Latest / Marine Operations in Korea The Chosin Reservoir Campaign / 026 - Chapter 13 Part 1 - Regroupment at Hagaru

Transcript

026 - Chapter 13 Part 1 - Regroupment at Hagaru · Marine Operations in Korea The Chosin Reservoir Campaign

• 0:00
  Speaker 1: Chapter thirteen, Part one of US Marine Operations in Korea
• 0:05
  Speaker 1: nineteen fifty to nineteen fifty three, Volume three, The Chosen
• 0:09
  Speaker 1: Reservoir Campaign by Lynn Montross and Nicholas Canzona. This LibriVox
• 0:14
  Speaker 1: recording is in the public domain. Regroupment at Hagarou. The
• 0:21
  Speaker 1: Marines at Hagarou would have been astonished to learn how
• 0:24
  Speaker 1: much anxiety over there encirclement was being currently felt in
• 0:28
  Speaker 1: the United States. It had been a root shock for Americans,
• 0:32
  Speaker 1: who believed that the troops in Korea would be home
• 0:35
  Speaker 1: by Christmas, to realize that the unexpected Chinese intervention had
• 0:39
  Speaker 1: created virtually a new war. This war, moreover, was apparently
• 0:44
  Speaker 1: going against the UN forces. On Thanksgiving Day, the victory
• 0:48
  Speaker 1: over Communist aggression had seemed almost complete, Yet only a
• 0:52
  Speaker 1: week later, the headlines announced major reverses. The eighth Army
• 0:57
  Speaker 1: was in full retreat and an entire Mareriae Division was
• 1:00
  Speaker 1: said to be trapped. So disturbing were the reports from Korea,
• 1:06
  Speaker 1: newspaper readers and radio listeners could scarcely have imagined the
• 1:10
  Speaker 1: mood of confidence prevailing at Hagaroo after the arrival of
• 1:13
  Speaker 1: the troops from udem Knee. Even prior to that event,
• 1:18
  Speaker 1: few marines had any doubts as to the ability of
• 1:21
  Speaker 1: the division to fight its way out to the seacoast.
• 1:24
  Speaker 1: The Hagaroo perimeter presented a scene of bustling activity during
• 1:28
  Speaker 1: the first days of December. Trucks and jeeps bounced along
• 1:32
  Speaker 1: the bumpy roads in such numbers as to create a
• 1:35
  Speaker 1: traffic problem. Twin engine planes roared in and out of
• 1:39
  Speaker 1: the snow covered airstrip at frequent intervals throughout the daylight hours. Overhead,
• 1:44
  Speaker 1: the flying boxcars spilled a rainbow profusion of red, blue, yellow, green,
• 1:51
  Speaker 1: and orange parachutes to drift earthward with heavy loads of rations, gasoline,
• 1:56
  Speaker 1: and ammunition. The busy panorama even had its humorous aspects,
• 2:02
  Speaker 1: parka cladmarines displaying a five day growth of beard when
• 2:06
  Speaker 1: about with their cheeks bulging from an accumulation of Tutsi rolls,
• 2:10
  Speaker 1: a caramel confection much esteemed by Stateside youngsters for its
• 2:14
  Speaker 1: long lasting qualities. The post Exchange Section had originally brought
• 2:19
  Speaker 1: merchandise into Hagaroo on the assumption that it would be
• 2:22
  Speaker 1: established as a base. No space in vehicles was available
• 2:26
  Speaker 1: for its removal, and the commanding General directed that the
• 2:29
  Speaker 1: entire remaining stock thirteen thousand, five hundred forty seven dollars
• 2:33
  Speaker 1: and eighty cents worth, chiefly candies and cookies, should be
• 2:38
  Speaker 1: issued gratuitously to the troops. Tutsi rolls proved to be
• 2:42
  Speaker 1: a prime favorite with men who would have scorned them
• 2:45
  Speaker 1: in civilian life. Not only were they more tasty than
• 2:48
  Speaker 1: half frozen sea rations, but they resulted in no intestinal disorders. Moreover,
• 2:55
  Speaker 1: they were useful as temporary repairs for leaking radiators. There
• 3:00
  Speaker 1: was nothing during the daytime to indicate the presence of
• 3:03
  Speaker 1: CCF troops near Hagaru, even in hours of darkness. The
• 3:07
  Speaker 1: enemy was quiet throughout the first five nights of December.
• 3:11
  Speaker 1: Apparently the Chinese were powerless to renew the attack until
• 3:15
  Speaker 1: reinforcements and replenishments of supplies and ammunition reached the area.
