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Ukraine War at 1,000 Days- Senior British and Indian Officers Speak · UK Column Radio

• 0:06
  Speaker 1: As the Ukraine War passes its thousandth day, things are
• 0:11
  Speaker 1: greatly increasing in pace and scale, with reports of ICBM
• 0:16
  Speaker 1: attacks from Russia on the Ukrainian city of Nipro, and
• 0:21
  Speaker 1: as we record this yesterday, the Kremlin having apparently announced
• 0:26
  Speaker 1: that British and American military targets within the unkt UK
• 0:29
  Speaker 1: and USA may be on the target list. To discuss
• 0:35
  Speaker 1: the escalation and potential resolution of the Russia Ukraine conflict,
• 0:40
  Speaker 1: I am joined today by three extremely experienced retired senior
• 0:45
  Speaker 1: military officers from India and from the United Kingdom in
• 0:49
  Speaker 1: alphabetical order, Major General Gagandhi Bbakshi, Major General Chip Chapman,
• 0:55
  Speaker 1: and Lieutenant Colonel Glenn Grant, who, as viewers will see
• 0:59
  Speaker 1: as we go on, have overlapping areas of expertise. They
• 1:02
  Speaker 1: have a core shared specialism in counter terrorism, but they
• 1:06
  Speaker 1: have gone on to develop that, respectively towards information and
• 1:11
  Speaker 1: psychological operations. In Major General Bakshi's case, in Chip Chapman's case,
• 1:17
  Speaker 1: security policy at the Ministry of Defense, and in Lieutenant
• 1:22
  Speaker 1: Colonel Glen Grant's case, framing of Defense legislation and modernization
• 1:27
  Speaker 1: and training of Eastern European military structures. You're all very welcome, gentlemen.
• 1:32
  Speaker 1: And for the first of the three themes that we
• 1:34
  Speaker 1: are going to discuss today, I would like to address
• 1:37
  Speaker 1: Chip Chapman. In the first instance we have seen in
• 1:40
  Speaker 1: this week in late November twenty twenty four, in which
• 1:43
  Speaker 1: we record this ICBM attacks, I don't think that they're
• 1:47
  Speaker 1: disputed now by either side, by vehicle borne Russian ICBM
• 1:52
  Speaker 1: systems on a large weapons production facility in the Ukrainian
• 1:56
  Speaker 1: industrial center of Nipro. We have then seen the Kremlin
• 2:02
  Speaker 1: up the anti once again with threats to the United
• 2:04
  Speaker 1: Kingdom and United States homelands. I would like to ask
• 2:08
  Speaker 1: first for Chip Chapmans assessment, and then the other two
• 2:11
  Speaker 1: of you can contribute as you see fit on what
• 2:15
  Speaker 1: exactly the likelihood of further escalation is in the very
• 2:18
  Speaker 1: short term, perhaps a month or two, and leading on
• 2:23
  Speaker 1: from that, which commentators each of you would particularly value,
• 2:28
  Speaker 1: and if you wish to be Frank, whom you would
• 2:30
  Speaker 1: not particularly value as astute observers of the realities on
• 2:33
  Speaker 1: the battlefield. Chip Chapman, well.
• 2:36
  Speaker 2: The first thing I'd say at a tactical level is
• 2:38
  Speaker 2: I think Ukraine is losing slowly and that's a term
• 2:41
  Speaker 2: that we've had before, and interestingly, the first time I
• 2:44
  Speaker 2: came across that was in June twenty two when it
• 2:47
  Speaker 2: was a term used by Mike Waltz, who's now going
• 2:49
  Speaker 2: to be part of Trump's government. Then, of course, the
• 2:53
  Speaker 2: Ukrainians equalize the battlefield by the introduction of Hei Mars
• 2:57
  Speaker 2: and more American artillery. So I do think the Russian
• 3:01
  Speaker 2: proverb of the chicken pecks grain brook by grain is
• 3:05
  Speaker 2: evident at the moment, particularly on the Denest front towards
• 3:09
  Speaker 2: pop Rosk, which if they do lose that I think
• 3:12
  Speaker 2: would be operationally significant in the way that a lot
• 3:15
  Speaker 2: of the other commentary throughout the last two years about
• 3:19
  Speaker 2: what has been operational operationally significant has not been. And
• 3:23
  Speaker 2: of course you sequence tactical battles for operational effect in
• 3:27
  Speaker 2: support of strategic objectives. So what I think has happened
• 3:31
  Speaker 2: in the last week or so is an attempt to
• 3:35
  Speaker 2: equalize the battlefield in the deep battle. Now, of course,
• 3:38
  Speaker 2: the deep battle is that outside of the contact zone,
• 3:42
  Speaker 2: and I think that was done for three reasons in
• 3:44
  Speaker 2: terms of the atacoms and storm shadow being used across
• 3:48
  Speaker 2: the border. Firstly, in the short term, I think it's
• 3:51
  Speaker 2: a trying to trump proof Ukraine for the next two months. Secondly,
• 3:57
  Speaker 2: I think it's a reaction to the introduction of the
• 4:00
  Speaker 2: North Koreans. And again a lot of commentators have said
• 4:03
  Speaker 2: that the introduction of the North Koreans is a sign
• 4:06
  Speaker 2: of weakness. I don't take that sort of view. I
• 4:09
  Speaker 2: take the view that if your total means is increased
• 4:13
  Speaker 2: and your strength of will is there, your power of
• 4:15
  Speaker 2: resistance is elevated. Now what the reciprocally what the Russians
• 4:20
  Speaker 2: are trying to do? I think with their attacks which
• 4:23
  Speaker 2: happened on the seventeenth in terms of again trying to
• 4:26
  Speaker 2: hit the electricy grid in the infrastructure, which of course
• 4:30
  Speaker 2: used one hundred and twenty missiles, both cruise and ballistic,
• 4:33
  Speaker 2: and ninety drones, and there's no doubt that a number
• 4:36
  Speaker 2: of those were Iranian. So there's always been Iranian technology
• 4:40
  Speaker 2: in Iranian capability being US. So I do think that
• 4:44
  Speaker 2: the Russians are trying to break the will of the
• 4:48
  Speaker 2: Ukrainian people on the third autumn and winter. And I
• 4:51
  Speaker 2: also think it's probably wrong that we're saying all the
• 4:55
  Speaker 2: time that we're doing this to get ourselves to a
• 4:57
  Speaker 2: negotiating position. That's only one strand of that. I think
• 5:01
  Speaker 2: the other strand is that a lot of the commentariat
• 5:04
  Speaker 2: from Russia would suggest that Russia is not interested in
• 5:07
  Speaker 2: any piece initiatives, that they do see that the submission
• 5:12
  Speaker 2: and submission of Ukraine and destruction of Ukraine and a
• 5:17
  Speaker 2: surrender piece is what they really want to achieve on
• 5:19
  Speaker 2: the maximalist objective. And thirdly, that they don't necessarily see
• 5:24
  Speaker 2: any need for putin wrong for Trump as a peace broker. Now,
• 5:29
  Speaker 2: it's in relation to that that we need to then
• 5:32
  Speaker 2: look at what happened with the use of the Orishnik
• 5:36
  Speaker 2: missile yesterday. Now I don't think it is an ICBM,
• 5:39
  Speaker 2: it's the Russian. The American intelligence suggests it's either an
• 5:44
  Speaker 2: MRBM or a or short range ballistic missile. Doesn't really
• 5:50
  Speaker 2: matter in a sense. It's the novel delivery vehicle which
• 5:53
  Speaker 2: is the most important thing, and its potential range which
• 5:56
  Speaker 2: gives it the strategic flavor. However, I wouldn't go towards
• 6:01
  Speaker 2: again this position which most of the mainstream media and
• 6:05
  Speaker 2: social media go to, that were necessarily heading for World
• 6:08
  Speaker 2: War three for three reasons. The first one is that
• 6:14
  Speaker 2: the Americans actually knew about the possibility of this experimental
• 6:18
  Speaker 2: missile being used. The second one is that the US
• 6:21
  Speaker 2: were notified beforehand about the launch, and of course the
• 6:24
  Speaker 2: reason for that is because through the nuclear risk reduction channels,
• 6:28
  Speaker 2: and the reason for that is to avoid any miscalculation,
• 6:31
  Speaker 2: because if you use an offset ballistic missile from range,
• 6:35
  Speaker 2: then that's going to set alarm bells ringing. But thirdly,
• 6:38
  Speaker 2: I think in terms of the American response, it is
• 6:41
  Speaker 2: still that they are not going to be deterred by
• 6:45
  Speaker 2: what the Russians have done. And I think I always
• 6:47
  Speaker 2: take the line here of Lord Robertson, who's former NATO
• 6:52
  Speaker 2: Secretary General and also involved in the British Strategic Defense
• 6:56
  Speaker 2: Review at the moment that Putin will only be forced
• 6:58
  Speaker 2: to retreat from UK by an absence of Western caution.
• 7:02
  Speaker 2: To answer your final question, Alex, about what sources do
• 7:06
  Speaker 2: I look at, I think it would be wrong of
• 7:08
  Speaker 2: me to give you any of the sources that I use.
• 7:11
  Speaker 2: But what I would say is anything that I analyze
• 7:15
  Speaker 2: I do through the prism of the seven deadly sins
• 7:18
  Speaker 2: of an analyst and the intelligence community, in including framing bias,
• 7:22
  Speaker 2: confirmation bias, group think, and all those sorts of things.
• 7:26
  Speaker 2: So I'm trying to discriminate between what is realistic and
• 7:29
  Speaker 2: credible and what is incredible and unrealistic.
• 7:34
  Speaker 1: From a parachute officer, we turn to an infantry officer.
• 7:37
  Speaker 1: Both of you have had counterinsurgency experience, and perhaps that's
• 7:42
  Speaker 1: more relevant to the battlefield now than it may seem.
• 7:45
  Speaker 1: I turned them to Mejor General Bakshi to respond to
• 7:49
  Speaker 1: what he's heard from Chip Chapman. How much of it
• 7:52
  Speaker 1: do you concur with, sir? And in particular, I'm a
• 7:55
  Speaker 1: keen to know what sources from India or elsewhere outside
• 7:59
  Speaker 1: the Euro American sphere where most of our sources inevitably
• 8:02
  Speaker 1: come from. Where are you looking at for reliable commentary
• 8:05
  Speaker 1: and analysis?
• 8:07
  Speaker 3: You know, there are information warfen narratives in play, propaganda
• 8:12
  Speaker 3: narratives in play, and we did feel for at a
• 8:17
  Speaker 3: particular stage of this early stages of this war, that
• 8:20
  Speaker 3: the propaganda narratives had become so dominant that, you know,
• 8:25
  Speaker 3: the objective reality on the battlefield was one thing, and
• 8:30
  Speaker 3: the propaganda narrative was a different meta universe altogether. And
• 8:37
  Speaker 3: we did find there was a tendency in the West
• 8:39
  Speaker 3: to believe your propaganda narrative, you know, to act as
• 8:43
  Speaker 3: if it were true. The simple fact is that the
• 8:47
  Speaker 3: Russians started this offensive, you know, with a very curiously restrained,
• 8:53
  Speaker 3: you know policy, given the standard Russian military doctrine that
• 9:00
  Speaker 3: relies on mass and scale right first Alon, second nation,
• 9:05
  Speaker 3: on third achelon operational maneuver group. I mean, that's the
• 9:09
  Speaker 3: kind we had seen in the Second World War. So
• 9:12
  Speaker 3: what we find found here was a curious tension between
• 9:16
  Speaker 3: the gerassim of hybrid war doctrine and the standard Russian
• 9:20
  Speaker 3: war doctrine of going a mass a mass scale, not
• 9:26
  Speaker 3: just in terms of manpower, but in terms of technology
• 9:29
  Speaker 3: right waves after waves, as we were used to. So
• 9:33
  Speaker 3: we were quite surprised by this force restriction. And then
• 9:37
  Speaker 3: I had the occasion to, you know, the military attache,
• 9:42
  Speaker 3: Russian military attached air in Delhi came over to me
• 9:45
  Speaker 3: to discuss some of these things, and I asked him,
• 9:48
  Speaker 3: why are you so restrained? Why are you not, you know,
• 9:53
  Speaker 3: doing things as as is your doctrine in mass and scale.
