Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [Mastermind] 1967 Warren Buffett to Partnership Letter
Transcript
- 0:001967 and an estimate of the 1966 tax situation. 98 cordially
- 0:07Warren Buffett, Webb and 99 Buffett Partnership Ltd, 610
- 0:12Kiewit Plaza, Omaha, NE 68131 Telephone 0424110 January 25th,
- 0:221967. The first decade the partnership
- 0:25had its 10th anniversary during 1966.
- 0:29The celebration was appropriate. An all time record, both past
- 0:33and future was established for our performance margin.
- 0:36Relative to the Dow, our advantage was 36 points which
- 0:40resulted from a + 20.4% for the partnership and a -, 15.6% for
- 0:45the Dow. This pleasant but non repeatable
- 0:48experience was partially due to a lackluster performance by the
- 0:51Dow. Virtually all investment
- 0:54managers outperformed it during the year.
- 0:56The Dow is weighted by the dollar price of the 30 stocks
- 0:59involved, several of the highest price components, which thereby
- 1:03carry disproportionate weight. DuPont General Motors were
- 1:07particularly poor performers in 1966.
- 1:11This coupled with the general aversion to conventional blue
- 1:14chips caused the Dow to suffer relative to general investment
- 1:18experience, particularly during the last quarter.
- 1:21The following summarizes the year by year performance of the
- 1:24Dow, the performance of the partnership before allocation,
- 1:281/4 of the excess over 6% to the general partner, and the results
- 1:33for limited partners. Year Overall results from
- 1:36Partnership Results to Limited Partners Dow 1 Results Three
- 1:401957 - 8.4 percent 10.4 percent 9.3% Nineteen 5838.5% Forty .9
- 1:50percent 32.2% Nineteen 5920 percent 25.9 percent 20.9% 1960
- 1:59- 6.2 percent 22.8 percent 18.6% Nineteen 6122.4 percent 45.9%
- 2:09Thirty 5.9 percent 1962 - 7.6 percent 13.9 percent 11.9%
- 2:18Nineteen 6320.6 percent 38.7% Thirty .5% 196418.7 percent 27.8
- 2:28percent 22.3% Nineteen 6514.2 percent 47.2 percent 36.9
- 2:37percent 1966 - 15.6 percent 20.4 percent 16.8% Cumulative Results
- 2:45141.1 percent 1000 and 28.7 percent 641.5% Annual compounded
- 2:539.7 percent 29 percent 23.5% Rate 1 Based on yearly changes
- 3:00in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been
- 3:03received through ownership of the Dow during that year.
- 3:06The table includes all complete years of partnership activity. 2
- 3:10for 1957 to 61 consists of combined results of all
- 3:15predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire
- 3:19year after all expenses but before distributions to partners
- 3:23or allocations to the general partner. 3 for 1957 to 61
- 3:28computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership
- 3:32results allowing for allocation to the general partner based
- 3:36upon the present partnership agreement but before monthly
- 3:39withdrawals by limited partners. 100 on a cumulative or
- 3:43compounded basis. The results are year overall
- 3:47results from partnership results.
