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Is the UN Still the World’s Best Last Hope? · Diplomacy and International Relations

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Welcome to this extra deep dive from Diplomacy and International
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Relations by Bastian Freiburg. If you value getting this level
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You can find that link, as always, right there in the
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description. So today we are wrestling with,
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well, maybe the biggest existential question facing
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global politics right now. Is the United Nations still the
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world's best last hope? That specific phrase, it's quite
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resonant, isn't it? It's rooted in history, linked
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directly to John F Kennedy's 1961 inaugural address.
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Apparently that was the one and only time AUS president actually
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chose to mention the UN in that particular speech.
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Quite something but that. Historical optimism.
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That kind of founding belief, it feels like it's in such stark
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contrast to where we are. Now I mean a world defined by
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overlapping global crises, intense geopolitical rivalry,
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and severe financial shortfalls within the system itself.
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Yeah, absolutely. We've been diving deep into
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sources that track these current existential challenges for the
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UN, and what emerges really consistently is 1 core truth.
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The UN's effectiveness is, and you know, it always has been,
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entirely conditional, conditional on the political
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will, the commitment of its member states.
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What makes this moment feel so acute, so critical, is that key
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central players, especially the major global powers, they just
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seem to be pivoting away from that multilateral commitment
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they're prioritizing, while short term national interests
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much more visibly so. Our mission in this deep dive is
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to explore the specific crisis points across the UN's 3
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foundational pillars, Peace and Security, Development and human
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rights. OK, let's start by grounding
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ourselves a bit in the history. Because the UN.
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Wasn't created in a vacuum, right?
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It was designed specifically, as I understand it, to fix the
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flaws of its predecessor, the League of Nations.
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For anyone who needs a quick refresher, the League was formed
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back in 1920 after World War One, and it essentially just
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dissolved in 1946 following the, well, the devastating outbreak
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of World War 2. Exactly.
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And the league's failure to prevent WWII, well, it provided
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EU NS founders in 1945 with an invaluable, though tragic
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blueprint of what not to do. The key differences, the
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structural improvements, those are really what have allowed the
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UN to survive where the league just collapsed.
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Probably the most crucial improvement was inclusivity.
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Right from the start, the UN included major powers,
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particularly the US and the USSR, now Russia.
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Of course, from the very beginning, the league, you
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remember, it fatally lacked the influence and participation of
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the United States. That was a huge gap.
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So that initial buy in from the world's heavy hitters gave the
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UN significantly more clout, more influence right out of the
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gate. Right, getting the big players
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to the table. But beyond who was at the table,
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the rules for making decisions were also fundamentally changed,
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weren't they? To avoid that kind of paralysis
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that crippled the league. Can you elaborate a bit on that
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decision making mechanism? How did they try to fix it?
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Yeah, that's where the structure really tried to modernize
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things. The League of Nations.
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It required unanimous decisions in both its General Assembly and
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its Security Council. Think about that.
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Every single member state effectively held veto power over
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every single substantive issue. It just made decisive action
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nearly impossible. Total gridlock potential.
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The UN General Assembly, by contrast, operates mostly on
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majority votes. That prevents that kind of
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general paralysis, at least in the GA.
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Then you look at the UN Security Council, the UNSC.
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Now it does have the controversial veto power held by
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the five permanent members, the P5, USA, France, Britain,
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Russia, China. We all know about that, but
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importantly the UN structure built in adaptation mechanisms
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that the league just didn't have.
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Such as the ability to actually bypass the veto entirely in some
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cases. That's what's really contributed
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to its resilience over the years, hasn't it?
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Yeah, exactly. That's a critical mechanism we
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need to unpack the Uniting for Peace resolution.
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This came about in 1950. It essentially created a kind of
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loophole designed specifically to prevent total paralysis.
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If the Security Council gets deadlocked because of AP5 veto,
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the resolution allows the General Assembly, where remember
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there is no veto, to step in and recommend collective measures
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that could even include the use of force, theoretically to
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restore international peace and security.
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Basically, it shifts the burden of response when the most
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powerful nations refuse to act or can't agree to act.
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It gives the UN system a kind of functional safety valve.
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That's fascinating. So even as they gave the P5 this
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immense power, the Founders almost immediately built in a
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mechanism to try and work around potential gridlock.
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Smart. But the UN also expanded its
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mandate way beyond just security, didn't it?
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Moving much more heavily into development and human rights.
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Oh, absolutely. And that broadened mandate is a
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massive part of the UN's longevity.
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Why it's still here. The League was almost
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exclusively focused on security and disarmament.
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Pretty narrow, really. The UN, though, recognized that.
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Poverty. Social injustice, these things
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fuel conflict. So it dedicated vast resources,
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relatively speaking, to socioeconomic development on
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good governance. You see this in the
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establishment of all the specialized agencies, you know,
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WHO, UNICEF, UNDP, and the creation of big global
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frameworks like the Millennium Development Goals and now the
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Sustainable Development Goals, the SDGS setting these ambitious
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targets for global improvement. And, importantly, the League had
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no real mechanism to champion individual rights.
