Latest / The Team House / How America Went Blind in Iran | EYES ON GEOPOLITICS
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: Hey, everybody, Welcome to another episode of Eyes on Geopolitics.
- 0:03Speaker 1: I'm here with Jack Murphy and Jonathan Hackett. I would
- 0:07Speaker 1: say that the two big brains of the group Ivy
- 0:13Speaker 1: League grads are almost Ivy League grad for John, he's
- 0:16Speaker 1: getting there. Today's show is gonna be a little bit
- 0:20Speaker 1: different than the normal show usually. Obviously we do like
- 0:22Speaker 1: you know, what's going on current events wise, you know,
- 0:26Speaker 1: you know, week fucking eighteen of the Iran War. I mean,
- 0:29Speaker 1: this does have to do with Iran, obviously. This is
- 0:32Speaker 1: more like I guess you can kind of characterize us
- 0:36Speaker 1: like one of the bigger intelligence stories in the last
- 0:39Speaker 1: four decades, and how the US is kind of like
- 0:42Speaker 1: try to understand, like what's going on in Iran, especially
- 0:46Speaker 1: after what happened in nineteen seventy nine with the revolution,
- 0:49Speaker 1: and like, you know, our embassies being our embassy was
- 0:53Speaker 1: a hostage place, a hostage, you know, a home for
- 0:57Speaker 1: hostages essentially, and like we lost all of our intelligence,
- 1:03Speaker 1: at least human intelligence inside of Iran after nineteen seventy nine,
- 1:08Speaker 1: and just leading up to what we're at where we're
- 1:10Speaker 1: at today, like who we leaned on for intelligence help
- 1:15Speaker 1: throughout the last four decades. I mean, really it's a
- 1:18Speaker 1: longer story too, because we talk about like nineteen fifty
- 1:20Speaker 1: three and stuff like that, Like it's so much, like
- 1:22Speaker 1: there's so much there and I'm open to talking about that.
- 1:26Speaker 1: But my thought process was basically starting it off right
- 1:30Speaker 1: after nineteen seventy nine, after the revolution, and basically us
- 1:35Speaker 1: trying to having to build back our intelligence apparatus or
- 1:39Speaker 1: the picture inside of Iran. So I brought our Iranian expert.
- 1:46Speaker 1: It was John Hackett, and Jack's here, Jacks here just
- 1:49Speaker 1: because he's cute and I need sex appeal in the episode.
- 1:52Speaker 2: I get it.
- 1:53Speaker 1: Yeah, So, like, John, where do you want to start?
- 1:56Speaker 1: You want to talk a little bit about what happened
- 1:58Speaker 1: in nineteen fifty three and stuff like that, just to
- 2:00Speaker 1: set the stage for what eventually happened with the revolution.
- 2:04Speaker 3: Yeah, so I can go back a little bit earlier
- 2:06Speaker 3: than that because it's kind of relevant to like why
- 2:08Speaker 3: did nineteen fifty three happen at all? So in nineteen
- 2:10Speaker 3: oh six you had something called the Constitutional Revolution in Iran.
- 2:13Speaker 3: There was this group called the Kajars, which had been
- 2:15Speaker 3: ruling Iran for about two centuries. That was the monarchy
- 2:17Speaker 3: for a while they were this originally Turkic backed group,
- 2:22Speaker 3: Turkish group, although they they're not Turks per se like
- 2:25Speaker 3: Turkey Turks. They're a different kind of Turks that were
- 2:28Speaker 3: ruling the country for a while. And you know, they're
- 2:31Speaker 3: Persian people are Persian, they're not Turk and that there
- 2:34Speaker 3: was a lot of friction between that monarchy and the
- 2:37Speaker 3: Persian people that this Kajar Turk monarchy was ruling over.
- 2:41Speaker 3: So there's a lot of friction there. And leading up
- 2:44Speaker 3: to that point, you had a lot of British and
- 2:45Speaker 3: Russian interests in what is now Iran. The Brits were
- 2:50Speaker 3: interested in the south and the Russians were interested in
- 2:52Speaker 3: the north. This will come into play later in World
- 2:55Speaker 3: War Two. Also, especially why some Kurds are pro regime
- 2:58Speaker 3: and some are anti regime and so are anti other Kurds.
- 3:01Speaker 3: That had a lot to do with how the Russians
- 3:02Speaker 3: and the British separated Iran and also separated what is
- 3:07Speaker 3: now Iraq and Turkey. As far as spheres of influence,
- 3:10Speaker 3: and if you remember the Pykes Picoa agreement. People have
- 3:12Speaker 3: heard of this May sixteenth, nineteen fifteen or nineteen sixteen.
- 3:16Speaker 3: The French, the British and the Russians agreed to split
- 3:19Speaker 3: up the Middle East into spheres of influence. That's how
- 3:21Speaker 3: we got the borders of Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Lebanon and
- 3:26Speaker 3: so on. This is obviously before the creation of Israel,
- 3:28Speaker 3: although it did set things in motion for what would
- 3:30Speaker 3: today become Israel in nineteen forty eight May nineteen forty eight,
- 3:34Speaker 3: so a lot of these kind of things, like these
- 3:35Speaker 3: little balls were getting put in motion and started to
- 3:37Speaker 3: move around around this time, like after nineteen hundred ish
- 3:40Speaker 3: to nineteen oh six, skipping a ton of history. Nineteen
- 3:43Speaker 3: oh six, the Iranian people said, we do not want
- 3:45Speaker 3: this monarchy anymore, being as oppressive as its being. This
- 3:48Speaker 3: is the Kadjar monarchy, and so they actually had something
- 3:51Speaker 3: called the Constitutional Revolution where they actually created eight what's
- 3:54Speaker 3: now called a Modulse, which is a council. It looks
- 3:56Speaker 3: a lot like a parliament that did not exist before.
- 4:00Speaker 3: They basically drew it up from scratch, and they said,
- 4:02Speaker 3: this is what we want for our parliament. We want
- 4:04Speaker 3: representation from all of our provinces. There were thirty two provinces.
- 4:06Speaker 3: We want all these people representing in parliament. The Kajar
- 4:10Speaker 3: monarchy became very weak because the Russian and British influence
- 4:14Speaker 3: was poorly managed, just like it wasn't a lot of
- 4:16Speaker 3: imperial situations throughout South Asia and West Asia at the time,
- 4:19Speaker 3: and so they basically got what they wanted. The Iranians
- 4:23Speaker 3: got an elected parliament for the first time in two
- 4:26Speaker 3: thousand years of history of monarchy, and the British and
- 4:29Speaker 3: the Russians did not like this. They said, well, if
- 4:33Speaker 3: that happens, we lose control over this country. And in
- 4:35Speaker 3: particular they meant the things under the ground, which was
- 4:37Speaker 3: oil because if you remember, Winston Churchill right before World
- 4:40Speaker 3: War One, converted the Navy into an oil only navy.
- 4:44Speaker 3: Before that it was a sale navy. It was a
- 4:46Speaker 3: coal navy, slow navy. And so the British interests were,
- 4:50Speaker 3: we need oil to power our ships because we know
- 4:53Speaker 3: that we're going to be in war. So what do
- 4:55Speaker 3: we do. We go find oil. There's no oil in
- 4:57Speaker 3: the UK obviously, and the refinery at Abadon, which is
- 5:01Speaker 3: where the refinery still is now where most of the
- 5:03Speaker 3: crude oil from Iran exits. That was a British run
- 5:05Speaker 3: petroleum situation. So fast forward a little bit World War one, happens.
- 5:12Speaker 3: There's you know, the Bolshevik Revolution. The Russians have their
- 5:15Speaker 3: own situation going on up in Russia. The Russians back
- 5:18Speaker 3: out of the sikes Peco agreement. They actually publicized the
- 5:21Speaker 3: secret sykes Pecoa agreement that divided up the Middle East,
- 5:24Speaker 3: and that's how we actually know about the sichs Pecoa
- 5:27Speaker 3: agreement between Britain and France and why the Kurds don't
- 5:30Speaker 3: have a state and all this stuff, and so the
- 5:32Speaker 3: Russians kind of let go of that for a while,
- 5:34Speaker 3: but then they realize, like, oh, man, actually there's a
- 5:35Speaker 3: lot of good resources there. Let's return there and actually
- 5:38Speaker 3: raise a shaw. The first Shaw of Iran in the
- 5:40Speaker 3: nineteen twenties early nineteen twenties was picked by the British
- 5:43Speaker 3: out of a Russian backed Cossick brigade. Essentially, it was
- 5:47Speaker 3: kind of this like irregular force that the Russians were
- 5:49Speaker 3: sponsoring and let him become the Shaw of the country.
- 5:53Speaker 3: They kicked the Kajars out and put the shaw in charge,
- 5:56Speaker 3: Shaw Palavi Raisa Palavi. Right, So then he gets a
- 5:59Speaker 3: little bit too close to Auto Turk, which was the
- 6:01Speaker 3: Turkish autocrat that emerged out of World War One, after
- 6:03Speaker 3: the Automan Empire dissolved. The sex Pico Agreement said there's
- 6:05Speaker 3: no more Automan Empire. There is now a Turkey, and
- 6:08Speaker 3: there's an Iran and Assyria and all so on. And
- 6:11Speaker 3: they didn't like the way that he was aligning with
- 6:13Speaker 3: Auto Turk. In fact, he was starting to wear the
- 6:15Speaker 3: same mustache, the same hair. He started banning certain clothing
- 6:19Speaker 3: that looks like too European. He liked the more fascist
- 6:22Speaker 3: type clothing because the's a lot of fascism going on
- 6:24Speaker 3: in the thirties in some parts of all Earth. Right, Yeah,
- 6:28Speaker 3: there's some different varieties of fascism going on. And it
- 6:31Speaker 3: turned out that Reza started getting a little too close
- 6:32Speaker 3: to that. World War II happens, and I'm focusing on
- 6:35Speaker 3: Iran here, So world War II happens, Russia and Britain
- 6:38Speaker 3: are still interested. They were allies in World War Two.
- 6:41Speaker 3: Middle East starts getting a little disrupted after World War
- 6:43Speaker 3: Two because a lot of the way France was ruling
- 6:46Speaker 3: things got disrupted because of Vichy France, which was the
- 6:48Speaker 3: Nazi backed part of France. So there's a lot of
- 6:50Speaker 3: disruption there also in Vietnam, different story, but in Iran.
- 6:54Speaker 3: Suddenly there are a lot of Kurds that were helping
- 6:57Speaker 3: the Russians and the Brits against the Nazis in parts
- 7:00Speaker 3: of the Middle East, because there was a whole part
- 7:03Speaker 3: of the Nazi situation in the Middle East that you know,
- 7:06Speaker 3: there were some Syrian groups, there were some Lebanese groups,
- 7:08Speaker 3: some Vichy French backed groups. You know, through the background
- 7:12Speaker 3: of the Nazi Party. There very fascinating part of history
- 7:15Speaker 3: that I think a lot of Westerners don't really understand
- 7:17Speaker 3: or think about, like what was going on in the
- 7:18Speaker 3: Middle East during World War two. And so what happened
- 7:21Speaker 3: was the Russians didn't let go of northern Iran. They said, no,
- 7:23Speaker 3: we're still interested in Iran. Even after the war ended,
- 7:26Speaker 3: they said we want this northern part for ourselves, because
- 7:29Speaker 3: the Soviet Union went all the way up to the
- 7:30Speaker 3: border there. And so you had some Kurds who said, well,
- 7:35Speaker 3: we want independence. Then in exchange for US supporting you, Russia,
- 7:39Speaker 3: and Russia said okay, and so you suddenly got the
- 7:41Speaker 3: Republic of Azerbaijan, not the country of Azerbaijan today, but
- 7:44Speaker 3: the province of Azerbaijan and Iran became independent for two
- 7:47Speaker 3: years backed by Russia, and so did Mahabad, which is
- 7:50Speaker 3: a Kurdish province in Iran near the Lake Ormea region,
- 7:53Speaker 3: which is where the Barzani family is from, which is
- 7:55Speaker 3: now why the Barzanis are not in Iran, they're in
- 7:57Speaker 3: Iraq because of that exact situation. They actually fled Iran
- 8:00Speaker 3: for their lives and survived, whereas the other Kurds who
- 8:03Speaker 3: backed that uprising all were slaughtered by the Shah's son
- 8:07Speaker 3: who came in after he was the father was actually ousted.
- 8:12Speaker 3: For a very brief period of time, there was a coup.
- 8:14Speaker 3: This was nineteen fifty three. So I put a lot
- 8:17Speaker 3: of spaghetti in that bowl. But all the little threads
- 8:20Speaker 3: kind of lead to that moment of why did we
- 8:22Speaker 3: have this coup in nineteen fifty three with the CIA
- 8:24Speaker 3: and the British backing this guy his son Polavi, And
- 8:29Speaker 3: that's kind of how we got there. And I can
- 8:31Speaker 3: talk about like what it was if you want, or
- 8:33Speaker 3: we can go down different pathways, whatever you think is best.
- 8:37Speaker 4: I mean, I think I would love to continue with
- 8:39Speaker 4: the history, but I think to take a quick pause,
- 8:43Speaker 4: if you could contextualize a little bit of how much
- 8:46Speaker 4: is the history of this period of Iranian history that
- 8:49Speaker 4: we're talking about.
- 8:50Speaker 2: Is it a history of foreign.
- 8:51Speaker 4: Meddling or is it a history of indigenous power struggle?
- 8:57Speaker 4: And or is it a confluence between the two, which
- 9:00Speaker 4: is what it sounds like happened. I mean, what system
- 9:03Speaker 4: do you think ended up being the defining feature of Iran?
- 9:07Speaker 3: So the problem in Iran is that the Iranian people
- 9:10Speaker 3: have not been able to rule themselves ever since Islam arrived, gotcha?
- 9:13Speaker 3: And this is kind of the narrative that you hear
- 9:15Speaker 3: a lot of. There's actually a book called Two Centuries
- 9:17Speaker 3: of Silence, which is by an author named Zarrein Koub
- 9:20Speaker 3: who wrote this book in Farsi. It's now in English
- 9:22Speaker 3: as well, I think, But it's basically about when Islam
- 9:25Speaker 3: arrived in Iran, the Iranians lost control of themselves because
- 9:30Speaker 3: there were these caliphates from Mecca and from what is
- 9:35Speaker 3: now Istanbul basically ruling over Iran in various ways, whether
- 9:38Speaker 3: that's religiously or politically, or a combination of the two,
- 9:41Speaker 3: in various iterations over those times. Since the ninth century,
- 9:44Speaker 3: when Iran lost its independence, which was a result of
- 9:47Speaker 3: the Byzantine Empire and the Persian empire fighting each other
- 9:49Speaker 3: so intensely in the Middle East that neither of them emerged,
- 9:51Speaker 3: and both the Byzantines and the Persians lost control, and
- 9:53Speaker 3: the Islam came in out of nowhere and basically took over,
- 9:57Speaker 3: which is exactly what happened. That's why Turkey is Turkey
- 9:59Speaker 3: and you know Rome anymore, and also why the the
- 10:04Speaker 3: the Iranians don't rule over any part of what used
- 10:06Speaker 3: to be Persia anymore. There is no more Persia per se.
- 10:10Speaker 4: And this must be a source of huge consternation for
- 10:13Speaker 4: the Iranian people, who they're very proud. They see themselves
- 10:18Speaker 4: as you know, I guess you could say the center
- 10:20Speaker 4: of civilization in some ways, they some of them see
- 10:24Speaker 4: themselves as a regional power, if not a world power.
- 10:27Speaker 4: If you go back into Iranian history, all the way
- 10:29Speaker 4: back to like Darius and all these other characters in
- 10:33Speaker 4: the in the historical past, and this must grind pretty
- 10:38Speaker 4: bad on the on the Persian people and you know, influence,
- 10:43Speaker 4: you know, their desire for self governance.
- 10:45Speaker 3: Well, the story of Islam and Iran is a story
- 10:48Speaker 3: of humiliation for a lot of Persians, because if you
- 10:51Speaker 3: look back, like you mentioned with Daryush, and Kurush, which
- 10:54Speaker 3: is Cyrus and English and Greek. They when you look
- 10:57Speaker 3: at that time period, the things that they invented, it's
- 10:59Speaker 3: kind of like when you look at the US in
- 11:00Speaker 3: the nineteenth century, like railways, electricity, telegraph Like that's how
- 11:05Speaker 3: they look at that time. Because the Kingdom of Lydia,
- 11:08Speaker 3: which was under Persian control at the time in the
- 11:10Speaker 3: fifth century, sixth century, they invented coined money. They also
- 11:13Speaker 3: invented the postal system, They invented passports. I mean, like
- 11:17Speaker 3: things that are so fundamental to modern society came from
- 11:20Speaker 3: that empire in like a very short period of time. Really,
- 11:22Speaker 3: it was about a century and a half to shoot
- 11:23Speaker 3: century's maximum, and suddenly, like this stuff was just coming
- 11:26Speaker 3: out of there. I mean, even during the Islamic Golden
- 11:28Speaker 3: Age the thirteenth century that we think about as like
- 11:31Speaker 3: Islam kind of being this enlightened period during the Dark
- 11:33Speaker 3: Ages in Europe, those were all Persian scholars who were
- 11:36Speaker 3: under Muslim control, you know, like the invention of algebra,
- 11:40Speaker 3: although the name Algebra is an Arabic name, that was
- 11:42Speaker 3: a Persian mathematician, you know, And like the list goes
- 11:46Speaker 3: on and on, like all these inventions, like the concept
- 11:48Speaker 3: of the zero sipher was invented by a Persian mathematician,
- 11:52Speaker 3: like all this stuff, so like they're thinking like also,
- 11:55Speaker 3: so they actually got chess through an Indian intermediaria named
- 11:59Speaker 3: Bozorgimir who came in the eighth century to Iran and
- 12:02Speaker 3: delivered it to the shot at the time, which is
- 12:04Speaker 3: actually in the book called Shahname, which is the book
- 12:07Speaker 3: of Kings by fer Dowsy, who's a famous Persian poet. Interesting,
- 12:10Speaker 3: very fascinating. But the word chess actually means SHA's kings
- 12:14Speaker 3: And when you say checkmate, it's shah mate, which means
- 12:17Speaker 3: king is dead.
- 12:18Speaker 1: Wow.
- 12:18Speaker 3: So like all this stuff is Persian.
- 12:21Speaker 1: Wow. Yo, John, I read just a little aside. I
- 12:24Speaker 1: feel like you're very good at jeopardy. Is that true.
- 12:28Speaker 3: Facts are important?
