Latest / Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer Podcasts / Cross Examining Cyber EP28: Cross Examining Charles Carmakal
Transcript
- 0:01SPEAKER_01: Welcome to Cross Examining Cyber, a podcast brought to you by Herbert Smith Free Hills Kramer.
- 0:06SPEAKER_01: In this podcast series, we speak to our business leaders about all things cyber, including the legal, governance, technical, regulatory, and policy developments that impact corporates around the world.
- 0:17SPEAKER_01: We look at the evolving cyber risk landscape by speaking to those people who are on the front line.
- 0:23SPEAKER_01: Today we cross-examine Charles Carmichael.
- 0:25SPEAKER_01: Charles is the Chief Technology Officer of Mandient Consulting, the security consulting arm of Google Cloud.
- 0:31SPEAKER_01: If you're an incident response, you'll know Charles.
- 0:34SPEAKER_01: He oversees a team of incident responders, analysts, and security consultants that have helped thousands of organisations around the world.
- 0:41SPEAKER_01: His team is advised on many of the globe's most significant cyber incidents, and he's a globally recognized commentator on cyber threat intelligence.
- 0:49SPEAKER_01: We recorded this podcast earlier this year but held it back for Cyber Awareness Month.
- 0:54SPEAKER_01: Thank you for listening.
- 0:55SPEAKER_01: This is Cross Examining Charles Carmichael.
- 0:58SPEAKER_01: Here we go.
- 1:00SPEAKER_01: Charles, welcome to Cross-Examining Cyber.
- 1:04SPEAKER_01: Where does this podcast find you today?
- 1:07SPEAKER_00: I'm in our Virginia, the United States, right now.
- 1:10SPEAKER_01: Well, thank you for making the time.
- 1:11SPEAKER_01: I know it's an unfriendly time zone.
- 1:13SPEAKER_01: One thing we like to do with our guests is help our listeners know a little bit more about who we're speaking to.
- 1:20SPEAKER_01: Who are you?
- 1:23SPEAKER_00: So I'm Charles Carmichael, the Chief Technology Officer at Mandiant.
- 1:28SPEAKER_00: Mandiant is a cybersecurity consulting organization that's been around for just a bit over 20 years.
- 1:34SPEAKER_00: And there's really two things that we do.
- 1:36SPEAKER_00: Number one, we help companies better prepare for cyber attacks.
- 1:40SPEAKER_00: And number two, we help companies actually respond to cybersecurity events when they occur.
- 1:45SPEAKER_00: We respond to north of a thousand uh security incidents every year.
- 1:49SPEAKER_00: And three and a half years ago, we were acquired by Google.
- 1:52SPEAKER_00: And so we are now the cybersecurity consulting practice within Google Cloud.
- 1:57SPEAKER_01: Cyber incidents come in various shapes and sizes.
- 2:00SPEAKER_01: When you say thousands or over even that's a that's a big number.
- 2:04SPEAKER_01: Are we talking extortion style attacks?
- 2:08SPEAKER_01: Because we can have BECs, we can have extortion, we can have state, insider, the work.
- 2:13SPEAKER_01: How do I quantify that in terms of the work you're doing?
- 2:16SPEAKER_01: Yeah.
- 2:17SPEAKER_00: Let me try and illustrate it in a few different ways.
- 2:19SPEAKER_00: The first way is by saying that collectively, we spent over 500,000 hours providing incident response services to our clients last year.
- 2:28SPEAKER_00: And that's just what we're doing with respect to responding to security incidents.
- 2:33SPEAKER_00: That doesn't include the offensive security work that we do, the proactive security work, and a variety of the security consulting capabilities that we provide.
- 2:41SPEAKER_00: But to your question around what types of incidents do we respond to, it really varies.
- 2:47SPEAKER_00: I would say most organizations that engage mandate to respond to a security incident are dealing with a few types of security matters.
- 2:55SPEAKER_00: Number one, they're dealing with a nation-state attack.
- 2:58SPEAKER_00: So a fairly advanced attack that's hard to detect by the organization, that usually requires some third party to come in and help them scope out the incident.
- 3:08SPEAKER_00: Another very common type of attack that we deal with are either ransomware or extortion matters or other financially motivated intrusion activity that could have a large impact on our clients.
- 3:22SPEAKER_00: It might happen pretty fast, and it might be pretty obvious to the victim organization that they're dealing with an attack, largely because a threat actor reaches out to them and extorts them.
- 3:31SPEAKER_00: So they advertise that they've broken in.
- 3:33SPEAKER_00: And then there's other types of cases that we deal with.
- 3:36SPEAKER_00: We see a lot of software supply chain attacks.
- 3:39SPEAKER_00: We see North Korean IT workers that have obtained jobs at Western organizations or organizations in other parts of the world.
- 3:46SPEAKER_00: So it really is a variety of incidents that the team's responding to.
- 3:51SPEAKER_01: And in terms of all that, all the work that you do in the space, it's one thing to be in the trenches.
- 3:57SPEAKER_01: And being in the trenches does help you, I guess, bring some perspective or at least some intelligence to companies around the world, your clients, whether you're they're retained or otherwise.
- 4:08SPEAKER_01: How do you stay ahead of the Intel?
- 4:11SPEAKER_01: Or at least at a point in the Intel sort of distribution communication, where it still remains a relevant piece of information because these things are moving at pace.
- 4:23SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
- 4:24SPEAKER_00: It can be really tricky staying up with the latest and the greatest.
