Latest / CLEs You Actually Want to Hear / Do AIs Dream of Electric Firms? Legal Personhood, Fiduciary Duties, and the AI-Managed Firm
Transcript
- 0:03Hello and welcome to Do AI's Dream of Electric
- 0:05Firms, Legal Personhood, Fiduciary Duties, and
- 0:08AI Managed Firm. I'm delighted to introduce our
- 0:12speaker today, Professor Robert Rhee. Professor
- 0:15Robert Rhee is a John H. and Mary Lou Dasberg
- 0:17Professor of Law at the University of Florida
- 0:19Levin College of Law. He brings a distinctive
- 0:22blend of legal and investment banking experience
- 0:24to his scholarship, having served as a third
- 0:26circuit law clerk and DOJ trial attorney before
- 0:29working as an investment banker at firms including
- 0:31Fox Pit Kelton, Deutsche Bank Alex Brown, and
- 0:35UBS Warburg in New York and London. A prolific
- 0:38author of leading casebooks on business organizations,
- 0:41corporate finance, and LLCs, his scholarship
- 0:44has appeared in top law reviews and has been
- 0:46cited in federal and state judicial opinions.
- 0:49And he's testified before Congress as an expert
- 0:51on financial markets and credit rating agencies,
- 0:54while also teaching law and business internationally
- 0:56in the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Korea,
- 0:59including as a Fulbright distinguished lecturer.
- 1:02And now let's get started. Good afternoon, everybody.
- 1:07Thank you for coming. This is an exciting topic,
- 1:11or I hope it will be. So the topic of the CLE
- 1:16is, do AIs dream of electric firms, legal personhood,
- 1:21fiduciary duties, and AI managed firms? So what
- 1:25we're going to talk about really is how AI could
- 1:30possibly play a role in managing business firms.
- 1:37It is not yet reality, at least not in the United
- 1:42States, but it is possibly coming very soon.
- 1:48So, I want to give a little bit of background
- 1:50of how I began to think about this topic. It
- 1:54was really about two, three years ago when I
- 1:57was having some conversations with some European
- 2:00colleagues and they were asking me about questions
- 2:05about how US firms are managed. legal personhood,
- 2:10who can manage firms, and so we had a good conversation
- 2:13and where they were thinking about was the possibility
- 2:17of AI and of course that triggered my curiosity
- 2:22as well. So I am not exclusively in the space
- 2:28of technology and business law. My area of research
- 2:33is principally more theoretically oriented in
- 2:38terms of the laws of firms and the theory of
- 2:41the firm. But this is certainly one area that
- 2:45is emerging and I think emerging quite quickly.
- 2:49Okay. All right. So just a little, does everybody
- 2:53see my screen? And I hope you do. So let me,
- 3:00let me move on here. There we are. Okay. So a
- 3:10little background on me. So I graduated from
- 3:14the University of Chicago, George Washington
- 3:18University and the Wharton Business School. I
- 3:20have a JD and MBA. I clerked on the Third Circuit
- 3:23coming out of law school and then subsequently
- 3:26went to the Department of Justice to become a
- 3:30trial lawyer. And then I had a career switch
- 3:34somewhat. I went to business school at the Wharton
- 3:37Business School and got my degree and got my
- 3:40MBA. concentrated on finance and became an investment
- 3:44banker. So I worked at several investment banking
- 3:46firms in New York, London and Baltimore. I did
- 3:51M &A deals. I did capital markets work, equity
- 3:56issuances, debt issuances, restructurings. And
- 4:01then I transitioned again to a different career
- 4:04in legal academia. And I became a law professor
- 4:09in 2000. And in 2014, I received the chair at
- 4:16the University of Florida, Levin College of Law,
- 4:19where I have been teaching since then. As I said
- 4:23before, my academic fields are really the laws
- 4:26of business firms, including corporate law and
- 4:28governance, partnership law, LLC law, and corporate
- 4:34finance. positions. My work tends to be more
- 4:39theoretically oriented, so I am a lawyer, a financial
- 4:45and economic analyst, and a legal scholar. Just
- 4:49a quick caveat, I am not an engineer, I am not
- 4:53a technologist, and I am not a futurist. So,
- 4:57this is coming at it from a lawyer's perspective
- 5:01as well as a law professor's perspective. So,
- 5:05our agenda today, we're going to explore what
- 5:08are the potential implications of an agentic
- 5:12AI in the laws of firms. So the discussion topics
- 5:17are the potential of AI as a manager of a business
- 5:21firm. We're going to go over some key legal features
- 5:24of corporations, partnerships, and LLCs that
- 5:27really touch on this question of the possibility
- 5:32of an AI manager. Some key concepts in the laws
- 5:37of firms, such as legal personhood, fiduciary
- 5:41duties, internal and external liability and implementation
- 5:47of the concept of AI as a manager. And specifically,
- 5:51I want to touch on two. This removal of AI managers
- 5:58and the two. And the second is the liability
- 6:01of AI managers. All right. So at one point, AI
- 6:07was this stuff of science fiction. And so if
- 6:11you have some background in literature or just
- 6:14like to read science fiction, of course you would
- 6:16be familiar with these two books. Do Androids,
- 6:21Dream of Electric Sheep by Philip Dick and 2001
- 6:26Space Odyssey by Arthur Clarke, both of which
- 6:31were made into classic science fiction movies
- 6:35as well, Blade Runner and 2001. So, at one point,
- 6:41AI was a science fiction, but it is quickly,
- 6:45it is reality, of course, but the possibility
- 6:49of agentic AI is fast approaching us, or at least
- 6:56that's what it seems to me as an informed reader.