• 3:21
  Speaker 1: Foury three hundred twelve casualties evacuated by air. Evacuation of
• 3:27
  Speaker 1: the wounded was the chief problem. On two December, when
• 3:30
  Speaker 1: it became evident that previous estimates of losses at UDMN
• 3:34
  Speaker 1: and among the army troops east of the reservoir were
• 3:37
  Speaker 1: far too low. A total of nine hundred fourteen casualties
• 3:41
  Speaker 1: were flown out by the C forty sevens and R
• 3:44
  Speaker 1: four d's that day, and more than seven hundred on
• 3:46
  Speaker 1: the third. Captain Herring and his assistants had assumed that
• 3:51
  Speaker 1: the Air Force evacuation officer was screening the casualties until
• 3:54
  Speaker 1: he informed them that this was not his responsibility. The
• 3:58
  Speaker 1: Division surgeon then set a spartan standard he passed personally
• 4:04
  Speaker 1: on all controversial cases, and a proof for evacuation only
• 4:08
  Speaker 1: those in as bad shape as Lieutenant Commander Lessened done,
• 4:11
  Speaker 1: the fifth Marine surgeon, who had refused to be flown
• 4:14
  Speaker 1: out and continued on duty after both feet were painfully frozen.
• 4:18
  Speaker 1: Apparently it was not too severe a test for men
• 4:21
  Speaker 1: who could stand the pain, since Lessenden suffered no permanent injuries.
• 4:26
  Speaker 1: Captain Herring had to use his medical authority in several
• 4:29
  Speaker 1: instances to overcome the objections of unimny casualties who declined
• 4:33
  Speaker 1: evacuation though in obvious need of hospitalization. The Liaison Air
• 4:39
  Speaker 1: Strip at Codo Ree had been of little use since
• 4:41
  Speaker 1: it was outside the perimeter and exposed to enemy fire,
• 4:45
  Speaker 1: but the completion of a new strip on the second
• 4:48
  Speaker 1: made it possible to evacuate about forty seven casualties that
• 4:51
  Speaker 1: day from the two to one perimeter. More than fourteen
• 4:55
  Speaker 1: hundred casualties remained at Hagarou on the morning of five December.
• 4:59
  Speaker 1: All flown out before nightfall, making a total of four thousand,
• 5:03
  Speaker 1: three hundred twelve men, three thousand, one hundred fifty marines,
• 5:07
  Speaker 1: one thousand, one hundred thirty seven Army personnel and twenty
• 5:11
  Speaker 1: five Royal marines evacuated from Hagaroo by air in the
• 5:15
  Speaker 1: first five days of December. According to Marine figures. Ten
• 5:20
  Speaker 1: Corps estimated a total of four thousand, two hundred seven
• 5:22
  Speaker 1: from the same period. Our four d's of the first
• 5:26
  Speaker 1: mall flying under wing operational control were represented in the
• 5:30
  Speaker 1: flights to and from Hagaroo, as well as the C
• 5:33
  Speaker 1: forty sevens of the Combat Cargo Command fief. The large
• 5:38
  Speaker 1: scale casualty evacuation was completed without losing a man, even
• 5:42
  Speaker 1: though the aircraft landing on the rough strip koreen precariously
• 5:45
  Speaker 1: as they bounced along the frozen runway. Only two planes
• 5:49
  Speaker 1: could be accommodated simultaneously at first, but marine engineers widened
• 5:54
  Speaker 1: the two thousand, nine hundred foot strip until six planes
• 5:57
  Speaker 1: could be parked at a time. A F four engine
• 6:00
  Speaker 1: Navy R five D made a successful landing with stretchers
• 6:03
  Speaker 1: flown in from Japan. After taking off with a load
• 6:07
  Speaker 1: of wounded, the pilot barely cleared the surrounding hills and
• 6:11
  Speaker 1: it was decided to risk no further evacuations with such
• 6:14
  Speaker 1: large aircraft. Two crash landings marred operations on the field.
