEL LEAF factions, one is led by Abdul Karim Sheikh Musei, uh, and this function has reaffirmed its commitment to uh peaceful domestic political engagement operating legally within the Somali region of Ethiopia.
• 21:28
  SPEAKER_01: While the Abdurrahman Mahadi faction uh realigned towards anti-government resistance, but there is no evidence uh showing us that this function has an armed wing, and they have also expressed that they have no interest to start violence after the announcement of uh alliances for survival.
• 21:52
  SPEAKER_01: Next slide, please.
• 21:54
  SPEAKER_01: Um when we see at Ugugumo uh following the political shift in Ethiopia in 2018, the Ugumo leadership signed a peace agreement uh with the uh the government and returned to AFAR.
• 22:09
  SPEAKER_01: It's uh it m it remained um largely dormant until let's say April August uh from April to August 2025 when uh Ibrahim Osman Aliyu uh repurposed Ugogomo Banner to form a newly organized group and the discontent seems to stem from accusation of non uh implementing the peace agreement and um he fled to Earth and organized um um its armoured brink and accolade data shows that this group uh was active way or started to be active on the 3rd of September 2026 when it reported reportedly crossed from Ertrea to Ethiopia and clashed with ENDF and AFAR regional state police and took control of uh a village um in uh zone two of AFAR region next slide please and when we look at the forces based in Benishangulgums region both actors signed a peace agreement uh finally they signed a peace agreement in June 2024 their peace talk started in 2022 with the aim of reintegrating the remaining uh forces into local administrative structure uh however the the some members uh didn't want to respect this peace agreement they didn't agree with the content of the peace agreement and they have returned to uh to the to raise arms and also continued uh fighting with security forces but this is also sporadic and so far the past one week we didn't see any increase in this region as well.
• 24:04
  SPEAKER_01: When we see TPL next slide please um since the end of the two years conflict the first armament clash involving TDF uh were recorded were recorded in February 2024 and uh this armament group usually um at that time uh army 24 uh was involved in clashing with cavalier militias and amhar ethnic militias in uh the disputed southern and north western Tigrai zone but as you as you all know in 2024 they also tried to uh remove Getacho so there was some occupation there and in 2025 there was also small uh violence in Tekrai region but this is the first time we saw uh armored clash after the signing of the peace agreement with that let's move on to scenarios next and what we expect to see next so the first scenario is that next slide um we expect that um the first scenario or outcome could be the government repeals the alliance's operation in northern Ethiopia and manages to control uh Meghalay uh and currently this is most likely due to the current capabilities of members of uh the alliance for survival ETRA and um more outside support could change this uh if the government um fails to control within the next one to two months uh the most likely outcome is the violence is that the violence to continue for an extended period across multiple regions if the government manages to control um uh Meghalay our prediction is that it's highly likely that the Tigray Council for Peace and Change remember the council I mentioned at the beginning will be the main actor that will probably govern Tigray if the TPA leave is removed from Tigray uh and the Tigray Peace Forces the TPF which are currently uh fighting alongside with the government will likely act um as a regional security forces replacing the TDF until stability returns.
• 26:42
  SPEAKER_00: This is from our data what we have been observing the past few years as well and uh and also uh looking at what happened in November December 2020 as well when the government managed to control Meghalay and then afterwards what happened so this is our first prediction second slide please and the second um prediction scenario is that members of the alliance uh initiate a coordinated operation across multiple regions and they manage to remove the current government and our prediction is that uh this is least likely due to the current um uh opposition against the alliance for survival and support for the government um but uh this also depends on how their supporters uh react to uh the current developments as well this is still developing scenario three is that next slide um the alliances initiate a coordinated oppression across multiple regions and the violence continues for an extended per period of time resulting in high casuality impact uh and our prediction is uh this is likely if continued support for the backers of the member of the alliance and or if the situation in the Red Sea continues to escalate with Hoikuti dominance uh the situation in two pa is not happening by itself there are so many aligned forces regional forces you know never you know it's um it's co connected the developments in the Horn of Africa the Red Sea and so on with that next slide we I give back the floor to Klina thank you so much Jalale that's uh incredibly helpful i'm going to um I'm going to get to to questions in just a moment I just wanted to summarize some very important uh points here that came up the first of course is that there has been a a real changing geography of threats in the region uh and in particular the country that is that the uh ENDF and other forces have been uh seeking to suppress um not just since the Pretoria Agreement but of course before it and during um these different regional threats um are all very very strongly regionally bound as we saw in the Alliance for survival but they represent different magnitudes of threat and in particular the Amhara and the OLA being of a much more let's say mature and organized group represent very significant threats should they cooperate and coordinate both in the alliance but also independently in part I say that because there's been a number of occasions over the last week where different attacks, you know, reported attacks for example in Deprezia toward Bishoftu and others and of course recent potential drone attacks in Bahadar, they may represent a component of the larger struggle, the larger opposition struggle, but they can just as easily of course represent the internal struggle in these groups and how they are either fighting factions of their of their parent group or regional forces themselves.