- 4:28SPEAKER_00: There's a few ways in which I do it.
- 4:30SPEAKER_00: The first way is I read my email.
- 4:32SPEAKER_00: I get lots of emails from lots of clients in my team that tell me things that they're dealing with on a day-to-day basis.
- 4:38SPEAKER_00: So that is a it's a very good source of information for me.
- 4:42SPEAKER_00: Second thing is I talk to my team, the folks that are actually responding to the day-to-day incidents, my threat intel folks that are actively collecting threat intelligence, either because we've got some kind of visibility into some attacker infrastructure or things that they're doing.
- 4:58SPEAKER_00: Maybe we have analysts that are actually talking to adversaries and hearing from them what they claim that they're doing.
- 5:06SPEAKER_00: You know, we're obviously monitoring the dark web and a variety of things.
- 5:09SPEAKER_00: And so I get a lot of that data from my team, but I also get it from the day-to-day incident response work and security consulting work that I do with my team.
- 5:18SPEAKER_01: You've been in this game probably longer than me, but I did not intend to be here when I was working for a large, one of the big four consulting firms, and we set up a uh a cyber advisory and digital trust team, we call it, working across the spectrum.
- 5:34SPEAKER_01: That was in 2015, so just 11 years ago.
- 5:37SPEAKER_01: Yeah, we were dealing with the odd security advisory work.
- 5:40SPEAKER_01: Before that, of course, because there were issues, you know, you remember nonpetie and all the those sort of early, early and perhaps less targeted cyber incidents.
- 5:52SPEAKER_01: Now, threat intelligence is probably one of the key pieces of information that boards need or companies need in order to make a risk assessment around investment and then how to respond.
- 6:05SPEAKER_01: How have you seen this change?
- 6:07SPEAKER_01: Has it changed?
- 6:09SPEAKER_01: And are we at the right place yet with our management and our board putting enough emphasis on the intelligence component to make a more effective risk-based decision?
- 6:22SPEAKER_00: Yeah, so look, there's, you know, years ago there were questions around what is the value of threat intelligence?
- 6:29SPEAKER_00: And there's a lot of questions around, or statements around whether or not organizations cared who actually hacked into them, because at the end of the day, they were getting hacked into.
- 6:38SPEAKER_00: You know, we were arguing for the concept of threat intelligence for a number of reasons.
- 6:44SPEAKER_00: Number one is if you know who the adversary is and you see that adversary at multiple different victim environments, you can anticipate what they've probably done in whatever organization that you are just starting to help with.
- 6:58SPEAKER_00: So you can kind of anticipate what systems the attacker go to, what tooling do they use, what infrastructure they maybe use, and it helps accelerate the incident response process.
- 7:10SPEAKER_00: Number two, you know, every so often, depending on who the adversary is, uh, you may be able to identify who the threat actor is.
- 7:17SPEAKER_00: You may be able to work with law enforcement, and law enforcement might be able to take action on these criminals, whether it's a criminal actor or even a state actor.
- 7:26SPEAKER_00: And so a number of things have been done to cause consequences to these adversaries that are, you know, that are causing harm to a number of organizations and individuals.
- 7:35SPEAKER_00: Threat intelligence is important from a board perspective because it's important for the directors to understand what are the real world threats to an organization that they sit on the boards of.
- 7:46SPEAKER_00: And the real world threats drive a lot of the actual investments so that these organizations can understand what they need to do to draw down risk as best they can.
- 7:57SPEAKER_00: But that has to be correlated with what the real world threats are.
- 8:01SPEAKER_00: So if you think about maybe what a healthcare organization has to deal with from a threat perspective, versus, say, a manufacturing organization, there's certainly some commonality between threats, but there's also a number of differences that will help the organization figure out what is the right amount of risk to drive down so that an organization can be pragmatic and just smart about the security investments.
- 8:26SPEAKER_00: Management will always ask, let me be a little more specific.
- 8:30SPEAKER_00: A chief information security officer will always ask for as much budget as they could possibly get.
- 8:36SPEAKER_00: It's up to a CFO and other members of management to be practical and pragmatic about what's the right level of investment.
- 8:43SPEAKER_00: And from a board perspective, they just need to ensure that the right governance structure, an adequate amount of funding is in place to draw down the risk as much as reasonable.
- 8:55SPEAKER_01: Yeah, it's a conundrum, isn't it?
- 8:57SPEAKER_01: Where do you start and stop?
- 8:58SPEAKER_01: Building a pitch of the threat landscape, though, it necessarily requires sharing.
- 9:05SPEAKER_01: And I'd be interested in your take on this because you are a commercial enterprise.
- 9:10SPEAKER_01: Uh the information that you know is of value to you financially, actually, if if someone's willing to pay you fair intelligence.
- 9:19SPEAKER_01: Yet there is this more sort of holistic need for us to be sharing threat intelligence more broadly.
- 9:26SPEAKER_01: Now, different cybersecurity, CISO, CISO, CTO, they set up the little communities to chat around this sort of stuff.
- 9:35SPEAKER_01: Governments are trying their best to sort of facilitate it, although I have to say in the US at the moment it's hard to see the Cybersecurity Infrastructure and Security Agency making a huge difference given no one's getting paid over there or it's going through a bit of a hard you know, I I look over at the US and think, gosh, um one of our one of the world's sort of leading lights in terms of helping us with our CVE and our vulnerability and patch protections is maybe more concerned about its ultimate survival.
- 10:05SPEAKER_01: Uh but how do we how do you think about that threat sharing world?