- 7:01just information about AI, things that are coming
- 7:05to us on a daily basis, incredible new sources.
- 7:10So in the near future, assuming continued technological
- 7:15progress towards ontological personhood, that
- 7:20means just personhood in fact, could and should
- 7:24AI acquire legal personhood to enable AI to serve
- 7:30as a manager of a business firm? And that's a
- 7:35question that I've thought about recently. Now,
- 7:41as I said, It's not reality, at least in the
- 7:44US so far. The realization of AI persons is closer
- 7:50than we may think. At first, I thought this was
- 7:54a joke. There is actually an AI CES. We don't
- 8:13really know whether or not this is an exactly
- 8:17a one -to -one comparison with what an ordinary
- 8:21oxygen -breathing CEO would do. but here we see
- 8:26the possibility of at least an AI CEO and maybe
- 8:33some sort of a manifestation, some sort of realization
- 8:36of this possibility elsewhere. So the idea of
- 8:41legal personhood is not new, but it has profound
- 8:46societal consequences and effects. Of course,
- 8:53what you see here is the Citizens United decision
- 8:57granting constitutional rights to corporations.
- 9:03Now, corporations are legal persons, so they
- 9:08sign their own contracts, they are liable for
- 9:11their own debts, they own property. We all know
- 9:14these are just basic aspects of a corporate person.
- 9:21but extended along constitutional dimensions.
- 9:27We see that the idea of legal personhood can
- 9:31have very, very significant societal consequences.
- 9:36So First Amendment is not the only right. Of
- 9:37course, they have 14th Amendment due process
- 9:41protections. They have Fourth Amendment protections
- 9:43against unreasonable search and seizure. There
- 9:47are certain constitutional rights that they do
- 9:49not have. So the Fifth Amendment privilege against
- 9:53self -incrimination, they do not have. Privileges
- 9:57and immunities is among others. I don't believe
- 10:00that the question of Second Amendment rights
- 10:02have been litigated, but some rights that they
- 10:06do have, some rights that they do not, they being
- 10:10corporations. If you were following the 2012
- 10:15campaign, that was Mitt Romney saying that corporations
- 10:19are people, my friends, and some of you may have
- 10:21remembered that. There's a small example in the
- 10:32Tennessee Limited Liability Company Act, where
- 10:38the Tennessee statute enables LLCs to be a decentralized
- 10:44organization. It's a company that's run by a
- 10:48smart contract. Of course, it's not a human being.
- 10:53It's not an oxygen breather. an event -driven
- 10:57computer program that executes an electronic
- 10:59distributed or decentralized shared and replicated
- 11:03ledger that is used to automate transactions.
- 11:06So I think what this is getting at is blockchain.
- 11:10And so possibly LLCs that own intangible assets,
- 11:19crypto assets that might be managed, traded or
- 11:23sold by blockchain technology. And so we see
- 11:28really a small example of innovation in the laws
- 11:34of firms that are trying to keep up with some
- 11:38of the technological events that are happening
- 11:41in our business world and our technology world.
- 11:46Okay, so reality is coming. The possibility of
- 11:54agent tech AI is coming at us pretty fast. I
- 12:00do make some explicit assumptions here. Again,
- 12:04I'm not an engineer, I'm not an engineer, I'm
- 12:07not a futurist. So there are some assumptions
- 12:11about technology here. The key assumption here
- 12:15is that at some point in the near future, AI
- 12:18will become so technologically sophisticated
- 12:21that it can acquire what I like to think of as
- 12:26unique intelligence. What is generally referred
- 12:29to in the literature among the engineers themselves
- 12:33is artificial general intelligence, AGI. There's
- 12:40the Wikipedia definition of AGI. Some of the
- 12:44key characteristics of AGI or my own term, unique
- 12:50intelligence, why unique? Because every one of
- 12:53us human beings have a unique intelligence, unique
- 12:57to us. Some of the general features or key characteristics
- 13:06with the managerial function in mind is general
- 13:11or unique intelligence, the capacity for didactic
- 13:14iterative thinking process, capacity for creativity
- 13:18and independent problem solving, capacity to
- 13:21communicate effectively with multiple constituents.
- 13:26I think if we've been following the literature
- 13:28or following the general press from credible
- 13:32sources, we see that AI is starting to really
- 13:36acquire these characteristics. And I can only
- 13:40imagine, I can only predict that the technology
- 13:44will compressing. I will say in my own experience,
- 13:48maybe around two years ago, there was this thing
- 13:52called AI that might have come to my radar and
- 13:55I would play around with it. I would ask it very,
- 13:59very simple questions and it made horrific mistakes,
- 14:03horrendous mistakes. type of mistakes that are
- 14:07really laughable. That is not the case anymore.
- 14:14Within the span of two years, it's rapidly developing
- 14:20to the point where I can ask AI some questions
- 14:25about what was that law in the SEC regs that
- 14:31talks about this? It would spit me the citation.
- 14:34I would check the citation, of course, and more
- 14:37likely than not, it's accurate. Okay, all right.
- 14:44So what roles could AI serve in business firms?