- 12:30Speaker 1: Yeah? All right, all right, so where do we leave off?
- 12:34Speaker 1: We left off you know the.
- 12:36Speaker 4: Fifty three, you know the the you know subsequent CIA
- 12:40Speaker 4: and MI six.
- 12:42Speaker 2: Interest in Iran.
- 12:44Speaker 3: Yeah, so it was called Operation Ajax. And what it was,
- 12:47Speaker 3: Remember I said the thing about nineteen oh six. It
- 12:49Speaker 3: was the first time in history that they had their
- 12:51Speaker 3: own elected government and so on, right, and that was
- 12:54Speaker 3: destroyed by the British for economic interests for the British. Well,
- 12:58Speaker 3: fast forward to nineteen fifty two, you have this guy
- 13:00Speaker 3: named Mohammad Mosadagg who was the first like really truly
- 13:04Speaker 3: widely elected prime minister in Iran that represented the people
- 13:08Speaker 3: in a way that was kind of disruptive for the
- 13:09Speaker 3: monarchy because a lot of the things that he supported
- 13:12Speaker 3: did not align with the monarchy, which meant remember this
- 13:14Speaker 3: monarchy was put there by the British essentially, and so
- 13:18Speaker 3: this guy who's very popular did not agree with the
- 13:21Speaker 3: things that this British installed monarch wanted. You have a
- 13:24Speaker 3: friction point. And right after World War Two, you know,
- 13:27Speaker 3: the world's recovering. You've got Breton woods in Europe, You've
- 13:29Speaker 3: got a lot of reconstruction going on. There's a huge
- 13:31Speaker 3: demand for oil and other industrial growth capacity in developing
- 13:34Speaker 3: countries that are now recently decolonized, including the places through
- 13:37Speaker 3: the Psychs Pico Agreement like Iraq, like Basara, which was
- 13:40Speaker 3: a very important Iraqi port that was run by the
- 13:43Speaker 3: British and Abadon another oil facility. Well, Mohammed Mosadegg nationalized
- 13:48Speaker 3: Iran's oil kind of like happened in Venezuela and you
- 13:52Speaker 3: kind of notice this theme of when leaders nationalize their oil, Britain,
- 13:57Speaker 3: the US, or Russia or a combination of the three
- 13:59Speaker 3: will enter that country and stop it from happening. Venezuela
- 14:02Speaker 3: as an example, Libya as another example. This is even
- 14:06Speaker 3: if they start talking about it, you just see this
- 14:08Speaker 3: giant influx of Western interest into the country, like you
- 14:10Speaker 3: will stop that now, or we'll stop you. So it's
- 14:14Speaker 3: very fascinating. Actually, Egypt, the whole reason we had the
- 14:16Speaker 3: Suez Crisis in Egypt in nineteen fifty six was again
- 14:18Speaker 3: because they wanted to nationalize the oil, and so France
- 14:21Speaker 3: and Britain basically told Israel to invade Egypt and stop
- 14:26Speaker 3: Egypt from nationalizing its oil. And it wasn't you know
- 14:28Speaker 3: until later on that the world realized that wasn't Israel,
- 14:30Speaker 3: that was actually Britain in France doing that through Israel.
- 14:33Speaker 3: In the States kind of opted out of that right
- 14:35Speaker 3: and it damaged relations, yes, exactly, and then we had
- 14:38Speaker 3: the Liberty Incident very you know, around the same exact time,
- 14:41Speaker 3: June eighth, and you know, one hundred over one hundred
- 14:44Speaker 3: American sailors were killed by Israeli air force strikes on
- 14:46Speaker 3: the on the ship, even though they knew it was
- 14:48Speaker 3: an American ship, but they didn't want a second ship
- 14:50Speaker 3: collecting on what they were doing, so they killed all
- 14:52Speaker 3: the Americans on board, which I think Americans like, don't
- 14:55Speaker 3: realize that was a deliberate strike on an American vessel
- 14:57Speaker 3: by Israeli Air Force pilots. But zooming back out again
- 15:01Speaker 3: to Mosadegg, he nationalizes the oil. The British are like,
- 15:05Speaker 3: no way, because they had the British Iranian Petroleum Company
- 15:08Speaker 3: and they they said, remember this is like when you
- 15:11Speaker 3: had shell oil like Royal Dutch Shell and all that.
- 15:15Speaker 3: There was the British VP, British Petroleum ran abadon that
- 15:19Speaker 3: the crude oil output platform in carg Island, all the
- 15:21Speaker 3: stuff we're talking about today, that was all British, you know,
- 15:24Speaker 3: colonized oil infrastructure. It was like slave like conditions there
- 15:27Speaker 3: and mosa Egg basically wanted to rest the control of
- 15:29Speaker 3: that because they were only getting like less than ten
- 15:31Speaker 3: percent of the oil revenues. The rest was going to
- 15:33Speaker 3: the British exchequer and so they wanted more. They didn't
- 15:37Speaker 3: want one hundred percent. Actually, they want to just negotiate. Yeah,
- 15:40Speaker 3: they want to negotiate. Yeah, because Saudi Arabia actually successfully
- 15:43Speaker 3: had done so at around the same time, and they're like, hey,
- 15:45Speaker 3: we want to be like Saudi Arabian and gaging control
- 15:47Speaker 3: of our sovereign assets under the soil and the British.
- 15:49Speaker 1: Shop you're not shocking theory, right, want to take control
- 15:53Speaker 1: of your sovereign assets.
- 15:54Speaker 4: Yeah.
- 15:54Speaker 3: It's like China come to the US and being like,
- 15:56Speaker 3: we're going to take over your oil in the US
- 15:57Speaker 3: is like okay, take it, you know. Yeah, so it's crazy.
- 16:02Speaker 3: And then the British basically said, well, we can't do
- 16:03Speaker 3: it on our own, we need help. Who else can
- 16:06Speaker 3: help us? Well, Kermit Roosevelt, the grandson of President Roosevelt,
- 16:09Speaker 3: raised his hand, you know, Oss guy now CIA guy
- 16:13Speaker 3: basically went in there and they came up with a
- 16:16Speaker 3: plan to put another guy named Zahidi, who was a
- 16:19Speaker 3: military officer in charge of the country temporarily in a
- 16:22Speaker 3: coup like situation. They surrounded Mosaegg's house. They like basically
- 16:26Speaker 3: threatened to blow his house up and kill the guy.
- 16:28Speaker 3: They captured him. It went south. It didn't go the
- 16:30Speaker 3: way they thought it would go. I mean imagine that
- 16:32Speaker 3: this kind of operation if you saw it was very
- 16:35Speaker 3: complicated and went badly. We have a history of doing
- 16:39Speaker 3: so in your own like you look at Operation Eagle
- 16:40Speaker 3: Claw nineteen eighty look at that, and you know, even now,
- 16:45Speaker 3: things sometimes get out of control there because we don't
- 16:47Speaker 3: really understand the situation anyways. So mosaed Egg is removed,
- 16:51Speaker 3: he's kind of like put into disgrace, and they bring
- 16:53Speaker 3: in rais A Paulavi's son, Mohammed Paulavi, and he he
- 17:00Speaker 3: becomes the Shah. So they basically destroyed the elected officials
- 17:04Speaker 3: and the government got rid of all of them and
- 17:05Speaker 3: put in autocrats that the US and Britain selected to
- 17:09Speaker 3: rule the country, and they ruled the country until nineteen
- 17:11Speaker 3: seventy nine. So there was a lot of discontent at
- 17:14Speaker 3: the time. And even if you talk to some Iranians today,
- 17:16Speaker 3: some of them that are monarchists don't support Mosaedgg. Now
- 17:19Speaker 3: they look back and they're like, oh, Mosaegg was terrible,
- 17:22Speaker 3: he was a tool of the Russians. He's a communist
- 17:25Speaker 3: who's a Marxist. You hear all this like negative stuff
- 17:27Speaker 3: because the people who are monarchists really are anti anything
- 17:31Speaker 3: else than the monarchy. So there's a lot of friction
- 17:33Speaker 3: there on the outside of Iran when you're thinking about, like,
- 17:36Speaker 3: why aren't these groups working together to overthrow the current
- 17:38Speaker 3: regime if it's so bad and they all hate it,
- 17:40Speaker 3: It's because they they don't all agree with each other
- 17:43Speaker 3: on what should happen in the country and like what's
- 17:45Speaker 3: the right government? Which makes sense. I mean, that's what
- 17:47Speaker 3: democracy actually is, is people all disagreeing about stuff, but
- 17:50Speaker 3: somehow they all vote and you know, get through it,
- 17:52Speaker 3: sometimes better or worse. But yeah, so that's what happened
- 17:58Speaker 3: in nineteen fifty three and kind of like a broad brushstroke.
- 18:02Speaker 1: Hello everyone, if you're hearing this you are not a
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- 18:42Speaker 1: then you saw I mean during that time, obviously people
- 18:45Speaker 1: were getting fed up with the Shaw and uh, you
- 18:48Speaker 1: know that's when the first uh, I don't know how
- 18:50Speaker 1: you come any came off any. Yeah, and uh he
- 18:55Speaker 1: was exiled.
- 18:56Speaker 3: He was exiled to Najeff. He was in Nadjoff, he
- 18:58Speaker 3: was making all these little tapes and stud them around
- 19:00Speaker 3: with basically his message against the regime or that regime
- 19:03Speaker 3: the kingdom. And then from Iraq he went to France
- 19:06Speaker 3: because at the time, France was very socialist. I mean,
- 19:09Speaker 3: I don't know what they are now, but at the
- 19:10Speaker 3: time they were very socialist, and there was a lot
- 19:12Speaker 3: of this, you know, the war in Algeria had just ended.
- 19:15Speaker 3: They got out of Vietnam, so there's a lot of
- 19:17Speaker 3: this like anti colonialism going on, anti monarchy going on
- 19:20Speaker 3: in France with the population. So they're very supportive of
- 19:23Speaker 3: bringing Hamani into France and giving him basically state protection
- 19:27Speaker 3: and giving him a platform to send his message instead
- 19:30Speaker 3: of through tapes with couriers. Now he was able to
- 19:33Speaker 3: be in the newspaper and on recordings and like really
- 19:35Speaker 3: made into this legitimate figure of opposition. He made a
- 19:39Speaker 3: ton of promises. He said like, oh, women will be
- 19:41Speaker 3: free under my control, and I'll only rule for a
- 19:43Speaker 3: short time and then there'll be an election. You know,
- 19:46Speaker 3: women will have not any requirements about what they wear.
- 19:49Speaker 3: Islam will be an option like all this stuff, which
- 19:51Speaker 3: actually is still in their constitution now, like women actually
- 19:54Speaker 3: have full rights in their constitution. But as you can see,
- 19:56Speaker 3: that is not actually what's going on. So people believed
- 19:59Speaker 3: him to the degree necessary. And actually there were a
- 20:02Speaker 3: lot of people from the Mossadeg camp, like the elected
- 20:05Speaker 3: officials who were kind of now just afloat and not
- 20:07Speaker 3: really part of the government anymore. They came to see
- 20:10Speaker 3: him and visit him, and he was saying like, hey,
- 20:12Speaker 3: I'll let you guys actually come on board. If we
- 20:13Speaker 3: have a revolution, there's a place for you, right, And
- 20:16Speaker 3: that's actually how it worked out. In the very beginning.
- 20:18Speaker 3: Sod Bani Sader, who was from the old government, was
- 20:22Speaker 3: actually able to be president of the country for a
- 20:24Speaker 3: short period of time until there were massive assassination attempts
- 20:27Speaker 3: across everybody in the government. But it wasn't just Ramani
- 20:33Speaker 3: who was resisting the Shah. You also had the Mujahadini Kalk,
- 20:36Speaker 3: which was a Marxist organization. You had the fedi Jini Kalk,
- 20:39Speaker 3: which is an even more Marxist organization. You had some
- 20:42Speaker 3: people following Ali Shariati, who is a very smart intellectual
- 20:46Speaker 3: that was also quasi Marxist, talking about how the Shah
- 20:50Speaker 3: should be removed and there should be this kind of
- 20:51Speaker 3: egalitarian Islam in the country. You had Kurdish groups as well.
- 20:56Speaker 3: There were you know, Komala which means hope. Kamala was
- 21:00Speaker 3: one of these parties, congred Jel which was in Turkey,
- 21:03Speaker 3: and some other groups as well that now have formed
- 21:06Speaker 3: two groups we recognize today, like p Jack and those groups.
- 21:10Speaker 3: Those came from that pre revolutionary period to resist the monarchy.
- 21:14Speaker 3: And as I said and shows previously, you know, it's
- 21:16Speaker 3: not that they don't like this government. They don't like
- 21:19Speaker 3: any of the governments that have been there. They want
- 21:21Speaker 3: their own ruling situation, you know. And if you've been
- 21:24Speaker 3: to Syria, you know that there's some Kurds in Syria
- 21:26Speaker 3: who want no government at all. They want this like
- 21:29Speaker 3: anarchic egalitarian system that and they've been able to actually
- 21:33Speaker 3: live it to a degree for some years. But it's
- 21:36Speaker 3: kind of a challenge for it to belong to the
- 21:37Speaker 3: rest of the region. Yeah, so you've got all these
- 21:40Speaker 3: groups there kind of with a unified goal, and that
- 21:43Speaker 3: goal is getting rid of the current government. But that ends.
- 21:47Speaker 3: The unification ends there because once the government's gone, they
- 21:50Speaker 3: are no longer friends. And when the revolution happened, you
- 21:53Speaker 3: saw that right away with the Muja Dicalc, which is
- 21:56Speaker 3: still currently the largest opposition to the current government that exists.
- 22:00Speaker 3: Their headquarters is in Tarana and Albania now, but during
- 22:04Speaker 3: the revolution they were immediately ostracized because the Ayatola recognized
- 22:09Speaker 3: that these guys are powerful, they have guns, and they
- 22:11Speaker 3: don't like us. They didn't like the Shah either, but
- 22:14Speaker 3: they don't like us, so we're gonna get rid of
- 22:15Speaker 3: them as much as we can. They executed like three
- 22:17Speaker 3: thousand of them across a couple of days through hanging,
- 22:20Speaker 3: so there's like mass lynching going on, and so a
- 22:23Speaker 3: lot of them went to Iraq where Saddam Hussein protected
- 22:25Speaker 3: them because remember the Iran Iraq War started as soon
- 22:27Speaker 3: as the revolution happened. Revolution happened, so these guys went
- 22:30Speaker 3: over there and Saddam protected them because they knew Iran,
- 22:33Speaker 3: they could infiltrate Iran and they could help Saddam basically
- 22:35Speaker 3: doing quasi advance force operations inside of.
- 22:38Speaker 2: Iran with the origins of Emik.
- 22:41Speaker 3: This is the mek Mujadini Khalk, which means the People's
- 22:44Speaker 3: Mujahadeen or the People's Fighters. Essentially. There's another group called Tudae,
- 22:48Speaker 3: which means the workers. Tuda was an actual communist party,
- 22:52Speaker 3: like a legit communist party that was like directly connected
- 22:54Speaker 3: to Russia that was immediately outlawed. They were all executed.
- 22:58Speaker 3: But the Mujadein actually knew how to fight, and so
- 23:00Speaker 3: they were a much more difficult problem for the new
- 23:02Speaker 3: government after the revolution. Well, Saddam, you know, and the
- 23:06Speaker 3: government of Iran came to an agreement that in nineteen
- 23:08Speaker 3: eighty eighth of the war is over, Saddam basically kicked
- 23:10Speaker 3: the Mujadini Kalk out of Iraq. There was nowhere for
- 23:13Speaker 3: them to go. But the US saw them as a partner,
- 23:15Speaker 3: because remember the US was backing Iran and Iraq at
- 23:18Speaker 3: the same time in that war, and so the US said,
- 23:20Speaker 3: these are useful people, let's let's do something about this.
- 23:22Speaker 3: They actually ended up in Albania and they are there
- 23:25Speaker 3: now at a place called Camp asharof number three. And
- 23:28Speaker 3: Asharaf is actually the name of a woman that was
- 23:30Speaker 3: married to the original founder of the Mujini i Kalk
- 23:33Speaker 3: and he was in love with her and all this,
- 23:35Speaker 3: but he actually married somebody else, and she's the one Rajawi,
- 23:37Speaker 3: Miriam Rajawi is now leading the Muchadin. It's a very crazy,
- 23:40Speaker 3: interesting cult like situation. But I'll just leave pin in that. Yeah,
- 23:44Speaker 3: but they're in Albania basically leading the resistance from one
- 23:48Speaker 3: angle against the regime. Now monarchists hate them like they
- 23:52Speaker 3: are arch enemies of the monarchists because they also were
- 23:54Speaker 3: fighting the SHA, so it's not like they joined the
- 23:57Speaker 3: revolution and everything's different. Like they still hate the Sha
- 24:00Speaker 3: and they hate the current government in Iran. So you
- 24:03Speaker 3: have this like armed trained organization that hates both resistance
- 24:07Speaker 3: and the current government that's allowed to operate. And you
- 24:10Speaker 3: know now today their best friend and trainer is Israel,
- 24:14Speaker 3: because Israel saw this as an opportunity to balance against
- 24:17Speaker 3: Iran in the regions. Starting in the nineteen nineties the
- 24:19Speaker 3: early nineties, especially after the Oslo Accords made Jordan part
- 24:21Speaker 3: of the alliance, you know, supporting Israel. So when that happened,
- 24:27Speaker 3: Israel started supporting surrogate forces that were Mujadini kalk And
- 24:32Speaker 3: forces in Azerbaijan because the Aziris have ethnic Aziris in
- 24:36Speaker 3: Iran as well. Remember I mentioned there's that separatist group
- 24:38Speaker 3: that had an independent Azerbaijan for two years inside of Iran.
- 24:42Speaker 3: Well there's the country of Azerbaijan across the border. They're
- 24:44Speaker 3: the same ethnic group. So Israel recognized, like, hey, we
- 24:47Speaker 3: can actually have a pretty poorest border situation if we
- 24:50Speaker 3: work with the Aziris in Azerbaijan and send them into
- 24:52Speaker 3: Iran to do things for us. If you remember Ferukzade
- 24:56Speaker 3: the nuclear scientist that was assassinated with a machine like
- 24:59Speaker 3: a robot, situation, that was Mujinini khalk and AZII entities
- 25:05Speaker 3: working together to do that. There wasn't like an Israeli
- 25:08Speaker 3: operative on the ground with a button that was recruited
- 25:10Speaker 3: assets that worked from these ethnic groups and these resistance
- 25:13Speaker 3: groups to do this. And Israel has used this to
- 25:15Speaker 3: great effect. I mean, a lot of the penetration of
- 25:17Speaker 3: the Iranian government is through these Aziri and mujahideen people
- 25:22Speaker 3: that are in Iran. They live in Iran, whether that's
- 25:24Speaker 3: from the western side of the country crossing over from
- 25:27Speaker 3: Kurdistan or from Azerbaijan coming south.