• 6:20
  Speaker 1: An incoming Marine R four D, heavily loaded with artillery ammunition,
• 6:25
  Speaker 1: wiped out its landing gear on the rough surface and
• 6:28
  Speaker 1: was abandoned after its load had been put to good
• 6:31
  Speaker 1: use by the gunners. A second accident involved an Air
• 6:35
  Speaker 1: Force C forty seven, which lost power on the takeoff
• 6:38
  Speaker 1: and came down just outside the Marine lines without injury
• 6:41
  Speaker 1: to its load of casualties. Troops from the perimeter were
• 6:45
  Speaker 1: rushed out immediately to rescue its occupants, but the plane
• 6:48
  Speaker 1: had to be destroyed. Not until long later were final
• 6:52
  Speaker 1: official casualty reports rendered for the period of the unem
• 6:55
  Speaker 1: Knee regroupment and breakout. Regimental figures were not available, and
• 7:00
  Speaker 1: the totals included the losses suffered by the troops at
• 7:03
  Speaker 1: Hagaroo during the night of thirty November to one December
• 7:07
  Speaker 1: following are the total figures for the First Marine Division
• 7:10
  Speaker 1: as a whole throughout this five day period KIA one
• 7:14
  Speaker 1: hundred thirty five, DOW twenty nine, MIA fifty five WIA
• 7:22
  Speaker 1: nine hundred twenty one total Battle one thousand, one hundred
• 7:27
  Speaker 1: forty non battle one thousand, one hundred ninety four five
• 7:33
  Speaker 1: hundred thirty seven replacements flown to Hagaroo at thirteen fifty nine.
• 7:38
  Speaker 1: On three December ten, Corps issued OI twenty two directing
• 7:43
  Speaker 1: the First Marine Division to withdraw all elements to Hamhung
• 7:46
  Speaker 1: area via the Hagaroo Hamhung Axis as rapidly as evacuation
• 7:51
  Speaker 1: of wounded and other preparations would permit. General Allman flew
• 7:55
  Speaker 1: to Hagaroo that same day for a conference with General Smith.
• 8:00
  Speaker 1: Nothing further was said about destruction of equipment at that
• 8:04
  Speaker 1: very time. In fact, various critical items were being salvaged
• 8:08
  Speaker 1: and flown out from Hagaroo when space on planes was available.
• 8:13
  Speaker 1: Surplus weapons had accumulated as a result of casualties in
• 8:16
  Speaker 1: the Marine. General wished to avoid the destruction of any
• 8:19
  Speaker 1: material that could be removed by air without interfering with
• 8:22
  Speaker 1: casualty evacuation. It was particularly necessary to salvage and fly
• 8:27
  Speaker 1: out the parachutes and packages used for air drops, since
• 8:31
  Speaker 1: a critical shortage of these had been reported from Japan.
• 8:35
  Speaker 1: Before leaving Hagaroo, the division also planned to evacuate large
• 8:39
  Speaker 1: quantities of stoves, tents, typewriters, rifles, machine guns, and damaged
• 8:45
  Speaker 1: four point two inch mortars, space and empty planes. Landing
• 8:49
  Speaker 1: at Hagaroo was utilized not only for bringing in equipment
• 8:52
  Speaker 1: and medical supplies, but also replacements. Since the wants on landing,
• 8:58
  Speaker 1: some hundreds of Marines, most of them wounded in the
• 9:00
  Speaker 1: inch On Soul operation, had returned from hospitals in Japan.
• 9:05
  Speaker 1: These men, upon reporting to hung Nam were temporarily assigned
• 9:10
  Speaker 1: to the headquarters battalion, since the division had no provision
• 9:13
  Speaker 1: in its too for a replacement organization. Ordinarily, they would
• 9:18
  Speaker 1: have been returned to their units, but enemy action made
• 9:21
  Speaker 1: this procedure impossible until the completion of the airstrip during
• 9:25
  Speaker 1: the first five days of December. Therefore, five hundred and
• 9:29
  Speaker 1: thirty seven replacements were flown to Hagaru, fit for duty
• 9:33
  Speaker 1: and equipped with cold weather clothing. Those destined for the
• 9:37
  Speaker 1: first Marines were assigned to the third Battalion for perimeter
• 9:40
  Speaker 1: defense and personnel for the fifth and seventh Marines joined
• 9:43
  Speaker 1: those units after their arrival at Hagaru. Major General William H. Tunner,
• 9:49
  Speaker 1: US Air Force, the chief of the Combat Cargo Command,
• 9:53
  Speaker 1: expressed astonishment during his visit of five December on learning
• 9:56
  Speaker 1: about these replacements. He had come to offer there his
• 10:00
  Speaker 1: Sea forty seven's for troop evacuation after the casualties were
• 10:04
  Speaker 1: flown out, but General Smith explained that all able bodied
• 10:07
  Speaker 1: men would be needed for the breakout airdrops of ammunition.