• 30:15
  SPEAKER_00: So I would emphasize here that all of the violence that is happening within Ethiopia tends to take on different themes and certainly a changing geography over time, but they often are related to the hyper-local and certainly hyper-regional politics of those regions and of course can be coordinated to to as many people were concerned about in the first northern conflict they can kind of cut the ENDF a thousand ways thereby thereby lessening its effectiveness as a as a nationwide force.
• 30:50
  SPEAKER_00: I also wanted to make it clear that the ENDF capabilities have certainly increased since the first conflict which ended of course in 2022 although the amount of violence that is happening within Ethiopia on a regular basis and certainly the very substantial conflict within the Amhara region with the Fano weakened its ability to use that regional strength, which was very key of course to its um overtaking the North in particular the Tigray forces in the original war.
• 31:26
  SPEAKER_00: Another thing I wanted to note is that it's not often typical to have this much information about different alliance structures within not just African conflicts but conflicts more generally and it really speaks to the unique nature of the Ethiopian conflict and how much attention it draws, certainly, but also how really interested both Ethiopians and those interested in Ethiopia are in what happens in this region.
• 32:07
  SPEAKER_00: But as things become more unstable within the Red Sea area, the outcome of these internal conflicts becomes ever more important about whether or not there's going to be the ability to turn to that region and either participate in conflicts or in fact to weaken some of the players within that.
• 32:26
  SPEAKER_01: In fact Jalale I'm going to ask you something that has been asked here about whether or not Eritrea has been involved in the fighting within the within Tigrai during this conflict of course it has a very very different experience in the last conflict that maybe you could also speak to so as I mentioned earlier um our data shows that uh in February and a few months after that we can see that the EDFs the AirTrian defense forces were also being mobilized within Tukrai region uh especially on the West side like Sheraro, Shere and so on.
• 33:11
  SPEAKER_01: That's what we know so far within the region there is no confirmation from our side uh that the EDFs are fighting within Tukrai uh but as I said there is communication blackout and we are unable to reach out to our local sources and and so on.
• 33:30
  SPEAKER_01: So as things uh develop we will get more information but in general in the pat like within the past one week um the the AFAR regional president has claimed that the ATRM forces are very much active within AFAR region and they have controlled part of the northern AFA region and they are also fighting alongside TDF so as things develop develop our analysis might also change and our answers might also change this is what we know being then uh physically present um just very quickly Jolly I should note that uh quite a lot of the information that we are receiving are from a network of of local informants in the region that we have cultivated and uh grown now for several years as we've been following the conflicts and so even despite this this level of investment in the region especially getting information out as we all know the information from Tigrae has been very difficult to both extract but also to confirm.
• 34:45
  SPEAKER_00: And so as Jalale mentioned the information that we currently have we are passing along especially on our alert page and we will continue to do so when we can.
• 34:56
  SPEAKER_01: So some other questions that I think that we would like to address here relate to um somebody had asked about the arresting of senior Tigrine officers uh prior to the outbreak of the current conflict perhaps Jalale you can speak to the level of let's say elite factionalization and fractures that have been present in the conflict now for some time um yes um so the the arrest officially happened or people being removed from their house arrest actually happened along that alongside when the violence was escalating last week uh but some of these um leaders top leaders is is that the uh the um I'm sorry the the former interim president Taddesawarada and uh some officials who were uh serving as the interim uh government du during uh his time of service and they were first uh under house arrest kind of thing but some of them were able to go outside but they had uh securities around them and this happened starting from May 2026 when um when TPLA free initiated the 2020 regional government however last week these individuals at least three uh officials were forcibly taken from their home and we don't know where they are we know that at the beginning they were placed in a one hotel together I mean at least in one hotel together but after that we have no further information other than the claims happening on online uh but I since this is not confirmed I'm not going to mention that here another development is that some of the generals might also be not be not active especially those who were in charge of the western side front because as analysts we were expecting uh the a third uh frontline on the disputed territory side you know across like near to the Tekase River um near to Walkite but that side has been quiet uh some information indicates that there might be a dispute or among the top leaders of TPLIF and also the generals uh who's supposed to lead that front so we are keeping an eye but this is what we know so far thank you very much and so just to confirm about some of the other actors that we've mentioned here today from what I understand the Eritreans have the Eritrean government I should specify has remained quiet in the face of this last um these last attacks and these this activity of the last week there has been some reports that they are fighting within Tigrae but those reports are um unconfirmed it might remind everybody of the previous conflict when the ways in which Eritrean troops were designated or distinguished from other troops was often quite difficult.