- 25:32Speaker 1: Yeah. Now, I'm glad you talked about the MKA a
- 25:35Speaker 1: little bit because they do seem like a little bit
- 25:36Speaker 1: of a paramilitary force for Israel.
- 25:39Speaker 4: That are one that's been active in Iran in the past.
- 25:41Speaker 4: I'm not sure where they are today.
- 25:43Speaker 3: Jundla, Yeah, so Jundalas and Balochistan in southeast they have
- 25:48Speaker 3: had their own separatist situation against the regime and actually
- 25:52Speaker 3: cost some Solamani, the former Kutz Force commander, when he
- 25:55Speaker 3: was a field great officer, when he was like a major,
- 25:57Speaker 3: his first combat experience was in Baluchistan fighting Jundala and
- 26:02Speaker 3: that's where he actually led units for the very first
- 26:05Speaker 3: time in combat. So he actually ran them out of
- 26:07Speaker 3: southeast Iran into Pakistan and Afghanistan because there's a triborder
- 26:12Speaker 3: area there that's known as Baluchistan in all three of
- 26:14Speaker 3: the countries. The Jindala people wanted to basically have a
- 26:19Speaker 3: separate Baluchistan country that would consist of parts of Iran,
- 26:23Speaker 3: parts of Afghanistan, and parts of Pakistan. They were in
- 26:27Speaker 3: some ways supported by Pakistan against Iran. But as has
- 26:30Speaker 3: happened with Pakistan numerous times, Pakistan has supported, you know,
- 26:35Speaker 3: insurgents in another country that end up coming into Pakistan
- 26:38Speaker 3: and causing problems in Pakistan because they're somehow don't have
- 26:42Speaker 3: the foresight to think about that. But Jundala has actually
- 26:45Speaker 3: changed its name into a couple of different groups now
- 26:47Speaker 3: and so Pakistan that way they can say that they've
- 26:49Speaker 3: defeated Jundala. It is not defeated. It continues till today.
- 26:52Speaker 3: And it's actually a huge problem because there's a Chinese
- 26:55Speaker 3: owned mine in western Pakistan that's inside of Balochistan that's
- 26:59Speaker 3: been like significantly under attack by is what used to
- 27:02Speaker 3: be Jundala but now different forces. And this is part
- 27:05Speaker 3: of China's Belt and Roade initiative in Pakistan. So you've
- 27:09Speaker 3: got this mine in Buluchistan, and you have a port
- 27:11Speaker 3: called Guadar which is also in the Pakistani coast, which
- 27:15Speaker 3: is completely owned by China, and it's owned by China,
- 27:18Speaker 3: run by China. It's basically China's access to that waterway
- 27:21Speaker 3: over land if they want to. And that all occurred
- 27:25Speaker 3: while the US was deployed in Afghanistan. You know, fighting
- 27:27Speaker 3: the Taliban. Meanwhile, China was in Islamabad negotiating with the
- 27:30Speaker 3: Pakistani's basically to set this thing up and also gain
- 27:33Speaker 3: access to all the tritium, which is a special rare
- 27:35Speaker 3: earth mineral that we need. They paid something like six
- 27:38Speaker 3: billion dollars for all tritium in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and
- 27:41Speaker 3: it's worth several trillion dollars in total value. So that
- 27:45Speaker 3: was a pretty good bargain for them. And actually yeah,
- 27:48Speaker 3: and actually the government of Afghanistan was great with that
- 27:51Speaker 3: because they signed the document and then when the Taliban came,
- 27:53Speaker 3: the Taliban took that document from the government of Afghanistan also
- 27:56Speaker 3: honored it. So China and the Taliban also, you know,
- 28:00Speaker 3: or an agreement about the tritium. And of course they
- 28:02Speaker 3: are with Pakistan too, So that kind of goes to
- 28:05Speaker 3: the Jundla issue because Junda is looking at that, they're like, hey,
- 28:07Speaker 3: we have sovereign, you know, ethnic ownership of this area.
- 28:10Speaker 3: You've got China, Pakistan, Iran like threatening our ethnic homeland
- 28:14Speaker 3: that we have been in for thousands of years. You know,
- 28:16Speaker 3: a lot of them are either nomadic or semi nomadic
- 28:19Speaker 3: in the past, they're a little bit more settled now,
- 28:22Speaker 3: but they're responsible for a lot of the drugs going
- 28:24Speaker 3: into and out of Iran because they're getting a lot
- 28:26Speaker 3: of opium from Afghanistan. There's no border. I mean, if
- 28:28Speaker 3: you've been to that area, there's literally no You have
- 28:30Speaker 3: no idea which country you're standing in at that moment.
- 28:32Speaker 3: And that's happened to me several times. It's just like
- 28:35Speaker 3: open desert and rock and mountain and you're like, oh,
- 28:37Speaker 3: did we land in Pakistan or is this Iran or Afghanistan?
- 28:41Speaker 3: And they're able, they have like complete control over it.
- 28:43Speaker 3: They move drugs all, like huge amounts of drugs. And
- 28:45Speaker 3: the other problem for Iran's government is that a lot
- 28:47Speaker 3: of the IERGC border control guys are like in bed
- 28:51Speaker 3: with these guys as far as drug movement because they're
- 28:54Speaker 3: making a lot of money off of it. So there's
- 28:56Speaker 3: a lot of like interest from Tehran over that southeast
- 28:59Speaker 3: border with power Pakistan and Afghanistan, like monitoring, counterintelligence, monitoring
- 29:03Speaker 3: of the IRGC officers that are down there, because they're
- 29:06Speaker 3: so concerned about the drugs moving into Iran, which is
- 29:08Speaker 3: a big problem in Iran.
- 29:10Speaker 2: So I mean, when I listen to you talk about
- 29:12Speaker 2: this subject.
- 29:13Speaker 4: What it sounds like is that there are all of
- 29:15Speaker 4: these different factions in Iran who dislike each other and
- 29:18Speaker 4: have their own grievances and have their own ideas about
- 29:21Speaker 4: how the country should be run. Are we in a
- 29:24Speaker 4: situation where these factions have kind of been tampered down
- 29:28Speaker 4: by oppressive authoritarian regimes for you know, fifty plus years,
- 29:32Speaker 4: and if we Americans were to go in and remove
- 29:34Speaker 4: that regime, it would plunge Iran into civil war, just
- 29:39Speaker 4: like the Syrians went through a civil war.
- 29:41Speaker 3: I like to use the example of Yugoslavia actually because
- 29:44Speaker 3: I feel like there's a lot of similarity there where
- 29:46Speaker 3: under a particular structure, very specific type of government, the
- 29:50Speaker 3: people were able to be managed to a degree. You
- 29:53Speaker 3: remove that person, Tito, and then you've got Bosnia, You've
- 29:57Speaker 3: got Kosovo, you've got the Albanian conflict, which wasn't part
- 29:59Speaker 3: of Yugos lobby, but still was on the cusp of it,
- 30:01Speaker 3: you know, Croatia. And before that, though, the reason Tito
- 30:06Speaker 3: was able to actually make a country was because of
- 30:11Speaker 3: British OSS SOOE support. So the US OSS and the
- 30:15Speaker 3: British SOE sent in very small teams to set up
- 30:18Speaker 3: drop zones inside of the Balkans, and it was a
- 30:21Speaker 3: pretty incredible operation that if you're a student of special operations,
- 30:25Speaker 3: I think like you need to master that that case study,
- 30:29Speaker 3: because it was probably one of the best ones we've
- 30:30Speaker 3: had in the past eighty years. That was very successful
- 30:33Speaker 3: of very minimal Western contact, like you know, US and
- 30:37Speaker 3: British contact with the Partner Force. The Partner Force like
- 30:40Speaker 3: owned that conflict and they they executed it really well.
- 30:44Speaker 3: They actually killed more Germans than the conventional forces did
- 30:47Speaker 3: in that area, and they were like a huge problem
- 30:50Speaker 3: for the Germans in the conflict, and Tito was able
- 30:53Speaker 3: to actually, as partisan leader, bring all those different ethnic
- 30:56Speaker 3: groups together. So the question is can that happen today?
- 30:59Speaker 3: Is there is there Tito like figure in Iran today?
- 31:01Speaker 3: And the answer is no, there isn't.
- 31:03Speaker 4: John, I'm gonna let you go, but I'm gonna let
- 31:06Speaker 4: you carry on. I just want to mention to people
- 31:08Speaker 4: out there, there's someone we interviewed on the show a
- 31:10Speaker 4: while back, Jassic Walala Luski publish.
- 31:15Speaker 3: Last name there.
- 31:16Speaker 4: He uncovered a lot of unpublished information from the OSS
- 31:21Speaker 4: years in a like museums and archives, and he wrote
- 31:25Speaker 4: this book he's written a series, but the one I
- 31:28Speaker 4: read his code named Spike, and it is all about
- 31:31Speaker 4: exactly this OSS operation into Albania back in the day.
- 31:39Speaker 3: Yeah, it's a it's a fascinating case study, and especially
- 31:41Speaker 3: because we didn't really have a special operations unit before that,
- 31:45Speaker 3: you know, I mean special ops really came out of
- 31:48Speaker 3: World War Two the way it is structured today, and
- 31:50Speaker 3: that was during World War Two, we were basically building
- 31:52Speaker 3: the aircraft in flight in that theater and succeeded where
- 31:57Speaker 3: we didn't succeed a lot in a lot of other places.
- 31:59Speaker 3: You know, we was kind of tough. So the question
- 32:02Speaker 3: I even was speaking to in Iranian this morning, and
- 32:04Speaker 3: he was asking, like what could we do in Iran
- 32:07Speaker 3: to actually fix this problem? Like he was asking me that,
- 32:09Speaker 3: and I said, you need guns. And he was concerned
- 32:13Speaker 3: because like, okay, he said, what happens if we get guns,
- 32:15Speaker 3: we take over the government. What happens the day after?
- 32:18Speaker 3: That's a really important question because maybe the Kurds have
- 32:21Speaker 3: the guns, the Baluchis have the guns, the Aziris have
- 32:23Speaker 3: the guns, which we've all just discussed. But those guys
- 32:25Speaker 3: do not agree on everything. They have some shared interests,
- 32:30Speaker 3: but they also have their own interests in mind, and
- 32:32Speaker 3: they've never really wanted to be ruled by anyone else
- 32:35Speaker 3: except themselves.
- 32:36Speaker 1: Are they all Muslim, some.
- 32:38Speaker 3: Are z are Astrian, some are Shia, some are Sunni,
- 32:42Speaker 3: some are Turkic speaking, some are Persians speaking primarily, some
- 32:44Speaker 3: are Bachtiari, some are Lure. There are some ethnic groups
- 32:48Speaker 3: there that have existed far even before Persia was Persia,
- 32:50Speaker 3: before there were Persians there, like an Ilam province there
- 32:54Speaker 3: are you know, like the Elamites in the Bible, that's
- 32:56Speaker 3: Ilam province Iran, you know, like the code of Hamarabi
- 33:00Speaker 3: was discovered in Shusha, which was the capital of Iran
- 33:03Speaker 3: at the time. You know, like you're talking about like
- 33:04Speaker 3: very old ethnic groups. Like it's true that culture is
- 33:07Speaker 3: not genetic, but it is passed down, you know, from
- 33:09Speaker 3: person to person, generation to generation, and the people that
- 33:12Speaker 3: have the culture look back to those things, whether that's
- 33:14Speaker 3: right or wrong. That is who they are now, that's
- 33:16Speaker 3: their identity. And especially up in the mountains like where
- 33:19Speaker 3: that pilot went down. Part of the reason that pilot
- 33:22Speaker 3: was rescued was because the population there was so against
- 33:24Speaker 3: the government that they they created ways to slow down
- 33:27Speaker 3: the process of the government.
- 33:28Speaker 2: Getting around traffic jams and things.
- 33:30Speaker 3: Yeah, exactly. And these people are like fiercely independent, So
- 33:34Speaker 3: I mean, if you give them guns, they're probably going
- 33:36Speaker 3: to just defend the place that they are at, right
- 33:39Speaker 3: because especially, I mean the two times they had a
- 33:41Speaker 3: democratic system it was destroyed. They're probably like, well, if
- 33:44Speaker 3: we do it a third time, probably get destroyed again.
- 33:47Speaker 3: What we should do instead is consolidate power in our
- 33:49Speaker 3: local area and rule ourselves, which then again leads to
- 33:52Speaker 3: that Balkanization problem, like after Tito, that is what happened
- 33:56Speaker 3: where you had ethnic groups basically roving around and eliminating
- 34:00Speaker 3: anyone else that wasn't their ethnic group and like controlling
- 34:02Speaker 3: the territory that they're in.
- 34:03Speaker 1: Mamea. All right, let's get back to the revolution. I
- 34:07Speaker 1: guess like the Islamists were the people that like came
- 34:11Speaker 1: out on top of everything essentially, right, because it's like
- 34:14Speaker 1: you said, most of these groups probably won't march on Tehran.
- 34:18Speaker 1: They'll just take control of their spheres like where they're from,
- 34:22Speaker 1: their local areas, and run it how they want to
- 34:25Speaker 1: run it.
- 34:27Speaker 2: And could we talk a little bit about.
- 34:29Speaker 4: Sort of like the emergence of the fanaticism, Shia fanaticism
- 34:33Speaker 4: that culminated in the nineteen seventy nine revolution, and you
- 34:37Speaker 4: hear these stories about, you know, the Iranian students getting
- 34:39Speaker 4: all glassy eyed talking about the shit about Gomani.
- 34:46Speaker 2: What was that movement and why did it happen?
- 34:49Speaker 3: So you remember I was talking about how this, like
- 34:51Speaker 3: the fascism issue in Europe, was influencing the leaders the Shah.
- 34:54Speaker 3: So the SHA's son was also doing this westernization push,
- 34:57Speaker 3: like dramatic push where he was basically subverting the clear
- 35:00Speaker 3: telling women that you're not only is it optional to
- 35:03Speaker 3: wear the hitjab, you're not allowed to wear it. So
- 35:06Speaker 3: there were some people that were already religious and now
- 35:08Speaker 3: they're being forced to walk out in public essentially naked,
- 35:11Speaker 3: right as far as they're concerned, and because the king
- 35:13Speaker 3: says so, which caused a lot of discontent within the population.
- 35:17Speaker 3: So he was over the you know, twenty years or
- 35:19Speaker 3: so since the time he came in office in nineteen
- 35:21Speaker 3: fifty three, he was really pushing this clerical class away
- 35:26Speaker 3: from the country, like away from him in a way
- 35:28Speaker 3: that made them upset. And they're thinking about like how
- 35:30Speaker 3: do we get people to resist this. Well, we can
- 35:33Speaker 3: tell them how terrible the shaw is, and the shaw
- 35:35Speaker 3: is going to, you know, make women be exposed to
- 35:38Speaker 3: the public and like take away your beliefs and destroy
- 35:40Speaker 3: Islam and et cetera. Because they were bringing in Western clothing,
- 35:43Speaker 3: they were banning the traditional clothing that people used to wear.
- 35:47Speaker 3: So there's a lot of this like disruptive stuff that
- 35:48Speaker 3: was very visible in society that a lot of different
- 35:51Speaker 3: people didn't like. So there were some religious people, it
- 35:53Speaker 3: was some secular people, but a lot of them just
- 35:55Speaker 3: didn't like how the Shaw was disrupting society. And people
- 35:57Speaker 3: were very poor. There was a lot of labor is
- 36:00Speaker 3: shoes going on. And then amidst all of that, the
- 36:03Speaker 3: Shah has this two thousand year anniversary of or twenty
- 36:05Speaker 3: five hundred year anniversary of the founding of the empire
- 36:08Speaker 3: and brings in all these foreign diplomats, spends millions of
- 36:11Speaker 3: dollars on Champagne and caviare no Iranians except the government
- 36:14Speaker 3: people are allowed to come to it. It's widely televised.
- 36:16Speaker 3: They all see this. They're all very upset. In order
- 36:20Speaker 3: to counter this, there's a lot of protests against this,
- 36:21Speaker 3: and in order to counter this, he has this thing
- 36:23Speaker 3: called the White Revolution, which came right after it, where
- 36:26Speaker 3: he basically tried to go out into the villages and
- 36:28Speaker 3: towns and like turn people back toward the government.
- 36:31Speaker 2: Is this kind of backfire got set on fire.
- 36:34Speaker 3: That was later, that was during the revolution, and nobody
- 36:38Speaker 3: is for sure who did that. It was very most
- 36:40Speaker 3: likely the Muccinini Kalk, but we don't know who did
- 36:43Speaker 3: that and probably never will because there are a lot
- 36:46Speaker 3: of attacks at that time that just were not attributed
- 36:48Speaker 3: and we will just never know, you know, who did it.
- 36:51Speaker 3: And actually the most recent Iatola that was just killed
- 36:55Speaker 3: in February, he had damage to his arm from one
- 36:59Speaker 3: of those attacks. He was almost assassinated in the early
- 37:02Speaker 3: eighties by we don't know who. We think it's a
- 37:04Speaker 3: moucha Adma, We don't know. But yeah, there was a
- 37:07Speaker 3: lot of the stuff going on. It's kind of like
- 37:08Speaker 3: fomenting unrest. And the loudest voice at the time was
- 37:12Speaker 3: Romani and he was able to unify a lot of
- 37:14Speaker 3: people that might not have been as religious at first,
- 37:17Speaker 3: but they started to get more whipped up into it
- 37:18Speaker 3: because they saw what was going on in the streets,
- 37:21Speaker 3: this inequality and that this unfairness to them, and they
- 37:24Speaker 3: were saying, like, maybe we should follow this idea. And
- 37:27Speaker 3: you know, Shia Islam is a lot about martyrdom and
- 37:31Speaker 3: kind of like the little guy against the big guy.