- 10:11SPEAKER_01: And how do we get past the commercial value of that information to a point where the rising tide of source ships?
- 10:19SPEAKER_01: For me, I I struggle.
- 10:21SPEAKER_00: Sure.
- 10:22SPEAKER_00: So look, most cyber security vendors have some kind of threat intelligence capability, and to some extent, it is a differentiator between certain organizations.
- 10:32SPEAKER_00: There's a question that I often ask myself or I ask my team in terms of what do we publish publicly versus what do we publish to our Intel subscribers?
- 10:43SPEAKER_00: And to me, if there's something that is broadly valuable to the community, I want to publish it so that the world has the benefit of getting access to it for free.
- 10:53SPEAKER_00: And of course, look, when we publish things where and when possible, when it makes sense to privately publish it internally to our subscriber, our Threat Intel subscribers, maybe a day early or a few days early.
- 11:07SPEAKER_00: There are times where we do that.
- 11:09SPEAKER_00: But we publish a lot of public blogs because we want to get this information out to the community.
- 11:14SPEAKER_00: And um, you know, ultimately at the end of the day, yes, there is a commercial aspect to the business, but we do fairly well.
- 11:21SPEAKER_00: And so we don't need to hoard and protect threat intelligence from the rest of the world.
- 11:29SPEAKER_00: We're happy for the world to consume it, we're happy for other security vendors to consume it.
- 11:34SPEAKER_00: And actually, some of our best collaboration comes from sharing information with other security vendors because we have different telemetry, we have different visibility into adversarial behaviors, and we do have a shared goal of disrupting adversaries.
- 11:46SPEAKER_00: And so to the extent that we're able to share information with each other, look, we're happy to do that.
- 11:51SPEAKER_01: Yeah.
- 11:52SPEAKER_01: When you look out now, we talk about the threat landscape sort of evolving almost daily.
- 11:57SPEAKER_01: Over the last sort of 12 months, we've dealt with a number of social engineering attacks from, you know, 16-year-old kids that originate from the COM.
- 12:06SPEAKER_01: Um, we're seeing more and more brash voice-related fishing exercises or fishing.
- 12:14SPEAKER_01: We have seen these American-accented individuals or English-accent deliver a socially engineered package which is so convincing that I just can't work out ha based on pure numbers, how we're going to prevent this continuing.
- 12:35SPEAKER_01: Yeah, we've got education, of course, uh, and education is uh is is helpful.
- 12:40SPEAKER_01: But I suspect no matter how much you educate, with a bit of persistence on the threat side, they will they will get through.
- 12:46SPEAKER_01: I I went to DEF CON last year, and I know you've probably been to DEF CON in the past.
- 12:51SPEAKER_01: You'll be familiar with the room in which they give the participants 20 minutes to socially engineer their way into organizations and you watch them doing it, which is just a fascinating project on human behaviors and the like.
- 13:02SPEAKER_01: But they're invariably successful uh in some during during that period to some degree.
- 13:07SPEAKER_01: But uh first of all, how how we how much of this are you seeing?
- 13:10SPEAKER_01: How much of this uh social engineering is sort of taking up your space at the moment?
- 13:16SPEAKER_01: And the$64 million question: what do we do to protect ourselves from ourselves?
- 13:22SPEAKER_00: Sure.
- 13:23SPEAKER_00: To answer you, the first part of your question, we see lots of telephone-based social engineering by native English-speaking actors that have Western accents or or or accents maybe in Australia or the UK, where they sound very convincing, where they pretend to be an employee of an IT help desk, and they can trick people into providing credentials or logging into websites that look very legitimate to the point where they're very successful.
- 13:53SPEAKER_00: Every single week we learn about new and new victims that um are dealing with very aggressive extortion events related to certain com-related actors.
- 14:02SPEAKER_00: Shiny Hunters is one example, but there's other groups like Pink, like Blackfile, and a variety of others that are out there that are employing a very similar tradecraft.
- 14:12SPEAKER_00: They develop scripts, they have native English-speaking callers that essentially read through the scripts and convince people to ultimately surrender their credentials.
- 14:22SPEAKER_00: You ask the question about sharing threat intelligence.
- 14:24SPEAKER_00: One of the reasons why uh the Manding team, we blog about this, is because we want the world to know about these tradecraft.
- 14:32SPEAKER_00: And so we actually first observed this kind of most recent round of telephone-based social engineering, which occurred roughly around November 2025.
- 14:41SPEAKER_00: And it continued in December and then January, and it continues to this day.
- 14:46SPEAKER_00: You know, we see realistically multiple victims that are um that fall victim to these attacks every single week.
- 14:53SPEAKER_00: Now, the fact of the matter is the people, the actual individuals that are falling victim to these social engineering attacks, they're not reading the media blogs.
- 15:02SPEAKER_00: We get it.
- 15:03SPEAKER_00: But we hope that the organizations that they work for are reading the blogs.
- 15:07SPEAKER_00: We want them to be aware of what are the actors doing to compromise credentials.
- 15:13SPEAKER_00: And then we provide a number of recommendations.
- 15:15SPEAKER_00: Some of them are easy, some of them are very hard to help organizations better defend against these types of attacks.
- 15:22SPEAKER_00: I'll tell you, it's a very hard thing to implement, but very effective thing to implement is FIDO2 authentication.
- 15:29SPEAKER_00: So having some kind of physical device, which um just maybe I'll if I could quickly pull my uh Google Titan key out.
