Latest / Eye Spy: The Intelligence History Podcast / The Russian FSB
Transcript
- 0:00Welcome to Eye Spy, the Intelligence History Podcast.
- 0:08I'm your host, Krystel von Kumberg.
- 0:12Every few weeks, I'm going to be interviewing historians, practitioners and scholars in
- 0:16the field of intelligence to explore some aspects of the past and what it can tell us
- 0:21about the present and future of intelligence studies.
- 0:28Kevin Riehle is a lecturer in intelligence and security studies at Brunel University of London.
- 0:33He spent over 30 years in the US government as a counterintelligence analyst studying
- 0:37foreign intelligence services and he finished his government career as an associate professor
- 0:41of strategic intelligence at the National Intelligence University.
- 0:45He previously taught at the University of Mississippi Center for Intelligence and Security
- 0:48Studies.
- 0:49He received a PhD in war studies from King's College, London.
- 0:54In 2020, his first book, Soviet Defectors, Revelations of Renegade Intelligence Offices,
- 0:58was published by Edinburgh University Press.
- 1:01His second book, Russian Intelligence, a case-based study of Russian services and missions past
- 1:06and present, was published by the National Intelligence Press in 2022.
- 1:10His articles have appeared in a variety of peer-reviewed journals, including Intelligence
- 1:14and National Security, Cold War History and Journal of Intelligence History.
- 1:19Today, we'll be discussing his latest book, The Russian FSB, a Concise History of the
- 1:24Federal Security Service.
- 1:26Thank you so much for joining us today on Eye Spy, the Intelligence History podcast.
- 1:32So to begin, having written so extensively on Russian intelligence, could you walk us
- 1:38through some of your research methods and key challenges you face when researching this
- 1:44topic?
- 1:46In the introduction of your book, you mentioned some of the challenges of relying heavily
- 1:51on Russian language sources like Agentura Roo and the Dossier Center.
- 1:57How did you navigate the scarcity of objective sources and reconcile between the overtly
- 2:01positive or extremely negative accounts?
- 2:06The main concern there, as you point out, was the polar aspect of the sources.
- 2:13But even in that environment of material that has high kind of opinion, insert into it as
- 2:24opposed to data, there is a lot of data there too.
- 2:27And some of the sources such as Agentura Roo and Dossier Center have a lot of organizational
- 2:33data, even if they do sometimes place that in a more negative context, particularly the
- 2:42Dossier Center discusses the role of corruption and really emphasizes the role of corruption
- 2:48in the FSB.
- 2:49But there's a lot of data there as well.
- 2:52And the challenge is to sort the data from the opinion.
- 2:59And so just trying to look across sources, look at the data that is consistent not just
- 3:07in the negative but also the positive sources.
- 3:10There is in fact Russian language and Russian government sponsored source material that
- 3:17is sometimes consistent with even that more exile material.
- 3:22So finding that consistent story, those consistent data points was really the challenge.
- 3:32The interesting thing about the FSB is there's a lot written about it.
- 3:35I'm in the process of doing research on some other Russian intelligence activities and
- 3:40the FSB is an exception for how much is available.
- 3:45The Russian media itself publishes a lot on the FSB.
- 3:50Now sometimes it's heroic, it's painting the FSB as a patriotic organization.
- 3:58Sometimes it's Russian media pointing out the corruption as well.
- 4:02So there's a lot discussed about the FSB because the FSB is more like the KGB in that aspect
- 4:10that it actually talks about itself a lot.
- 4:13It's a public organization.
- 4:14It's a law enforcement organization.
- 4:16It conducts arrests.
- 4:19It conducts counterterrorism operations that it portrays to the Russian populist.
- 4:25So it wants to be seen in some ways so that it can be that deterrent to crime and terrorism
- 4:33and to spies.
- 4:35So there's a lot out there.
- 4:37And so the navigating between the pro-Russian and the anti-Russian government material is
- 4:45just a matter of kind of extracting the data points and trying to set aside the opinion
- 4:52from it.