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The UN, on the other hand, enshrined the Universal
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Declaration of Human Rights right after its founding in 48.
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That was fundamental. OK.
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So the UN was definitely designed to be more inclusive,
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more flexible, broader in scope. Seems like a clear improvement.
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Yet they still seem to share some fundamental weaknesses,
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don't they? Challenges that have persisted
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for, well, a century now, if you count the League.
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What are those enduring political and structural
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headaches? Well, the central political
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challenges remain stubbornly similar.
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Unfortunately, both organizations have always faced
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that criticism of being merely tools of powerful nations.
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You hear it all the time. The League leaned heavily on
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Britain and France. The UN historically has been
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very heavily influenced by the US and that leads to frequent
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accusations, especially from emerging powers in the global
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South, of a kind of pro western bias.
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And the most practical persistent weakness is probably
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that neither organization has true independent authority to
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enforce its will. Right.
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No UN army. Precisely.
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Neither the UN nor the League possesses a permanent standing
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army. That's key.
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Enforcement capability is always, always contingent on
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member states volunteering troops and resources.
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Blue helmets come from national armies.
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So if national capitals decide not to act or not to contribute,
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the UN's resolutions are essentially just paper hollow.
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And finally, financial dependency.
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That's a shared Achilles heel. The UN is, and has long been
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really reliant on specific large donors, making it acutely
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susceptible to the financial whims or frankly, the political
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leverage of countries like the United States when they threaten
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to pull funding. It matters a lot.
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OK, let's pivot now to the present day and dive into the
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state of those 3 foundational pillars, starting with pillar
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one, Peace and security. This is really where the world's
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headlines seem to intersect most visibly with UN paralysis, isn't
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it? Absolutely.
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The sources we looked at confirm that peace and security efforts
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are just severely compromised right now by these great power
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disagreements when the P5 are fundamentally opposed.
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And we see the so clearly in situations like Ukraine, Gaza,
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Sudan, the Security Council becomes what one source called
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frustratingly paralyzed, just stuck.
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Core global security issues get stranded.
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The ability to impose sanctions or authorize effective missions.
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It just disappears in that gridlock.
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And this political paralysis, it's amplified by what sounds
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like a deep operational crisis in peacekeeping itself.
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The numbers you mentioned on budget cuts are genuinely
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alarming. They really are.
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The sources paint a frankly dire picture.
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The 11 peace operations currently running worldwide.
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They're facing up to an overall 25% budget reduction.
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That's huge. To put that in perspective, the
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total budget for peace missions has shrunk from about $7.2
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billion a decade ago down to $5.6 billion for 2024-2025.
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This kind of drastic reduction forces the UN into making these
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agonizing choices. Either you reduce the
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effectiveness of missions already on the ground, spread
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them thinner, or you withdraw entirely from crucial areas.
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It fundamentally changes peacekeeping potentially from a
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proactive force to more of a reactive observer in really key
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regions. And we've seen the real world
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consequences of this struggle, haven't we, in places like Mali,
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where the UN Mission Minos Ma had withdraw, and the Congo
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Manusco, where missions are struggling desperately to
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deliver on these massive mandates they're given.
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This really illustrates the evolution of the peacekeeping
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mandate itself, which seems to have changed dramatically since
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the UN's early days. Oh, the evolution is absolutely
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a key factor in the current crisis.
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It's crucial to understand this. The original concept back after
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1948 was pretty straightforward. UN missions were intended
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strictly to preserve an existing peace, a ceasefire usually.
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They were lightly armed, strictly impartial, and
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critically, they're required consent from all the conflict
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parties involved. But then the Cold War ended in
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89 and the nature of conflict shifted dramatically.
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Suddenly we saw complex internal conflicts, ethnic cleansing,
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religious wars, state collapse. Think Rwanda, Yugoslavia.
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Right. And the mass atrocities
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committed in places like Sabrenica and Rwanda became this
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sort of moral reckoning for the UN, didn't they?
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Forcing a really painful recognition that the traditional
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peacekeepers often lack the mandate or frankly, the means to
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actually protect civilians caught in the crossfire.
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Precisely that terrible experience LED directly to the
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post 1989 shift toward more robust, or sometimes called
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militarized mandates. Chapter 7 Mandates peacekeepers
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were given greater authority and sometimes the firepower to
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protect civilians even without everyone's consent.
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But then in the 2000s and 20 tens, the mandates expanded
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again into these highly complex, multidimensional missions.
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The sources described these missions as being tasked with,
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well, practically everything counterterrorism support, State
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Building, human rights monitoring, election support and
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civilian protection. One analyst suggested these
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missions are asked to be like a Swiss army knife, simultaneously
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A peacekeeper, a counter terror unit, A development agency and a
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local government advisor. That staggering level of
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expectation combined with dwindling financial support?
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Well, it's a recipe for why many are seen as failing to achieve
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their incredibly complex success criteria.
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OK. So given this really difficult
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operational environment and the complex mandates, let's talk
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about the efforts to maybe decentralize some of the
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security responsibility, particularly pushing it towards
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regional players. We have some specific detail on
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this, don't we, especially concerning Africa.