- 15:38SPEAKER_00: I don't know how well you could see this, but this is essentially a device that is always plugged into my laptop.
- 15:43SPEAKER_00: And when I log into a website, any Google resource, I type in my username, my password, and then it asks me to physically tap the button on the side of my computer or that that device that I just showed you to prove that it's actually me logging into this resource.
- 16:00SPEAKER_00: So somebody can't log into a resource on their own laptop, even if I give them a user and a password, because they have to have one of these devices and they have to physically touch the device.
- 16:12SPEAKER_00: If they ask me to touch the device, that's not going to do anything because um they are not logging into the website for my device.
- 16:20SPEAKER_00: So I say this is hard, it's hard from a deployment perspective.
- 16:23SPEAKER_00: So for people that all work in a corporation that might go into an office, okay, that might be relatively easy.
- 16:31SPEAKER_00: But just look at a retail environment where you have a number of associates that work in a store.
- 16:37SPEAKER_00: Realistically, most of these people may not even check a corporate email address.
- 16:41SPEAKER_00: Many of them may not even have a laptop.
- 16:43SPEAKER_00: And so deploying FIA2 authentication to them is obviously much more difficult.
- 16:47SPEAKER_00: And then if you just remember the size of the device that I showed you, it's very small.
- 16:51SPEAKER_00: It could easily fall out of, well, maybe it could fall out of a laptop.
- 16:55SPEAKER_00: Um it actually hasn't fallen out of mine in the last uh you know, roughly six years or so since I've been using it.
- 17:01SPEAKER_00: And one thing that I found is that it is much more convenient for me to log into a website because of this device, as opposed to what I had to do before.
- 17:10SPEAKER_00: Before what I had to do is I had to load my phone, use my thumbprint, load up the duo application, get a six-digit code, and then go back to my keyboard and type in that six-digit code.
- 17:21SPEAKER_00: That was inconvenient.
- 17:22SPEAKER_00: It's a lot easier for me to tap into one of these little keys, a Yubi key or a Google Titan key.
- 17:27SPEAKER_00: So, anyway, so the key point here is the end user at some point in time will fall victim to a social engineering attack.
- 17:35SPEAKER_00: But what's our responsibility is that we are building enough other controls to minimize the impact of somebody falling victim to a social engineering attack.
- 17:44SPEAKER_00: So, for example, if we rolled out FIDO2 authentication, then it becomes very, very hard for somebody to successfully social engineer an employee of a company and actually be able to log into whatever resource they're trying to log into.
- 17:59SPEAKER_01: Yeah.
- 18:00SPEAKER_01: Like I said, no matter how much you educate, no matter how much you we we speak about this just on pure numbers alone.
- 18:06SPEAKER_01: And I've heard the transcripts and I've heard the recordings.
- 18:10SPEAKER_01: Uh they're a tough listen, right, when you hear someone being manipulated.
- 18:15SPEAKER_01: That's why it's so important for us to acknowledge that no matter what we do, there will still be that five or ten percent that will still uh fall through it.
- 18:22SPEAKER_01: I mean I bought four tickets to Coldplay uh about a year and a half ago of someone who never delivered them, actually through my daughter.
- 18:31SPEAKER_01: My daughter was doing it, but I was like, yeah, we should definitely do that.
- 18:34SPEAKER_00: So it's disappointing for a lot of reasons.
- 18:37SPEAKER_00: Uh yeah, yeah.
- 18:38SPEAKER_00: It would have been a great show if you had a chance to go.
- 18:41SPEAKER_00: That's true.
- 18:42SPEAKER_01: One one thing I'm I'm grappling with a little bit at the moment, Charles, is whether whether I think fatigue is building it in around cyber.
- 18:51SPEAKER_01: This thing goes in waves.
- 18:52SPEAKER_01: Um and quite often it is it goes through a lull where perhaps we haven't seen as much in the media as what's actually occurring.
- 19:01SPEAKER_01: We start to get a bit jaded about not seeing return on investment and in relation to cyberspend, uh, because it's it's a little bit like trying to see a return on investment by seeing nothing occur.
- 19:13SPEAKER_01: That that's a key to a success, and how do you measure that success?
- 19:18SPEAKER_01: Are you are you seeing that?
- 19:19SPEAKER_01: And if so, uh how do we keep boards, senior management teams energized about this risk?
- 19:28SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
- 19:29SPEAKER_00: Uh so what one thing that I I try my best to do when I speak to management or boards or or or chief information security officers is I don't want them to feel that no matter what they do, they'll still be compromised.
- 19:46SPEAKER_00: Because then we start to develop this defeatist mentality and we start to kind of throw our hands up in the air and we just kind of give up and we we stop putting in the effort.
- 19:55SPEAKER_00: There are a lot of things that we can do to mitigate the risk and the impact of cyber attacks.
- 20:01SPEAKER_00: There's a number of layers of controls that we could put in place.
- 20:03SPEAKER_00: There's a number of defenses, there's increased telemetry.
- 20:07SPEAKER_00: And the fact of the matter is, many adversaries are opportunistic.
- 20:11SPEAKER_00: You know, many adversaries don't wake up in the morning saying, I want to hack into Company X.
- 20:16SPEAKER_00: It's a bit of an opportunity for them.
- 20:18SPEAKER_00: They're scanning the internet looking for vulnerabilities, they're sending hundreds of thousands of phishing emails to people.
- 20:24SPEAKER_00: There are times where certain threat actors say, hey, I'm going to try to social engineer employees of a so-and-so company.