- 3:49Limited Partners Dow Results 1957 - 8.4 percent 10.4 percent
- 3:569.3 percent 19575826.9 percent 55.6% Forty 4.5% 19575952.3
- 4:08percent 95.9% Seventy 4.7 percent 19576042.9 percent 140.6
- 4:17percent 107.2 percent 1950760174 .9 percent 251 percent 181.6%
- 4:2819576261.6 percent 299.8 percent 215.1 percent 1950760395 .1
- 4:39percent 454.5 percent 311.2 percent 1957 Sixty 4131.3
- 4:49percent 608.7 percent 402.9% 1957 Sixty 5164.1 percent 943.2
- 5:00percent 588.5 percent 1957 Sixty 6122.9 percent 1156 percent
- 5:11704.2% Annual Compounded 11.4 percent 29.8 percent 23.9% Rate
- 5:20Investment Companies. On the following page is the
- 5:23usual tabulation showing the results of the two largest open
- 5:27end investment companies, mutual funds that follow a policy of
- 5:30being typically 95 to 100% invested in common stocks, and
- 5:35the two largest diversified closed end investment companies
- 5:40Year Massachusetts Inv Investors Lehman 2 Tricont Dow Limited
- 5:45Trust One Stock 1-2 Partners 1957 - 11.4% - 12.4% - 11.4% -
- 5:542.4% - 8.4 percent 9.3 percent 195842.7 percent 47.5% Forty .8
- 6:05percent 33.2 percent 38.5 percent 32.2 percent 19599
- 6:12percent 10.3 percent 8.1 percent 8.4 percent 20% 20.9 percent
- 6:191960 - 1.0% - 0.6% Two .5 percent 2.8% - 6.2 percent 18.6%
- 6:30Nineteen 6125.6 percent 24.9 percent 23.6 percent 22.5
- 6:37percent 22.4 percent 35.9% 1962 - 9.8% - 13.4% - 14.4% - 10.0% -
- 6:517.6 percent 11.9% Nineteen 6320 percent 16.5 percent 23.7
- 6:59percent 18.3 percent 20.6% Thirty .5% 196415.9 percent 14.3
- 7:08percent 13.6 percent 12.6 percent 18.7 percent 22.3%
- 7:15Nineteen 6510.2 percent 9.8% Nineteen percent 10.7 percent
- 7:2214.2 percent 36.9% 1966 - 7.7% - 10.0% - 2.6% - 6.9% - 15.6
- 7:35percent 16.8% cumulative. 118.1 percent 106.3 percent 142.8
- 7:43percent 126.9 percent. 141.1 percent 641.5% Results Annual
- 7:518.6% Seven point 9 percent 9.8% Nine percent 9.7 percent 23.5%
- 7:59Compounded rate 1 Computed from changes in asset value plus any
- 8:04distributions to holders of record during year 2 from 1966.
- 8:08Moody's Bank and Finance Manual for 1957 to 1965 Estimated for
- 8:141966. These investment company
- 8:17performance figures have been regularly reported here to show
- 8:20that the now is no Patsy as an investment standard.
- 8:24It should again be emphasized that the companies were not
- 8:26selected on the basis of comparability to Buffett
- 8:29Partnership Limited. There are important differences
- 8:32including one, investment companies operate under both
- 8:36internally and externally imposed restrictions on their
- 8:39investment actions that are not applicable to us.
- 8:43Two, investment companies diversify far more than we do
- 8:46and in all probability thereby 101 have less chance for a
- 8:51really bad performance relative to the now in a single year.
- 8:55And three, their managers have considerably less incentive for
- 8:58abnormal performance and greater incentive for conventionality.
- 9:02However, the records above do reveal what well regarded,
- 9:06highly paid, full time professional investment managers
- 9:10have been able to accomplish while working with common
- 9:12stocks. These managers have been
- 9:14favorites of American investors more than 600,000 making free
- 9:19choices among many alternatives in the investment management
- 9:22field. It is probable that their
- 9:24results are typical of the overwhelming majority of
- 9:28professional investment managers.
- 9:30It is not true, however, that these are the best records
- 9:33achieved in the investment field.
- 9:35A few mutual funds and some private investment operations
- 9:38have compiled records vastly superior to the Dow and in some
- 9:42cases substantially superior to Buffett Partnership Limited.
- 9:47Their investment techniques are usually very dissimilar to ours
- 9:50and not within my capabilities. However, they are generally
- 9:54managed by very bright, motivated people and it is only
- 9:58fair that I mentioned the existence of such superior
- 10:01results in this general discussion of the record of
- 10:04professional investment management trends in our
- 10:07business. A keen mind working diligently
- 10:09at interpreting the figures on page one could come to a lot of
- 10:13wrong conclusions. The results of the 1st 10 years
- 10:16have absolutely no chance of being duplicated or even
- 10:19remotely approximated during the next decade.