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Yes, this is a critical strategic direction and it's
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championed by many like minded states, including Denmark.
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There is a strong push to strengthen partnerships with
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regional actors, most importantly the African Union.
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The AUA major focus here is supporting UN Security Council
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Resolution 20 2719 that was passed in 2023.
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This resolution is vital because it allows for assessed UN
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contributions, meaning mandatory reliable payments from all
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member states to finance AU LED peace operations.
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This directly addresses 2 long standing problems.
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One, the need for more regionally owned solutions,
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African solutions for African problems.
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That's a phrase often used. And two, the chronic
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underfunding of these African LED initiatives, which often
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rely on voluntary, unpredictable funding.
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Right. Getting reliable funding for
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regional efforts and this kind of initiative, it's a core focus
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for nations that are actively engaged in the UNSC, like
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Denmark, which is currently serving for the 20252026 term.
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So what specific strategies are they in countries like them
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prioritizing to try and deal with the paralysis and these
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complex challenges? Well, Denmark certainly
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recognizes the deadlock, the difficulty, but their approach
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focuses on constructive engagement anyway, trying to
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find openings. They are prioritizing, for
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example, conflict prevention, trying to get ahead of crises,
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and reforming the 2005 peace Building architecture that
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encompasses the Peace Building Commission and the Peace
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Building Fund. The goal there is to ensure
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better integration with civil society on the ground and
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greater efficiency in delivering results at the country level.
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They are essentially trying to strengthen the parts of the UN
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system that function before a conflict totally spirals out of
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control, which is crucial of course, when the council itself
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can't agree on intervention later on.
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OK, that makes sense. Let's shift gears now to Pillar
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2 development. The UN has actually seen massive
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success here historically, hasn't it?
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Building global consensus around things like the Sustainable
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Development Goals, the SDGS, and the Paris Agreement on climate
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change. Yet this progress now seems to
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be in severe retreat. It's a real paradox.
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Multilateral action, when it works, can and does yield
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significant results. The sources absolutely noted
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that global warming projections, for example, dropped quite
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significantly because of the framework set up by the Paris
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Agreement. That's a tangible success.
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However, we are now just five years away from the 2030
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deadline for the SD GS, and the sources state very clearly that
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no single goal is currently on track to be met.
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Zero. In fact, progress is actually
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reversing across key indicators, poverty, hunger, education, a
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trend that was dramatically worsened by the COVID-19
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pandemic, which just pushed millions back into extreme
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poverty and disrupted everything.
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And fueling this reversal, or at least making it much harder to
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combat, is what sounds like a financial catastrophe within the
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UN system itself. This liquidity crisis isn't just
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a budget line item, it sounds like a genuine humanitarian
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threat. It is a severe threat, yeah, and
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it's compounded by member states simply failing to pay their dues
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on time or in full. By early 2025, apparently only
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75 out of 193 member states have paid their ordinary budget dues
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in full. That's less than half the
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financial cuts, and specifically the withdrawal or withholding of
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funds by major donors, particularly the US
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historically, but others too are described in our sources with
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frankly shocking severity. One source actually referred to
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this kind of defunding, especially of humanitarian and
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development work, as potentially the greatest crime against the
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entire idea of international human development, warning that
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these cuts could directly jeopardize humanitarian aid for
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up to 30 million people who depend on it.
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Aid workers view this kind of chronic underfunding as
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potentially a larger, slower burning humanitarian catastrophe
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than many of the high profile conflicts combined.
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Wow, so when the money dries up like this, the focus inevitably
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shifts, doesn't it? Towards efficiency?
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Internal reform? That whole idea of doing more
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with less. Absolutely.
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That becomes the mantra. And this is where countries like
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the Nordic nations, including Denmark, tend to gain
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credibility and really push for structural efficiency reforms.
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They often champion the One UN structure, trying to make the
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system work Better Together. The concept behind One UN and
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Copenhagen's UN city is often cited as a kind of model for
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this physical Co location. It's pretty simple.
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Merge overlapping agency mandates where possible, reduce
15:03
duplication, and, importantly, relocate staff from expensive
15:06
headquarters like New York or Geneva to regional hubs or
15:09
directly into the field. The idea is to reduce
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bureaucratic overlap, cut overhead costs, and
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theoretically put resources closer to the people they're
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actually meant to serve. That brings up a really crucial
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point about credibility, doesn't it?
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We see that Denmark, for instance, by maintaining its
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long standing commitment to the .7% GNI target for development
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aid, gains the necessary leverage the standing to push
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these difficult reforms on others.
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That financial commitment is absolutely their currency in
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these discussions. In a world where overall global
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aid is actually declining from many traditional donors, that
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reliability gives them the moral and political authority to
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insist on efficiency and reform from the UN system itself.
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And this leverage is crucial because, as the sources warn,
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these reforms must avoid simply becoming a donor driven savings
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exercise, just cutting costs for the sake of cutting costs.
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If it's perceived that way, it just alienates the global S who
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often feel the cuts most directly.
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The reform has to genuinely focus on better delivery of core
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tasks across all pillars, not just become an exercise in
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austerity dictated by the North. Right, very delicate balance.