- 20:31SPEAKER_00: But but in general, there's a lot of opportunistic attacks that you could avoid dealing with an opportunistic attack with a number of foundational security controls.
- 20:39SPEAKER_00: So I think that continues to be really important.
- 20:42SPEAKER_00: Now, to your point about the fatigue around breach disclosures, look, we hear about a breach disclosure all the time.
- 20:48SPEAKER_00: Do we really think that much about it?
- 20:50SPEAKER_00: Sometimes, maybe if it's a brand that we use a lot or we care a lot about, maybe if it's um, you know, an organization that lost very sensitive information, maybe.
- 21:01SPEAKER_00: But yeah, you're right.
- 21:02SPEAKER_00: There is a little bit of a sense of fatigue.
- 21:04SPEAKER_00: Now, what I'll tell you, just so you have a view into the US.
- 21:08SPEAKER_00: So, as I'm sure you know, a few years ago there was a major health payer in Australia that had a security event.
- 21:15SPEAKER_00: Very, very sensitive data was unfortunately released, data that should have never been published to the world.
- 21:21SPEAKER_00: And as you think about that, the people who were impacted said the harm was imposed upon us as the insureds, as opposed to the company.
- 21:30SPEAKER_00: And that actually drove a lot of change in the United States.
- 21:34SPEAKER_00: What I found was for about two years after that healthcare payer incident in Australia, in the U.S., we found that a number of healthcare organizations ended up paying extortion demands to reduce the likelihood of very sensitive health information being published on the internet.
- 21:51SPEAKER_00: That was somewhat of a direct reaction to what actually happened in Australia.
- 21:56SPEAKER_00: We paid attention in the U.S.
- 21:57SPEAKER_00: So there have been major security events.
- 22:00SPEAKER_00: In the US, where other health payers lost very sensitive data for a large portion of Americans.
- 22:07SPEAKER_00: And unfortunately, extortion payments had to be made again to reduce the likelihood of that stolen data being published on the internet.
- 22:16SPEAKER_01: I wonder whether that company, if it had its time again, Charles, would do things slightly differently.
- 22:23SPEAKER_01: Because to so publicly go out with the messaging, which was that messaging in and of itself was troublesome, but that payment would not be made.
- 22:33SPEAKER_01: And then for individuals, news agencies, journalists to trawl the dark web and find this information and then use it as a rolling headline, it was sort of catastrophic, really, f uh in many respects.
- 22:49SPEAKER_01: It brought out the worst in all of us.
- 22:52SPEAKER_01: We've got many other mitigation things to put in place nowadays to sort of help with that.
- 22:55SPEAKER_01: So I'm saying here in Australia that that company did a great thing.
- 23:00SPEAKER_01: They stared down, notwithstanding the sensitivity, and set the bar for when a company would pay or not pay.
- 23:09SPEAKER_01: Rightly or wrongly.
- 23:10SPEAKER_01: From your experience, it's the opposite.
- 23:12SPEAKER_01: It's actually moved the dial the other way for organizations in the US where they say, look, you know what, it's actually worth paying here.
- 23:19SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
- 23:20SPEAKER_00: The bottom line is this a lot of people were negatively impacted by these cyber attacks.
- 23:26SPEAKER_00: It was tough on the insurer, it was tough on the insureds.
- 23:28SPEAKER_00: It's an awful situation for a lot of folks.
- 23:31SPEAKER_00: And by the way, you know, the the other thing that maybe perpetuated this problem was that because it became known that health insurers and healthcare providers ended up paying extortion demands, it actually increased the frequency of a number of attacks against other healthcare organizations.
- 23:47SPEAKER_00: And so ultimately, look, what's the right and wrong answer?
- 23:51SPEAKER_00: I don't know.
- 23:52SPEAKER_00: It depends on each situation.
- 23:55SPEAKER_00: And ultimately, what you're trying to do is you're trying to minimize the amount of negative impact.
- 23:59SPEAKER_00: But there's always going to be some level of negative impact to somebody, whether it's the actual company themselves or the customers, the insurance, the business partners, it usually there's some negative consequences to some some number of people.
- 24:12SPEAKER_01: Yeah, it's fascinating, isn't it?
- 24:15SPEAKER_01: People often ask me, do you think we're sort of winning the war here with this particular adversary?
- 24:20SPEAKER_01: And it's And I look at it and think, well, you know, we've been fighting physical crime since time immemorial, and I don't think we've managed to crack that yet.
- 24:29SPEAKER_01: And not suggesting we don't we're not making good headway, whether it's disruptive activity or otherwise.
- 24:34SPEAKER_01: But people talk to me and they said, Well, what about the sanctions?
- 24:37SPEAKER_01: We've arrested Vladimir.
- 24:40SPEAKER_01: He's been arrested based on this analysis.
- 24:43SPEAKER_01: And my response is, well, it's a little bit like saying we've managed to arrest a burglar who's burgled a house in our suburb, and I think we've now got a pretty good handle on the global burglary problem that we have.
- 24:59SPEAKER_00: Look, from my perspective, I feel like there are periods of time where there's a lot of great law enforcement actions.
- 25:05SPEAKER_01: Yeah.
- 25:05SPEAKER_00: A number of disruptions of adversaries, disruptions of threat campaigns, seizures of funds and threat actor infrastructure, maybe arrests, indictments, sanctions, whatnot, of actors.
- 25:17SPEAKER_00: And I don't think that's year-round, but there are periods of time where I get really excited by the actions that law enforcement takes against uh threat actors.