- 10:23They may well be achieved by some hungry 25 year old working
- 10:26with $105,100 initial partnership capital and
- 10:31operating during a 10 year business and market environment
- 10:34which is frequently conducive to successful implementation of his
- 10:38investment philosophy. They will not be achieved by a
- 10:41better Fed 36 year old working with our $54,065,345 current
- 10:48partnership capital who presently finds perhaps 1/5 to
- 10:52110th as many really good ideas as previously to implement his
- 10:57investment philosophy. Buffett Associates Limited,
- 11:00predecessor to Buffett Partnership Limited, was founded
- 11:03on the West banks of the Missouri May 5th, 1956 by a
- 11:08hearty little band consisting of four family members, three close
- 11:12friends and $105,100. I tried to find some brilliant
- 11:17flash of insight regarding our future or present conditions
- 11:21from my first page and a half annual letter of January 1957 to
- 11:26insert as a quote here. However, someone evidently
- 11:30doctored my file copy so as to remove the perceptive remarks I
- 11:34must have made. At that time and for some years
- 11:37subsequently, there were substantial numbers of
- 11:39securities selling it well below the value to a private owner
- 11:43criterion we utilized for selection of general market
- 11:47investments. We also experienced a flow of
- 11:50workout opportunities where the percentages were very much to
- 11:53our liking. The problem was always which not
- 11:56what. Accordingly, we were able to own
- 11:5915 to 25 issues in B, enthusiastic about the
- 12:03probabilities inherent in all holdings.
- 12:06In the last few years, this situation has changed
- 12:09dramatically. We now find very few securities
- 12:11that are understandable to me, available in decent size and
- 12:16which offer the expectation of investment performance, meeting
- 12:19our yardstick of 10 percentage points per annum superior to the
- 12:22Dow. In the last three years, we have
- 12:25come up with only two or three new ideas a year that have had
- 12:28such an expectancy of superior performance.
- 12:31Fortunately, in some cases we have made the most of them.
- 12:35However, in earlier years a lesser effort produced literally
- 12:39dozens of comparable opportunities.
- 12:41It is difficult to be objective about the causes for such
- 12:44diminution of 1's own productivity. 3 factors that
- 12:48seem apparent are one is somewhat changed market
- 12:51environment, 2 are increased size, and three, substantially
- 12:54more competition. 102 It is obvious that a business based
- 12:59upon only a trickle of fine ideas has poorer prospects than
- 13:02one based upon a steady flow of such ideas.
- 13:06To date, the trickle has provided as much financial
- 13:09nourishment as the flow. This is true because there is
- 13:12only so much one can digest, $1,000,000 ideas are of no great
- 13:17benefit to $1000 bank accounts. This was impressed on me in my
- 13:21early days and because a limited number of ideas causes 1 to
- 13:25utilize those available more intensively.
- 13:28The latter factor has definitely been operative with us in recent
- 13:31years. However, a trickle has
- 13:33considerably more chance of drying up completely than a
- 13:36flow. These conditions will not cause
- 13:38me to attempt investment decisions outside my sphere of
- 13:42understanding. I don't go for the if you can't
- 13:44lick M, join in philosophy. My own leaning is toward if you
- 13:48can't join M, lick M. We will not go into businesses
- 13:52where technology, which is a way over my head, is crucial to the
- 13:56investment decision. I know about as much about
- 13:59semiconductors or integrated circuits as I do of the mating
- 14:02habits of the cruzasch. That's a Polish made bug,
- 14:06students. If you have trouble pronouncing
- 14:08it, rhyme it with Thruzasks. Furthermore, we will not follow
- 14:12the frequently prevalent approach of investing in
- 14:15securities where an attempt to anticipate market action
- 14:18overrides business valuations. Such so-called fashion investing
- 14:23has frequently produced very substantial and quick profits in
- 14:26recent years and currently, as I write this in January, it
- 14:30represents an investment technique whose soundness I can
- 14:34neither affirm nor deny. It does not completely satisfy
- 14:37my intellect or perhaps my prejudices and most definitely
- 14:41does not fit my temperament. I will not invest my own money
- 14:45based upon such an approach. Hence I will most certainly not
- 14:48do so with your money. Finally, we will not seek out
- 14:52activity in investment operations even if offering
- 14:55splendid profit expectations where major human problems
- 14:59appear to have a substantial chance of developing.
- 15:01What I do promise you as partners is that I will work
- 15:04hard to maintain the trickle of ideas and try to get the most
- 15:08out of it. That is possible, but if it
- 15:10should dry up completely, you will be informed honestly and
- 15:14promptly so that we may all take alternative action.
- 15:17Analysis of 1966 results All four main categories of our
- 15:22investment operation worked out well in 1966.
- 15:26Specifically, we had a total overall gain of $8,906,701.00.