• 9:57
  Speaker 3: So he, you know, very curiously he's and he said, sir,
• 10:01
  Speaker 3: you'll have to ask Poutin that because you know he
• 10:06
  Speaker 3: believes Putin's I believe his anchor premise was that these
• 10:10
  Speaker 3: are our cousins, they are slav cousins, and therefore we
• 10:14
  Speaker 3: should be restrained in the usage of wars. In fact,
• 10:17
  Speaker 3: it even objected to very heavy use of artillery, which
• 10:21
  Speaker 3: is standard God of War practice as far as the
• 10:24
  Speaker 3: Russians are concerned. So I told him tongue in cheek
• 10:28
  Speaker 3: that even the Pakistanis and we are cousins, but we
• 10:32
  Speaker 3: fought five wars and you will have to get over
• 10:35
  Speaker 3: the cousins syndrome because it's going.
• 10:37
  Speaker 4: To cost you. And frankly it did.
• 10:40
  Speaker 3: Though they achieved their initial objectives in terms of securing
• 10:44
  Speaker 3: about sixty percent of don Bas, ninety percent of Lawansk,
• 10:48
  Speaker 3: they secured the land bridge to Crimea, and of course
• 10:51
  Speaker 3: Crimea was already with them, So about twenty percent of Ukraine,
• 10:55
  Speaker 3: most of the industrial portion, the Russian speaking portion, that
• 10:59
  Speaker 3: is what they secured, and I do believe that that
• 11:03
  Speaker 3: was their maximal objective because they don't have the false levels. Simple,
• 11:08
  Speaker 3: if you want to go in for the whole of Ukraine,
• 11:11
  Speaker 3: you'd need a false levels about ten times the size
• 11:14
  Speaker 3: of what you have. So initially they went in with
• 11:17
  Speaker 3: just one hundred and fifty thousand troops against the Ukrainian
• 11:21
  Speaker 3: army that was two hundred and fifty thousand strong to
• 11:23
  Speaker 3: start with and is over five hundred and fifty thousand
• 11:26
  Speaker 3: after mobilization.
• 11:29
  Speaker 4: And then, you know, it was okay in the offensive.
• 11:32
  Speaker 3: Phase because people were a bit dazed by this initial
• 11:35
  Speaker 3: speed et cetera of the offensive. But then it all
• 11:38
  Speaker 3: ground down to a battle of attrition, and then they
• 11:41
  Speaker 3: had to hold a thousand kilometer front, and you know,
• 11:44
  Speaker 3: their manpower gaps began to show through. The Ukrainians counterattacked
• 11:51
  Speaker 3: in Kerson and they pulled out troops from Kharkiv to
• 11:54
  Speaker 3: reinforce Heirson, and then you are living in an area
• 11:59
  Speaker 3: of battle field transparency of unprecedented levels.
• 12:03
  Speaker 4: American satellites picked up the gap.
• 12:05
  Speaker 3: In Kharkiv and they told the Ukrainians to go for it.
• 12:09
  Speaker 3: The Russians were withdrawing to the line of the oscill
• 12:12
  Speaker 3: and of course they're motorized infantry elements made a very
• 12:18
  Speaker 3: grand looking charge which looked like a Britz creek. So
• 12:23
  Speaker 3: the Russians were forced to mobilize, much against Putin's will. Politically,
• 12:27
  Speaker 3: he has been resisting mobilization from the word go. He
• 12:30
  Speaker 3: was taking their kicking and screaming by his generals. So,
• 12:35
  Speaker 3: you know, three hundred thousand they had to mobilize, and
• 12:38
  Speaker 3: then they built a servokin line to defend what they have.
• 12:41
  Speaker 4: And in twenty twenty.
• 12:43
  Speaker 3: Three, all the offensives that the Ukrainians launched to you know,
• 12:48
  Speaker 3: throw the Russians out of that, I thought that was
• 12:51
  Speaker 3: a bit overstraighted, that was overtly optimistic. All these offensives
• 12:56
  Speaker 3: failed with heavy losses to the Ukrainians, heavy losses to
• 13:00
  Speaker 3: the Ukrainians, and now the Russians are on the role.
• 13:04
  Speaker 3: They have mobilized, but they were initial reports that they
• 13:09
  Speaker 3: had about two hundred and fifty thousand troops in reserve
• 13:12
  Speaker 3: would be used for an offensive.
• 13:14
  Speaker 4: Either towards Kaiev or Odessa.
• 13:16
  Speaker 3: But they're bringing in the Ukrainian shores that they have
• 13:20
  Speaker 3: also reached the end of the battle unless they mobilize again.
• 13:25
  Speaker 3: And they are not really very keen to throwing their
• 13:28
  Speaker 3: conscripts because in twenty twenty two the conscripts suffered heavily.
• 13:34
  Speaker 3: You know, these short term inductees suffer badly in war.
• 13:38
  Speaker 3: They have suffered quite badly, so the putin his loath
• 13:41
  Speaker 3: to commit them to battle, though he has about two
• 13:43
  Speaker 3: hundred and fifty of them, so there is that force
• 13:46
  Speaker 3: constraint which is operative even more for the Ukrainians. About
• 13:52
  Speaker 3: eight million Ukrainians have fled the country, but one million
• 13:56
  Speaker 3: plus have died or severely wounded horsety combat. So Ukrainian
• 14:02
  Speaker 3: Ukraine is really really very desperate for Manpa. And now
• 14:08
  Speaker 3: there is also the aspect of when Donald Trump comes in, well,
• 14:12
  Speaker 3: the weapon flowing will also be severely curtailed.
• 14:17
  Speaker 4: So they are running against time.
• 14:19
  Speaker 3: We find the Russians are now making steady but relentless
• 14:24
  Speaker 3: progress in the east. The Ukrainian offensive in Kursk was
• 14:28
  Speaker 3: designed to pull out Russian forces from the east and
• 14:33
  Speaker 3: forced them to be redeployed for the defense of Kursk.
• 14:36
  Speaker 4: That doesn't seem to have happened.
• 14:38
  Speaker 3: That doesn't seem to have happened, though, I've recently read
• 14:42
  Speaker 3: reports of the one hundred and sixth and another airborne division,
• 14:46
  Speaker 3: you know, being possibly troops being taken out there to
• 14:49
  Speaker 3: reinforce Kursk. But while large the eastern offensive continues, they're
• 14:54
  Speaker 3: making progress towards Petrovarsk. They're also now in the Koopians direction,
• 15:01
  Speaker 3: moving ahead, and it's a steady progress. They've been using
• 15:05
  Speaker 3: their dismounted infantry. They've been using infantry on motorcycles, very innovative,
• 15:12
  Speaker 3: used to get over the drones. The drones have become
• 15:15
  Speaker 3: caused the revolution in military affairs.
• 15:18
  Speaker 4: Frankly, that's what we feel in India.
• 15:21
  Speaker 3: They've caused a revolution in military affairs in the you know,
• 15:24
  Speaker 3: a two hundred dollars drone can knock out a Leopard
• 15:27
  Speaker 3: tank or a you know, even an Abrams and so
• 15:31
  Speaker 3: many of them have gone. So are the Ukrainians very
• 15:35
  Speaker 3: adapted using drones. In fact, both the sides are using drones,
• 15:40
  Speaker 3: and it is interesting to see how both sides have innovated,
• 15:44
  Speaker 3: especially the Russians. They seem to have innovated quite well.
• 15:48
  Speaker 3: Now where do we go from here? That's the critical
• 15:51
  Speaker 3: question right now. So I would reckon that the Ukrainian
• 15:57
  Speaker 3: the Russian Eastern offensive is going to progress. They're at
• 16:02
  Speaker 3: the breakthrough point, at the turning point more or less
• 16:05
  Speaker 3: of the war, and if they succeed, they might try
• 16:08
  Speaker 3: to break out towards the Kniper River right and even
• 16:13
  Speaker 3: if they don't, by and large they would have captured
• 16:15
  Speaker 3: before Donald Trump takes charge. A large amount of the
• 16:20
  Speaker 3: balanced territory in the don bas right. As far as
• 16:23
  Speaker 3: Coursk is concerned, they seem to be quite determined. Their
• 16:26
  Speaker 3: first assault after the Koreans came in have not really
• 16:31
  Speaker 3: made a breakthrough, but they are threatening the lines of communication.
• 16:35
  Speaker 3: So they are determined to snuff that salient out and
• 16:39
  Speaker 3: we'll have to see how it goes. But now with
• 16:43
  Speaker 3: the use of the attack cams, you know.
• 16:47
  Speaker 4: The attack cams.
• 16:49
  Speaker 3: President Joe Biden had initially refused to allow these weapons
• 16:53
  Speaker 3: to be used against Russia a few months back. Now
• 16:57
  Speaker 3: he has and there is a school of thought that
• 17:00
  Speaker 3: seems to believe that tends to believe that this is
• 17:03
  Speaker 3: to complicate things for Donald Trump. Donald Trump had made
• 17:07
  Speaker 3: a very very clear assertion that he would like to
• 17:10
  Speaker 3: bring peace to the region.
• 17:12
  Speaker 4: So there seems.
• 17:14
  Speaker 3: To be a clear attempt to discomfit Donald Trump, to
• 17:18
  Speaker 3: create problems for him.
• 17:19
  Speaker 4: And if you can shake up the pot so much that.
• 17:22
  Speaker 3: It becomes impossible to try and achieve peace, well, well
• 17:27
  Speaker 3: that's one narrative.
• 17:28
  Speaker 4: That's one narrative.
• 17:29
  Speaker 3: We hope it's not true, but that's the way it
• 17:31
  Speaker 3: looks like right now. And therefore this round of escalation
• 17:35
  Speaker 3: has started. Now Putin has also painted himself into a corner, right.
• 17:40
  Speaker 3: He had said that if you use atacams, atacams can't
• 17:46
  Speaker 3: be fired unless the satellite data or the targets is given,
• 17:51
  Speaker 3: unless the unless the coordinates are fed in by the cryptologists,
• 17:55
  Speaker 3: who are only the Americans. These crypto codes are not
• 17:59
  Speaker 3: repeat not with Ukrainians. So if you are going to
• 18:02
  Speaker 3: fire attac ms, if you are going to fire storm shadows,
• 18:05
  Speaker 3: you need American and British experts on the ground, whether
• 18:09
  Speaker 3: soldiers in mufty or civil contractors.
• 18:12
  Speaker 4: You have to have them on the ground.
• 18:14
  Speaker 3: And he had asserted that that means that United States
• 18:18
  Speaker 3: and United Kingdom but directly engaged in.
• 18:21
  Speaker 4: War with Russia. That's a clear assertion that he has made.
• 18:26
  Speaker 3: And then he has gone on, you know, with that
• 18:29
  Speaker 3: up the what shall I say, the escalation ladder, by
• 18:33
  Speaker 3: firstly signing that nuclear doctrine revision, which says that in
• 18:39
  Speaker 3: this kind of a contingency he can go for nuclear first.
• 18:43
  Speaker 4: Qu's right.
• 18:44
  Speaker 3: And then of course now he has fired an ICBM,
• 18:50
  Speaker 3: you can say that it was an intermediate range ballistic
• 18:53
  Speaker 3: missile or rather medium range ballustick missile. The R twenty
• 18:57
  Speaker 3: six supposedly as a range of six thousand kilometers, So
• 19:02
  Speaker 3: they've fired from Astra Carnet's hardly a thousand kilometers, but
• 19:06
  Speaker 3: it was a MIRVD warhead. And you know, as a demonstration,
• 19:13
  Speaker 3: as a demonstration, what are the demonstrations you can do?