- 25:27SPEAKER_00: And I hear a lot of criticism of law enforcement for not doing enough.
- 25:33SPEAKER_00: Now, could they do more?
- 25:34SPEAKER_00: Look, I think we all want more actions to be taken, especially when there's a number of actors that we know who exactly they are, where they where they live.
- 25:43SPEAKER_00: I get it, it's complicated, but I would like to see a little bit more actions.
- 25:47SPEAKER_00: But I do celebrate the wins.
- 25:49SPEAKER_00: I do celebrate the law enforcement actions.
- 25:51SPEAKER_00: And from my perspective, I feel that if there were no law enforcement actions, the amount of crime that we deal with would be exponentially higher than what we're dealing with today.
- 26:01SPEAKER_00: Look, I'll tell you, if you remember back, it was 2021 when Colonial Pipeline had a security event.
- 26:06SPEAKER_00: Yep.
- 26:07SPEAKER_00: And then R Eagle had compromised a technology company in the United States, and they they ultimately encrypted somewhere between 1,000 and 1,500 companies.
- 26:18SPEAKER_00: There are so many really positive law enforcement actions that occurred.
- 26:23SPEAKER_00: The extortion payment that Colonial Pipeline made to the threat actor was obtained by law enforcement.
- 26:31SPEAKER_00: So they basically stole the funds, the cryptocurrency from the threat actor.
- 26:36SPEAKER_00: Our evil campaign against that technology company that impacted about a thousand or 1,500 companies.
- 26:41SPEAKER_00: Law enforcement was able to get access to a universal decryptor for that particular threat campaign and gave it to as many victims as they could get a hold of for free to decrypt data.
- 26:52SPEAKER_00: They made a lot of arrests, they indicted a number of people, they seized a lot of infrastructure.
- 26:56SPEAKER_00: By the end of 2021, there were a number of adversaries that were really questioning whether they should continue doing this.
- 27:03SPEAKER_00: Because some of these folks, you know, they had families, they have kids.
- 27:06SPEAKER_00: This is a job for them.
- 27:08SPEAKER_00: And this job became very risky.
- 27:11SPEAKER_00: Now, I believe that if law enforcement continued to take actions all throughout the years in 2022 and onward, I think a number of threat actors would be too scared to continue doing their operations.
- 27:23SPEAKER_00: Unfortunately, there's a lot of starts and stops.
- 27:26SPEAKER_00: And I am I'm very hopeful and optimistic that there will see a number of really good, notable arrests and law enforcement actions which will curb the intrusion activity to some extent.
- 27:36SPEAKER_01: Yeah, okay.
- 27:37SPEAKER_01: I'm hopeful too.
- 27:38SPEAKER_01: Quick question on geopolitics.
- 27:40SPEAKER_01: What do I mean by geopolitics?
- 27:42SPEAKER_01: Uh it means a lot of things, doesn't it?
- 27:44SPEAKER_01: Whether it's conflicts, whether it's sort of unstable economies, whether it's East and West, you know, authoritarian regimes, whether it's the mood of the White House when it wakes up in the morning, uh where do you see the largest challenge on the on the geopolitical front coming from?
- 28:04SPEAKER_01: When you see something occur, what what what is that something that says, look, we're probably going to be in for a little bit of a spike in what we uh in the attacks for this reason.
- 28:15SPEAKER_00: Let me focus on the ANZ part of the world first.
- 28:19SPEAKER_00: If China invades Taiwan, I think ANZ and a few other parts of the world will probably deal with a surge in cyber intrusion activity.
- 28:29SPEAKER_00: And part of that could just be because uh the PRC is really focused on understanding what would Australia would do if uh China invaded Taiwan.
- 28:40SPEAKER_00: Same thing with the United States, the United Kingdom, and a variety of other nations that don't want China to invade Taiwan.
- 28:47SPEAKER_00: So I think that is something that could potentially increase the amount of intrusion activity.
- 28:53SPEAKER_00: The other thing that it could potentially do, and the big thing that we're worried about in the United States, is we know that the PRC has access to a lot of critical infrastructure in the US.
- 29:02SPEAKER_00: And we know that they technically have the access to cause disruptions to critical infrastructure.
- 29:08SPEAKER_00: They haven't done that.
- 29:10SPEAKER_00: They operate under strict rules of engagement.
- 29:13SPEAKER_00: Now, will something change?
- 29:15SPEAKER_00: Will the rules change if there's a current war going on?
- 29:19SPEAKER_00: That is a question that a number of us are pretty concerned about.
- 29:22SPEAKER_00: Um you'll find that the White House is is increasingly concerned about uh about that.
- 29:28SPEAKER_00: Other things that could potentially impact the ANZ part of the world, or really any other conflict that's going on.
- 29:35SPEAKER_00: I think right now Australia may not have felt a lot of the outcomes of increased geopolitical tensions in the Middle East or in Russian Ukraine because other parts of the world were dealing with that.
- 29:47SPEAKER_00: So when Russia invaded Ukraine, what we found was that Russia was mostly putting all their effort, all their cyber effort, against organizations in Ukraine.
- 29:56SPEAKER_00: And there's only so much offensive cyber capacity that they had.
- 30:00SPEAKER_00: Um so we didn't really see a whole lot of cyber attacks anywhere else in the world.
- 30:04SPEAKER_00: With what's going on in the Middle East right now, we see a lot of intrusion activity in the Middle East, a lot of intrusion activity targeted towards Israeli organizations and other organizations in other countries, neighboring countries.