- 14:51In a simple way, there's a spectrum. And the
- 14:56spectrum is from an asset, an asset meaning a
- 15:00thing, just like we need laptops. to do our work
- 15:05and the programs that are in the laptop and the
- 15:10laptop connects to the internet we have access
- 15:12to the internet and we can do work and that work
- 15:16makes us more productive more efficient we get
- 15:18a lot more things done so it's an asset and then
- 15:22we can follow along a progression in which it
- 15:26is an augmentation or a substitute for actual
- 15:32labor So there's a lot of that discussion right
- 15:36now happening. So I follow the financial news
- 15:39every day. As a part of what I do and there's
- 15:43a lot of that conversation going on in in the
- 15:46financial news and the news about the markets
- 15:50so substitution or augmentation And there's a
- 15:56progression in terms of the labor function that
- 15:59the highest end of that labor function is of
- 16:03course a Manager of a firm a manager firm is
- 16:08as the term of art. It means the person that
- 16:10actually has the managerial authority within
- 16:13the firm. So we can think about a managerial
- 16:15firm being the board of directors in a corporation,
- 16:18or in a partnership, the general partners, or
- 16:21in the limited liability companies, the members,
- 16:25or possibly the managers, if it's the manager
- 16:27-managed LLC. So in terms of the labor function,
- 16:35the highest end of that is the managers. AI not
- 16:42only be a helpful asset, perhaps even a substitute
- 16:49for employees. or certain employees, but can
- 16:54it then progress along that ladder up to being
- 17:00the manager of a firm? That's what we're going
- 17:04to talk about in this CLE session. What role
- 17:10could AI serve in business firms? That will depend
- 17:13upon the assumptions that I just laid out. which
- 17:16is technologically, how far can this technology
- 17:21progress? Can it at some point acquire agency,
- 17:29acquire ontological personhood, and acquire this
- 17:36unique intelligence? If so, then we, society,
- 17:43policymakers, lawyers, politicians, technologists,
- 17:49business leaders, we confront a question. What
- 17:53role may AI serve in business firms? The answer
- 17:59is going to depend in part on the policy imperatives
- 18:03and the laws response to society and business
- 18:05needs. So, what are the current laws of business
- 18:13firms? So, I like to go over a few features from
- 18:17the corporate law, from partnership law, from
- 18:21LLC law, particularly features that I think are
- 18:25particularly pertinent to this question of AI
- 18:30as a manager. I'm going to refer to the DGCL,
- 18:38the MBCA, the Uniform Statutes with respect to
- 18:42non -corporate firms. The Uniform Statutes are,
- 18:46of course, highly influential. Most of the United
- 18:49States in terms of partnerships is a RUPA jurisdiction,
- 18:53Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1997. or the
- 19:04more dated 1976 with the 1985 amendments for
- 19:10limited partnerships and the 2006 uniform law
- 19:17on LLCs as well. These are statutes that are
- 19:22highly influential in the United States. most
- 19:26of the states, the majority of the states have
- 19:28adopted some form of all three statutes there.
- 19:33Okay, so who can manage a firm? So can we have
- 19:39Director Exxon Mobil? in a corporation? Can we
- 19:43have a partner ExxonMobil in a corporation? And
- 19:46I want to make it clear, I'm really talking about
- 19:48say ExxonMobil or any other firm, NVIDIA, IBM,
- 19:53Google, whatever it might be, as opposed to somebody
- 19:57designated by that person by that firm to act
- 20:03in a representative capacity. I'm really talking
- 20:07about the firm itself and so who can manage a
- 20:12firm. Corporate law is actually pretty clear
- 20:16on this. A director has to be a natural person
- 20:21and so that would be an oxygen breather and that's
- 20:26what the Delaware stat The MBCA refers to individuals
- 20:32and then defines individuals as natural persons.
- 20:39Officers and directors must be natural persons
- 20:45under corporate law. Shift now to non -corporate
- 20:52firms, partnerships and LLCs. term person includes
- 21:00business entities such as corporations and partnerships.
- 21:04And so, we can have partnerships between firms.
- 21:07We can have partnerships between a natural person
- 21:10and a firm. We can have partnerships between
- 21:13natural persons as well. And so, who can manage
- 21:17firms? There is no director exon, but we can
- 21:23have partner exon. Okay, so that's a split in
- 21:31the laws of firms in a lot of ways. That split
- 21:37that we see there in this specific issue also
- 21:41represents a theoretical split between corporate
- 21:46law and the laws of non -corporate firms. It's
- 21:50an area that I work on specifically in terms
- 21:54of thinking about theoretical issues and writing
- 21:57my law review articles, what is the implications
- 22:01of that split, what is the implication in terms
- 22:04of the theories of the firm, those types of issues.
- 22:08But here we see a really, really concrete one
- 22:11example of a split between corporate law and
- 22:14the laws of non -corporate firms. What is required
- 22:21for legal personhood? We, of course, are really
- 22:27familiar with the idea of legal personhood. Here
- 22:31is Chief Justice John Marshall's comment in the
- 22:35very famous Dartmouth College case talking about
- 22:39how a corporation is an artificial thing, it's
- 22:43a legal person, it's a creature of law, all of
- 22:47that. of course is laying out some basic truths.
- 22:52Here's the definition of a corporation as a legal
- 22:55entity. It's a separate entity. It has its own
- 23:00legal rights and obligations and powers and privileges
- 23:04from corpus juris secundum. Okay, and we see
- 23:10this specific legal element flowing into the
- 23:18laws of firms. So, RUPA section 201, a partnership
- 23:23is an entity, a partnership is an entity distinct
- 23:27from its partners. The ULPA 2001, a limited partnership
- 23:32is an entity distinct from its partners. RULCA,
- 23:37a limited liability company is an entity distinct
- 23:40from its members and It's a separate legal entity
- 23:59and a person. So, pragmatically, I'm speaking
- 24:05at a CLE. and to an audience of practicing lawyers,
- 24:10mostly practicing lawyers. So pragmatically,
- 24:13what does this mean? The number one litigated
- 24:16issue in corporate law, under corporate law,
- 24:19is that of veil piercing. And companies and shareholders
- 24:25and members get into trouble in terms of veil
- 24:29piercing when this entity is not respected. and
- 24:34so the courts will use various kinds of tests
- 24:39and metaphors, the things we learned in law school
- 24:43and the basic business associations course, but
- 24:47this is just one little iteration of how this
- 24:51idea of personhood Entity -ness becomes really
- 24:59important in terms of theory and practice as
- 25:05well. Okay, so why is legal personhood necessary?