• 19:16
  Speaker 4: You can fire a new you can test a nuke.
• 19:18
  Speaker 3: In your own territory to send the signals around the
• 19:23
  Speaker 3: message that don't thus far and no further. But he
• 19:27
  Speaker 3: started with this the lowest level of the deterrents, by
• 19:31
  Speaker 3: firing a medium range ballistic missile right armed with conventional weapons.
• 19:36
  Speaker 3: And even though the two hundred kg blasts were not
• 19:38
  Speaker 3: much damage done is not so substantial, right?
• 19:43
  Speaker 4: The fact is now, now, what.
• 19:47
  Speaker 3: Will it deter the use of atacams and storm shadows.
• 19:51
  Speaker 4: I'm not very convinced because I think.
• 19:54
  Speaker 3: This will likely go on. So what does Putin do?
• 19:58
  Speaker 3: Does he tamely lose face? And Willie askale? That is
• 20:02
  Speaker 3: the key question. And I would be happy if my
• 20:05
  Speaker 3: colleagues also, you know, pristian with the British perspective.
• 20:11
  Speaker 4: Thank you.
• 20:12
  Speaker 1: And with discussion having turned to the most sophisticated of
• 20:16
  Speaker 1: artillery and missile systems, who better to pick up this thread?
• 20:20
  Speaker 1: Than the tenant, Colonel Glenn Grant, who has specialized in
• 20:23
  Speaker 1: artillery for much of his career. Indeed, he was leading
• 20:26
  Speaker 1: the British intelligence effort on artillery for a while. Glen Grant,
• 20:30
  Speaker 1: I'm particularly keen to hear how much of what you
• 20:33
  Speaker 1: have heard you concur with from these two speakers. And
• 20:36
  Speaker 1: as you have lived and worked in Eastern Europe for
• 20:38
  Speaker 1: some years now, there's hardly an Eastern European capital whose
• 20:41
  Speaker 1: ministries you have not assisted with defense reform in various ways.
• 20:45
  Speaker 1: What sources are you keen to advise to us, particularly
• 20:49
  Speaker 1: if there are English language battlefield analysis sources from the
• 20:53
  Speaker 1: region that we might not be so familiar with.
• 20:56
  Speaker 5: I agree almost completely with my two general colleagues. I mean,
• 20:59
  Speaker 5: it's a tour de force from both of them, if
• 21:02
  Speaker 5: I may say so, to start the whole thing off.
• 21:05
  Speaker 5: But I have a couple of points that I would
• 21:07
  Speaker 5: like to not argue with, but just make a sort
• 21:12
  Speaker 5: of my own feeling being different. And that's with Chip's
• 21:14
  Speaker 5: comment about the World War three coming. I think we're
• 21:19
  Speaker 5: in World War three because I think that there's been
• 21:22
  Speaker 5: a there's been far too much focused by everybody upon Ukraine,
• 21:27
  Speaker 5: which I see as being that the fighting battlefield and
• 21:31
  Speaker 5: far too little understanding of what is going on that
• 21:34
  Speaker 5: people I think erroneously call hybrid warfare. And so that
• 21:39
  Speaker 5: you know that the fact that that communication lines are
• 21:43
  Speaker 5: being damaged, that Germany's had people trying to derail trains,
• 21:47
  Speaker 5: that I think five major, five major ammunition dumps over
• 21:56
  Speaker 5: the years have been blown up in Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
• 21:59
  Speaker 5: and Ukraine five six, and that that actually the war
• 22:03
  Speaker 5: has been going on comfortably against us since I think
• 22:08
  Speaker 5: at least we should say, two thousand and two, two
• 22:11
  Speaker 5: thousand and three, something like that, and we just haven't
• 22:14
  Speaker 5: woken up to it. But now if you list all
• 22:17
  Speaker 5: the things that are called hybrid warfare, it's actually now
• 22:21
  Speaker 5: it's a full a four page of things all over
• 22:25
  Speaker 5: the world, and from what I hear from some of
• 22:28
  Speaker 5: my better sources, there's a lot more to come. So
• 22:32
  Speaker 5: I would just say that on Chip everything else, the
• 22:35
  Speaker 5: General Chip said, I agree with on the actual attack
• 22:41
  Speaker 5: point of the forces coming in. Yes, Russia did come
• 22:44
  Speaker 5: in with the forces they had, but a point that
• 22:47
  Speaker 5: is not actually grasped by many people is that they
• 22:50
  Speaker 5: came in in a different shape from doctrine that they've
• 22:54
  Speaker 5: been using previously. In other words, that there were actually
• 22:59
  Speaker 5: brigades were coming in and they had their own artillery
• 23:01
  Speaker 5: and their own logistics with them when they came in.
• 23:04
  Speaker 5: You can actually see this on the videos. But the
• 23:07
  Speaker 5: trouble was that the generals in the system I, the
• 23:10
  Speaker 5: commanders had not gone away from, had not gone away
• 23:15
  Speaker 5: from centralization of fighting, which was their old way. So
• 23:19
  Speaker 5: in other words, you had troops coming in with a
• 23:21
  Speaker 5: different with equipment in different shape, generals who wanted centralization,
• 23:26
  Speaker 5: and a lot of people coming in who had never
• 23:29
  Speaker 5: actually ever been trained in doctrine because they'd never been
• 23:33
  Speaker 5: on exercise, they'd never done doctrine. Because of the corruption
• 23:37
  Speaker 5: in the first place, that any money for training was stolen,
• 23:40
  Speaker 5: so many many of the soldiers coming in were simply
• 23:45
  Speaker 5: and so you had all these mix ups, plus this
• 23:49
  Speaker 5: great belief that they were going to be met with flowers,
• 23:51
  Speaker 5: which of course they weren't. They were met with a
• 23:54
  Speaker 5: lot of individuals who had been out of war twenty fifteen,
• 24:01
  Speaker 5: but who had got all their clothing and equipment at
• 24:03
  Speaker 5: home and who were waiting for Russia to come back.
• 24:06
  Speaker 5: So there were actually a lot of very quite high
• 24:08
  Speaker 5: grade people who'd fought in places like Kharkiv in front
• 24:12
  Speaker 5: of Summi in front of Kharkiv, who were actually nasty
• 24:16
  Speaker 5: and ready and waiting, which the Russians weren't expecting. And
• 24:21
  Speaker 5: I think the last point before moving on to the
• 24:23
  Speaker 5: artillery was this thing about this the nuclear doctrine revision,
• 24:27
  Speaker 5: because I think that it's very often forgotten that paperwork
• 24:31
  Speaker 5: in Eastern Europe and in Russia is not actually anything
• 24:35
  Speaker 5: to do with decision making. It's to do with the
• 24:38
  Speaker 5: gloriousness of the paper itself. So you write a paper
• 24:43
  Speaker 5: and it's glorious. It's like a speech. You do a
• 24:45
  Speaker 5: speech and it's glorious. And therefore what Putin is doing
• 24:49
  Speaker 5: with his glorious paper is showing that he is both
• 24:53
  Speaker 5: glorious and he's in charge of it. So the only
• 24:56
  Speaker 5: way to be in charge of it and to get
• 24:58
  Speaker 5: any benefit internally is to change it. And of course
• 25:02
  Speaker 5: the only way to change it is to make it harder.
• 25:04
  Speaker 5: So he was left with no choice. And I think
• 25:06
  Speaker 5: this point about the general made about you know, what
• 25:09
  Speaker 5: does he do next? He's boxing himself in, the gloriousness
• 25:13
  Speaker 5: of the paper is boxing him in as well. But
• 25:18
  Speaker 5: in the West. Gee wiz how many people took this seriously.
• 25:23
  Speaker 5: I mean, Putin hasn't changed his views on how he's
• 25:25
  Speaker 5: going to use weapons since the beginning of the war.
• 25:27
  Speaker 5: He'll use them when he feels its right to use them,
• 25:31
  Speaker 5: not what some piece of paper says or or anybody else.
• 25:34
  Speaker 5: It's his program. And the one thing that comes to
• 25:38
  Speaker 5: my mind completely with this is that if he does
• 25:43
  Speaker 5: go nuclear and does do expand go too far, he
• 25:48
  Speaker 5: will lose all the games he's made because that all
• 25:51
  Speaker 5: these people that are not really convinced about what they
• 25:54
  Speaker 5: should do next and how they should support would then
• 25:57
  Speaker 5: be left with little choice. They either have to go
• 26:00
  Speaker 5: completely backwards and show total cowardliness for their countries, or
• 26:05
  Speaker 5: they would have to step forward alongside Britain, Sweden, Finland,
• 26:11
  Speaker 5: the Baltic States, Poland and actually do something. So I
• 26:15
  Speaker 5: think that that this point about Putin boxing himself in
• 26:20
  Speaker 5: is actually quite significant. But to play, if he goes
• 26:23
  Speaker 5: more serious, he loses. He loses the gains, you know,
• 26:28
  Speaker 5: the gain of Hungary, the gain of Slovakia, the gain
• 26:30
  Speaker 5: of President of Bulgaria and many other countries that are
• 26:34
  Speaker 5: half helping would be what I would say, missiles. I
• 26:39
  Speaker 5: think it's just another step. I don't think that the
• 26:44
  Speaker 5: that the Ukrainians see this as being anything worse, because
• 26:51
  Speaker 5: actually the bombs that have been thrown at them on
• 26:54
  Speaker 5: the front line and into some of the cities and
• 26:57
  Speaker 5: near the front line are actually quite significant. I mean
• 27:01
  Speaker 5: they are making huge, huge craters, they are destroying whole buildings.
• 27:07
  Speaker 5: So I don't think that they would see this as
• 27:09
  Speaker 5: being any worse than that which has already hit unless
• 27:14
  Speaker 5: he goes nuclear. But even then, two weeks ago in
• 27:17
  Speaker 5: Ukraine in kie If, I talked to a couple of
• 27:19
  Speaker 5: people and they said, well, if he goes nuclear, there
• 27:21
  Speaker 5: isn't anything worse he can do to us. So there
• 27:25
  Speaker 5: is already a mentality coming that you know, we're expecting
• 27:29
  Speaker 5: him to do this, but it's not going to matter
• 27:32
  Speaker 5: because we're not going to give in.
• 27:34
  Speaker 1: And with that I turned to General Bakshi to kick
• 27:36
  Speaker 1: off the second round of questions on this very point
• 27:39
  Speaker 1: of nuclear escalation. You already addressed much of that, General
• 27:43
  Speaker 1: Bakshi in your first set of comments. No doubt you
• 27:45
  Speaker 1: will wish to respond to what you have heard here
• 27:48
  Speaker 1: from Glenn Grant, and then, more pointedly then for this
• 27:52
  Speaker 1: middle round, I'd like to ask what you understand, since
• 27:55
  Speaker 1: you've spoken about Russia, as has Glen Grant, what you
• 27:58
  Speaker 1: understand as being the United States and to some extent
• 28:02
  Speaker 1: NATO's Britain's nuclear doctrine, to some extent Franci's as well,
• 28:06
  Speaker 1: is that likely to change in the Ukrainian theater with
• 28:10
  Speaker 1: regards to licensing of Ukrainians obviously not to use nuclear weapons,
• 28:16
  Speaker 1: but to use heavier weapons with more direct Western support,
• 28:19
  Speaker 1: if low yield nuclear weapons are launched first by Russia.
• 28:23
  Speaker 1: And what about the first use doctrine In reality, We've
• 28:26
  Speaker 1: heard from Glen Grant that in Russia many would argue
• 28:29
  Speaker 1: in the States as well, first use policy is not
• 28:32
  Speaker 1: what it is written up as being for public consumption.
• 28:35
  Speaker 1: So your thoughts on the possibility of nuclear escalation in
• 28:38
  Speaker 1: the next couple of months please.
• 28:40
  Speaker 3: So to directly address that question, you see, I frankly
• 28:46
  Speaker 3: do not see it going to the level of nuclear escalation.