- 30:18SPEAKER_00: And then we also obviously see targeting of U.S.
- 30:21SPEAKER_00: organizations.
- 30:22SPEAKER_00: And the really important thing to note is uh some of these Iranian actors, uh, while they certainly have cyber offensive capabilities, they also really embellish what they've done and what they have access to.
- 30:37SPEAKER_00: And so they operate in half-truths.
- 30:39SPEAKER_00: So we have to be careful when we investigate to try to really understand what actually did they do versus what they said they did.
- 30:46SPEAKER_00: And it's usually a portion of what they said they did, that they actually did.
- 30:51SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
- 30:52SPEAKER_01: It's pretty scary stuff, isn't it, when you think about a nation-state positional attacks, someone in your organization quietly waiting for something.
- 31:01SPEAKER_01: And who really knows what that is.
- 31:03SPEAKER_01: Just to take a step back for a second, uh, two more questions for you, Charles.
- 31:07SPEAKER_01: Uh we talked about social engineering.
- 31:09SPEAKER_01: Social engineering is in many respects one of the most basic ways of getting yourself into an organization.
- 31:14SPEAKER_01: It's and it is being done by the the the kid in the hoodie in mum's basement again, th the the back.
- 31:20SPEAKER_01: Um but so too is basic security and physical security, like tailgating into businesses and the like.
- 31:27SPEAKER_01: Have you been sort of surprised to see the simplification of these attacks down to what really kind of existed 20, 30 years ago, the social engineering and sort of physical tailgating intrusions?
- 31:44SPEAKER_00: So for social engineering, when we first started seeing the surge in it, it was roughly when Scattered Spider started targeting organizations.
- 31:54SPEAKER_00: And then I forget exactly what year that was, but it was you know, roughly around 2021, 2022-ish time frame.
- 32:01SPEAKER_00: And I remember thinking at the time they were employing this tradecraft that was very effective.
- 32:09SPEAKER_00: And they were doing things that a lot of us used to do back when we were doing penetration tests against organizations many years ago.
- 32:18SPEAKER_00: And I remember at the time thinking, you know, and this is roughly around, you know, when I was doing a lot of offensive security work and penetration testing, it was roughly around like the 2002 to maybe 2012 time frame.
- 32:31SPEAKER_00: I remember thinking when I pick up the phone and I call somebody to socially engineer them as part of a penetration testing engagement.
- 32:37SPEAKER_00: I kind of thought to myself at times, who's actually going to do this?
- 32:40SPEAKER_00: Like what adversary is actually gonna pick up the phone and try to trick somebody into providing their credentials?
- 32:46SPEAKER_00: And so there was a part of me that felt like, look, it's helpful that we're doing this, but look, real world adversaries don't do this.
- 32:52SPEAKER_00: And realistically, I don't think I ever saw any real world adversary at any scale, actually, from like 2002 to I don't know, 2021, actually pick up the phone and call somebody.
- 33:05SPEAKER_00: And there was this period of time where I actually started telling my team, I don't know if we need to keep picking up the phone and calling people.
- 33:12SPEAKER_00: It's just, it's not a really and by the way, this is around like maybe 2017, 2018.
- 33:16SPEAKER_00: So this is not really how adversaries are actually breaking into networks.
- 33:20SPEAKER_00: And so I was kind of right, but I was also kind of wrong.
- 33:22SPEAKER_00: I I I didn't anticipate that this would become a really become a thing.
- 33:26SPEAKER_00: And it has become a thing.
- 33:27SPEAKER_00: Obviously, it's become a very big thing, and it's been it's increasingly becoming a more and more important thing for us to defend against.
- 33:35SPEAKER_00: As it relates to physical access to buildings, in the early 2000s, we saw a decent amount of that.
- 33:42SPEAKER_00: I mean, people were sitting in a parking lot of a retail store pointing a Yagi antenna, which is a long antenna, and just literally pointing it at, you know, from their car, pointing it at a retail store and capturing credit card numbers that were traversing through a point of sale system to what's usually called an in-store processor, which is a server in the back of the store with unencrypted credit card numbers.
- 34:05SPEAKER_00: And so they were physically acquiring credit cards by physically sitting in a parking lot at a retail store.
- 34:11SPEAKER_00: And a number of these folks were over time, they were caught and arrested.
- 34:15SPEAKER_00: And then we didn't see too much physical related or proximity-based intrusion activity.
- 34:20SPEAKER_00: We saw some of it.
- 34:21SPEAKER_00: I mean, APT-28 was a good example where we saw them physically in hotels, compromising hotel networks, and then using that to get access to high-value target systems.
- 34:31SPEAKER_00: Um, and there are a few other public cases around that.
- 34:34SPEAKER_00: But recently, uh, and this might be what you were alluding to, um, there's a there's a situation where we saw a particular threat actor targeting a number of professional services organizations, where for a small percentage of them, there are humans that kind of trick their way into a building, pretended to be part of the IT help desk, and physically get access to victim computers, plug in thumb drives, external hard drives, and then copy over data from the laptops of the individuals working at these professional services organizations.
- 35:09SPEAKER_00: So we saw that this year.
- 35:11SPEAKER_00: And as we started seeing that a little bit more often, we thought to ourselves, hey, we saw this last year, but we weren't sure if this was actually directly connected to these security incidents.
- 35:20SPEAKER_00: So we started going back and realizing, hey, actually, this happened a few other times that we didn't quite have enough concrete data to tie it to these security incidents.