- 37:33Speaker 3: I mean, that's where the idea of Shia Islam separated
- 37:35Speaker 3: from Sunni Islam, because the Sunnies basically killed the two
- 37:38Speaker 3: most important figures in Shia Islam, which eventually became the
- 37:41Speaker 3: two most important figures. And there was this kind of like,
- 37:43Speaker 3: you know, one hundred of us against ten thousand of them,
- 37:46Speaker 3: will just all die to the last man. That's part
- 37:48Speaker 3: of Shia Islam. And there was a lot of that
- 37:51Speaker 3: rhetoric getting tossed around. And the best way to access
- 37:53Speaker 3: people's minds in Iran at the time, because there's no internet,
- 37:56Speaker 3: there's no cell phones, right, the best way to access
- 37:59Speaker 3: people is through the Friday prayer at the pulpit because
- 38:02Speaker 3: that's when everybody is in the same room together hearing
- 38:04Speaker 3: the same thing. And if you're coordinating the messages at
- 38:07Speaker 3: all those Friday prayers, now across the entire country, everyone's
- 38:10Speaker 3: hearing the exact same message every Friday. And this is
- 38:12Speaker 3: a lot of what pushed the religious fervor into high gear,
- 38:16Speaker 3: because not only were they upset and hearing similar stuff,
- 38:18Speaker 3: they're hearing the exact same message. So if I traveled
- 38:21Speaker 3: like eight hundred miles, you would also know in that
- 38:23Speaker 3: same village eight or miles away what I heard in Tehran. Right,
- 38:26Speaker 3: So this is like really unifying force going on. And
- 38:29Speaker 3: at the same time, you had people at universities in
- 38:31Speaker 3: France to the United States and Britain and some other
- 38:34Speaker 3: places that were Iranian students that were very intellectual, this
- 38:38Speaker 3: intellectual group that was ostracized from the Shah, and they
- 38:42Speaker 3: were thinking about, like how do we fix this problem.
- 38:44Speaker 3: Like Mustafa Chamran, for example, was at University Berkeley in
- 38:48Speaker 3: California in the nineteen seventies. He founded a mall in Lebanon.
- 38:53Speaker 3: Amal became Hesbala eventually has Bulah later on. He was
- 38:56Speaker 3: the founder of that and he actually came up with
- 38:57Speaker 3: that idea with a student, an Iranian student group in
- 39:00Speaker 3: nineteen seventy three in Berkeley. And you had a lot
- 39:03Speaker 3: of the stuff going on in the early nineteen seventies.
- 39:04Speaker 3: A lot of them were listening to Ali Shariati, which
- 39:06Speaker 3: is the guy that I mentioned earlier. He was in France.
- 39:09Speaker 3: He died of a very mysterious heart attack in his
- 39:11Speaker 3: early thirties. And he had been writing all these tracks
- 39:15Speaker 3: about how to resist the Shaw and why the Shaw
- 39:17Speaker 3: was illegitimate, and why there should be an Islamic country,
- 39:20Speaker 3: you know, and all this stuff and all of this
- 39:22Speaker 3: stuff is kind of like floating around and Ayatola Hamani
- 39:25Speaker 3: brought all together. It kind of said follow me, and
- 39:28Speaker 3: that's and a lot of people did that. They said,
- 39:30Speaker 3: we will do that because there are various things that
- 39:32Speaker 3: bother us. It seems like, you know what you're talking about.
- 39:34Speaker 3: And that's kind of how that unification happened over about
- 39:36Speaker 3: an eight to ten year period.
- 39:38Speaker 1: So, John, let me ask you. That White revolution that
- 39:40Speaker 1: Shaw tried to pull off, it did not. It went nowhere.
- 39:43Speaker 3: Yeah, so it affected some areas, but some areas it
- 39:46Speaker 3: made them even more upset because basically, like if you
- 39:48Speaker 3: see some of the imagery from it or videos, you'll
- 39:50Speaker 3: see like women dressed up in like really western military clothing,
- 39:53Speaker 3: like marching around their village with guns and stuff. And
- 39:56Speaker 3: people saw that like, what, this is not Persian, this
- 39:59Speaker 3: is not Iran, this is the West. And in fact,
- 40:02Speaker 3: there are two people, Ali Ahmad and Ali Shariati who
- 40:05Speaker 3: I mentioned that used this term garb zadaghi, which means
- 40:08Speaker 3: West toxification, in other words, being drunk on westernness. And
- 40:13Speaker 3: this was the thing that that Aatola kept talking about,
- 40:16Speaker 3: like these people are just drinking the water of the
- 40:19Speaker 3: West and like getting you know, corrupted by these Western
- 40:22Speaker 3: ideas and disgusting. Yeah, yeah, exactly. And actually Ramani the
- 40:28Speaker 3: second one during nineteen eighty eight, when they were deciding
- 40:32Speaker 3: to end the war, he said, I'm drinking from the
- 40:35Speaker 3: poison chalice to accept this peace agreement. And that was
- 40:38Speaker 3: a hearkening back to that idea about like I'm drinking
- 40:41Speaker 3: this Western poison, you know, right, because I'm making a deal,
- 40:44Speaker 3: right exactly. So even though it was with Saddam and
- 40:47Speaker 3: not with the West, but it was because the West
- 40:49Speaker 3: had supported Saddam Wemya.
- 40:52Speaker 1: All right, So nineteen eighty nineteen seventy nine happens, the revolution,
- 40:58Speaker 1: the Shaw's gone, you know, the Islamic Republic is born.
- 41:04Speaker 1: They CIA in the United States basically loses all of
- 41:06Speaker 1: its intelligence assets inside of the country more or less.
- 41:10Speaker 3: Yeah, So what happened is the students there's this, remember
- 41:13Speaker 3: I mentioned these student groups. There was one student group
- 41:15Speaker 3: in Iran called the Imam's Line or students for the
- 41:17Speaker 3: Imam's Line. They were not connected to Hamania at that point.
- 41:21Speaker 3: They stormed the embassy actually twice. They happened earlier in
- 41:24Speaker 3: the year that was stopped. They realized that they could
- 41:26Speaker 3: get through, so they did it again and actually succeeded
- 41:29Speaker 3: the second time, taking over the embassy. And when they
- 41:31Speaker 3: got in there, they found all these documents in a
- 41:33Speaker 3: bunch of filing cabinets that had intel reports and sources
- 41:37Speaker 3: written on them about like who said what, and basically
- 41:41Speaker 3: the people the Americans in there try to shred a
- 41:43Speaker 3: lot of this stuff, but the Iranians actually pieced it
- 41:45Speaker 3: back together, and they were like these shredded pieces of
- 41:47Speaker 3: paper glued back together.
- 41:48Speaker 1: I'm assuming most people watch the movie Argo. There's a
- 41:51Speaker 1: scene in that when they take over the embassy and
- 41:53Speaker 1: they're putting together shredded pieces of paper.
- 41:56Speaker 3: That was real. Yeah, yeah, And that was actually why
- 42:00Speaker 3: now we used like pulverized paper instead of just shredding straight.
- 42:04Speaker 3: That came from that situation. And also there are anti
- 42:07Speaker 3: Terrorism Force protection or AATFP that we have in the
- 42:09Speaker 3: military and net embassies also came from Iran related terrorist
- 42:13Speaker 3: activities in Lebanon. So both of those were kind of
- 42:16Speaker 3: like new moments for us or turning points for us
- 42:19Speaker 3: in the intelligence community. W we were like, we can't
- 42:21Speaker 3: just operate with autonomy and countries anymore. We have to
- 42:23Speaker 3: come up with ways to protect sources, methods and the
- 42:25Speaker 3: intelligence we collected. And that came out of that embassy situation.
- 42:29Speaker 3: And when they took over the embassy, Kamani at first
- 42:32Speaker 3: didn't think it was a good idea. He thought that
- 42:34Speaker 3: would actually disrupt the revolution, but then he saw the
- 42:36Speaker 3: media attention they were getting and he reached out to
- 42:38Speaker 3: them and said, you guys are on board with us
- 42:40Speaker 3: now and actually supported them. So a lot of people
- 42:43Speaker 3: in the West think that like that was a Iatola
- 42:45Speaker 3: sponsored thing, Like it wasn't. It was actually organic. And
- 42:47Speaker 3: then he took it over and made it look like
- 42:49Speaker 3: it was his idea and it wasn't. And Mahmud Amani
- 42:53Speaker 3: Najad was at that embassy takeover, by the way, which
- 42:56Speaker 3: is a very important thing to keep in mind about
- 42:57Speaker 3: now when Israel is trying to make Amai Najad and
- 43:00Speaker 3: of the country again, like that dude was, Yeah, that
- 43:02Speaker 3: dude was there, right, So yeah, we lost control at
- 43:08Speaker 3: that time because at the time, our liaison partner in
- 43:11Speaker 3: Iran was the Savak, which was the SHA's secret intelligence
- 43:15Speaker 3: service that we helped build. All those Savak guys were
- 43:18Speaker 3: either executed, exiled, or turned and worked to train the
- 43:22Speaker 3: new government's intelligence apparatus. So we completely lost control over
- 43:26Speaker 3: everything going on in Iran at the time. Part that
- 43:29Speaker 3: actually led to why Saddam Hussein decided to invade in
- 43:31Speaker 3: nineteen eighty because you know, just a few months before
- 43:35Speaker 3: the country was very powerful, it was a regional actor,
- 43:37Speaker 3: and now they have no intelligence service, they have a
- 43:40Speaker 3: disarrayed military, their weapons just kind of floating around like
- 43:43Speaker 3: Libya for a few months, and Saddam said like, look,
- 43:46Speaker 3: I've had this issue over this waterway with the Shah
- 43:49Speaker 3: for a long time. This is my chance to win
- 43:52Speaker 3: that conflict with the Shah. The Shah is gone because
- 43:54Speaker 3: the Shaw was still alive. If you remember when this
- 43:56Speaker 3: was going on, he didn't die yet. He was he
- 43:58Speaker 3: was almost dead, but we didn't die yet. But he's
- 44:00Speaker 3: so in Saddam's mind like this wasn't a revolution of
- 44:03Speaker 3: a new government. This was just like the Shaw is
- 44:05Speaker 3: absent and so he invaded the country, and that invasion
- 44:09Speaker 3: really galvanized the Islamist set because now it's like Sunni
- 44:13Speaker 3: Islam against Shia Islam, the story of Ali and Hussein
- 44:17Speaker 3: against the evil Sunnis. That's exactly how it was framed.
- 44:20Speaker 3: And that's suddenly, like you mentioned the glassy eyed talk
- 44:22Speaker 3: about the Ayatola, that's where that started immediately because they
- 44:26Speaker 3: were like, now we have one enemy and it's Saddam Husaying,
- 44:29Speaker 3: it's the Sunnis.
- 44:31Speaker 1: So that kind of helped, you know, essentially completely set
- 44:37Speaker 1: in the Islamic Republic's power over the country. Right, you
- 44:42Speaker 1: have a common enemy, you know, even.
- 44:44Speaker 3: If really that Saddam Hussein invasion is what made the
- 44:46Speaker 3: revolution real. Up to that point, it was just a
- 44:50Speaker 3: disarray of people, different groups against the Shah for various reasons.
- 44:54Speaker 3: There was no real unification that and I've said this before.
- 44:57Speaker 3: There were eight different major groups that were against the
- 44:59Speaker 3: Shah that participated in the revolution. The Islamists were not
- 45:02Speaker 3: like the the one guaranteed to make it. But once
- 45:07Speaker 3: they crossed, once the Iraqis crossed into Iran, like that
- 45:10Speaker 3: was it. It was really that invasion that kicked off the
- 45:14Speaker 3: cementing of what we have now as the Islamic Republic,
- 45:18Speaker 3: and that.
- 45:18Speaker 4: Brought on like, as I recall, there were like human
- 45:22Speaker 4: wave attacks. They even used children. Suicide bombings became a thing.
- 45:27Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, I mean it's because they were running out
- 45:29Speaker 3: of conventional assets to use. Againt Saddam, I mean, Saddam
- 45:31Speaker 3: was and if you read about the Iran Iraq War,
- 45:34Speaker 3: it was the longest conventional war in the world in
- 45:37Speaker 3: the twentieth century. And somebody argued with me once that
- 45:40Speaker 3: there was a Japanese conflict with China that was longer,
- 45:42Speaker 3: but it's actually the same, But it was the longest
- 45:45Speaker 3: in the world. In the first two years Iraq was winning,
- 45:51Speaker 3: Iran turned the tables, started winning and pushed the Iraqis
- 45:54Speaker 3: out of Iran completely back into Iraq. And if you
- 45:57Speaker 3: do like some military strategic analysis of this, that was
- 46:00Speaker 3: the moment that Iran should have just declared victory and stopped.
- 46:03Speaker 3: But they got a taste of victory and kept going.
- 46:06Speaker 3: And this was the big problem because suddenly that's when
- 46:08Speaker 3: the war became a war of attrition because both sides
- 46:11Speaker 3: couldn't advance anymore. Now it became like you know, the
- 46:13Speaker 3: Eastern Front or the Western Front and World War Two.
- 46:15Speaker 3: These guys are just stuck in trenches. Well, the Iranians
- 46:18Speaker 3: don't have a ton of equipment and training. They do,
- 46:22Speaker 3: but they don't know how to use it. They don't
- 46:23Speaker 3: how to use the equipment. They have a Phantom aircraft
- 46:25Speaker 3: that the US sent them, they have Hawk radar systems.
- 46:26Speaker 3: They have all this stuff, but they don't know how
- 46:28Speaker 3: to use it very well. Because there's a revolution and
- 46:29Speaker 3: all the all the army people left, so they said, well,
- 46:32Speaker 3: what else do we have. We have guys in the
- 46:33Speaker 3: ground that are willing to fight, send them and they did.
- 46:37Speaker 3: And like you said, human waves, you had kids like
- 46:39Speaker 3: running over bodies because there were huge minefields and the
- 46:42Speaker 3: only way to clear the mindfields was to send people
- 46:44Speaker 3: over them to blow up to clear them with their bodies.
- 46:47Speaker 3: So you'd have kids, like kids, young kids running over
- 46:50Speaker 3: the field blowing up and then guys behind them seeing
- 46:53Speaker 3: that happening and continuing on, which is wild to us.
- 46:56Speaker 3: But if you believe in what that is, you're going
- 46:58Speaker 3: to do it. You know, that's the way the human
- 47:00Speaker 3: brain works. Like, if you believe in this thing, I
- 47:02Speaker 3: mean that we do that in the military, like in
- 47:04Speaker 3: fighting Japan and the Battle of Pelulu, guys were fighting
- 47:07Speaker 3: with Niaves because they ran out of bullets. You know,
- 47:09Speaker 3: like that's wild and it takes a lot of something
- 47:13Speaker 3: in your brain to be able to do that, and
- 47:15Speaker 3: those guys believed in it at that time.
- 47:19Speaker 1: So in couple go ahead.
- 47:20Speaker 4: Well, I was just going to say, where did the
- 47:23Speaker 4: United States fall on this conflict, because I recall reading
- 47:26Speaker 4: that we kind of backed both sides, like wouldn't it
- 47:28Speaker 4: be a great thing if they both lost?
- 47:31Speaker 3: Yes, what the US was looking at this from a
- 47:33Speaker 3: Cold War angle and seeing that Saddam Hussein had primarily
- 47:36Speaker 3: been funded by the Soviets, and actually in the seventies,
- 47:38Speaker 3: Egypt suddenly gained access to a choice do we allow
- 47:43Speaker 3: primarily US weapons or Soviet weapons in our military infrastructure?
- 47:47Speaker 3: And the US convinced Egypt, and that's why we got
- 47:50Speaker 3: Egypt to agree to recognize Israel. That had a lot
- 47:52Speaker 3: to do with it, or like this triangular agreement going
- 47:54Speaker 3: on where so suddenly now we got Egypt. The other
- 47:58Speaker 3: problem is Libya as far as Soviet Union's concerned, and Iraq.
- 48:02Speaker 3: Iraq had the fifth largest military on the planet at
- 48:04Speaker 3: the time, primarily sourced with Soviet assets. So the way
- 48:07Speaker 3: the US saw this, and if you look a little
- 48:09Speaker 3: bit wider Afghanistan on the east side, the Soviets invaded
- 48:12Speaker 3: Afghanistan because the monarch in Afghanistan was kicked out and
- 48:16Speaker 3: replaced with the communist leader. The Russian supported that communist leader,
- 48:18Speaker 3: they invaded Afghanistan. So the war in Afghanistan is going
- 48:21Speaker 3: on at the exact same time as the Iran Iraq
- 48:23Speaker 3: war is going on. So the US is seeing this
- 48:25Speaker 3: from a Cold War perspective that if we can disrupt
- 48:28Speaker 3: the Soviets and keep them bogged down like Ukraine. Now,
- 48:31Speaker 3: if we can bleed them but not win, this is
- 48:35Speaker 3: a victory. And this was the US strategy in the
- 48:37Speaker 3: Ran Iraq war, and also the British strategy and the
- 48:39Speaker 3: French strategy was to arm both sides, but not so
- 48:43Speaker 3: much that they would win. And remember I told you
- 48:45Speaker 3: the first two years Iraq was winning and then Iran
- 48:48Speaker 3: pushed them in. Part of the reason Iran continued going
- 48:51Speaker 3: is because they thought that with the weapons they were
- 48:54Speaker 3: getting clandestinely, they'd be able to win. And that was
- 48:57Speaker 3: the plan on our side, was to make them think that,
- 48:59Speaker 3: even though it wasn't true. So there was this war
- 49:01Speaker 3: of attrition that started that we wanted, the US wanted
- 49:05Speaker 3: Iran in Iraq to continue fighting each other to the
- 49:07Speaker 3: last man. That was the whole goal. And so from
- 49:10Speaker 3: nineteen eighty three to nineteen eighty eight, that last five
- 49:13Speaker 3: years of the war, that is what happened. You had
- 49:15Speaker 3: this massive war of attrition of guys just murdering each other.
- 49:18Speaker 3: Whether that's civilians, soldiers, does not matter. They were shooting
- 49:22Speaker 3: ballistic missiles at cities. You had one battle called the
- 49:25Speaker 3: War of the Cities because they were basically setting up
- 49:27Speaker 3: launchpads inside of dense urban centers on both sides of
- 49:30Speaker 3: the border and just firing ballistic missiles into the cities
- 49:33Speaker 3: at each other for days.
- 49:34Speaker 2: O Bird was in one of those cities.