• 28:49
  Speaker 3: I don't think it suits Russia because if Donald Trump
• 28:54
  Speaker 3: is going to come in on twentieth of January, and
• 28:59
  Speaker 3: he is quite coming it to, you know, winding this
• 29:02
  Speaker 3: conflict down, then I think the saner strategy is for
• 29:07
  Speaker 3: the Russians to uh, you know, steadily keep making gains
• 29:11
  Speaker 3: on the ground, ramp up the profession the pressure conventionally
• 29:16
  Speaker 3: in terms of conventional tipped even heavier missiles. There was
• 29:21
  Speaker 3: some talk that and in fact there was a bit
• 29:24
  Speaker 3: of a panic that one could sense that, you know,
• 29:27
  Speaker 3: American embassy was being evacuated. European embassies in the Cave
• 29:32
  Speaker 3: were being evacuated because they anticipated missile hypersonic missile with
• 29:39
  Speaker 3: a thermobaric warhead or even uh, you know, heavier I
• 29:44
  Speaker 3: C B M or M RBM with a thermobaric warhead,
• 29:47
  Speaker 3: which would do considerable amount of damage to the American embassy.
• 29:51
  Speaker 3: Now American embassy, sovereign space, you know, you are you're
• 29:56
  Speaker 3: mora less targeting the United States, and that has a
• 30:00
  Speaker 3: it's whole range of ramifications. So we didn't see the
• 30:05
  Speaker 3: attack on Cave with those thermobaric weapons, but we definitely
• 30:08
  Speaker 3: saw a lower level attack there, which quite obviously to
• 30:13
  Speaker 3: me hasn't sufficed to tamp down the American and British
• 30:18
  Speaker 3: decision to keep supplying or to continue with the permission
• 30:23
  Speaker 3: for Ukraine to engage targets in Russia. With the attack
• 30:26
  Speaker 3: AMS with the cruise missiles. The problem that we foresee
• 30:31
  Speaker 3: is eastern loss of face. You see, there are too
• 30:37
  Speaker 3: many red lines of Putin that have been crossed, right,
• 30:42
  Speaker 3: and he's very conscious of his image back home. If
• 30:46
  Speaker 3: this red line is crossed with impurity, I'm afraid it
• 30:50
  Speaker 3: is putting put in between a rock and.
• 30:52
  Speaker 4: A hard place.
• 30:53
  Speaker 3: And he's like, he's a very rational man, very calculating,
• 30:57
  Speaker 3: very methodical, and that's what kept the peace so far.
• 31:02
  Speaker 3: But how long will that continue? How long can he
• 31:07
  Speaker 3: you know, how long can you rub his nose in
• 31:09
  Speaker 3: the sand. You can't go beyond a point. And at
• 31:13
  Speaker 3: the end of it, there will be pressure within the
• 31:15
  Speaker 3: country for him to escalate, and that can lead to
• 31:19
  Speaker 3: accidental escalation. I am convinced that both sides may not
• 31:25
  Speaker 3: want it. But in such a you know, escalation ladder
• 31:29
  Speaker 3: which has been entrained, it has been entrained. He's gone
• 31:33
  Speaker 3: the lowest run. He'd likely to go a few notches
• 31:37
  Speaker 3: up there. I'm sure they have worked it out. It's
• 31:39
  Speaker 3: not something which is you know, caught them by surprise.
• 31:44
  Speaker 3: They had worked it out a few months back when
• 31:46
  Speaker 3: there was so much talk of this thing. So they
• 31:48
  Speaker 3: have worked it out and beyond the point they will
• 31:51
  Speaker 3: have to react.
• 31:52
  Speaker 4: They will have to react.
• 31:54
  Speaker 3: I think the way would be to up the antake conventionally,
• 31:57
  Speaker 3: right up the antake conventionally, then going for a demonstration
• 32:01
  Speaker 3: demonstration nuclear test on on soil, and then possibly graduate
• 32:07
  Speaker 3: to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Firstly, it could
• 32:11
  Speaker 3: be in Curs itself, a very nice, juicy target sitting there,
• 32:16
  Speaker 3: and the ideal for tactical new use. The point is
• 32:23
  Speaker 3: then what happens. The point is then what happens? What
• 32:26
  Speaker 3: is the American Western response going to be? And then
• 32:29
  Speaker 3: what about Donald Trump's desire for peace? His son has said,
• 32:33
  Speaker 3: they are trying to styme in my father's chance for
• 32:37
  Speaker 3: securing peace. And especially if then we keep pushing the envelope,
• 32:43
  Speaker 3: I'm afraid you are going to lose the global war
• 32:46
  Speaker 3: of narrative first right, because because I mean, it doesn't
• 32:52
  Speaker 3: sound quite right that the by then administration, which a
• 32:55
  Speaker 3: few months back has said no two attack ams on
• 32:59
  Speaker 3: the advice of the Pentagon, right on the advice of
• 33:02
  Speaker 3: the Pentagon.
• 33:03
  Speaker 4: He was not very happy with it. But even when Prime.
• 33:06
  Speaker 3: Minister Streymer went to Washington, you know, he was Jonaldton
• 33:10
  Speaker 3: I mean Joe Biden was you know, there was an
• 33:14
  Speaker 3: outburst that he had on he said, I'm in charge,
• 33:19
  Speaker 3: I'm in charge, et cetera. And because of the advice
• 33:23
  Speaker 3: he got from the Pentagon that look, this could trigger escalation.
• 33:28
  Speaker 4: The Russian seemed to be more serious.
• 33:30
  Speaker 3: So at this stage now he has dismissed that advice
• 33:35
  Speaker 3: that I found was, you know, with the global audiences
• 33:40
  Speaker 3: may not go down too well. Doesn't paint the the
• 33:45
  Speaker 3: Democratic administration in very good light. It paints them, as
• 33:50
  Speaker 3: you know, seemingly as warmongers, you know, bent upon trying
• 33:54
  Speaker 3: to push the envelope till there is a nuclear reaction,
• 33:58
  Speaker 3: and a nuclear reaction doesn't benefit anybody, not least the
• 34:01
  Speaker 3: United States or Europe. But let me be you know,
• 34:08
  Speaker 3: with tongue in cheek, World War One happened in Europe,
• 34:12
  Speaker 3: World War two happened in Europe. And if this is
• 34:15
  Speaker 3: the pace at which we are going to go, I
• 34:17
  Speaker 3: wouldn't be too surprised if World War three and a
• 34:19
  Speaker 3: nuclear armageddon originates in Europe again.
• 34:24
  Speaker 4: So that's one aspect of it.
• 34:26
  Speaker 3: The second aspect, very interesting observations by my colleague. You know,
• 34:31
  Speaker 3: the fact of the matter is the era of low
• 34:34
  Speaker 3: intensity wars lasted was there in the last century.
• 34:38
  Speaker 4: They were asymmetric wars.
• 34:39
  Speaker 3: I mean United States invading Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya.
• 34:43
  Speaker 4: They were totally asymmetric conflicts.
• 34:46
  Speaker 3: Now we've come to the era of symmetric wars, wars
• 34:50
  Speaker 3: between peer group armies, and we found that we have
• 34:55
  Speaker 3: gone back to the level of lethality of end of
• 34:58
  Speaker 3: World War One, end of World War I two, more
• 35:01
  Speaker 3: specifically end of World War two, when britz Krieg had
• 35:04
  Speaker 3: lost its steam and they were brutal battles of attrition
• 35:07
  Speaker 3: that were being fought. So we are down to those
• 35:10
  Speaker 3: levels of attrition, and I mean, one finds the national
• 35:15
  Speaker 3: stamina required is far more and I have my doubts
• 35:19
  Speaker 3: even if the American European military industrial complex is really
• 35:23
  Speaker 3: geared up for these kind of wars. I totally agree
• 35:26
  Speaker 3: with my colleague who just spoke that, Look, we've had
• 35:31
  Speaker 3: a war going on in Ukraine for three years. Over
• 35:35
  Speaker 3: a million people on both sides have been killed named wounded.
• 35:39
  Speaker 4: You know, eight million have fled Ukraine.
• 35:42
  Speaker 3: Right in the Middle East you have two hundred thousand killed,
• 35:48
  Speaker 3: and it doesn't seem like it is coming to an end.
• 35:50
  Speaker 3: And if it escalates with Iran. If it escalates with Iran,
• 35:55
  Speaker 3: you have a second hotspot. Right, and all these ATTA
• 35:59
  Speaker 3: cams are needed against China.
• 36:02
  Speaker 4: Right.
• 36:03
  Speaker 3: The aircraft carrier battlegroups now deployed to the Middle East.
• 36:06
  Speaker 3: There were two which were there. They had to be
• 36:08
  Speaker 3: taken out after a long time for rest and refit.
• 36:11
  Speaker 3: Two more have gone, so four aircraft career battlegroups are
• 36:14
  Speaker 3: out of the reckoning. If China tomorrow decides this is
• 36:18
  Speaker 3: the ideal opportunity to either, you know, mount.
• 36:25
  Speaker 4: You know, a siege of Taiwan, a blockhead of Taiwan, or.
• 36:29
  Speaker 3: Going for a full flag defensive and achieve strategic surprise.
• 36:33
  Speaker 3: Everybody expects them to do it in twenty twenty seven.
• 36:37
  Speaker 3: You do it in twenty twenty four to twenty twenty five,
• 36:39
  Speaker 3: and you've got strategic surprise, and you've done it at
• 36:42
  Speaker 3: a point when there is you know, America is heavily
• 36:46
  Speaker 3: bogged down in Europe, in Middle East, and now a
• 36:49
  Speaker 3: third spot coming up. I will only quote Henry Kissinger.
• 36:54
  Speaker 3: It should be settled maxim of American policy never to
• 36:59
  Speaker 3: take on more than one major Asian power at a time.
• 37:05
  Speaker 3: Joe Biden in taking on personally Russia in Ukraine.
• 37:10
  Speaker 4: I mean, he undid the.
• 37:12
  Speaker 3: Pivot towards Asia, pivot towards the Indo Pacific. He's pivoted
• 37:18
  Speaker 3: back to Europe, right, And I thought, you have to
• 37:23
  Speaker 3: define who your primary threat is, who your long range,
• 37:27
  Speaker 3: long term threat is economically, militarily.
• 37:32
  Speaker 4: I mean now it is increasingly China.
• 37:35
  Speaker 3: And we are a little disconcerted with this pivot back
• 37:40
  Speaker 3: to Europe and the war with Russia. Mersheimer, Professor Mersheimer,
• 37:47
  Speaker 3: Henry Kissinger. I think they have their advice has been
• 37:50
  Speaker 3: very sagacious. Don't choose your strategic direction and let it
• 37:55
  Speaker 3: be one strategic direction. Let it be China or Russia.
• 37:59
  Speaker 3: It can't be both. With the Middle East, you know,
• 38:04
  Speaker 3: a toss up thrown in between. So I think we
• 38:07
  Speaker 3: are living through dangerous times. We are back to what
• 38:10
  Speaker 3: it was in World War two. And may I just
• 38:13
  Speaker 3: conclude World War One there was a multipolar power equation
• 38:17
  Speaker 3: in place. World War two there was a multipolar power
• 38:21
  Speaker 3: equation in place. Today we are heading towards a multipolar
• 38:26
  Speaker 3: power equation. If we are not already there, I mean
• 38:29
  Speaker 3: that's a fact of life. I think the unipolar moment
• 38:33
  Speaker 3: is over. It's over. And that's why we are seeing,
• 38:37
  Speaker 3: I mean, the historical patterns repeating themselves.
• 38:42
  Speaker 4: In national security forecasting. There can be no single event
• 38:46
  Speaker 4: prediction model.