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Now let's turn to Pillar 3, human rights.
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Historically, this has arguably been one of EU NS greatest
16:21
successes. Right created these mechanisms
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for individuals to actually seek justice against states.
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It's a massive legal and normative shift since 1945.
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It truly redefined global governance in many ways, giving
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the individual standing against their own state at the
16:34
international level. That was revolutionary.
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The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and then the
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subsequent establishment of all the international conventions on
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torture, on racial discrimination, on women's
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rights, children's rights and the committees to monitor them
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created this unprecedented system of accountability.
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Yet this vital pillar is now facing a really dangerous 2
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pronged crisis. One, severe underfunding, and
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two, an intense geopolitical attack.
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Let's start with the money, or lack thereof.
17:04
The underfunding statistics you mentioned are truly astonishing.
17:07
They're absolutely staggering. The human rights pillar is by
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far the worst finance of the three main pillars.
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It receives less than 1%, let me repeat that, less than 1% of the
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UNS ordinary core budget. Less than 1%?
17:19
What are the functional consequences of basically
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starving this pillar of funds like that?
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What does it mean in practice? Well, the consequences are
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severe and very practical. This chronic underfunding
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fundamentally limits the ability of the monitoring bodies, the
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treaty committees, the experts who review state reports and
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individual complaints to actually function effectively.
17:40
The sources noted that these committees are literally
17:42
canceling sessions because there isn't the budget to hold them,
17:46
to pay for translation, for experts, travel for the basic
17:49
functioning. And when sessions are cancelled,
17:51
the UN simply can't process individual complaints that come
17:54
in. It can't review state compliance
17:56
reports in a timely manner. It can't fulfill its monitoring
18:00
mandates. It directly degrades the
18:02
accountability system that took decades to build.
18:04
It grinds it to a halt. And this financial siege, this
18:08
starvation, is compounded by what you call the calculated
18:11
geopolitical attack, primarily from states that prioritize
18:14
national control over international scrutiny.
18:17
Absolutely. The human rights space
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unfortunately has become a major geopolitical battleground and
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it's strongly influenced now by authoritarian states.
18:26
Particularly Russia and China are often mentioned, but others
18:29
too. Their strategy seems to be to
18:31
fundamentally shift the bounds away from the protection of
18:34
individual rights and back towards the primacy of state
18:37
sovereignty and national interests.
18:40
They argue essentially that human rights issues should be
18:42
solved internally or maybe discussed diplomatically between
18:45
states, but certainly not subject to independent
18:48
international monitoring or judgment.
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This push represents a real risk of regression then doesn't it?
18:53
Undoing these hard won global norms about universal rights?
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How are these actors attempting to undermine the system
18:59
practically in the day-to-day work of the UN?
19:02
They attempt to do this in several ways.
19:04
One is by trying to change the specific language used in UN
19:07
resolutions, watering down commitments, inserting caveats
19:11
about national context or non interference.
19:13
They emphasize concepts like non interference and state autonomy
19:16
very heavily. They also tend to focus heavily
19:19
on economic and social rights, which are important of course,
19:21
but often harder to universally measure and enforce, while
19:25
simultaneously downplaying or actively criticizing civil and
19:28
political rights like freedom of speech or assembly.
19:31
They are essentially trying to dismantle, or at least
19:34
significantly weaken, the monitoring and independent
19:38
complaint mechanisms that challenge state power and hold
19:40
governments accountable to international standards.
19:43
O In this context, the responsive nations that are
19:45
still committed to Liberal Democratic values and universal
19:48
rights becomes absolutely crucial.
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What specific actions are countries like Denmark and their
19:53
allies taking to try and defend this pillar under attack?
19:56
Well, they're essentially forming defensive alliances,
19:59
working closely with like minded states, other EU members, Nordic
20:02
countries, Canada, others across different regions to defend
20:06
these normative standards that have been built up.
20:09
They put particular focus on defending the rights of
20:11
vulnerable groups who are often the first targets when rights
20:14
regress. So women and girls, LGBT plus
20:17
persons, ethnic and religious minorities groups that are
20:20
seeing significant rights rollbacks globally right now for
20:23
these countries. The rights based approach to
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development and security is seen as non negotiable fundamental,
20:29
so they are fighting hard diplomatically to ensure that
20:32
those monitoring bodies, the committee is getting less than
20:35
1% of the budget, remember remain relevant, funded enough
20:38
to continue their essential work and that their independence is
20:41
protected. OK, this connects to the broader
20:44
dynamics. Let's look at that now,
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especially the well, the overwhelming role of the United
20:48
States and EU NS fate. The historical volatility of the
20:52
US posture is really striking, isn't it?
20:54
It absolutely dictates the environment, or at least heavily
20:56
influences it. the US approach has swung wildly over the
21:00
decades. You go from the visionary ideals
21:03
of Franklin D Roosevelt, who was a key architect that died just
21:06
before the founding conference, to the kind of Cold War
21:09
pragmatism of JFK, who you mentioned earlier, right through
21:12
to the outright skepticism, even hostility, we saw under the
21:15
Trump administration. There was that anecdote
21:18
mentioned in one source about Trump being apparently
21:20
nonplussed by a broken escalator at the UN General Assembly.