- 25:11Well, there's a lot of instrumental reasons why.
- 25:15The corporation signs its own contracts, owns
- 25:18its own properties, sue and be sued, and owe
- 25:21fiduciary duties. So, those are all very instrumental
- 25:28pragmatic reasons for personhood. It facilitates
- 25:34business. and business dealings. Underneath those
- 25:42pragmatic answers, Necessities are the theoretical
- 25:48reasons that the idea of asset and liability
- 25:53partitioning is a good thing. Corporation owns
- 25:58its own assets. It is not shareholders' assets.
- 26:09I have a high number of shares of Walmart. I'm
- 26:14a big Walmart shareholder. I cannot go into a
- 26:17Walmart store and take a $10 lawn chair. And
- 26:21then as I'm walking down and say, I'm an owner,
- 26:24this is mine. That doesn't work. So asset partitioning,
- 26:31liability partitioning. The liabilities of the
- 26:34corporation are the corporation's own liabilities
- 26:37and they are distinct from my own personal liabilities.
- 26:40As a shareholder, the two does not cross. The
- 26:44idea of limited liability, liabilities owed to
- 26:51creditors of the firm do not bleed over into
- 26:54becoming the liabilities of shareholders. That's
- 26:57limited liability. This idea of perpetual existence.
- 27:02of a firm, of a corporation specifically, it
- 27:08facilitates the creation of capital, the enhancement
- 27:11and maximization of capital. So, a lot of reasons
- 27:16for this idea of limited partners, limited legal
- 27:21personal, excuse me. So, managers, persons with
- 27:27agency owe fiduciary duties. Of course, corporate
- 27:31directors and officers owe fiduciary duties,
- 27:33general partners owe fiduciary duties to the
- 27:37partnership and its partners, and members and
- 27:39managers of LLCs owe fiduciary duties to the
- 27:42firm and its members. That kind of depends on
- 27:45whether or not it's a member -managed LLC or
- 27:48management -managed LLC. So, there's a very,
- 27:50very specific provision in the RULLCA. Section
- 27:54409 that sets all this out. And whether or not
- 28:01a member owes fiduciary duties or not will kind
- 28:04of hinge on what type of an LLC it is. But I'm
- 28:08speaking in generalities here. The third bullet
- 28:11point is the generality. So I recently saw this
- 28:15in the Wall Street Journal. does AI have a fiduciary
- 28:22duty? These issues are really just coming out
- 28:25as pretty fast. And I said, that's pretty interesting.
- 28:31I think that specific question, I think kind
- 28:34of jumps a little bit. I think it's a little
- 28:36bit premature. AI must first be capable of agency
- 28:41and must be endowed with personhood as a predicate.
- 28:45before we can say that yes, this person owes
- 28:50fiduciary duties to the firm and its owners.
- 28:55Okay, all right. So our laptops do not owe us
- 28:59fiduciary duties, but a person does, a may or
- 29:04a person may. So the question becomes, could
- 29:08I be a legal person and So that's a factual question.
- 29:16Can it be a possibility? Is it a possibility?
- 29:19And the second is a normative question, of course,
- 29:22which is should I be a legal person? So I think
- 29:26there are really two predicates, two very, very
- 29:30important predicates to personhood of AI. The
- 29:36first predicate is one of an ontological personhood.
- 29:42That is, if AI were able to see itself in the
- 29:47mirror and ask itself a question, I see myself
- 29:52in the mirror and recognize a self that is distinct
- 29:55from the external world. I think freely and am
- 29:59aware of my thinking and pursuant to my thoughts,
- 30:03I am an independent agent of my actions, and
- 30:05I learn from my continued experience of thinking,
- 30:09acting, and engaging with the external world.
- 30:14The first sentence there, discreteness, goes
- 30:19towards discreteness. We have to have a separation
- 30:22between the AI and between the rest of the world.
- 30:26I'm going to talk about why. but that distinctness,
- 30:30that separateness is important. And of course,
- 30:34the second paragraph that you see there, unique
- 30:38intelligence, that's really the technological
- 30:41issue, the technological assumption that I talked
- 30:45about at the start of this presentation. Can
- 30:48we get there as a matter of technological progress?
- 30:56Four criteria of that predicate are this concept
- 31:02of an ontological personhood and it requires
- 31:07a technological feasibility that results in ontological
- 31:11personhood. Can AI distinguish itself as a discrete
- 31:16entity from all other things in the external
- 31:19world? When I apply that question to the laws
- 31:21of firms as it is right now, Today, the answer
- 31:25is yes for the legal persons. Under partnership
- 31:30law, a corporation can be a person. A corporation
- 31:34is a separate and distinct thing. It's a separate
- 31:38person. It's separate from its board. It's separate
- 31:41from its shareholders. You and I. are separate
- 31:49and distinct persons and we easily answer that
- 31:52question every morning we wake up in the world
- 31:54we look at ourselves in the mirror and we say
- 31:57I'm me and and that's me and there's an external
- 32:01world out there 2, 3, and 4 are very connected.
- 32:11Can it perform the sophisticated type of work
- 32:15that is necessary just a thinking thing that
- 32:23is highly useful in our workplace but is a thing
- 32:28that is capable of making decisions, making complex
- 32:32decisions about risk -taking, about human resources,
- 32:39about interface with the government, about operations,
- 32:45about finance, all of those managerial tasks
- 32:49and functions that managers do inside firms.