• 38:25
  SPEAKER_00: And that is and that is a uh that is the purpose in some ways to to make sure that it's quite difficult to distinguish between the fighting forces of different entities rather than rather than a result of disinformation or misinformation.
• 38:42
  SPEAKER_00: It's quite intentional to do it that way.
• 38:45
  SPEAKER_00: There has been some let's say belligerent words between different governments in the region in particular the Ethiopian government assuming or rather stating that both Egypt and Sudan are contributing to the current support base for the alliance more generally but the TPLF in particular that has been met with the Sudanese parties noting that the Ethiopian governments are bel government is believed to be supporting the RSF which is of course a Sudanese insurgent group which has remained relatively quiet in the last few months compared to their previous activity and is supported by UAE or certainly was supported by UAE and um and another another I would say close to confirmed assertion that they are being trained in Binishokung.
• 39:43
  SPEAKER_00: So there are as we can see here massive numbers of regional let's say tensions that are coming together in this conflict and um and leading to governments of all kinds stepping in let's say and um and trying to either assert what it is they're doing or deny what it is they're doing or potentially as we've just said in the Eritrean example to to um participate.
• 40:12
  SPEAKER_01: One thing that is important and I think is a development from today is that the TPLF and its particular forces as it goes through Afar is looking to claim that they are trying to sever the um the links with the line to Djibouti do you want to speak to that um Julale yes uh so the Djibouti case is a bit um economically related as well uh so um ethiopia's main trade route is um uh through Djibouti and that's why we we are seeing one of the fronts being with an AFAR and um just like the previous war um they the TPA left wants to control the main route from Djibouti to Addis Ababa and there are also different actors uh behind not closed door but a slightly opened door where we can pick and see who's involved and who's trying to support um when it comes to regional actors I would like to say that um the regional power dynamic in the Horn of Africa began to began to shift this year at the beginning of this year uh following um the Israelis recognition of Somaliland and also uh after the UAE was kicked out of Somalia uh after being accused of helping um uh an opposition leader uh from Yemen to skip.
• 41:58
  SPEAKER_01: Um after that we have seen a lot of um uh power change shifts uh agreements being changed and this also includes uh Djibouti as well sometimes aligning uh with um etrea Egypt uh and so on but they are also trying to be neutral and also uh changing sides but the shift was not completed because of the Iran war which affected uh most of the regional powers would like to uh who were involved in this power change and so on so now what we are seeing is that this uh interest of alignment shifts and so on have begun again uh to make sure who's supporting whom in this conflict happening in Ethiopia as well as in the neighboring countries.
• 42:52
  SPEAKER_01: So I hope this gives a bit like a general picture of what's going on uh with Djibouti as well and other regional actors.
• 43:02
  SPEAKER_00: Thanks very much I will say that the the very very volatile international situation could really lead this conflict to go in any number of different ways.
• 43:13
  SPEAKER_00: What what I will say about this conflict more so than almost any other on the continent at the moment is that it is more likely to be strongly affected by the occurrences in Yemen or in Iran or in fact in Israel than they are from other African conflicts as we as we often see.
• 43:34
  SPEAKER_00: So this is a particularly let's say open conflict to the international politics not just of the Red Sea but beyond because of how prominent or how important and what kind of priority the TPLF issue is going to be to other parties outside of Ethiopia.
• 43:53
  SPEAKER_00: That is that is really a scenario that can go any which way at the moment and they certainly have let's say the global attention just at the moment but as we've seen in this region quite often just in the last six to eight months that can quick quickly shift to any number of different uh unstable areas and opposition actors within the region.