- 4:53And in your book you reflect how we should think about the FSB as an amalgamation of
- 5:01pre-Soviet, post-Soviet and Soviet-era forces.
- 5:06How does the FSB borrow elements from the Tsarist security services, the Czechoskult
- 5:11and KGB in its current operational philosophy and methods?
- 5:17The FSB, as you point out, is a combination of all of those three.
- 5:20And those three are very different eras.
- 5:23And the pre-Bolshevik era has come back in a way that during the Soviet era it never
- 5:33would have been discussed.
- 5:35During the Soviet era it was taboo to talk positively about the bourgeois Tsarist Russia.
- 5:44It could be discussed in private, but it couldn't be discussed publicly.
- 5:49Because that was the very entity that the Bolsheviks were sweeping out.
- 5:55So it couldn't be held up during the Soviet era as a positive example.
- 6:01But particularly since around the late 1990s, early 2000s, pre-Bolshevik era police security
- 6:11officers, counterintelligence officers, have been discussed publicly as actually examples
- 6:19to emulate.
- 6:21Several of those Tsarist-era officers wrote books.
- 6:24Most of them published in exile outside of Russia in the 1920s.
- 6:29And they have been republished in Russia in the past 20 years, 25 years.
- 6:35People like Stepan Bilevsky, who was the director of the Tsarist-era police department in the
- 6:41pre-World War I era, and Piotr Zawarzyn, who was in the Tsarist police for many years in
- 6:50the early 20th century, they published their stories about how they went about operating
- 6:58against enemies of the Tsar.
- 7:01And those are now being discussed publicly even in FSB-published venues, such as the
- 7:10FSB's journal, FSB for and against.
- 7:17There are historical articles regularly published in there about pre-Bolshevik era police security
- 7:25officers and police security operations.
- 7:27So it was something that you couldn't talk about during the Soviet era, but now can.
- 7:36And another of the major trends in the FSB today is the immediate post-Soviet era, the
- 7:45chaos of the 1990s, the time when post-Soviet Russia was weak, when it had lost its superpower
- 7:54status.
- 7:55It was militarily weak as it showed in Chechnya.
- 8:00It was politically weak as it showed when Yeltsin ordered tanks to fire on the White
- 8:06House in 1993.
- 8:07And then Yeltsin invited the oligarchs to support him politically, and that created
- 8:17a dispersed power structure within Russia.
- 8:22And then it was economically weak.
- 8:24In 1997, the Russian ruble collapsed after the Russian government defaulted on loans,
- 8:31the international loans.
- 8:32So it looked like it was ready to collapse.
- 8:37By the late 1990s, there were elements of the Russian Federation that were developing
- 8:45relations outside of Russia without going through Moscow.
- 8:50Places like Tatarstan and other ethnic entities within the Russian Federation.
- 9:01That was an era that impacted the thinking of FSB officers today.
- 9:09Most of the senior officers lived through that period, and they saw the weakness that
- 9:16Russia was experiencing.
- 9:18And they are now intent to prevent that from ever happening again.
- 9:23And Putin himself has said that quite publicly, saying, we'll never allow our enemies to
- 9:29be tempted by our weakness again.
- 9:32So those two eras, the pre-Bolshevik and the post-Soviet, have heavy influence on the thinking
- 9:42of FSB officers today.
- 9:45However, there's still the many years of KGB influence as well.
- 9:54And that KGB influence manifests itself in organization and even in senior officers.
- 10:01Most senior officers at the general officer level began their careers during the Soviet
- 10:07era and they were trained during the Soviet era.
- 10:09So that the concept of the Czechist is still a point of pride for them.
- 10:18It's not something that they ever set aside.
- 10:21In fact, to the point where now senior FSB leaders publicly use the label of Czechist
- 10:32as one that they see as something to be aspired to amongst their officers.
- 10:42So that Czechist cult, as you mentioned, basically means that that KGB era mindset hasn't gone
- 10:50away.
- 10:51The mindset of a threat from the domestic Russian population in conjunction with a threat
- 11:01from enemies outside.
