Latest / The Vault: The Epstein Files / Ghislaine Maxwell Seeks A Summary Judgement Against Virginia Roberts (Part 4) (6/6/26)

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Ghislaine Maxwell Seeks A Summary Judgement Against Virginia Roberts (Part 4) (6/6/26) · The Vault: The Epstein Files

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  Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
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  In this episode, we're going to dive right back in
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  to the brief in support for a summary judgment for
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  Glaine Maxwell. Factor number four. The broader setting surrounding the statement,
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  including conventions that might signal to readers that the statement
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  is likely opinion and not fact. It is undisputed that
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  the January twenty fifteen statement was sent exclusively to more
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  than six and fewer than thirty media representatives, each of
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  whom expressly had requested from mister Gwo that he provided
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  them with miss Maxwell's reply to the new Joint Motion
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  Allegations Document five point forty two seven example K eight
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  and ten. As was obvious from the statement, it was
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  not a traditional press release. As such, press releases does
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  not explain lawyer like why new allegations, when measured against
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  previous allegations, lack credibility, nor does a traditional release threaten
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  to sue the meetia to whom the release is sent.
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  The media representatives, upon receiving the January twenty fifteen statement
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  would have understood it was presenting an opinionated argument that
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  plaintiff was not credible because of her inconsistent and shifting
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  sex abuse story and her increasingly lurid allegations against more
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  and more prominent individuals, and they would have understood that
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  these characteristics of a storyteller undermine her credibility and ergo
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  the credibility of her new allegations. In its twelve B
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  six order, the Court said the three sentences have the
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  effect of denying Plaintiff's story, but they also clearly constitute
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  fact to the reader. The ruling is affected in two
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  ways by the rule fifty six record. Based on the
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  foregoing discussion of the evidence, the three sentences clearly constitute
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  argumentative opinions of mister Barton on behalf of Miss Maxwell,
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  though the court did not discuss who is the reader.
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  This is important in Steinheil fact four. Under settled defamation
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  opinion law, an allegedly defamatory statement is to be viewed
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  from the perspective of the audience to whom it is
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  addressed de bella verse Hopkins number one CIV. Eleven seven
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  seventy nine, d C two zero zero two w L
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  three one four two seven three six two AT two SDNY,
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  October thirtieth, two thousand and two. Here the reader is
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  six to thirty journalists, they could not have read the
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  July twenty fifteen statement or the three allegedly defamatory sentences
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  the same way it was read by these journalists audience, ie,
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  the general public. This is because, as plaintiff implicitly concedes,
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  these journalists only republish excerpts and not the entirety of
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  the statement, which would have given context to the three sentences.
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  It's axiomatic that an ad of context republication of the
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  three sentences without the rest of the statement would deprive
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  the reader of the logic and reasoning behind them. In
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  the opinionated conclusion that plaintiff was making untrue allegations and
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  telling obvious lies. Three, the pre litigation privilege bars this action. A.
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  The privilege applies to the January twenty fifteen statement. Statements
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  pertinent to a good faith anticipated litigation made by attorneys
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  or their agents under their direction before the commencement of
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  litigation are privileged, and no cause of action for defamation
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  can be based on those statements Front Incorporated Verse Khalil
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  twenty eight ne E three D fifteen sixteen and Y
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  twenty fifteen. The facts that must be established therefore are
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  A statement and B that is pertinent to a good
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  faith anticipation litigation and C by attorneys or their agents
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  under their direction. We did this See Memo of Law
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  six through eight, thirty three through thirty eight, Document five
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  forty two and five forty seven Example K. For example,
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  mister Barton A drafted the vast majority of the January
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  twenty fifteen statement and approved and adopted all of it.
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  B directed mister Gow to send it to the media
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  representatives who had requested Miss Maxwell's reply to Plaintiff's joint motion.
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  Allegations C in the statement threatened legal action against these
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  media representatives, and D at the time of the statement
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  was contemplating litigation against the press recipients ID example K
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  ten sixteen and seventeen, twenty eight and thirty. Plaintiff argues,
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  without citation to authority, Miss Maxwell herself did not testify,
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  she intended to sue. She hasn't offered any witnesses to testify.