• 10:14
  Speaker 1: Visitors and press correspondents arrived daily at Hagaroo in the
• 10:18
  Speaker 1: empty C forty sevens and R four d's. Among them
• 10:23
  Speaker 1: was Miss Margaret Higgins, reporter for the New York Herald Tribune.
• 10:28
  Speaker 1: General Smith ruled that for her own protection, considering the
• 10:31
  Speaker 1: possibility of enemy attack, she must leave the perimeter before nightfall.
• 10:36
  Speaker 1: French and British publications were represented, as well as most
• 10:39
  Speaker 1: of the larger American dailies and wire services. At one
• 10:44
  Speaker 1: of the press conferences, the question arose as to the
• 10:47
  Speaker 1: proper name of the marine operation. A British correspondent had
• 10:51
  Speaker 1: intended to refer to it as a retreat or retirement,
• 10:55
  Speaker 1: but General Smith held that there could be no retreat
• 10:58
  Speaker 1: when there was no rear since the division was surrounded.
• 11:02
  Speaker 1: He maintained the word retreat was not a correct term
• 11:06
  Speaker 1: for the coming breakout to the coast. General Smith and
• 11:10
  Speaker 1: Lieutenant Colonel Murray were interviewed for television by Charles Desoria,
• 11:14
  Speaker 1: who also shot marines on infantry duty and casualties awaiting evacuation.
• 11:20
  Speaker 1: These pictures and recordings were later shown in the United
• 11:23
  Speaker 1: States under the title Guesthamine. The correspondents were astonished to
• 11:28
  Speaker 1: find the Hagaroo perimeter so lacking an enemy activity. The
• 11:33
  Speaker 1: quiet was shattered at twenty ten on five December, when
• 11:36
  Speaker 1: two B twenty six is bombed and straighted the area.
• 11:40
  Speaker 1: Marine night fighters were absent on a search mission, but
• 11:43
  Speaker 1: one was recalled to offer protection against further efforts of
• 11:47
  Speaker 1: the sort. A possible explanation was advanced by First Lieutenant
• 11:51
  Speaker 1: Harry S. Wilson of vm F five forty two, who
• 11:55
  Speaker 1: reported that he had received orders by radio to attack Hagarou.
• 12:00
  Speaker 1: It was his conviction that Chinese use of captured radio
• 12:03
  Speaker 1: equipment accounted for the B twenty six attack. The interlude
• 12:07
  Speaker 1: of CCF activity gave the first Marine Division an opportunity
• 12:10
  Speaker 1: to build up a stock of air dropped ammunition and supplies.
• 12:15
  Speaker 1: Poor communications had prevented the obtaining of advanced information as
• 12:19
  Speaker 1: to the requirements of the um Knee troops, and their
• 12:22
  Speaker 1: needs had to be estimated by the Assistant G four.
• 12:26
  Speaker 1: It was planned that units moving out from Hagarou would
• 12:28
  Speaker 1: take only enough supplies for the advance to Codo Ree.
• 12:33
  Speaker 1: Material would be air dropped there to support the next
• 12:35
  Speaker 1: stage of the breakout. The C one nineteens of the
• 12:39
  Speaker 1: Combat Cargo Command were called upon to fly in the
• 12:42
  Speaker 1: largest part of the total of the three hundred seventy
• 12:45
  Speaker 1: two point seven tons requested for air delivery at Hagarou.
• 12:50
  Speaker 1: C forty sevens and R four d's were available for
• 12:53
  Speaker 1: some items, particularly of fragile nature, and specially packaged small
• 12:58
  Speaker 1: drops to meet specific knee could be made by planes
• 13:01
  Speaker 1: of the first Marine Aircraft Wing. Officers and men of
• 13:05
  Speaker 1: the Headquarters Battalion at Hagarou were ordered to assist the
• 13:08
  Speaker 1: first Regulating Detachment in the operation of the Hagarou Airfield.