- 32:55I said that discreteness was really important
- 32:59because there has to be what I like to think
- 33:04of a control wall. A wall where the outside world
- 33:11does not penetrate to then start to control the
- 33:19firm and its operations from internally. Robinson
- 33:29Caruso. We're living in society and, of course,
- 33:34we're all influenced. I'm not talking about influence.
- 33:37I'm talking about actually control in terms of
- 33:40levers of power inside a firm, levers of power
- 33:44inside within a firm that the laws of firms give
- 33:47us. They are the specific provisions that say
- 33:56that certain people can exercise control within
- 34:01a firm. A board of directors manages the business
- 34:05and affairs of the corporation. That is a lever
- 34:12of power right there. That's what I mean by control.
- 34:18There has to be a control wall and an AI manager
- 34:23must be loyal only to the firm, just the way
- 34:27that we lawyers are loyal to our clients only.
- 34:33We need to really ensure that whoever may be
- 34:39the provider of the AI It has real legal consequences.
- 34:55If there are holes in that wall such that some
- 35:00other third party can exercise the levers of
- 35:06control internally within the firm, then there's
- 35:10actually laws right now in the books that then
- 35:15create liabilities for those third party controllers.
- 35:21There could be actions brought against third
- 35:29parties for the exercise of control. There are
- 35:34actual cases that are out there, well established
- 35:37cases that create the liability for these controllers.
- 35:45The second predicate is really an economic rationale.
- 35:56This has less to do with technology. We're just
- 35:58assuming now the technology has gotten there.
- 36:02Then the rationale becomes one of, how do we
- 36:08create value? from this proposition. We only
- 36:12have AI managers if it's going to create value.
- 36:16And so does it create value? And so ordinarily
- 36:21we like to think of the factors of production,
- 36:25counterparties, employees, AI manager, equity
- 36:28capital, debt capital, whatever it might be.
- 36:30Then we have the firm and the firm has assets
- 36:34and it has capital, assets on the left side,
- 36:36capital on the right -hand side. And so there
- 36:41are then claimants to the sum of all the cash
- 36:45flows that a firm will will create and so now
- 36:52the question is the cash flows that ordinarily
- 36:56that we would assign to managers that we would
- 36:58give managers their salaries their bonuses those
- 37:03kinds of things well can it can it then become
- 37:06dropped down to become a part of the residual
- 37:10profit and of course residual profits are going
- 37:12to be claimed by the equity holders of the firm
- 37:15shareholders partners members So, the second
- 37:19predicate is, assuming that we can pass the first
- 37:24predicate, we can do this. Then, the second predicate
- 37:28is, should we do it? And a part, I'm not saying
- 37:32all, but a part of that answer is yes, because
- 37:38it's economically profitable. We can create more
- 37:41profits out of this. a part of the answer, not
- 37:46a complete answer. So the first predicate If
- 37:53we pass the first predicate and we pass the second
- 37:55predicate, then we have the possibility of legal
- 37:58personhood and then we have a policy decision
- 38:04that lawmakers will have and of course lawmakers
- 38:08are going to respond to various constituents
- 38:11and they're going to listen to constituents and
- 38:16consider all these matters and so forth and so
- 38:19forth. a policy question. Now, this is where
- 38:27I kind of come down. Where do I come down on
- 38:29this? Well, I've already written on this subject
- 38:32in an article in the Northwestern University
- 38:36Law Review that talks about this possibility
- 38:40of AI managers. And so I think where I come down
- 38:45is for non -corporate firms, I think that there
- 38:50is a real possibility and we should explore the
- 38:53possibility of AI as manager, meaning AI as partner
- 38:59or as member. But for a corporation, I think
- 39:05that AI as an asset, of course, I think that
- 39:11goes without saying. Yes, of course, there is
- 39:16right now a lot of talk. about AI augmenting
- 39:21or substituting employee labor. That's something
- 39:26that's just going to shake out in the marketplace,
- 39:30but really doesn't have a direct role in terms
- 39:35of the laws of firms. But now, can or should
- 39:41AI be able to serve as a director or officer?
- 39:46Remember, we require natural persons under corporate
- 39:48law, and my answer would be no. I don't think
- 39:51we should. Recently again, news is just coming
- 39:55at us so fast. Recently again, Sam Altman was
- 40:00asked this very specific question and that was
- 40:04his answer that you see there. I think he's saying
- 40:09that you ought to have a natural person there.
- 40:17and I think he's right on this specific point.
- 40:23The American laws of business firms already create
- 40:27this dichotomy between corporate law that requires
- 40:32oxygen breathers at the highest levels of management
- 40:35and laws of non -corporate firms. That's the
- 40:39dichotomy that already exists in our laws. Why
- 40:45limit corporations? I come down as just a matter
- 40:50of corporations. Of course, it comes in all forms
- 40:56and shapes and sizes. We can have a corporation
- 40:59that is simply a one -shareholder, storefront
- 41:03business. century ago would have been operated
- 41:09as a sole proprietorship. Well, now here we have
- 41:12modern laws of firms and so we can create an
- 41:14LLC or a corporation, but it's a one -person
- 41:18shop. So we can have those kind of corporations
- 41:21all the way to our NVIDIAs that are multi -trillion
- 41:27dollar corporations and everything else in between.
- 41:33So the point is that yes, corporations come in
- 41:36all sorts of shapes and sizes, but corporations
- 41:40are very, very consequential in our lives. They
- 41:45generally represent the largest business firms
- 41:49that are out there in the market. Again, you
- 41:53can point to private corporations that are big
- 41:57and enormous and only owned by a few shareholders.