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  She intended to bring a lawsuit, she didn't in fact sue,
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  and this one as a non sequitur, the statement was
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  an attempt to continue to conceal her criminal acts. Response
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  at forty one and forty two these arguments fail. The
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  privilege exists without regard to whether Miss Maxwell testifies she
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  intended to sue, whether she has witnessed to say she
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  intended to sue, or whether she in fact sued. It
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  refers to anticipated litigation, not guaranteed litigation. Indeed, the point
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  of pre litigation privilege is to promote communications that avoid
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  litigation see Khalil twenty eight, three d at nineteen. When
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  litigation is anticipated, attorneys and parties should be free to
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  communicate in order to reduce or avoid the need to
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  actually commence litigation. It applies when there is a good
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  faith basis to anticipate litigation. Mister Bardon, miss Maxwell's lawyer
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  who drafted and caused the statement to be sent out
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  actually was anticipating litigation. Document fifth five forty two through
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  five forty seven, example, k at twenty eight. The argument
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  that the statement was an attempt to conceal Miss Maxwell's
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  criminal acts is incorrect. It would be hard to post
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  facto conceal allege criminal acts that plaintiff luridly and salaciously
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  described in an earlier public filing, i e. The CVRAA
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  case in which the United States its government was the defendant.
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  Citing no record evidence. Plaintiff argues the record evidence shows
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  mister Barden did not make the January twenty fifteen statement,
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  Response at forty two. That argument is easily disposed of
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  by mister Barton's uncontested testimony. B malice is irrelevant to
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  the pre litigation privilege. Citing the New York Court of
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  Appeals decision in Khalil, We pointed out that malice is
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  not relevant to the pre litigation privilege Memorandum of Law
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  thirty four and thirty five. To prevail on the pre
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  litigation privilege, the defendant need only establish one element the
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  allegedly defamatory statement at issue was pertinent to a good
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  faith anticipation litigation ID quoting Khalil twenty eight and E
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  three d at sixteen. Plaintiff disputes this, and, without discussing
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  Khalil or citing authorities, simply argues that pre litigation privilege
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  is foreclosed because Miss Maxwell acted with malice Responsive forty three,
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  as suggested by her inability to find any law to
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  support her, plaintiff is wrong. Under general New York defamation law,
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  the shield provided by a qualified privilege may be dissolved
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  if plaintiff in rebuttal can show that the defendants spoke
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  with malice Lieberman versus Gelstein, six oh five E two
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  d three forty four, three forty nine, New York, nineteen
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  ninety two. According to Khalil twenty eight E three d. At. Nineteen,
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  malice means two things, spite or ill will and knowledge
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  of falsity or reckless disregard of falsity Lieberman, six oh
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  five E two d at. Three forty nine. Plaintiff relies
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  on this general qualified privilege law. The problem for plaintiff
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  is that in Khalil, the New York Court of Appeals
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  held that general rule does not apply to the pre
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  litigation privilege. Khalil worked for a company named FRONT. After
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  eight years, he resigned and began working for EOC, one
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  of Front's competitors. Front's lawyer, Kimmel, sent a demand letter
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  to Col. Kalil, alleging he had committed criminal, tortious and
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  ethical misconduct. Kimmel sent another demand letter to EOC and others,
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  stating Khalil had conspired with EOC to breach his fiduciary
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  duty to FONT. Six months later, Front sued Khalil. Khalil
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  brought a third party claim against Kimmel for libel per se.
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  The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that the letters
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  were absolutely privileged under the litigation privilege and that it
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  therefore did not need to reach the question of malice.
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  Twenty eight et three d At seventeen. The Appellate Division affirmed,
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  holding that the litigation privilege absolutely protected the letter because
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  they were issued in the context of prospective litigation id
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  At eighteen. The Court of Appeals affirmed but altered the
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  law on the litigation privilege. It observed, although it is
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  well settled that statements made in the course of litigation
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  are entitled to absolute privilege, this Court has not directly
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  addressed whether statements made by an attorney on behalf of
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  his or her client in connection with prospective litigation are privileged.
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  Some Appellate Division departments had held that absolute privilege applies
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  to statements made in connection with prospective litigation, but other
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  departments had held such statements were entitled only to qualified privilege.