- 15:32Derived as follows Category Average Investment Overall Gain
- 15:37Controls 17,259,342 Dollars 1,566,302 Dollars General's
- 15:47Private Owner 1,359,340 Dollars $1,004,362 Generals Relatively
- 15:5621,847,045 Dollars $5,124,254 Undervalued Workouts 7,666,314
- 16:11Dollars $1,714,181.00 Miscellaneous Including US
- 16:181,332,609 dollars $18,422 Treasury bills Total Income
- 16:27$9,390,677 less General expense 483,976 dollars Overall gain
- 16:39$8,906,701.00 A few caveats are necessary before we get on with
- 16:45the main discussion. One.
- 16:47An explanation of the various categories listed above was made
- 16:50in the January 18th, 1965 letter.
- 16:54If your memory needs refreshing and your favorite newsstand does
- 16:58not have the Pocketbook edition, we'll be glad to give you a
- 17:01copy. 103 Two, The classifications are not
- 17:05ironclad. Nothing is changed
- 17:07retroactively, but the initial decision as to category is
- 17:11sometimes arbitrary. 3 percentage returns calculated on
- 17:15the average investment base by category would be understated
- 17:19relative to partnership percentage returns which are
- 17:22calculated on a beginning investment base.
- 17:24In the above figures, a security purchased by us at 100 on
- 17:29January 1st, which appreciated at an even rate to 150 on
- 17:33December 31st, would have an average investment of 125,
- 17:37producing a 40% result contrasted to a 50% result by
- 17:42the customary approach. In other words, the above
- 17:45figures use a monthly average of market values in calculating the
- 17:49average investment for all. Results are based on a 100%
- 17:53ownership non leverage basis. Interest and other general
- 17:58expenses are deducted from total performance and not segregated
- 18:02by category. Expenses directly related to
- 18:05specific investment operations, such as dividends paid on short
- 18:09stock, are deducted by category when securities are borrowed
- 18:13directly and sold short. The net investment longs minus
- 18:17shorts is shown for the applicable average investment
- 18:20category. 5 The above table has only limited use.
- 18:24The results applicable to each category are dominated by one or
- 18:29two investments. They do not represent a
- 18:31collection of great quantities of stable data, mortality rates
- 18:35of all American males, or something of the sort from which
- 18:38conclusions can be drawn in projections made.
- 18:41Instead, they represent infrequent, non homogeneous
- 18:45phenomena leading to very tentative suggestions regarding
- 18:49various courses of action, and are so used by US.
- 18:52Six. Finally, these calculations are
- 18:55not made with the same loving care we apply to counting the
- 18:58money and are subject to possible clerical or
- 19:01mathematical error since they are not entirely self checking
- 19:05controls. There were three main sources of
- 19:07gain during 1966 in respect to controlled companies.
- 19:11These arose through 1 retained business earnings applicable to
- 19:15our holdings in 1966 to open market purchases of additional
- 19:20stock below our controlling interest valuation and three,
- 19:24unrealized appreciation in marketable securities held by
- 19:27the controlled companies. The total of all positive items
- 19:31came to $2,600,838 in 1966. However, due to factors
- 19:39mentioned in my November 1st, 1966 letter, specific industry
- 19:43conditions and other relevant valuation items, this gain was
- 19:47reduced by $1,034,780 in arriving at our fair valuation
- 19:54applicable to controlling interests as of December 31st,
- 19:581966. Thus, the overall gain in the
- 20:01control category was reduced to $1,566,058 for the year.
- 20:08We were undoubtedly fortunate that we had a relatively high
- 20:11percentage of net assets invested in businesses.
- 20:14And not stocks. During 1966, the same money in
- 20:18general market holdings would probably have produced a loss,
- 20:21perhaps substantial, during the year.
- 20:23This was not planned, and if the stock market had advanced
- 20:26substantially during the year, this category would have been an
- 20:30important drag on overall performance.
- 20:33The same situation will prevail during 1967.
- 20:37General's private owner, our performance here falls in the
- 20:40$21.00 a day, once a month category.