- 42:01I fully understand that point. We can have coke
- 42:05industries. We can have Publix down here in Florida,
- 42:09the big shopping, the big supermarket. We can
- 42:12have Bechtel's, so forth. Totally understand,
- 42:15but generally, public corporations are going
- 42:19to be the largest, most sophisticated, most innovative,
- 42:23in a lot of ways, most consequential firms, business
- 42:26firms that are out there. I'd like to think that
- 42:32the corporate law itself is geared towards serving
- 42:36that market. Even though that market, for example,
- 42:39in the United States may be only 4 ,000 or so
- 42:44public companies that are out there, but it's
- 42:47that market that corporate law must serve. So,
- 42:56given that, given the possibility of very significant
- 43:01impact, I think corporate law matters, corporations
- 43:07matter, and corporate ethics matter quite a bit.
- 43:13And so, then going back to Sam Altman's response,
- 43:19I think we need to have a real person there,
- 43:21a natural person there. I think that that makes
- 43:24a lot of sense. Okay, all right, so given that
- 43:32dichotomy, now let's talk about safeguards then
- 43:37for non -corporate firms. So, I think this is
- 43:41where the experimentation, if there is experimentation,
- 43:44this is where it will be. It will be in the realm
- 43:48of non -corporate firms, for business firms,
- 43:52those being principally some form of a partnership
- 43:55or an LLC. And so, I think that there are two
- 44:01very important safeguards that I'd like to identify.
- 44:08One is for the removal of AI managers. I think
- 44:13that makes a lot of intuitive sense. Suppose
- 44:15something goes wrong. We'd like to be able to
- 44:17remove them pretty quickly. And some sort of
- 44:22a scheme for capitalization of AI. And I'm assuming
- 44:27that AI will not come walking into that door
- 44:30with its own pockets full of its own wealth and
- 44:34its own bank account. Somehow, we're going to
- 44:40have to capitalize AI. The reason being is that
- 44:45AI can create liabilities. How do we deal with
- 44:49these kinds of liabilities? Recently as well,
- 44:57I'm sure all of us are pretty familiar with these
- 45:00headlines about the possibility of the alignment
- 45:04problem, the possibility of rogue AI, AI that
- 45:11is engaging in behavior that is not positive.
- 45:17Of course, AI is not the only person, not the
- 45:21only thing. We can have rogue managers as well.
- 45:26We can have bad managers, bad directors, bad
- 45:30officers, bad partners, bad members. flip through
- 45:35any law school case books and we're just going
- 45:37to find those cases a dime a dozen. So we have
- 45:42the possibility of an alignment problem. And
- 45:48what happens if there's a misalignment? What
- 45:52happens if there is a real misalignment between
- 45:56the interests of the firm and its owners and
- 46:00the AI's actions. Theoretically, in economics
- 46:06and in the laws of firms, we like to call this
- 46:10agency costs. What are the possibilities here?
- 46:21First, some law. and I think some important law
- 46:27with respect to how we should think about this
- 46:32alignment issue. and the possibility of AI going
- 46:38wayward. So we have default rules of removal
- 46:43in the statutes for non -corporate firms. The
- 46:50first bullet point, most rules of corporate firms
- 46:52are default rules, and I think that's true. For
- 46:58those of us who are in structuring partnerships
- 47:03and structuring businesses, Section 105 is going
- 47:08to be very, very important. Section 105 tells
- 47:12us essentially that with respect to partnerships
- 47:14and LLCs, that most of the statute, not all,
- 47:20but most of the statute are going to be comprised
- 47:25of default rules. This is what the statute gives
- 47:27us and if we don't like these rules then we can
- 47:33change them. We can contract for their alteration,
- 47:37their elimination, or adoption or augmentation
- 47:44or restriction, whatever it is that we want to
- 47:48do contractually in the partnership agreement
- 47:51or the operating agreement of the firms. With
- 47:56respect to the default rules in the statutes,
- 48:00which are most of the rules, then those rules
- 48:06can be altered. Those default rules are the rules
- 48:12for removal. A partner is dissociated when an
- 48:19event stated in the partnership agreement occurs.
- 48:24The person is expelled as a partner pursuant
- 48:27to the partnership agreement. The person is expelled
- 48:32as a partner by the affirmative vote or consent
- 48:35of all the other partners. the conditions might
- 48:44be breach of the partnership or operating agreement
- 48:48or some other kinds of bad conduct and things
- 48:51like that. We see the provisions for dissociation
- 49:01of a partner in the limited partnership statute
- 49:05as well as well as the LLC statute as well. These
- 49:11are the uniform laws but but they're also present
- 49:15in the state laws as well. Many have adopted
- 49:19word for word the uniform laws, but even the
- 49:22ones that haven't have adopted very, very similar
- 49:27provisions. So, the RULCA also states that a
- 49:34manager may be removed by any time by an affirmative
- 49:38vote or consent of the majority of the members
- 49:41without notice or cause. And so, where I think
- 49:46in terms of policy now, in terms of policy, what
- 49:50the law should state, assuming that we have passed
- 49:54those hurdles, those predicates, is that the
- 49:58removal of an AI manager should be a mandatory
- 50:05rule, not a default rule, a mandatory rule in
- 50:08the laws of firms and that the rule of removal
- 50:15should always be there. as a mandatory rule.
- 50:19It cannot be fixed or it cannot be altered for
- 50:25removing AI agents. That's the first safeguard.