• 13:13
  Speaker 1: Army Service troops were also assigned to the task and
• 13:17
  Speaker 1: dumps were set up adjacent to the drop zone for
• 13:19
  Speaker 1: the direct issuing of supplies. The major items requested were
• 13:24
  Speaker 1: artillery mortar and small arms ammunition, hand grenades, gasoline and
• 13:29
  Speaker 1: diesel oil, rations, and communication wire. There is no record
• 13:34
  Speaker 1: of the amounts actually received. Pilots sometimes missed the drop
• 13:39
  Speaker 1: zone so far that the containers were captured by the
• 13:42
  Speaker 1: enemy or landed in areas where recovery was not feasible
• 13:46
  Speaker 1: because of enemy fire. In other instances, the supplies fell
• 13:50
  Speaker 1: near the positions of frontline units, which issued them on
• 13:54
  Speaker 1: the spot without any formalities of bookkeeping. Breakage rates were
• 13:58
  Speaker 1: high due to the fund. About seventy percent of the
• 14:03
  Speaker 1: pol products and seventy to eighty percent of the rations
• 14:07
  Speaker 1: were recovered in usable condition. Of the artillery ammunition delivered
• 14:12
  Speaker 1: to the drop zone, forty percent was badly damaged, and
• 14:15
  Speaker 1: only twenty five percent ever reached the gun positions. About
• 14:20
  Speaker 1: forty five percent of the small arms ammunition was recovered
• 14:23
  Speaker 1: and usable, one hundred percent of the requested mortar ammunition
• 14:27
  Speaker 1: and ninety percent of the eighty one millimeters rounds were
• 14:30
  Speaker 1: put into the air over the drop zone, though the
• 14:33
  Speaker 1: damage rate was nearly as high as that of the
• 14:35
  Speaker 1: artillery shells. In spite of the seemingly low percentages of
• 14:40
  Speaker 1: receipts as compared to requests. It was considered that the
• 14:44
  Speaker 1: Hagaroo air drops had been successful on the whole. Without
• 14:48
  Speaker 1: the extra ammunition, commented General Smith, many more of the
• 14:52
  Speaker 1: friendly troops would have been killed. There can be no
• 14:55
  Speaker 1: doubt that the supplies received by this method proved to
• 14:58
  Speaker 1: be the margin necessary to sustain saying adequately the operation
• 15:01
  Speaker 1: of the division during this period planning for breakout to
• 15:06
  Speaker 1: Coteo Ree. The need of the um Knee troops for
• 15:10
  Speaker 1: recuperation was so urgent that six December was set as
• 15:14
  Speaker 1: the d day of the attack from Hagaroo to Coteo Ree.
• 15:18
  Speaker 1: On the recommendation of his staff, General Smith decided that
• 15:22
  Speaker 1: the need of the troops for rest and regroupment outweighed
• 15:25
  Speaker 1: the advantages of a speedy advance, even though the enemy
• 15:29
  Speaker 1: would be allowed more time to get his forces into
• 15:31
  Speaker 1: position along the MSR. Another factor influencing this decision was
• 15:36
  Speaker 1: the thinning of the command group and staff sections of
• 15:39
  Speaker 1: the division. It will be recalled that General Craig, the
• 15:43
  Speaker 1: assistant division commander, had recently been returned on emergency leave
• 15:47
  Speaker 1: to the United States. Colonel Walseyth g One was wounded
• 15:52
  Speaker 1: on thirty November, while Lieutenant Colonel chaster had been mia
• 15:57
  Speaker 1: since that date. Colonel McCaw luster G four had been
• 16:02
  Speaker 1: directed to remain at hung Nam to coordinate logistic functions.
• 16:07
  Speaker 1: A serious handicap to planning was the shortage of staff personnel.
• 16:12
  Speaker 1: This was due in part to the casualties suffered by
• 16:14
  Speaker 1: the last convoy of Headquarters troops to move up from
• 16:17
  Speaker 1: hung Nam. Moreover, the office force had been depleted by
• 16:22
  Speaker 1: calls for reinforcements to defend the perimeter. By dint of
• 16:26
  Speaker 1: working round the clock, however, planning for the breakout to
• 16:30
  Speaker 1: Koto Ree was completed on schedule. Operation Order twenty five
• 16:34
  Speaker 1: DASH fifty, issued at zero eight hundred on five December,
• 16:39
  Speaker 1: provided for an advance of the first Marine Division at
• 16:41
  Speaker 1: first light the following morning on the Koto Re Chinhungni
• 16:45
  Speaker 1: Majamdong axis to close the ham Hung area. The principal
• 16:50
  Speaker 1: subordinate units were assigned these tasks. A RCT five three
• 16:56
  Speaker 1: to one attached to relieve all elements on perimeter day
• 17:00
  Speaker 1: fence in the Hagarou area by twelve hundred five December,
• 17:04
  Speaker 1: to cover the movement of RCT seven out of Hagaroo
• 17:07
  Speaker 1: to the south to follow RCT seven to the south
• 17:11
  Speaker 1: on the Hagaroo Ri, koto Re, Chinhungni access, to protect
• 17:16
  Speaker 1: the division rear from Hagaroo to koto Re and to
• 17:20
  Speaker 1: follow RCT seven from koto Re to the ham Hung
• 17:23
  Speaker 1: area as division reserve b. RCT seven to advance south
• 17:28
  Speaker 1: at first light on six December on the Hagaroo Coodo
• 17:32
  Speaker 1: Re Chinhungni access to close the Hamhung area. C RCT
• 17:37
  Speaker 1: IE minus to continue to hold koto Re and Chenhungni
• 17:42
  Speaker 1: protecting the approach and passage of the remainder of the
• 17:45
  Speaker 1: division through koto Re, and to protect the division rear
• 17:49
  Speaker 1: from koto Re to Hamhung area. All personnel except drivers,
• 17:54
  Speaker 1: relief drivers, radio operators, casualties and men specially designated by
• 17:59
  Speaker 1: our commanders were to march on foot alongside motor serials
• 18:04
  Speaker 1: to provide close insecurity. It was directed that vehicles breaking
• 18:09
  Speaker 1: down should be pushed to the side of the road
• 18:11
  Speaker 1: and destroyed if not operative by the time the column passed.