• 44:16
  SPEAKER_00: I'm gonna take some questions now from the audience and in particular from Benyam.
• 44:21
  SPEAKER_00: Uh what is the end game of this confrontation do you think, Julali?
• 44:24
  SPEAKER_00: And do you think that um the Tigrina people, the Tigranes in general, the Amhara and of course the Oromo will ever be able to make peace with this government.
• 44:38
  SPEAKER_01: So it depends who you ask for the end game.
• 44:42
  SPEAKER_01: So the end game for the Alliances, Alliances for Survival, is to remove the current government and then hold in quotation, constitutional dialogue, closed quotation, and then based on this outcome of dialogue, continue administrating the country.
• 45:01
  SPEAKER_01: This is what they are telling us.
• 45:03
  SPEAKER_01: But when we see practically none of them has the same ideology, each of them exists because the other one existed.
• 45:12
  SPEAKER_01: They are enemies and there is no way for them to work together.
• 45:19
  SPEAKER_01: As for the government, the government wants of course to remove all rebel groups and ascertain its dominance when it comes to security and weapons and they believe that TPA live is the root cause I'm mentioning the government side is the root cause and removing that might de escalate the situation in the country.
• 46:02
  SPEAKER_01: Their supporters are not happy for example OLA's most supporters are not happy with OLS decision to align with TPA left.
• 46:12
  SPEAKER_01: The same is true for those uh true followers of IFNM and who thought that um this uh organization was going to protect the disputed territories and and so on and we are seeing a lot of opposition when it comes to um this organization as well and the people want peace peace um and they know who's who's making their daily life we have to talk about the daily life and uh people are not able to travel freely um they economically they cannot get what they need especially those outside of Addis or within Addis because economically there there is a lot of abduction there is a lot of checking checkpoints by different armed groups so the people who are living daily within the country they know who's who's making trouble and who's trying to bring peace so in general the people want peace and uh for example um they want the they don't want any peace agreement for example when it comes to the current escalation in northern Ethiopia some of them are saying that there's no need for peace agreement let's finish it either TPA leave removing the government or the government uh getting the upper hand so everyone wants things to be done and then move on to the next uh stability so that's what we know that's a that's a really good point um I just want to bring up a few things to maybe summarize some of the things we've mentioned about Eritrea and and um other cases here which is and especially about drone capabilities so Eritrea was under sanctions by the US until September 18th of this year when they were alleviated they were under sanctions because of their activity within the First Northern War.
• 48:08
  SPEAKER_00: Once those sanctions were removed of course it it allowed Eritrea to purchase more arms and that is one of the reasons people are concerned not just about Eritrea's actions but also about the ability of the TPLF to access arms despite the fact that the TPLF have been placed under sanctions by the U.S.
• 48:27
  SPEAKER_00: since the beginning of this year.
• 48:29
  SPEAKER_00: Now, of course the US is not the only people who can provide arms by any means but it does indicate some level of international support and willingness to provide new new hardware for these conflicts I will also just mention because I think it's important to get a sense of the the change in the last five years.
• 48:50
  SPEAKER_00: More broadly in the last five years offense or attack has become extremely cheap much, much cheaper than defense.
• 48:58
  SPEAKER_00: And that is in part because of the availability and the accessibility of drone warfare to not just state partners but of course non-state armed groups so whereas people may be somewhat shocked by the availability of these types of arms to not just the TPLF but others, it really shouldn't be in fact ACLED has noted a drastic increase in the use of drones by almost all non-state armed actors, especially across the African continent.
• 49:30
  SPEAKER_00: So it should be something that we are all expecting rather than surprised by when we see these weapons being used much more freely and in and in much greater quantities than they would have been in 2021-2022.
• 49:44
  SPEAKER_00: So I also want to note though that Ethiopia itself has drastically changed since the last conflict not only I think is the ENDF a far more professional and coherent force but unfortunately areas like Amhara and Otomia which would have been relatively free to go into even in 2021 now have become quite difficult to traverse for normal people, for regular people, in part because of the really quite extreme levels of violence especially in Amhara, which of course was a region that was closely allied with the government during the last conflict and what has happened there since has not just been a drastic increase in FONO violence especially with the ENDF but a splintering of that movement significant enough to cause some FANO to remain um as we've mentioned before certainly less active against the government now because of an agreement after this conflict has ceased but others extremely motivated factions of of the of the Unhara coalition seeking to actually destabilize their previous their previous partners and Jalale mentioned that in reference to the current Amharan forces.