- 49:36Speaker 3: You remember that story, Yeah, yeah, yeah, And that was
- 49:40Speaker 3: the strategy was just destroy each other. And the US said,
- 49:42Speaker 3: that's a great thing. We'll support that. So you had
- 49:44Speaker 3: the US supporting Saddam Hussein on one side and also
- 49:47Speaker 3: supporting Iran on the other side through israel intermediaries who
- 49:52Speaker 3: quote unquote did not work for the government. But you know,
- 49:54Speaker 3: that's how things work in the Middle East. Everything is connected,
- 49:57Speaker 3: and the US did not want Iran to win because
- 50:00Speaker 3: of the Russians. They did not want the Russians to
- 50:02Speaker 3: win essentially, and this was kind of a test of
- 50:05Speaker 3: you know, who is stronger in the Middle East, Russia
- 50:07Speaker 3: or the United States. And if you remember we talked
- 50:10Speaker 3: about the Suez Crisis nineteen fifty six when France and
- 50:13Speaker 3: Britain supported Israel into Egypt. Well, that was a disaster
- 50:17Speaker 3: for Britain and France, and that was the end of
- 50:20Speaker 3: British and French influence in the Middle East. And that
- 50:22Speaker 3: was the beginning of US and Russian influence in the
- 50:24Speaker 3: Middle East. So from nineteen fifty six through the eighties,
- 50:27Speaker 3: you see this like dramatic increase in US and Russian
- 50:30Speaker 3: contest in the Middle East between which partner is going
- 50:33Speaker 3: to work with which power. And so that's part of
- 50:36Speaker 3: what the Iran Iraq War was, was the US exploiting
- 50:38Speaker 3: that contest to keep both of these countries fighting each
- 50:41Speaker 3: other until nineteen eighty eight. Because remember in nineteen eighty eight,
- 50:44Speaker 3: that's when Perestroika glasnost which was two policies in Russia
- 50:48Speaker 3: about restructuring and changing the economy and like becoming part
- 50:51Speaker 3: of the Western world. And that led to the wall
- 50:53Speaker 3: coming down and all that, and especially the failure in
- 50:55Speaker 3: Afghanistan when they had to retreat out of Afghanistan in
- 50:57Speaker 3: nineteen eighty nine. All that was happening at the same time.
- 51:00Speaker 3: So you have to look at it in that context
- 51:01Speaker 3: of like, the US was seeing this as a piece
- 51:03Speaker 3: in a larger play against the Soviets.
- 51:07Speaker 1: And I know this is like and that's known as
- 51:09Speaker 1: a part of it's known as I rank Contra. It's
- 51:11Speaker 1: just like the.
- 51:11Speaker 2: Yeah, that's what I was.
- 51:12Speaker 4: That's exactly where I was going with that. That's a
- 51:14Speaker 4: whole other can of worms. But I think since we're
- 51:17Speaker 4: into the nineteen eighties we should probably touch upon that.
- 51:19Speaker 1: Yeah.
- 51:20Speaker 3: Yeah, So think about the Iran Contra as just a
- 51:23Speaker 3: larger zooming out of the same exact contest between the
- 51:25Speaker 3: Soviets and the United States, because the Contra rebels were
- 51:28Speaker 3: CIA rebels in Nicaragua that were fighting against the actual
- 51:32Speaker 3: legitimate government, although we didn't think it was legitimate in
- 51:34Speaker 3: Nicaragua called the Sandinistas. The Sandinistas were socialists, some would
- 51:41Speaker 3: call them, or you know, maybe let worse than that,
- 51:43Speaker 3: they were supported by the Soviets. So the US was
- 51:46Speaker 3: looking at this as an opportunity to crush a Russian
- 51:49Speaker 3: interest in Central America while also crushing a Russian interest
- 51:52Speaker 3: in the Middle East. And so what was going on here.
- 51:54Speaker 3: You had a group of folks in the National Security Council,
- 51:58Speaker 3: including all over North, who's a marine that active duty
- 52:00Speaker 3: at the time, that came up with this idea. They
- 52:02Speaker 3: knew Reagan wouldn't approve it, so they didn't even ask it. Yeah,
- 52:07Speaker 3: and so what they're basically doing was they can't pay
- 52:10Speaker 3: for weapons in Iran because of the laws that happened
- 52:12Speaker 3: after the hostage crisis. So they said, well, how do
- 52:14Speaker 3: we pay for it anyway, Well, we can use proceeds
- 52:17Speaker 3: from this other clandestine activity to pay for weapons. And
- 52:21Speaker 3: actually this this whole thing went through I said earlier Israel.
- 52:24Speaker 3: But there were a lot of intermediaries involved, including folks
- 52:26Speaker 3: in Lebanon and Hezbolah. And actually it was a Hezbola
- 52:30Speaker 3: guy that made this public, that published it in a
- 52:33Speaker 3: newspaper because he was in a set about yes, exactly,
- 52:36Speaker 3: because they were upset about the diversion of assets that
- 52:39Speaker 3: they thought they should have because we were pushing all
- 52:42Speaker 3: these weapons through Lebanon. They were fighting a war in
- 52:43Speaker 3: Lebanon against the Syrians and the Israelis, and they're like, hey,
- 52:46Speaker 3: we need weapons too, and the US was like, no,
- 52:47Speaker 3: we have something more important Iran going on right now,
- 52:50Speaker 3: and he said, okay, then we're going to publish it,
- 52:52Speaker 3: and they did, and that's actually how the Iran contra
- 52:54Speaker 3: affair became public.
- 52:57Speaker 4: And then you had the plane go down in Nicaragua,
- 52:59Speaker 4: which was kind of like by now it's splashed on
- 53:03Speaker 4: United States newspapers because just for folks out there as
- 53:06Speaker 4: a CIA aircraft and one of their paramilitary guys parachuted
- 53:11Speaker 4: down and was captured.
- 53:14Speaker 3: Yep. And we also had Operation Eagle Claw around the
- 53:16Speaker 3: same time nineteen eighty at Desert One, when I believe
- 53:19Speaker 3: it was eighteen Americans were killed in the desert trying
- 53:21Speaker 3: to rescue the American hostages. So there's a lot of
- 53:23Speaker 3: US activity going on over there trying to kind of
- 53:26Speaker 3: take control of the situation, and we never quite got
- 53:28Speaker 3: our hands around it. And that's the reason we have
- 53:31Speaker 3: JASOK today. It's because of Operation Eagle Claw, where we realized, like, hey,
- 53:35Speaker 3: we don't work together very well in something like this
- 53:37Speaker 3: very specialized problem. We need to have a unified command
- 53:40Speaker 3: that can do this kind of national level activity.
- 53:45Speaker 1: All right, let's talk a little bit about the proxy.
- 53:47Speaker 1: As you mentioned a little bit about Hesibel and stuff
- 53:49Speaker 1: like that. Hasbal obviously came up starting in nineteen eighty
- 53:52Speaker 1: two right during the war, you know, in high splod
- 53:56Speaker 1: being you know, Rand's chief proxy essentially close.
- 54:00Speaker 3: Yes, is a lot more nuanced than a lot of
- 54:02Speaker 3: people understand. I mentioned Mustafa Chamaran founding Amal in Lebanon
- 54:06Speaker 3: in nineteen seventy five.
- 54:08Speaker 1: In by like going to school in Berkeley, banging co
- 54:11Speaker 1: Ed's in California.
- 54:12Speaker 3: Oh for sure.
- 54:13Speaker 1: You know what, I got a sick idea, dude, that's
- 54:15Speaker 1: fucking star fuckings.
- 54:17Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, let's get some guns.
- 54:19Speaker 1: Yeah.
- 54:19Speaker 3: He went to Lebanon, and uh, there's actually a lot
- 54:22Speaker 3: of connected history between Lebanon and Iran, like culturally because
- 54:25Speaker 3: the Persian Empire used to rule over Lebanon. So there's
- 54:28Speaker 3: a lot of connection there, right, especially in Jubble Ali
- 54:31Speaker 3: and Abu Musa, which is a mountain in the south
- 54:34Speaker 3: of Lebanon. There's a lot of Shia clerics that are
- 54:37Speaker 3: Iranian that have lived for centuries in South Lebanon. So
- 54:40Speaker 3: there's already like this deep, deep connection going on there.
- 54:43Speaker 3: And you remember Israel had been harassing Lebanese territory since
- 54:48Speaker 3: nineteen seventy eight. Really nineteen seventy five was the first incursion.
- 54:51Speaker 3: We also had Operation Blue Bat in nineteen fifty eight
- 54:53Speaker 3: when President I think it was Johnson kimber Wish president,
- 54:58Speaker 3: but we the United States invaded lebanon nineteen fifty eight.
- 55:01Speaker 3: We sent a bunch of Marines in there to stabilize
- 55:03Speaker 3: the Christian leadership against Was that Eisenhower, I guess it
- 55:08Speaker 3: was Eisenhower, Yeah, before Kennedy. Yep. Yes, that was Operation
- 55:12Speaker 3: Blue Bat. Very interesting thing we don't really talk about.
- 55:15Speaker 3: So there's been a lot of Israeli and US interests.
- 55:17Speaker 3: Remember I said after nineteen fifty six, Britain and France
- 55:19Speaker 3: pulled back and the US came in. That was the
- 55:21Speaker 3: US coming in nineteen fifty eight, Operations Bran.
- 55:23Speaker 1: If France leave in the fifties, the US and the
- 55:27Speaker 1: Soviet Union Russia are like trying to fill the vacuum essentially.
- 55:30Speaker 3: Yep, yep. And remember the Russians are supporting Syria. The
- 55:33Speaker 3: Assad family, which just had a coup took over the country.
- 55:37Speaker 3: In that period of time, so the Soviets are backing Syria,
- 55:39Speaker 3: the US is backing Israel. It's only a matter of
- 55:42Speaker 3: time before there is a conflict or you know, a clash.
- 55:45Speaker 3: And we had already co opted Jordan. There's something called
- 55:48Speaker 3: No Beef, which was the name of the covert operation
- 55:51Speaker 3: to recruit the king to become a US asset. That's
- 55:54Speaker 3: why the king's son is a US citizen. Has a
- 55:56Speaker 3: whole other story, but that was happening at the same time.
- 55:59Speaker 3: So the US had already bought Jordan. We were working
- 56:01Speaker 3: on Israel. Soviets are working on Syria. And there's these
- 56:05Speaker 3: Lebanese people who are like, stay out of my country
- 56:07Speaker 3: to everybody. Israel kept coming in nineteen seventy five, nineteen
- 56:11Speaker 3: seventy eight, the PLO was there. Israel invaded nineteen eighty
- 56:14Speaker 3: two to come after the PLO. The PLO were gone
- 56:16Speaker 3: within three months September is when they left to Triple
- 56:20Speaker 3: or to Tunis. They were gone in Algeria as well,
- 56:24Speaker 3: and Israel State.
- 56:28Speaker 1: And they accomplished.
- 56:30Speaker 3: They stayed. So they actually went up to the Latani River,
- 56:32Speaker 3: which sounds familiar, and then Ariel Sharon said, well, if
- 56:35Speaker 3: we've gone this far, we should keep going, and the
- 56:38Speaker 3: Israeli government said, no, you shouldn't, and he said, well,
- 56:41Speaker 3: who's in Lebanon, me, not you, And they actually kept
- 56:44Speaker 3: going up to be Root, and that's how they got
- 56:45Speaker 3: into Bay Route. So you can imagine some people that
- 56:48Speaker 3: were pretty upset that this was going on, and they
- 56:51Speaker 3: saw this as an existential threat to their existence and
- 56:54Speaker 3: other things as well. And there were a lot of
- 56:56Speaker 3: different groups that resisted the Israeli occupation, which by the way,
- 57:00Speaker 3: lasted till the year two thousand, eighteen years. So in
- 57:03Speaker 3: those early years, one group broke off from Amal because
- 57:07Speaker 3: Amal was not as violent as some of the people
- 57:09Speaker 3: wanted them to be. Amal was the main resistance force
- 57:12Speaker 3: down there, led by Nabi Berry, who was actually still
- 57:15Speaker 3: the Speaker of Parliament in Lebanon today. This group, called
- 57:18Speaker 3: Islamic Amal broke off that contributed to what became Hesbala.
- 57:21Speaker 3: He had another group called Islamic Jihad, which was led
- 57:23Speaker 3: by Imad Mugnia, who the US and Israel killed in
- 57:26Speaker 3: Syria a few years ago. These different groups were all separate.
- 57:30Speaker 3: They were not one group, but they had one common enemy,
- 57:32Speaker 3: which again familiar refrained. They had a common enemy. They
- 57:35Speaker 3: banded together. This guy named Musawi led them. Musawi was
- 57:40Speaker 3: assassinated by Israel in nineteen ninety one, by the way,
- 57:42Speaker 3: and that's why Hassan Nosrola took over Hesbula. So Musawi
- 57:46Speaker 3: was leading Hasbola his little organization, which wasn't called Habala yet,
- 57:51Speaker 3: they didn't really have a name. The Syrians came in
- 57:53Speaker 3: and they said, hey, we noticed that you guys are
- 57:55Speaker 3: fighting Israel. We're fighting Israel too, because remember the Syrians
- 57:57Speaker 3: also invaded Lebanon. Syrian said we will back you. And
- 58:02Speaker 3: then the multinational force came in there to try to
- 58:04Speaker 3: stabilize the country nineteen eighty two. Multinational force was the US, France.
- 58:09Speaker 3: You had some Italians there, and it was the French
- 58:12Speaker 3: embassy that was actually hit first, the French barracks. They
- 58:16Speaker 3: also tried to blow up the Italian barracks, but no
- 58:18Speaker 3: Italians were actually sleeping in the barracks that were sleeping outside,
- 58:20Speaker 3: so there was no damage there. And they struck the US,
- 58:23Speaker 3: the CIA compound and the US embassy. This was all
- 58:26Speaker 3: in opposition to the multinational force that came in there
- 58:29Speaker 3: to support Israel inside of Lebanon. So Israel asked for
- 58:33Speaker 3: our help to come in and support their invasion of Lebanon.
- 58:37Speaker 3: This is why a lot of Shia and Lebanon are
- 58:39Speaker 3: opposed to the in Lebanon because they see it as
- 58:41Speaker 3: the US came in there and helped Israel occupy their land. Right,
- 58:45Speaker 3: and the malt National Force did leave after the US
- 58:48Speaker 3: embassy bombing nineteen eighty three October. The US was there
- 58:51Speaker 3: for about a year, but in that period of time
- 58:54Speaker 3: they felt the US was on Israel side. So they said, well,
- 58:58Speaker 3: we have one common enemy is the United States. The
- 59:01Speaker 3: US is supporting Israel in our country and like taking
- 59:03Speaker 3: away our land and hurting our people and murdering people
- 59:05Speaker 3: like and it's true, it was happening, and so I
- 59:08Speaker 3: mean it was war. Plus the Syrians were like telling
- 59:11Speaker 3: them like, yeah, those are your enemies, and here's some
- 59:12Speaker 3: weapons to fight them. By the way, so and Iran
- 59:15Speaker 3: was also coming in there and saying the same thing.
- 59:16Speaker 3: Because these are Shia people. They're like, hey, we're Shia,
- 59:18Speaker 3: you're Shia. We had just had a revolution, we got
- 59:20Speaker 3: this war against Saddam over here. Those guys in Syria,
- 59:23Speaker 3: some of them are Sunni Saddam Sunni. Those guys are Jews.
- 59:26Speaker 3: We don't like them either. Here, let's support you.
- 59:29Speaker 1: There was more nuance to Christians.
- 59:32Speaker 3: Yeah, well, and the Americans were only supporting the Christian
- 59:35Speaker 3: Lebanese government, not the Sunni or the Shia parts of
- 59:37Speaker 3: the government. So again it's like this this alien country
- 59:40Speaker 3: in here, like running around with guns and blowing stuff
- 59:43Speaker 3: up and like causing problems everywhere. In Israel too, doing
- 59:47Speaker 3: the same thing. You had the sovereign and Shatila massacre
- 59:49Speaker 3: where over a thousand civilians were murdered in two days
- 59:52Speaker 3: by the Israeli controlled U Katab party, which is a
- 59:56Speaker 3: political party in Lebanon now, but it was called the
- 59:57Speaker 3: Falangis back then. That Ariel Sharon watched himself. He was there,
- 1:00:01Speaker 3: watched it, witnessed it allows it to happen. That was
- 1:00:04Speaker 3: just one massacre. There were many massacres in Lebanon all
- 1:00:06Speaker 3: the way through the eighteen years. You know. There were
- 1:00:09Speaker 3: two torture prisons in South Lebanon, and like so I'm
- 1:00:12Speaker 3: just mentioning all this as like context of like why
- 1:00:14Speaker 3: do they like people ask like why do they hate us?
- 1:00:16Speaker 1: Yeah? The holdop one day and we're like, you know
- 1:00:19Speaker 1: what fuck did yous fucked those Americans too, you know
- 1:00:22Speaker 1: what I mean, like let's kill them all.
- 1:00:24Speaker 2: They hate us, but guys, we're free.
- 1:00:26Speaker 3: Yeah right, yeah, yeah. It's really because we were there,
- 1:00:28Speaker 3: like shooting people in front of them, you know. That's
- 1:00:31Speaker 3: that's where that came from.
- 1:00:32Speaker 1: Uh.
- 1:00:33Speaker 3: And of course you know times have changed, things are different,
- 1:00:35Speaker 3: the world is different, but memories are there. You know,
- 1:00:37Speaker 3: Like if you go to Lebanon, like I've been there
- 1:00:39Speaker 3: several times, and there are still bullet holes from us.
- 1:00:43Speaker 3: They're still bombed out areas that the Israelis bombed out,
- 1:00:46Speaker 3: not just the recent ones but the ones from the beginning,
- 1:00:49Speaker 3: you know.
- 1:00:49Speaker 4: So if you're people in that part of the world,
- 1:00:50Speaker 4: they talk about Sych's pea co like it happened last month.
- 1:00:54Speaker 3: Absolutely. I was in Iraq in twenty sixteen, in Kurdistan
- 1:00:57Speaker 3: and I was trying to go to a source meeting
- 1:00:59Speaker 3: and I got interrupted because there was this giant parade
- 1:01:01Speaker 3: coming down the street of guys crying younger than me,
- 1:01:05Speaker 3: carrying signs that said like down with the British, fuck
- 1:01:07Speaker 3: sex Pecou, like on the on the one hundred year
- 1:01:10Speaker 3: anniversary of sex Pecou insane. And Americans don't even know
- 1:01:14Speaker 3: what that.
- 1:01:14Speaker 1: Is, right, and it's got it honestly, frankly, like as
- 1:01:17Speaker 1: an American, right, we were you know, America was born
- 1:01:20Speaker 1: through a revolution and established freedom as shitty as it
- 1:01:24Speaker 1: might have become ready. Like the fact is where democracy
- 1:01:30Speaker 1: I You can't help but kind of feel for those people, right,
- 1:01:33Speaker 1: because they want to be able to self determine their country,
- 1:01:37Speaker 1: have self determination, have some self respect and stuff like that,
- 1:01:40Speaker 1: and not have other outward countries, you know, using them
- 1:01:45Speaker 1: as a pawn, whether it's a pawn between capitalism, communism
- 1:01:49Speaker 1: during the Cold War or something else, right, Like, they
- 1:01:51Speaker 1: want to be able to make their own decisions about
- 1:01:53Speaker 1: their country.
