Latest / Kublai Khan and the Mongol Rule of China — Fexingo History / Kublai Khan's Mongol Navy: Shipbuilding and the Failed Invasion of Japan
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- Luna: So we've talked a lot about Kublai Khan's failed invasions of Japan, but I feel like we've never really dug into the nuts and bolts of how he actually built a navy in the first place. Lucas: You're right, and it's a fascinating story because the Mongols were a land-based empire. They famously joked about ships being like 'wooden horses'—something alien to their steppe upbringing. But Kublai needed a fleet to conquer the Song Dynasty, and later to project power across the seas to Japan, Java, and Vietnam. Lucas: So in the early 1270s, after years of fighting the Song, Kublai's forces captured the major shipbuilding centers along the Chinese coast. He inherited thousands of Song craftsmen, many of whom had built the massive river fleets that patrolled the Yangtze. Suddenly, the Mongols had the technical expertise, but they had to adapt quickly. Luna: But didn't the Song also have a tradition of ocean-going ships, not just river boats? Lucas: Exactly. And that distinction matters. The Song had a thriving maritime trade using sturdy ocean junks with multiple masts and watertight compartments. But for the first invasion of Japan in 1274, known as the Bun'ei War, Kublai's fleet was assembled hurriedly. Many ships were built in the Korean kingdom of Goryeo—a vassal state—and they were mostly flat-bottomed river craft, not built for the open sea. Lucas: Goryeo was forced to construct 900 ships, but they were under immense pressure. Their forests were stripped, and the labor was brutal. The ships were often shoddily made. When this fleet crossed the Tsushima Strait, many vessels leaked or broke apart. The invasion force that landed at Hakata Bay was smaller than intended. Luna: So the typhoon that hit—the so-called 'divine wind'—wasn't the only problem? Lucas: Not at all. The first typhoon in 1274 came after a day of fierce fighting. The Mongols had actually pushed the samurai back and were winning the beachhead. But then a storm hit at night, sinking about a third of their ships. The surviving Mongol commanders decided to retreat, claiming the storm was the decisive factor. But really, the fleet's poor condition and the lack of a secure harbor left them vulnerable. Lucas: Fast forward to the second invasion in 1281, the Kōan War. This time Kublai demanded a massive fleet of over 4,000 ships, split into two forces. One from Goryeo, one from southern China—former Song ports like Quanzhou and Guangzhou. The Chinese-built ships were larger, some called 'zhenchuan' or treasure ships, but again, construction was rushed. Luna: I've read that some of the wrecks found near Takashima Island show signs of really hasty work. Lucas: Right, and that's where archaeology gives us concrete evidence. Underwater excavations off Takashima, near the site of the 1281 battle, revealed ship timbers that had been repaired with nails driven in at odd angles, planks that didn't fit properly, and even recycled lumber from older buildings. Some ships were literally converted riverboats, with flat bottoms that couldn't handle the open ocean's waves. Lucas: There's also evidence that the Mongols tried to use Chinese-style ships—the ocean-going junks—but they were built too quickly, using green wood that warped. The Song had built their ships using seasoned timber and careful joinery. Kublai's shipyards didn't have that luxury. Luna: What about the commanders? Who was in charge of these fleets? Lucas: The Mongol general Alaqan—a trusted commander—led the invasion initially, but he died of illness early in the campaign. Then Hong Dagu, a Korean-born general, took over. But there was tension between the Korean and Chinese contingents. The Korean ships arrived first and fought alone for a while, while the Chinese fleet lagged behind. By the time the full force assembled, the samurai had built a stone wall along Hakata Bay, so the Mongols couldn't land easily. Lucas: The typhoon that struck in August 1281—the famous kamikaze—hit when the Mongol fleet was anchored near Takashima, waiting for a good landing spot. The storm annihilated the ships that were packed together. Hundreds of vessels sank, and tens of thousands of soldiers drowned. The survivors who made it ashore were killed or captured by the samurai. Luna: It's almost like the whole naval strategy was doomed from the start. Lucas: In hindsight, yes. Kublai's decision to build so many ships so quickly was a classic case of overreach. He had conquered China by land, but he couldn't simply transfer that model to the sea. The Mongols never developed a core naval culture. They relied on conquered peoples—Koreans and Chinese—who had their own resentments. And the logistics of supplying a huge fleet across the open ocean were far beyond what the Yuan could manage. Lucas: There's also a human cost. The Goryeo kingdom was devastated by the shipbuilding demands. Tens of thousands of Korean laborers died in the forests or at sea. And the Song craftsmen were treated as prisoners, forced to work under military supervision. The invasion of Japan was a colossal investment that yielded nothing but disaster. Luna: So after 1281, did Kublai try again? I know there were plans. Lucas: He did. In 1283, he ordered a third invasion, but internal rebellions and the cost of the previous failures made it impossible. By 1286, the project was scrapped. Kublai's later years were marked by military setbacks elsewhere—in Vietnam, in Java—and the Yuan dynasty's finances were strained. The navy essentially retreated to coastal defense. Lucas: But the legacy of those invasions is huge. For Japan, the kamikaze became a myth of divine protection, used to bolster national identity for centuries. And for the Mongols, the failure exposed the limits of their empire. They could not dominate the seas, and that would become a defining weakness as the Yuan declined. Luna: It's interesting how the same technology—shipbuilding—that enabled the Song's prosperity became a liability under Mongol command. Lucas: Exactly. The Song had a sophisticated maritime economy, with state-run shipyards and a merchant marine. The Mongols inherited that, but they lacked the supporting infrastructure—the experienced admirals, the supply chains, the knowledge of tides and weather patterns. And they forced the pace, demanding results that the system couldn't deliver. Lucas: There's a telling detail: after the 1281 disaster, Kublai executed several of his commanders and blamed them for the failure. But the real failure was systemic. The Mongols never learned to adapt their military machine to the sea. Luna: Do we know anything more from the shipwrecks themselves? What have archaeologists found? Lucas: Yes, the excavations off Takashima have been ongoing since the 1980s. They've found anchors, ceramics, weapons, and human remains. One of the most telling finds was a ship's hull that showed signs of being a converted river barge—it had a flat bottom and was only about 20 meters long, which is tiny for an ocean voyage. The wood was poorly preserved, but they could see that it was made from pine, which was readily available but not durable for saltwater. Lucas: They also found stone anchors and iron anchors, but many of the iron ones were of low quality, probably made in a hurry. And there were thousands of arrowheads and armor fragments, suggesting the ships were packed with soldiers and supplies, not designed for combat at sea. Luna: So the typhoon was catastrophic, but the ships were already a disaster waiting to happen. Lucas: Precisely. The storm was the final blow, but the invasion was already faltering. The Japanese, led by warriors like Takezaki Suenaga, had fought fiercely and built defensive walls. The Mongols couldn't establish a beachhead. And when the typhoon scattered the fleet, the samurai attacked the survivors in small boats, killing many in the water. Lucas: So the narrative of a single divine wind saving Japan is a simplification. The real story is about logistics, poor planning, and the limits of imperial ambition.