- 11:04And that combination of the two types of threats, the internal and external, always being in
- 11:12concert with each other in the minds of the Czechist is very much invisible today.
- 11:23I've been reading some things about the other Russian intelligence services recently and
- 11:31some things written in the 2010 to 2015 timeframe where the interpretation of the West is very
- 11:42much the same as it was during the Cold War.
- 11:46The West is invariably an enemy, the United States in particular, and NATO more broadly,
- 11:56and even to some extent the UK, but that enemy status also flows into domestic opposition
- 12:08within Russia.
- 12:09The domestic opposition is always in this Czechist mindset influenced by the outside.
- 12:17So keeping outside influences out and weakening those outside influences abroad are an important
- 12:25goal of the Czechist mindset.
- 12:30Absolutely.
- 12:32And so the president is the primary decision maker for Russia's state security.
- 12:40And you note that the post-Soviet driver in the FSB is the demand for political loyalty
- 12:44to the president rather than to the party.
- 12:47So how does this relationship between the FSB and the president function in practice?
- 12:54The first touch point is the director of the FSB himself being, since Putin was the director
- 13:04when he left the directorship in 1998, the two individuals who have been the director
- 13:12of the FSB since then were both close friends of Vladimir Putin.
- 13:16And that connection between the director of the FSB back to the St. Petersburg days when
- 13:24all of them served together in the KGB is an important aspect that allows Putin to have
- 13:35influence on the FSB, that personal connection.
- 13:38And that's not the only thing.
- 13:41The FSB also is the organization that keeps Putin in power.
- 13:49It identifies and neutralizes potential threats to the presidency, to Putin in person.
- 14:01And by doing that, it becomes the lever that Putin can use directly against his own opposition.
- 14:12And that relationship then goes two ways.
- 14:17The FSB is that lever, but in return, it enjoys a great deal of power in society.
- 14:27That power manifests itself both in the breadth of the FSB's operational capabilities, but
- 14:36then also in the benefits that many FSB senior officers get from being to the center, the
- 14:44benefits of having multimillion dollar dachas and having access to business funds and those
- 14:54sorts of things, that their loyalty wins them.
- 15:01So both sides get benefit from that.
- 15:05So that keeps both sides happy in that relationship.
- 15:14How has religion come to play such a crucial role within Russian intelligence?
- 15:20For example, you note that Patriarch Kirill's establishment of a church from the FSB Academy
- 15:26grounds in 2012 represents this significant break from the Soviet era.
- 15:33At the same time, religious undertone seemed to have always played some role, even in the
- 15:38Cheka, as historian Ian Lodzman observes that Zhezhinski, the founder of the Cheka, hits
- 15:44principle of a fiery heart, a cold mind and clean hands, parallels the theological virtues
- 15:50of faith, hope and charity.
- 15:52So how has its significance evolved over time?
- 15:57The difference really is that during the Soviet era, there was essentially a type of religious
- 16:04adherence, a religious devotion.
- 16:07But that religious devotion, as you point out the phrase from Zhezhinski, that devotion
- 16:12was to a secular faith.
- 16:16It was not a theological faith.
- 16:20In fact, it specifically denied theological value.
- 16:27So that when the Bolsheviks took control of Russia and solidified their control, part
- 16:35of their solidification was to essentially overlay themselves on top of a very religious
- 16:42society, by creating a heaven and hell and creating scriptures in the form of Lenin's
- 16:51and Stalin's writings, eventually Stalin's writings, by creating martyrs and prophets.
- 17:01And almost to the extent of creating miracles and saints.
- 17:07And so that a theological religion was the replacement for a very religious society,
- 17:19in a very religious society that had been Russia prior to the Bolsheviks.
- 17:24When that Bolshevik ideology was stripped away in 1991, the Russian society quite quickly
- 17:34returned to the religion that they had had prior to the Bolshevik era, with a great deal
- 17:43of government sponsorship, with the Russian Orthodox Church enjoying a lot of government
- 17:51support, and in return, the Orthodox Church supports the government itself through urging
- 18:01a religious devotion almost to the president.