- 1:01:54Speaker 3: But even in America, like when we were our revolution,
- 1:01:57Speaker 3: we only won that because the French came to fight British, right,
- 1:02:00Speaker 3: you know, that was a great power competition. We were
- 1:02:02Speaker 3: the surrogate force. We happened to have a great success
- 1:02:05Speaker 3: later on, but we wouldn't have had the successes we
- 1:02:07Speaker 3: had without you know, Lafayette and all these guys like
- 1:02:10Speaker 3: coming across and helping us out, with helping George Washington,
- 1:02:13Speaker 3: he was like he was the partner for us leader.
- 1:02:15Speaker 3: You know, they're training us and we were the surrogates,
- 1:02:18Speaker 3: and you know, they were advising and assisting us and
- 1:02:20Speaker 3: accompanying us in combat. And that's you know, still to
- 1:02:23Speaker 3: this day, very similar happening in the Middle East or
- 1:02:27Speaker 3: the British. Yeah, people should really read the Declaration of Independence,
- 1:02:32Speaker 3: like the list of things, the litany of problems they
- 1:02:34Speaker 3: had with the king, and think about, like people have
- 1:02:38Speaker 3: these problems with governments today. You know, you can't just
- 1:02:41Speaker 3: be like, well, you guys should just accept our freedom.
- 1:02:43Speaker 3: It's like, well, I mean, they might have actual legitimate
- 1:02:45Speaker 3: grievances going on here in addition to some stuff that
- 1:02:47Speaker 3: might also not be legitimate. But think about like Afghanistan
- 1:02:50Speaker 3: when Hamid Karzai came in there and we're like, hey, guys,
- 1:02:52Speaker 3: here's your new constitution. Take it. We didn't do that
- 1:02:55Speaker 3: for our own constitution, you know what I mean?
- 1:02:58Speaker 1: Yah? All right, So we're in the eighties. Now has
- 1:03:03Speaker 1: Belah Syria that fucking you know powder keg? When do
- 1:03:10Speaker 1: we start hearing about Iranian nuclear weapons?
- 1:03:14Speaker 3: So you had a guy named aq Khan. He was Pakistani.
- 1:03:17Speaker 3: He had these centrifuges that he was selling to people.
- 1:03:20Speaker 3: And this is important to put in the context of
- 1:03:23Speaker 3: Israel's nuclear weapon program, which was older. Israel got its
- 1:03:26Speaker 3: first nuclear weapons exposure testing exposure in Algeria from the
- 1:03:30Speaker 3: French in the nineteen fifties, and there were some Israeli
- 1:03:33Speaker 3: scientists that were there that were invited there to witness
- 1:03:36Speaker 3: these nuclear tests. There were some other Israeli scientists in
- 1:03:39Speaker 3: the United States that actually took some uranium from the
- 1:03:42Speaker 3: United States to Israel and used that as like the
- 1:03:44Speaker 3: seed for the Demona reactor in Israel and the weapons
- 1:03:48Speaker 3: program as well. There was also the Vila weapons test
- 1:03:52Speaker 3: in nineteen seventy eight, which was a highly classified detection
- 1:03:56Speaker 3: the US had of a nuclear test in the Cific
- 1:04:00Speaker 3: Ocean south of Africa. This was and is considered to
- 1:04:04Speaker 3: be a South African joint Israeli nuclear weapons test with
- 1:04:08Speaker 3: the apartheid government of South Africa testing out nuclear weapons.
- 1:04:11Speaker 3: If you remember, South Africa gave up its nuclear program
- 1:04:13Speaker 3: after apartheid ended. All their stuff left South Africa. Nobody
- 1:04:19Speaker 3: asks where it went. It went to Israel. So that's
- 1:04:21Speaker 3: important to know because you have this other country, Iran
- 1:04:25Speaker 3: that's looking at Israel like they have a nuclear weapon.
- 1:04:28Speaker 3: They have probably one hundred of them, they have a reactor.
- 1:04:30Speaker 3: They have not signed the Biological Weapons Treaty, they have
- 1:04:33Speaker 3: not signed the Chemical Weapons Treaty, they haven't signed the
- 1:04:35Speaker 3: Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, they haven't signed the NPT Nuclear
- 1:04:38Speaker 3: Non Proliferation Treaty. Like, this is a country that clearly
- 1:04:41Speaker 3: has weapons and intends to use them. By not I
- 1:04:42Speaker 3: mean it's indicated by their insistence on not acknowledging them
- 1:04:45Speaker 3: and also not signing these agreements. That's like rationally what
- 1:04:48Speaker 3: they're thinking. They're like, we need something like that. So
- 1:04:51Speaker 3: in the nineties they start doing that, they start researching,
- 1:04:53Speaker 3: like can we do this? Well, Ayatola Kamani says like,
- 1:04:57Speaker 3: you can do nuclear research, but you can't make weapons,
- 1:05:00Speaker 3: and he actually issued a fatwa that said no weapons,
- 1:05:03Speaker 3: but research was okay. And this was kind of the
- 1:05:05Speaker 3: genesis of that. It was exposed in two thousand and
- 1:05:08Speaker 3: three by the Mujadini Kalk. The Mujadini Kalk are not
- 1:05:11Speaker 3: intelligence collectors, they're intelligence assets. It was Masad that collected
- 1:05:17Speaker 3: this intelligence and then had the Mujinini Kalk announce that
- 1:05:20Speaker 3: Iran had a nuclear weapons program. And actually in the
- 1:05:24Speaker 3: early two thousands, like two thousand, two thousand and three,
- 1:05:26Speaker 3: Meridigan was the Masad director. He was told by Natyahu,
- 1:05:31Speaker 3: we're no longer interested in the PLO and Palestinian issues.
- 1:05:34Speaker 3: We're now focusing on Iran, has Bulah and Hamas, and
- 1:05:37Speaker 3: they shifted their priorities against Iran. Part of that nuclear
- 1:05:40Speaker 3: weapons announcement or part of that shift was the nuclear
- 1:05:43Speaker 3: weapons announcement that the Mujahideen made. Up till two thousand
- 1:05:47Speaker 3: and three, the Mujadini Kalk was a terrorist organization in
- 1:05:49Speaker 3: the United States. We had them labeled as a terrorist organization. Miraculously,
- 1:05:53Speaker 3: that same month that the announcement was made, we took
- 1:05:55Speaker 3: the designation off. That's crazy or coincidental happened. Suddenly they
- 1:06:01Speaker 3: started being on our side, and we started giving them
- 1:06:03Speaker 3: diplomatic protection and things like this. And now suddenly, after
- 1:06:07Speaker 3: two thousand and three, you start to see a lot
- 1:06:08Speaker 3: of this stuff released to the public.
- 1:06:10Speaker 1: Yeah, So, why did it happen in two thousand and three,
- 1:06:13Speaker 1: I wonder it.
- 1:06:13Speaker 3: So there was this discussion in the nineteen nineties, nineteen
- 1:06:18Speaker 3: ninety six. I believe it was when Netanyahu first came
- 1:06:20Speaker 3: to power. The very first time, they wanted this idea
- 1:06:23Speaker 3: of removing extreme governments from Israel's periphery. So they got
- 1:06:28Speaker 3: Egypt in nineteen seventy eight seventy nine with Saddad to
- 1:06:31Speaker 3: agree to stop doing that. They got Jordan in nineteen
- 1:06:34Speaker 3: ninety three. Then they said, well, these other countries are
- 1:06:37Speaker 3: just never going to sign a peace treaty, so what
- 1:06:38Speaker 3: we need to do is regime change for the really
- 1:06:41Speaker 3: serious ones. Those serious ones are Syria, Iraq, and Iran.
- 1:06:45Speaker 3: This was part of the push that Israel had with
- 1:06:47Speaker 3: the United States, like we need to change the regime
- 1:06:49Speaker 3: in Iran, change the regime in Syria, and change it
- 1:06:52Speaker 3: in Iraq. And they actually struck the nuclear reactor in Syria,
- 1:06:55Speaker 3: they struck the nuclear facility in Iraq. They didn't get
- 1:06:59Speaker 3: into Iran because they couldn't reach that far at the time, right,
- 1:07:03Speaker 3: so who could do it? Oh U to us could
- 1:07:05Speaker 3: do it. So there was this push since the early
- 1:07:07Speaker 3: two thousands to convince the United States that Iran was
- 1:07:09Speaker 3: part of this problem. And if you remember the famous
- 1:07:11Speaker 3: George Bush State of the Union, the Axis of Evil
- 1:07:13Speaker 3: that caught the Irunians off guard. They were like, wait
- 1:07:15Speaker 3: a minute, we had just given you guys intelligence about
- 1:07:18Speaker 3: what was going on with Al Kaida in Afghanistan. And
- 1:07:20Speaker 3: they did they had given us, like actual raw intelligence
- 1:07:23Speaker 3: from their collection in Afghanistan. They're trying to work with us.
- 1:07:26Speaker 3: The Syrians also had given US intelligence after nine to eleven,
- 1:07:29Speaker 3: saying like, hey, there's Al Qaida guys here and here
- 1:07:31Speaker 3: and here, and you can do what you want with them.
- 1:07:33Speaker 3: That shocked those guys, but it was part of this
- 1:07:36Speaker 3: push to alienate those countries. And as I said, Israel
- 1:07:40Speaker 3: couldn't do itself.
- 1:07:43Speaker 4: Yeah, there's I wish I could remember exactly where it
- 1:07:46Speaker 4: was published, but it was in a memoir They wrote
- 1:07:50Speaker 4: about a meeting that happened during George W. Bush's presidency
- 1:07:54Speaker 4: where the discussion about invading and doing a regime change
- 1:07:57Speaker 4: in Syria came up and Dick Cheney he was the
- 1:08:00Speaker 4: only one in support. This was post two thousand and three.
- 1:08:03Speaker 4: They had gotten burned by the war in Iraq, obviously,
- 1:08:07Speaker 4: and Cheney was all about it, but everyone else in
- 1:08:09Speaker 4: the room in the National Security Council was.
- 1:08:11Speaker 1: Like, nah, oh sorry, yeah, very Cheney. Thing to do
- 1:08:14Speaker 1: is just so be down to go into it. Yeah,
- 1:08:19Speaker 1: it wasn't. There also an intelligence assessment in two thousand
- 1:08:22Speaker 1: and seven that basically said a US intelligence assessment that
- 1:08:25Speaker 1: said that the Iranians were not building a nuclear weapon.
- 1:08:30Speaker 3: That's correct. And if you've seen you know that, you
- 1:08:32Speaker 3: could probably make a montage of all the clips of
- 1:08:34Speaker 3: net Yahoo in the UN holding up a piece of
- 1:08:36Speaker 3: paper with a bomb saying like tomorrow, yeah, two weeks
- 1:08:39Speaker 3: to exactly. And he's been saying that since that two
- 1:08:41Speaker 3: thousand and three announcement. I bet you if you asked
- 1:08:44Speaker 3: him now, he'd still say it, even though we've completely
- 1:08:46Speaker 3: obliterated all their nuclear materials. But that's part of what
- 1:08:49Speaker 3: they want to do, is to change the regime, to
- 1:08:51Speaker 3: have control over that regional actor in a way that
- 1:08:54Speaker 3: they can they can manage. That's the end state.
- 1:08:57Speaker 4: And throughout the two thousands and twenty ten, there were
- 1:09:01Speaker 4: all these like American joint American Israeli programs like developing
- 1:09:06Speaker 4: new bunker buster bombs and things like this that was
- 1:09:10Speaker 4: all specifically targeted for Iran, and there were all kinds
- 1:09:13Speaker 4: of plans drawn up that you would have, you know,
- 1:09:16Speaker 4: American submarines and Israelis would come in and do this,
- 1:09:18Speaker 4: and that basically regime change plans for Iran. And my
- 1:09:23Speaker 4: understanding is that Obama had the opportunity that the plan
- 1:09:26Speaker 4: was put in front of him and he said no,
- 1:09:29Speaker 4: and you know, yeah, and actually.
- 1:09:31Speaker 3: The Obama situation. Obama had his idea about Iran was
- 1:09:35Speaker 3: to use the diplomatic instrument of national power as the
- 1:09:38Speaker 3: number one instrument. And that's how we got to Stucksnet
- 1:09:41Speaker 3: because it was a dual track.
- 1:09:43Speaker 2: Coviction supporting a diplomatic effort.
- 1:09:45Speaker 1: Yeah.
- 1:09:45Speaker 3: Absolutely, Yeah, So they're putting pressure on the program while
- 1:09:48Speaker 3: also trying to negotiate the program. That was the way
- 1:09:50Speaker 3: that was working, and it worked.
- 1:09:51Speaker 1: Is real way of doing that just murdering nuclear scientists and.
- 1:09:56Speaker 3: That came later twenty twelve. They killed six of them
- 1:09:58Speaker 3: in one year. Yeah.
- 1:10:00Speaker 1: So stucks Net, like as the layman, obviously, I've heard
- 1:10:04Speaker 1: of it. I've read about it slightly. My understanding is
- 1:10:07Speaker 1: that Stuck's Net was developed by the United States, We
- 1:10:09Speaker 1: shared it with Israel, and then Israel deployed it without
- 1:10:12Speaker 1: our note, without our Okay, So that's.
- 1:10:15Speaker 3: Not exactly accurate. So it's actually called Operation Olympic Games.
- 1:10:17Speaker 3: The reason it was called Olympic Games is because there's
- 1:10:19Speaker 3: five rings in the Olympics logo. Each of those rings
- 1:10:24Speaker 3: was one of the five countries participating in Stucksnet. Israel
- 1:10:26Speaker 3: and the United States for two of those five countries.
- 1:10:29Speaker 3: There were also three European countries participating as well, and
- 1:10:34Speaker 3: the reason all of these countries were participating is because
- 1:10:36Speaker 3: they all had some steak in. They had a problem
- 1:10:39Speaker 3: with this nuclear program in some way. For example, Germany
- 1:10:42Speaker 3: was one of the five and the reason Germany participated
- 1:10:44Speaker 3: is because Iran was using the Siemens produced centrifuges and
- 1:10:48Speaker 3: they didn't like that. The Germans also provided a ton
- 1:10:51Speaker 3: of intelligence on the Semens centrifuges to help the US
- 1:10:55Speaker 3: build the zero day attack against the Semens centrifuges. That's
- 1:10:59Speaker 3: how we knew how to actually exploit them the way
- 1:11:02Speaker 3: that we did, which is very creative. It's because we
- 1:11:03Speaker 3: were given the schematics by Germany as a participant in
- 1:11:07Speaker 3: this program.
- 1:11:08Speaker 4: Siemens has a pretty long history backstory with the CIA,
- 1:11:11Speaker 4: I believe.
- 1:11:12Speaker 3: Yeah, that's another episode probably, Yeah.
- 1:11:16Speaker 1: It is.
- 1:11:16Speaker 3: Yeah, because actually in the nineties the Germans were training
- 1:11:18Speaker 3: the Iranian intelligence on how to do intelops against the West.
- 1:11:21Speaker 3: So that's a whole other thing. But they had kind
- 1:11:25Speaker 3: of cleaned up their act by the early two thousands
- 1:11:27Speaker 3: and they were actually helping us at that point. But yeah,
- 1:11:29Speaker 3: it was the B and D. The B and D
- 1:11:31Speaker 3: is also the one that owned the curveball asset in
- 1:11:33Speaker 3: the nineteen nineties that gave us false information about the
- 1:11:36Speaker 3: weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. So that's another Germany contribution.
- 1:11:39Speaker 1: Home run.
- 1:11:40Speaker 2: Yeah, thanks, No, it's.
- 1:11:42Speaker 3: A curve ball, not a home run. Yeah, but uh yeah.
- 1:11:47Speaker 3: So what happened was they put they got these zero
- 1:11:49Speaker 3: day exploits, which means exploits that you know, the moment
- 1:11:54Speaker 3: you use them, they disappear, right, they lose their efficacy
- 1:11:56Speaker 3: because they're so bad. They's so they attack of vulnerability
- 1:11:59Speaker 3: in such a way that you can only use it once.
- 1:12:00Speaker 3: It's like a one shot thing. The US came up
- 1:12:03Speaker 3: with a couple of them that were within the chain
- 1:12:06Speaker 3: of reactor elements there, so it wasn't just the centrifugees.
- 1:12:10Speaker 3: It was other stuff in there as well, in natons,
- 1:12:13Speaker 3: And what they're able to do was actually slow down
- 1:12:16Speaker 3: the centrifuges on demand using this kind of program sequence
- 1:12:20Speaker 3: on these things called programmable logic controllers or PLCs, and
- 1:12:24Speaker 3: it would basically speed them up and slow them down
- 1:12:26Speaker 3: and degrade the process of enrichment, but not destroy it
- 1:12:30Speaker 3: and also not let it happen perfectly. It was like
- 1:12:32Speaker 3: the perfect gray area in between where it was just
- 1:12:35Speaker 3: enough to degrade the activity. It was pretty brilliant and
- 1:12:39Speaker 3: it was done with these zero day exploits. The real
- 1:12:41Speaker 3: win there is not the zero days, because there are
- 1:12:44Speaker 3: zero days everywhere. It was that they were able to
- 1:12:46Speaker 3: jump an air gap, which means the reactor system was
- 1:12:50Speaker 3: separate on it was not on a network that was
- 1:12:52Speaker 3: attached to anything. They were able to actually jump the
- 1:12:55Speaker 3: air gap between a computer attached to the world and
- 1:12:58Speaker 3: a computer not attached to anything. This was the pure
- 1:13:02Speaker 3: stroke of genius in stuck snet.
- 1:13:04Speaker 4: And is there any idea how they did that? Did
- 1:13:07Speaker 4: they have somebody like put a USB stick into it?
- 1:13:10Speaker 4: How did that come about?
- 1:13:11Speaker 3: That's exactly what happens. So there's actually a control laptop
- 1:13:14Speaker 3: in there in the in the reactor sub bay where
- 1:13:17Speaker 3: you know it's it's this computer that's hooked up because
- 1:13:20Speaker 3: program will logic controllers use machine language to work, and
- 1:13:24Speaker 3: that laptop has to kind of work with the machine language,
- 1:13:26Speaker 3: you know, without getting too technical, it's basically like a
- 1:13:28Speaker 3: way for the human to interface with the machine language.