• 51:07
  SPEAKER_00: That is also the case of course in in the Aroma region where we have some members of OL Shahne contributing or at least coordinating with local and regional forces whereas others of course are actively taking against it.
• 51:22
  SPEAKER_00: Although of course as we've also noted the OLA is the is certainly not a major member of this Alliance for survival and in many ways wants to distance themselves quite a bit which is not to say that they will cease their own violence in the in Oromia but this is all to say that whatever whatever plan the federal government had to create peace across Ethiopia, even in and outside of Tigrae has largely failed.
• 51:55
  SPEAKER_00: And if anything these violent groups have been suppressed but they certainly haven't dissipated as threats both to people within their own regions but also their ability to coordinate and potentially to create much larger problems within Ethiopia.
• 52:10
  SPEAKER_00: We had a question earlier about how safe it was across Ethiopia, how safe it is in Odes, and it's a hard question to answer today but it wouldn't necessarily have been a hard one to answer five years ago which was that it was generally safe but it's a much harder question to answer today.
• 52:27
  SPEAKER_00: Jalale do you have anything to add on that?
• 52:31
  SPEAKER_01: One thing I think I didn't correct me if I mentioned this during the presentation or not um among the different phano militias uh the Gonder Fanal militias and the North Shawa phano militias are against uh working together with TP so in other words they have been they became enemies of IFNM uh the the the the party which is aligned with the uh under alliances for survival and for example over the weekend um on Saturday and Sunday there was an armed clash between those militias who who are under IFNM and those leaders or final militias we who are believed to be against IFNM they clashed in I believe South Gondorzone somewhere in Gonder not the city the area South Gondorzone uh they clashed for two days uh so we expect um this is not a new thing uh within final militias we have seen the past three years uh we have seen a lot of infighting and this is one part of that infighting and the tradition of eliminating in quotation uh any opposition within uh final militias um regarding trouble as you said it's a bit difficult and it's outside of uh a clade um um uh preview to comment on this but for those who would like to continue being updated we invite you to follow our conflict alert page um maybe someone could share the link on the or it's it maybe it's already shared and you can follow uh our uh daily um information there.
• 54:27
  SPEAKER_00: Yes very much that's uh we do have an alert page we also have um a podcast where Jalali and I have addressed much more specific questions than what we covered today.
• 54:39
  SPEAKER_00: Um I do want to make sure that people understand that what we are effectively saying is that looking at this conflict over really six years, which I think is the appropriate amount of time to understand it at the moment, it's going in one direction, which is that it's going to continue in some vein.
• 54:59
  SPEAKER_00: It's going towards the Red Sea.
• 55:02
  SPEAKER_00: It will of course incorporate the very clearly stated government aim of access to the Red Sea for Ethiopia in some respects.
• 55:11
  SPEAKER_00: This is obviously a conduit to that goal being met the fact that there will be a very long road between where we are today and where that particular battle may uh end up and how it will manifest.
• 55:26
  SPEAKER_00: For that to happen which I think if anything is notable about the government reaction to this outside of the fighting forces in in the border regions that Jalali mentioned, if there's anything notable it's that the government reiterated their stated desire and in fact intention of finding a way for Ethiopia to access the sea um as a as a national priority and I think that we shouldn't understand the opportunity that this conflict allows for the government to seek that that goal.
• 56:00
  SPEAKER_00: Jalale that was probably that was that was off script so you could please maybe you should rein us back in um I think uh we are good to go unless otherwise there is a last question.
• 56:14
  SPEAKER_01: This is um based on available information we are analysts we are bringing clarity whenever crisis happens uh based on our data so we are um trying uh our best to analyze the situation based on our previous experience um and also uh current available data as I said we will keep uh updating our uh website we with recent developments as well so thank you everyone for coming but I will give back the floor to you thanks very much I did want to thank everybody for their patience today for their questions we will address all of your questions directly in fact through email if we haven't gotten to the the the sense of them today um I also just wanted to mention that this is you know a very moving as in it's a quite it's quite a flexible adaptable and I think complex um series of conflicts here.
• 57:17
  SPEAKER_00: Jalali and I and of course the small army of our of our um monitors and stringers and coders will keep everybody up to date with the most recent information as and when we find it and um thank you very much for your attention.
• 57:37
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you everybody.