• 18:15
  Speaker 1: During haltz, a perimeter defense of motor serials was to
• 18:18
  Speaker 1: be established. Nine control points were designated by map references
• 18:24
  Speaker 1: to be used for reporting progress of the advance or
• 18:26
  Speaker 1: directing air drops demolitions to clear obstacles from the front
• 18:31
  Speaker 1: and to create them to the rear were planned by
• 18:33
  Speaker 1: the Division Engineer Officer. Division ADMIN Order twenty DASH fifty,
• 18:39
  Speaker 1: which accompanied Operation Order twenty five Dash fifty, prescribed that
• 18:43
  Speaker 1: the troops were to take enough c rations for two days,
• 18:47
  Speaker 1: equally distributed between individual and organic transportation. Selected items of
• 18:54
  Speaker 1: b rations were to be loaded on organic vehicles, and
• 18:57
  Speaker 1: the following provision was made for ammunition on individual up
• 19:02
  Speaker 1: to one UF per individual weapon on vehicle minimum one UF,
• 19:08
  Speaker 1: then proportionate share per RCT until dumps depleted or transportation
• 19:12
  Speaker 1: capacity exceeded. Helicopter evacuation was indicated for emergency cases. Other
• 19:19
  Speaker 1: casualties were to be placed in sleeping bags and evacuated
• 19:23
  Speaker 1: in vehicles of the column. Two division trains were set
• 19:27
  Speaker 1: up by ADMIN Order twenty Dash fifty. Lieutenant Colonel Banks
• 19:31
  Speaker 1: commanded train number one under OURCT seven and number two
• 19:36
  Speaker 1: under OUR CT five was in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Milne.
• 19:41
  Speaker 1: Each motor serial in the trains was to have a
• 19:44
  Speaker 1: commander who maintained radio communication with the train commander. Truck
• 19:49
  Speaker 1: transportation not being available for all supplies and equipment at Hagaru,
• 19:53
  Speaker 1: a division destruction plan was issued on four December, making
• 19:57
  Speaker 1: unit commanders responsible for disposing of all all excess supplies
• 20:01
  Speaker 1: and equipment within their own areas. Commanding Officer First Regulating
• 20:05
  Speaker 1: Detachment is responsible for destruction all classes supplies and equipment
• 20:10
  Speaker 1: remaining in dumps. The order continued. Unit commanders and co
• 20:15
  Speaker 1: First Regulating Detachment report types and amounts of supplies and
• 20:19
  Speaker 1: equipment to this headquarters G four prior to destruction. Permission
• 20:24
  Speaker 1: to use fuel and ammunition for destruction purposes must be
• 20:27
  Speaker 1: obtained from this headquarters. G four three to one relieved
• 20:33
  Speaker 1: by RCT five. At Hagarou, General Smith held conferences on
• 20:38
  Speaker 1: four and five December of senior unit commanders. During the
• 20:43
  Speaker 1: afternoon of the fourth, General Alman arrived by plane and
• 20:46
  Speaker 1: was briefed on the plan for the breakout. In a
• 20:49
  Speaker 1: brief ceremony at the Division CP, he presented the Distinguished
• 20:52
  Speaker 1: Service Cross to General Smith, Colonel Litzenburg, and Lieutenant Colonel's
• 20:57
  Speaker 1: Murray and Beale. The night of five dec sixth December
• 21:00
  Speaker 1: was the fifth in a row to pass without enemy
• 21:03
  Speaker 1: activity at Hagarou, but if Division G two summaries were
• 21:07
  Speaker 1: to be credited, it was the calm before the storm,
• 21:11
  Speaker 1: for the Chinese were believed to be assembling troops and
• 21:13
  Speaker 1: supplies both at Hagarou and along the MSR to Coto Ree.