• 38:47
  Speaker 3: The only model, as some American scientists have said, is
• 38:50
  Speaker 3: a pattern prediction model. Patterns tend to persist and repeat
• 38:54
  Speaker 3: themselves cyclically. World War one multipolar, World War two multipolar,
• 39:01
  Speaker 3: and now when we are on the brink of World
• 39:03
  Speaker 3: War three, we are on a multipolar order. And these
• 39:06
  Speaker 3: are the power equations that tend to excerbate conflict. Conflicts
• 39:12
  Speaker 3: tend to spin out of control because there are too
• 39:14
  Speaker 3: many actors who are trying to kick the ball at
• 39:18
  Speaker 3: the same time. I would be happy to have the
• 39:20
  Speaker 3: reactions of my British colleagues.
• 39:23
  Speaker 1: Major General Chapman, we're getting into strategic planning territory that
• 39:27
  Speaker 1: you can speak very interestingly to, because of course your
• 39:31
  Speaker 1: last post in the Army was senior British military advisor
• 39:35
  Speaker 1: to SCENTCOM in the United States. So what do you
• 39:38
  Speaker 1: have to say about all that we've heard from Major
• 39:42
  Speaker 1: General Bakshi, and particularly on the consensus that both of
• 39:46
  Speaker 1: the last speakers seem to have been hinting at more
• 39:49
  Speaker 1: than hinting at, that there is a lot more escalation
• 39:52
  Speaker 1: that could come just from the current belligerent powers, particularly
• 39:56
  Speaker 1: on the Russian side, before we get to the stupefying
• 39:59
  Speaker 1: nuclear launch.
• 40:02
  Speaker 2: I don't take that much of it, to be honest.
• 40:04
  Speaker 2: From the Ukrainian perspective, this is absolutely a total local war.
• 40:08
  Speaker 5: That is absolutely the case.
• 40:10
  Speaker 2: I don't think that you can make a case at
• 40:13
  Speaker 2: all that the US are at war with Russia. In fact,
• 40:17
  Speaker 2: it's only ten percent of one year's worth of a
• 40:20
  Speaker 2: defense budget in terms of support that they've given to
• 40:24
  Speaker 2: the sovereignty of Ukraine, and it's supporting the independent sovereignty
• 40:30
  Speaker 2: of Ukraine, which is the American objective at the moment.
• 40:34
  Speaker 2: I think the vastest way to lose the narrative is
• 40:37
  Speaker 2: to cross for the nuclear Tiboo, and I don't think
• 40:40
  Speaker 2: that Russia would like to do that, and indeed are
• 40:43
  Speaker 2: constrained by being the sort of junior vassal to China,
• 40:48
  Speaker 2: and indeed, China's twelve point piece plan of February twenty
• 40:52
  Speaker 2: three warned against them doing that. And there's also potentially
• 40:57
  Speaker 2: they didn't go to the nuclear case in September twenty
• 41:01
  Speaker 2: two because of that Chinese restraint, and indeed went to
• 41:04
  Speaker 2: the mobilization a paradigm instead. So what I really think
• 41:11
  Speaker 2: we're doing at the moment is Putin is making maximist
• 41:15
  Speaker 2: threats to induce a minimalist response from the West, which
• 41:19
  Speaker 2: is not working. And he's always had this occasion when
• 41:22
  Speaker 2: he makes these nuclear extortion and threats, the sort of
• 41:25
  Speaker 2: back off or else. We've had it, not just on
• 41:29
  Speaker 2: the nuclear side, We've had it on the grain side.
• 41:31
  Speaker 2: We've had it on the energy side. And of course,
• 41:34
  Speaker 2: as the risks that are killed people and the risks
• 41:37
  Speaker 2: that scare people are two different things, and people are
• 41:40
  Speaker 2: scared when you mentioned the N word. But the way
• 41:45
  Speaker 2: I look at this is when might they use them?
• 41:48
  Speaker 2: And they certainly wouldn't use them in cursed on Russian
• 41:51
  Speaker 2: sovereign territory, And what would we do if Russia use them?
• 41:54
  Speaker 4: Now?
• 41:55
  Speaker 2: The best articulation of this actually does come from one
• 41:58
  Speaker 2: of my comrades. Incent used to sit next to him,
• 42:02
  Speaker 2: but he was the head of the DIA Defense Intelligence Agency,
• 42:06
  Speaker 2: one of the eighteen parts of the intelligence community in America,
• 42:12
  Speaker 2: when he said in the Husk the House on Services
• 42:15
  Speaker 2: Committee in March twenty two that Russia would make nuclear
• 42:21
  Speaker 2: threats if the war drags and run day one thousand
• 42:23
  Speaker 2: and three, to compel an adversary into pursuing negotiations that
• 42:28
  Speaker 2: might result in termination on the conflict on terms favorable
• 42:33
  Speaker 2: to Russia, or after the enemy as an entry of
• 42:36
  Speaker 2: others into the conflict, or when russia offensive progress looks
• 42:40
  Speaker 2: like it might be reversed. It's those that set the
• 42:43
  Speaker 2: conditions for whether they might use nuclear weapons. Then you
• 42:48
  Speaker 2: would look at what the Western response would be if
• 42:50
  Speaker 2: Russia does that, and NATO of course always uses scenario
• 42:56
  Speaker 2: and wargaming to see what the range of responses might be.
• 43:01
  Speaker 2: The days of flexible response and countervailing strategy are gone.
• 43:05
  Speaker 2: But the bipartisan approach from that, certainly from the Americans
• 43:10
  Speaker 2: in early twenty three, both from the Democrat side with
• 43:14
  Speaker 2: Bloomintal and Linda Graham on the Republican side, was that
• 43:18
  Speaker 2: it would be dire consequences for the Russian military who
• 43:22
  Speaker 2: would be destroyed in Ukraine in a conventional approach.
• 43:28
  Speaker 1: Glenn Grant the view from Eastern Europe for those who
• 43:30
  Speaker 1: don't know among the viewers and listeners, you have lived
• 43:33
  Speaker 1: there for some years. You heard the mention by General
• 43:37
  Speaker 1: Batchi earlier of national stamina and wars of attrition, familiar
• 43:42
  Speaker 1: language for everyone in that belt of countries from Estonia
• 43:46
  Speaker 1: down to Georgia through which you travel and advise your
• 43:48
  Speaker 1: assessment of that national stamina.
• 43:52
  Speaker 5: Actually been there now for twenty six years in Eastern Europe,
• 43:57
  Speaker 5: which is quite a long time. I think that that,
• 44:01
  Speaker 5: I mean, the stamina in Ukraine is quite high. I mean,
• 44:06
  Speaker 5: in fact, it's really really high. I think it's it's
• 44:08
  Speaker 5: got the same it's got the same sort of feel
• 44:12
  Speaker 5: to it as as what one reads about Britain during
• 44:15
  Speaker 5: the Blitz. And and in fact it's not it's not
• 44:19
  Speaker 5: unusual that people actually talk about the Blitz and how
• 44:24
  Speaker 5: it's stubborn. We were in Britain during that time. And
• 44:28
  Speaker 5: you know, eight eight million people have left Ukraine. But
• 44:34
  Speaker 5: I think that something that both both my two generals
• 44:37
  Speaker 5: will be surprised to hear is that there are twenty
• 44:40
  Speaker 5: buses a day from Riga into Kiev and back, and
• 44:48
  Speaker 5: that the number of buses from from from Prague, which
• 44:55
  Speaker 5: which is the sort of the joining point for people
• 44:57
  Speaker 5: coming from everywhere everywhere else on the content is huge.
• 45:01
  Speaker 5: So a lot of those eight million are coming in
• 45:03
  Speaker 5: and out on a regular basis for birthdays, for Christmas,
• 45:08
  Speaker 5: for school holidays and everything else. So they're not people
• 45:12
  Speaker 5: who've just run away and are not coming back. They're
• 45:15
  Speaker 5: keeping a quite strong relationship and also providing a huge
• 45:19
  Speaker 5: amount of money that goes to the that goes to
• 45:23
  Speaker 5: the volunteer support for the army. So I see the
• 45:27
  Speaker 5: stubbornness in Ukraine every time I go there and listen
• 45:30
  Speaker 5: to it on the bus and and and hear it.
• 45:34
  Speaker 5: So but also I mean, if you actually look around,
• 45:38
  Speaker 5: there are other parts of Eastern Europe Abkhazia. At the moment,
• 45:43
  Speaker 5: you know, people are showing their unhappiness with the way
• 45:45
  Speaker 5: that Russia deals with them. Georgians have bela Russians have.
• 45:49
  Speaker 5: They just didn't do a very good job of it
• 45:51
  Speaker 5: because they're too nice, and that it is genuinely their problem.
• 45:56
  Speaker 5: They're too nice. They're not into going around and having
• 45:59
  Speaker 5: a midn Or or a Chouchescu moment. But but the
• 46:02
  Speaker 5: desire to live in the West from all these people
• 46:06
  Speaker 5: is extremely strong. And I don't see any any any
• 46:11
  Speaker 5: thoughts at all from people in Ukraine of wanting to
• 46:15
  Speaker 5: give up whatever happens. So I think that that is
• 46:17
  Speaker 5: that the point I would make. I can't add anything
• 46:22
  Speaker 5: more on what the two generals have said about, you know,
• 46:24
  Speaker 5: put in a nuclear because I think that you know,
• 46:28
  Speaker 5: it is as it is. My only view on that
• 46:32
  Speaker 5: that I've been I've been arguing for quite a long time,
• 46:36
  Speaker 5: is that we've got to win this battle on the
• 46:38
  Speaker 5: front line, and that that deep attack is good. But
• 46:43
  Speaker 5: deep attack is the thing that is actually creating, creating
• 46:46
  Speaker 5: the problems that we're of escalation that we're getting. What
• 46:50
  Speaker 5: we haven't done is equip the front line properly, and
• 46:53
  Speaker 5: there are many soldiers who are going into battle short
• 46:56
  Speaker 5: on virtually everything, you know, with no night sights, with
• 46:59
  Speaker 5: with with the wrong clothing, the wrong equipment, and it
• 47:04
  Speaker 5: is no wonder in many cases that they're going backwards.
• 47:08
  Speaker 5: A point that was made about which I add to that,
• 47:10
  Speaker 5: that that them going backwards. It's not a lack of
• 47:14
  Speaker 5: manpower in Ukraine, it's a lack of belief in the
• 47:18
  Speaker 5: military system, in the leadership of the military system, which
• 47:22
  Speaker 5: because the upper echelons of the military system are still
• 47:26
  Speaker 5: fighting in an extremely Soviet way along the lines that
• 47:31
  Speaker 5: I once wrote of. You know, a small Soviet army
• 47:34
  Speaker 5: can't beat a large Soviet army. And unless you actually
• 47:37
  Speaker 5: release the soldiers to think, and release the soldiers to
• 47:40
  Speaker 5: actually to soldier tactically and operationally, you just tell them
• 47:45
  Speaker 5: you've got to stay in that village and stay there
• 47:48
  Speaker 5: and hold it. Then of course they're going to die,
• 47:50
  Speaker 5: which they are, and Russia will go over the top
• 47:54
  Speaker 5: of them by sheer numbers, sheer numbers of people, sheer
• 47:57
  Speaker 5: numbers of ammunition. It's still about ten to one and
• 48:00
  Speaker 5: one five to five millimeter ammunition for example, not to
• 48:04
  Speaker 5: mention that in many places Russia is actually putting more
• 48:07
  Speaker 5: drones in the field than Ukraine can.
• 48:12
  Speaker 1: So a few thoughts, and we stay with Lieutenant Colonel
• 48:16
  Speaker 1: Grant to start the final round, because we turn now
• 48:20
  Speaker 1: to the philosophical and the resolution aspects of the discussion.