21:23
While it seems trivial, it kind of perfectly illustrates the
21:26
larger point the sources make. The shift in US posture isn't
21:30
just about policy changes. It can reflect A deeper, almost
21:33
emotional, disengagement from the fundamental idea, the
21:36
infrastructure, of global governance itself.
21:39
Right. And that sentiment that maybe
21:41
multilateralism is either purely transactional or maybe even an
21:44
impediment to national interests that translated into concrete
21:47
actions like defunding certain agencies and withdrawing from
21:50
agreements or bodies. So what happens globally when
21:53
the traditional anchor of the system, the US, steps back or
21:57
seems ambivalent? Well, it creates a vacuum,
21:59
especially in an already fragmenting, increasingly
22:02
multipolar world. Other powers China, Russia, but
22:06
also an emerging class of significant regional powers like
22:09
India, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, and influential middle
22:12
powers. They're actively filling that
22:14
space they have to China, for instance, has dramatically
22:18
increased its financial contributions to some UN
22:20
agencies and peacekeeping efforts in recent years, partly
22:23
filling gaps but also naturally seeking to assert its own policy
22:26
priorities and gain influence within the system.
22:29
The world isn't necessarily waiting for Washington to lead
22:31
anymore. It's adapting, sometimes
22:33
reforming around US absence or perceived unreliability.
22:37
And that dynamic seems clearly reflected in the increased
22:39
weight, or at least the increased activity of the UN
22:42
General Assembly, the UNGA. It seems to be stepping up where
22:45
the Security Council fails. Absolutely.
22:47
The widespread frustration globally over the paralyzed
22:51
Security Council has definitely forced the UNGA to assume a far
22:54
larger role in peace and security debates than perhaps
22:57
originally envisioned. We've seen the UNGA pass
23:00
powerful symbolic resolutions on major flashpoints like Ukraine
23:04
and Gaza, where the P5 are completely deadlocked by vetoes.
23:08
And crucially, the UNGA has implemented A mechanism now to
23:11
hold P5 members accountable, at least politically, for their use
23:14
of the veto. They have to come and explain
23:16
their veto to the broader membership.
23:17
This gives the entire UN membership, all 193 states, a
23:21
louder, more formalized voice when the major powers are in
23:24
gridlock. It's a significant procedural
23:26
shift. OK, so despite all this evidence
23:28
we've discussed the political paralysis, the financial siege,
23:31
the geopolitical attacks on human rights and scarity, the
23:34
sources still seem to maintain that the UN is indispensable.
23:37
Why is that? Is it simply because there's no
23:39
other viable option? Is that the main argument?
23:42
That's a huge part of it, yes. As one source articulated it,
23:45
the UN remains the only universal forum, the only place
23:49
where literally all major powers, minor powers, emerging
23:52
regional players, everybody meets regularly to discuss
23:55
shared global problems. That space for dialogue, even
23:59
when it's contentious, even when it's frustrating and slow, it
24:02
holds intrinsic value because it provides A baseline minimum for
24:05
global interaction and diplomacy, a place to talk even
24:08
when you disagree fiercely. And when you consider that the
24:11
vast majority of international law and cooperation is actually
24:14
based on the UN system, everything from international
24:17
trade rules, maritime law, aviation standards, refugee law,
24:21
its legitimacy and its physical space are often required even
24:24
for ad hoc global action or coordination outside its formal
24:27
structures. OK, indispensable but flawed.
24:30
Let's look toward the future in this reform agenda.
24:32
Secretary General Antonio Guterres launched the UN80
24:34
initiative back in 2025, marking the 80th anniversary.
24:38
What are the comprehensive goals of this UN80 initiative?
24:40
What's it trying to achieve? UN80 is intended as a massive
24:44
undertaking. Yeah, it aims for pretty
24:46
comprehensive structural reform, better economic management and
24:50
significant efficiency gains. The core idea is streamlining
24:54
internal processes, trying to improve delivery on the ground,
24:58
and maybe even relocating certain administrative functions
25:00
to what they call low cost locations.
25:03
Nairobi is often mentioned as an example of a major UN hub
25:07
outside the West to reduce overheads and optimize the use
25:10
of taxpayer money globally. Gutierrez is basically arguing
25:13
that these kinds of deep reforms are absolutely necessary for the
25:16
organization's survival and its ability to deliver better
25:19
results in the 21st century. But as we discussed earlier with
25:22
A1 UN idea, reform always runs that risk, doesn't it?
25:25
Becoming a political battle over where the cuts fall and who
25:27
benefits. That is the absolute central
25:30
political struggle here. The sources really stressed that
25:33
UN80 must avoid being perceived merely as a donor driven savings
25:36
exercise that would be fatal to its legitimacy.
25:40
If the reforms are seen to primarily focus on slashing
25:43
development and human rights budgets while maybe maintaining
25:46
or even increasing security expenditures, it risks deeply
25:49
alienating the global S the majority of UN members.
25:53
So the reform must maintain a holistic vision.