- 20:43In the middle of 1965, we started purchasing a very
- 20:47attractive widely held security which was selling far below its
- 20:51value to a private owner. Our hope was that over a two or
- 20:55three-year period, we could get $10 million or more invested at
- 20:59the favorable prices prevailing. The various businesses that the
- 21:03company operated were understandable and we could
- 21:06check out competitive strengths and weaknesses thoroughly with
- 21:09competitors, distributors, customers, 104 suppliers, ex
- 21:14employees, etcetera. Market conditions peculiar to
- 21:18the stock gave us hope that with patients we could buy
- 21:22substantial quantities of the stock without disturbing the
- 21:25price. At year end 1965, we had
- 21:28invested $1,956,980 and the market value of our holding was
- 21:34$2,358,412.00. So that $401,432.00 was
- 21:42contributed to performance during 1965.
- 21:45We would have preferred of course to have seen the market
- 21:49below cost since our interest was an additional buying, not in
- 21:52selling. This would have dampened Buffett
- 21:55Partnerships Limited S 1965 performance and perhaps reduce
- 21:59the euphoria experienced by limited partners.
- 22:02Psychically, the net result to all partners would have been a
- 22:05standoff since the general partner would have been
- 22:08floating, but would have enhanced long term performance.
- 22:11The fact that the stock had risen somewhat above our cost
- 22:14had already slowed down our buying program and thereby
- 22:17reduced ultimate profit. An even more dramatic example of
- 22:21the conflict between short term performance and the maximization
- 22:24of long term results occurred in 1966.
- 22:28Another party, previously completely unknown to me, issued
- 22:31a tender offer which foreclosed opportunities for future
- 22:35advantageous buying. I made the decision that the
- 22:38wisest course it may not have been for us to follow was to
- 22:41dispose of our holdings and we thus realized a total profit of
- 22:45$1,269,181.00 in February, of which $867,749 was applicable to
- 22:561966. While any gains look
- 22:59particularly good in the market environment that intimately
- 23:02developed in 1966, you can be sure I don't delight in going
- 23:06round making molehills out of mountains.
- 23:08The molehill, of course, was reflected in 1966 results.
- 23:13However, we would have been much better off from a long range
- 23:17standpoint if 1966 results had been 5 percentage points worse
- 23:22and we were continuing to buy substantial quantities of the
- 23:24stock at the depressed prices that might have been expected to
- 23:28prevail in this year's market environment.
- 23:30Good ideas were a dime a dozen. Such a premature ending would
- 23:34not be unpleasant. There is something to be said,
- 23:37of course, for a business operation where some of the
- 23:40failures produce moderate profits.
- 23:42However, you can see how hard it is to develop replacement ideas
- 23:47by examining our average investment in the private owner
- 23:50category. We came up with nothing during
- 23:52the remainder of the year, despite lower stock prices,
- 23:55which should have been conducive to finding such opportunities.
- 23:59Generals relatively undervalued. Our relative performance in this
- 24:03category was the best we have ever had due to one holding
- 24:07which was our largest investment at year end 1965 and also year
- 24:12end 1966. This investment has
- 24:15substantially outperformed the general market for us during
- 24:18each year 196419651966 that we have held it.
- 24:24While any single years performance can be quite
- 24:27erratic, we think the probabilities are highly
- 24:30favorable for superior future performance over a three or four
- 24:34year period. The attractiveness and relative
- 24:36certainty of this particular security are what caused me to
- 24:40introduce Ground Rule 7 in November 1965 to allow
- 24:45individual holdings of up to 40% of our net assets.
- 24:50We send considerable effort continuously evaluating every
- 24:53facet of the company and constantly testing our
- 24:56hypothesis that this security is superior to alternative
- 25:00investment choices. Such constant evaluation and
- 25:03comparison at shifting prices is absolutely essential to our
- 25:07investment operation. It would be much more pleasant
- 25:10and indicate a more favorable future to report that our
- 25:13results in the generals relatively undervalued category
- 25:17represented 15 securities in 10 industries, practically all of
- 25:22which outperformed the market. We simply don't have that many
- 25:25good ideas. As mentioned above, new ideas
- 25:28are continually measured against present ideas, and we will not
- 25:32make shifts if the effect is to downgrade expectable
- 25:36performance. This policy has resulted in
- 25:38limited activity in recent years when we have felt so strongly
- 25:42about the relative merits of our largest holding.
- 25:45Such a condition has meant that realized gains have been a much
- 25:48smaller portion of total performance than in earlier
- 25:52years when the flow of good ideas was more substantial.