- 18:05So when the Patriarch Kirill dedicated a church on the FSB Academy grounds, nothing like that
- 18:19could have been done during the Soviet era, but it was something that reflected that return
- 18:26to the pre-Soviet era that we talked about earlier, that pre-Soviet era included the
- 18:34importance of religion in society, of orthodoxy in society, and that orthodoxy returned because
- 18:43both the people maintained that religious devotion, but also because the government
- 18:50benefits from the religious motivation that goes alongside the government power.
- 19:02Religion is one of the most powerful motivating forces.
- 19:06People would do many things for religion.
- 19:10And one of the aspects of orthodoxy is the concept of self-sacrifice for the greater
- 19:19good.
- 19:21And the Russian government has used that element of self-sacrifice for the greater good extensively,
- 19:32particularly now in a war in Ukraine, where the Russian leadership is essentially preaching
- 19:39the idea that if you die for the state, you are dying for a righteous cause, directly
- 19:48connecting righteousness with loyalty to the state.
- 19:54And so the FSB benefits from that because as it is loyal to the state, it also has that
- 20:03religious approval, a stamp placed on it, through not just Kirill's dedication to that
- 20:13church, but also a regular discussion of the social structure and the social values that
- 20:21come with orthodoxy and the need for the FSB to protect those things.
- 20:26So it's something that never could have been discussed in the way it's being discussed
- 20:31now during the Soviet era.
- 20:34The Soviet era replaced it with something else, but that something else has now been
- 20:40returned to the pre-Soviet era.
- 20:43Very interesting.
- 20:48And in the West, we tend to compare the FSB to the US FBI, but you reflect on how the
- 20:55FSB is actually a little bit more complex, so much so that their responsibilities can
- 21:00overlap with other Russian agencies, such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
- 21:05Would you briefly highlight how it's organized and what its core functions are, as well as
- 21:11its scope of activities?
- 21:14And specifically, how does the FSB monitor Russia's former empire?
- 21:19The FSB is first and foremost a security service, not an intelligence service.
- 21:25It has intelligence capabilities that support that security mission, but it is first and
- 21:30foremost a security organization.
- 21:31And within that security mission is a law enforcement mission as well.
- 21:38And that is why it's often connected, compared with the US FBI.
- 21:43It is the primary security-related law enforcement organization in Russia, just as the FBI is
- 21:52in the United States.
- 21:53But the FSB is much more than the FBI.
- 21:57The FSB has the equivalent capabilities of many different organizations within the US
- 22:05structure, of organizations that fall under the offices of the Director of National Intelligence,
- 22:12under the Department of Homeland Security, under the Department of Defense, under the
- 22:16Department of Justice, under the Environmental Protection Agency, under the Securities and
- 22:21Exchange Commission, many different functions that all are unified into one agency, the
- 22:27FBI.
- 22:28And so that comparison with the FBI is only partial because what is the FBI in the US
- 22:36is subsumed under the FSB, but the FSB is much more than that.
- 22:44Because of that, it does overlap with other organizations within the Russian Federation,
- 22:49particularly the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which also is a federal-level law enforcement
- 22:53organization.
- 22:55It has lower-level law enforcement responsibilities.
- 23:02It has responsibilities for non-security criminal-related activities, such as drug crimes and illegal
- 23:19smuggling and things like that.
- 23:21But because those activities can also have a security aspect to them, the FSB also gets
- 23:29involved in them.
- 23:31And the relationship between the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs is one of antagonism
- 23:38and has been that way for many years since the Soviet era because both of them have so
- 23:44many overlapping missions in the counterterrorism area, where the MVD does conduct counterterrorism
- 23:51operations and counterterrorism investigations, where the FSB sees itself as the primary counterterrorism
- 23:58organization within Russia.
- 24:02Both of them have a counter-corruption mission, and both of them at times have been known
- 24:09to investigate each other for corruption.
- 24:13And that leads them to compete or to conflict.
- 24:17And they each have their favorite elements of the prosecutorial structure within Russia,
- 24:23and they use those prosecutors for their own side of a criminal matter, and they try to
- 24:32prosecute each other.