25:56
It needs to be about defining which tasks the UN should
25:59
prioritize and handle effectively in the coming
26:01
decades, and ensuring that all three pillars, peace, security,
26:05
development and human rights, are seen as equally important,
26:07
prioritized, and adequately funded, not just picking winners
26:10
and losers based on donor preferences.
26:12
And perhaps the most talked about, maybe the most difficult
26:15
structural flaw, is the Security Council's composition itself.
26:18
Why is Security Council reform always such an acute priority in
26:21
these discussions? It boils down fundamentally to a
26:24
legitimacy problem. A massive 1.
26:26
The UNSC, with its five permanent members and their veto
26:29
power, reflects the global power structure of 1945, not the world
26:33
of today. It's undeniable.
26:35
The sources consistently highlight that it's outdated
26:38
composition, which excludes permanent seats for major global
26:41
regions like Africa and Latin America, and for huge global
26:45
economic and demographic giants like India, Brazil, Germany,
26:48
Japan. It just undermines its authority
26:50
and its representativeness. So for nations like Denmark
26:53
currently serving on the Council, pushing for
26:55
modernization, even if progress is incredibly slow, is a crucial
26:59
priority because the lack of representation prevents the
27:02
Council from truly reflecting global realities, making its
27:05
decisions inherently vulnerable to criticism and harder to
27:08
implement. Effective.
27:09
You also need to talk about the generational leadership change
27:11
that's coming up relatively soon, the selection process for
27:14
the new secretary general who will replace Guterres in 2026.
27:18
What are the key elements needed for this crucial selection
27:20
process? What are countries looking for?
27:22
Well, firstly, the UN desperately needs a strong,
27:25
independent and genuinely merit based leader, someone with
27:29
vision and courage. But the selection process itself
27:32
is also vital. Denmark and other reform minded
27:35
states are working quite hard, apparently, to maintain and even
27:38
expand the transparency that was established in the 2015, 2016
27:42
process. That process, which was
27:44
championed by Majin's Lick it Off when he was President of the
27:47
General Assembly, was seen as a big step forward.
27:50
Historically, the SG selection often happened in while a dark
27:53
backroom, sometimes involving pretty much only the P5 making a
27:57
deal. The current push is to make the
27:59
process much more open, involving public hearings for
28:01
candidates, making their qualifications and visions
28:04
transparent to all Member States, and preventing A
28:07
reversion to those opaque power politics of the past, keeping it
28:10
out in the light. And a major priority within that
28:12
process, I assume, is finally addressing the historical gender
28:15
imbalance at the very top. Absolutely.
28:17
It's stark. Every single secretary general
28:19
in the UN's nearly 80 year history has been a man.
28:23
So yes, Denmark and many other countries are actively
28:25
encouraging member states to put forward qualified female
28:28
candidates this time around, recognizing that diversity and
28:32
leadership isn't just symbolic, it's necessary for legitimacy
28:35
and for bringing varied perspectives and experiences to
28:38
global problem solving. It's long overdue.
28:41
Let's tell just a bit more into Denmark specific thematic
28:44
priorities within the UN system, as it often seems to champion
28:47
themes that other middle powers then rally around.
28:50
Beyond the big structural reforms, what specific areas are
28:53
they focusing on, say during the 80th General Assembly session?
28:56
Well, their thematic focus really seems to center on the
28:58
interconnectedness of conflict development and rights.
29:01
They don't see them in silos. So they are celebrating and
29:04
pushing hard for the continued advancement of the Women Peace
29:07
and Security WPS agenda that's marking the 25th anniversary of
29:11
the landmark Resolution 1325. Also the Youth Peace and
29:16
Security YPS agenda, which is hitting its 10th anniversary,
29:19
getting young people more involved in peace processes.
29:22
And crucially, as you might expect from a Nordic country,
29:25
they're also very strong advocates for what's called
29:27
climate peace and security, linking climate change to
29:31
conflict. Their argument, which is
29:33
definitely gaining traction among many member states now, is
29:36
that climate change is a threat multiplier or conflict
29:39
multiplier. The effects of climate change,
29:41
things like resource scarcity, droughts, floods, population
29:44
displacement, or directly impacting existing conflicts and
29:47
potentially sparking new ones. Therefore, they argue, these
29:50
security implications must be discussed seriously in the
29:52
Security Council, not just siloed away as a purely
29:55
environmental or development issue handled elsewhere.
29:58
And underpinning all of this is a commitment to maintaining the
30:01
rule of law internationally. Yes, absolutely.
30:04
Active support for the international courts, you know,
30:06
the International Court of Justice, ICJ, the International
30:10
Criminal Court, ICC is paramount for countries like Denmark.
30:14
They are actively supporting the principle of accountability for
30:16
the worst international crimes. This includes the responsibility
30:19
to protect or R2P principle. We should probably define R2P
30:24
clearly here for listeners. It's a global political
30:26
commitment established back in 2005 based on the idea that
30:30
sovereignty isn't just a right or a privilege, it's also a
30:32
responsibility. The core idea is that if a state
30:35
fails massively to protect its own citizens from mass
30:38
atrocities, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes
30:41
against humanity, then the international community has the
30:44
responsibility to step in collectively, using diplomatic
30:48
means first, but potentially even forcefully as a last resort
30:51
through the Security Council. Now, this is a highly contested
30:54
concept, especially by states wary of intervention.