- 25:55The sort of concentration we have in this category is bound
- 25:58to produce wide swings in short term performance, some most
- 26:03certainly unpleasant. There have already been some of
- 26:06these applicable to shorter time spans than I one O 5 use in
- 26:10reporting to partners. This is one reason I think
- 26:13frequent reporting to be foolish and potentially misleading in a
- 26:16long term oriented business such as ours.
- 26:19Personally, within the limits expressed in last year's letter
- 26:23on diversification, I am willing to trade the pains forget about
- 26:27the pleasures of substantial short term variance in exchange
- 26:30for maximization of long term performance.
- 26:34However, I am not willing to incur risk of substantial
- 26:37permanent capital loss and seeking to better long term
- 26:41performance. To be perfectly clear, under our
- 26:44policy of concentration of holdings, partners should be
- 26:47completely prepared for periods of substantial underperformance,
- 26:51far more likely and sharply rising markets to offset the
- 26:55occasional overperformance such as we have experienced in 1965
- 26:59and 1966. And as a price we pay for hope
- 27:03for good long term performance. All this talk about the long
- 27:06pole has caused one partner to observe that even 5 minutes is a
- 27:10long time if once head is being held underwater.
- 27:14This is the reason of course that we use borrowed money very
- 27:18sparingly an hour operation. Average bank borrowings during
- 27:211966 were well under 10% of average net worth.
- 27:26One final word about the generals relatively undervalued
- 27:29category. In this section we also had an
- 27:32experience which helped results in 1966 but hurt our long term
- 27:36prospects. We had just one really important
- 27:39new idea in this category in 1966.
- 27:43Our purchasing started in late spring but had only come to
- 27:46about $1.6 million. It could be bought steadily, but
- 27:50at only a moderate pace when outside conditions drove the
- 27:53stock price up to a point where it was not relatively
- 27:56attractive. Though our overall gain was
- 27:59$728,141.00 on an average holding period of 6 1/2 months
- 28:05in 1966, it would have been much more desirable had the stock
- 28:09done nothing for a long period of time while we accumulated a
- 28:13really substantial position. Workouts.
- 28:16In last year's letter, I forecast reduced importance for
- 28:19workouts. While they were not of the
- 28:21importance of some past years, I was pleasantly surprised by our
- 28:25experience in 1966 during which we kept an average of
- 28:29$7,666,314.00 employed in this category.
- 28:35Furthermore, we tend to ascribe borrowings to the workout
- 28:38section so that our net equity capital employed was really
- 28:42something under this figure and our return was somewhat better
- 28:45than that 22.4% indicated on page 6.
- 28:49Here too, we ran into substantial variation.
- 28:53At June 30th, our overall profit on this category was $16,112 on
- 28:59an average investment of $7,870,151.00, so that we really
- 29:05had a case of an extraordinarily good second-half offsetting a
- 29:09poor first half. In past years, sometimes as much
- 29:13as 30 to 40% of our net worth has been invested in workouts,
- 29:17but it is highly unlikely that this condition will prevail in
- 29:20the future. Nevertheless, they may continue
- 29:23to produce some decent returns on the moderate amount of
- 29:26capital employed. Miscellaneous Operationally, we
- 29:29continue to function well above rated capacity with Bill, John,
- 29:34Elizabeth and Donna all contributing excellent
- 29:36performances. At Buffett Partnership Limited.
- 29:39We have never had to divert investment effort to offset
- 29:43organizational shortcomings and this has been an important
- 29:46ingredient in the performance over the years.
- 29:49Pete Marwick Mitchell and company, aided for the second
- 29:53year by their computer, turned in the usual speedy, efficient
- 29:57and comprehensive job. We all continue to maintain more
- 30:00than an academic interest in the partnership.
- 30:03The employees and I, our spouses and children, have a total of
- 30:07over $10 million invested at January 1st, 1967.
- 30:12In the case of my family, our Buffett Partnership Limited
- 30:15investment represents well over 90% of our net worth. 106 Within
- 30:21the coming two weeks, you will receive 1A tax letter giving you
- 30:25all BPL information needed for your 1966 federal income tax
- 30:29return. This letter is the only item
- 30:32that counts for tax purposes. 2 An audit from Pete Marwick
- 30:36Mitchell and Company for 1966 setting forth the operations and
- 30:41financial position of BPL as well as your own capital
- 30:44account. 3A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your
- 30:49BPL interest on January 1st, 1967.