- 24:34And they have had some success in doing that.
- 24:38So they get at each other because in so many ways they're similar to each other.
- 24:48One of the big differences, though, as you asked in your question about how the FSB monitors
- 24:55the former Soviet empire, the FSB has a mission that is similar in scope to the KGB during
- 25:04the Soviet era.
- 25:05And that during the KGB era, the KGB had offices in all of the Soviet state republics.
- 25:14And those offices all conducted basically the local version of what FSB, other KGB headquarters
- 25:22did in Moscow.
- 25:23And they were the extensions of KGB headquarters in Moscow.
- 25:31When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, those post-KGB offices across the Soviet states
- 25:40continued to exist.
- 25:43And the FSB, when it became known as that in 1995, maintained contact across the former
- 25:53Soviet states with those people that had worked for the KGB previously.
- 25:58And also, part of that KGB era mission was to collect security-related intelligence across
- 26:07the whole Soviet space.
- 26:10But when the Soviet era republics gained their independence, the security services of each
- 26:20of them got together and they signed a treaty that said that they would not collect intelligence
- 26:25on each other.
- 26:28The Russian SVR and the GRU at the time were both part of that agreement.
- 26:34But the FSB was not, because the FSB did not describe itself as an intelligence service.
- 26:41It described itself as a security service.
- 26:45So it didn't make any agreement not to conduct operations in post-Soviet republics.
- 26:52Now, because Russia views the post-Soviet space as still part of its rightful sphere,
- 27:04the FSB then operates within those post-Soviet states heavily as if it was still part of
- 27:12Russia's domestic security space.
- 27:15So we'll see, for example, in Ukraine, many of the human intelligence operations that
- 27:21the Ukrainian services have neutralized, have arrested people, were run by the FSB, not
- 27:28by what would seem to be the more logical organization, the GU or the GRU.
- 27:33They were collecting tactical military intelligence about missile spotting and about the movement
- 27:41of Ukrainian forces along roads and those sort of things.
- 27:48That's because the FSB still views Ukraine as a domestic space.
- 27:54And it hasn't accepted the sovereignty of post-Soviet states.
- 28:00And it then also benefits from that infrastructure that it inherited when the Soviet Union dissolved.
- 28:07Now, some states are more cooperative, obviously, than others.
- 28:11The Baltic states are now NATO members, and they have completely replaced their security
- 28:17structure and their security personnel.
- 28:20And so they don't have as many connections with people-to-people connections as they
- 28:25would have had as a state such as Belarus or Kyrgyzstan might have.
- 28:31But Russia still sees them as domestic intelligence, the domestic intelligence location for operations.
- 28:45So the FSB then continues to operate in those areas just as it sees them as part of Russia's
- 28:54security sphere.
- 28:56In what ways does the FSB's approach to intelligence sharing abroad reflect the Kremlin's internal
- 29:03security priorities?
- 29:06And what are the implications of this approach for international cooperation in counterintelligence
- 29:11and counterterrorism efforts?
- 29:16In the early 2000s, Russia and the United States had an intelligence sharing relationship,
- 29:21where they shared information particularly about counterterrorism issues.
- 29:27The conflict arose when the Kremlin's definition of terrorism diverged from the West's, particularly
- 29:38the United States' definition of terrorism.
- 29:40So the Kremlin, terrorism means any action that threatens the ruling regime.
- 29:49That could be opposition, it could be Islamist terrorism, anything across the whole spectrum
- 29:57that potentially threatens the regime is terrorism.
- 30:01In the Western context, terrorism is more focused on political-based attacks on civilian
- 30:10population or often civilian population, civilian infrastructure site for political causes.
- 30:19So they're less focused internally and more focused externally.
- 30:25Because of that, the intelligence sharing between the US and Russia reached an impasse
- 30:32and they weren't able to continue that along with a number of other things.
- 30:37But Russia continues to share intelligence with many allies and that intelligence sharing
- 30:44often continues to be in connection with counterterrorism.