• 21:18
  Speaker 1: Up to this time, seven CCF divisions, the fifty eighth,
• 21:22
  Speaker 1: fifty ninth, sixtieth, seventy sixth, seventy ninth, eightieth and eighty
• 21:28
  Speaker 1: ninth had been identified through POW interrogations, but there were
• 21:33
  Speaker 1: evidences that the seventy seventh and seventy eighth were also
• 21:36
  Speaker 1: within striking distance. At twelve hundred on five December, the
• 21:41
  Speaker 1: fifth Marines werelieved three to one of the responsibility for
• 21:43
  Speaker 1: the defense of the Hagarou area. Division elements other than
• 21:48
  Speaker 1: infantry were withdrawn from the front line, leaving Lieutenant Colonel
• 21:51
  Speaker 1: Murray's three battalions with three to one attached disposed around
• 21:56
  Speaker 1: the perimeter as follows from the udem Knee Road around
• 22:01
  Speaker 1: the north of Hagaroo and destride the chang Jin Valley
• 22:04
  Speaker 1: to a point at the base of the ridge about
• 22:07
  Speaker 1: one thousand yards east of the bridge over the Changjin River.
• 22:11
  Speaker 1: Two five imposition on the western slopes of East Hill.
• 22:16
  Speaker 1: Three five from the south nose of East Hill west
• 22:19
  Speaker 1: across the river to link up with three to one
• 22:22
  Speaker 1: south of the airstrip three to one south and southwest
• 22:26
  Speaker 1: of airstrip in sector formerly held by Howe and Item
• 22:30
  Speaker 1: companies of three to one. Not only were the CCF
• 22:33
  Speaker 1: positions on East Hill a threat to Hagaroo, they also
• 22:36
  Speaker 1: dominated the road leading south to kto Ree. Thus, the
• 22:40
  Speaker 1: plan for the breakout called for simultaneous attacks to be
• 22:44
  Speaker 1: launched at first light on the sixth, RCT five to
• 22:47
  Speaker 1: regain the enemy held portion of East Hill and RCT
• 22:51
  Speaker 1: seven to lead the advance of the division motor column
• 22:54
  Speaker 1: toward coto Ree. A plan for air support prepared by
• 22:58
  Speaker 1: the command and staff of the First MOW was brought
• 23:01
  Speaker 1: to Hagaroo by Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, Assistant Wing Commander,
• 23:06
  Speaker 1: on five December. Aircraft were to beyond station at zero
• 23:10
  Speaker 1: seven hundred to furnish close support for the attack on
• 23:13
  Speaker 1: East Hill along the MSR to coto Ree. An umbrella
• 23:16
  Speaker 1: of twenty four close support aircraft was to cover the head,
• 23:20
  Speaker 1: rear and flanks of the breakout column while searching attack
• 23:24
  Speaker 1: planes scoured the ridges flanking the road and approaches leading
• 23:27
  Speaker 1: into it. Support was also to be furnished after dark
• 23:31
  Speaker 1: by the night hecklers. All strikes within three miles of
• 23:35
  Speaker 1: either side of the MSR were to be controlled by
• 23:37
  Speaker 1: the ground forces, while the planes were free to hit
• 23:40
  Speaker 1: any targets beyond the concentration of aircraft covering the advance
• 23:45
  Speaker 1: south from Hagaroo was one of the greatest of the
• 23:47
  Speaker 1: whole war. Marine planes at Yanpo would of course continue
• 23:53
  Speaker 1: approximately one hundred daily sorties, to which VMF three twenty
• 23:57
  Speaker 1: three would add thirty more from the Batong Straight. The
• 24:00
  Speaker 1: Navy's fast carriers Layte Valley, Forge, Philippine Sea and Princeton
• 24:06
  Speaker 1: were to abandon temporarily their deep support or interdiction operations
• 24:10
  Speaker 1: and contribute about one hundred or more attack sorties daily.