- 30:53This is identical with the figures developed in the audit.
- 30:56Let me know if anything in this letter or that occurs during the
- 30:59year needs clarifying. My next letter will be about
- 31:03July 15th, summarizing the first half of this year cordially.
- 31:07Warren E Buffett Webb at 107 Buffett Partnership Ltd, 610
- 31:13Kiewit Plaza, Omaha, NE 68131 Telephone 0424110 July 12th,
- 31:231967 First half performance Again, this is being written in
- 31:28late June prior to the family's trip to California.
- 31:31To maintain the usual chronological symmetry, I try to
- 31:35sublimate my aesthetic urges. When it comes to creating
- 31:38symmetry in the prophet and loss statement, I will leave a few
- 31:41blanks and trust that the conclusions look appropriate
- 31:44when the figures are entered. We began 1967 on a traumatic
- 31:49note, with January turning out to be one of the worst months we
- 31:53have experienced, with a + 3.3% for BPL versus a + 8.5% for the
- 31:59Dow. Despite this sour start, we
- 32:01finished the half about plus 21% for an edge of 9.6 percentage
- 32:06points over the Dow. Again, as throughout 1966 the
- 32:11Dow was a relatively easy competitor, it won't be every
- 32:14year prevailing thinking to the contrary notwithstanding, and a
- 32:18large majority of investment managers outdid this yardstick.
- 32:22The following table summarizes performance to date on the usual
- 32:26basis year overall results from partnership results to limited
- 32:31partners. Dow 1 Results Three 1957 - 8.4
- 32:36percent 10.4 percent 9.3% Nineteen 5838.5% Forty .9
- 32:43percent 32.2% Nineteen 5920 percent 25.9 percent 20.9% 1960
- 32:52- 6.2 percent 22.8 percent 18.6% Nineteen 6122.4 percent 45.9
- 33:01percent 35.9% 1962 - 7.6 percent 13.9 percent 11.9% Nineteen
- 33:116320.6 percent 38.7% Thirty .5% Nineteen 6418.7 percent 27.8
- 33:21percent 22.3% Nineteen 6514.2 percent 47.2 percent 36.9% 1966
- 33:32- 15.6 percent 20.4 percent 16.8% First Half 196711.4
- 33:40percent 21 percent 17.3% Cumulative Results 148.3 percent
- 33:471419.8 percent 843.3% Annual Compounded 9.1 percent 29.6
- 33:56percent 23.8% rate 1 Based on yearly changes in the value of
- 34:01the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through
- 34:04ownership of the Dow during that year.
- 34:06The table includes all complete years of partnership activity. 2
- 34:10for 1957 to 61 consists of combined results of all
- 34:15predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire
- 34:19year after all expenses but before distributions to partners
- 34:23or allocations to the general partner. 3 for 1957 to 61
- 34:28computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership
- 34:31results, allowing for allocation to the general partner based
- 34:35upon the present partnership agreement but before monthly
- 34:39withdrawals by limited partners. BP LS performance during the
- 34:42first hall reflects no change in valuation of our controlled
- 34:46companies and was thus achieved solely by the 63.3% of our net
- 34:52assets invested in marketable securities at the beginning of
- 34:55the year. 108 Any revaluation of diversified retailing company
- 35:00DRC and Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated BH will be made in
- 35:04December, prior to the time the commitment letters become final,
- 35:08and will be based upon all relevant criteria, including
- 35:11current operating, market and credit conditions at that time.
- 35:15Both DRC and BH made important acquisitions during the first
- 35:19half. The overall progress of DRC, 80%
- 35:23owned and both of its subsidiaries Hot Shield Cone and
- 35:26associated cotton shops is highly satisfactory.
- 35:29However, BH is experiencing and faces real difficulties in the
- 35:33textile business. While I don't presently foresee
- 35:36any loss in underlying values, I similarly see no prospect of a
- 35:41good return on the assets employed in the textile
- 35:44business. Therefore, this segment of our
- 35:46portfolio will be a substantial drag on our relative performance
- 35:50as it has been during the first half if the Dow continues to
- 35:53advance. Such relative performance with
- 35:56controlled companies is expected in a strongly advancing market,
- 36:00but is accentuated when the business is making no progress.