• 48:25
  Speaker 1: All three of you, gentlemen, particularly since retiring from active service,
• 48:29
  Speaker 1: in various ways, have been involved in training and have
• 48:32
  Speaker 1: considered in large measure, no doubt in your own ways,
• 48:35
  Speaker 1: what constitutes a just war. Everyone has their own philosophical
• 48:40
  Speaker 1: even religious understanding of what that is. I suspect that yours,
• 48:45
  Speaker 1: Lieutenant Colonel Grant, will be quite strong in favor of
• 48:50
  Speaker 1: arguing that Ukraine is entirely facing a just war, and
• 48:54
  Speaker 1: that's the Western Allies, the Northern Alliance, which I think
• 48:57
  Speaker 1: you've had some hand in shaping, that's just been an
• 49:00
  Speaker 1: ounced of the Eastern European and Scandinavian and British and
• 49:02
  Speaker 1: Dutch militaries standing with Ukraine. You would argue that that's
• 49:06
  Speaker 1: entirely justified all the means that are being used. Particularly
• 49:11
  Speaker 1: interested in what you said about Russia having been effectively
• 49:14
  Speaker 1: at war with the West for over twenty years. Not
• 49:17
  Speaker 1: many people date it that far back, so I'm presuming
• 49:21
  Speaker 1: correct me if I'm wrong, that that's what you'll argue
• 49:24
  Speaker 1: is the realistic chance of victory present as part of
• 49:29
  Speaker 1: the just war that's always been in various traditions, part
• 49:31
  Speaker 1: of the equation that you don't send men and these
• 49:33
  Speaker 1: days women to a hopeless death. And I think you've
• 49:36
  Speaker 1: answered that to some extent. And then as we turn
• 49:39
  Speaker 1: it to the other two gentlemen, I'll think we'll have
• 49:41
  Speaker 1: more to ask about alliances too, But in your case,
• 49:45
  Speaker 1: particularly the role of the Northern Alliance as it's now
• 49:49
  Speaker 1: being dubbed not the first in history, and the role
• 49:52
  Speaker 1: of European financial support. When we record this, we have
• 49:56
  Speaker 1: just had summit in Warsaw hosted by the Foreign Minister
• 49:59
  Speaker 1: of Poland radex Yikorski, in which his British, French, German
• 50:03
  Speaker 1: and Italian counterparts pledged to pick up the slack if
• 50:07
  Speaker 1: Trump stops funding the war in large measure, using all
• 50:10
  Speaker 1: the levers they can pull is part of their communicate
• 50:13
  Speaker 1: and innovative financialization in order to keep funding the war.
• 50:17
  Speaker 1: I'm not a financial expert and don't know what that
• 50:19
  Speaker 1: would mean. So your thoughts really on the road to
• 50:22
  Speaker 1: resolution and the justness of the war.
• 50:25
  Speaker 5: If I start with the Ukrainian side first, it is
• 50:31
  Speaker 5: quite clear I think to most people that you know,
• 50:35
  Speaker 5: Putin is determined to trash Ukraine, to take it under
• 50:39
  Speaker 5: complete control, or if he cannot actually trash it as
• 50:45
  Speaker 5: General Salucini, the ambassador, the ambassador in London from Ukraine
• 50:51
  Speaker 5: says that this is his method is destruction. You just
• 50:55
  Speaker 5: destroy and then you take it over and you move forward.
• 50:57
  Speaker 5: You destroy and you take it over, which is exactly
• 51:00
  Speaker 5: what we've seen, whether that's Mariopol and whether it's all
• 51:03
  Speaker 5: the villages Bachmut and other places. So so that is
• 51:09
  Speaker 5: that is going to keep going now, you know, is
• 51:12
  Speaker 5: it just to allow this sort of thing to happen
• 51:15
  Speaker 5: for a country that actually wants to be part of
• 51:18
  Speaker 5: the democratic world. And my answer to that is it
• 51:21
  Speaker 5: cannot be because if we give in to this, and
• 51:24
  Speaker 5: we give in to someone who who decides that they're
• 51:28
  Speaker 5: going to take parts of the world, and and how
• 51:32
  Speaker 5: many more parts will he take, then then we're going
• 51:36
  Speaker 5: back to the days of Hitler and and power and
• 51:39
  Speaker 5: do what you like. So I don't think we can
• 51:42
  Speaker 5: afford to do that. So that's got to be born
• 51:45
  Speaker 5: in mind that if we do, if we do believe
• 51:48
  Speaker 5: in this, then we have to fight for it. And
• 51:51
  Speaker 5: if if the rest of Europe and Europe's values, you know,
• 51:55
  Speaker 5: the formation of what people want within Europe, that if
• 51:59
  Speaker 5: they don't believe in this and support it, and then
• 52:02
  Speaker 5: Europe is finished. It will be the Europe of you know,
• 52:06
  Speaker 5: leaders like that, like the president of Hungary and things
• 52:11
  Speaker 5: that we will just lose Europe in its in its form.
• 52:15
  Speaker 5: So I think we have no choice but to support it.
• 52:18
  Speaker 5: I have no idea what Trump's going to do, and
• 52:22
  Speaker 5: I shall say this honestly because really I have no
• 52:24
  Speaker 5: idea what his values really are. And in fact, if
• 52:27
  Speaker 5: he's got any that would actually apply in this case.
• 52:31
  Speaker 5: He says he wants peace, and let's hope he does,
• 52:33
  Speaker 5: and that's his value. But how he does that is
• 52:38
  Speaker 5: extremely complex. But he can't do it by not supporting Ukraine,
• 52:44
  Speaker 5: because if he doesn't support Ukraine, then there is a
• 52:47
  Speaker 5: complete break between you might call it what you call
• 52:50
  Speaker 5: the Northern Alliance and the other European leaders that want it,
• 52:54
  Speaker 5: and there will be a break between Trump and them.
• 52:57
  Speaker 5: So I don't believe that his even even some of
• 53:01
  Speaker 5: his worst people are going to realize that it's not
• 53:04
  Speaker 5: a good idea. But less wait and see on the
• 53:07
  Speaker 5: Trump side. On the Russian side, Russia is really complex
• 53:10
  Speaker 5: at the moment because the you know, the great Russian
• 53:14
  Speaker 5: soul has never been about what people write about. You know,
• 53:18
  Speaker 5: Russia has always been a bit bit of a let's
• 53:20
  Speaker 5: call it nice. It's always been in a bit of
• 53:23
  Speaker 5: a state. It's not actually been a great country most
• 53:26
  Speaker 5: of it. And you know, you know, you we all
• 53:29
  Speaker 5: see the pictures of the villages and the roads and
• 53:32
  Speaker 5: people who earn very very very little money in all
• 53:35
  Speaker 5: sorts of parts of over Russia. So anything that that
• 53:42
  Speaker 5: bolsters their their current view of themselves and the world
• 53:46
  Speaker 5: like Putin is doing, is going to have is going
• 53:48
  Speaker 5: to have great resonance with them. So the fact that
• 53:51
  Speaker 5: more people are actually supporting Putin does not surprise me,
• 53:54
  Speaker 5: because what else do you support If you're living in
• 53:56
  Speaker 5: a hovel and you have no toilet, it's at all,
• 54:00
  Speaker 5: not even a proper outdoor toilet. Life is rough. And
• 54:05
  Speaker 5: if someone offers you huge amounts of money as well
• 54:08
  Speaker 5: to go and fight for him, huge amounts of money,
• 54:11
  Speaker 5: you know, a year's worth of money a month, then
• 54:14
  Speaker 5: there is no choice for them but to go to
• 54:16
  Speaker 5: the front line and fight. So even if Putin was lost,
• 54:24
  Speaker 5: Even if Putin was lost, I'm pretty sure that there
• 54:26
  Speaker 5: are one or two others in his close koterie who
• 54:29
  Speaker 5: would step up and carry on the good work for
• 54:33
  Speaker 5: the greatness of Russia. So I don't see the greatness
• 54:36
  Speaker 5: of Russia going away in its form unless it is beaten,
• 54:40
  Speaker 5: unless that the empire is actually beaten as an empire.
• 54:44
  Speaker 5: Otherwise it's just going to keep going because it actually
• 54:47
  Speaker 5: has no other choice. That's the problem. It has no
• 54:51
  Speaker 5: other choice. They've talked themselves over hundreds of years into
• 54:55
  Speaker 5: this state of mind, into this attitude of I'm trying
• 55:01
  Speaker 5: to think of the right word for it, but indulgence.
• 55:04
  Speaker 5: Let's just call it that indulgence, a state of mind,
• 55:07
  Speaker 5: of indulgence where you want everything and and you know,
• 55:11
  Speaker 5: you could see this in when they attacked the outskirts
• 55:18
  Speaker 5: of Kiev that they were taking everything. They were taking
• 55:22
  Speaker 5: the toilets, they were taking, the glass from the windows,
• 55:26
  Speaker 5: they were taking they they took everything back to Russia.
• 55:29
  Speaker 5: And it's this indulgence of stealing and it's ours, it's
• 55:32
  Speaker 5: rightfully ours. And that attitude is not only not not
• 55:37
  Speaker 5: going to go away without it being beaten, it's getting worse.
• 55:41
  Speaker 5: So I see the two sides there. So how does
• 55:44
  Speaker 5: one get peace from this? Will you either win or
• 55:47
  Speaker 5: you accept that we've got a problem that we can
• 55:49
  Speaker 5: maybe maybe mitigate by NATO getting stronger around the outside.
• 55:54
  Speaker 5: But it's not going to go away in my view
• 55:56
  Speaker 5: unless it's beaten. That's my shortened shark.
• 56:02
  Speaker 1: Major General Bakshi, your Indian perspective on this, please, particularly
• 56:07
  Speaker 1: on the aspects of Russia increasingly using its own allies
• 56:12
  Speaker 1: in a pan Asian arc from Korea to Iran. As
• 56:15
  Speaker 1: you have previously adumbrated, how Indian security and policymakers view this,
• 56:23
  Speaker 1: particularly with China being the other massive presence in your
• 56:27
  Speaker 1: part of the world, and also your thoughts on the
• 56:29
  Speaker 1: justness of prosecuting the war from the Russian perspective, particularly
• 56:34
  Speaker 1: given that, certainly in international institutions, whenever this current war,
• 56:39
  Speaker 1: which has just passed its thousandth day, is mentioned, the
• 56:42
  Speaker 1: Derrigir phrase is contrary to international law. To what extent
• 56:46
  Speaker 1: do you see that as being the case that Russia
• 56:50
  Speaker 1: is unjustly or contrary to international law prolonging this war.
• 56:55
  Speaker 3: Well, I'm afraid I can't entirely agree with the thesis, because.
• 57:01
  Speaker 4: It's it's always useful to.
• 57:03
  Speaker 3: Understand the other perspective, It's always useful to understand the
• 57:08
  Speaker 3: others motivations.
• 57:10
  Speaker 4: As far as the Russians are concerned. You know, they've
• 57:12
  Speaker 4: been saying and there are a number.
• 57:14
  Speaker 3: Of uh, you know, very what shall I say, very
• 57:18
  Speaker 3: bright people in the United States who's been echoing the
• 57:22
  Speaker 3: Russian viewpoint that at the time of you know, when
• 57:25
  Speaker 3: Russia collapsed, with the Soviet Union collapsed, you know, it
• 57:29
  Speaker 3: had been promised to the Russians that not one inch
• 57:32
  Speaker 3: eastward expansion of NATO. You know, the Russian said it
• 57:37
  Speaker 3: was given in writing. They of course, there are different
• 57:40
  Speaker 3: views on that, but the fact of the matter is
• 57:43
  Speaker 3: then the world has seen a relentless eastward expansion of Russia,
• 57:47
  Speaker 3: of NATO to the borders of Russia. And then the
• 57:52
  Speaker 3: Russians turned around and said, look, our last two red
• 57:55
  Speaker 3: lines are Georgia and Ukraine. So the movement there was
• 57:59
  Speaker 3: that coup, that Maidan I mean, that colored revolution kind
• 58:04
  Speaker 3: of a thing in Georgia with the Russians inter be
• 58:08
  Speaker 3: two thousand and eight, they intervene, and before you.
• 58:10
  Speaker 4: Could say it, in four days it was all over. Right.