- 50:30If something goes wrong, we can expeditiously
- 50:34remove the AI manager from the firm. How serious
- 50:42is the problem of a rogue agent? We don't really
- 50:48know yet. We have widely covered instances in
- 50:53the press about instances in which AI might have
- 50:59attempted to blackmail its handler or might have
- 51:04gotten out of a sandbox. some way or some other
- 51:10types of things that we read about and hear about
- 51:15these stories in the media which is where most
- 51:18of us are going to get our information. We're
- 51:21not in the laboratories. We're not aware of actually
- 51:26what the state of the art is and so I think at
- 51:31this point in somewhat of a crude fashion we
- 51:34kind of need to distinguish Well, is this thing
- 51:37super intelligent? Their intelligence, their
- 51:41unique intelligence far, far outpace our abilities.
- 51:47Or is this quote unquote an ordinary intelligent
- 51:51thing? And if it's ordinary, then we have of
- 51:58course internal monitoring by our owners. This
- 52:00is what we do for ordinary firms. We have removal.
- 52:05provisions, either in the statute or in our partnership
- 52:08or operating agreement. We can go ahead and take
- 52:13the measures that are necessary. We can fire
- 52:17that bad manager. We can take internal measures
- 52:22to lock out the manager. We can provide notice
- 52:25to third parties about the termination of agency
- 52:28authority and all sorts of measures that we would
- 52:32ordinarily take. Okay, so that would be the first
- 52:37safeguard. The second is what about liability
- 52:42for bad conduct? I think conceptually we want
- 52:48to think about two forms of liability. One is
- 52:52an internal liability. liability that's internal
- 52:56within the firm itself. And the second is liability
- 53:01to external, to third parties. And so the internal
- 53:07liabilities arise from the fact that managers
- 53:12and controllers of firms, even if the controller
- 53:19seems to be external, to the firm, if they are
- 53:24actually exercising those levers of power, levers
- 53:26of authority, then they owe fiduciary duties
- 53:29and they could be held liable for those fiduciary
- 53:35duties, breach of fiduciary duties. If there
- 53:39is a breach, of course we can get all sorts of
- 53:43remedies, but among which are money damages.
- 53:52liabilities of the managers. For example, corporate
- 53:56directors are liable for money damages for breach
- 54:02of the duty of loyalty. The exculpation provisions
- 54:07that we will find in, for example, Section 102B7
- 54:11do not apply to bad faith conduct and a breach
- 54:15of the duty of loyalty. A bad faith conduct is
- 54:18one specific form of a loyalty breach. There
- 54:23are real stakes that are involved here. I think
- 54:28that this is a lesser of a concern. I'll state
- 54:34the reason why. First of all, I'm assuming that
- 54:39AI is not going to walk into our firms with its
- 54:46own checking account, with its own wealth. If
- 54:53AI is liable, where does that money come from?
- 54:58Bottom line, I think it's one that is a form
- 55:02of a cost in a cost -benefit analysis where any
- 55:08sort of conduct that is detrimental to the firm
- 55:13and to its owners is a form of a cost internalization.
- 55:18This is a part of the cost of running a firm
- 55:27through an AI manager, along which comes with
- 55:32the benefits, which is the second predicate that
- 55:35I talked about, that there's an economic rationale
- 55:38for possibly using AI managers here. There's
- 55:41a cost and a benefit to this. I'm less concerned
- 55:47internally. I suppose bottom line, this is what
- 55:52you signed up for. This is what you, you being
- 55:56the shareholders or the partners or the members
- 55:59and so forth. There's a real question about external
- 56:04liabilities, the third parties. And so how do
- 56:08we, how should we handle external liabilities?
- 56:14Because that's one where I think that there's
- 56:18a greater connection to a public interest. and
- 56:23a societal concern. Economists like to call this
- 56:26externalities, the effects, the negative effects
- 56:31of internally among us using an AI manager. messes
- 56:39up certain things. In the ordinary context, we
- 56:43would see this as possibly a breach of its fiduciary
- 56:46duties. Well, we're going to internalize our
- 56:48costs among ourselves. But what happens if AI
- 56:51does something internally within the firm and
- 56:53the effects are outside and creating those liabilities?
- 57:03Now, the form of the firm matters and so we have
- 57:08general partners who are liable for the debts
- 57:11and obligations of the partnerships under the
- 57:13RUPA and ULPA, so the limited partnership statute.
- 57:21We have broad -based limited liability for LLCs,
- 57:27but notice what the LLC statute is saying. A
- 57:29member or manager is not personally liable directly
- 57:32or indirectly by way of contribution or otherwise
- 57:34for the debts and obligations or other liabilities
- 57:37of the company. The company's debts are its own.
- 57:41and it's not that of the members. However, solely
- 57:47by reason of acting as a member or manager. Anything
- 57:52that you do other than vicarious liability could
- 57:58be a form of direct liability. I've written about
- 58:08this issue In 2010, not AI, but more generally
- 58:16about limited liability. One way that we can
- 58:20approach the policy question of how do we handle
- 58:24liability externally could be some sort of a
- 58:28bonding of that liability, which basically means
- 58:32that there's a mandatory pool for all firms that
- 58:37use AI managers. They chip into the pool and
- 58:41If the firm cannot satisfy its liability, then
- 58:45we dip into the pool and this is the basically
- 58:47concept That I talked about in in bonding limited
- 58:52liability limited liability is a good thing.
- 58:54We've had it around for a long time It is a defining
- 58:58feature of the corporation And that we cannot
- 59:01have modern public equity capital markets. I
- 59:05think without this limited liability There are
- 59:09several efficiency arguments for limited liability.