- 36:04As a friend of mine says, experience is what you find when
- 36:07you're looking for something else.
- 36:09Investment companies. The usual comparison follows,
- 36:12showing the results of the two largest open end and two largest
- 36:16closed end investment companies, which pursue a policy of 95 to
- 36:20100%. Investment in Common Stocks Year
- 36:24Massachusetts Inv Investors Lehman 2 Tricont Dow Limited
- 36:29Trust One Stock 1-2 Partners 1957 - 11.4% - 12.4% - 11.4% -
- 36:382.4% - 8.4 percent 9.3 percent 195842.7 percent 47.5% Forty .8
- 36:49percent 33.2 percent 38.5 percent 32.2 percent 19599
- 36:56percent 10.3 percent 8.1 percent 8.4 percent 20% 20.9 percent
- 37:031960 - 1.0% - 0.6% Two .5 percent 2.8% - 6.2 percent 18.6%
- 37:14Nineteen 6125.6 percent 24.9 percent 23.6 percent 22.5
- 37:21percent 22.4 percent 35.9% 1962 - 9.8% - 13.4% - 14.4% - 10.0% -
- 37:347.6 percent 11.9% Nineteen 6320 percent 16.5 percent 23.7
- 37:43percent 18.3 percent 20.6% Thirty .5% 196415.9 percent 14.3
- 37:52percent 13.6 percent 12.6 percent 18.7 percent 22.3%
- 37:59Nineteen 6510.2 percent 9.8% Nineteen percent 10.7 percent
- 38:0514.2 percent 36.9% 1966 - 7.7% - 10.0% - 2.6% - 6.9% - 15.6
- 38:19percent 16.8% First Half. 11.3 percent 12.3 percent 19.3
- 38:25percent 14.4 percent 11.4 percent 17.3 percent 1967
- 38:33cumulative 143.3 percent 126.4 percent 185.4 percent 156.8
- 38:41percent 148.3 percent 843.3% Results Annual 8.9 percent 8.1
- 38:50percent 10.5 percent 9.4 percent 9.1 percent 23.8% Compounded
- 38:58rate 1 Computed from changes in asset value plus any
- 39:01distributions to holders of record during year 2 from 1967.
- 39:06Moody's Bank and Finance Manual for 1957 to 1966 Estimated for
- 39:12first half of 1967. The tide continues to be far
- 39:16more important than the swimmers taxes.
- 39:19We entered 1967 with unrealized gains of $16,361,974.
- 39:27Through June 30th we have realized net capital gains of
- 39:31$7,084,104. So it appears likely that we
- 39:35will realize in 1967 a fairly substantial portion of the
- 39:40unrealized gain attributable to your interest at the beginning
- 39:43of the year. This amount was reported to you
- 39:46as item three of our February 2nd, 1967 letter.
- 39:51A copy of that letter, along with a tax letter, will be
- 39:54mailed to you in November giving a rough idea of the tax
- 39:58situation at that time. 109 As I regularly suggest, the safe
- 40:02course to follow on interim estimates is to pay the same
- 40:05estimated tax for 1967 as your actual tax was for 1966.
- 40:11There can be no penalties if you follow this procedure.
- 40:14Whatever our final figure, it looks now as if it will be very
- 40:17largely long term capital gain with only minor amounts, if any,
- 40:22of short term gain and ordinary income.
- 40:25I consider the whole income principal myth fair game for one
- 40:28of my soft spoken, gently worded critiques.
- 40:31As I told Susie in the early days of our marriage, don't
- 40:35worry about the income, just the outcome.
- 40:37Miscellaneous During the first half stand, Perimeter resigned
- 40:41from the Dissolution Committee because of his present full time
- 40:44involvement in investment management.
- 40:47Fred Stanback Junior, a long time partner and experienced
- 40:50investor, was elected by the remaining members to fill the
- 40:54vacancy. As in past years, we will have a
- 40:57report out about November 11th along with the commitment letter
- 41:00and the rough estimate of the 1967 tax situation etcetera.
- 41:06However, there will be a special letter to focus your attention
- 41:09upon it in October. The subject matter will not
- 41:12relate to change in the partnership agreement, but will
- 41:15involve some evolutionary changes in several ground rules,
- 41:19which I want you to have ample time to contemplate before
- 41:22making your plans for.