- 30:49Then using that Kremlin definition of counterterrorism being that anything that threatens the ruling
- 30:58regime is considered a terrorist activity.
- 31:01So as it shares intelligence abroad with partners such as in Central Asia or in Africa, it does
- 31:12so as not necessarily a way to gain information from them but to steer the opinions of those
- 31:24liaison partners, to direct them in a pro-Russian alignment so that they see the world the same
- 31:34way Russia does.
- 31:35So that intelligence sharing is quite selective for as much influence as information.
- 31:44The implications are that anyone with whom Russia shares intelligence needs to recognize
- 31:53that they're not getting a full story, first of all.
- 31:56They're getting a story that only portrays a Kremlin line and Russia is going to use
- 32:09it also to penetrate the liaison partner itself.
- 32:14That closeness that a liaison allows then opens up opportunities for recruiting someone
- 32:20within that liaison service.
- 32:23So liaison operations with Russia need to be taken quite carefully because they're going
- 32:32to be very much focused on Russia achieving its mission without a lot of interest in a
- 32:42reciprocal accomplishment.
- 32:44What are the primary challenges the FSB faces today and how does the organization manage
- 32:55its public image, particularly regarding issues of corruption and legitimacy?
- 33:00Well, one of the challenges that Russia faces today is that perception of corruption.
- 33:10There are for many people in Russia, they see the FSB as a necessary evil more than
- 33:18a benefit to them.
- 33:23This is an old example, but during the late 1990s, I had an opportunity to meet some FSB
- 33:29officers.
- 33:31I went to Russia and actually went with an FSB officer in an investigative operation.
- 33:46That FSB officer knocked on the doors of some houses in a big tower block.
- 33:52When people would answer the door, the FSB officer would just walk in.
- 33:56No warrant, no questions just to hear.
- 34:01We were here to look at your flat.
- 34:05For most people, that was like, okay, whatever.
- 34:07They just accepted that.
- 34:10For one person, the response was to break into tears and hysterics.
- 34:14I didn't do anything wrong.
- 34:17You can't hurt me.
- 34:18I have a five-year-old son.
- 34:19I mean, that can't be.
- 34:20It's just a completely lost control when this FSB officer showed up.
- 34:28For some people, that fear of the FSB is still there.
- 34:34That fear is to a great extent a value for the FSB.
- 34:43If the FSB can present itself as a fearsome yet loyal organization to the Russian people,
- 34:52that facilitates its mission.
- 34:58The downside of that though is that there have been FSB officers who in many cases have
- 35:03been convicted of corruption either through illegally importing customs, free goods, or
- 35:16using their position in regulating banks to accumulate huge amounts of money.
- 35:24The FSB has access to a lot of money and a lot of opportunities to earn money.
- 35:30Because of that, that's a temptation for many FSB officers.
- 35:36That then has led many FSB officers into corruption.
- 35:43That counter ways that attempt by the FSB to portray itself as the upholder of the law
- 35:53and the most loyal organization in Russia to protect the Russian people.
- 36:01The Russian people don't always see it as protection.
- 36:03Much of that corruption, as I mentioned earlier, is actually discussed in Russian press or
- 36:08has been.
- 36:12The ability of the FSB to hide that is only partial.
- 36:18The FSB has been quite openly accused of being involved in corruption over the years, both
- 36:27in internal Russian media and external Russian analysis.
- 36:34Russia tries to counter that by holding contests that reward those who portray the FSB in a
- 36:46positive light in books or artwork or music or statues around the country.
- 36:53There are many statues and memorials around the Russian Federation to Russian border guards
- 37:01or to famous Russian security officers, to those who have been awarded the Hero of the
- 37:09Russian Federation medal.
- 37:12There are streets named after them, there are schools named after them, and their name
- 37:16is applied in many places to remind the Russian population of how these great people.
- 37:28Those two forces are kind of pulling at each other.
- 37:32Is the FSB a group of strong, patriotic, loyal soldiers fighting against evil, or are they
- 37:43the evil themselves?
- 37:46That then becomes a challenge for the FSB to control that narrative.