- 1:13:31Speaker 3: And that gentleman did go in there with a USB
- 1:13:33Speaker 3: thumb drive that gentleman was unwitting to what he was doing,
- 1:13:37Speaker 3: put the thumb drive in there and was able to
- 1:13:39Speaker 3: deliver the exploit package to the reactor system.
- 1:13:45Speaker 1: And this is all don't take don't leave your laptops,
- 1:13:48Speaker 1: your USB's around hot ladies, guys, just remember that.
- 1:13:52Speaker 3: Yeah, Actually we had a problem. I was at NSA
- 1:13:54Speaker 3: at this time, and we had a problem because we
- 1:13:56Speaker 3: had USB's also in our computers back then, and as
- 1:14:00Speaker 3: soon as the exploit was getting developed, all of us
- 1:14:03Speaker 3: in the whole NSA enterprise had to switch out our
- 1:14:07Speaker 3: laptops and change everything, and all the USB imports were
- 1:14:09Speaker 3: disabled because there was a counter intelligence concern that once
- 1:14:12Speaker 3: we use this zero day it will be understood and
- 1:14:14Speaker 3: will immediately we'll all be exploited.
- 1:14:16Speaker 1: I mean, there's just so much more, like, so much
- 1:14:19Speaker 1: to cover, you know, in conjunction obviously with stucks net,
- 1:14:24Speaker 1: you know, we do. Obama or administration was trying to
- 1:14:29Speaker 1: made it happen. It took a few years to get
- 1:14:32Speaker 1: the JCPOA together. Let's talk a little bit about that
- 1:14:36Speaker 1: and how it came, how it came up, how it
- 1:14:39Speaker 1: was established.
- 1:14:41Speaker 3: Yeah, so basically what you had was these five countries
- 1:14:44Speaker 3: plus Germany, so the five countries of the National Security
- 1:14:46Speaker 3: Council or the UN Security Council representatives and Germany P
- 1:14:52Speaker 3: five plus one is what it was called. And they
- 1:14:55Speaker 3: all had the shared interest of basically using kind of
- 1:14:58Speaker 3: an atoms for peace approach, which is the Eisenhower idea
- 1:15:01Speaker 3: of how countries should have nuclear programs, like let them
- 1:15:03Speaker 3: have it, but let us participate in it. That was
- 1:15:06Speaker 3: the kind of concept that was there. So they're trying
- 1:15:07Speaker 3: to like make it a new way to do that
- 1:15:09Speaker 3: where instead of obliterating their nuclear program, because if you
- 1:15:13Speaker 3: tell people they can't have something, they tend to go
- 1:15:15Speaker 3: want to get it. So instead, let's actually participate in
- 1:15:17Speaker 3: their nuclear program. And this is Russia there also in China,
- 1:15:20Speaker 3: so like there are actors who are actually aligned with
- 1:15:22Speaker 3: the Iran that were willing to come in there and
- 1:15:24Speaker 3: help out to make sure that Iran could have a
- 1:15:26Speaker 3: peaceful nuclear research program but not weapons. And the best
- 1:15:29Speaker 3: way to know that is to be really close to
- 1:15:31Speaker 3: the program and see it and observe it and know like, okay,
- 1:15:34Speaker 3: they're not enriching past x percentage. And so John Kerrey
- 1:15:38Speaker 3: actually went there and met with Mohammed Zarif in Switzerland
- 1:15:41Speaker 3: numerous times. They had laid hours and hours of time
- 1:15:43Speaker 3: together talking about this and actually like really working this
- 1:15:46Speaker 3: out all in secret, Like the world knew the negotiations
- 1:15:49Speaker 3: were happening, but we didn't know what the substance of
- 1:15:51Speaker 3: the negotiations.
- 1:15:52Speaker 1: Yeah, we weren't screaming that stuff on like Twitter or
- 1:15:55Speaker 1: anything like that.
- 1:15:56Speaker 3: Yeah. So in twenty fifteen, we finally reached that agreement.
- 1:16:00Speaker 3: The thing was, this was a nuclear agreement, not a
- 1:16:02Speaker 3: comprehensive treaty with Iran or something. So it was missing
- 1:16:05Speaker 3: the ballistic missile component, it was missing the surrogate force component.
- 1:16:10Speaker 3: This was where a lot of the backlash came to
- 1:16:12Speaker 3: this agreement because people said, well, this isn't covering Hasbola,
- 1:16:15Speaker 3: it's not covering ICBMs, And the thing was like, well, yeah,
- 1:16:18Speaker 3: that's not what this is about. This is about nuclear
- 1:16:20Speaker 3: research and nuclear weapons specific. It's very specific, and if
- 1:16:24Speaker 3: you read the JCPOA, it's extremely specific. It's just the program.
- 1:16:28Speaker 3: And it was a victory in its own, like, it's
- 1:16:30Speaker 3: amazing that we even got to that point because we
- 1:16:31Speaker 3: disagreed in a lot of things as country I mean
- 1:16:33Speaker 3: five countries, Russia and China agreed in this thing with
- 1:16:36Speaker 3: the United States. That's amazing, not just the Iran that
- 1:16:39Speaker 3: Iran agreed, but that those two countries agreed. Right, So
- 1:16:43Speaker 3: we had that twenty fifteen, and Trump, when he was
- 1:16:48Speaker 3: elected in twenty sixteen, immediately began saying that they were
- 1:16:51Speaker 3: going to withdraw from it. And so twenty seventeen the
- 1:16:55Speaker 3: withdrawal threats grew louder and louder, and the twenty eighteen
- 1:16:58Speaker 3: he finally withdrew and also kicked Iran out of the
- 1:17:00Speaker 3: Swift banking system. Swift is the system you used to
- 1:17:03Speaker 3: actually have, you know, finance transfers across the world, so
- 1:17:06Speaker 3: that means Iran was cut off from the world banking system.
- 1:17:09Speaker 3: We ramped up sanctions, we pulled out of the nuclear agreement,
- 1:17:11Speaker 3: and instead of Iran like immediately going and building a
- 1:17:13Speaker 3: nuclear bomb, they stayed on the diplomatic track and tried
- 1:17:17Speaker 3: to slowly, slowly get back to the plan. They said, look,
- 1:17:21Speaker 3: we're going to do this ratcheted program where if you
- 1:17:24Speaker 3: don't agree by this point, we're going to do this thing.
- 1:17:25Speaker 3: If you don't agree on the next thing, we're going
- 1:17:27Speaker 3: to do this thing, and they actually laid it out
- 1:17:28Speaker 3: and they did that. They ratcheted up in Richmond, for example,
- 1:17:30Speaker 3: very slowly. You know, they said, okay, next time.
- 1:17:33Speaker 1: There was a bunch of other countries involved in this.
- 1:17:35Speaker 1: It wasn't just US in the It wasn't by lad.
- 1:17:37Speaker 3: Or right right. The problem is it was an executive
- 1:17:41Speaker 3: action on the US side. It wasn't a treaty, which
- 1:17:46Speaker 3: means that any president, as the executive has the ability
- 1:17:48Speaker 3: to pull out of it. There's nothing wrong with that, Like,
- 1:17:50Speaker 3: that's how it's designed. That's supposed to be that way. So,
- 1:17:53Speaker 3: you know, because we in the US knew. I remember,
- 1:17:55Speaker 3: if you remember, this was a Republican controlled Senate when
- 1:17:57Speaker 3: this thing was first thought up, and Republican controlled Congress
- 1:18:00Speaker 3: who did not agree with the JCPOA from the very beginning.
- 1:18:03Speaker 3: So you know, Obama knew that, like, hey, I can't
- 1:18:05Speaker 3: make this into a treaty. I have to do an
- 1:18:07Speaker 3: executive agreement instead, because Congress will never approve they have
- 1:18:09Speaker 3: to ratify a treaty. They'll never approve it.
- 1:18:11Speaker 1: Why would they? Why would they do that? Right, a
- 1:18:14Speaker 1: treaty to stop the enrichment of uranium and to not
- 1:18:17Speaker 1: have another country that is looked at as a belligerent
- 1:18:20Speaker 1: country to you and says, get a nuclear weapon. Why
- 1:18:22Speaker 1: would Congress ever act in the interest of the world
- 1:18:25Speaker 1: or the United States? It's wild to me.
- 1:18:27Speaker 3: Well they thought it just you know, it's missing Hesbola
- 1:18:29Speaker 3: and the ICBMs.
- 1:18:30Speaker 1: And that's that's the problem. I get it. Yeah, yeah,
- 1:18:32Speaker 1: that's what fast forwards. Can we be honest?
- 1:18:35Speaker 3: So we fast forward and Trump has now made Iran
- 1:18:38Speaker 3: the most sanctioned country on the planet. This was twenty
- 1:18:40Speaker 3: eighteen when Pompeo was the Sex State and all that
- 1:18:46Speaker 3: before he was CIA director, and that was his plan
- 1:18:50Speaker 3: was basically like, hey, instead of like negotiating with them,
- 1:18:52Speaker 3: let's sanction them into submission. And I've said this before.
- 1:18:55Speaker 3: Sanctions are perfectly designed to hurt a capitalist economy. They're
- 1:19:00Speaker 3: terrible on an authoritarian government because authoritarian governments already have
- 1:19:04Speaker 3: their own access to assets. They don't care about the
- 1:19:06Speaker 3: regular economic system enriching them. They don't care if the
- 1:19:10Speaker 3: people are harmed and starving. And so we had over
- 1:19:12Speaker 3: seven hundred and fifty sanctions on them after twenty nineteen,
- 1:19:15Speaker 3: and it actually made them richer. And there's a graph
- 1:19:17Speaker 3: that I have in my book that you can look
- 1:19:19Speaker 3: at where it's like an upward pointing arrow. As soon
- 1:19:22Speaker 3: as we pulled out a swift, pulled them out of swift.
- 1:19:24Speaker 3: As soon as we sanctioned them. Every year they're riches
- 1:19:28Speaker 3: of that small group of elites running the country doubled.
- 1:19:31Speaker 3: It made them extremely wealthy because now no Iranian can
- 1:19:35Speaker 3: participate in the banking system, even regular ones. So guess
- 1:19:38Speaker 3: who controls the banks in the country. The IERGC now
- 1:19:41Speaker 3: controls the entire black market, and they're taxing you and
- 1:19:44Speaker 3: charging you. If you want an iPhone and Iran you
- 1:19:46Speaker 3: can have it. It's just four thousand dollars and all
- 1:19:48Speaker 3: that overhead money goes to the IERGC. So it basically
- 1:19:52Speaker 3: served to enrich the government and the people that run
- 1:19:54Speaker 3: the government and their families and all that. They're super
- 1:19:56Speaker 3: wealthy now because of how we exited the JCPOA.
- 1:20:01Speaker 1: And as we're exiting the JCPOA, and that's you know,
- 1:20:05Speaker 1: beginning to slowly fall apart, well least on our end
- 1:20:09Speaker 1: after sanctioning them and all that. Our intel network inside
- 1:20:13Speaker 1: of Iran was compromised twenty nineteen.
- 1:20:16Speaker 3: Yeah, yes, so we had a lot of human recruited
- 1:20:20Speaker 3: assets inside of Iran that we were meeting with inside
- 1:20:22Speaker 3: of Iran, not just CIA, but also some dd very
- 1:20:26Speaker 3: specialized collection entities working in there, and they were using
- 1:20:31Speaker 3: certain ways of communicating that got compromised. Once one of
- 1:20:36Speaker 3: those was compromised, the regime was able to analyze that
- 1:20:39Speaker 3: and look for patterns and how that communication happened across
- 1:20:43Speaker 3: the Internet, and they were able to identify many, many
- 1:20:45Speaker 3: recruited assets that also used that communication method. And the
- 1:20:49Speaker 3: truth is, we got kind of complacent with our covert
- 1:20:51Speaker 3: communication methods and started using the same ones over and
- 1:20:54Speaker 3: over with multiple assets, which allowed them to be compromised
- 1:20:57Speaker 3: once that communication method was discovered. And so what the
- 1:21:00Speaker 3: regime did was they let the meetings go on for
- 1:21:03Speaker 3: a while, and they actually let they capture some of
- 1:21:06Speaker 3: the recordings of those meetings and then publicize them, kind
- 1:21:09Speaker 3: of what the Cubans did in the nineteen eighties when
- 1:21:11Speaker 3: they there's a bunch of double agents in Cuba, very
- 1:21:14Speaker 3: similar thing. The Russians actually released video of US dead
- 1:21:16Speaker 3: drops and stuff like that with sources inside of Cuba.
- 1:21:19Speaker 3: So the Iranians did that. They capture a lot of
- 1:21:21Speaker 3: these Iranians that we're working with. The US executed them.
- 1:21:26Speaker 3: So then we're left with no assets in Iran almost
- 1:21:28Speaker 3: like let's say almost none. Well, who still has assets
- 1:21:31Speaker 3: in Iran Israel? So now the US has to rely
- 1:21:35Speaker 3: on Israeli gathered intelligence, like filtered through Israeli intelligence systems
- 1:21:40Speaker 3: and released to us what they have proved to be
- 1:21:43Speaker 3: released to us. That's the intel that we now have
- 1:21:45Speaker 3: on human intelligence in Iran. We still have signals, intelligence
- 1:21:48Speaker 3: and other mechanisms, but the human is now reduced to
- 1:21:52Speaker 3: a third country providing it to us. Every country has
- 1:21:55Speaker 3: their own interests, every country, Even when we share intelligence
- 1:21:58Speaker 3: with the British or whomever, we have decided what we
- 1:22:01Speaker 3: will share and how we will share it for our
- 1:22:03Speaker 3: own interests. It's not because we love them, right, and
- 1:22:06Speaker 3: Israel is the same way. I'm not making it, I'm
- 1:22:07Speaker 3: not defending them, but I'm just saying, like, you cannot
- 1:22:09Speaker 3: expect them to share the raw stuff because that's just
- 1:22:11Speaker 3: not how it happens. Yeah, yeah, exactly exactly. So that
- 1:22:14Speaker 3: means that we probably got some biased intelligence about the
- 1:22:17Speaker 3: situation on the ground in Iran.
- 1:22:19Speaker 1: So I mean we had like the National Assessment intelligence
- 1:22:24Speaker 1: assessment that was obviously flying in the like you know,
- 1:22:28Speaker 1: going up against what Israel was giving us and telling
- 1:22:30Speaker 1: us over the last like year or so, or obviously
- 1:22:34Speaker 1: probably before June or twenty five after when we hit
- 1:22:37Speaker 1: the nuclear reactors, saying that they weren't I mean, they
- 1:22:42Speaker 1: had enriched geranium so sixty percent, but they weren't actively
- 1:22:45Speaker 1: going at it. And the weaponization part was still like
- 1:22:48Speaker 1: a year or so away, And particularly after the bombing
- 1:22:53Speaker 1: in June of twenty twenty five, when we obliterated quote
- 1:22:56Speaker 1: unquote their nuclear program, you know, there was no indication
- 1:23:00Speaker 1: of any enrichment whatsoever anymore. So why don't we go
- 1:23:06Speaker 1: into Iran this time?
- 1:23:09Speaker 3: Yeah? So there's these deeply buried facilities that Jack was mentioning.
- 1:23:13Speaker 3: We had this whole program about like how do we
- 1:23:14Speaker 3: penetrate these deeply buried assets and how do we use
- 1:23:17Speaker 3: either weapons to do that or how do we breach them.
- 1:23:20Speaker 3: There's like a whole you know, package designed for these
- 1:23:23Speaker 3: types of activities. There's a whole element within Jaysock that
- 1:23:25Speaker 3: does this. And the reason they had designed that is
- 1:23:28Speaker 3: because they thought that that threat was real. Right. Sometimes
- 1:23:31Speaker 3: when you have a tool, you want to use it.
- 1:23:33Speaker 3: And when someone comes to you and says Hey, that threat,
- 1:23:36Speaker 3: that thing you have that you can use, that threat exists,
- 1:23:38Speaker 3: you should use it. And I'm not I'm kind of
- 1:23:41Speaker 3: oversimplifying here, but that's kind of how the case was
- 1:23:43Speaker 3: made to the United States that you have an opportunity,
- 1:23:45Speaker 3: You have a one time opportunity. Right now. The regime
- 1:23:48Speaker 3: is weak, their air defenses are poor. We have we
- 1:23:51Speaker 3: can create air superiorities that you can go in there
- 1:23:53Speaker 3: and destroy this and you can have a win, just
- 1:23:55Speaker 3: like you had in Venezuela. This is how it was
- 1:23:57Speaker 3: framed and it was believed. And again, we don't have
- 1:24:02Speaker 3: human assets in Iran the way that we used to,
- 1:24:04Speaker 3: so we couldn't really verify even if we wanted to,
- 1:24:07Speaker 3: We couldn't easily verify that that was true. Like to
- 1:24:10Speaker 3: be able to know what's going on in underground facility,
- 1:24:13Speaker 3: you can't really rely on segant, Right, these are deep things.
- 1:24:16Speaker 3: You cannot even if someone brought a cell phone in there,
- 1:24:18Speaker 3: the cell phone won't work because it just can't. There's
- 1:24:20Speaker 3: no transmission between that person and outside the facility.
- 1:24:23Speaker 1: Right.
- 1:24:24Speaker 3: If you've ever been in a tunnel that you know,
- 1:24:25Speaker 3: you understand how this works. That means you need a
- 1:24:27Speaker 3: human source to go in there, or use measurement and
- 1:24:29Speaker 3: signature intelligence or Amazon't to measure soil movement density, the
- 1:24:34Speaker 3: weight of vehicles, did different things like that, But that
- 1:24:37Speaker 3: can only give you inferential information. You can't make deductions
- 1:24:41Speaker 3: based on mazont alone. You have to have human to
- 1:24:44Speaker 3: corroborate the Mazon't. Well, Israel's the human. We have the Mazont.
- 1:24:50Speaker 3: We can see that earth has been moved. We can
- 1:24:52Speaker 3: see that very heavy vehicles that are heavier now than
- 1:24:55Speaker 3: they were when they got there have left. So we
- 1:24:58Speaker 3: can see that something has happened here. We need to
- 1:25:00Speaker 3: fill in the blanks. Well, Israel says, We'll fill the
- 1:25:02Speaker 3: blanks in for you. They're enriching uranium.
- 1:25:05Speaker 2: We know it.