• 58:14
  Speaker 3: Then in twenty fourteen there was the Maidan coup in Ukraine, right,
• 58:21
  Speaker 3: and Victoria Nolan played a pretty active part in instigating
• 58:26
  Speaker 3: that colored kind of a revolution and overthrow of a
• 58:29
  Speaker 3: duly elected government. I mean, that is the Russian view,
• 58:33
  Speaker 3: and that's some of it sounds reasonable, right, And therefore
• 58:39
  Speaker 3: the Russians had no option now but to go in
• 58:41
  Speaker 3: for they They went in for Crimea because they felt
• 58:45
  Speaker 3: it was far too the only warm water port to
• 58:48
  Speaker 3: strategically important. And they took it because they said, well,
• 58:52
  Speaker 3: it is basically ours.
• 58:53
  Speaker 4: I mean, that history is there.
• 58:56
  Speaker 3: After all, Ukraine has come into existence only about a
• 58:59
  Speaker 3: couple of decades back, right.
• 59:02
  Speaker 5: No, no, it came into existence about a thousand years.
• 59:06
  Speaker 4: Ago, so no, no, well years ago. Please remember, well,
• 59:12
  Speaker 4: you know what Ukraine is also may I may, and Ukraine.
• 59:17
  Speaker 3: Is also the seat, the spiritual seat or the Orthodox
• 59:21
  Speaker 3: Christian uh dispensation the Orthodox Christian religion. Most of the
• 59:27
  Speaker 3: Russian Orthodox Christian institutions.
• 59:30
  Speaker 4: They're there, their their home is cave. Their home is cave.
• 59:34
  Speaker 3: So that is the other, the other narrative, and therefore
• 59:38
  Speaker 3: the narrative is that the Russian narrative, if you may,
• 59:42
  Speaker 3: if I may say so, and it is always useful
• 59:44
  Speaker 3: to have that at the back of our mind to
• 59:48
  Speaker 3: understand motivations for actions, motivations for actions. The Russian narrative
• 59:53
  Speaker 3: is we've been pushed into hitting out before we were
• 59:56
  Speaker 3: taken and before you know, the maximal damage was done
• 1:00:01
  Speaker 3: to us. So it from their side, it is a
• 1:00:04
  Speaker 3: defensive offensive reaction. They tried to preempt what they felt
• 1:00:09
  Speaker 3: was the Ukraine takeover of the don Bars, complete takeover
• 1:00:14
  Speaker 3: of the Russian speaking areas of don Bars, where they
• 1:00:17
  Speaker 3: felt the Russian people were being badly discriminated against, the
• 1:00:22
  Speaker 3: Russian language, the culture, was being suppressed, right, and that
• 1:00:26
  Speaker 3: actually that story goes back now as a military historician,
• 1:00:30
  Speaker 3: let me be quite clear, to the German invasion of Russia.
• 1:00:35
  Speaker 3: To Reinhard Gahellen, the head of the ARBA, the military
• 1:00:40
  Speaker 3: intelligence of Germany, he had you know, Bandhera and this
• 1:00:44
  Speaker 3: entire groupings of people whom they had used to fight
• 1:00:49
  Speaker 3: against the Russians. At the end of the World War,
• 1:00:52
  Speaker 3: they handed over these two the United States and Bandera
• 1:00:57
  Speaker 3: and this entire gang go back date back to the
• 1:00:59
  Speaker 3: time when Nazi Germany was invading invading Russia. That is
• 1:01:04
  Speaker 3: the Russian viewpoint, and I think we need to be
• 1:01:08
  Speaker 3: cognizant of that viewpoint because if we ignore that viewpoint,
• 1:01:12
  Speaker 3: then I mean there is no meeting ground. Then then
• 1:01:15
  Speaker 3: then there is no resolution towards the conflict. So the
• 1:01:19
  Speaker 3: simple fact is that that is the Russian narrative. And
• 1:01:22
  Speaker 3: if you believe the Russian narrative, they'd say that, look,
• 1:01:27
  Speaker 3: we were poked in the eye till we were forced
• 1:01:29
  Speaker 3: to invade, just like we are being poked in the
• 1:01:31
  Speaker 3: eye to go nuclub now, right, And because we had
• 1:01:38
  Speaker 3: no options, so we had to hit out in an offensive,
• 1:01:41
  Speaker 3: defensive kind of a way virtuous defense, as the Russians
• 1:01:46
  Speaker 3: like to call it. So that is appropos the philosophical
• 1:01:51
  Speaker 3: issue of whether it is just war, who has justice
• 1:01:54
  Speaker 3: in his side? Just and below, you know, just in cause,
• 1:01:59
  Speaker 3: just and execution, et cetera.
• 1:02:02
  Speaker 4: That is the philosophical side of it.
• 1:02:04
  Speaker 3: What the Russian narrative is that this was we were
• 1:02:07
  Speaker 3: poked in the eye till we were forced to invade.
• 1:02:10
  Speaker 4: There was a playbook ready.
• 1:02:12
  Speaker 3: There was a playbook ready, and the playbook was to
• 1:02:15
  Speaker 3: accuse us of aggression and to enforce economic sanctions to
• 1:02:21
  Speaker 3: a level that would cause bring about a collapse of Russia.
• 1:02:25
  Speaker 3: As in nineteen ninety the Soviet Union had been caused
• 1:02:29
  Speaker 3: to collapse, go into a black hole, right, and that
• 1:02:34
  Speaker 3: economic war, it is, the basic war was the economic war.
• 1:02:38
  Speaker 3: The proxy war is the front, but the basic war
• 1:02:42
  Speaker 3: was the economic war to destroy Russia economically, bring about
• 1:02:48
  Speaker 3: a regime change.
• 1:02:50
  Speaker 4: We heard that quite a lot.
• 1:02:52
  Speaker 3: Putin is about to flee Moscow, the plane is ready,
• 1:02:55
  Speaker 3: and stuff like that. But the fact of the matter
• 1:02:58
  Speaker 3: is that Russia has a merged from that war. Let's
• 1:03:01
  Speaker 3: be practical, Let's see things on the ground. Let's be
• 1:03:05
  Speaker 3: objective and not subjective, right, what I would like to
• 1:03:09
  Speaker 3: see is different. What is happening on the ground is
• 1:03:13
  Speaker 3: what we need to focus on. So what has happened
• 1:03:17
  Speaker 3: on the ground is that Russia has emerged economically stronger
• 1:03:20
  Speaker 3: from this war. The countries that have economically suffered hell
• 1:03:24
  Speaker 3: of a lot, other countries of Europe, even the American economy.
• 1:03:27
  Speaker 4: Has gained because they've been selling the arms to everybody.
• 1:03:31
  Speaker 4: But the fact of the matter is.
• 1:03:32
  Speaker 3: The European economies, economies of France, Germany, they've taken a
• 1:03:37
  Speaker 3: big hit. They've taken a big hit. So now can
• 1:03:40
  Speaker 3: Europe on its own sustain the war? Let us say,
• 1:03:43
  Speaker 3: if Donald Trump says, sorry, I'm cutting off the tap.
• 1:03:48
  Speaker 3: The Americans have given about one hundred and seventy five
• 1:03:50
  Speaker 3: billion dollars arms and economic aid. The European's total, I
• 1:03:55
  Speaker 3: understand is one hundred and thirty four billion dollars, right,
• 1:03:59
  Speaker 3: so can make up the shortfall at what economic costs
• 1:04:02
  Speaker 3: to themselves? Can they sustain this war alone? Those are
• 1:04:06
  Speaker 3: the questions I'd like to ask you, and Russia, is
• 1:04:11
  Speaker 3: it really you know, the narrative is that if you
• 1:04:14
  Speaker 3: don't stop them in Ukraine, well, you know, then the
• 1:04:18
  Speaker 3: nine pins will start falling all over Europe and LaTavia
• 1:04:22
  Speaker 3: will be next, or Moldova will be next, and they
• 1:04:25
  Speaker 3: does Russia have that man power? The fact that they
• 1:04:28
  Speaker 3: brought the North Koreans it clearly indicates that they don't
• 1:04:32
  Speaker 3: have that man power. Look from a smaller population base.
• 1:04:36
  Speaker 3: In World War Two, the Russians had filled twelve million soldiers,
• 1:04:42
  Speaker 3: twelve million soldiers, and they'd taken the heaviest losses in
• 1:04:46
  Speaker 3: that war, you know, the Great Patriotic War from their side,
• 1:04:49
  Speaker 3: World War two from our side. You see the But
• 1:04:52
  Speaker 3: the simple fact that today the population based with the
• 1:04:55
  Speaker 3: Russians is larger. But because of the nature of the regime,
• 1:05:00
  Speaker 3: the Puther is not capable. He's very worried about a
• 1:05:04
  Speaker 3: full scale mobilization of that order. So I don't think
• 1:05:09
  Speaker 3: he's even capable of taking the whole of Ukraine. I
• 1:05:12
  Speaker 3: think what he wanted is what he's got, and he's
• 1:05:14
  Speaker 3: quite content with this. I don't see him now trying
• 1:05:19
  Speaker 3: to take the whole of Ukraine at best till the
• 1:05:21
  Speaker 3: line of the Jenniper. If he's pushed too hard, maybe
• 1:05:25
  Speaker 3: he'll try for Kaiva Odessa.
• 1:05:27
  Speaker 4: But that's about it. That's about it.
• 1:05:30
  Speaker 3: He's not got the capacity capability to take on other countries,
• 1:05:35
  Speaker 3: take on the whole of NATO, et cetera. I think
• 1:05:39
  Speaker 3: we are exaggerating that threat, and in exaggerating that threat,
• 1:05:43
  Speaker 3: we are imputing motivations which are perhaps not there well.
• 1:05:48
  Speaker 5: General motivations are his motivations, the things that he has said.
• 1:05:54
  Speaker 4: So if you plarn the other things that you've.
• 1:05:56
  Speaker 5: Said, then you have to believe what he's saying now,
• 1:06:01
  Speaker 5: and that is and that is that Baltic stakes. The
• 1:06:04
  Speaker 5: next you can go back.
• 1:06:05
  Speaker 3: And read, well, I think we could, and nobody because
• 1:06:11
  Speaker 3: nobody is.
• 1:06:11
  Speaker 5: Suggesting general that he would fight all the way across Ukraine.
• 1:06:14
  Speaker 5: He would want political control, and that's the main name
• 1:06:19
  Speaker 5: tried actually to get the politics to change, which which
• 1:06:22
  Speaker 5: is what he was trying to do with Yanakovich, is
• 1:06:25
  Speaker 5: to get a country.
• 1:06:26
  Speaker 3: Did I agree, because if he takes Kaiv, that was
• 1:06:30
  Speaker 3: that was what he attacked Kaive for originally, because I
• 1:06:33
  Speaker 3: thought it was a regime change that.
• 1:06:35
  Speaker 4: He was after. I think he was. I thought it
• 1:06:37
  Speaker 4: was the regime change that he was after. It's cheap and.
• 1:06:41
  Speaker 3: What the Russian said, Now, let me give you the
• 1:06:43
  Speaker 3: Russian perspective here again. They say that in March April
• 1:06:49
  Speaker 3: twenty twenty two they had negotiations, you know, mediated by
• 1:06:54
  Speaker 3: Belarus with the Ukrainians and then by Turkey, and they
• 1:06:58
  Speaker 3: had come to a peace treaty, which they say, and
• 1:07:02
  Speaker 3: Boris Johnson flew in into cave. He torpedoed that treaty
• 1:07:07
  Speaker 3: and the Americans said, no, you will fight on. But
• 1:07:10
  Speaker 3: that that was he had agreed to withdraw from the
• 1:07:13
  Speaker 3: gates of Kaiu, And that in the propaganda organs, information
• 1:07:17
  Speaker 3: warfare teams.
• 1:07:19
  Speaker 2: Was istambul agreement were actually only four the six parts
• 1:07:24
  Speaker 2: were and it was to have a surrender piece for Ukraine.