- 35:31SPEAKER_00: Um, but now that we see the bigger picture and we see more cases, now we are tying it back to um uh back to the cyber activity.
- 35:39SPEAKER_00: Now, the reason why I'm surprised is because there's real physical consequences.
- 35:43SPEAKER_00: You know, your face is getting caught by cameras.
- 35:46SPEAKER_00: You're physically entering a building that has security in it.
- 35:49SPEAKER_00: And so at some point in time, you are going to increase the likelihood of you getting arrested.
- 35:54SPEAKER_00: Now, the people that are doing this, we don't think they're actually the hackers.
- 35:58SPEAKER_00: We think that they might be outsourced mules that are coming in, that are following a script and doing what it is that the threat actor is telling them to do, and they're getting paid some cut.
- 36:07SPEAKER_00: So do they know that they're doing something really illegal?
- 36:10SPEAKER_00: I think they know they're doing something illegal, but I don't think they're actually the guys or or gals that are on keyboard actually doing the hacking activity.
- 36:18SPEAKER_01: Yeah.
- 36:19SPEAKER_01: Remember the days when you'd you'd chuck the old USB outside the front of the building to see who picked it up and put it in their laptop as part of your pen physical picture.
- 36:27SPEAKER_01: We did that in pen tests, yeah.
- 36:28SPEAKER_01: Yeah.
- 36:29SPEAKER_01: Crazy.
- 36:30SPEAKER_01: Hey, final question.
- 36:31SPEAKER_01: You must deal with a lot of lawyers.
- 36:33SPEAKER_01: America was.
- 36:34SPEAKER_01: Yeah.
- 36:34SPEAKER_01: Yeah, well, congratulations.
- 36:37SPEAKER_01: The role of the lawyer has changed a lot over the last five or six years, and the role of the lawyer has moved from sort of pure legal advice and sort of and also this illusion of legal professional privilege, which has largely been the power of it has been dispelled somewhat.
- 36:54SPEAKER_01: But I still find myself often at the center of a an incident.
- 37:00SPEAKER_01: So my question to you in that circumstance, what should I be doing?
- 37:06SPEAKER_01: What what does a good lawyer look like?
- 37:08SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
- 37:09SPEAKER_01: In an incident response?
- 37:11SPEAKER_00: The the lawyers that I love working with can have a very plain English language conversation with executives at the victim organization, and in just very plain English, help them understand what's going on, what's the risk associated with the security event, and talk to them in a very rational way, where you're thinking about protecting your client, but you're talking to them in a way that they could just simply understand what's going on.
- 37:42SPEAKER_00: What I find that sometimes since in a response companies struggle with is they're so obsessed with the technical bits and bytes that they sometimes struggle to communicate in just a plain old English language to somebody who's not a cyber expert.
- 37:56SPEAKER_00: And being able to talk at the right level in the language that people understand is really important.
- 38:03SPEAKER_00: And I find that lawyers like yourself and you know members of your team do a great job of.
- 38:08SPEAKER_01: Yeah, really important.
- 38:10SPEAKER_01: It's a great takeaway, isn't it?
- 38:11SPEAKER_01: We we often find that if one of our most significant contributions in the room can just bring a calmness to a room which is otherwise sort of chaotic.
- 38:21SPEAKER_01: And and and maybe there's something inherent in the logic of how we've been trained to deal with crises, you know, logically work our way through a crisis.
- 38:30SPEAKER_01: And I'm pleased it's acknowledged actually, because there have certainly been meetings where I've felt the technology or forensic teams have left the board and the board have left, and neither have really fully understood one another.
- 38:42SPEAKER_01: I can guarantee they didn't, you know.
- 38:44SPEAKER_01: It's like, I think we might need another briefing here.
- 38:46SPEAKER_01: Anyway, hey uh Charles, congratulations on not just a remarkable career, but building a profile around your name, which is obviously respected by the community, but also sort of generates interest.
- 38:59SPEAKER_01: Your emails, your contributions that you make when you push your notifications out mean a lot to people.
- 39:04SPEAKER_01: And it's because what you've done in the past is you've built credibility by delivering things which are of use.
- 39:12SPEAKER_01: Thank you very much for that broader contribution that you bring to the industry.
- 39:16SPEAKER_01: It's you may well be sitting over there in the US, but your contribution is felt very deeply and and you're deeply respected in this part of the world too, and I'm sure in other parts.
- 39:23SPEAKER_01: So thank you very much.
- 39:24SPEAKER_01: And that and that's why it's always a privilege for us to have a guest of your quality on our podcast, and our uh our listeners will be very grateful too.
- 39:32SPEAKER_01: So thank you very much, Charles.
- 39:34SPEAKER_01: I very much appreciate it.
- 39:36SPEAKER_01: All right, all the best.
- 39:38SPEAKER_01: Thank you.
- 39:38SPEAKER_00: You take care.
- 39:39SPEAKER_01: Bye-bye.
- 39:41SPEAKER_01: Thanks again for tuning in to Cross Examining Cyber, a podcast brought to you by Herbert Smith Free Hills Kramer.
- 39:47SPEAKER_01: In our next episode, we cross-examine David Gonsky, one of Australia's most respected business leaders and board directors.
- 39:54SPEAKER_01: David brings a clarity to cybersecurity like very few directors can.
- 39:59SPEAKER_01: It's a great episode.
- 40:00SPEAKER_01: Thank you again, Charles, for your time today, and thank you all for listening.