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  The answer to whether pre litigation statements should be absolute
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  or qualified, the Court of Appeals held, is driven by
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  the rationale for protecting pre litigation statements when litigation is anticipated,
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  attorneys and parties should be free to communicate. In order
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  to reduce or avoid the need to actually commence litigation.
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  Attorneys often send cease and desist letters to avoid litigation.
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  Communication during this pre litigation phase should be encouraged and
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  not chilled by the possibility of being the basis for
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  a defamation suit Idea nineteen. However, the court recognized that
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  extending privilege status to communication made prior to anticipated litigation
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  has the potential to be abused. Extending an absolute privilege
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  to this context, the Court said, would be problematic and unnecessary.
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  The court held it would recognize only a qualified privilege
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  for pre litigation communications. Crucially to the case at Bar,
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  the court held that the traditional privilege rebuttal malice was
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  inapplicable to the pre litigation privilege. Rather than applying the
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  general malice standard to this pre litigation stage, the privilege
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  should only be applied to statements pertinent to a good
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  faith anticipated litigation. This requirement ensures that privilege does not
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  protect attorneys who are seeking to bully, harass, or intimidate
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  their client's adversaries by threatening baseless litigation or by asserting
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  wholly on meritis claims unsupported in law and fact in
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  violation of Council's ethical obligations. Therefore, we hold that statements
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  made prior to the commencement of an anticipated litigation or privilege,
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  and that the privilege is lost where a defendant proves
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  that the statements were not pertinent to a good faith
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  anticipated litigation. Accordingly, the only question is whether the January
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  twenty fifteen statement mister Barden caused to be issued to
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  the six to thirty journalists was pertinent to a good
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  faith anticipated litigation. The undisputed evidence establishes that the answer
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  is yes. Mister Barden anticipated litigation. He fully complied with
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  his ethical obligation as a lawyer. He was hardly bullying, harassing,
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  or intimidating the six to thirty journalists, since he caused
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  a press agent, mister Gow, to issue a statement, and
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  he believed he had affirmative duty in representing Miss Maxwell
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  to prepare the statement and cause it to be delivered
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  to the journalists. Plantiff argues that when mister Barden issued
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  the January twenty fifteen statement on Miss Maxwell's behalf, he
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  had only wholly unmerit his claims unsupported in law in
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  fact in violation of Council's ethical obligations and did not
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  have good faith anticipated litigation response at forty six, quoting
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  Khalil twenty eight ne E three d at nineteen. Plaintiff's
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  rationale because she was telling the truth and so media
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  would only be reporting the truth. That is nonsensical frivolous arguments.
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  Whether mister Barden, who represents Miss Maxwell, had emeritis or
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  good faith basis for anticipating defamation litigation has nothing to
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  do with whether the media believe plaintiff was telling the truth,
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  and surely not whether the plaintiff believed or said she
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  was telling the truth. Based on this knowledge of plaintiff's history,
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  mister Barden, in good faith believed that plaintiff had been
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  making false allegations for years and that the falsity of
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  the allegations should have been obvious to the media Document
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  five point forty two through five forty seven example K thirteen, fourteen, sixteen, seventeen,
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  twenty through twenty three, twenty six through twenty eight, and thirty. Accordingly,
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  at the time he caused the statement to issue, mister
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  Barden had a good faith basis to an end anticipate
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  litigation against any of the media that republished Plaintiff's false allegations.
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  It hardly matters for purpose of pre litigation privilege whether
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  the media republished or did not republish Plaintiff's allegations, or
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  whether mister Barden ultimately did or did not sue any
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  of the media for republication. As the Khalil Court recognized,
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  attorneys often send ceasoned desist letters to avoid litigation, and
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  such letters have a valid purpose protected by the pre
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  litigation privilege. Mister Barden testified that the January twenty fifteen
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  statement in fact served as a cease and desist letter
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  see Document five forty two through five forty seven, example
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  K and seventeen. All right, folks, we're going to wrap
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  up this episode here and then the next episode we'll
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  pick up where we left off. All of the information
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  that goes with this episode can be found in the
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  description box.