- 1:25:05Speaker 3: Here's what we've collected and it was believed. And it's
- 1:25:09Speaker 3: hard because we can't just go recruit an asset today
- 1:25:12Speaker 3: and be like, hey man, can you go check that
- 1:25:13Speaker 3: out for me and let me know if that's true. Right,
- 1:25:15Speaker 3: It's super tough to verify this stuff. And we've talked
- 1:25:18Speaker 3: about this with battle damage assessment. Even during the war,
- 1:25:20Speaker 3: we don't really know if we've destroyed that transporter erector
- 1:25:23Speaker 3: launcher really until it fires another missile because we say, oh,
- 1:25:26Speaker 3: it wasn't actually destroyed, because you could blow up the tires,
- 1:25:29Speaker 3: you could damage the erector, you could damage part of
- 1:25:32Speaker 3: the tail fin. The thing's still going to go. You know,
- 1:25:35Speaker 3: It's really tough unless you have a guy there saying
- 1:25:37Speaker 3: like it's actually destroyed, or I'm the guy that operates it.
- 1:25:40Speaker 3: I'm not gonna hit the button because you're paying me
- 1:25:42Speaker 3: not to hit the button. Like that's human, right, So
- 1:25:45Speaker 3: there's like two different ways you could go after that.
- 1:25:47Speaker 3: We don't have any of that. In January, when this
- 1:25:50Speaker 3: delegation came to convince our country's leadership to go do
- 1:25:54Speaker 3: this operation, I.
- 1:25:55Speaker 1: Hear you, right, and like you obviously know that, and
- 1:25:59Speaker 1: that they're that their human intelligence that they would be
- 1:26:01Speaker 1: feeding us would be tainted or biased. Why didn't How
- 1:26:08Speaker 1: didn't they know that? Like how wasn't that taken into
- 1:26:11Speaker 1: into the assessment? I guess generally it was right, because
- 1:26:15Speaker 1: like the actual national intelligence assessment was like they're not
- 1:26:18Speaker 1: doing it, but in the room, like you know. That's
- 1:26:24Speaker 1: why I wanted to talk about the intelligence that led
- 1:26:26Speaker 1: up to this, because it seems kind of sort of
- 1:26:30Speaker 1: like Echoes of Iraq, but in a different type of
- 1:26:34Speaker 1: flavor and maybe a little like turbo charge a little bit.
- 1:26:36Speaker 1: But you know, and it's it's wild to me because
- 1:26:40Speaker 1: there's a lot of smart people out there doing this,
- 1:26:43Speaker 1: and how we can continue to make the same mistake
- 1:26:46Speaker 1: over and over and over again because we knew how
- 1:26:49Speaker 1: it would play out. Maybe we didn't know that they
- 1:26:50Speaker 1: would bomb the region. You know that all the all
- 1:26:53Speaker 1: of our bases and all of our allies in the region.
- 1:26:56Speaker 1: We knew that they would close the straight off hor moves.
- 1:26:58Speaker 1: We knew it.
- 1:27:00Speaker 4: Well, you are a policy decision that's already been made
- 1:27:04Speaker 4: in search of a WMD crisis to justify it, and
- 1:27:10Speaker 4: humans are.
- 1:27:10Speaker 1: Not mystic Iraq, go ahead, I'm sorry, Joe.
- 1:27:13Speaker 3: Well, humans are just so optimistic, like we see a problem,
- 1:27:15Speaker 3: we're like, no, it has to be the best outcome.
- 1:27:17Speaker 3: And it's very hard for us to like wind ourselves
- 1:27:20Speaker 3: down and be like, wait a minute, it might not
- 1:27:21Speaker 3: actually work out the way we hope it does. Like
- 1:27:23Speaker 3: look back to Desert one, nineteen eighty Operation Eagle Claw.
- 1:27:26Speaker 3: You know when they're briefing that to the president, that
- 1:27:29Speaker 3: is a wild operation. Like if you look at like
- 1:27:31Speaker 3: how it was designed, like this is crazy that you
- 1:27:33Speaker 3: guys have all these like logistics hubs and FARPs and
- 1:27:36Speaker 3: like there's no way, like even like getting to the
- 1:27:38Speaker 3: desert was incredible that they even got to the desert,
- 1:27:40Speaker 3: Like the desert was supposed to be a refueling point
- 1:27:42Speaker 3: where they continue to terran like hundreds of kilometers north
- 1:27:44Speaker 3: like you kidding me, But like people look at that
- 1:27:47Speaker 3: and they're like, this could work, guys, this could work,
- 1:27:50Speaker 3: you know. And it's very similar like when you all
- 1:27:51Speaker 3: want the same thing, it's like you don't need very
- 1:27:53Speaker 3: much pushing to go do it, you know. And and
- 1:27:57Speaker 3: Trump has wanted this, the people in National Security Council
- 1:27:59Speaker 3: have wanted this. Rubio, even though he probably doesn't like
- 1:28:02Speaker 3: the way the war is going, he's from a Cuban
- 1:28:05Speaker 3: family that fled from an authoritarian state, Like somewhere in
- 1:28:08Speaker 3: his soul he's like, we need to get rid of
- 1:28:09Speaker 3: these authoritarians like other bad guys, and oh there's a
- 1:28:12Speaker 3: threat right now, we should go do something about that,
- 1:28:14Speaker 3: you know. So and I think there was only what
- 1:28:16Speaker 3: eight guys in the room on the US side when
- 1:28:17Speaker 3: this was briefed, Like there weren't experts sitting there to
- 1:28:20Speaker 3: like say, hold on guys, have you thought about this?
- 1:28:23Speaker 3: Or guys that at least had served in Sentcom during
- 1:28:25Speaker 3: the Gulf War and they were like, hey, we remember
- 1:28:27Speaker 3: this back. You remember back at their tanker war nineteen
- 1:28:29Speaker 3: eighty eight when we had Operation Praying Mantis and we
- 1:28:32Speaker 3: had to like try to reflag the Kuwaiti vessels and
- 1:28:34Speaker 3: protect them in the straits of Horror moves and that
- 1:28:35Speaker 3: didn't work out very well, and we accidentally shot down
- 1:28:38Speaker 3: a civilian aircraft with one of our aircraft carriers, Like
- 1:28:40Speaker 3: you remember, you remember that? Like there wasn't anyone in
- 1:28:43Speaker 3: the room to like bring that up and like remind
- 1:28:45Speaker 3: them of this. These were civilian leaders, which is how
- 1:28:47Speaker 3: our government designed civilian leadership. Sitting there without any expertise.
- 1:28:51Speaker 3: There wasn't like the depth of bench of National Security
- 1:28:54Speaker 3: Council advisors in there that you would expect. It was
- 1:28:57Speaker 3: people that just don't understand the problem. Hearing people that
- 1:28:59Speaker 3: the trust as experts, which is the Israeli briefers, telling
- 1:29:03Speaker 3: them like this is real. You guys can probably win
- 1:29:06Speaker 3: pretty good chance, you know, and even with intelligence, like
- 1:29:09Speaker 3: it's never one hundred percent, even if we have great,
- 1:29:12Speaker 3: great data, you still never know, Like there could always
- 1:29:14Speaker 3: be some black swan event that comes up and like
- 1:29:15Speaker 3: disrupts this whole thing. You know, I mentioned the Tito's Partisans,
- 1:29:19Speaker 3: like they luckily succeeded. Wasn't necessarily going to be that way,
- 1:29:24Speaker 3: you know. So these guys went in there and basically
- 1:29:27Speaker 3: convinced some layman with a lot of power to do
- 1:29:30Speaker 3: something that was probably a bad idea.
- 1:29:33Speaker 2: And where does that leave us today?
- 1:29:35Speaker 4: That it seems like I know, people are maybe allergic
- 1:29:38Speaker 4: to the term forever war, and maybe I don't want
- 1:29:40Speaker 4: to go that far myself, but it does seem like
- 1:29:43Speaker 4: a war that has as of now, no end state,
- 1:29:45Speaker 4: there's no strategic end goal. And is it just going
- 1:29:49Speaker 4: to continue on until the next administration when they negotiate
- 1:29:53Speaker 4: some sort of settlement. I mean, what do you how
- 1:29:56Speaker 4: do you see this playing out over the next couple
- 1:29:58Speaker 4: of years.
- 1:29:59Speaker 3: The way it's right now, it looks like the regime
- 1:30:01Speaker 3: is going to be stronger than it was when the
- 1:30:03Speaker 3: war started. But before the war started, I mean, and
- 1:30:07Speaker 3: that's a result of how we are handling the situation.
- 1:30:09Speaker 3: We the West, we the United States. There's still opportunity
- 1:30:13Speaker 3: to turn things around if we had the political acumen
- 1:30:15Speaker 3: to do so, but it seems that we're not willing
- 1:30:17Speaker 3: to use that acumen. Instead, it's it's very hard for
- 1:30:21Speaker 3: us to admit that we might have been wrong about
- 1:30:22Speaker 3: something we did and turn left or turn right and
- 1:30:25Speaker 3: go the other way. Instead, we're kind of digging our heels.
- 1:30:28Speaker 3: And I, like I mentioned, I was talking about Iranian
- 1:30:31Speaker 3: this morning and he was he was talking about the war,
- 1:30:33Speaker 3: and I was telling him, like, you haven't heard them
- 1:30:35Speaker 3: mention the Iranian people recently, have you? No, it's about
- 1:30:39Speaker 3: the straits of Hormus. Suddenly, wasn't it about the ballistic
- 1:30:42Speaker 3: missiles at the beginning, wasn't about the nuclear program? Like
- 1:30:45Speaker 3: what happened to all those objectives? It was so hard
- 1:30:47Speaker 3: to even hear what the objectives were in the beginning,
- 1:30:49Speaker 3: and now it's like the objectives are just a new
- 1:30:51Speaker 3: set of objectives.
- 1:30:52Speaker 1: There weren't very many objectives either. I remember when they
- 1:30:54Speaker 1: first we first started bombing them in February twenty eighth,
- 1:30:58Speaker 1: like we didn't know what the plan was. There was
- 1:31:01Speaker 1: no plan, there was no actual I guess like they
- 1:31:04Speaker 1: had targets. And I think what they're doing is cherry picking,
- 1:31:07Speaker 1: like Sandcom, Like what Sandcom's picking to kill and being like, oh, yeah,
- 1:31:12Speaker 1: that's our that's our strategy. Inst like we're blowing up
- 1:31:15Speaker 1: ballistic missiles or we're blown up where they build ballistic
- 1:31:17Speaker 1: missiles on the ground or navy ships. So we took
- 1:31:20Speaker 1: out their navy. We took out their ballistic missiles. Meanwhile,
- 1:31:23Speaker 1: we have it, you know, at least like they've reconstituted it.
- 1:31:27Speaker 1: You know, we've got nowhere and we see plus stuck
- 1:31:30Speaker 1: in this escalation spiral.
- 1:31:31Speaker 3: That's the other problem is at Sencom, Like you've got
- 1:31:34Speaker 3: these spreadsheets with targets on them, right, some of those
- 1:31:36Speaker 3: targets were put on that spreadsheet in like nineteen ninety
- 1:31:39Speaker 3: three and they haven't been validated, and they just like
- 1:31:41Speaker 3: get turned over and turned over, and these spreadsheets are
- 1:31:44Speaker 3: just like continuing through like this is how targeting works.
- 1:31:46Speaker 3: You're like, Okay, what's the great coordinate for this location?
- 1:31:48Speaker 3: Is that still valid? We think so, like it's still
- 1:31:50Speaker 3: physically there. I can see it on the imagery, like
- 1:31:52Speaker 3: let's blow it up. But you have no idea if
- 1:31:54Speaker 3: that thing is still what you think it was back
- 1:31:55Speaker 3: then when you put that on the spreadsheet.
- 1:31:57Speaker 1: Blew up that that girls' school.
- 1:31:59Speaker 3: I mean you can even see the satellite imagery of
- 1:32:01Speaker 3: that school, like in the past five years, how it's
- 1:32:04Speaker 3: been built up around that facility that we were trying
- 1:32:06Speaker 3: to strike, and like we just didn't have We didn't
- 1:32:08Speaker 3: use that imagery. We used a spreadsheet that said this
- 1:32:11Speaker 3: is an IRGC target, and we struck on Google.
- 1:32:14Speaker 1: It actually says something whatever school, you know.
- 1:32:18Speaker 3: Yeah, but we don't use Google. We use our own
- 1:32:20Speaker 3: proprietary you know stuff. And the way it's literally a
- 1:32:23Speaker 3: spreadsheet that has like the targeting on it. It's got
- 1:32:26Speaker 3: the MGRS, the tended to grid on it, and like
- 1:32:27Speaker 3: some other stuff on there, and you're like, this looks
- 1:32:30Speaker 3: like a target. And we did the same thing in
- 1:32:32Speaker 3: Operation Allied Force in nineteen ninety nine. We bombed the
- 1:32:34Speaker 3: Chinese embassy by accident because we had a grid that
- 1:32:37Speaker 3: we thought was an enemy grid and it was wrong.
- 1:32:40Speaker 3: It was it was like a number off and we
- 1:32:42Speaker 3: didn't validate the target. We just blew it up.
- 1:32:44Speaker 1: Oh yeah, yeah, I don't know. I didn't even think
- 1:32:47Speaker 1: about an ending to this show.
- 1:32:48Speaker 3: But uh, well there is no ending, just like the war.
- 1:32:52Speaker 1: Yeah, it's still going. We're actually on day six now
- 1:32:54Speaker 1: of continuous bombing every night by the US into Iran
- 1:32:59Speaker 1: and Iran shooting and missiles at you know, our allies,
- 1:33:04Speaker 1: our bases and stuff. I mean I I in a
- 1:33:07Speaker 1: few years from now, when this actual comes out, like
- 1:33:09Speaker 1: the actualist battle damage assessment comes out, I would not
- 1:33:14Speaker 1: be surprised if it was like twenty or thirty billion
- 1:33:16Speaker 1: dollars worth of damage like on our radar systems and
- 1:33:18Speaker 1: everything like that. And around the area. Our fifth Fleet
- 1:33:22Speaker 1: HQ is essentially fucking abandoned. You know, our aircraft carriers
- 1:33:26Speaker 1: are hanging out like three hundred and fifty miles into
- 1:33:28Speaker 1: the Gulf of Aman. Yeah, you know they're not We're
- 1:33:32Speaker 1: not exactly showing our you know, walking around. Yeah, we're
- 1:33:37Speaker 1: not strutting around at all. We're at a safe distance.
- 1:33:41Speaker 1: And it's it almost makes you think, like, what's the
- 1:33:45Speaker 1: what's the actual point I know, not just of our
- 1:33:47Speaker 1: aircraft carriers, but in terms of like projecting power in
- 1:33:51Speaker 1: any way.
- 1:33:51Speaker 4: Right, Yes, we've got the Navy can't secure freedom of
- 1:33:54Speaker 4: navigation through the strengths of her moves.
- 1:33:56Speaker 2: It's like, why do we have a navy? Explain that
- 1:33:59Speaker 2: to me, especially aircraft carriers.
- 1:34:03Speaker 1: Yeah, makes no sense. It's just a big target. It's
- 1:34:06Speaker 1: a big target. It's a big target that's got probably
- 1:34:10Speaker 1: thirty billion dollars of hardware on it, plus five thousand people.
- 1:34:15Speaker 3: But hey, it gave people jobs in Virginia to manufacture it.
- 1:34:19Speaker 1: Yeah, it's pro economy, it's pro business. Good god, guys,
- 1:34:23Speaker 1: I never feel good better about these ever. I think
- 1:34:25Speaker 1: I'm done. I think I'm gonna quit this show. I'm
- 1:34:28Speaker 1: gonna do like a good news show. We're gonna talk
- 1:34:30Speaker 1: about like dogs getting adopted and shit like that, or
- 1:34:32Speaker 1: like a cancer or like cancer research that's working out,
- 1:34:36Speaker 1: and like people you might cure cancer because this this.
- 1:34:40Speaker 1: I mean, I don't even know how you guys worked
- 1:34:41Speaker 1: in this fucking business, to be honest, it's ridiculous.
- 1:34:46Speaker 3: Yeah, it's pretty crazy.
- 1:34:47Speaker 1: Yeah, it's fucking crazy, all right, So obviously we'll keep
- 1:34:52Speaker 1: our eyes on it like that. There's so much more
- 1:34:56Speaker 1: we could get into. Obviously, we like basically just uh
- 1:34:59Speaker 1: gol aw still over most like of this fifty or more,
- 1:35:02Speaker 1: you know, one hundred year history.
- 1:35:06Speaker 4: Thanks thanks, John, I mean you covered a lot of
- 1:35:08Speaker 4: ground in an hour and a half here.
- 1:35:10Speaker 3: Yeah, sorry for all the tangents, but I think the
- 1:35:11Speaker 3: context is super important.
- 1:35:13Speaker 1: Yeah, you're right. Yeah, the context is extremely important. You
- 1:35:17Speaker 1: guys want to read more. John's book Iran Shadow Weapons Incredible,
- 1:35:23Speaker 1: really goes into and shows you just you know, the
- 1:35:27Speaker 1: Iranians are working on a pretty They're pretty sophisticated bunch.
- 1:35:31Speaker 1: I'm not gonna lie to you know. So for us
- 1:35:33Speaker 1: to like underestimate them, which is what we've seem to
- 1:35:36Speaker 1: have done, has seemed to be a huge blunder, a
- 1:35:39Speaker 1: huge blunder, of course, Jack Murphy, The Most Dangerous Man
- 1:35:43Speaker 1: book is out now on Amazon, New York Times bestseller.
- 1:35:49Speaker 1: We can hope, no, no, we just once you say it,
- 1:35:51Speaker 1: it's true, so manifest.
- 1:35:53Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah, I'm a former New York Times bestseller, so
- 1:35:56Speaker 4: I can legitimately say so.
- 1:35:58Speaker 1: Yeah, I'm not even lying, Yeah, Jack, New York Times bestseller.
- 1:36:01Speaker 2: But not this book as far as I know.
- 1:36:03Speaker 1: The new book is called The Most Dangerous Man. It's
- 1:36:05Speaker 1: a lot of fun, It's incredible. Check that out and
- 1:36:09Speaker 1: do us a favor and go to our Patreon Patreon
- 1:36:11Speaker 1: dot com Slash the Teamhouse you get both Eyes On
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- 1:36:18Speaker 1: has the High Side with Sean Naylor where they do
- 1:36:20Speaker 1: a deep dive, investigative articles, incredible stuff. All those links
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- 1:36:26Speaker 1: guys and tell them you love them, you can go
- 1:36:28Speaker 1: to the links and do that. Don't DM me because
- 1:36:32Speaker 1: I don't love you. All right, A pleasure, guys, as always,
- 1:36:36Speaker 1: Thank you, all right, Thanks.
- 1:36:36Speaker 3: Guys, See you guys. Thanks, Hey, guys.
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