30:57
So strong support for RTP is actually a key differentiator
31:00
for nations committed to interventionism, albeit
31:02
selectively when necessary to prevent event mass atrocities.
31:05
And Denmark also has a unique focus stemming from its status
31:08
as a major global player in trade and particularly shipping.
31:12
Right. That's right.
31:13
As one of the world's leading shipping nations, maritime
31:15
security is a constant practical focus for them.
31:18
This includes vigorously upholding UN Clio rests, the UN
31:22
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which is really the bedrock
31:26
of global maritime governance, the Constitution for the Oceans.
31:30
So they're focused not only on addressing current threats like
31:32
piracy or attacks on shipping, but also importantly, on
31:35
addressing the root causes of insecurity on land, things like
31:38
poverty, lack of opportunity, ongoing conflicts which often
31:42
fuel maritime threats like piracy in the 1st place.
31:45
It's connecting the land and sea issues.
31:47
Now for a smaller state like Denmark to have this level of
31:50
influence across so many areas, it clearly relies heavily on
31:53
strategic alliances rather than sheer military or economic power
31:57
alone. That is the absolute definition
31:59
of smart multilateralism for middle powers.
32:01
Yeah. They have to maximize their
32:03
influence by operating effectively within various
32:05
blocks and groups. So leveraging the collective
32:08
weight of the EU negotiating position where possible,
32:11
coordinating closely with their Nordic and Baltic cooperation
32:13
partners who often share similar values, and building these cross
32:16
regional alliances, often referred to informally as groups
32:20
of friends on specific issues like accountability or climate
32:23
security or gender equality. They use the consistency of
32:27
their policy, like reliably meeting that 1.7% aid target we
32:31
mentioned, to gain credibility and sometimes act as a bridge
32:34
between the global North and the global S.
32:37
They argue, quite persuasively I think, that a rules based
32:40
cooperative international order, even a flawed 1, is absolutely
32:43
essential for small states to thrive, protect their interests
32:45
and have their voices heard. We've talked a lot about
32:47
paralysis, particularly in the Security Council, but let's just
32:50
confirm the instances where the UN system, Despite that deadlock
32:54
at the top, still manages to function in major conflict
32:57
zones. Take the really complex
32:59
situations we see in Gaza or Ukraine, where the Security
33:02
Council is clearly paralyzed by P5 vetoes or the threat of them.
33:06
What role does the UN still managed to carve out on the
33:08
ground? Right.
33:09
In these very high profile conflicts, even if the Security
33:12
Council is totally unable to authorize peace enforcement or
33:15
impose binding resolutions, the broader UN system still plays a
33:18
massive, often essential role in at least two key ways, providing
33:22
legitimacy and coordinating the humanitarian response.
33:26
The General Assembly often takes over the political debate, as we
33:28
mentioned, passing resolutions that demonstrate global
33:31
consensus and politically isolate the vetoing powers that
33:35
has normative weight. And crucially, on the ground,
33:37
even if ceasefires are brokered by other actors outside the UN
33:40
framework, the legitimacy of a Security Council resolution, or
33:44
at least UN coordination is often still required or
33:46
preferred to provide a mandate for international stabilization
33:49
forces or more commonly, for large scale humanitarian aid
33:53
distribution. The UN system, it's agencies
33:56
like WFPUNHCROCO, acts as the undisputed neutral pipeline for
34:01
humanitarian aid delivery. And most major crises, whether
34:04
in Gaza or Ukraine or elsewhere, they often operate in areas
34:07
where no single nation could operate with the same perceived
34:09
neutrality or reach. So even for the major powers
34:12
that might express skepticism about the UN politically, it's
34:15
practical authority and coordination role are still
34:18
often the gold standard for global action on the ground.
34:21
It often remains the only globally accepted standard
34:24
available. Yeah, look at the situation in
34:26
Sudan, which according to the sources, is currently the
34:29
world's largest and arguably most tragic ongoing military
34:33
humanitarian catastrophe, even if it doesn't always dominate
34:36
the headlines. While the Security Council
34:39
struggles to find unity, the UN system, the humanitarian
34:42
agencies, the Secretary General's envoys, is constantly
34:45
engaged on the ground attempting to negotiate access for aid,
34:49
secure humanitarian corridors, and maintain at least a baseline
34:52
presence and reporting function. Even without a strong SC mandate
34:56
for intervention, the structure, however flawed, is still often
35:00
indispensable for just minimum maintenance of global order and
35:02
humanitarian principles in these catastrophic situations.
35:05
Conversely, in conflicts where the great power interests are
35:08
perhaps less directly opposed, or where there's some consensus
35:11
on avoiding total chaos, we do see the Council can still
35:14
function more effectively. Correct.
35:16
You mentioned South Sudan earlier.