- 37:55How has the leadership of Vladimir Putin shaped the priorities of the FSB, and what do you
- 38:04forecast for the future?
- 38:06Do you think a non-Czechist could ever take control?
- 38:11Vladimir Putin is 72 years old.
- 38:14He's in good health, but one day he is going to die.
- 38:20That will deprive the FSB of its most important patron.
- 38:29The FSB has benefited greatly from Putin, from Putin being president.
- 38:35Partially because Putin himself was not just a KGB officer during the 80s, many people
- 38:40cite that as his foundation.
- 38:43It is an important part of his upbringing.
- 38:47But just importantly, he was the director of the FSB in the late 1990s when he saw firsthand
- 38:53the chaos and the lack of coordination and the weakness that the Russian government experienced
- 39:03in that time period.
- 39:04He saw the corruption.
- 39:08Then he moved into the prime minister position.
- 39:10He saw even more so the divisions within the Russian state between factions, between geographic
- 39:23regions, and just the Russian government kind of spinning out of control.
- 39:27He saw that.
- 39:30When he became president, it seems like it was his, he saw it as his personal mission
- 39:37to reverse that decline.
- 39:42And he did so partially by rejoining pieces of the old KGB that had been divided previously.
- 39:55So the FSB gained in strength significantly in the late 1990s into the early 2000s.
- 40:02It took on a more potent foreign intelligence mission.
- 40:08It returned some of the, partially the mission of the fifth directorate that the KGB had
- 40:16had that was dissolved completely at the end of the Soviet era, but started to return in
- 40:23the late 1990s and early 2000s even using the label protecting the constitution, which
- 40:29was what the fifth directorate was called at the end of the Soviet era.
- 40:34And then with that phrase returned again in the 1990s, he rejoined elements like the border
- 40:43guards into the FSB, which had been split off into a separate agency and the Federal
- 40:49Agency for Government Communications and Information, the space of the signals intelligence and
- 40:53information security agency that was split off in the 1990s.
- 40:56It was to a great extent rejoined back into the FSB along with pieces of going to other
- 41:00agencies.
- 41:02By 2004, the FSB was to a great extent reflected much of what the of the KGB structure.
- 41:15That was because of Putin's patronage.
- 41:19So the FSB is what it is today to a great deal because of Putin's patronage.
- 41:24What will happen when Putin goes away?
- 41:27Eventually he will die.
- 41:30The possibility of a Czechist taking control looks a little bit like what the Soviet Union
- 41:39looked like in 1953 when Stalin died suddenly and left no successor.
- 41:48There were several people who fought for power in the post-Stalin Soviet Union, one of which
- 41:55was Lavrentiy Beria, who was the in charge of the security structure within the state.
- 42:03But because of the power that that security structure had in the 1950s, the other parties
- 42:13to the other wolves that circled around that government that post on leadership opportunity
- 42:24removed Beria because they were more afraid of him than they were of each other.
- 42:30Something similar could happen in a post-Putin era.
- 42:34If Putin were to die suddenly, there would be multiple aspirants for his throne.
- 42:43And those aspirants are only held together by their loyalty to Putin.
- 42:50If Putin were to be removed, they would have little loyalty to each other.
- 42:56And there would be a food fight that would suddenly arise to see who was going to inherit
- 43:07that throne.
- 43:08A Chekist could undoubtedly be part of that food fight.
- 43:14But whether a Czechist actually succeeds in taking control will depend upon the strength
- 43:22of the other, the non-Chekists who are also circling that throne.
- 43:28And I can foresee a scenario similar to 1953 where a Chekist steps in and says, I'm in
- 43:37charge here.
- 43:38And the rest of them say, no, no, we can't allow that.
- 43:42And they remove that Czechist.
- 43:45That's only speculation on my part.
- 43:47I can't, I don't have a crystal ball.
- 43:49I can't predict that.
- 43:51But the scenario is similar enough that such a thing could happen again.
- 44:00Thank you so much.
- 44:04This has really been amazing.
- 44:07Thanks for the opportunity.