- 59:13Those are good, but yet at the end of the day,
- 59:18there may be unpaid liabilities. How should we
- 59:23address this question? That's what that article
- 59:25was about. We want to keep limited liability,
- 59:29but is there a way to soften the rough edges
- 59:32of limited liability? I talked about that and
- 59:35I think we can borrow that concept here. the
- 59:38concept of bonding limited liability to the AI
- 59:42context given the fact that AI does not come
- 59:45with its own checking account. That's one possibility.
- 59:51Another possibility is something the way that
- 59:55Oregon has laid out its tort laws. There's a
- 1:00:01case out there called Cortez versus NACO material.
- 1:00:05What this is is a parent company and a subsidiary.
- 1:00:13The subsidiary is where the accident occurred.
- 1:00:19The plaintiff there, an employee, sued the parent
- 1:00:24under tort law. common law negligence as well
- 1:00:31as under Oregon's employer liability law, the
- 1:00:35EEL. The EEL says it's liability to all owners
- 1:00:40having charge of or responsibility for work involving
- 1:00:45a risk or danger to the employees or the public.
- 1:00:48What happened in Cortez was that there was a
- 1:00:51finding of no negligence No common law negligence
- 1:00:56by the parent. Most of the risk -creating activities
- 1:01:02were created by the subsidiary. The subsidiary
- 1:01:05is a separate person from the parent. These two
- 1:01:08are separate, distinct persons. We cannot merge
- 1:01:11the two. If we merge the two, then we may have
- 1:01:15the possibility of being alter -egos of each
- 1:01:18other. door possibility to veil piercing claims
- 1:01:23and those types of things. So, we have separate
- 1:01:27persons there, but the EO is a statute and creates
- 1:01:33a higher form of a liability. So, what the court
- 1:01:36says is the EO imposes a duty to persons who
- 1:01:40have charge of responsibility for the activity.
- 1:01:43retention of control. The retention of control
- 1:01:48could possibly be the basis of direct liability
- 1:01:53on other persons, meaning non -AI persons within
- 1:02:02the firm as well. These are two possibilities
- 1:02:05of how we can possibly handle the issue of external
- 1:02:11liabilities liabilities to the public, to the
- 1:02:15third parties. And so I laid that out there.
- 1:02:20I set that out there. And so again, coming back,
- 1:02:25I think that there are two safeguards that we
- 1:02:27need to think about in terms of policy. If we
- 1:02:31pass the technological hurdle, then we get to
- 1:02:35a policy question of law. and economics and society.
- 1:02:44The policy question is, do we want to create
- 1:02:47legal persons? Legal persons who can come in
- 1:02:50and manage business firms. I laid out some of
- 1:02:56the things that we need to think about for those
- 1:02:58policy questions. I think that there are two
- 1:03:01very important safeguards. The first is with
- 1:03:05respect to removal, I think that there has to
- 1:03:10be a very clear removal provision in the statute
- 1:03:15and unlike cutting against the grain of the general
- 1:03:19philosophy of the laws of non -corporate firms
- 1:03:22which is contract based and most of the statutory
- 1:03:25rules are default rules, I think unlike most
- 1:03:30of the rules that we find in the laws of business
- 1:03:35firms, I think we need to have a mandatory provision
- 1:03:37for mandatory removal. or mandatory removal provision
- 1:03:42in the statute so that if there are any questions
- 1:03:45about the safety both externally and also internally
- 1:03:51of using AI managers that we can quickly and
- 1:03:55expeditiously remove the AI as a manager. Again,
- 1:04:02there are mandatory rules in the laws of non
- 1:04:04-corporate firms. At least in the uniform laws,
- 1:04:08fiduciary duties are mandatory. There is a minimum
- 1:04:20core that is mandatory and I think we can distinguish
- 1:04:23that. The uniform laws with the laws of Delaware
- 1:04:27with respect to limited partnerships and LLCs
- 1:04:30where even fiduciary duties can be completely
- 1:04:33eliminated in Delaware for those two forms of
- 1:04:38business firms. push for mandatory rules of removal.
- 1:04:45The other safeguard I think is how do we handle
- 1:04:49the externalities from wrongful conduct by AI
- 1:04:56in light of the fact that AI does not have its
- 1:05:01own independent economic assets. I think that's
- 1:05:05something that we really need to think about
- 1:05:09on the issue. And so with that, I think I'll
- 1:05:15thank you. for listening to this presentation
- 1:05:18and coming to this CLE. If you're interested
- 1:05:22in these topics, I do have an article out. It
- 1:05:27should be widely available, publicly available.
- 1:05:31It's the Northwestern University Law Review that's
- 1:05:35cited there. It's been reprinted in the corporate
- 1:05:38practice commentators. The book chapter that
- 1:05:43you see there is not yet quite available. It
- 1:05:47will be available in the next couple of months.
- 1:05:51But I've written everything and now it's being
- 1:05:54assembled into a book. But do AIs dream of electric
- 1:06:01duties? I talk about this specifically the issue
- 1:06:04of can AI owe fiduciary duties? And I think it
- 1:06:10can. I think it can. It must owe fiduciary duties,
- 1:06:16first of all, and I think it is capable of owing
- 1:06:20those duties and doing the things that are necessary
- 1:06:24to comply with this fiduciary duties as well.
- 1:06:29I talk about those issues as well as further
- 1:06:33liability issues and removal issues in the book
- 1:06:36chapter. So with that, I will close this presentation
- 1:06:41and once again, thank you for coming and hopefully
- 1:06:47this presentation was helpful. This concludes
- 1:06:53today's presentation. Thank you again to Professor
- 1:06:56Robert Reeve for an excellent presentation today
- 1:06:58and thank you so much to our audience. Have a
- 1:07:00great day everybody.