35:17
Yes, exactly. South Sudan is a reasonable
35:20
recent example where the P5, despite their broader global
35:23
disagreements, found enough relative unity or at least lack
35:27
of direct opposition regarding the basic need to prevent a full
35:30
national collapse back into all out civil war.
35:33
In those cases, the Council can still be effective, maybe
35:36
backing regional peace efforts led by the AU or IGAD, setting
35:40
clear expectations for governance reform, imposing
35:43
targeted sanctions, and maintaining A mandate for a
35:46
peacekeeping mission, UNMISS in this case, that is broadly
35:49
supported, even if its implementation faces huge
35:52
challenges. It just reminds us that the
35:54
machinery itself, the potential for action, is often sound.
35:57
It's the political will, the unity among the key members,
36:00
that is the critical variable. Let's just return briefly to the
36:03
human rights pillar for our final synthesis because it feels
36:06
so critical. You mentioned this regression,
36:09
this pushback towards state sovereignty over individual
36:11
rights. Is there a strong enough counter
36:13
demand from global civil society, from people around the
36:16
world, to push back against that?
36:18
Or is the political tide controlled by states simply too
36:22
strong right now? That's a really important
36:24
question. The sources suggest there is a
36:26
very strong popular demand for individual rights globally.
36:30
Ordinary people are generally not indifferent torture or
36:33
arbitrary detention or seeing their governments become
36:35
abusive. You see protests, you see Ng OS
36:38
working tirelessly. However, the current political
36:41
environment within the UN bodies themselves, exacerbated by that
36:44
chronic lack of funding for the human rights mechanisms,
36:47
definitely favors the states that wish to prioritize non
36:50
interference and state sovereignty above all else.
36:53
They are successfully, in many forms, weaponizing the concept
36:57
of non interference to block scrutiny.
36:59
Which means that the focused, persistent actions of states
37:02
like Denmark and their allies who insist on defending and
37:06
promoting these universal standards are almost existential
37:10
for the pillar survival right now.
37:11
Precisely. They're essentially fighting an
37:14
active erosion campaign, working within their alliances to ensure
37:18
that the human rights system, which let's just remind
37:20
ourselves again, receives less than 1% of EU NS ordinary
37:24
budget, doesn't completely crumble due to this combination
37:27
of calculated underfunding and sustained political attack from
37:30
powerful states. Because if this pillar
37:33
fundamentally fails, if the idea of universal standards and
37:36
international accountability collapses, it sets a dangerous
37:39
global precedent. It risks allowing states to
37:42
retreat entirely into unaccountable self-interest,
37:45
jeopardizing the rights and safety of individuals
37:47
everywhere. OK, we've established that the
37:49
UN is essential, yet deeply troubled, but also undergoing
37:52
this critical reform push with UN80 to conclude our deep dive,
37:56
how do we synthesize the path forward?
37:59
Where does the hope in that original phrase truly lie in
38:02
2025 and beyond? I think the final synthesis from
38:04
the source is pretty clear. The UN is indispensable, warts
38:08
and all. We simply have no viable
38:10
alternative global forum for tackling shared complex problems
38:14
that cross borders. Climate change, pandemics,
38:18
cross-border conflict, financial stability.
38:20
Its current crisis is very much a direct reflection of the
38:23
broader global crisis of political will and rising
38:25
nationalism. The UN reflects the world.
38:28
It doesn't create it. The hope therefore rests not
38:32
necessarily with the five permanent members of the
38:34
Security Council, who are often deadlocked, but perhaps more
38:37
with the vast majority of other member states, the global S
38:40
nations, the influential middle powers, the alliances of like
38:44
minded states across regions, the large group that still
38:47
fundamentally wants to maintain and strengthen the rules based
38:50
international order because they benefit from its stability and
38:53
predictability. So the stability may be the hope
38:56
comes from acknowledging that yes, institutionalized
38:58
cooperation is slow, it's formal, can be incredibly
39:00
tedious and frustrating, but it offers a kind of predictability
39:04
in a framework for dialogue that informal, purely self interested
39:07
alliances can never really match long term.
39:09
Absolutely. That's the core argument for its
39:12
endurance. The future of the UN ultimately
39:14
depends on the here insistence of its member states.
39:17
It's not guaranteed. It depends on enough countries
39:20
actively supporting it, fully funding it, which is a big if,
39:24
continually pushing for reforms to make it more effective and
39:26
representative, and critically defending its normative
39:30
standards, especially on human rights.
39:32
Even when under immense geopolitical pressure, if enough
39:35
nations consistently insist that the UN must work and act
39:38
accordingly, it will likely endure, adapt, and continue to
39:41
play a vital role. It really only fails completely
39:44
when its members allow it to fail.
39:46
That is a critical take away, isn't it?
39:48
The future of the UN isn't some pre written destiny.
39:50
It's being actively shaped right now by the political choices and
39:54
the financial commitments, or lack thereof, of its members
39:57
today. This has been an incredibly
39:59
insightful deep dive into this really complex and vital
40:02
question of whether the UN is still the world's best last
40:04
hope. Thank you so much for sharing
40:06
your analysis. If this deep dive into
40:08
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40:11
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We'll see you on the next deep dive.