• 24:14
  Speaker 1: The Fifth Air Force was to add more power with
• 24:17
  Speaker 1: additional US and Australian fighter bombers, as well as medium
• 24:20
  Speaker 1: and heavy bomber interdiction beyond the bomb line, to augment
• 24:25
  Speaker 1: the carrier support for the ten core consolidation impossible redeployment
• 24:29
  Speaker 1: by sea. VMF two twelve had departed Yonpo on four
• 24:33
  Speaker 1: December and was re equipping in Itami for return to
• 24:36
  Speaker 1: battle aboard the newly arrived USS Baton. The Sicily was
• 24:41
  Speaker 1: also heading for the area to take back aboard the
• 24:44
  Speaker 1: corsairs of VMF two fourteen on seven December. Continuous artillery
• 24:49
  Speaker 1: support both four RCT five and RCT seven was planned
• 24:54
  Speaker 1: by the eleventh Marines. Two batteries of the third battalion
• 24:58
  Speaker 1: and one of the fourth were to move out at
• 25:00
  Speaker 1: the head of the RCT seven train, the two from
• 25:03
  Speaker 1: three to eleven to occupy initial positions halfway to koto
• 25:06
  Speaker 1: Ree to support the attack southward to the objective, and
• 25:10
  Speaker 1: the four to eleven battery to take position in koto
• 25:12
  Speaker 1: Ree and provide general support northward. In combination with the
• 25:16
  Speaker 1: battery of two eleven attached to that perimeter. The remaining
• 25:21
  Speaker 1: batteries of the third and fourth battalions would provide initial
• 25:24
  Speaker 1: support from Hagaroo southward until ordered to move out. The
• 25:28
  Speaker 1: three batteries of one to eleven with D eleven attached
• 25:31
  Speaker 1: were to support the operations of RCT five in a
• 25:34
  Speaker 1: similar manner. Two batteries would move out at the head
• 25:38
  Speaker 1: of the regimental train to position half way to koto Ree.
• 25:42
  Speaker 1: The remaining two would fire to the south in support
• 25:44
  Speaker 1: of withdrawing units and then displaced when the first two
• 25:47
  Speaker 1: were in position. Throughout the night of five to six December,
• 25:52
  Speaker 1: the darkness was stabbed by flashes as the artillery at
• 25:55
  Speaker 1: Hagaroo fired concentrations to saturate the area along the Hagaroo
• 25:59
  Speaker 1: Kodo Rea axis in order to prevent cratering of the road.
• 26:03
  Speaker 1: The one fifty fives fired VT rounds. A second purpose
• 26:08
  Speaker 1: of this bombardment was to expend profitably the surplus of
• 26:12
  Speaker 1: ammunition which could not be brought out. At daybreak on
• 26:16
  Speaker 1: the sixth, the division headquarters broke Camp. General Smith had
• 26:20
  Speaker 1: decided to fly the command group to coto Ree in
• 26:22
  Speaker 1: advance of the troops so that planning could begin immediately
• 26:26
  Speaker 1: for the breakout from coto Ree southward. General Barr visited
• 26:30
  Speaker 1: during the morning and was informed that the seventh Infantry
• 26:33
  Speaker 1: Division casualties who had reached Hagaroo had been flown out.
• 26:37
  Speaker 1: The remaining four hundred and ninety able bodied men, including
• 26:41
  Speaker 1: three hundred eighty five survivors of Task Force Faith, had
• 26:44
  Speaker 1: been provided with marine equipment and organized into a provisional
• 26:47
  Speaker 1: battalion under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Anderson US Army.
• 26:52
  Speaker 1: This battalion was attached to the seventh Marines and sometimes
• 26:56
  Speaker 1: referred to as thirty one seven. Throughout the word morning,
• 27:00
  Speaker 1: General Smith kept in close touch with the progress of
• 27:03
  Speaker 1: RCT seven toward coto Ree. At fourteen hundred, a reassuring
• 27:08
  Speaker 1: message was received from Colonel Litzenburg, and the commanding general
• 27:11
  Speaker 1: took off from Hagaroo by helicopter. Ten minutes later, he
• 27:15
  Speaker 1: and his aide, Captain Martin J. Sexton, landed at coto Ree.
• 27:21
  Speaker 1: The other members of the command group, following by oy
• 27:24
  Speaker 1: and helicopter, set up in a large ten at coto
• 27:27
  Speaker 1: Ree and started planning for the next stage. End of
• 27:32
  Speaker 1: Chapter thirteen, Part one read by Aaron Bennett,