Latest / Logic Library / 12 - The Prince - Machiavelli
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- Chapter twenty are fortresses and many other things to which princes often resort, advantageous or hurtful. One. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their subjects. Others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions. Others have fostered enmities against themselves. Others have laid themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning of their governments. Some have built fortresses, some have overthrown and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a final judgment on all of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those states in which a decision has to be made, Nevertheless, I will speak as comprehensively as the matter of itself. Will admit. Two, there never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects. Rather, when he has found them disarmed, he has always armed them, Because by arming them those arms become yours. Those men who were distrusted become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so and your subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be handled more freely, And this difference in their temperament, which they quite understand, makes the former your dependence, and the latter, considering it to be a necessity that those who have the most danger and service should have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these onions breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it follows that you should turn to mercenaries, which are of the character already shown. Even if they should be good, they would not be sufficient to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new principality has always distributed arms. Histories are full of examples. But when a prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a province to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those who have been his adherents in acquiring it, And these, again, with time and opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate, and matters should be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state shall be your own soldiers, who in your old state were living near you. Three our forefathers, those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by fortresses. And with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way balanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for today, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use. Rather, it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided cities, you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always assist the outside forces, and the other will not be able to resist. The Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the Gath and Ghibelin factions in their tributary cities. And although they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these disputes among them, so that the citizens distracted by their differences should not unite against them, which as we saw, did not afterwards turn out as expected, because after the route at Valia, one party at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue therefore weakness in the prince, because these factions will never be permitted in a vigorous principality. Such methods for enabling one the more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace. But if war comes, this policy proves fallacious. Four. Without doubt, princes become great when they overcome the difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and and therefore fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may have the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher, as by a ladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason, many consider that the wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with craft to foster some animosity against himself, so that having crushed it, his renown may rise higher. Five Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and assistance in those men who, in the beginning of their rule were distrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolpho Petrucci, Prince of sis Sienna, ruled his state more by those who had been distrusted than by others. But on this question one cannot speak generally, for it varies so much with the individual. I will only say this that those men who, at the commencements of a princedom have been hostile, if they are of a description to need assistance to support themselves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to serve the Prince with fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had formed of them. And thus the Prince always extracts more profit from them than from those who, serving him in too much security, may neglect his affairs. And since the matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a prince who, by means of secret favors, has acquired a new state, that he must well consider the reasons which induced those to favor him who did so. And if it be not a natural affection toward him, but only discontent with their government, then he will only keep them friendly with great trouble and difficulty, for it will be impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well the reasons for this, in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modern affairs, we shall find that it is easier for the prince to make friends of those men who were contented under their former government, and are therefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented with it, were favorable to him and encouraged him to seize it. Six. It has been accustomed with princes, in order to hold their states more securely, to build fortresses that they may serve as a brighter and bit to those who might design to work against them, and as a place of refuge from a first attack. I praise this system because it has been made use of formerly. Notwithstanding that Messer Nicolo Vitelli in our times has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Sitta di Castello, that he might keep that state. Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Verbino, on returning to his dominion, whence he had been driven by sees ri Bolgia raised to the foundations all the fortresses in that province, and considered that without them it would be more difficult to lose it. The bent Vogueli, returning to Bologna, came to a similar decision. Fortresses, therefore, are useful or not according to circumstances. If they do you good in one way, they injure you in another. And this question can be reasoned. Thus, the prince who has more to fear from the people than from foreigners, ought to build fortresses. But he who has more to fear from foreigners than from the people, ought to leave them alone. The Castle of Milan, built by Francesco Ciborza, has made and will make, more trouble for the House of Saborza than any other disorder in the state. For this reason, the best possible fortress is not to be hated by the people, because although you may hold the fortresses, yet they will not save you if the people hate you, for there will never be wanting foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you. It has not been seen in our times that such fortresses have been used to any prince, unless to the Countess of Forli when the Count Girolamo, her consort, was killed, for by that means she was able to withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and thus recover her state. And the posture of affairs was such at that time that the foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses were of little value to her afterwards, when Caesaribolga attacked her, and when the people her enemy, were allied with the foreigners. Therefore, it would have been safer for her, both then and before, not to have been hated by the people than to have had the fortresses. All these things considered, then I shall praise him who builds fortresses, as well as him who does not, and I shall blame whoever, trusting in them, cares little about being hated by the people. Chapter twenty one. How a prince should conduct himself so as to gain renown. Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises, and setting a fine example, we have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the present King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he has risen by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to being the foremost king. In Christendom. And if you will consider his deeds, you will find them all great deeds, and some of them extraordinary. In the beginning of his reign he attacked Grenada, and this enterprise was the foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first, and without any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of Castile occupied in thinking of the war, and not anticipating any innovations. Thus they did not perceive that by these means he was acquiring power and authority over them. He was able, with the money of the Church and the the people, to sustain his armies, and by that long war, to lay the foundation for the military skill which has since distinguished him. Further, always using religion as a plea so as to undertake greater schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty, to driving out and clearing his kingdom of the moors. Nor could there be a more admirable example, nor one so rare. Under this same cloak, he assailed Africa, he came down on Italy, he was finally attacked France. And thus his achievements and designs have always been great, and have kept the minds of his people in suspense and admiration, and occupied with the issue of them, and his actions have risen in such a way one out of the other, that men have never been given time to work steadily against him. Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo di Milano, who, when he had the opportunity by any one in civil life, doing such extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some method of rewarding or punishing him, which would be very much spoken about. And a prince ought, above all things, always endeavor in every action to gain for himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man. The prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a downright enemy, that is to say, when without any reservation, he declares himself in favor of one party against another, which course will always be more advantageous than standing neutral, Because if two of your or powerful neighbors come to blows, they are of such a character that if one of them conquers, you either have to fear him or not. In either case it will always be more advantageous for you to declare yourself than make war strenuously, because if the first case, if you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to the conqueror. To the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been conquered. You will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to protect or to shelter you, because he who conquers does not want doubtful friends who will not aid him in time of trial, and he who loses will will not harbor you, because you did not willingly soard in hand court his fate. Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Aetolians to drive the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of the Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral, and on the other hand, the Romans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed in the Council of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged them to stand neutral. To this, the Roman legate answered, as for that which has been said, that it is better and more advantageous for your state not to interfere in our war. Nothing can be more erroneous, because by not interfering, you will be left without favor or consideration the gurdon of the conqueror. Thus it will always happen that he who is not your friend will demand your neutrality, whilst he who is your friend will entreat you to declare yourself with arms and irresolute. Princes, to avoid present dangers, generally follow the neutral path and are generally ruined. But when a prince declares himself gallantly in favor of one side, if the party with whom he allies himself conquers, although the victor may be powerful and have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and there is established a bond of amity. And men are never so shameless as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories, after all, are never so complete that the victor must not show some regard, especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally yourself loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able, he may aid you and become your companions on a fortune that may rise again. In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that you have no anxiety as to who may conquer so much. The more it is greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction of one by the aid of another, who, if he had been wise, would have saved him, and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do so with your assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be noted that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with one more powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking others, unless necessity compels him, as it is said above, because if he conquers, you are at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as possible, being in the discretion of anyone. The Venetians joined with France against the Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which cause their ruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as happened to the Florentines, when the Pope and Spain sent armies to attack Lombardy, than in such a case, for the above reasons, the prince ought to favor one of the parties. Never let any government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe courses. Rather, let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones, because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid one trouble without running into another. But prudence consists in knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles and for choice to take the lesser evil. A prince ought also to show himself a patron of the ability, and to honor the proficient in every art. At the same time, he should encourage his citizens to practice their callings peaceably, both in commerce and in agriculture, and in every other following, so that one should not be deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken away from him, or another from opening up trade for fear of taxes. But the prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things and designs in any way to honor his city or state. Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles at convenient seasons of the year. And as every city is divided into guilds or into societies, he ought to hold such bodies in esteem and associate with them sometimes and show himself an example of courtesy and liberality. Nevertheless, always maintaining the majesty of his rank. For this he must never consent to abate in anything. Chapter twenty two, concerning the secretaries of princes. The choice of serpents is of no little importance to a prince, and they are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And the first opinion which one forms of a prince and of his understanding, is by observing the men who he has around him. And when they are capable and faithful, he may always be considered wise, because he has known how to recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are otherwise, one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error which he has made in choosing them. There were none who knew Messer Antonio de Venophro as a servant of Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Sienna, who would not consider Pandolpho to be a very clever man in having Vanafro for his servant. Because there are three classes of intellects, one which comprehends by itself, another which appreciates what others have comprehended, and a third which neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others. The first is most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless. Therefore, it follows necessarily that if Pandolpho was not in the first rank, he was in the second. For whenever one has judgment to know good and bad when it is said and done, although he himself may not have the initiative, yet he can recognize the good and bad in his servant, and the one can praise and the other correct. Thus the servants cannot hope to deceive him, and are kept honest. But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant, there is one test which never fails. When you see the servant thinking more of his own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you ever be able to trust him, because he who has the state of another in his hands, ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince, and never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not concerned. On the other hand, to keep his servant honest, a prince ought to study him, honoring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with him the honors and cares, and at the same time let him see that he cannot stand alone, so that many honors may not make him desire more, many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him dreadge chances. When therefore, servants and princes towards servants are thus disposed, they can trust each other. But when it is otherwise, the end will always be disastrous for either one or the other. End of Chapter twenty two of The Prince by Niccolo Macchiavelli.