• 1:07:27
  Speaker 2: That is not true that it was an equitable piece
• 1:07:30
  Speaker 2: or a piece that Ukraine could have lived with.
• 1:07:32
  Speaker 5: Yeah, and the people who went were also we're not
• 1:07:38
  Speaker 5: properly elected officials in some case, and were also people
• 1:07:41
  Speaker 5: who went there only with their own mandate. They didn't
• 1:07:45
  Speaker 5: go there with a mandate from the Ukraine, if you
• 1:07:49
  Speaker 5: know what I mean.
• 1:07:51
  Speaker 3: The the the fact of the matter is that that agreement,
• 1:07:55
  Speaker 3: if it had come through, you know, I think a
• 1:07:58
  Speaker 3: lot of a lot of killing meming.
• 1:08:02
  Speaker 4: Of people would have possibly been avoided.
• 1:08:04
  Speaker 5: It would not have changed anything. So it wouldn't have
• 1:08:07
  Speaker 5: changed anything.
• 1:08:08
  Speaker 4: The army would have fought on.
• 1:08:09
  Speaker 5: The army was not going to the public, was not
• 1:08:12
  Speaker 5: going to let Russia take ground for a peace agreement.
• 1:08:17
  Speaker 5: They wouldn't have done it. I was there at the time,
• 1:08:19
  Speaker 5: so I know listening to people that the army would
• 1:08:23
  Speaker 5: not have allowed. It just would not happen, because they
• 1:08:28
  Speaker 5: they've been the country has been devastated by Russia too
• 1:08:32
  Speaker 5: many times before the wholto more, you know all about that,
• 1:08:36
  Speaker 5: previous times when they've been you know, mass murders in Ukraine,
• 1:08:40
  Speaker 5: and the general line in Ukraine is enough is enough.
• 1:08:43
  Speaker 5: We cannot pass this down to our children, which is
• 1:08:47
  Speaker 5: what will happen.
• 1:08:48
  Speaker 3: If I may, If I may, I have greatest respect
• 1:08:51
  Speaker 3: for the Ukrainians as soldiers. They're same slavestock. They're very
• 1:08:55
  Speaker 3: tenacious fighters, both of them. In the Second World War,
• 1:08:59
  Speaker 3: the Russian Soviet Union had the maximum casualties, you know,
• 1:09:04
  Speaker 3: almost about I think fifteen million plus casualties of the
• 1:09:09
  Speaker 3: civilians and about ten million military casualties.
• 1:09:12
  Speaker 4: I think they bore the brunt of that war till
• 1:09:15
  Speaker 4: that time.
• 1:09:15
  Speaker 3: When you know, the invasion at Normandy took place, et cetera.
• 1:09:20
  Speaker 3: They had been fighting alone on the continent. So they
• 1:09:23
  Speaker 3: are tenacious fighters, both of them. Slavs are good fighters
• 1:09:26
  Speaker 3: and have the greatest of respect for.
• 1:09:28
  Speaker 4: All the soldiers that have fallen from both sides.
• 1:09:31
  Speaker 3: But the fact of the matter is today the Ukrainian
• 1:09:35
  Speaker 3: armed forces, what they started with, have been destroyed about
• 1:09:39
  Speaker 3: three times over. Their economy has been absolutely ruined. Today
• 1:09:44
  Speaker 3: every single Ukrainian city is in.
• 1:09:48
  Speaker 4: Ruble right and infrastructure that is so I'm not very sure.
• 1:09:58
  Speaker 3: If if Ukraine has gained at the end of the day,
• 1:10:03
  Speaker 3: if they had, you know, look for a piece, and
• 1:10:07
  Speaker 3: if that same piece is enforced on them by Donald Trump,
• 1:10:10
  Speaker 3: what then will there You think there'll be a who
• 1:10:13
  Speaker 3: in the Ukrainian.
• 1:10:14
  Speaker 5: Army, Sir cat, Donald Trump cannot enforce the peace on
• 1:10:18
  Speaker 5: the Ukrainian people. It's not going to happen.
• 1:10:22
  Speaker 3: Well, I think at a particular time they'll have to
• 1:10:27
  Speaker 3: be pragmatic and cut the losses for their people, would
• 1:10:31
  Speaker 3: you know a leader has to be has to be
• 1:10:35
  Speaker 3: cognizant of the suffering that is people are going through.
• 1:10:39
  Speaker 1: Let us now move to Chip Chapman as for the
• 1:10:41
  Speaker 1: final contribution. I'm keen to hear your response to what
• 1:10:44
  Speaker 1: you've heard in this this back and forth, which is
• 1:10:46
  Speaker 1: precisely what we wanted this discussion for. And you know,
• 1:10:50
  Speaker 1: as it's the closing round also to give us perhaps
• 1:10:53
  Speaker 1: a more optimistic note, you have the honor of being
• 1:10:55
  Speaker 1: the man who effectively wound up Operation Banner as well,
• 1:10:59
  Speaker 1: so you you ended the British Army's regular large manpower
• 1:11:04
  Speaker 1: presence in Northern Ireland because a multi generational conflict of
• 1:11:09
  Speaker 1: a different nature and order had come to an end.
• 1:11:11
  Speaker 1: That's what the other two gentlemen contributing are talking about
• 1:11:14
  Speaker 1: reaching a just resolution.
• 1:11:15
  Speaker 2: Well, I think the first thing you need to look
• 1:11:17
  Speaker 2: at is why the war's end, and they end either
• 1:11:19
  Speaker 2: in decisive military victory. Probability of that is quite low.
• 1:11:24
  Speaker 2: The improbability of victory, the probability that is quite high.
• 1:11:28
  Speaker 2: That is, there is no decisive military victory. Or the
• 1:11:32
  Speaker 2: third reason, which is I think Russia still pursuing, is
• 1:11:36
  Speaker 2: because the costs of the population, economic, infrastructure, whatever are
• 1:11:41
  Speaker 2: too great. And if they're too great for both sides,
• 1:11:44
  Speaker 2: then you get to a negotiating position. So it's not
• 1:11:47
  Speaker 2: whether this is a just war, it's what sort of
• 1:11:49
  Speaker 2: peace should we go to? And if we look at
• 1:11:52
  Speaker 2: what Donald Trump says, it's far more nuanced than most
• 1:11:55
  Speaker 2: people tend to think. So the first piece of evidence
• 1:12:00
  Speaker 2: we have for him, which may not look very good,
• 1:12:04
  Speaker 2: is his town hall meeting in May twenty three when
• 1:12:07
  Speaker 2: he said he doesn't look through the prism of winning
• 1:12:10
  Speaker 2: or losing or victory. He looks through at the prism
• 1:12:13
  Speaker 2: of stopping the killing. Now, one might say that is
• 1:12:16
  Speaker 2: a humanitarian piece, as you know, the Indian General would
• 1:12:20
  Speaker 2: have said, you know, stopping the killing is an honorable
• 1:12:23
  Speaker 2: thing because human security needs include staying alive. That's a
• 1:12:27
  Speaker 2: decent thing to do. But of course that potentially rewards
• 1:12:30
  Speaker 2: the aggressor. That is the problem with it. The second
• 1:12:33
  Speaker 2: way of looking at this is that Donald Trump had
• 1:12:37
  Speaker 2: actually said, through his national security advisors, particularly Keith Kellogg,
• 1:12:42
  Speaker 2: in the run up to the election, that he would
• 1:12:44
  Speaker 2: stop the war. And I don't think he can do
• 1:12:45
  Speaker 2: it in one day, of course, because the great Man
• 1:12:47
  Speaker 2: theory of international relations doesn't really apply. By saying to Zelenski,
• 1:12:53
  Speaker 2: come to the table, or I won't support you, but
• 1:12:56
  Speaker 2: at the same time saying to Putin come to the table,
• 1:13:00
  Speaker 2: or I'll support Ukraine with everything. Now, of course, it's
• 1:13:03
  Speaker 2: what's on the table, which is the real issue, which
• 1:13:06
  Speaker 2: leads you to the notion of do you go for
• 1:13:08
  Speaker 2: a frozen piece a land for peace, which I think
• 1:13:11
  Speaker 2: is absolutely flawed because also what Putin desires is the
• 1:13:16
  Speaker 2: exclusive economic zone and to stop any coastal potential for
• 1:13:22
  Speaker 2: Ukraine in the future to make it a landlocked country.
• 1:13:26
  Speaker 2: Do you go for a neutral peace? And neutrality in
• 1:13:29
  Speaker 2: history has always had three parts as well, the ability
• 1:13:32
  Speaker 2: to trade space for time, very large armed forces, and
• 1:13:36
  Speaker 2: a security guarantee. Now Ukraine already had a security guarantee,
• 1:13:41
  Speaker 2: they potentially had three of them. Firstly through the UN
• 1:13:43
  Speaker 2: Charter Article two brackets for you only go to war,
• 1:13:47
  Speaker 2: authorized by either Article fifty one or a UN Security
• 1:13:51
  Speaker 2: Council resolution, and by the Helsinki Final Agreement in nineteen
• 1:13:55
  Speaker 2: seventy five, led to the assue there should be no
• 1:13:59
  Speaker 2: boundary chain in Europe by war or by the Budapest
• 1:14:04
  Speaker 2: Memorandum of ninety four. Ukraine's sovereign independence of nineteen ninety
• 1:14:09
  Speaker 2: one guaranteed by Russia, UK and the USSR. So what
• 1:14:17
  Speaker 2: we're often talking about and what Putin wants is a
• 1:14:20
  Speaker 2: surrender piece. He wants the dismemberment of Ukraine. One of
• 1:14:24
  Speaker 2: his grand strategic objectives is to regain territory and lost
• 1:14:28
  Speaker 2: fears of influence. I think there will be a negotiated
• 1:14:32
  Speaker 2: piece at some time, but I think it will be
• 1:14:34
  Speaker 2: through strength, because the final bit of evidence for Trump
• 1:14:38
  Speaker 2: is the Helsinki Commission in September this year, led by
• 1:14:42
  Speaker 2: a Republican Senator Joe Wilson from South Carolina, that Trump
• 1:14:48
  Speaker 2: will realize that Putin is not an honest broker in
• 1:14:51
  Speaker 2: negotiations when they get to any table, and there you
• 1:14:55
  Speaker 2: would quote kaya Kala's lines all the time, quoting gramig
• 1:15:00
  Speaker 2: Go from the past, that Russia will always demand the maximum,
• 1:15:03
  Speaker 2: they will always make threats. And the real worry, because
• 1:15:07
  Speaker 2: theory of victory is the West will just lose interest
• 1:15:10
  Speaker 2: and won't want to continue, is that there are useful
• 1:15:13
  Speaker 2: idiots in the West who will give you something. Then
• 1:15:16
  Speaker 2: you'll have and pocket a half or one third of
• 1:15:19
  Speaker 2: something you didn't have before. That's why we need to
• 1:15:22
  Speaker 2: continue to support those resilient Ukrainians so they're not sowed
• 1:15:26
  Speaker 2: down the river by that sort of Grumiko paradigm for
• 1:15:30
  Speaker 2: the future.
• 1:15:32
  Speaker 1: I would like to thank all three of you, gentlemen
• 1:15:34
  Speaker 1: for keeping it cordial in the midst of an impassioned discussion.
• 1:15:38
  Speaker 1: It's notable that we moved from very substantial consensus in
• 1:15:42
  Speaker 1: battlefield analysis to very substantial disagreement when we came to
• 1:15:46
  Speaker 1: what's inside Putin's and Trump's heads. So perhaps there's a
• 1:15:50
  Speaker 1: lesson in there for students of international relations and military
• 1:15:53
  Speaker 1: analysts and more besides. Thank you very much, indeed, and
• 1:15:57
  Speaker 1: above all, we do, of course hope that we will
• 1:15:58
  Speaker 1: not have to repeat this discussion at the two two
• 1:16:01
  Speaker 1: thousand deymark of the war.
• 1:16:03
  Speaker 4: Thank you,